SCOPE OF THE PROTECTION

Moncada vs People’s Court

80 Phil 1
1/14/1948

Scope of Protection

Facts:
Petitioner stands accused of treason before the People's Court, the information
against him having been filed by Prosecutor Juan M. Ladaw on February 28, 1946.
Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6:00 p.m., petitioner was
arrested by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his
residence at 199-A San Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest, and taken to
the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa, where he was detained.
On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario
Drive, Quezon City, was approached by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olives, and
ordered to accompany them to the house at San Rafael to witness the taking of
documents and things belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from the officers that they
did not have any search warrant for the purpose, she refused to go with them, but after
the officers told her that with or without her presence they would search the house at
San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decided to accompany them.
Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been
ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in the attic and
in the garage when she left the house, had been ripped open and their contents
scattered on the floor. Lt. Olives informed Mrs. Moncado that they were going to take a
bundle of documents and things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered
things, because they proved the guilt of her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain.
No receipt was issued to her.
Subsequently, after making an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael, Mrs.
Moncado found the following things missing:
"(a) Passes issued by Japanese friends for the personal safety and conduct of the
petitioners;
"(b) Correspondences of the petitioner as president of the Neighborhood Association in
Quezon City during the Japanese occupation;
"(c) Correspondence of the petitioner with certain Japanese officers;
"(d) The personal file and the love letters of Mrs. Moncado to Dr. Moncado and vice
versa;
"(e) Marriage certificate of Dr. Moncado with Mrs. Moncado issued at Reno, Nevada;
"(f) Private correspondence and letters of Dr. Moncado to and from his Filipino
Federation of America in Hawaii and United States;
"(g) Several law books by Guevara, Albert, Francisco, Harvard Classics (complete set),
books on diplomacy, international law;
"(h) A complete collection of the 'Tribunal' compilation of the same during occupation
until the last day of its issuance;
"(i) Complete collection of American magazines, from 1940 to 1941 - Los Angeles
Examiner, San Francisco Chronicle, Los Angeles Evening Herald and newspapers
edited and owned by Dr. Moncado and published in the United States; and National
Geographic Society;
"(j) Personal letters of Dr. Moncado with several members of the United States Senate
and Congress of the United States including a picture of President Hoover dedicated to
Dr. Moncado;
"(k) Pictures with personal dedication and autograph to Dr. and Mrs. Moncado by actors
and actresses from Hollywood, including Mary Astor, Binnie Barnes, Robert
Montgomery, Clark Gable, Gary Cooper, Boris Karloff, Wallace Beery, William and Dick
Powell, Myrna Loy, Bette Davis and Ceasar Romero;
"(l) Certificate as first flighter in the Pan-American Airways and even several stickers
issued by Pan American Airways for passengers' baggage;
"(m) A promissory note of Dr. Moncado for fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) in favor of
Architect Mr. Igmidio A. Marquez of Quezon City;
"(n) Three (3) volumes of modern ballroom dancing by Arthur MacMurray of New York,
pamphlets of dancing obtained by Dr. Moncado while he was studying dancing at
Waldorf-Astoria, New York;
"(o) Two (2) volumes of rhumba, zamba and tango obtained from Mexico and Argentina
by Dr. Moncado"
On June 27, 1946, petitioner filed with the People's Court a motion praying that the
return of said documents and things be ordered. The petition was denied on July 9,
1946.
Thereupon, petitioner filed with this Supreme Court on August 10, 1946, a
petition praying that the lower court's order of July 9, 1946, be set aside, that said court
be required to order the return of the documents and things in question to petitioner,
and that the prosecutor be restrained from using and presenting them as evidence at
the trial of the criminal case for treason.

All seized documents were not denied by the prosecution and that the said
documents are at their possession.

Respondents argue:
We followed the decision in Alvero vs. Dizon (L-342) that the seized documents
at his house at the time of arrest be admitted as competent evidence against the crime
charged.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not the petitioner can avail the constitutional inhibition against
unlawful searches and seizures and to privacy of communication and
correspondence?
2.) Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizures done were legal and authorized
by law?
3.) Whether or not the seized documents can be admitted in prosecuting the
petitioner against the crime charged?

Held:

1.) Yes, the petitioner can avail the constitutional inhibition against unlawful
searches and seizures and to privacy of communication and correspondence
because the rights are available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused
of crime or not.

2.) No. The seizure of the papers and effects in questions, having been made
without any search warrant, was and is illegal, and was effected in open violation
of the following provisions of the Constitution:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determine by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
 may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. (Article III, section 1 [3] of the Constitution.)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require
otherwise.” (Article III, section 1 [5] of the Constitution.)

The seizure was also in open violation of sections 3, 10, and 11 of Rule
122,which are as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce,and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.

The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed
receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was
found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least
two witnesses, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property.SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory there of to court.

The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the
peace or judge of the municipal court or of the Court of First Instance
which issue the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
by oath.
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched
for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant.
The fallacy of the doctrine contended for by appellant is in
assuming that the constitutional rights of the defendant are violated
by using his private papers as evidence against him, whereas it was the
invasion of his premises and the taking of his goods that constituted the
offense irrespective of what was taken or what use was made of it; and
the law having declared that the articles taken are competent and
admissible evidence, notwithstanding the unlawful search and seizure,
how can the circumstance that the court erred in an independent
proceeding for the return of the property on defendant's demand add
anything to or detract from the violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights in the unlawful search and seizure?

3.) No. The argument that goods and personal properties illegally taken, stolen, or
snatched from the owner of possessor without a duly issued search warrant can
be retained by the prosecution for use as evidence in a criminal case instituted is
initiated by an original and basic flaw. The argument rests on the assume
existence or commission of a crime as its minor premise. but, under the orderly
processes of law, the assumption has yet to be proved, and it is impossible to be
proved before it can be of any use to support and clinch the argument.
The prosecution is called upon to make the assumption that the goods
and properties in question are evidence of a crime. To be valid, the assumption
has to presuppose the commission or existence of the crime.That presupposition,
in order to be valid, must in turn stand on an authoritative pronouncement which
can only be made in a final and executory decision rendered by a court of justice.
The prosecution cannot make a conclusive pronouncement, as to the existence
or commission of a crime, the basic fact which, under the argument, will entitled
the prosecution to retain and use the goods and properties in question. The
 argument assumes a fact the existence of which still remains to be proved and
continues to be enveloped in the mists of the realm of uncertainties, which fact
may lead to the disputed right of the prosecution to retain the goods and
properties illegally seized as essential evidence of the crime. The line of
reasoning the build up the argument can be restated in more abstract terms as
follows: justify the means by their necessity to attain an end by starting from the
premise that the end was accomplished. Such a reasoning process is
fundamentally subversive to logic and is incompatible with the natural workings of
the human mind.

Disposition:
The court granted the prayer of the herein petitioner.
THE RIGHT IS PERSONAL

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

FACTS:

Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to
have committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”

Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners

personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to
search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank
Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and

(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the
constitution and the Rules of court by:

(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the
petitioner;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for
disposal in accordance with law.

The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in
accordance with law; The defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners consent;
and in any event, the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However,
by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized
from the offices of the corporations.
ISSUE:

WON the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD:

NO the search warrant is invalid.

The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of
these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code.”

In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.

As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal.
Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.

However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search
warrant issued against their corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.

The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein
may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
 JOSE G. LOPEZ
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, REPARATIONS COMMISSION, DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND/OR ANY OF THEIR
AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, the petitioner and Reparations Commission entered into a

conditional contract, subject to the condition that the title to and ownership of the vessel
shall remain with the Commission until full payment. Later on, petitioner entered into a
contract with one Tomas Velasco, authorizing the latter to supervise and manage the
M/V JOLO LEMA. The vessel however was however apprehended, searched and then
seized by the Collector of Customs. A Seizure Identification proceeding was instituted
against said vessel for smuggling into the Philippines 1,408 sacks of Indonesian copra
and 86 sacks of Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of Section 2530 (a) and (k) of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.

This appeal taken by Lopez directly to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only
questions of law would be taken up therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to interfere with the
Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66 pending before the Commissioner of
Customs, on account of the Indonesian agricultural products smuggles into the
Philippines through the use of M/V JOLO LEMA

HELD:

Lopez maintains that whatever powers the Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto,
over seizure identification proceedings had been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission. The Supreme Court said that this pretense is manifestly devoid of merit.
Said section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512 merely transfers to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission the powers, functions and duties of the Bureau of Customs, the Philippine
Navy and the Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters. Such
transfer should be construed in the light of section 1 of said Republic Act No. 3512,
reading.

It is clear that the powers transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission by

Republic Act No. 3512 are limited to those relating to the "development, improvement,
management and conservation of our fishery resources." All other matters, such as
those concerning smuggling, particularly of agricultural products, into the Philippines,
are absolutely foreign to the object and purpose of said Act and could not have been
and were not transferred to the aforementioned Commission. Seizure Identification
proceeding No. 25/66 for the smuggling of Indonesian agricultural products into the
Philippines is certainly beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

The M/V JOLO LEMA is not subject to forfeiture, inasmuch as Davao is a port of entry.
This is neither the time nor the place to pass upon the merits of this contention. Suffice
it to say that, if petitioner feels it is a good defense, the proper place to set it up is in
Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66. If the Commissioner of Customs overrules
such defense and decrees the forfeiture of the vessel, Lopez may appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals, whose decision may, in turn, be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the Reparations Commission may not unilaterally rescind
its conditional contract of purchase and sale in his favor and that the Commission must
first seek a judicial declaration of rescission of said contract. Well-settled is, however,
the rule that a judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the
contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms
and conditions.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. KAGUI
MALASUGUI, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-44335            

July 30, 1936

DIAZ, J.:

Facts: On March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, a

victim of robbery was found lying on the ground, with several wounds in the head, on a
path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato. Shortly before the victim’s death he was
able to mention the appellant’s first name, “Kagui”, when he was asked about assailant.

Appellant was later searched by the investigating police, without opposition or protest
on his part, and it was discovered that he also had the victim’s pocketbook, containing
P92 in bills, the victim’s identification card and a memorandum of amounts with some
Chinese characters. In one of the pockets of his pants was found some change, making
the total amount of money found in his possession P92.68. The said search was
conducted after the appellant had voluntarily produced the bracelets Exhibit A and
placed them on Lieutenant Jacaria's table, because, upon being asked if he had
anything, he tremblingly answered in the negative.

The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had
forcibly and through intimidation taken from him the bracelets the pocketbook and all the
money which he and that, but for the printing thereon, the identification card found in the
pocketbook then was blank and there was no memorandum of the kind, in Tan Why's
handwriting, inside the pocketbook, thereby, insinuating that it was Lieutenant Jacaria
who typed or caused to be typewritten on the card Tan Why's name and personal data
and who placed the memorandum in the pocketbook.

Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted on the accused legal?

SC ruling: Yes. The SC held that When the search of the person detained or arrested
and the seizure of the effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in
conformity with the law, they cannot be considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence
and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent,
at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.

The record shows that before proceeding with the trial in the lower court, the
appellant asked for the return of said effects to him on the ground that they were
unlawfully taken away from him. Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, his
testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract that of the
government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who testified that
when Lieutenant Jacaria asked him what other things he carried, after having
voluntarily placed the two pairs of bracelets, Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant
Urangut felt his body, he did not show the least opposition. It follows, therefore, that
the lower court committed no error in accepting as evidence the items taken from
the accused, not only because the appellant did not object to the taking thereof from
him when searched, but also because the effects found in his possession of a
person detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him, if
they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto. It is certainly
repugnant to maintain the opposite view because it would amount to authorizing the
return to the accused of the means of conviction seized from him, notwithstanding
their being eloquent proofs of crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise
dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.

People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, 212 SCRA 547, August 12, 1992

FACTS:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right. 

The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2)
one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.

 The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members
in Dagupan City.
 They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of
someone whom they earlier arrested.
 They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that
she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant.
 Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz
Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house.
 The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant
when the latter was absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to
look around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they confiscated.
They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and
owned the items confiscated.
 Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE:

Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.

RULING:

 The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a
valid search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is present
in this case.
 Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are
invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
 In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz,
his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence.
 Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in
representation of her employer.
 Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained
thereafter is inadmissible.
 People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991

FACTS:

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals.

It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law.

It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.

 Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in
Switzerland and contracted the services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
 When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages,
Marti refused, assuring that the packages simply contained books and cigars.
 However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their
SOP. Upon opening, they suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.
 The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected
content were marijuana.
 In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried
marijuana leaves inside.
 After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
 Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which,
according to him, is obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.

ISSUE:

May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's

constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? NO.

RULING:

 The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. Its protection is directed only
to governmental action.
 This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a
private citizen.
 In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities.
Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him.
 Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure
of the evidence.
 The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable
search of the packages in compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and
seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
 Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals.
 The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships
between individuals.
Additional notes:

When a private individual violates another person’s right to privacy, the evidence
obtained therefrom is admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable
under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico
sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal
selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of
P640.  YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It
was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC:
Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims,
that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite
this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
 People v. Mendoza

G.R. No. 191267, June 13, 2013

Arrest

Search and Seizure

See: Rule 113 Section. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful

Rule 126 Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest

FACTS: PO2 dela Cruz and PO2 Sangel, both operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF), PO2 dela Cruz testified that on
May 15, 2004 at about 8:15 in the evening, their confidential informant arrrived at their
office reporting that a certain alias Monica, who turned out to be the accused, was
involved in the rampant sale of illegal drugs along PNR South Compound, Brgy. Pio del
Pilar, Makati City. Their Action Officer, SPO4 Mangulabnan formed a buy- bust team led
by SPO1 Magallanes to effect the arrest of Mendoza. A briefing was conducted
regarding the anti-narcotics operation and dela Cruz was designated as poseur-buyer.
He was tasked to buy PhP 200.00 worth of shabu from accused. Two pieces of one
hundred peso bills were provided and marked with “AMM” for use in the buy-bust
operation. Coordination with the PDEA was made. The team then proceeded to the
area of operation, at the PNR South Compound, Brgy, Pio del Pilar, Makati City to
conduct the buy- bust operation.

Dela Cruz further testified that upon arrival at the said area, the informant accompanied
him to where accused was. The rest of the team positioned themselves strategically
within the perimeter. Thereafter, the informant introduced him to accused as a person in
need of shabu. At this instance, he conveyed his intentions of buying two hundred
pesos worth of shabu to accused. He then gave the PhP 200.00 pesos buy-bust money
to accused who in turn, gave one plastic sachet containing suspected shabu to him. The
transaction having been consummated, he then made a motion of giving a high five to
accused which was the pre-arranged signal for the rest of the back-up team.

Operations back-up Sangel then approached the area of transaction, introduced himself
as a police officer and placed Mendoza under arrest. She was apprised of the nature of
the arrest and of her constitutional rights.

Dela Cruz continued that at the area of transaction, a search conducted after the arrest
which resulted in the recovery of the buy-bust money and five other plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu. He was just very near Sangel when the sachets of shabu
were taken from accused. He accordingly marked the pieces of evidence recovered
from accused. Likewise marked was the shabu subject matter of the sale transaction.
Accused was thereafter brought to the office of the SAID -SOTF, where she was turned
over to the investigator on duty.
Afterwards, the items seized were brought to the PNOC Crime Laboratory Office for
examination. The laboratory examination on the specimens submitted yielded positive
result for the presence of a dangerous drug shabu. He maintained that the operation
was properly coordinated with the PDEA.

Sangel corroborated the testimony of dela Cruz mainly with respect to the buy-bust
operation against accused. He declared that he was about seven to ten meters away
from the place of transaction. After the pre- arranged signal was given by dela Cruz, he,
together with the team, proceeded to the accused to arrest her.

After Mendoza was arrested, she was ordered to empty her short pants and five pieces
of plastic sachets containing shabu were found and confiscated together with the
marked money in the amount of PhP 200.00. Thereafter, dela Cruz placed the marking
on the seized items at the place of transaction. The accused was then brought to the
SAID-SOTF of the Makati Police for investigation while the seized items were brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for laboratory examination.

Accused for her part, denied the charges against her. She denied that she was caught
selling shabu and that she was caught in possession of the same. She maintained that
on May 15, 2004 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was at the back of her
house at PNR Compound, P. Medina Street, Brgy. Pio del Pilar, Makati City hanging
clothes when a kid named Totoy, told her that police officers were looking for her. Upon
learning that police officers were looking for her she went home. There she saw Sangel
together with other police officers. She knew Sangel because her live- in partner would
give half of his earnings to his dispatcher the same to be given to Sangel otherwise, the
latter would not allow them to park their vehicles for passengers. She approached
Sangel and asked if they needed something from her. Sangel told her to go with them.
The accused dressed up and went with the policemen thinking that the reason she was
asked to go with them because of the murder case of Jun Riles filed against Jonathan
Lesaca and Alfredo Lesaca before the RTC where she was a star witness.

She was brought to the office of the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU). At the office of the
DEU, Mangulabnan talked to her. He told her that she was stubborn as he once told her
not to meddle with the case of her friend Jun Riles or else something will happen to her.
She was then asked if she knew Edwin Kerabu and she said she knew him because he
was her neighbor. She was asked if she knew where to find Kerabu. She told them that
she usually sees this Kerabu in front of the “binggohan.”

Afterwards she was brought to the place she was referring to. Accused was left inside
the vehicle for about thirty minutes and thereafter she saw the police officers with
Kerabu. He was brought inside the vehicle. There Kerabu was asked if he had shabu
and he replied that he did not have any. He was frisked and the police officers were
able to recover from his pocket white substance suspected to be shabu. Accused and
Kerabu were both brought back to the office of the DEU.
At the DEU, Mendoza wanted to go home but she was not permitted by the police
officers. She was made to stay and she was surprised that the DEU filed charges
against her. She was brought to a place where she underwent

drug testing. She was made to urinate in a bottle. After the drug test, she was brought
back to the office of the DEU where she was detained. She was then brought to the
fiscal's office where she learned of the charges filed against her. At the fiscal's office
she was made to sign a document.

The RTC, found the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. She was found guilty of the
charge for the violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, the illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs, and sentenced her to life imprisonment.

Accused appealed the RTC decision to the CA, where she raised the issue of error on
the part of the RTC in admitting the evidence seized despite being products of an
unlawful arrest. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the trial court's
convictions. Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a warrant should have been secured first before the accused
was arrested

HELD:

No.

The Court finds the prosecutor's evidence credible and sufficient to convict the accused
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and possession of the same in violation of Section 5
and Section 11, of R.A. No. 9165, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

It is significant to reiterate and emphasize that the elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, like shabu, were convincingly established. These
are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration, and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.
After a thorough and painstaking review of evidence on record, the Court affirms the
conviction of accused. Indeed, the prosecution has presented sufficient proof of her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused alleged that the trial court erred in appreciating the evidence presented by the
prosecution as they were seized as a result of an unlawful arrest. She insists that a valid
warrant should have been secured first before they proceeded to arrest her.

This argument is totally faulty and is without even an iota of credibility. The warrantless
arrest conducted on accused was valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Proceedure enumerates the situations when a person may xd

be arrested without a warrant, thus:

“SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it;

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgement or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.”

Paragraph (a) of Section 5, is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a

warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the instant case, the prosecution completely and fully established that accused was
arrested in flagrante delicto.

At any rate, accused failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest before
arraignment. In fact, she participated in the trial. She even took the witness stand and
testified in her own behalf. She is now estopped from assailing the legality of her arrest
as she waived any irregularity, if any, that may have tainted her arrest

Significantly, the proof of an in flagrante delicto arrest, removes whatever credibility

there may have been about the testimony of the accused of the alleged circumstances
that made her go with the police to the DEU unit. Her version that she was a frame-up
victim cannot stand against the testimony of the police, supported by evidence of corpus
delicti.

The Decision appealed was AFFIRMED.

RATIO: Rule 113 Section. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it;

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has

escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Rule 126 Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002

FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger
ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March
13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer,
Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4)
other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as
the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and
was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but
no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy
section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this
back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase,
revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security personnel immediately reported
the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and
its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.

But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened and searched without
his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid

HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to
the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee
and does not discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a
regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To

overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi as the
owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses
were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person
named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does
exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and
support the claim of the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if,
as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories
can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this
Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent
to possess the same.
B. SEARCH WARRANT

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.
SUPERGREEN, INCORPORATED

G.R. No. 161823             March 22, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., filed a case against respondent

Supergreen, Incorporated in violation of Republic Act No. 8293.

According to Sony, Respondent imitated the general appearance of petitioner’s goods

and that respondent sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila.
Furthermore, the NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and
distribution of counterfeit "PlayStation" game software, consoles and accessories in
violation of Sony Computer’s intellectual property rights.

Thus, NBI applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1 for warrants
to search respondent’s premises in Parañaque City and Cavite and simultaneously
served the search warrants on the subject premises and seized a replicating machine
and several units of counterfeit "PlayStation" consoles, joy pads, housing, labels and
game software.

Respondent assails the validity of the warrant due to wrong venue and counters that the
applications should be filed and provided the territorial limitations on search warrants.
Even granting that petitioner has compelling reasons, respondent maintains that
petitioner cannot file the application with the RTC of Manila because Cavite
belongs to another judicial region. Respondent also argues that the doctrine on
continuing crime is applicable only to the institution of a criminal action, not to
search warrant applications which is governed by Rule 126, and in this case
Section.

Issue:

Whether or not the offenses involved in the subject search warrants are "continuing
crimes" .

Held:

We agree with petitioner that this case involves a transitory or continuing offense of
unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293, which provides,

SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. – …

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good
faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or
his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who
shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair
competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against
unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of
goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the
wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon,
or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence
purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer,
other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with
such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade,
or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling
such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another
who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall
commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of another.

Pertinent too is Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code that enumerates the elements
of unfair competition, to wit:

(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another
manufacturer or dealer;

(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2)
wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other
feature of their appearance;

(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance
or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and

(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.

Respondent’s imitation of the general appearance of petitioner’s goods was done

allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The
alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under
Section 2 (b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any
element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the courts within the
National Capital Region (Metro Manila).
Sps Marimlavs People

Facts: Special Investigator (SI) Ray Lagasca filed for a search warrant to search the
house of petitioners and certain premises on Maria Aquino St., Pampanga both for
violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425. All requisites for the issuance of a valid
search warrant were met. After searching petitioners’ house they were able to seize
various amounts of dried flowering tops and cash at around 15,000. An information for
violation of RA 6425 was filed against Petitioners, who in turn filed a motion to quash
search warrants and to suppress evidence illegally seized.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the court had jurisdiction to issue the search warrant
2. Whether or not the application for the search warrant was defective considering that it
was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head but only by the Deputy Director
3. Whether AM No. 99-10-09 SC enacted on Jan 25, 2000 was repealed when the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000? And that the
latter should govern the case.

Ruling:

(1) The public prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by Judge
Mario Guaria III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in order
considering that AM 991009SC allows or authorizes executive judges and vice
executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue
warrants which may be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases
where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI.

(2) Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an
assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be
specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law.

Director Wycocos act of delegating his task of endorsing the application for search
warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law unless
it is shown to be inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols endorsement
had the same force and effect as an endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself

(3) They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the
enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.

A.M. No. 991009SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on
application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOCTF, and REACTTF.

Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for
search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

A.M. No. 991009SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search
warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the
guidelines in A.M. No. 991009SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03802SC entitled
Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their
Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the
issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Petition is dismissed.