Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

SALT I

Begun in November 1969, by May 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
had produced both the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited strategic
missile defenses to 200 (later 100) interceptors each, and the Interim Agreement, an
executive agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces. Under the Interim
Agreement, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos, not to increase the
size of existing ICBM silos “significantly,” and capped the number of SLBM launch
tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers
and did not address warhead numbers, leaving both sides free to enlarge their forces
by deploying multiple warheads (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs and
increasing their bomber-based forces. The agreement limited the United States to
1,054 ICBM silos and 656 SLBM launch tubes. The Soviet Union was limited to
1,607 ICBM silos and 740 SLBM launch tubes. In June 2002, the United States
unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty.

SALT II

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to pursue a follow-on treaty to

SALT I. SALT II, signed in June 1979, limited U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and
strategic bomber-based nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles (defined as an
ICBM silo, a SLBM launch tube, or a heavy bomber) and placed a variety of other
restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces. The agreement would have
required the Soviets to reduce their forces by roughly 270 delivery vehicles, but U.S.
forces were below the limits and could actually have been increased. However,
President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and
consent after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the
treaty was not taken up again. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged
to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failure to enter into force. However, on
May 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions on strategic
nuclear forces would be based on the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on "a
flawed SALT II Treaty.”

START I

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), first proposed in the early 1980s by
President Ronald Reagan and finally signed in July 1991, required the United States
and the Soviet Union to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery
vehicles, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads as counted using the agreement’s
rules. The agreement required the destruction of excess delivery vehicles which was
verified using an intrusive verification regime that involved on-site inspections, the
regular exchange of information, including telemetry, and the use of national
technical means (i.e., satellites). The agreement’s entry into force was delayed for
several years because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and ensuing efforts to
denuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus by returning their nuclear weapons
to Russia and making them parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and
START I agreements. START I reductions were completed in December 2001 and
the treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009.

START II

In June 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to pursue a
follow-on accord to START I. START II, signed in January 1993, called for reducing
deployed strategic arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads and banned the deployment of
destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles. START II would have counted
warheads in roughly the same fashion as START I and, also like its predecessor,
would have required the destruction of delivery vehicles but not warheads. The
agreement's original implementation deadline was January 2003, ten years after
signature, but a 1997 protocol moved this deadline to December 2007 because of
the extended delay in ratification. Both the Senate and the Duma approved START
II, but the treaty did not take effect because the Senate did not ratify the 1997
protocol and several ABM Treaty amendments, whose passage the Duma
established as a condition for START II’s entry into force. START II was effectively
shelved as a result of the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

START III Framework

In March 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to a framework for
START III negotiations that included a reduction in deployed strategic warheads to
2,000-2,500. Significantly, in addition to requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles,
START III negotiations were to address “the destruction of strategic nuclear
warheads…to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a
rapid increase in the number of warheads.” Negotiations were supposed to begin
after START II entered into force, which never happened.

SORT (Moscow Treaty)

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) under which the
United States and Russia reduced their strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads
each. The warhead limit took effect and expired on the same day, Dec. 31, 2012.
Although the two sides did not agree on specific counting rules, the Bush
administration asserted that the United States would reduce only warheads deployed
on strategic delivery vehicles in active service, i.e., “operationally deployed”
warheads, and would not count warheads removed from service and placed in
storage or warheads on delivery vehicles undergoing overhaul or repair. The
agreement’s limits are similar to those envisioned for START III, but the treaty did
not require the destruction of delivery vehicles, as START I and II did, or the
destruction of warheads, as had been envisioned for START III. The treaty was
approved by the Senate and Duma and entered into force on June 1, 2003. SORT
was replaced by New START on February 5, 2011.

New START
On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed New START, a legally
binding, verifiable agreement that limits each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear
warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy
bombers), and limits deployed and nondeployed launchers to 800. The treaty-
accountable warhead limit is 30 percent lower than the 2,200 upper limit of SORT,
and the delivery vehicle limit is 50 percent lower than the 1,600 allowed in START I.
The treaty has a verification regime that combines elements of START I with new
elements tailored to New START. Measures under the treaty include on-site
inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic
offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use
of national technical means for treaty monitoring. The treaty also provides for the
continued exchange of telemetry (missile flight-test data on up to five tests per year)
and does not meaningfully limit missile defenses or long-range conventional strike
capabilities. The U.S. Senate approved New START on Dec. 22, 2010. The approval
process of the Russian parliament (passage by both the State Duma and Federation
Council) was completed Jan. 26, 2011. The treaty entered into force on Feb. 5, 2011
and will expire in 2021, though both parties may agree to extend the treaty for a
period of up to five years. Both parties met the treaty’s central limits by the Feb. 4,
2018 deadline for implementation.

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

Ne
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*On Feb. 2, 2019, both the United States and Russia announced they were
suspending their obligations to the treaty.

**New START allows for the option to extend the treaty beyond 2021 for a period of
up to five years.

Nonstrategic Nuclear Arms Control Measures

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Signed Dec. 8, 1987, the INF Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union
to verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges
between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented, intrusive
inspection regime, including on-site inspections, the INF Treaty laid the groundwork
for verification of the subsequent START I. The INF Treaty entered into force June 1,
1988, and the two sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1991, destroying a
total of 2,692 missiles. The agreement was multilateralized after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, and current active participants in the agreement include the United
States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
are also parties to the agreement but do not participate in treaty meetings or on-site
inspections. The ban on intermediate-range missiles is of unlimited duration.

Both the United States and Russia have raised concerns about the other side’s
compliance with the INF Treaty. The United States first publicly charged Russia with
developing and testing a ground-launched cruise with a range that meets the INF
Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500
km to 5,500 km in 2014.
Russia denies that it is breaching the agreement and has raised its own concerns
about Washington’s compliance. Moscow is charging that the United States is
placing a missile defense launch system in Europe that can also be used to fire
cruise missiles, using targets for missile defense tests with similar characteristics to
INF Treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, and is making armed drones that
are equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles. On Oct. 20, 2018 President
Donald Trump announced his intention to “terminate” the agreement citing Russian
noncompliance and concerns about China’s missiles, and on Dec. 4, Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo declared Russia in “material breach” of the treaty. The Trump
administration provided official notice to the other treaty states-parties on Feb. 2, that
it would both suspend its obligations to the treaty and withdraw from the agreement
in six months—per the treaty's terms—and "terminate" the agreement. The
administration has stated that it may reverse the withdrawal if Russia returns to
compliance by eliminating its ground-launched 9M729 missile, which the United
States alleges is the noncompliant missile which can fly beyond the 500-kilometer
range limit set by the treaty. 

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 

On Sept. 27, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States
would remove almost all U.S. tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear forces from deployment
so that Russia could undertake similar actions, reducing the risk of nuclear
proliferation as the Soviet Union dissolved. Specifically, Bush said the United States
would eliminate all its nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic missile
warheads and remove all nonstrategic nuclear warheads from surface ships, attack
submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
reciprocated on Oct. 5, pledging to eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear
warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear landmines. He also pledged to withdraw
all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons from deployment. Under these initiatives,
the United States and Russia reduced their deployed nonstrategic stockpiles by an
estimated 5,000 and 13,000 warheads, respectively. However, significant questions
remain about Russian implementation of its pledges, and there is considerable
uncertainty about the current state of Russia’s tactical nuclear forces. The Defense
Department estimates that Russia possess roughly 2,000 non-strategic nuclear
weapons and the numbers are expanding. The United States maintains several
hundred nonstrategic B61 gravity bombs for delivery by short-range fighter aircraft. 

gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC),
political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries—Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. The
GCC was established in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 1981. The purpose
of the GCC is to achieve unity among its members based on their common
objectives and their similar political and cultural identities, which are rooted
in Arab and Islamic cultures. Presidency of the council rotates annually.
Arguably the most important article of the GCC charter is Article 4, which
states that the alliance was formed to strengthen relations among its
member countries and to promote cooperation among the countries’
citizens. The GCC also has a defense planning council that coordinates
military cooperation between member countries. The highest decision-
making entity of the GCC is the Supreme Council, which meets on an
annual basis and consists of GCC heads of state. Decisions of the
Supreme Council are adopted by unanimous approval. The Ministerial
Council, made up of foreign ministers or other government officials, meets
every three months to implement the decisions of the Supreme Council and
to propose new policy. The administrative arm of the alliance is the office of
the Secretariat-General, which monitors policy implementation and
arranges meetings.
GCC agreements typically focus on either security or economic
coordination. In terms of security coordination, policies have included the
creation of the Peninsula Shield Force in 1984, a joint military venture
based in Saudi Arabia, and the signing of an intelligence-sharing pact in
2004. The first significant deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force was in
2011 in Bahrain to guard government infrastructure against an uprising
there during the Arab Spring protests. Economic coordination included
attempts at economic union, though integrative agreements were often
lacklustre in comparison with policy coordination. An agreement to launch a
single regional currency similar to the euro by 2010 saw little movement
apart from the establishment of a monetary council in 2009. Coordination in
tax policy proved fruitful, however: a customs union was implemented in
2015, and the member states began rolling out a value-added tax of 5
percent in 2018. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have tended
to lead policy coordination. They were the first countries to send troops to
Bahrain in 2011 and the first countries to levy the value-added tax.
While membership of the GCC remained consistent throughout its first
several decades, changes in regional relationships sometimes led to
speculation on changes in membership. Expansion appeared possible
when the interests of Gulf countries aligned with those of other Arab
states. Jordan and Morocco, two other Arab monarchies, were invited to
join the GCC in 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring uprisings. Morocco
declined, while Jordan’s application remained delayed because of internal
GCC disagreements. Conflicting interests at times led to rifts. Egypt and
fellow GCC members Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain
instated a blockade against Qatar in 2017. In December 2018 Qatar’s head
of state skipped the GCC’s annual summit and sent an envoy instead.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Text of the Treaty
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to
the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a

nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the
danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of
peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance

the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly

calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider
dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to

further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of
safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials
by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear

technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived
by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive
devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the
Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are

entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific
information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States
to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the

cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in
the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty

banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under
water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all
time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening

of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing
stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons
and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of
international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion
for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to

any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage,
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive

the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept

safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s
safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment
of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this
Article shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed
or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The
safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source
or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or
special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes,
unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner

designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the
economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-
operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the
international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for
the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes
in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of
safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements

with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements
of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance
with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation
of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry
into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of
ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such
agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after
the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right

of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in
contributing alone or together with other States or international
organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the
needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure

that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international
observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential
benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made
available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-
discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive
devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research
and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be
able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or
agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate
representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject
shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such
benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good

faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude

regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in
their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text
of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon,
if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the
Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall
invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes

of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date
the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force
for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment
upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment
is circulated, are members of the Board
of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall
enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of
ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties
to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review
the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals
of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by
submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments,
the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing
the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does
not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments

of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,
which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the
Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and
forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their
instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon
State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited

subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on
the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and

acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of
this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a
conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to

Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to

withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties
to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference
shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in
force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or
periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the
Treaty.1

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of

which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this

Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first

day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

Note:
On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force
indefinitely (see decision 3).

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)(overview)
The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving
nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty
represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of
disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the
Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended
indefinitely.  A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five
nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other
arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s
significance.

The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-

proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to
further the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete
disarmament, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure

between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the
responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards
are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted
by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear
technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while
safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

General Assembly Resolutions

 A/RES/66/33 (2011)

 A/RES/61/70 (2006)

 A/RES/56/24 (2001)

The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a

review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was
reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference.
The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ended without the adoption of a consensus
substantive outcome. After a successful 2010 Review Conference at which
States parties agreed to a final document which included conclusions and
recommendations for follow-on actions, including the implementation of the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the 2015 outcome constitutes a setback
for the strengthened review process instituted to ensure accountability with
respect to activities under the three pillars of the Treaty as part of the
package in support of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in
1995. The preparatory process for the 2020 Review Conference is currently
underway.

____________

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving
nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty
represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of
disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the
Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended
indefinitely.  A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five
nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other
arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s
significance.

The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-

proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to
further the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete
disarmament, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure

between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the
responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards
are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted
by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear
technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while
safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

General Assembly Resolutions

 A/RES/66/33 (2011)

 A/RES/61/70 (2006)

 A/RES/56/24 (2001)

The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a

review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was
reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference.
The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ended without the adoption of a consensus
substantive outcome. After a successful 2010 Review Conference at which
States parties agreed to a final document which included conclusions and
recommendations for follow-on actions, including the implementation of the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the 2015 outcome constitutes a setback
for the strengthened review process instituted to ensure accountability with
respect to activities under the three pillars of the Treaty as part of the
package in support of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in
1995. The preparatory process for the 2020 Review Conference is currently
underway.

____________

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
History of the Treaty
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) began its substantive negotiations on
a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in January 1994 within the
framework of an Ad Hoc Committee established for that purpose. Although
the CD had long been involved with the issue of a test-ban, only in 1982 did it
establish a subsidiary body on the item. Disagreement over a mandate for that
body blocked tangible progress for years.

Status of the Treaty

In accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty, it will enter into force after all
44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have ratified it.

The following Article XIV states have ratified the treaty:

Algeria Argentina Australia

Austria Bangladesh Belgium
Brazil Bulgaria Canada
Democratic Republic of the
Chile Colombia
Congo
Finland France Germany
Hungary Indonesia Italy
Japan Mexico Netherlands
Norway Peru Poland
Romania Republic of Korea Russian Federation
Slovakia South Africa Spain
Sweden Switzerland Turkey
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ukraine Viet Nam
Ireland
Zimbabw
e

The following Article XIV states have not yet ratified the treaty:

Democratic People’s Republic of

China Egypt
Korea
India Iran (Islamic Republic of) Israel
Pakistan United States of America
For more information on the ratification status of this treaty,

visit the CTBTO website

After more than two years of intensive negotiations, the Chairman of the Ad
Hoc Committee, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, presented a
final draft treaty to the CD in June 1996. An overwhelming majority of Member
States of the CD expressed their readiness to support the draft treaty. India,
for its part, stated that it could not go along with a consensus on the draft
text and its transmittal to the United Nations General Assembly. The main
reasons for such a decision, as India pointed out, were related to its strong
misgivings about the provision for the entry-into-force of the treaty, which it
considered unprecedented in multilateral practice and running contrary to
customary international law, and the failure of the treaty to include a
commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons
within a time-bound framework.

As a result, Australia, on 22 August 1996, requested that the General

Assembly resume the consideration of agenda item 65, entitled
“Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty” as provided for in resolution 50/65
of 12 December 1995. For that purpose it also submitted the draft CTBT,
identical to that negotiated in the CD, for adoption by the General Assembly. 
On 10 September, the General Assembly by
resolution (A/RES/50/245) adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his
capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature at the earliest
possible date. The Treaty was opened for signature in September 1996.

On 29 May 2009, the Secretary-General launched “Securing our Common

Future: An Agenda for Disarmament.” The Agenda highlights the norm against
testing nuclear weapons of a measure that serves both disarmament and non-
proliferation objectives. In that context, the Secretary-General appealed to all
remaining States whose ratifications are required for the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter into force to commit to sign the
Treaty at an early date if they have not already done so, and to accelerate the
completion of their ratification processes.

Latest Developments
Article XIV of the CTBT states that if the Treaty has not entered into force
three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, a
conference may be held upon the request of a majority of ratifying States.
Such a conference is held to examine to what extent the requirements for
entry into force have been met, and to decide on measures to accelerate the
ratification process. Previous Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into
Force of the Treaty were held in 1999, 2003 and 2007 in Vienna, and 2001,
2005 , 2009 , 2011.2013, 2015 and 2017 in New York.

In years between conferences held pursuant to Article XIV of the Treaty,

Foreign Ministers of CTBT Member States particular dedicated to the entry
into force of the CTBT usually meet in the margins of the General Debate of
the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. The next
such CTBT Ministerial Meeting is scheduled to take place in September
2018.

Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into force of the

CTBT:
September 2003
October 1999 November 2001 September 2
September 2007 September 2009 September 2011 September 2

September 2015 September 2017 September 2019 September 2

About the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive

Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
is an international organization established by the States Signatories to the
Treaty on 19 November 1996 and has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The
objective of the organization is to achieve the object and purpose of the
Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for
international verification of compliance with the Treaty, and to provide a
forum for consultation and cooperation among Member States. To this end,
the Commission prepares for the entry-into-force of the Treaty and carries out
the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Treaty,
including the establishment of a global verification regime. The Preparatory
Commission consists of a plenary body composed of all States signatories to
the Treaty and a Provisional Technical Secretariat.

The relationship agreement between the United Nations and the CTBTO was
adopted in 2000 by the General Assembly as A/RES/54/280.

Documents and Resources

General Assembly Resolutions

 A/RES/72/70 —2017

 A/RES/71/86 —2016

 A/RES/70/73 —2015

 A/RES/69/81 —2014

 A/RES/68/68 —2013

 A/RES/67/76 —2012