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The Need for Abstract Entities

Alonzo Church

Published in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Proceedings 80 (1951):

pp. 100-113.

We distinguish between a logistic system and a formalized language on the

basis that the former is an abstractly formulated calculus for which no
interpretation is fixed, and thus has a syntax and no semantics; but the latter is
a logistic system together with an assignment of meanings to its expressions.

As primitive basis of a logistic system it suffices to give, in a familiar fashion:

1. The list of primitive symbols or vocabulary of the system (together

usually with a classification of the primitive symbols into categories,
which will be used in stating the formation rules and rules of inference).
2. The formation rules, determining which finite sequences of primitive
symbols are to be well-formed expressions, determining certain categories
of well-formed expressions -- among which we shall assume that at least
the category of sentence is included -- and determining (in case variables
are included among the primitive symbols) which occurences of variables
in a well-formed expression are free occurences and which are bound
occurences.1
3. The transformation rules or rules of inference, by which from the
assertion of certain sentences (the premisses, finite in number) a certain
sentence (the conclusion) may be inferred.
4. Certain asserted sentences, the axioms.

In order to obtain a formalized language it is necessary to add to these

syntactical rules of the logistic system, semantical rules assigning meanings (in
some sense) to the well-formed expressions of the system.2 The character of the
semantical rules will depend on the theory of meaning adopted, and this in
turn must be justified by the purpose it will serve.

Let us take it as our purpose to provide an abstract theory of the actual use
of language for human communication -- not a factual or historical report of
what has been observed to take place, but a norm to which we may regard
everyday linguistic behavior as an imprecise approximation, in the same way
that e.g. elementary (applied) geometry is a norm to which we may regard as
imprecise approximations the practical activity of the land-surveyor in laying
out a plot of ground, or of the construction foreman in seeing that building
plans are followed. We must demand of such a theory that it have a place for
all observably informative kinds of communication -- including such
notoriously troublesome cases as belief statements, modal statements,
conditions contrary to fact -- or at least that it provide a (theoretically)
workable substitute for them. And solutions must be available for puzzles
about meaning which may arise, such as the so-called "paradox of analysis."

There exist more than one theory of meaning showing some promise of
fulfilling these requirements, at least so far as the formulation and
development have been presently carried. But the theory of Frege seems to
recommend itself above others for its relative simplicity, naturalness, and
explanatory power -- or, as I would advocate, Frege's theory as modified by
elimination of his somewhat problematical notion of a function (and in
particular of a Begriff) as ungesättigt, and by some other changes which bring
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it closer to the present logistic practice without loss of such essentials as the
distinction between sense and denotation.

This modified Fregean theory may be roughly characterized by the tendency

to minimize the category of syncategorematic notations -- i.e., notations to
which no meaning at all is ascribed in isolation but which may combine with
one or more meaningful expressions to form a meaningful expression 3 -- and
to reduce the categories of meaningful expressions to two, (proper) names and
forms, for each of which two kinds of meanings are distinguished in a parallel
way.

A name, or constant (as we shall also say, imitating mathematical

terminology), has first its denotation, or that of which it is a name 4. And each
name has also a sense -- which is perhaps more properly called its meaning,
since it is held that complete understanding of a language involves the ability to
recognize the sense of any name in the language, but does not demand any
knowledge beyond this of the denotations of names. (Declarative) sentences, in
particular, are taken as a kind of names, the denotation being the truth-value of
the sentence, truth or falsehood, and the sense being the proposition which the
sentence expresses.

A name is said to denote its denotation and to express its sense, and the sense
is said to be a concept of the denotation. The abstract entities which serve as
the senses of names let us call concepts -- although the use of this word
'concept' has no analogue in the writings of Frege, and must be carefully
distinguished from Frege's use of 'Begriff'. Thus anything which is or is
capable of being the sense of some name in some language, actual or possible, is
a concept.5 The terms individual concept, function concept, and the like are
then to mean a concept which is a concept of an individual, of a function, etc. A
class concept may be identified with a property, and a truth-value concept (as
already indicated) with a proposition.

Names are to be meaningful expressions without free variables, and

expressions which are analogous to names except that they contain free
variables, we call forms (a rather wide extension of the ordinary mathematical
usage, here adopted for lack of a better term)6. Each variable has a range,
which is the class of admissible values of the variable.7 And analogous to the
denotation of a name, a form has as a value for every system of admissible
values of its free variables.8

The assignment of a value to a variable, although it is not a syntactical

operation, corresponds in a certain way to the syntactical operation of
substituting a constant for the variable. The denotation of the substituted
constant represents the value of the variable.9 And the sense of the substituted
constant may be taken as representing a sense-value of the variable. Thus every
variable has, besides its range, also a sense-range, which is the class of
admissible sense-values of the variable. And analogous to the sense of a name, a
form has a sense-value for every system of admissible sense-values of its free
variables.10

The following principles are assumed.11

i. Every concept is a concept of at most one thing.

ii. Every constant has a unique concept as its sense.
iii. Every variable has a non-empty class of concepts as its sense-range.

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iv. For any assignment of sense-values, one to each of the free variables of a
given form, if each sense-value is admissible in the sense that it belongs to
the sense-range of the corresponding variable, the form has a unique
concept as its sense-value.
v. The denotation of a constant is that of which its sense is a concept.
vi. The range of a variable is the class of those things of which the members
of the sense-range are concepts.
vii. If S, s1, s2, ... , sm are concepts of A,a1, a2, .... , am respectively, and if S is
the sense-value of a form F for the system of sense values s1, s2, ... , sm of
its free variables x1, x2, ... , xm, then the value of F for the system of
values a1, a2, ... , am of x1, x2, ... , xm is A.
viii. If C' is obtained from a constant C by replacing a particular occurence of
a constant c by a constant c' that has the same sense as c, then C' is a
constant having the same sense as C.12
ix. If C' is obtained from a constant C by replacing a particular occurence of
a constant c by a constant c' that has the same denotation as c, then C' is
a constant having the same denotation as C.13
x. If C' is obtained from a constant C by replacing a particular occurence of
a form f by a form f' that has the same free variables as f, and if, for
every admissible system of sense-values of their free variables, f and f'
have the same sense-value, then C' is a constant having the same sense as
C.12
xi. If C' is obtained from a constant C by replacing a particular occurence of
a form f by a form f' that has the same free variables as f, and if, for
every system of values of their free variables which are admissible in the
sense that each value belongs to the range of the corresponding variable,
f and f' have the same sense-value, then C' is a constant having the same
denotation as C.13
xii. If x1, x2, ... , xm are all the distinct variables occurring (necessarily as
bound variables) in a constant C, if y11, y2, ... , ym are distinct variables
having the same sense-values as x1, x2, ... , xm respectively, and if C' is
obtained from C by substituting y1, y2, ... , ym throughout for x1, x2, ... ,
xm respectively, then C' is a constant having the same sense as C.
xiii. If x1, x2, ... , xm are the distinct variables occurring (necessarily as bound
variables) in a constant C, if y1, y2, ... , ym are distinct variables having
the same ranges as x1, x2, ... , xm respectively, and if C' is obtained from
C by substituting y1, y2, ... , ym throughout for x1, x2, ... , xm respectively,
then C' is a constant having the same denotation as C.
xiv. The result of substituting constants for all the free variables of a form is a
constant, if the sense of each substituted constant belongs to the sense-
range of the corresponding variable.12
xv. The sense of a constant C thus obtained by substituting constants c1, c2,
... , cm for the free variables x1, x2, ... , xm of a form F is the same as the
sense-value of F when the senses of c1, c2, ... , cm are assigned as the
sense-values of x1, x2, ... , xm.

To these must still be added principles which are similar to (viii) -- (xv),
except that substitution is made in forms instead of constants, or that forms
and variables as well as constants are substituted for the free variables of a
form. Instead of stating these here, it may be sufficient to remark that they
follow if arbitrary extensions of the language are allowed by adjoining (as
primitive symbols) constants which have as their senses any concepts that
belong to sense-ranges of variables in the language, if the foregoing principles
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are assumed to hold also for such extensions of the language, and if there is
assumed further

xvi. Let an expression F contain the variables x1, x2, ... , xm; and suppose that
in every extension of the language of the kind just described and for
every substitution of constants c1, c2, ... , cm for the variables x1, x2, ... ,
xm respectively, if the sense of each constant belongs to the sense-range of
the corresponding variable, F becomes a constant; then F is a form
having x1, x2, ... , xm as its free variables.

To those who find forbidding the array of abstract entities and principles
concerning them which is here proposed, I would say that the problems which
give rise to the proposal are difficult and a simpler theory is not known to be
possible.14

To those who object to the introduction of abstract entities at all I would say
that I believe that there are more important criteria by which a theory should
be judged. The extreme demand for a simple prohibition of abstract entities
under all circumstances perhaps arises from a desire to maintain the
connection between theory and observation. But the preference of (say) seeing
over understanding as a method of observation seems to me to be capricious.
For just as an opaque body may be seen, so a concept may be understood or
grasped. And the parallel between the two cases is indeed rather close. In both
cases the observation is not direct but through intermediaries -- light, lens of
eye or optical instrument, and retina in the case of the visible body, linguistic
expressions in the case of the concept. And in both cases there are or may be
tenable theories according to which the entity in question, opaque body or
concept, is not assumed, but only those things which would be otherwise called
its effects.

The variety of entities (whether abstract or concrete) which a theory assumes

is indeed one among other criteria by which it may be judged. If multiplication
of entities is found beyond the needs of workability, simplicity and generality of
the theory, then the razor shall be applied.15 The theory of meaning here
outlined I hold exempt from such treatment no more than any other, but I
advocate its study.

Let us return now to our initial question, as to the character of the semantical
rules which are to be added to the syntactical rules of a logistic system in order
to define a particular formalized language.

On the foregoing theory of meaning the semantical rules must at least include
the following:

5. Rules of sense, by which a sense is determined for each well-formed

expression without free variables (all such expressions thus becoming
names).
6. Rules of sense-range, assigning to each variable a sense-range.
7. Rules of sense-value, by which a sense-value is determined for every well-
formed expression containing free variables and every admissible system
of sense-values of its free variables (all such expressions thus becoming
forms).

In the case of both syntactical and semantical rules there is a distinction to be

drawn between primitive and derived rules, the primitive rules being those
which are stated in giving the primitive basis for the formalized language, and
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the derived rules being rules of a similar kind which follow as consequences of
the primitive rules. Thus besides primitive rules of inference there are also
derived rules of inference, besides primitive rules of sense also derived rules of
sense, and so on. (But instead of "derived axioms" it is usual to say theorems.)

A statement of the denotation of a name, the range of a variable, or the value

of a form does not necessarily belong to the semantics of a language. For
example, that 'the number of planets' denotes the number nine is a fact as
much of astronomy as it is of the semantics of the English language, and can be
described only as as belonging to a discipline broad enough to include both
semantics and astronomy. On the other hand, a statement that 'the number of
planets' denotes the number of planets is a purely semantical statement about
the English language. And indeed it would seem that a statement of this kind
may be considered as purely semantical only if it is a consequence of the rules
of sense, sense-range, and sense-value, together with the syntactical rules and
general principles of meaning (i) -- (xiv).

Thus as derived semantical rules rather than primitive, there will be also:

8. Rules of denotation, by which a denotation is determined for each name.

9. Rules of range, assigning to each variable a range.
10. Rules of value, by which a value is determined for every form and for
every admissible system of values of its free variables.

By stating (8), (9) and (10) as primitive rules, without (5), (6) and (7) there
results what may be called the extensional part of the semantics of a language.
The remaining intensional part of the semantics does not follow from the
extensional part. For the sense of a name is not uniquely determined by its
denotation, and thus a particular rule of denotation does not of itself have as a
consequence the corresponding rule of sense.

On the other hand, because the meta-linguistic phrase which is used in the
rule of denotation must itself have a sense, there is a certain sense (though not
that of logical consequence) in which the rule of denotation, uniquely indicates
the corresponding rule of sense. Since the like is true of the rules of range and
rules of value, it is permissible to say that we have fixed an interpretation of
given logistic system, and thus a formalized language, if we have stated only the
extensional part of the semantics.16

Although all the foregoing account has been concerned with is the case of a
formalized language, I would go on to say that in my opinion there is no
difference in principle between this case and that of one of the natural
languages. In particular, it must not be thought that a formalized language
depends for its meaning or its justification (in any sense in which a natural
language does not) upon some prior natural language, say English, through
some system of translation of its sentences into English -- or, more plausibly,
through the statement of its syntactical and semantical rules in English. For
speaking in principle, and leaving questions of practicality aside, the logician
must declare it a mere historical accident that you and I learned from birth to
speak English rather than a language with less irregular and logically simpler,
syntactical rules, similar to those of one of the familiar logicistic systems in use
today -- or that we learned in school the content of conventional English
grammars and dictionaries rather than a more precise statement of a system of
syntactical and semantical rules of the kind which has been described in this
present sketch. The difference of a formalized language from a natural
language lies not in any matter of principle, but in the degree of completeness
that has been attained in the laying down of explicit syntactical and semantical
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rules and the extent to which vagueness and uncertainties have been removed
from them.

For this reason, the English language itself may be used as a convenient
though makeshift illustration of a language for which syntactical and
semantical rules are to be given. Of course only a few illustrative examples of
such rules can be given in brief space. And even for this it is necessary to avoid
carefully the use of examples involving English constructions that raise special
difficulties or show too great logical irregularities, and to evade the manifold
equivocacy of English words by selecting and giving attention to just one
meaning of each word mentioned. It must also not be asked whether the rules
given as examples are the "true" rules of the English language or are "really"
part of what is implied in understanding English; for the laying down of rules
for a natural language, because of the need to fill gaps and to decide doubtful
points, is as much a process of legislation as reporting.

With these understandings, and with no attempt made to distinguish between

primitive and derived rules, following are some examples of syntactical and
semantical rules of English according to the program which has been
outlined.17

1. Vocabulary: 'equals' 'five' four' 'if' 'is' 'nine' 'number' 'of' 'planet'
'planets' 'plus' 'round' 'the' 'then' 'the world' -- besides a bare list of
primitive symbols (words) there must be statements regarding their
classification of into categories and systematic relations among them, e.g.
that 'planet' is a common noun18, that 'planets' is the plural of 'planet'19,
that 'the world' is a proper noun, that 'round' is an adjective.
2. Formation Rules: If A is the plural of a common noun, then
'the'^'number'^'of'^A> is a singular term. A proper noun standing alone
is a singular term. If A and B are singular terms, then A^'equals'^B is a
sentence. If A is a singular term and B is an adjective, then A^'is'^B is a
sentence.20 If A and B are sentences, then 'if'^A^'then'^B is a sentence.
Here singular terms and sentences are to be understood as categories of
well-formed expressions; a more complete list of formation rules would
no doubt introduce many more such.
3. Rules of inference: Where A and B are sentences, from 'if'^A^'then'^B
and A to infer B. Where A and B are singular terms and C is an
adjective, from A^'equals'^B and B^'is'^C to infer A^'is'^C.
4. Axioms-Theorems: 'if the world is round, then the world is round'; 'four
plus five equals nine'.
5. Rules of Sense: 'round' expresses the property of roundness. 'the world'
expresses the (individual) concept of the world. 'the world is round'
expresses the proposition that the world is round.

8. Rules of Denotation: 'round' denotes the class of round things. 'the

world' denotes the world. 'the world is round' denotes the truth-value
thereof that the world is round.21

On a Fregean theory of meaning, rules of truth in Tarski's form -- e.g. " 'the
world is round' is true if and only if the world is round" -- follow from the
rules of denotation for sentences. For that a sentence is true is taken to be the
same as that it denotes truth.

Notes

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1 Forconvenience of the present brief exposition we make the simplifying

assumption that sentences are without free variables, and that only sentences
are asserted. [Back]
2 Thepossibility that the meaningful expressions may be a proper subclass of
the well-formed expressions must not ultimately be excluded. But again for the
present sketch it will be convenient to treat the two classes as identical -- the
simplest and most usual case. Compare, however, footnote 13. [Back]
3 Such notations can be reduced to at most two, namely the notation
(consisting, say, of juxtaposition between parentheses) which is used in
application of a singular function to its argument, and the abstraction operator
lambda. By the methods of the Schönfinkel-Curry combinatory logic it may
even be possible to further eliminate the abstraction operator, and along with it
the use of variables altogether. But this final reduction is not contemplated here
-- nor even necessarily the simpler reduction to two syncategorematic
notations. [Back]
4 Thecomplicating possibility is here ignored of denotationless names, or
names which have sense but no denotation. For though it may be held that
these do occur in the natural languages, it is possible, as Frege showed,to
construct a formalized language in such a way as to avoid them. [Back]
5 This is
meant only as a preliminary rough description. In logical order, the
notion of a concept must be postulated and that of a possible language defined
by the means of it. [Back]

6 Frege'sterm in German is Marke. -- The form or Marke must of course not

be confused with its associated abstract entity, the function. The function
differs from the form in that it is not a linguistic entity, and belongs to no
particular language. Indeed, the same function may be associated with
different forms; and if there is more than one free variable the same form may
have several associated functions. But in some languages it is possible from the
form to construct a name (or names) of the associated function (or functions)
by means of an abstraction operator. [Back]
7 Theidea of allowing variables of different ranges is not Fregean, except in
the case of functions in Frege's sense (i.e. as ungesättigt), the different
categories of which appear as ranges for different variables. The introduction
of Gegenstandsbuchstaben with restricted ranges is one of the modifications
here advocated in Frege's theory. [Back]
8 Exceptionsto this are familiar in common mathematical notation. E.g. the
form x/y has no value for the system of values 0,0 of x, y. However, the
semantics of a language is much simplified if a value is assigned to a form for
every system of values of the free variables which are admissible in the sense
that each value belongs to the range of the corresponding variable. And for the
purposes of the present exposition we assume that this has been done.
(Compare footnote 4.) [Back]
9 Even if the language contains no constant denoting the value in question, it
is possible to consider an extension of the language obtained by adjoining such
a constant. [Back]
10 Thenotion of a sense-value of a form is not introduced by Frege, at least
not explicitly, but it can be argued that it is necessarily implicit in his theory.

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For Frege's question, "How can a=b if true ever differ in meaning from a=a?"
can be asked as well for forms a and b as for constants, and leads to the
distinction of denotation and sense of a constant. Even in a language like that
of Principia Mathematica, having no forms other than propositional forms, a
parallel argument can be used to show that from the equivalence of two
propositional forms A and B the identity in meaning of A and B in all respects
is not to be inferred. For otherwise how could A iff B if true (i.e., true for all
values of the variables) ever differ in meaning from A iff A? [Back]

11For purposes of the preliminary sketch, the meta-language is left

unformalized, and such questions are ignored as whether the meta-language
shall conform to the theory of types or to some alternative such as transfinite
type theory or axiomatic set theory. Because of the extreme generality which is
attempted in laying down these principles, it is clear that there may be some
difficulty in rendering them precise (in their full attempted generality) by
restatement in a formalized metalanguage. But it should be possible to state the
semantical rules of a particular object language so as to conform, so that the
principles are clarified to this extent by the illustration.

It is not meant that the list of principles is necessarily complete or in final

form, but rather a tentative list is here proposed for study and possible
amendment. Moreover it is not meant that it may not be possible to formulate
a language not conforming to the principles, but only that a satisfactory
general theory may result by making conformity to these principles a part of
the definition of a formalized language (compare footnote 12). [Back]
12 Inthe case of some logistic systems that have been proposed (e.g., by
Hilbert and Bernays), if semantical rules are to be added, in conformity with
the theory here described and with the informally intended interpretation of
the system, it is found to be impossible to satisfy (viii), (x) and (xiv), because of
restrictions imposed on the bound variables which may appear in a constant or
form used in a particular context. But it would seem that modifications in the
logistic system necessary to remove the restriction may be considered
nonessential, and that in this sense (viii), (x), (xiv) may still be maintained.

In regard to all of the principles it should be understood that nonessential

modifications in existing logistic systems may be required to make them
conform. In particular the principles have been formulated in a way which
does not contemplate the distinction in typographical style between free and
bound variables that appears in systems of Frege and Hilbert-Bernays.

In (x) and (xi), the condition that f' have the same free variables as f can in
many cases be weakened to the condition that every free variable of f' occur
also as a free variable of f. [Back]
13 Possibly (ix) and (xi) should be weakened to require only that if C' is well-
formed then it is a constant having the same denotation as C. Since there is in
general no syntactical criterion by which to ascertain whether two constants c
and c' have the same denotation, or whether two forms always have the same
values, there is the possibility that the stronger forms of (ix) and (xi) might lead
to difficulty in some cases. However, (ix) as here stated has the effect of
preserving fully the rule of substitutivity of equality -- where the equality sign
is so interpreted that [c1=c2] is a sentence denoting truth if and only if c1 and c2
are constants having the same denotation -- and if in some formalized
languages, (ix) and (xi) should prove to be inconsistent with the requirement
that every well-formed expression be meaningful (footnote 2), it may be
preferable to abandon the latter. Indeed the preservation of the rule of

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substitutivity of equality may be regarded as an important advantage of the

Fregean theory of meaning over some of the alternatives that suggest
themselves. [Back]
14 At the present stage it cannot be said with assurance that a modification of
Frege's theory will ultimately prove to be the best or the simplest. Alternative
theories demanding study are: the theory of Russell, which relies on the
elimination of names by contextual definition to a sufficient extent to render
the distinction of sense and denotation unnecessary; the modification of
Russell's theory, briefly suggested by Smullyan [The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
13 (1948), pp. 31-37], according to which descriptive phrases are to be
considered as actually contained in the logistic system rather than being (in the
phrase of Whitehead and Russell) "mere typographical conveniences," but are
to differ from names in that they retain their need for scope indicators; and
finally, the theory of Carnap's Meaning and Necessity.

Though the Russell theory has an element of simplicity in avoiding the

distinction of two kinds of meaning, it leads to complications of its own of a
different sort, in connection with the matter of scope of descriptions. The same
should be said of Smullyan's proposed modification of the the theory. And the
distinctions of scope become especially important in modal statements, where
they cannot be eliminated by the convention of always taking the minimal
scope, as Smullyan has shown (loc. cit.).

Moreover, in its present form it would seem that the Russell theory requires
some supplementation. For example, 'I am thinking of Pegasus', 'Ponce de
Leon searched for the fountain of youth', 'Barbara Villiers was less chaste than
Diana' cannot be analyzed as '(Ec)(x)[x is Pegasus iff x=c] [I am thinking of c],'
'(Ec)(x)[x is a fountain of youth iff x=c] [Ponce de Leon searched for c],' '(Ec)
(x)[x is Diana iff x=c] [Barabare Villiers was less chaste than c]' respectively --
if only because of the (probable or possible) difference of truth-value between
the given statement and their proposed analyses. On a Fregean theory of
meaning the given statements may be analyzed as being about the individual
concepts of Pegasus, of the fountain of youth, and of Diana rather than about
some certain winged horse, some certain fountain, and some certain goddess.
For the Russell theory it might be suggested to analyze them as being about the
property of being Pegasus, the property of being a fountain of youth, and the
property of being Diana. This analysis in terms of properties would also be
possible on a Fregean theory, though perhaps slightly less natural. On a theory
of the Russell type the difficulty arises that names of properties seem to be
required, and on pain of readmitting Frege's puzzle about equality (which
leads to the distinction of sense and denotation in connection with names of any
kind), such names of properties must be analyzed away by contextual
definitions -- it is not clear how -- or must be so severely restricted that two
names of the same property cannot occur unless trivially synonymous. [Back]

15 Here awarning is necessary against spurious economies, since not every

subtraction from the entities with which a theory assumes is a reduction in the
variety of entities.

For example, in the simple theory of types it is well known that the
individuals may be dispensed with if classes and relations of all types are
retained; or one may abandon also classes and relations of the lowest type,
retaining only those of higher type. In fact any finite number of levels at the
bottom of the hierarchy of types may be deleted. But this is no reduction in the
variety of entities, because the truncated theory of types, by appropriate
deletions of entities in each type, can be made isomorphic to the original

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hierarchy -- and indeed the continued adequacy of the truncated hierarchy to

the original purposes depends on this isomorphism.

Similarly the idea may suggest itself to admit the distinction of sense and
denotation at the nth level and above in the hierarchy of types, but below the
nth level to deny this distinction and to adopt instead Russell's device of
contextual elimination of names. The entities assumed would thus include only
the usual extentional entities below the nth level, but at the nth level and above
they would also include concepts, and so on. However, this is no reduction in
the variety of entities assumed, as compared to the theory which assumes at all
levels in the hierarchy of types not only the extensional entities but also
concepts of them, concepts of concepts of them, and so on. For the entities
assumed by the former theory are reduced again to isomorphism with those
assumed by the latter, if all entities below the nth level are deleted and
appropriate deletions are made in every type at the nth level and above.

Some one may object that the notion of isomorphism is irrelevant which is
here introduced, and insist that any subtraction from the entities assumed by a
theory must be considered a simplification. But to such objector I would reply
that his proposal leads (in the cases just named, and others) to perpetual
oscillation between two theories T1 and T2, T1 being reduced to T2 and T2 to
T1 by successive "simplifications" ad infinitum. [Back]

16 As is done in the revised edition of my Introduction to Mathematical Logic,

Part I. [Back]
17 Forconvenience, English is also used as the metalanguage, although this
gives a false appearance of triviality or obviousness to some of the semantical
rules. Since the purpose is only illustrative, the danger of semantical
antinomies is ignored. [Back]
18 For present illustrative purposes the question may be avoided whether
common nouns in English, in the singular, shall be considered to be variables
(e.g. 'planet' or 'a planet' as a variable having planets as its range), or to be
class names (e.g. 'planet' as a proper name of the class of planets), or to have
"no status at all in a logical grammar" (see Quine's Methods of Logic, p. 207),
or perhaps to vary from one of these uses to another according to context.
[Back]
19 Orpossibly 'planet' and 's' could be regarded as two primitive symbols, by
making a minor change in existing English so that all common nouns form the
plural by adding 's'. [Back]
20 If anyof you finds unacceptable the conclusion that therefore 'the number
of planets is round' is a sentence, he may try to alter the rules to suit, perhaps
by distinguishing different types of terms. This is an example of a doubtful
point, on the decision of which there may well be differences of opinion. The
advocate of a set-theoretical analysis may decide one way and the advocate of
type theory another, but it is hard to say that either decision is the "true"
decision for the English language as it is. [Back]

21 But of
course it would be wrong to include as a rule of denotation: 'the
world is round' denotes truth. For this depends on a fact of geography
extraneous to semantics (namely that the world is round). [Back]

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Transcribed into hypertext by Maarten Maartensz and Andrew Chrucky,

January 1, 1999.

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