natural DBP precursors and further chlorine dioxide as a disinfectant disinfection is not compromised

reduce DBP exposure. The MCL to comply with the same TTHM (80 and that a suitable residual level of
applied to all systems that added ppb) and HAA5 (60 ppb) MCLs, but disinfectant is maintained throughout
chlorine, chloramine, or chlorine changes how compliance with the the distribution system.
dioxide as a disinfectant. For the MCLs is calculated (EPA, 2005a).
See the Latin American Cholera
original 1979 Total Trihalomethane Because DBP formation increases
Epidemic of the 1990s inset (Box
Rule and the Stage 1 DBP Rule, over time, “older water” in the more
4-1) for a poignant example of
compliance was determined by distant portions of the distribution
when a failure to balance these
averaging all samples in specific system tend to have higher levels of
risks had extensive public health
locations in the distribution system. DBPs than locations closer to the
ramifications.
treatment plant. The Stage 2 DBP
In addition to lowering the TTHM The incidence of reported water-
Rule established more stringent
MCL level, the Stage 1 DBP Rule set borne disease outbreaks in the
MCL requirements by calculating
enforceable MCLs for HAA5 at 60 United States has generally been in
“locational running annual aver-
ppb, chlorite at 100 ppb (for plants decline since the implementation of
ages,” which are annual averages
that use chlorine dioxide disinfec- the SDWA in 1976—due in large part
for each sampling location (as
tant), and bromate at 10 ppb (for to regulation-driven improved treat-
opposed to the entire distribution
plants that disinfect with ozone) (see ment plant operations and oversight
system average used in the Stage
EPA, 2010). The TTHM and HAA5 by state regulators. However, the
1 DBP Rule) (see EPA, 2010). The
MCLs were based on distribution proportion of the remaining disease
more stringent averaging require-
system running annual averages, outbreaks due to deficiencies in dis-
ments increase the probability of a
meaning that concentrations could tribution systems, including plumb-
TTHM and HAA5 MCL exceedance.
exceed the MCL at certain times and ing infrastructure, has increased
at certain locations throughout the Balancing Disinfection Byproducts as a result of microbial (re)growth,
distribution system, but as long as and Microbial Risks leaks, main breaks, and decaying
the average concentration for the The 1996 SDWA Amendments pipes. Such deficiencies can cause
year was below the MCL, the water required EPA to develop rules to a drop in residual chlorine levels
system was in compliance with the balance the risks between microbial and increase microbial pathogen
Stage 1 DBP Rule. pathogens and DBPs. In maintaining risks. As noted previously, Legionella
this balance, the WHO’s IPCS (2000; is now considered to be the most
In developing the Stage 1 DBP Rule
in the late 1990s, EPA was cau- p. 375) warned: significant drinking water-related
tious about encouraging the use disease risk, and is caused by inha-
Disinfection is unquestionably the
of alternative disinfectants. The lation of contaminated water aero-
most important step in the treatment
Agency recognized that alternative sols from premise plumbing, spas,
of water for drinking water supplies.
disinfectants might reduce TTHM and cooling towers (CDC, 2017a).
The microbial quality of drinking
and HAA5, but produce other, less water should not be compromised Controlling Disinfection
understood, byproducts. The Agency because of concern over the potential Byproducts
also avoided making recommenda- long-term effects of disinfectants and
tions that would encourage utilities, Efficient and cost-effective treat-
DBPs. The risk of illness and death
especially small systems, to reduce ment techniques are available that
resulting from exposure to pathogens
the level of disinfection currently provide drinking water suppliers
in drinking water is very much greater
being practiced. the opportunity to maximize potable
than the risks from disinfectants and
water safety and quality while
EPA’s Stage 2 Disinfectants and DBPs.
minimizing any potential DBP risks.
Disinfection Byproduct Rule Such DBP control strategies can
Almost two decades later, the
A Stage 2 DBP Rule was promul- WHO’s Drinking-water Guidelines be divided into three categories:
gated in 2006, which supplements still emphasize the importance of (1) removal of DBP precursors, (2)
EPA’s 1998 Stage 1 DBP Rule (EPA, balancing these risks (WHO, 2017; optimization of treatment and dis-
2006b). The Stage 2 DBP Rule is p. 173): infection practices to minimize DBP
intended to reduce DBP exposures formation, and (3) removal of DBPs
by limiting exposure to TTHM and In attempting to control DBP after formation (WRF, 2017c). In
HAA5. It requires treatment plants concentrations, it is of paramount general, maintaining THM and HAA
that add chlorine, chloramine, or importance that the efficiency of concentrations below regulatory or

The Challenge of Disinfection Byproducts 21

 guideline values by controlling
Box 4-1: The Latin American Cholera Epidemic of the 1990s precursor natural organic matter,
represented as total organic carbon
(TOC), will provide adequate control
Between 1991 and 1993, cholera, an acute and deadly diarrheal disease, over other chlorination byproducts
raged throughout Latin American, sparing only Uruguay and the Caribbean. (WHO, 2017).
The outbreak claimed almost 9,000 lives and sickened nearly one million
people [Guthman, 1995]. Three treatment processes can
effectively remove naturally-occur-
For many years prior to 1991, the Pan American Health Organization ring organic compounds prior to
(PAHO) had been promoting the disinfection of community water distri-
disinfection (see EPA, 2001b):
bution systems. Primarily through its Center for Sanitary Engineering
and Environmental Science in Lima, Peru, PAHO collaborated with the 1. Coagulation and Clarification
countries in demonstration and pilot projects for virtually all disinfection Most drinking water systems opti-
methodologies to ascertain their relative efficiency, cost effectiveness, and mize their coagulation process for
practicality for a wide range of cultural and economic situations. Some
turbidity (particle removal). How-
methods worked well while others were failures. Chlorination was almost
always found to be the most reliable and cost effective. ever, coagulation processes can also
be optimized for natural organic
PAHO’s response to the first appearance of cholera was swift. It included a matter precursor removal using
directive to each of the PAHO Country Offices to promote continuous chlo-
higher doses of inorganic coagu-
rination of all water distribution and delivery systems. Logic guided this
decision: chlorine is very effective at destroying the Vibrio cholerae patho- lants (such as alum or iron salts)
gen; all of the countries were familiar with chlorination technology; chlo- and optimization of pH.
rine products were readily available; and chlorination was the least costly
2. Adsorption
disinfection method.
Activated carbon can be used to
Surprisingly, shortly after the directive to encourage water chlorination, adsorb naturally-occurring organic
local PAHO officials began encountering pockets of resistance from health substances (TOC) that react with
officials in Peru and other countries. The resistance stemmed from con-
disinfectants to form DBPs. This
cern over public exposure to disinfection by-products, a subject highlighted
is, however, costly. Biological acti-
in press releases and published scientific studies widely disseminated by
environmental agencies in the developed countries. vated carbon, which usually involves
ozone and granular activated car-
It was pointed out to all that when Vibrio cholerae is present in a water sup- bon, may be more cost-effective in
ply, the risk of contracting the disease is immediate, and that a resulting
some instances.
epidemic could cause thousands of deaths. In contrast, the hypothetical
health risk posed by disinfection byproducts at levels in excess of those 3. Membrane Technology
recommended by the WHO was one extra death per 100,000 persons Advances in membranes, used his-
exposed for a period of 70 years. Unfortunately, some of these well-mean-
torically to desalinate briny waters,
ing, but ill-informed officials had to experience the immense proportional
difference in risk before accepting this reality. continue to demonstrate excellent
removal of natural organic matter.
(Excerpted from “The Latin American Cholera Epidemic of the 1990’s: My View from the In- Membrane processes use hydraulic
side,” by Fred M. Reiff, PE; WQHC, 2015b.) pressure to force water through
a semi-permeable membrane
that rejects most contaminants.
Variations of this technology include
reverse osmosis, nanofiltration
(low-pressure reverse osmosis),
ultrafiltration, and microfiltration
(comparable to conventional sand
filtration).
Other conventional DBP control
strategies include changing the
point of chlorination to later in the
treatment process after some of
the TOC has been removed (see

22 The Challenge of Disinfection Byproducts

Figure 1-2), and using chloramine
for residual disinfection, which are
much less reactive than free chlo-
rine with DBP precursors. Most
U.S. water systems have achieved
compliance with updated DBP regu-
lations using one or more of these
processes.
Water system managers may also
consider switching from chlorine
to one or more alternative disinfec-
tants to reduce formation of TTHM
and HAA5. However, all disinfectants
form some DBPs, many of which
remain unknown, while groups of
related DBPs (e.g., nitrogenous-
DBPs) continue to be identified
(WRF, 2017b). Much less is known
about the byproducts of disinfectant
alternatives to chlorination than is
known about chlorination-related
DBPs. Moreover, each disinfection
method has advantages and disad-
vantages. Chapter 6 discusses some
of the key issues for water system
managers to consider when choos-
ing between one or more disinfec-
tion methods.

The Challenge of Disinfection Byproducts 23

 5  Drinking Water and Security

Water treatment and distribution even multiple conventional treat-

systems provide one of the most ment barriers cannot ensure safety
basic elements of life—a reliable from all biological attacks, and for
supply of safe drinking water. Prior many potential bioterrorism agents,
to the terrorist attacks of September there is limited scientific informa-
11, 2001, for most systems, security tion regarding achievable levels of
measures were primarily designed reduction that can be achieved with
to protect facilities and equipment chlorine or other disinfectants.
from pranks and vandalism. In the
post-9/11 reality, protecting and Protecting Chlorine and
controlling access to these critical Other Treatment Chemicals
systems is now a standard part of Vulnerability assessments provide a
water system planning and opera- comprehensive analysis of potential
tions (Box 5-1). threats to a drinking water system,
including chemical or biological
Disinfection and Bioterrorism contamination of the water supply
Disinfection is also crucial to water and disruption of water treatment
system security, providing protection or distribution. As part of its vulner-
against accidental and intentional ability assessment, each drinking
microbiological contamination. water system should also carefully
Water systems should maintain the consider its transportation, storage,
flexibility to increase disinfection and use of treatment chemicals.
doses in response to a particular These chemicals are simultaneously
threat. Normal filtration and disin- critical assets (necessary for deliv-
fection can reduce or remove the ering safe water) and potential vul-
threats posed by a number of poten- nerabilities (might pose significant
tial bioterrorism agents. However, hazards, if released). For example, a

24
release of chlorine gas would pose an
Box 5-1: American Water Works Association and American
immediate threat to system operators,
whereas a large release might pose a National Standards Institute Security Guidance
danger to the surrounding community.
For more than 100 years, the AWWA has developed voluntary standards
Also as part of its vulnerability assess-
for materials, equipment, and practices used in drinking water treatment
ment, a drinking water system using and supply. AWWA has worked with the American National Standards
chlorine should determine whether Institute (ANSI) to develop guidance documents and voluntary standards
existing layers of protection are ade- related to operational security, risk and resilience management, and
quate. If not, a system should consider emergency preparedness, including the following:
taking additional measures to reduce
Selecting Disinfectants in a Security-Conscious Environment provides
the likelihood of an attack or to miti- guidance to assist with evaluating disinfectants to meet water quality
gate the potential consequences. needs and security considerations. This ANSI/AWWA document helps
drinking water system operators analyze and quantify safety and security
Possible measures to address chlo-
risks and costs for any type of disinfectant. The information is consistent
rine security within drinking water
with the EPA’s water utility security guidelines and the Department of
treatment systems include enhanced Homeland Security (DHS) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
physical barriers (e.g., constructing (CFATS) Program (AWWA, 2009).
secure chemical storage facilities);
ANSI/AWWA G430-14: Security Practices for Operations and Manage-
policy changes (e.g., instituting addi-
ment Standard provides guidance on developing a protective security
tional secure procedures for receiv-
program for a water or wastewater utility that will promote employee
ing chemical shipments); reducing safety, public health, public safety, and public confidence. This standard
disinfectant quantities stored onsite; received SAFETY (Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Tech-
or considering the use of alternative nologies) Act designation from DHS in 2012, and can apply to all water or
disinfection methods, including onsite wastewater utilities—regardless of size, location, ownership, or regula-
generation of sodium hypochlorite tory status. The standard builds on the long-standing practice of employ-
(see Chapter 6). However, chang- ing a multi-barrier approach for the protection of public health and
ing disinfection technologies will not safety (AWWA, 2014).
necessarily improve overall safety ANSI/AWWA J100-10: RAMCAP Standard for Risk and Resilience Man-
and security as each disinfectant has agement of Water and Wastewater Systems Standard provides guid-
unique strengths and limitations. ance on identifying, analyzing, quantifying, and communicating risks of
specific terrorist attacks and natural hazards against critical water and
Water system officials should evaluate wastewater systems. It also provides guidance on identifying security
the risk tradeoffs associated with each vulnerabilities and methods to evaluate the options for improving these
option available to address chlorine weaknesses and received SAFETY Act designation from DHS in 2012
security. For example, reducing the (AWWA, 2010).
chemical quantities stored onsite can ANSI/AWWA G440-11: Emergency Preparedness Practices Standard
simultaneously reduce a system’s provides guidance for emergency preparedness for a water or wastewa-
ability to cope with an interruption ter utility. Emergency preparedness practices include the development
of chemical supplies. All security- of an emergency response plan (hazard evaluation, hazard mitigation,
related options should be weighed and response planning and mutual aid agreements, evaluation of the emer-
prioritized, considering the unique gency response plan through exercises, and revision of the emergency
characteristics and resources of each response plan after exercises) (AWWA, 2011).
system. In addition, water industry
organizations, including AWWA, the
Association of Metropolitan Water
Agencies, and Association of State
Drinking Water Administrators, serve
as clearinghouses for sharing security
and other critical information with the
thousands of drinking water systems
located throughout the United States.

Drinking Water and Security 25

 6  Comparing Disinfection Methods

Until the late 1970s, chlorine meet overall disinfection goals at Elemental Chlorine Elemental
was virtually the only disinfectant the drinking water facility and to chlorine gas (Cl2) remains one of
used to treat drinking water in the provide residual disinfection pro- the most commonly used form of
United States. Chlorine was long- tection throughout the storage and chlorine in drinking water systems.
considered by treatment operators distribution system. It is transported and stored as a
to be an almost ideal disinfectant liquefied gas under pressure. Water
The sections below summarize and
because it destroys most pathogens treatment facilities typically use
compare conventional and alterna-
and provides a residual disinfectant chlorine in 100- and 150-pound
tive disinfection technologies, and
to help prevent microbial (re)growth cylinders or 1-ton containers. Some
discuss some of the major advan-
throughout the distribution system. large drinking water systems use
tages and limitations associated
Additionally, chlorine is: chlorine gas delivered in railroad
with each option.
• A potent oxidizer and disinfectant tank cars or tanker trucks.
that can detoxify some chemicals Chlorination
ADVANTAGES
• Suitable for a broad range of wa- Chlorine is applied to water in one
of three principal forms: elemen- • Lowest cost and most energy
ter quality conditions
tal chlorine (chlorine gas), sodium efficient of all chlorine-based
• Easily monitored and controlled disinfectants
hypochlorite solution (liquid bleach),
• Cost-effective or dry calcium hypochlorite. Chlori- • Unlimited shelf-life
Moreover, drinking water providers nated isocyanurates are also used • Does not add bromate
continue to face new and evolving for some drinking water applica-
tions (but more commonly for swim- • Will react with algal- and cyano-
treatment and regulatory challenges,
ming pool disinfection). All produce bacteria-produced toxins
including:
free chlorine in water (see Box 2-1). LIMITATIONS
• Treating chlorine-resistant patho-
gens such as Cryptosporidium and ADVANTAGES
• Hazardous pressurized gas
Giardia requires special handling and
• Highly effective against bacterial
operator training
• Growing Legionella, biofilm, and and viral waterborne pathogens
premise plumbing issues and some protozoa • Additional regulatory require-
ments, including EPA’s Risk
• Minimizing DBP formation and • Provides a residual level of dis-
infectant to help protect against Management Program and the
controlling emerging DBPs
microbial (re)growth and to help Occupational Safety and Health
• New environmental and safety Administration’s Process Safety
regulations control biofilm growth in the dis-
tribution system Management Standard
• Strengthening security at treat-
ment facilities • Easily applied, controlled, and Sodium Hypochlorite  Sodium
monitored hypochlorite, or bleach (an aque-
To meet these challenges, water sys- ous solution of NaOCl), is produced
• Operationally simple and highly
tem managers must design unique reliable by adding elemental chlorine to
disinfection approaches to match sodium hydroxide. Typically, hypo-
each system’s characteristics, • The most cost-effective disinfec-
tant chlorite solutions for water treat-
source water quality, and resources. ment applications contain from 12
Although chlorination still remains LIMITATIONS to 15% chlorine, and are shipped in
the most commonly used disinfec- • Disinfection byproduct forma- 1,000- to 5,000-gallon containers.
tion method (AWWA, 2018), drink- tion (e.g., THMs, HAAs, and other
ing water systems increasingly use DBPs) ADVANTAGES
alternative disinfectants or combi- • Solution is less hazardous and
• Will oxidize bromide in water to
nations of disinfectants, including easier to handle than elemental
hypobromite forming brominated
chlorine along with chloramine,
DBPs chlorine (gas)
chlorine dioxide, ozone, and UV radi-
ation. No single disinfection method • Not effective against Cryptospo- • Fewer training requirements and
is right for all circumstances. Water ridium regulations than chlorine gas
systems may use a variety of meth- • Requires transport and storage of • Will react with algal- and cyano-
ods as multiple barriers to both chemicals bacteria-produced toxins

26
LIMITATIONS ADVANTAGES Onsite Hypochlorite Generation 
• Limited shelf-life; degrades slow- • More stable than sodium hypo- In recent years, some municipalities
ly over time to chlorate and then chlorite, allowing longer storage have installed onsite hypochlorite
perchlorate during storage—par- • Fewer training requirements generators that produce weak hypo-
ticularly at warm temperatures and regulations than elemental chlorite solutions (~0.8%) using an
• Can contain bromate from elec- chlorine electrolytic cell and a solution of
trolysis of bromide in the precur- salt water (brine).
• Will react with algal- and cyano-
sor salt bacteria-produced toxins ADVANTAGES
• Corrosive to some materials and
LIMITATIONS • Storage and transport of salt
more difficult to store than most
• Dry chemical requires more han- rather than chlorine gas or so-
solution chemicals
dling than sodium hypochlorite dium hypochlorite solution
• Higher costs than elemental
chlorine due to shipping (water) • Precipitated solids formed in LIMITATIONS

weight (~85%) solution complicate chemical • Higher capital and operating cost
feeding due to electricity consumption for
Calcium Hypochlorite  Calcium electrolysis and system mainte-
• Higher chemical costs than el-
hypochlorite (Ca(OCl)2) is used nance
emental chlorine
primarily in small treatment appli-
• Fire or explosive hazard if handled • More complex processing and
cations. It is a white, dry solid con-
improperly requires a higher level of mainte-
taining approximately 65% chlorine
• Can contain chlorate, chlorite, and nance and technical expertise
and is commercially available in
granular and tablet forms. bromate • Requires careful control of salt
quality

Comparing Disinfection Methods 27