Q1 Pak-India Relations (Kashmir and LoC)

Kashmir, after 1947, became of even greater strategic value than in imperial times. Its military relevance for both India
and Pakistan lay in its location and in its usefulness for each state’s defense posture. For India, control over the Kashmir
Valley, in particular, became essential for the protection of remote Ladakh, next to the Chinese borderland. In a war with
Pakistan too, India could be vulnerable to a fast penetration of Kashmir by Pakistani armour and tactical airpower aiming
to sever the territory off from India proper. Kashmir, however, had numerous links to Pakistani territory: its partition had
meant economic disruption … and the natural access routes from Kashmir led mainly to the West Punjab”.

Section I: Introduction
Pakistan and India share a turbulent and complex, history.
The history is replete with numerous existential issues.
Characterised by mistrust, contrasting interests and the oft-quoted ‘missed opportunities’, the bloodshed of 1947 has
been replaced by a more diverse set of issues that continue to mar the relationship.
Kashmir is a classic case of a territorial dispute
But failures of State, internal conflicts, deep-rooted differences have led to continued tension between the two
neighbours.
Pak-India relationship can be divided into phases depending on important junctures in South Asian history.
None of the chances that were provided to the countries bore fruit. The most recent such case was in 2004; following a
prolonged period of military standoff, there began a ‘peace process’ led by President Musharraf and Prime Minister
Vajpayee.
This phase was significant since it allowed for a more systematic approach to negotiations by adopting the concept
of “Composite Dialogue” that covered various issues that have continually hindered progress on even seemingly non-
contentious fronts.
A move away from a traditionally line of control- (LoC) and Kashmir-centric policy, it called for a number of concerns
to be brought to the table and economic cooperation to be enhanced.
However nothing came out of it.

The process did expose some important aspects of the relationship.

 progressive talks and meaningful solutions were not just desirable, they were also possible.
 lack of political will, or more suitably, the political constraints, in both countries prevent agreeable solutions.

This was clear for instance in the case of the Sir Creek and Siachin issues where significant progress through
collaboration could not be translated into concrete agreements.
Similarly, when a proposed visit to Islamabad by Prime Mister Manmohan Singh, as part of this process, could not
materialise, progress was further derailed.

The current phase succeeding the aforementioned period of peaceful Composite Dialogue begins with the terrorist
attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008.
Suspension of dialogue ensued and that has only recently been revived in 2010.
Ever since the attacks, with the international pressure and attention garnered by India, militancy in Pakistan has been
under intense scrutiny.
India’s stance on Pakistan’s alleged State policy of supporting militants and on dealing with certain individuals and
groups, whose name has been linked to the Mumbai attacks, is paramount to all other areas of negotiations as far as
New Delhi is concerned.
Pakistan’s priorities remain the more traditional long-standing issues such as Kashmir and water security. Moreover,
there is insistence from Pakistan for a more structured rather than uni-dimensional dialogue.
Ironically, some suggest that the current positions are paradoxical since it was actually India that had benefited from
the Composite Dialogue process.
This nonetheless remains a minority opinion as both countries remain adamant in their positions.
After the 16th SAARC summit in Bhutan in April 2010, there has been a revival of sorts that some see as a resumption
of the Composite Dialogue ‘for all practical purposes’ even as the term itself has been avoided. For others, this is simply
a continuation of erstwhile stubborn attitudes and signifies no progress on any front. Even as intent for dialogue as the
only way forward has been appreciated, there are no solid foundations, proposed framework or clear guidelines as to how
talks will proceed.
Future talks between foreign ministers of both countries are expected to bring some coherence to negotiations.

However, additional complications arise from, for instance, the case of Ajmal Kasab, the sole captured terrorist from the
group that was involved in the Mumbai attacks who has now been charged by Indian courts amid great public and official
outpouring against Pakistan.
Moreover, with the failed bombing attempt in New York’s Time Square by a Pakistani that once again highlights
terrorist outfits in the country, there are concerns that the process of negotiations with India will be derailed before it even
begins since Pakistan remains in the Indian narrative as an ‘epicentre’ for terrorism.

Section II: Mumbai 2008 and beyond

At the outset, it is relevant to discuss the events that have dominated headlines in both Pakistan and India, and have been
the juncture from which starts a new phase in a troublesome relationship.
On November 26, 2008, a group of militants simultaneously attacked multiple targets in Mumbai, killing around 183
people, including nine terrorists and 22 foreign nationals, while some further 327 people received injuries.
Although relations between India and Pakistan had already been strained following a suicide attack on the Indian
Embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008 that had killed over 40 people including the Indian defence attaché, these attacks in
Mumbai served as a nail in the coffin as all fingers pointed to Pakistan.
Option of a military strike was ruled out by the Indian government, but on December 16, 2008, Foreign Minister
Pranab Mukherjee announced that the Composite Dialogue process with Pakistan was to be put on hold until credible
action is taken against those responsible for the Mumbai carnage. Since then, there has been hardly any vacillation from
this stance.
Following the 2009 Lok Sabha elections that saw the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coming back to power, there
were high hopes that India would show some flexibility. However, on June 16, 2009, on the sidelines of a Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on
meeting President Zardari, flouted traditional norms of diplomacy, saying that, “my mandate is to tell you that
Pakistani territory should not be used for terrorism against India” in the presence of the international media.
Unsurprisingly, the incident was not taken well in Pakistan, and in a statement made in the Senate, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Malik Amad Khan made it clear that the comments were unacceptable to Islamabad. In response,
Pakistan decided that the president would not participate in the upcoming Non-Aligned Summit (NAM) in Egypt and
instead Prime Minster Yousuf Raza Gillani would lead the country’s delegation. It had been decided earlier that the
foreign secretaries of both countries would meet to discuss the steps taken by Pakistan to check terrorism against India
before a possible Singh-Zardari stock-taking meeting in Egypt.
Nevertheless, things were looking up when on July 16, 2009, Gillani met with Singh in the Egyptian city of Sharm-el-
Sheikh on the sidelines of the NAM summit.
The meeting concluded with the issuance of a joint statement in which both countries agreed to de-link action on
terrorism and the Composite Dialogue process. It clearly stated that “both Prime Ministers recognized that dialogue is
the only way forward. Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue Process and these
should not be bracketed.”
Indian premier had to face severe criticism not only from Opposition parties but also from coalition partners and
some members of the Congress party. Dubbing the statement a ‘surrender’ by India,
Opposition parties, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), made such a hue and cry that Singh was forced to
backtrack from the commitment made in Sharm-el-Sheikh. The very next day, in order to clarify his position, he stated
that de-linking dialogue and action on terrorism only served to strengthen India’s commitment that a meaningful process
of engagement cannot move forward unless Pakistan takes measures to control terrorism.
Similarly, a reference to Balochistan in the joint statement was also criticised in India as it was perceived as an
acknowledgement of its alleged role in the Pakistani province. Singh defended himself by saying that India had nothing to
hide and that the statement was perhaps a case of bad drafting. In Pakistan, the reaction to the inclusion of Balochistan
was seen as a great success, but at the same time an absence of any reference to Kashmir was also highlighted.
The following months saw growing tensions as Pakistan witnessed a tirade of allegations from India, unsurprisingly
with terrorism as the central theme. Ranging from allegations and issues such “forty-two terrorist camps operating in
Pakistan”, rise in infiltration to India, exporting terrorism and using it as a State policy to further its strategic goals and
targeting Indian interests in Afghanistan, the narrative emerging from India adopted an accusing stance that supposed a
lack of interest in tackling terrorism that targeted India. There were also occasional threats given to Pakistan, albeit
coming from various sources and covering different levels of intensity, of dire consequences if another Mumbai-type
attack was to take place.
The former Indian Chief of the Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor also came forth and announced his
provocative Cold Start strategy which aims at quick mobilisation in order to launch a retaliatory strike against Pakistan in
case of a terrorist attack. The war doctrine, which had been in place before the attacks took place and was now re-
emphasised, seeks to make territorial gains 50-80 kilometres inside Pakistan which could be used in post-conflict
negotiations to extract concessions.
Indian intentions, coupled with its military strength, have consequently led to much debate in Pakistan.

India is currently the tenth largest defence spender in the world with an estimated two per cent share of global
expenditure. It has earmarked a massive amount of money for a modernisation programme of its armed forces and has
inked agreements with other countries worth billions of dollars. However, it vehemently opposes any such agreement
for Pakistan. Recently, France finalised a $2.2 billion deal with India to upgrade its fleet of Mirage 2000 fighters,
but suspended the sale of electronics and missiles for Pakistan’s JF 17 fighters, reportedly under “Indian pressure.”
Renewed incidents of firing on both at the line of control (LoC) and the international boundary also served to escalate
tensions.
However, despite Pakistan’s accusing India of creating unrest in Balochistan and FATA through its consulates in
Afghanistan, it also continued its efforts towards a process of dialogue.

Thaw finally came when on February 4, 2010 India formally offered to resume foreign secretary-level talks with
Pakistan. Without clarifying the scope of the proposed discussions, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupuma Rao invited her
Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir for talks to New Delhi. It was claimed that the offer had been made with an open
mind, and official sources made it clear that while India would be willing to discuss all issues including Balochistan, its
sole focus would be on terrorism. It was also stressed that this revival of a bilateral relationship should not be seen as
resumption of the Composite Dialogue.
A behind-the-scene role played by the U.S., as well as the emerging situation in Afghanistan, were perhaps the main
reasons behind this Indian decision.
Besides, there was also a tacit realisation that coercive diplomacy had run its course and was now counterproductive for
India; indeed it was felt that by establishing ‘measured contact’, India would be able to put more pressure on Pakistan.
An unstructured dialogue such as the one on offer would help present terrorism as the core issue without giving Pakistan
an equal chance to raise other issues.
Pakistan accepted the offer and a delegation went to New Delhi on February 24, 2010 with the hope of recreating an
atmosphere of friendship. During the meeting, India handed over three dossiers to Pakistanand demanded that thirty-
three individuals, including two serving Pakistan army officers as well as Indian fugitives allegedly involved in
terror acts, be handed over to India.
This forced the Pakistani foreign secretary to remind India that his country had witnessed “hundreds of
Mumbais” and lost 5,366 civilians in 3,043 terror attacks since 2008 and, therefore, was not ignorant of the dangers of
terrorism.
The delegation had gone to New Delhi with a roadmap with guidelines leading to a potential resumption of the Composite
Dialogue, including an invitation for External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna to visit Pakistan.

The proposal envisaged that the February meeting lay the ground for future discussions between Prime Ministers Singh
and Gilani that could take place on the margins of a SAARC meeting in Bhutan in late April, where resumption of the
Composite Dialogue could be announced through a joint statement.
However, India was more interested to broaden the discussion at official levels first, and suggested a ‘technical
meeting’ to improve cross-LoC trade, a meeting between commerce secretaries to carry forward discussions on trade
issues and a session of the Indo-Pakistan judicial committee for release of prisoners and fishermen.
The meeting visibly failed to melt the ice and both officials decided to conduct press briefings separately, indicating that
talks had not progressed as desired and this opinion was strengthened as the two made counter-claims regarding the issues
discussed.
Rao claimed that 85 per cent of talk time had been taken up by terrorism and the remaining by eleven other issues.
She insisted that Kashmir was only briefly touched on, and Afghanistan was not discussed at all. On the other
hand, Bashir categorically stated that Kashmir had been discussed “extensively” since it is the core issue and one that
cannot be left out.
A lack of trust between the two countries limited the task of the foreign secretaries and there was no consensus on a
potential roadmap to resumption of a composite or any structured dialogue process for the future. India’s sole focus on
terrorism can be gauged by the fact that Pakistan had to make last-minute changes in its delegation, leaving behind
members from interior and water and power ministries due to Indian insistence.
Pakistan strongly advocated resumption of the Composite Dialogue with India stressing that it was “unfair, unrealistic
and counter-productive” to allow the issue of terrorism to stall the process of improving relations.
Indian foreign minister responded that “the resumption of such a process would have to await the restoration of
greater trust and confidence.”
As expected, the decision to hold talks with Pakistan met severe criticism in India.
All major political parties came down hard on the government and alleged that it had bowed to U.S. pressure.
Prime minister defended his stance by saying that the decision was not sudden but a “calculated” move after weighing all
the costs and benefits.
During March 2010, India repeatedly expressed its desire to conduct a second round of foreign secretary-level talks in
Islamabad. However, Pakistan made it clear that it was not interested in a mere photo opportunity and wanted result-
oriented talks that discussed all outstanding issues.
In this backdrop, the aforementioned SAARC summit was held in Bhutan from April 28-29, 2010 and it led to a
meeting between the two prime ministers, although both countries gave mixed signals till the last moment.
This came soon after a 47-nation summit on nuclear security that had taken place in Washington in early April. Referring
to the exchange of pleasantries that had occurred during that meeting, Pakistan’s foreign minister insisted that both India
and Pakistan “need to go beyond a handshake.” He further demanded that India stop demonising Pakistan since
terrorism is a challenge common to both countries.
Pressure from the U.S, as well as from SAARC members played a vital role in bringing the two countries to some sort of
an agreement in Bhutan.
The two leaders had three meetings, including a one-on-one discussion that lasted over an hour. What emerged was
an agreement that there was lack of trust that necessitated dialogue. In order to pacify Opposition parties and the general
public, terrorism and prosecution of terrorists allegedly involved in the Mumbai attacks were issues highlighted by
Manmohan Singh, to which the Pakistani premier responded by giving assurances that terrorism was a threat that the
country is working against.
Both countries also agreed that foreign ministers and foreign secretaries meet as soon as possible to work out
modalities for future course of talks and restore trust. Dispelling the notion that this might lead to a resumption of the
Composite Dialogue, Indian officials made it clear that a move to resume a dialogue that had existed before the
Mumbai attacks would make no sense since a new method of engagement needed to be introduced.
It is argued that Pakistan’s assertion that it cannot give guarantees against another Mumbai-like attack in India goes
against the spirit of the January 6, 2004 joint statement between the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpaee and former
President Pervez Musharaf which formed the basis for the resumption of Composite Dialogue. It is also being said that
Pakistan’s action against those accused in the Mumbai case will shape the contours of future engagement. Terrorism,
then, has remained a necessary focal issue.
Nirupama Rao visited Islamabad on June 24, 2010 and met her counterpart Salman Bashir to set an agenda for a
meeting between the foreign ministers in July. However, prior to the meeting, India made it clear that Pakistan’s
willingness to build on progress made by the two countries in back-channel diplomacy on Kashmir would be viewed
favourably. The meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere as both the countries pledged to work together to reduce
the trust deficit.

The talks, as Rao put it, “provided an opportunity to talk to each other and not at each other.” Both sides exchanged
proposals on issues that were deemed deliverable during the foreign ministers’ meeting in July. While India’s proposals
dealt with trade and humanitarian issues, Rao also asked Pakistan to ensure that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) chief Hafiz
Saeed is prevented from issuing anti-India statements or making contentious speeches. At a joint press conference,
both confirmed that all main issues had been taken up for discussion. The talks, according to Bashir, began as an
exploratory venture, but “after this round, we are much more optimistic of good prospects at the foreign ministers’
meeting.” Rao too described the talks as forward-looking with both sides trying to understand each other’s position.
On the heels of her visit, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram also flew to Islamabad to attend a SAARC Interior
Ministers’ conference, and met Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik. He reiterated the Indian position, insisting that
Pakistan bring to justice all the 26/11 plotters, including Hafiz Saeed. He also asked Pakistan to hand over voice samples
of all seven LeT terrorists who have been in Pakistani jails for their involvement in 26/11 as ‘a first step’ towards
restoring confidence. He demanded that Pakistan step up efforts to locate and arrest thirteen absconders who had been
found guilty by Indian courts, and Pakistan on its part assured full cooperation.

Since the two sets of meetings, India has been continuously insisting that Pakistan take some credible action before the
visit by Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna as it was “an important test of Pakistan’s willingness to act against terrorism
directed at India.”

Section III: Terrorism in India-Pakistan ties

Ajmal Kasab, the protagonist of the saga that followed on from the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008,
was sentenced to death by Indian courts in May 2010. The verdict has in that country been hailed by the media and
politicians alike, with Law Minister Moily terming it a message to Pakistan to abandon its “State policy of terrorism”. A
similar statement by Home Minister Chidambaram also makes for ominous reading, warning Pakistan to refrain from
“exporting” terror to India.
Questions of alliances between people and groups across borders, the role of militant groups; specifically the infamous
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), attackers’ training and planning inside Pakistan and the roles of the State and Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI); have since provided the framework within which the Indian response has been based. For our
purpose it is important to understand three major aspects of the entire debate.
 how Pakistan has dealt with the terrorists related to the attacks

 Indian perception of Pakistani actions and

 The people and groups – most notable LeT – named and brought up as part of the alleged and confirmed terrorist
groups.

Cynical Indian policy of maligning Pakistan and making repeated references to alleged State sponsorship of terrorism in
order to gain international sympathy, have done considerable damage to the relationship. The rhetoric of Pakistan’s
being the “epicentre” of extremism and terrorism dominates the jargon designed for the Indian narrative, and the global
response clearly shows not just the importance of external actors, but also the success of Indian policy. This has,
according to some analysts, broadly covered a two-pronged strategy for coping with terrorism in Pakistan – one,
using coercive diplomacy by moving troops from peacetime locations to positions closer to the border, and two, through
the aforementioned tough statements by civilian and military officials.

While rumour mills among masses, and of late also a largely independent and expressive media, have traditionally blamed
actors from across the border for mishaps in both countries, events of Mumbai have brought this to an official platform
with even the Indian premier blaming “agencies” in Pakistan. There has been an overwhelming consensus in India that
Pakistan is not inclined to pursue those involved in the attack; the role of the ISI is brought up specifically in its alleged
historical ties with groups like the LeT. Indeed, the intelligence agency has been suggested to have played a “direct role
guiding Lashkar-e-Tayyiba” in Mumbai attacks.

This is even more worrisome since talks between the two countries have had no extensive frameworksince then. While
Pakistan has been pushing for a structured dialogue, Indian focus has solely been on terrorism – more specifically,
Pakistan’s attitude to terrorism and its commitment, or lack of commitment, in dealing with the masterminds of the
Mumbai attacks. The LeT and its members, with alleged leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed being the most sought-after
individual, dominate this terrorism debate.
Strongly denying Indian criticism, Pakistan claims to have been working adequately, even attributing delays in
investigation to India. Accepting that Kasab was a Pakistani citizen, there was an implicit acceptance also of the fact that
training and planning had taken place in the country.
The arrest and subsequent release of Hafiz Saeed is seen by India as a masquerade, based on allegations of the ISI
supporting LeT. However, anti-terrorism courts are already hearing prosecution arguments against seven men captured in
November 2009 for their involvement in the said attacks.

The most prominent of these, Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi, is believed to be second-in-command of the LeT. Moreover, arrest
warrants have been issued for nine others charged in absentia.

For his part, the enigma that is Hafiz Saeed has had his mystique further enhanced by assuming the leadership of Jamaat-
ud-Dawa (JuD), a religious charity organization that is deemed to be a front cover for the LeT. JuD has been officially
banned due to UN interjection but continues to garner respect in Pakistan due to its charitable activities. Hafiz
Saeed has in fact distanced himself from the LeT.
The Indian focus on Hafiz Saeed and the belief that he still heads the LeT remains intact. This has come up time and
again; the most glaring example being the occasion of foreign secretary-level talks in February 2010 when his freedom
was openly criticised. More recently, Pakistan’s foreign minister termed Indian demands for his arrest as the “same old
beaten track”, noting that the legal system was leading the process in Pakistan. Regardless of that, as late as July 2010,
before the foreign ministers meet in what is expected to be a return to comprehensive dialogue, Indian officials continue
to stress extradition of certain alleged terrorists among other demands regarding the capture of LeT members including
Saeed.
This Indian pressure is troublesome for Pakistan since after the UN declared JuD a terrorist organization, it was
banned and Saeed was captured before the court decided to release him and dismiss charges against him. It is even
more worrisome since the criticism comes at a time when the judiciary is experiencing unprecedented independence in the
country.
While some members of the banned LeT are undergoing trial, Pakistan has failed to convince India of its commitment.
LeT, a banned organisation as it is, is seen as a low priority even as the country is involved in counterterrorism operations.

Other groups including Al Qaeda, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban are seen as requiring more
immediate attention as far as Pakistan’s security is concerned. Punjabi groups such as the LeT have in the last decade not
been prioritised in comparison. While chances are that this trend is changing as Punjab-based organisations face severe
criticism from inside the country and it appears that a large-scale showdown against these is possible, if talks between
India and Pakistan remain uni-dimensional in focusing on the LeT, they ignore other larger dimensions of security threats
to Pakistan.
Increasingly, it is being seen as the most important group after Al Qaeda in terms of its global reach, even though it is
still based in Pakistan and has only Pakistani members.
Founded in 1987, alleged State support led to a steady flow of finances and volunteers as its initial role in Afghanistan
gradually evolved into Kashmir-centricism. It has reportedly been part of a network that aims to destabilise India
since 1993 where it has “literally launched hundreds of attacks”; now, its interest in Afghanistan make it an
organisation of interest to the U.S. as well.
Allegedly nurtured by State patronage for influence in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the LeT was banned in 2002 and has
since outgrown its reported State sponsors. Indeed, “more than any other group, LeT encapsulates the complicated history
of intertwined relations between Pakistani security services and ideologically-driven militants.” However, since it is now
recognised that proxy fighters will not lead to a settlement in Kashmir, Pakistan may possibly try to eliminate the group
using a gradualist approach – arresting members and banning JuD might have been the first steps already taken to reach
such an eventuality.
With an overall focus on Kashmir and India, this mainly Punjabi outfit shares a rocky relationship with other militant
groups due to ideological differences, a reluctance to join in the Afghan jihad and alleged close ties with the military.
With no militant allies, LeT remains susceptible to State pressure even if it has outgrown State control and so refrains
from launching attacks inside Pakistan. Lately, however, it has reportedly increased its presence in Afghanistan and
FATA under the banner of JuD with aims to infiltrate fighters in Afghanistan, using its charitable venues for
recruitment.

While India remains its primary concern, there are members within the LeT who are believed to be providing support to
the Pakistani Taliban. Lately, evidence of support from the Gulf countries, the U.K., America and Australia has
appeared to make it a more dangerous organisation with a global agenda – David Headley’s capture in the USA being a
case in point showing LeT’s global reach. While this is still debatable; what is certain is that India remains its priority
even if its “peripheral jihad” has in some ways expanded to the West.
While there are signs of Pakistan’s cracking down on the group, a gradualist approach may not be acceptable to India.
There is even an argument that for Pakistan, the risk of escalating violence that is sure to accompany swift action, may be
well worth taking if it leads to peace with India. Events since Mumbai have made the Indian position stronger. While
initially it had tried to engage Saudi Arabia and the U.S. to gain sympathy against the LeT, there had been only superficial
reciprocation since the Al Qaeda and Taliban offered a bigger threat to these countries; now, however, events may have
caused a shift in the discourse on LeT.
Favoured by the army due to its Punjabi character and State loyalty, it is claimed that it was given all kinds of support and
has now grown in part due to its charity wing JuD from whose finances and resources are siphoned off. As a result, its
autonomy from the ISI has increased and it now requires only specific support – including safe havens, intelligence and
campaign guidance rather than finances.

May 2010 has been an eventful month; in India, a “historic trial” with many “legal firsts” has seen the death penalty and
imprisonment for life for Kasab. At the same time, individuals are being tried in Pakistan and the Pakistani-American
David Headley in the U.S. Cautious voices cognizant that the Kasab trial is a mere piece in the jigsaw have warned
against enthusiastic claims of victory since this is just the beginning of a long process. However, where it goes from this
point is still not clear.

The much publicized foreign secretary talks in Delhi in February 2010 were also inconclusive, if not altogether
demoralising. The necessity of engagement was apparent; Nirupama Rao admitted this much when she noted
that “dialogue between India and Pakistan is obviously the way forward for normalisation of relations and to
resolve outstanding issues between the two countries. We in India have never turned our back on dialogue with
Pakistan. But let me also add that terrorism is a stand-alone phenomenon that affects the climate of dialogue.”
Indian response to Mumbai has been seen as largely inadequate by the public; warning signs are that a further attack
traced to Pakistan will not be responded to with restraint. “Minor, cosmetic gestures including the brief arrest of Hafiz
Saeed” by the Pakistani government are unlikely to appease a growing tension that could find any further attack
being responded to in some form of military retaliation – as manifest perhaps in the Cold Start doctrine.
When one focuses on the aftermath of Mumbai while analysing terrorism in Pakistan-India relations, there is the risk of
overlooking other developments. There has, for instance, been alarm on the Pakistani side regarding Indian role in
supporting militants in Balochistan – for which officials claim to have “conclusive proof”. This is an added dimension
to what is being called a proxy war between the two countries in Afghanistan.
Counterterrorism cooperation between the two seems impossible in the foreseeable future. Policy shifts are required
in both countries and need to incorporate a multitude of avenues that include terrorism if a long-term stable South Asia is
to surface out of the current turmoil and a new, hopefully permanent, phase in the relationship is to rise out of the current
hostile one. As it stands, however, the multidimensional aspect of terrorism – unfortunately narrowed down to the LeT –
remains on top of the agenda as India and Pakistan try to restore peace to the region.

Section IV: Water insecurity

The Indus Water Treaty signed decades ago has had the distinction of a unique precedent, the magnitude of which has
yet to be replicated in any sphere between the two countries since then.
However, the use of water resources and security issues related to these, remain in place.

These have been enhanced in recent years, as economic concerns coupled with water insecurity have led to legal,
ethical, environmental and geographic discussions as water becomes a prominent talking point. Not surprisingly,
Pakistan being the lower riparian has been the natural complainant in this debate.
The two nuclear neighbours that have fought three wars since independence, rivers flowing to Pakistan from Indian-
occupied Jammu and Kashmir have again emerged as a belated flashpoint. And, their re-emergence at a time when
relations were already going through a troubled period has not helped matters.
The dispute has seen Pakistan raise its concerns, since its very economy and the livelihoods of citizens are at stake. This
is because the country comes under direct threat due to the construction of various dams and projects by India on western
rivers that decrease the flow in rivers that provide water to Pakistan, the lower riparian.
In itself, the issue of water is not new; in fact, it is rooted in Indo-Pak history.
The river Indus originates in western Tibet, flows through China and Kashmir and then turns south into Pakistan
before entering the Arabian Sea. The partition of the Punjab had severely affected the water system of the Indus as
well as five other rivers (Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) of the province. Just after partition, in 1948, India
stopped the flow of water from the canals on its side, denying water to some eight per cent of cultivated area and
5.5 percent of sown area. This necessitated, on the one hand, clear guidelines, and on the other, it gave indications
of a problem that could, in future, get extremely complicated. This contention has indeed shown remarkable
foresight.

On May 4, 1948, India agreed to an Inter-Dominion agreement with Pakistan which allowed for the continuation of
water flow to Pakistan for irrigation until the newly formed Muslim State developed alternative water resources. This
agreement was not a permanent answer to the problem and a long-term, substantial solution was required. Pakistan,
therefore, approached the World Bank in 1952 to settle the issue permanently. Negotiations were carried out between
the two countries through the good offices of the World Bank and culminated in the signing of the Indus Water Treaty.
The treaty allocated three eastern rivers; Ravi, Beas and Sutlej; to India, and the western rivers; Chenab, Jhelum
and Indus; to Pakistan. It also enunciated a mechanism to exchange a regular flow-data of rivers, canals and streams.
Moreover, it stipulated that if either of the two countries plans to carry out “engineering work” on any of the rivers
and potentially interferes with the water flow, it would be required to provide the other with relevant
details. Accordingly, a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) was constituted, headed by commissioners from both
countries. In addition, the treaty also set the procedures for settlement of differences and disputes, both bilaterally and
through international arbitration. The conditions were deemed acceptable and the Indus Water Treaty emerged as a victory
for diplomatic and political negotiations between India and Pakistan.
The treaty is also a unique example of a success story of international riparian rights, and has withstood two major wars.
However, it could not successfully be used to put an end to a water dispute that arose in 1984. This was when India began
the construction of the Wullar barrage on River Jhelum in occupied Kashmir. New Delhi halted construction work
in 1987 after Pakistan lodged a strong protest over the project over its alleged violation of the Indus Water Treaty.
The controversies did not end there; in fact, they had only just begun. Since then, India and Pakistan have looked at water
as an issue in its own right, and one that threatens to supersede Kashmir and gain primacy among unresolved issues. In
the mid-1990s, India started another project, the Baglihar dam on River Chenab which is very important for
Pakistan’s agriculture. This badly reduced the flow of water and, unsurprisingly, perhaps also belatedly in 2005,
Pakistan again sought the World Bank’s help. Although the World Bank allowed India to go ahead with the project after a
few modifications, it did not permit the interruption of the agreed quota of water flow to Pakistan.
Yet, in 2008, Pakistan suffered a huge setback to its autumnal crops due to reduced water flow of the Chenab. Jamat Ali
Shah, Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner, claimed that this was because of a shortage of water in the river that had
occurred due to the filling of the Baglihar dam. India did nothing to address the problem initially, exacerbating the
relations that had already turned hostile. However, there was cause for some optimism later when, as in 1978 when the
Salal Dam issue was resolved through talks, given the necessary will, the Baglihar Dam issue also led to settlement
through meetings of the two countries Indus water commissioners in June 2010.
Settlements such as these, however, appear myopic when the sheer numbers of projects that are deemed controversial are
brought up. The Kishanganga dam on Jhelum River is another alleged violation of the treaty that represents a deep
cleavage in India-Pakistan water issues. The project involves the construction of a 37m high concrete-faced, rock-filled
dam and an underground powerhouse. A maximum gross head of 697 m is proposed to be utilised to generate 1,350
million units of energy, achieving efficiency of 90 per cent in a year with an installed capacity of 3×110 MW. New Delhi
maintains that it is within its rights, under the treaty, to divert Kishanganga waters to the Bonar Madmati Nallah, another
tributary of the Jhelum, which falls into the Wullar Lake before joining the Jhelum again.
Pakistan has objected to this, noting that India’s plan to divert water causes an obstruction to the flow of the Kishanganga,
claiming that the project has been designed to divert water from one tributary of the Jhelum to another. This in effect will
adversely affect Pakistan’s own 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum project being built downstream on the Jhelum with
Chinese support. It has also raised objection to the depletion of dead storage in the run of the Kishanganga project.
However, both countries have failed to resolve the issue bilaterally at different levels.
Consequently, India has decided to nominate Peter Tomka, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice at the
Hague, and Lucius Caflisch who is a Swiss international law expert, to represent its case in the Kishanganga project
dispute with Pakistan. Pakistan had already named Bruno Simma, also of the International Court of Justice, and Jan
Paulsson, a Norwegian who heads an international law firm, as its arbitrators in the Court of Arbitration that will be set
up to resolve its differences with India under the bilateral Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.
The aforementioned Indian hydro projects are just some examples from a long list of works by India which could
adversely affect Pakistan. On the Chenab River, planned projects include the Bursur dam, Swalkot, Pakul dul, Dul
Hasti, Chenani-I, Chenani-II, Chenani-III, Bhaderwah, Baglihar-II, Kawar, Kiru and Kirthai-I; on the Jhelum,
there are the Lower Jhelum, Upper Sindh-I, Ganderbal, Upper Sindh-II, Pahalgam, Karnah and Parnai; while on
Indus basin, they include Iqbal, Hunder, Sumoor, Igo-Mercellong, Haftal, Marpachoo and Bazgo Stakna (with
J&KPDD). Needless to say, individual settlements on every project seem an uninviting and implausible solution; water
security needs to be pushed to the forefront considering the urgency of the problem that cannot afford wastage of time.
There is reason, however, to be cautiously hopeful. One positive aspect related to the issue is that during a meeting
between the Indus Water Commissioners that lasted from June 1 to June 4, 2010, Pakistan withdrew objections on two
Indian projects (Chutak and Uri-II). The 44 MW Chutak is located in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir on River
Suru and Pakistan had earlier raised objections to its construction. The other project, the Uri-II is a 250 MW dam, is
located in the Uri Tehsil of Baramulla district in Jammu and Kashmir. However, differences on the 45MW Nimoo Bazgo
project on the Indus in the Ladakh region of Indian-held Kashmir remained unresolved, with settlement depending on
further talks and information.

Despite these limited successes, the issue has to be dealt with much more intensely, involving a multitude of sectors. For
Pakistan, water security as a result of Indian projects takes such a precedence since its economy – some might say its very
survival – depends on water from these sources. India, on the other hand, sees a natural decrease in the amount of water
due to environmental and climatic effects, affecting both countries as a consequence.
Out of 79.6 million hectares of land that make up Pakistan, 20 million are available for agriculture. Of these, 16 million
are dependent on irrigation from the water sources in question. Consequently, 80 per cent of agriculture is dependent on
the water that is allegedly being ‘stolen’.

Section V: Kashmir
A South Asian dispute with global dimensions, Kashmir has been the one most prominent issue that divides Pakistan
and India. Economic concerns mix with the ideological, religious, political and the historical and even with matters of
pride and prestige as a solution to the territorial dispute becomes a major hurdle to lasting peace in the region.
In this context, events since November 2008 have, for once, relatively marginalised the issue as larger questions of
terrorism are put forward. That said, Kashmir is unlikely to remain on the sidelines for long, and in the current phase of
Pakistan-India ties, there have been movements on this front, even if they have been relatively insignificant given the
milieu. In this section, an overview since the Mumbai attacks, of how events pertaining to Kashmir have progressed, will
be given in order to contextualize the situation.
Almost a year after the Mumbai attacks, in October 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made his first visit to the
valley since re-election in the 15th Lok Sabha election. During his visit, he seemed to be extending a hand of friendship to
Pakistan by signalling strong commitment of his government in proceeding with unconditional dialogue with all Kashmiri
groups, provided that they shun violence.
Prior to that, Home Minister Chidambaram had also hinted that the Indian government was working on holding ‘quiet’
talks with every group in Kashmir, so that a unique solution to the issue could be sought. Talking at an editors’
conference, he stressed that “talks will be held silently, away from the media glare,”noting that this was important at
least until the contours of a political solution could be found.
Even as Pakistan’s relationship with India was going through a rocky phase, Prime Minister Singh’s offer for
unconditional talks in Kashmir came at a time when militant violence in the valley was at an all-time low. And, on this
occasion, there were many who were looking at such a dialogue with optimism; indeed, there was even speculation that
the offer would be accompanied by a number of confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as the potential
reduction of troops, and the abrogation of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).
The approach was welcomed by Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and former Chief Minister Mufti
Mohammad Sayeed, who insisted that talks without pre-conditions could help resolve the Kashmir problem. Announcing
his readiness for “sincere and meaningful talks” with the Centre, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, chairman of the moderate faction
of the Hurriyat Conference, stressed, however, that the participation of New Delhi, Islamabad, Muzaffarabad as well as
the people of Kashmir is imperative for the realisation of any proposed solution. While showing optimism, he also argued
that without adhering to the six-point proposal put forward by the Hurriyat Conference – which included the revocation of
all draconian laws, the unconditional release of all detainees and the withdrawal of troops – dialogue would be
insubstantial.
The Mirwaiz also clarified that willingness to engage in talks with New Delhi did not compromise the alliance’s basic
principle, since the Hurriyat believes that the right to self-determination is the basis of any solution. Stressing that
Kashmir’s problems cannot be resolved through bilateral talks, he added that the Hurriyat had taken a triangular
approach that involved engaging India as well as Pakistan so as to pave the way for tripartite talks.
The effect of this new round of desired negotiations as put forward by Manmohan Singh was not universally praised or
accepted with optimism. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, for instance, was one of those who rejected the initiative, with the
contention that “talks have been held over 130 times between Kashmiris and New Delhi since March 23, 1952, but
failed to achieve desired results. There is nothing new in the offer of talks.” Thus, as the suspension of bilateral
dialogue continued between Pakistan and India through this period, New Delhi was facing ambivalent reaction to its
initiative in Kashmir as well.
By the middle of November 2009, however, reports of a secret two-hour meeting between Chidambaram and Mirwaiz
Umar Farooq, along with his coalition colleagues Abdul Gani Bhat and Bilal Lone, appeared in the media. Mirwaiz, while
denying that such a meeting had taken place, accepted that that there were ongoing back-channel contacts between the
Hurriyat and the government but that these amounted to “communication” rather than dialogue. On the other hand,
Chidambaram’s office refrained from making any comments, except that since the Home Minister had initiated a process
of “quiet diplomacy”, details could not be made public.

The implied progress was corroborated and confirmed on November 18, 2009 when Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, while talking
to the media, said: “A lot is happening. Work is going on … on many possible solutions, one of which is an
agreement between New Delhi and Srinagar with Pakistan’s blessings.” It was also reported that India and Pakistan
had held two rounds of meetings in Bangkok and that the dialogue had been conducted between former Pakistan High
Commissioner Aziz Ahmed Khan and former RAW chief A S Dullat despite an apparent suspension of overall talks
between the two neighbours.
The Mirwaiz also said that the basic paradigm of discussions was inspired by Pervez Musharraf’s four-point proposal
for an acceptable solution to Kashmir. However, India was not ready for the aspect within these that called for joint
management and control of foreign affairs, currency and communications in Kashmir. He noted that it was hoped that
back-channel communication could create a substantive opening before the Hurriyat considered entering into public
dialogue with the Centre. He also admitted that the new momentum had much to do with pressure from the U.S. which
was pushing for a solution in order to address Pakistan’s growing concerns.
However, the Mirwaiz has been in a precarious position due to the process being followed. Facing allegations of starting
this “quiet diplomacy” with the Indian government without taking General Council of the amalgam and the Kashmiri
people in confidence, he has argued that that talks for resolving any issue were yet to start, insisting that both India and
Pakistan needed to start dialogue in order to pave the way for tripartite talks.

Whatever the progress on Chidambaram’s approach, the process received a setback when senior All Parties Hurriyat
Conference leader Fazal Haq Qureshi, believed to be a key player in the secret talks held between the Mirwaiz Umar
Farooq-led APHC and the Home Minister, was attacked. The assassination bid was seen as a move to disrupt the covert
negotiations and came as a direct threat to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and his separatist conglomerate in reaction to their
apparent decision to begin engaging in quiet and direct talks with New Delhi.

Some effects, as had been expected at the initiation of the talks, have since seen light. On December 19, 2009, Indian
Defence Minister A.K. Antony announced that two Army divisions (about 30,000 troops) had been withdrawn from
Jammu and Kashmir and that there were plans to pull back more troops if the law and order situation continued to
improve. At the same time though, he ruled out revocation of the AFSPAfrom areas where armed forces were deployed
for counterinsurgency operations.
On December 24, 2009, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs released its year-end review which noted that the number of
terrorism-related incidents in Kashmir had dropped by 27 per cent in 2009 as compared to 2008. India continued to accuse
Pakistan, however, of abetting in the training and infiltration of militants in Kashmir. The review stated that during
2009, 473 infiltration bids were made, out of which 367 were foiled; from these, 93 terrorists were intercepted and
227 retreated into Pakistan on being intercepted, whereas 110 terrorists managed to sneak into the valley.
Indian intelligence sources also contend that Pakistan has set up dedicated communication towers at Tum, Nikral,
Samani and Zaffarwal in Azad Kashmir to provide assistance to terrorists operating in the Poonch, Rajauri,
Naushera and Kathua regions. Upping its ante against Pakistan, the Indian media reported that in 2008, of the 237
militants killed, 171 had been foreigners; in 2009 another 161 militants were killed and these included 133 foreigners. In
the current year, until mid-March, 21 militants had been killed, and out of these, five were reported to be
foreigners. Defence Minister Antony also alleged that there are forty-two training camps operating in Pakistan and
that there had been little effort to close them down.
Somewhat contradictory at first glance are reports of an alleged spike in violence even as talks progress amid relatively
peaceful times. Citing various factors such as the quiet talks, the prime minister’s reconstruction programme, and a stable
government in the state as reasons for rising frustration among militant groups, Chidambaram warned that “militant
groups are coming together to give a push.” Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor also insisted that Pakistan had done
nothing to dismantle the forty-two anti-India training camps and was continuing to support militants. Pakistan is also
being blamed for the recent spurt in violence and renewed ceasefire violations both at LoC and the international border.
Towards February 2010, in an effort to mollify anger in the valley over the killing of a teenage boy at the hands of
security forces, India announced that it was considering a major confidence-building measure of granting amnesty to
young Kashmiris who had allegedly joined militant groups in Azad Kashmir, as well as to families that had crossed the
LoC to save themselves from shelling and troop harassment. India hopes that this “surrender and rehabilitation
policy” would go a long way towards addressing the political dimensions of Kashmiri dynamics.
Under such a scheme, those who seek to return are to be “quarantined” for at least a month for interrogation by
agencies. The proposal has attracted severe criticism from various quarters as it is being pointed out that a return
of militants would escalate violence as it could be abused by forces that are bent on creating havoc. In these testing
times, this comes as a challenge to New Delhi in terms of balancing its negotiations with APHC and appeasing the
Kashmiri populace.
Home Minister Chidambaram has come out and defended the initiative, saying that the identification, screening,
facilitation of travel from Pakistan, de-briefing, rehabilitation and integration with the country will be part of the policy
and will be observed with meticulous organisation. He observed that there was nothing new in the scheme as the
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has already recruited one full battalion of surrendered militants, whereas
the Border Security Force (BSF) also absorbed 450 ultras. On May 12, 2010, Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister
Omar Abdullah announced that the rehabilitation policy to facilitate return of militants from Pakistan-
administered Kashmir is in the final process of submission to New Delhi.
As far as Pakistan’s own approach to Kashmir is concerned, the manner in which it has now attempted to raise the issue in
the now reopened bilateral discussions with India shows how its importance has never diminished. While the strategic
element has never been questioned, even if it has remained sidelined relative to the emotive aspect; of late, the economic
facet has surfaced like never before due to a cognizance of water insecurity in the region. Nevertheless, Kashmir remains
a major issue for Pakistan as it attempts to engage India in systematic and organized discussions on a number of issues.

Recently, Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri disclosed that the previous government had
completed almost 90 per cent of the spadework on the Kashmir dispute by 2007, and that the entire exercise needed just
the formal signature of all the three parties to the issue – Pakistan, India and representatives of Kashmir. He said that the
solution is ‘just a signature away’ once India and Pakistan decide to pull the file from the rack as the entire paper-
work has been done.
He also claimed that the copies of related documents are safe with some friendly countries as negotiators from Islamabad
and New Delhi had quietly toiled away for three years, talking to each other and Kashmiri representatives from the Indian
side as well as those settled overseas, to reach the “only possible solution to the Kashmir issue.” Through this, the two
sides had reportedly agreed to full demilitarisation of both Indian-occupied Kashmir and Azad Kashmir. In addition, a
package of loose autonomy that stopped short of the ‘azadi’ and self-governance aspirations had been agreed and
was to be introduced on both sides of the disputed frontier. “We agreed on a point between complete independence
and autonomy,” he said.

He noted that this arrangement needed a review after fifteen years of its announcement and was to be implemented and
monitored by all parties concerned, and that it could be further improved. However, following a political upheaval in
Pakistan, the issue was thrown in the backburner. Similar claims were made by former President Pervez Musharraf when
addressing a gathering in the House of Lords in England, where he said, “We were not far from resolving Kashmir
problem with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the basis of a four-point parameter which would demilitarise Kashmir
and make the line of control irrelevant.”
However, rejecting these claims, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that neither he nor the
people of Pakistan have any knowledge about such a Kashmir solution as the proposal has never been debated and
there exists no corresponding record in the Foreign Office. While acknowledging the important role of backchannel
diplomacy, Qureshi insisted that disputes were always resolved through formal talks and this is exactly what the current
government is attempting.
On May 25, 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once again announced that his government was ready for dialogue on
Jammu and Kashmir if separatists shun violence. He said, “I would like to appeal to all the groups outside the political
mainstream that our government is ready for dialogue if they shed violence.” Rejecting the offer to resume dialogue,
APHC leader Mirwaiz Omar Farooq said that “genocide of Kashmiris and dialogue can’t go together.” He also asked
Pakistan to raise the issue of human rights abuse of Kashmiris at the hands of Indian occupation forces during the
India-Pakistan talks in July, insisting that, “you can’t have only one kind of terrorism on the agenda.”
For the past couple of years, the Indian government has been taking credit for a decline in militancy, and a turnout of 60
per cent voters in the 2008 state election which is deemed to be a reflection of people’s attitude against separatist politics.
However, the recent spate of violence indicates how deceptive that claim has been and how frustrations among the
Kashmiri people, and especially the youth, have risen due to the state of affairs in the valley.

The younger generation has come out to the streets not with guns but with stones to express anger and disillusionment.
The deployment of the army for the first time in a decade indicates the gravity of situation. Though protests or even stone
pelting is not a new phenomenon in Kashmir, the latest round of violence which started with an incident on May 30,
2010, a fake encounter in the Machil sector, has shown how the situation has not improved. Three young
Kashmiris were declared to be cross-border terrorists and had been killed by an Indian army unit in this
encounter which was exposed and naturally led to much backlash.

The motive behind staging this incident was the monetary reward and promotion that comes with encounters on the LoC.
Tempers in the valley were already high when the killing of a seventeen-year-old student by occupation forces on June 11
added fuel to fire. Since then, fifteen people (mostly teenagers but also a nine-year-old boy and a woman) have been
killed by the CRPF in just over a month. As a result, as Kashmir again dominates headlines, the rhetoric of negotiations is
increasingly being replaced with the slogan of “azadi” in the valley.
While refusing to admit its own failures and looking at the root causes of unrest, the Indian government was quick to shift
the blame on the Pakistan-based LeT as Home Minister Chidambaram noted that anti-national elements linked to LeT
were trying to exploit the situation in Kashmir.
The statement evoked strong reactions in Kashmir as not only the mainstream political parties but also ordinary people
felt the insensitivity of these words as well as the actions of the Indian government. Mehbooba Mufti, leader of the main
Opposition party in Kashmir, termed the statement an “insult to the Kashmiri people”. Fingers were also pointed
towards hard-line separatists for fomenting trouble in the valley since the Union Home Ministry claimed to have
intercepted a conversation between two senior office-bearers of the Geelani-led Hurriyat faction in which they were
allegedly discussing the killing of at least fifteen people in a procession near Srinagar.
Pakistan was also not spared as on July 7, 2010, Indian Defence Minister A.K Antony professed that attempts of
infiltration into Kashmir from Pakistan were increasing with “conscious, calculated attempts” to push more
terrorists into the valley. The very next day, the Congress party held Pakistan responsible for the turmoil in Kashmir and
advised the government to take up the issue of “inimical elements” from across the border that had a hand in perpetrating
violence, with the neighbouring country.
Despite these efforts to shift the blame to Pakistan or LeT, it is heartening to see that a large number of Indian analysts
have been able to understand and highlight the root causes of current turmoil. Though admitting that Pakistan can take
advantage of the current situation by mobilising the international community, the majority of analysts have rejected the
idea of Pakistan’s hand in creating unrest. Instead, these commentators have blamed both the Union as well as the state
government. It is being pointed out that while the abuse of human rights is a major factor, other concerns such as the
growing gap of communication between the state government and the people has played a key role in forcing the people
to protest.
Few of the ministers of the Legislative Assembly have bothered to engage with their constituencies since elections in
2008 and the state administration remains indifferent to the problems faced by the people. The laxity of the Union
government can be gauged by the fact that on November 18, 2004, in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the
Kashmiri people, Manmohan Singh had announced a reconstruction plan, involving an outlay of Rs 24,000 crores
for basic services, employment generation, and relief and rehabilitation to families of victims; but most of this has
not gone through. Six years later, the Indian government has recently admitted that only half of the 67 projects
drawn up under the Prime Minister’s Reconstruction Plan for Jammu and Kashmir have been completed. Omar
Abdullah’s government is also being blamed for corruption and mismanagement.
Moreover, the CRPF has also been severely criticised for its brutal response to the protests. The total indifference of the
political elite towards human rights abuses has turned the people of Kashmir against the government. Furthermore, it is
being largely acknowledged that India has failed to build on the gains made by occupation forces by bringing the overall
law and order situation under control. New Delhi has been unable to introduce CBMs such as the revocation of AFSPA
that could have helped win back the confidence of the Kashmiri people. This latest acknowledgment has come from the
Indian Chief of the Army Staff General V. K. Singh.
Cautioning the government, analysts and commentators are denouncing the efforts to relate these protesters to LeT or Al
Qaeda as these arguments could be used by security forces to justify civilian killings. Demonising the protesters and
labelling them LeT cadres or anti-national elements would only further alienate them. The need of an internal dialogue
between the Union government and Kashmiri political parties to address the political future of the state is also being
highlighted. Better training of the police and paramilitary forces to control mob violence has also been suggested as the
politicians need to be more responsive to people’s grievances.

But all these measures may not bear fruit unless India realises the fact that it cannot suppress the popular demands of
the people by using force and a strategy of denial is not going to serve its purpose. The settlement of Kashmir is
central to peace in South Asia. A resolution between India and Pakistan with the Kashmiri leadership on board will
contribute to the fight against terror and ensure prosperity not only for the two countries but for the entire South Asian
region. And, given the importance it has on a global stage, not only will it improve the regional image, but allow for
potentially unprecedented progress on other avenues of contention between the two countries.
While there is no reason to dismiss arguments that the best possible solution to Pakistan-India problems would be to
overlook the Kashmiri dimension, making less controversial issues the bedrock, it is equally important to recognize the
other side of the argument – that a reasonable solution to Kashmir may well end up defining the future course of action on
most of the important facets of the relationship including water, terrorism and trade.

Section VI: Trade

While seemingly non-contentious an issue, trade relations have also suffered from strident and chronic politicisation. Two
contrasting views have traditionally existed when prospects of peace through trade are considered. While it has been
assumed, perhaps a little too simplistically, that a stable relationship is a prerequisite to trade, recent scholarship has
suggested that in fact Pakistan and India should enhance trade relations as a means to attain regional stability and bilateral
friendship.
As it is, successful trade between Pakistan and India, while problematic, offers multiple workable avenues that
have tremendous potential. The irony is that while trade between the two countries is abysmally low, there has, except
for a period of nine years between 1965 and 1974, never been a complete trade embargo. While the debate of whether
flourishing trade can precede regional security continues, there is almost unanimous agreement that economics offers the
one most potentially effective path for bilateral as well as regional benefits. It was for this reason that “one of the most
important meetings between India and Pakistan on trade issues” in 2005 attended by President Musharraf and
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh generated considerable optimism. However, a subsequent joint communiqué has
not seen any fruitful results five years down the line
In 2008, trade between India and Pakistan amounted to a paltry 2 billion dollars with India accounting for one per
cent of Pakistan’s and Pakistan accounting for 0.5 per cent of India’s trade. Despite these seemingly low figures,
compared to trade with other countries in the South Asian region, 36 per cent of South Asian imports of India come from
Pakistan. The corresponding figure for Pakistan is 69 per cent, making them two major trading partners in South
Asia “despite all hurdles” and deceptively low absolute figures. Current official trade figures of about $2 billion
are actually a substantial increase from the meagre $300 million in 2003-2004, so while still “unnaturally
small”, any increase in trade needs to be studied in context.
While criticised on many grounds, one giant failure of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
has been in its ineffectiveness on trade expansion. While the South Asia Free Trade Agreement or SAFTA has been
signed by members, interregional trade has not grown. Some argue that India needs to take the lead since it represents 80
per cent of South Asian GDP and has the “primary responsibility for promoting economic stability in the region.” This
has in fact allowed China to build up its own regional strengths by partnering with Pakistan and Bangladesh.
However, much of the responsibility also rests on the bilateral failures of Pakistan and India to reach agreeable
solutions to conflicts outside of the trade relationship since the two dominate dynamics within SAARC.

Two primary reasons and significant features of low trade between the two countries are largely cited. First, Pakistan’s
failure to grant India the MFN or Most Favoured Nation status which, if nothing else, is politically significant,
especially since India had done so in compliance with the principles of the WTO regime in 1995. Secondly, highly
problematic are the substantial tariff and especially non-tariff barriers which are more significant in India’s case since they
prevent Pakistan from developing a market. Pakistan’s ‘Positive List’, while having its fair share of critics, has widely
been regarded as being fair to India. This is a telling point since a large percentage of imports from India covers a small
part of this list of importable goods, and additions have been made to it when need is felt. A further breakdown of barriers
to trade – both tariff and non-tariff barriers – is given in the table below.
Source: Mohsin S. Khan, “India-Pakistan Trade: A Roadmap for Enhancing Economic Relations”, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Number PB09-15, July 2009.
While bilateral and regional figures show the essential dynamics of trade, some important facets of specifically Pakistan-
India are ignored if one focuses on official statistics. Third-country trade and smuggling or illegal trade increase the
official figures substantially, even if by adding their value, figures still remain much lower than expected. Third-country
involvement alone is likely to increase the figure by a factor of four or five. Informal trade via third countries such as
UAE, but specifically Dubai, is estimated to be between $2 billion and $3 billion per year – even higher than official
bilateral trade; needless to say, if carried out bilaterally, it could be done at a much lower cost and bring substantial
benefits.
The issue of trade in the energy sector – and it is here that regional security issues are most important – is a further area of
substantial interest. Through this, Pakistan seeks to gain royalty figures that could be equivalent to as much as 5 per cent
of its total export earnings. And, when one encompasses other regional issues in the trade debate, there are also concerns
emanating from India regarding its trade with Afghanistan where land routes and transportation through Pakistan makes it
much more effective. Needless to say, regional stability and at times issues that may not be in State control hinder
progress on all these fronts. With the politicisation of trade in energy accompanied by foreign policy dilemmas, the
potential of trade in energy, as well as of transit routes, will take some time to be actualised.

This regional dimension for trade in South as well as Central Asia is highlighted in a recent World Bank report on peace
and economic cooperation. It stresses the need for a more comprehensive cooperation that brings security together with
trade in this “moment of reckoning in South Asia”. It argues for a leadership role for the region in a global economy that
rests on cooperation rather than competition in order to maximise individual gains. Taking the example of perennial
hostile neighbours Pakistan and India, the argument is that there has been a persistent zero-sum game where one tries to
gain at the expense of the other. However, a clear winning strategy is cooperation.

To elaborate as an example, India needs to sustain its high growth rate and will require cheap and stable supplies of
oil, gas and industrial raw material from Central and West Asia, for which Pakistan is “the most feasible conduit”.
Additionally, it will need to develop a larger regional market for its exports, and again the relevance of Pakistan, given its
proximity, cannot be discounted.
For Pakistan, one major problem that has been exacerbated by Indian policy is its most prized commodity – the textile
sector. While internal energy problems need to be accounted for, there is reason to suggest that better economic ties with
India would have prevented the decrease of 9.3 per cent in exports from this sector alone. In addition, the strong
sense of an Indian failure to adopt leadership is seen by the existing non-tariff barriers and its disapproval of liberalisation
policies and innovative partnerships with Pakistan such as common trade zones at distinct points at the border.
Indeed, this ‘sabotage’ by India is also evidenced in its bilateral trade with Pakistan as its imports from Pakistan are
among the lowest, while the reverse is true for Pakistan. While this may be acknowledged as a biased understanding from
a partisan Pakistani framework, it goes to show at the very least the mistrust that has seeped into economic spheres as
well.

Based on some earlier studies, under the SAFTA treaty, Pakistan and India’s trade could be increased to up to fifty
times its current level if its true potential is achieved. A more recent report by the Peterson Institute for International
Economics on India-Pakistan trade presents a more conservative but still substantial potential figure for official trade
being twenty times greater if relations are normalised.
Some of the salient features of Pakistan’s trade policy 2008-09 – whether implemented or not – are very relevant to
trade ties with India as noted by the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2008-09. This included the import of cheaper raw
material machinery sourced from India due to the addition of 136 items in the Positive List which also included diesel and
fuel oil which will be cheaper due to lower transportation cost. Reducing these costs is a policy followed since the import
of stainless steel and cotton yarn has been allowed through both trains and trucks at the Wagah border.
While there is no comprehensive trade agreement between the two countries and Pakistan only allows limited number of
tradable goods in its Positive List, the number has been growing. As per potential tradable goods, there is scope for
tremendous improvement if one analyses the current imports and exports of both countries.

For instance, 32 per cent of the value of Pakistani exports occurs in goods that are imported by India from other
countries and these cover multiple sectors – significantly, in the non-textile arena. Similarly, Indian exports cover
almost 53 per cent of the goods that Pakistan imports. This distinction of the goods is important since firstly it looks at
diversified sectors and can cause much benefit to the economy in many ways, and two, it can allow more effective, low-
cost trade in goods that are already being traded from other parts of the world, perhaps a necessary lead-up to a South
Asian leadership in the global economy.
Moreover, it needs to be recognized that the oft-quoted high potential for trade between the two neighbours has been
highlighted due to a number of reasons. Indeed, given the circumstances, it seems almost incredible to a neutral observer
in the modern world that the potential benefits are not being harnessed; the countries are rich in resources and labour,
provide land routes for regional trade and energy supplies, and being neighbouring countries can undertake trade at much
lower costs. Moreover, sharing a long border, innovative strategies can be implemented for enhancing trade and raising
employment levels. Hence, it needs to be analysed as to why trade has remained low despite all the likely advantages to
the contrary.

There are other less obvious areas of interest. The energy sector, for instance, offers numerous chances but is dependant
on political stability. India’s export of its ‘soft power’ and increasing partnership with Pakistan brings in an altogether
more social dimension to economics. Entertainment industries in both countries have traditionally sought common ground
and this has risen in recent years. And the issue of India’s trade relationship with Afghanistan and transport routes through
Pakistan also needs to be highlighted. There are numerous implications for the trade debate and there have been many
suggestions made as to how the two countries should proceed.

One recommended process to be followed has been divided into two phases of short-term and medium-term measures that
could be adopted. The former, many of which were agreed to in principle at the aforementioned Musharraf-Singh
meeting in 2005, have been widely debated and relate to trade facilitation. These include easing restrictions on visas,
eliminating requirements of ships touching a third country port before bringing imports, opening additional border
crossings and additional bus routes, allowing branches of banks to function in both countries and increasing air links. The
medium-term measures primarily relate to Pakistan’s granting MFN status to India, and India’s reducing tariff rates on
goods relevant to Pakistan and removing non-tariff barriers. Other goals for mutual benefit in the long term include transit
routes and infrastructure development.
Since the Mumbai attacks, the climate for negotiations has been unusually bad. Indeed, on the first anniversary of the
attacks, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) released a contentious document titled
“Task Force Report on National Security and Terrorism” that recommended “a limited but intense attack on Pakistani
territory to prevent similar acts of terrorism” and proposed an immediate ban on trade, “closure of travel routes, as well as
denial of permission for overflights to Pakistani airliners.”

Seeing this within the larger framework of Indian designs against Pakistan, the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and
Industry proclaimed that it was suspending all trade delegations to India till the resumption of the Composite
Dialogue. Since then, however, the situation has cooled down. In December 2009, a Pakistani delegation took part in a
Trade Expo in India and returned optimistic. Later, in 2010, the Indian High Commissioner, speaking on trade issues also
noted that construction work on Integrated Customs Check Posts had started at Wagah and would allow both countries to
ship consignments easily. Suggesting the opening up of trade on further land routes, he also noted that potential of $10
billion trade could be achieved if other such measures are taken.
One can safely say then that enhanced trade offers much potential for economic and perhaps also political ties
between India and Pakistan. The current state of affairs shows a rise in trade but the figures still remain unsubstantial.
The most obvious issues include Indian tariff and non-tariff structures and Pakistan’s delaying the MFN status to India.
There are also other more technical concerns of the Positive List – whether or not this should be a system at all, and if so,
how it needs to be enhanced.
More immediate concerns of visa issuance, red tape and travelling also require political solutions. Moreover, the entire
subject needs to be studied keeping in mind large quantities of informal trade through third countries as well as illegal
trade, which if added to current official data makes up a bigger if still unsatisfactory picture. The energy sector may end
up providing the biggest challenge, but also the most potential as India and Pakistan look to develop an enhanced trade
relationship. For, only if that happens will the proverbial chicken-and-egg riddle of trade and regional peace be solved.

Conclusion
This study has attempted to comprehensively point out the main areas of concern, especially since the Mumbai attacks of
November 2008, that have caused the relationship between Pakistan and India to enter a significant phase in an already
turbulent current history. Perhaps more importantly, it has tried to establish the regional implications of peace and security
through cooperation between the neighbours that require amiable solutions to all the problems, among many others, listed
above.
It is increasingly becoming clear that the relationship is moving into a new phase. For all the darkness and mistrust in the
time since 26/11, there is now cause for some mobilisation towards a political negotiation of sorts, the contours of which
are yet to be manifested. And, despite the prevailing hostility and the collective, often despairing notions of helplessness
and fatalism, there is no reason to withhold any aspirations and optimism.

In July 2010, there is an expected meeting between the foreign ministers of both countries; this is to be sandwiched
between a second meeting between both foreign secretaries and an expected meeting between the prime ministers at a
later date. There are those who scoff at dialogue and how years of meetings have held no fruitful results; however, it is
also noted that periods of negotiations go hand-in-hand with periods of relative peace, even if no substantial or tangible
progress is made. This allows for deeper understanding to develop between the nations, for people to be able to move
across the border and for a rising sense of security that may in the end diminish the hostile collective memories that have
plagued processes of peace in the first place.

More importantly, these periods of negotiations, however superficial, deny the existence of a vacuum that could be used
by militants and extremist ideologues and lead to regional insecurity, hostility between the countries and an exacerbation
of unresolved issues.

Various untested avenues are continually being sought. The power of soft image is slowing coming into the more informal
field of diplomacy being tested by people of the two countries. Cooperation in media and the entertainment industries as
well as projects such as ‘Aman ki Asha’ between media groups have, for instance, have added to the already existing
innovative and non-traditional attempts at peace-building that previously included ‘cricket diplomacy’. Broadening the
discourse to include all the multifaceted efforts can only result in decreasing the improbability of lasting peace.

However, with rising regional issues at play, there are other more serious indicators that will also require new platforms to
discuss previously ignored or irrelevant issues. A ‘proxy war’ in Afghanistan being fought between India and Pakistan, for
instance, is an issue that may replace Kashmir and terrorism as the primary talking point. There is a resurfacing of
allegations on both sides, regarding the support of militants that cause destabilisation in the home country, and the
situation with water insecurity has the potential to cause tremendous problems for policymakers.

In the end, while there are warning signs that need to be examined, there are also signposts that indicate paths towards
peaceful, if not altogether mutually beneficial, co-existence. As the world grapples with new and more immediate
challenges on a truly global scale, Pakistan and India need to evolve, more so now than ever before, from what has been
an extremely narrow and regional view of political economy to a more relevant platform from where both can aim to
reach the ends they desire. The old conventional wisdom of one of the two succeeding as opposed to the other has run its
course. For Indian ambitions of regional, if not global, leadership and Pakistan’s quest for national stability, the discourse
itself needs to be enhanced.

That a political solution is being sought, is indeed a positive sign, but a sustained, concentrated and systematic effort to
solving broader issues needs to be made. Over six decades of interaction at the highest possible level has not led to such
an effort. However, as both countries deal with pressing concerns – some, on which they become minor players for each
other – there is reason to hope that conditions now allow for more meaningful talks with substantial results. It remains to
be seen whether missed opportunities of the past will now be translated into an actualization of the potential that
generations continue to wait for. The challenge is to transform a negative collective memory of two peoples into a
collective hope – and that is something that belligerence has never achieved
Q2 Second question

Pak-Afghan Relation

Introduction:
Afghanistan is one of the most important countries in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Geographical contingency, shared faith
and mutual interest are the main factors driving Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan. It is the location at the gross
roads of south and central Asia further adds to its importance for Pakistan. Since its independence Pakistan has been
aspiring for friendly cordial and mutually beneficial relations with Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan non-cooperative
attitude prompted by the internal and external vested interest particularly in the wake of cold war perverted their full
development. Pakistan had to remain prepared for the new situation on ethnicity and faith. Relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan had never been smooth. With the sole exception four years of the Taliban rule over Afghanistan, successive
governments in Kabul have displayed varying degree of dissatisfaction towards Islamabad. While the principal historical
cause of this dissatisfaction has been the unresolved issue of the Durand line, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan
have also emanated from their divergent strategic outlooks and dissimilar national ethos.

There is no country that wants peace and stability in Afghanistan more than Pakistan and a no country stood to suffer from
the instability in Afghanistan more than Pakistan. Also the absence of an effective state authority is responsible for the
cross boarder traffic in arms and narcotics threatening the security of Pakistan citizens and the state. Without going into
too much of the past it is relevant to have a look to at some of the facts of the soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban
regime, post September 11 scenario, security contents and Pak-afghan relations. This is going to help analyze the present
situation to recommend certain policy options for Pakistan subsequently.

Beginning of Relation -1947:

At the time of Pakistan independence in 1947, Afghanistan was under the influence of USSRA, and India. Though it
adopted an anti-Pakistan policy from the beginning and opposed Pakistan s membership of UNO, It also supported
pakhtoonistan issue which was the invention of red shirt leader khan Abdul Ghaffar khan. Moreover Afghanistan refuses
to consider the establishment of Durand line and started demanding the redrawing of Durand line and Pakistan -afghan
borders. As a result Pakistan faced a lot of problems which emanated across the Durand line. However, leadership of
Pakistan shows a lot of patience and did not allow the situation to explode into incontrollable proportions.

Afghanistan Support to Pakhtoonistan Stunt:

Abdul Ghaffar khan started the pakhtoonistan stunt at the connivance of India, USSR and Afghanistan after the inception
of Pakistan in 1947. Afghanistan leaders like king Zahir shah and Sardar Daud khan extended full moral and financial
support to Ghaffar khan to keep this issue alive. Afghanistan role in Pakhtoonistans stunt created a lot of bad blood
between Afghanistan and Pakistan and bitterness continued for decades.

In 1949 afghan government vehemently protested on Pakistan governor general’s statement that “north western tribal area
in frontier are a part of Pakistan”. But Pakistan leadership, very wisely avoided confrontation. However, Afghanistan
started a propaganda campaign. In this wake and put all efforts to rise tribal population in rebellion against Pakistan.
Afghanistan even demanded that tribal people should be given a right of plebiscite to decide whether they want to join
Pakistan or not. When in 1955, Pakistan establishes one unit, Afghanistan launched a great protest and Pakistan embassy
in Kabul was attacked. Pakistan s flag was set ablaze and putative Pokhtoonistans flag was hoisted on Pakistan s embassy.
Pakistan in protest its consulates in kandhar and jalalabad and demanded apology and guarantee of good behavior from
Afghanistan and even threatened of a befitting reply.

Durand Line Issue -1955:

In 1954, 1955, Pakistan-afghan relations reached its lowest ebb when afghan mob attacked Pakistan s consulate in
jalalabad and kandhar. Further, in 1955 great tension and bitterness in relation was created by Afghanistan claims that
Durand line didn’t constitute the Pakistan -afghan border. Though Durand line was the internationally recognized border
but Afghanistan refused to accept this and it created a lot of enmity.

To avoid any conflicts many efforts were made on international level to resolve the issue. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt
offered their services to facilitate and resolve the issue. In 1955, Saudi Arabia offered to resolve Pakistan -afghan dispute
which was accepted by both countries. Saudi Arabia presented new proposal for the resolving of dispute and held talks
with Afghanistan authority in Kabul. Saudi prince Saad bin Abdul Rehman announce that the dispute was about to settle.
Pakistan started deliberated on Saudi proposal and arbitration when Afghanistan rejected Saudi proposal and arbitration.
The bitterness continued in Pakistan -afghan relations.

In 1954 and 1955 Pakistan joined SETO and CENTO and her weight on US side. USSR didn’t like it and on USSR signal
Afghanistan to raise such issued.
Efforts to Normalize Relations:
President Sikander Mirza visited Kabul in 1956 and discussed bilateral disputes with king Zahid shah. These talks took
place in a very friendly atmosphere. Later, afghan prince Minster Sardar Daod visited Pakistan. Though these visits
cooled down the heat in Pakistan -afghan relations but failed to normalize relations completely.

PM Hussein Shaheed Suharwardi visited Afghanistan in 1957. Leaders of both countries discussed bilateral dispute and
issues and issued a joint declaration at the end with a vow to increase mutual cooperation.

In 1958, king Zahir shah visited Pakistan. He held talks with PM Feroz khan noon and President Sikendar Mirza on
bilateral relations and international issued. Karachi University awarded him an honorary degree of DLL. During his
presence in a very important landmark agreement of transit trade took place between the two countries.

Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement:

Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a transit trade agreement in 1958 which provided to Kabul transit facilities to the Karachi
port. Main feature of this agreement were as under:

1. Afghan goods shall enjoy full freedom of passage through Pakistan.

2. Pakistan agreed to construct railway track from Chaman to the afghan terrority in order to facilitate the movement of
goods.
3. Pakistan pledge to provide railway wagons for the carriage of afghan goods.
4. Pakistan committed to provide storage facility for afghan goods at Chaman, Peshawar and Karachi.
5. Pakistan exempted afghan goods from all excise duty and custom duties.
In spite of all friendly steps taken by Pakistan, Afghanistan continued its anti-Pakistan posture and violated the terms of
transit agreement. She continued anti-Pakistan propaganda and took advantage of transit facilities for their purpose.
Afghan prevented entrance of Pakistan good trucks and imposed unfair taxes on Pakistan transporters.

Pakhtoonistan Issue Once Again:

In 1060, Afghanistan gave an ultimatum to Pakistan that if Pakistan didn’t settle the issue of pakhtoonistan with
Afghanistan then Afghans should adopt alternative means to resolve it. Furthermore, Afghanistan blamed Pakistan for
supporting terrorism and feelings of rebellion among Afghans masses against the government. During these
developments, Afghanistan planes violated the Pakistan’s air boundaries, on which Pakistan put up a strong protest. It was
in 1960 that it happened for the very first time in Afghanistan that the pakhtoonistan day was celebrated on official level.

In 1960, Afghanistan fomented the tribesmen to raise a banner of revolt against Pakistan, but there mischiefs were ripped
in the bud.

Due to this anti-Pakistan attitude, Pakistan severed its diplomatic ties with Afghanistan. Even during this Pakistan
respected the transit agreement.

Afghanistan president Sardar Daod in 1961 offered some sort of reconciliation but bound it with such severe terms which
were not acceptable for Pakistan.

Tehran Agreement-1963:
The Muslim world concerned at this sad development between the two countries. Iran’s President King Raza Shah Pehlvi
played the role of mediator and succeeded in convincing both nations for restoring their links. Then in 1963 an agreement
between Pakistan and Afghanistan took place in Tehran. Both countries agreed to restore diplomatic ties and open their
respective consulates. Thus diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were restored on 23rd may 1963.
Even after the conclusion of the restoration agreement in Tehran, Afghanistan government started harping the same tune
of Durand line.

A Short span of Friendly Relations:

After Tehran agreement there was a considerable change and improvement in Pakistan -afghan relation. President Ayub
khan met king Zahir shah of Afghanistan in 1964 and discussed bilateral relations and importance of Pakistan -afghan
mutual role in international scenario.

Afghanistan Neutrality in 1965 Indo-Pakistan War:

After the Tehran agreement of 1963, Afghanistan continued its hostile attitude towards Pakistan. Thus a new phase of
friendly relations between the two nations started and lasted throughout the period of king Zahir shah.

In the indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Afghanistan adopted a neutral attitude and didn’t create any problems for Pakistan on
the Durand line. At the end of the war Ayub khan went to Tashkent in January 1966, for peace talks with Indian PM. In
his way to Tashkent, he visited Kabul and thanked king zahir shah for his cooperation during the war. In a joint
declaration, Afghanistan even supported Pakistan stance on Kashmir issue.

King Zahir Shah visit to Pakistan:

In 1967, king zahir visited Pakistan and addressed the people in Lahore and Karachi. He assured Pakistan of his full
support in his long stand off on Kashmir issue with India. This visit further strengthens the Pakistan Afghanistan relations.

Afghanistan Neutrality in 1971 Indo-Pakistan War:

In 1971, Pakistan -India war, despite the pressure from India and Russia, Afghanistan assumed a neutral position and
didn’t take side with any of two sides. This was a positive gesture towards Pakistan and it further strengthened neutral
confidence.

Start of New Era of Bitterness and Enmity

Sardar Daud’s Government:

After the 1971 Pakistan -India war, most important development which had taken place in the region was the toppling of
king zahir shah government by Sardar Daud (1973). After setting aside the government USSR had installed Sardar Daud
who was considers being an ardent supporter of pakhtoonistan and USSR. With the advent of Sardar Daud’s government
the afghan policy towards Pakistan went through a major change. Afghanistan started airing the pakhtoonistan
propaganda. However, Pakistan recognized the Daud’s government and offered a hand of friendship and dialogues which
were rejected.

Afghanistan raised the issue of pakhtoonistan first in NAM and then in UN general assembly which was against the
international principles. Pakistan launched a great protest against Afghanistan attitude.

Pakistan’s Effort to Promote Improvement in Relations:

Though Sardar Daud’s anti-Pakistan attitude had created a lot of animosity in Pakistan -afghan relation, but Pakistan was
still putting up efforts to bring improvement in relations with Afghanistan.

PM Bhutto who had transformed Pakistan foreign policy n new pattern of bilateralism and neutrality in order to normalize
relations on western borders. Doing this, he wanted to settle accounts with India and resolve all dispute with her. In this
regard, Pakistan displayed a very friendly gesture when she dispatched a big financial and material assistance for earth
quake strikes in Afghanistan in 1976.

High Level Visits and Improvement in Relations:

To further his friendly foreign policy towards Afghanistan, PM Bhutto visited Kabul in 1976. Sardar Daud returned his
visit in august 1976 and held dialogue with PM Bhutto. Both leaders gave a joint declaration to promote harmony,
normalize relations and foster peaceful coexistence. It was also vowed that all kind of malign propaganda would be put to
an end.
All these bilateral efforts put an end to the enmity and created a feeling of friendship and goodwill at both sides. Sardar
Daud who was anti-Pakistan, a little time back, now seemed to be working for promoting improvement in Pakistan -
afghan relationship. The main reason for this sudden change in afghan leadership’s posture was due to new foreign policy
of Pakistan which was termed as bilateralism. According to this policy Pakistan also promoted friendly relationships with
all big powers including USSR and USSR seemed to be happy with independent and non-allied/non-alliance foreign
policy of Pakistan. Consequently, USSR also influenced afghan government to change her attitude towards Pakistan.

President Zia-ul-Haq and His Friendly Policy toward Afghanistan – 1977:

In 1977 president Zia ousted Bhutto’s government. However, he continued Bhutto’s friendly policy toward Afghanistan.
Zia visited Kabul in 1977 and held talks with President Daod. Afghan president returned his visit in 1978 and both leaders
declared to further promote friendship, harmony and amity. Both leaders decided to extend cooperation in trade, culture,
education and many other directions. There was complete harmony in the views of both leaders related to international
issued.

Bloody Revolution in Afghanistan:

The thaw in Pakistan -afghan relation was on its way when there started an era of bloody revolution in Afghanistan.
Sardar Daod was murdered and government was taken over by ‘Khalak Party’ leader Noor Muhammad Taraki. He was
also killed and government was again taken over by Hafeez-al-Ameen who assumed an anti-Pakistan posture. Though
Hafeez had complete support of USSR in start but later he lost confidence of USSR. By then, USSR interference in
Afghanistan had increased to a great extent. Hafeez was also killed allegedly by the agents of USSR and an ex-prime
minister, Babrak Karmal who was leading exile life was installed by USSR in 1979.

Babrak Karmal was a puppet of USSR. He invited USSR to send her troops in Afghanistan to restore orders and
consolidate the government. Under this flimsy pretext, USSR’s army landed in Afghanistan with a huge number of
personnel and sophisticated weapons.

International Response:
USSR’s direct interference in the Afghanistan directly and indirectly affected the whole world, anti-USSR demonstration
took place in many countries, USA, Britain, Germany, France and other western nations strongly condemned this act of
USSR and demanded an immediate withdrawal of USSR’s troops from Afghanistan, which was plainly rejected by USSR.

Pakistan’s New Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan:

Due to USSR’s presence on her western borders, Pakistan found herself to be in very vulnerable situation. A threat of
USSR’s ambitions across the Durand line was perceived by Pakistan. Even USSR’s planes violated the Pakistan’s air
limits time and again. A strong reaction at public level took place and anti-USSR demonstrations started all over Pakistan.

In this regard Afghanistan problem became the corner stone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The change in the Pakistan
foreign policy could be analyzed in the light of following events.

1. End of Bhutto’s government and marshal’s law in 1977

2. Islamic revolution against king of Iran in 1979.
3. USSR’s direct interference and military presence in Afghanistan in 1979
All above events gave Pakistan’s foreign policy a new shape. USSR’s military presence in Afghanistan had directly
challenged the US interest in Middle East and Persian Gulf. US desire to capitalize all the oil reserves in this region now
seemed to be under soviet threat. Pakistan has assumed the status of front line state in this situation. UN and western block
decided to strengthen Pakistan and use her to counter soviet ambitions in the region. Huge plans of Pakistan’s financial
and military assistance were hatched and a complete strategy was prepared to check soviet advance towards warm waters.

Afghan Refugees:
The exodus to afghan refugees continued during 1980 and 1981. Pakistan had to bear the burden of more than 2,000,000
afghan refugees by the end of 1981. By September 1981, more than 2,298,767 Afghans had got themselves registered in
Pakistan while more than 1.5 million had fled to Iran.
Afghan Resistance:
The activities of freedom fighter continued during these years. In many battles the Mujahideens inflicted heavy causalities
on Babrak Karmal forces. Many afghan provinces including Herat, Kandhar, Nagar, and Nangarhar were under repeated
invasions on mujahideens.

Pakistan’s Efforts to Resolve Afghanistan Problem in UN:

Pakistan made Afghanistan issue as the hub of its foreign policy and put up all his diplomatic efforts to resolve it. Due to
Pakistan ‘s and other Muslim countries efforts, UN was approached which passed a resolution in 1980 with 111 votes in
favor and 22 votes against calling for a peaceful settlement of the problem, the withdrawal of soviet army, restoration of
afghan’s independence, returns of refugees and formation of an elected government in Afghanistan.

Diego Cordovez, personal representative of UN secretary-general frequently shuttled between the parties. USSR wanted
that Pakistan should recognize afghan government which was refused by Pakistan; Pakistan agreed to hold indirect talks
with Afghanistan. The advent of Gorbachov in USSR corridors of powers further softened the stance of USSR.

Geneva Talks for Soviet Withdrawal – (1982-1986):

Pakistan didn’t recognize the puppet afghan government therefore she refused to hold direct talk with her. At last both
sides agreed to hold indirect talk through UN secretary general. This third round of UN sponsored indirect talk in Geneva
between Pakistan and afghan held in august 1984, ended without any progress.

Infact the issues were inter-linked. The soviets were reluctant to announce a time table of withdrawal under international
guarantees were furnished and the US refuse to offer any guarantee prior to withdrawal. The situation was further
stalemated because international guarantees were not forthcoming despite Pakistan‘s efforts to obtain them. The soviets
insisted that the refugee issues should be tackled separately but Pakistan insisted an integrated approach. The situation
therefore represented mistrust between the super powers. This situation continued till 1986, when USSR suggested a
partial withdrawal.

Babrak Karmal wanted direct talks with Pakistan but Installation of Dr. Najeeb’s government in 1986, eased the situation.
Dr. Najeeb agreed on indirect talks. In 1987, Gorbachov manifested his desire to promote friendly ties with Asian
countries and announced unilateral withdrawal without giving any time table.

Geneva Agreement 1988:

Since 1986 to 1988, diplomatic efforts from all quarters continued to resolve the issue. Observers from many countries
payed visits and propounded many proposals to make Geneva talk successful.

At last, after 8th round of rigorous talks, four countries signed an accord in April 1988, in Geneva and these talks achieved
success.
The UN sponsored agreement under which Soviet Union started pulling out its 115,000 troops from Afghanistan on May
15 was signed on April 14, 1988, acting as guarantors joined Afghanistan and Pakistan in a series of agreements aimed at
ending a bitter nine years old conflict in the land-locked Muslim country Afghanistan.

The soviet foreign minister Edward Shevardnadze and the US secretary of state, George Sheelt for the two super powers,
foreign minister Abdul Wakil for Afghanistan and minister of state for foreign affairs Zain Noorani for Pakistan signed
the agreement. UN secretary general Javier Perez DC presided over the historic ceremony in the council chamber of old
League of Nations headquarters, the palace de nation.

Following were the main point’sof Geneva accord for an Afghan settlement.

1. Only half of the troops will be withdrawal by august 15, 1988 and the withdrawal of all the troops will be completed
within nine months.
2. No interference will be made in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
3. US and USSR made an agreement of guarantor to avoid interference in the affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
4. Pakistan and Afghanistan made a bilateral accord on the voluntary return of afghan refugees.
Late president Zia ul Haq in an exclusive interview with a panel of NPT editors and senior correspondents spoke in detail
about the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan following the Geneva accord and its aftermath. He made it clear that
Pakistan had not accepted any dictation with regard to signing of accord and had firmly maintained its principled stance.
The main objectives of the accord from the Pakistan’s view point were the withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan,
the return of refugees to their country with honor and dignity and setting up of a government in Afghanistan which was
acceptable to all sections of people.

Pitfall of Geneva Accord and Its Aftermath:

Afghan mujahideen:
Afghan mujahideen did not accept Geneva accord because they were not a party to the agreement. The Geneva accord was
not binding on afghan mujahideen.

The Symmetry Provision:

The Geneva accord was not binding on afghan mujahideen since the Soviet Union had thought it fit to adopt a
negative scpnusetry rather than a positive one which meant that the soviet could wage supplies of defense equipments to
the government in Afghanistan and American were free to make available arms to mujahideen.

Soviet allegations on Pakistan :

During the second half of the 1988 the Soviet Union had been very vocal in accusing Pakistan of violating Geneva accord.
USSR accused Pakistan to assist the afghan mujahideen who had waged a relentless war against the soviet occupation and
Nijib’s government. However, Pakistan reiterated her commitment to Geneva accord and her determination to obscure the
agreement in letter and sprit.

Afghan Interim Government and Pakistan’s Support:

The afghan interim government was established. As Pakistan soil in early 1989, but could not achieve wide international
recognition even among the Muslim countries.

After prolonged negotiations among various factions of afghan mujahideen, sibghatullah mujadidi was nominated as the
president of AIG and Abdul Rub Rasool Saggaf as PM and Gulbadin Hykmatyar as Foreign minister.

War among Rival Factions:

Afghan interim government still lacked a strong and identifiable territorial bone, it excluded the eight party alliance of
afghan mujahideen based in Tehran and it also did not enjoy the confidence of such important non Pakhtoon military
commanders like Ahmad Shah Masud based in Panjsher valley or Ismail khan, operating in Herat. Ahmad shah masood
forged critical alliance with the militia forces in the north and after defeating the afghan army went beyond the UN plans
which had proposed the take over by neutral interim setup.

In 1991, a mujahideen leader Jalal-ud-din Haqqani attacked and captured Khost. This success jolted the Najib’s
government.

Pakistan‘s Opposition of Najeeb’s Government:

President Najeeb blames Pakistan in interfering Afghan’s internal affairs. Pakistan refused to hold dialogue with Najeeb’s
government and demonstrated from UN to install some other acceptable person in place of Najeeb. UN representatives
started discussing proposals on making interim government in Afghanistan with Pakistan, Iran and factions in afghan.

Peshawar Accord 1992:

Communist president had to resign on 16 April, 1992. On 24th April, 1992, in governor house Peshawar, held a ceremony
including leaders of almost all rival factions of afghan mujahideen agreed on a framework of an interim government. In
their talks. Pakistan played and important role and PM Nawaz Sherif held dialogue with six organizations of afghan
mujahideens. As a result they agreed upon the names of president and PM and other officials of the interim government
and were chosen are: professor sibghat ullah mujadadi was made President for an interim period of two months. He took
over the government in Afghanistan. PM Nawaz Sherif with a high level delegation visited Kabul and congratulated
afghan president on assuming the president ship.
Pakistan sent 10,000 tons of wheat as a gesture of good will, as assistance. With the help of Pakistan, Afghanistan joined
ECO in September 1992.

Failure of Peshawar Accord, Civil War and Pakistan’s Efforts:

Hizb e islami leader Golbadin Hikmatyar rejected Peshawar accord because he did not participate in it. As a result civil
war started. Pakistan tried to bring a sort of compromise among rival sections but Junbash e Mili’s leader Rasheed
Dostum refused to accept and chaos went on.

Islamabad Accord (1993):

With the combined efforts of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Islamabad accord took place in 1993 to resolve all disputes
among afghan factions and bring peace in Afghanistan. Following are the main points:

 Burhan ud din Rabbani was made president for nest 18 months and Gulbadein Hikmatyar was made PM. It was
agreed that rest of the cabinet would be chosen by the consultant on both, PM and president.
 An election commission would be made to hold elections in Afghanistan in 8 months to elect legislature.
 Legislature would formulate a constitution.
 A defense council will be made with members from all parties.
Though in start. This accord helped in bringing peace in Afghanistan but later a tug of war for power took place between
president and PM, and civil war again started in which thousand of people were killed.

Anti Pakistan activities:

Seeing such a bloodshed and volatile situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan started supporting Hikmatyar. This created a
feeling of animosity among the factions lead by Burhan ud din Rabbani and he sought a secret assistance from India. India
started backing Rabbani and Indian influence started increasing in Afghanistan. With this anti Pakistan activities started in
Afghanistan on large scale which culminated into burning up of Pakistan embassy in Kabul and high jacking of school bus
in Pakistan.

Pakistan, who had made so many sacrifices for the resolving afghan issue and bringing peace in Afghanistan, and bringing
a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul, could not see India taking away the fruit of her sufferings. Moreover, with
Indian involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan dreams to make an access to CAR’S could not have come true. Thus
Pakistan had to revise her afghan policy once again to handle the situation and to make her western borders safe.

Rise of Taliban:
In a war torn Afghanistan, a new powerful element came to the scene in 1995 who were called as Taliban, lead by Mullah
Omer. Taliban started making victories and by 1995 they had took hold of many provinces. At last, in 1996 they took hold
of Kabul and established a government based on fundamentalist principles.

Pakistan’s Support to Taliban:

Being a neighbor, peace and stability in Afghanistan was of direst interest to Pakistan and Taliban had successfully
established it. There were the factors on which was standing the whole building of Pakistan afghan policy.

Pakistan was fully supporting Taliban. Pakistan was the only country who recognized Taliban government and established
ties with them. Even relations with Taliban affected Pakistan’s relations with Iran who was opposing anti-Iran
fundamentalist Taliban government. With the passage of time Taliban got control of a large part of Afghanistan and
consolidated their hold on them. Later Saudi Arabia and UAE too recognized Taliban government.

Pakistan was fully supporting Taliban, which created a lot of bad blood in anti Taliban forces, northern alliance against
Pakistan.

Sanctions against Taliban Government and Pakistan’s Opposition:

Over the time western powers blamed Taliban on harboring terrorism and supporting al-qaeda. International community
also condemned Taliban on violating human rights against women and minority Shia Muslim community. However,
Pakistan kept on supporting Taliban’s government.

In 2000, UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Taliban government and Pakistan opposed these sanctions
because Pakistan believed that these sanctions would badly affect poor Afghans people. However, UN recognized
Rabbani government and US blamed Taliban for supporting terrorism. UNSC demanded that Taliban should immediately
cease fire and surrenders Osama bin Ladin to US. Taliban turned deaf ear to these demands.

Differences between Pakistan and Taliban:

In the mean while government of Pakistan got some evidence which revealed that the Taliban were involved in terrorist
activities inside Pakistan. Pakistan demanded Taliban to immediately stop supporting such activities but Taliban did not
listen to the friendly advice and this created differences between the two neighbors.

Pakistan policy was to support a stable government but when Taliban got involved in religious terrorism, it created a wide
chasm between the two governments

Post 9/11 Pakistan’s Afghan policy:

Pakistan has to revise once again its afghan policy in the after math of terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 on US. The
first visible response of Pakistan to US call was the abandonment of a decade long efforts by Pakistan to turn Afghanistan
under the Taliban regime. In addition to abandoning its support to Taliban, Pakistan stood at the fore front of the US
coalition by providing a range of assistance to the US, including the use of military base and airports, logistic and
intelligence support etc. the ultimate result was the collapse of Taliban regime in the second week of December and
subsequently a new UN backed government came into power in Afghanistan.

New Afghan Government and Pakistan’s Full Support:

Boon (Germany) conference under the UN umbrella took important decisions regarding the future afghan government in
2002. Pashtoon leader Hamid Karzai was made president who later was chosen for the next term of another two years by
“Afghan Jirga” to formulate a new constitution. ISAF forces are present in afghan to consolidate Karzai’s government.

Pakistan fully recognized the Karzai’s government and fully supported it. Pakistan is extending a full cooperation for the
consolidation of afghan government and reconstruction of war torn country.

Difference between Pakistan and Afghan Government:

Even after the installation of Karzai government by the US in afghan. Peace has been rather precarious. Neither Osama
bin Ladin nor Mullah Omer has been apprehended. Resistance against the coalition forces has continued. The Taliban are
part of the resistance. President Karazi blames Pakistan for treating Taliban elements in Pakistan with leniency. Afghan
government blamed that the terrorist conducting such activities take safe refuge across the border in Pakistan and Pakistan
government willfully over looks their presence. Afghanistan has given a list of top Taliban leaders who is believes are
hiding in Pakistan and whom it wants apprehended and extradited. On the contrary oak has vehemently denied such
allegations and claims to have arrested many high ranking al-qaeda figures and handed over some of them to US.

Pakistan Long Term Interests in Afghanistan:

Political interests:
Pakistan’s foremost political interest is to see strong, stable and united Afghanistan with a Pakistan friendly government
giving the pashtoons their due share in power.

Economic interests:
A peaceful Afghanistan that enables the laying oil and gas pipeline from CAR’S, through afghan terrority to Pakistan.
Moreover, CAR’S represents a huge market for Pakistani goods. Afghanistan is a landlocked county and Pakistan can
give access to its harbors.

Security Interests:
A stable and united Afghanistan with a Pakistan friendly government will result in a secure western border. Both countries
want to eradicate terrorism from their countries to bring stability in Afghanistan.

Reconstruction of Afghanistan:
Pakistan wants to participate in reconstruction of Afghanistan and want to see Afghanistan stable and prosperous country.

Divergence of Interests:

Following are a few areas of divergence;

1. Islamabad is faced with the nightmare of a failing neighbors, damaging Pakistan’s long existing friendly relations
with Iran and hindering, instead of facilitating access and cooperation with CAR’S.
2. There is legacy of mistrust and hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan due to many incidents in the past.
3. Durand line remains an irritant between both countries.
4. Influence of external players.
5. Afghanistan blames Pakistan of Taliban elements who want to destabilize Afghanistan government.
6. Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan and opening of Indian consulates in many cities of Afghanistan.

Pakistan-Afghan Relations (2010):

The misunderstanding between Pakistan and Afghanistan should not be attributed to the policies of Kabul alone. Our
abrupt changes in the foreign policy in tackling the situation in Afghanistan after the US attacks and the subsequent fall of
the Taliban have contributed to the Afghans hostility towards Pakistan.

If Islamabad and Kabul avoid misunderstanding in future. To avoid any problems, Afghanistan and Pakistan must
establish trust on each other; discuss all issues on bilateral level, without any third party mediation. Such a policy may
push the US, India and Iran out of the equation and pave the way for durable friendship between the two countries.

Karzai should also realize that Afghanistan’s problem stems from persistent foreign interventions. Karzai needs to hold
direct talks with the Taliban and mist satisfy their demands including the demand for outer of foreign forces from the
Afghanistan.

Pakistan has legitimate interests in Afghanistan and as such, karzai should heed Islamabad’s call for the protection of
Pakistan interests. Reciprocally, Pakistan must support him to play a positive role in the development of reconciliation
between Taliban and Kabul.

The geopolitical and geo-strategic enviourment of Afghanistan of the next decade will be determine by the converging
interest of its neighbors, i-e Russia, china, Iran, the central Asian states and the US. If we are looking for a peace in
Afghanistan we have to accommodate the interests of other. And therefore Pakistan needs to “recalibrate its position on
afghan. It means harmonizing Pakistan’s geo-strategic interests with Afghanistan and regional neighbors and real
accommodation of some US and NATO interests.”

Pak-Afghan relations 2010 onwards:

Being a neighbor, Pakistan gives paramount importance to its relations with Afghanistan as Pakistan’s peace and stability
depends on Afghan peace and stability. Traditionally, Pak-Afghan relationship has been characterized by mutual mistrust
and lack of confidence and third parties have always been a decisive factor in determining the Pak-Afghan relations.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have not developed strategic relations as there have been many factors that hindered the
progress in this sphere. Since the formation of national unity government in Afghanistan in September 2014 a paradigm
shift was noted in the approach of Afghan government in engaging Pakistan.

At Beijing Conference President Ghani defined five circles manifesting Afghanistan’s future foreign policy. He placed
Pakistan in first circle and stated that partnership with Pakistan was an important pillar of Afghan foreign policy. He
placed India in fourth circle implying a shift in Afghan thinking. These announcements have been followed by visits of
civil and military leadership of both states.

On economic front, Pakistan remains the largest trading partner of Afghanistan and bilateral trade has reached to $2
billion in 2014. Afghanistan has been the third largest destination for Pakistan’s exports. Afghan trade with outside world
is also regulated by Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement signed in 2010. Pakistan has extended support to
Afghanistan under technical assistance programme in 2003 for infrastructure development projects and some of these
projects have been completed while others are under the process of completion.

Being a landlocked state, Afghanistan’s trade has been passing through Pakistan and has been regulated under 1965
Afghan Transit Trade Agreement that allowed transit to Afghan imports from all the countries through the port of
Karachi. It was replaced by Afghan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) signed in 2010 that now regulates trade
between Afghanistan- Pakistan and the rest of the world. In the post 2014 period, a decrease has been noted in commercial
as well as non-commercial transit. Non- commercial transit has been reduced to half due to the withdrawal of bulk of
forces. The commercial transit has also reduced to half from more than 75,000 to 35,000 in 2014. There is also evidence
of shifting transit from Pakistan to Iran due to improved infrastructure on Iranian side, devaluation of Iranian currency
against dollar, reduced transportation cost, and extra charges at Pakistani ports for Afghan transit cargo are reasons for
this decline.

There have been some irritants in Pak-Afghan relations. Post 9/11 terrorism has been the major irritant in Pak-Afghan
relations. Afghanistan has been accusing Pakistan for supporting and harboring terrorists. Afghan government has been
publicly criticizing Pakistan for not doing enough to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table. Pakistan has been
facilitating the peace process between the US and Afghan Taliban and later on it facilitated the first round of intra-Afghan
talks but unfortunately peace process could not be continued.

An increase has been noted in border attacks after Afghan National Security Forces’ assumption of security
responsibilities. Earlier, during 2007-2010, 194 border violations were noted while these numbers have been on the rise as
2012 alone saw 732 cross border attacks while in 2013, 23 such incursions were reported.

Apart from these attacks, members of Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan having hideouts in Afghanistan have also been
responsible for incursions from Afghan side and had mounted attacks on Pakistani check posts in Chitral, Dir, Kurram and
Bajaur agencies in FATA.
Indian role in Afghanistan has been a grave concern for Pakistan. Contrary to the use of Indian hard power in respect to its
relations with other South Asian neighbors, the use of soft power in Afghanistan gives rise to many questions about
India’s motives. Given the history of troubled India-Pakistan relations, Afghanistan is strategically important for India.

There were hopes that coming to power of the new government in Afghanistan would transform Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations. Initially, Afghan government tried to address Pakistan’s concerns regarding Indian role in Afghanistan and
sought Pakistan’s help to initiate dialogue process with Taliban. Recent cross border firing and killing of troops on both
sides gave rise to blame game against Pakistan and disrupted the cooperative interaction between the two states. The
relations cannot be normalized or improved unless lack of confidence and mistrust that characterize their relations is
addressed. Both sides need to take measures to create an environment that is conducive to peace.

How to manage relations with Afghanistan by Talat Masood

When President Ashraf Ghani assumed office, he gave a high priority to improving relations with Pakistan. Our
leadership, both civilian and military, fully realising how important this relationship was, made sincere efforts at working
closely with Afghan leaders to build bridges. With common threats and shared concerns, one hoped that the process
would take a logical course of confidence-building, maturing into a more stable and mutually cooperative relationship.
Regrettably, this has not happened so far and the future remains unpredictable. Historically, too, Pakistan-Afghan
relations have generally remained problematic. What are the current challenges and is there a way out for a better future?

Afghanistan’s leadership expects Pakistan to stop patronising the Taliban and take definitive steps against the powerful
Haqqani network that is blamed for the daring siege of the strategic city of Kunduz last April followed by the catastrophic
suicide assault on an elite military unit in Kabul in which there were scores of fatal casualties and over 300 injured.

Afghans want the Pakistan military to compel the Taliban to engage in a dialogue that leads to a political settlement. Our
military feels that it has limited influence over them and it is for the two Afghan antagonists to find a political solution.
Pakistan, at best, can facilitate the dialogue process and even that is becoming problematic.

It may be politically expedient for a faltering regime to blame Pakistan while the hard reality is that the Afghan
government, due to chronic political infighting, poor governance and the limited ability of its security forces, is ceding
territory and control to the Taliban in several provinces. Exploiting these weaknesses, the Taliban have stepped up their
offensive and are in no mood to engage in dialogue. The other determining factor is that Mullah Mansoor, to consolidate
his leadership, is keen to demonstrate tactical gains in the insurgency and is less inclined to talk. Meanwhile, Pakistan
remains under pressure, albeit unfairly, from the US to ‘do more’. At what stage, if at all, will the Taliban be inclined to
engage in peace talks is uncertain. As and when this happens, both sides will have to demonstrate flexibility in their basic
positions to make any headway.

Due to serious political differences between President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, it is unlikely that the former would
be in any position to take any initiatives towards peace. The latest statement of Afghanistan’s ambassador to Pakistan that
the Taliban be declared “irreconcilables” by the Quartet is to put pressure on the group’s leadership to engage in
meaningful dialogue. The statement also has a message for Pakistan that it should act against the Taliban in case they
remain averse to a political settlement.

One of the main demands of the Taliban is the withdrawal of American and Nato forces. They insist that they would only
talk about a ceasefire with the Americans and brand the Afghan government as their stooges. The objective reality is that
the Afghan National Army in its present state of morale and combat readiness is not in a position to hold ground on its
own. Despite a relatively small American presence, their contribution becomes significant in conducting air strikes as well
as when it comes to providing air support to Afghan forces during ground operations and under critical operational
conditions. There are other political and economic implications apart from the psychological factor if Americans were to
leave at this stage. It will reflect an attitude of abandonment by the US and other Western countries. On the contrary, the
presence of foreign troops, historically, has been an anathema to the Afghans. The genesis of the present situation is
rooted in their resistance to the erstwhile Soviet occupation. The current situation presents a paradox with the government
looking at the US and Nato countries as liberators, and the Taliban viewing them as occupiers, conveniently ignoring that
their predecessor, the Mujahedeen, were at one time their allies.

Today, Pakistan finds itself in a catch-22 situation. Its failure to persuade the Taliban to come to the negotiating table has
unfairly earned the ire of the Afghanistan government and provided the US with an opportunity to start a blame game.
Scapegoating and derogatory public statements, however, do not solve problems. They only aggravate them.
Unsurprisingly, this is reflected in the Taliban taking full advantage of this both politically and on the battlefield by
closing ranks, with the exception of the dissident faction led by Mohammad Rasool.

Pakistan’s claim that it has limited influence over the Taliban is not taken at face value and is a cause of tension with both
the Afghans and the US. This is largely true, as the Pakistan military can only push the Taliban to a certain extent. If the
military takes military action against them, there are always fears that the Afghan Taliban will then join the TTP and other
militant groups that are inimical to Pakistan, creating serious consequences for our own security. Moreover, Afghanistan’s
fragile power structure, uncertain political future and leanings towards India are additional restraining factors inhibiting
Pakistan from placing all its eggs in one basket. Already, the Taliban exercise considerable control over several provinces,
especially those in the east and south, close to the Pakistan border.

The India factor has been a major reason in influencing Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. Kabul has always tried to
leverage its position by maintaining close ties with India to Pakistan’s chagrin. This vexing action-reaction phenomenon
has bedevilled Afghan-Pakistan relations from which both countries need to come out of. Afghanistan’s refusal to accept
the Durand line is a major impediment in the way of regulating the border and a constant irritant in a problematic
relationship. All these issues have economic and political ramifications for both countries that need to be resolved
peacefully. Safe havens on both sides of the border have strengthened militants and weakened the two states. Fata and
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have been the worst sufferers on our side and similarly, Kunar, Nuristan, Khost and other eastern
and southern provinces on the Afghan side. Pakistan is sceptical of US motives in the region and its growing strategic ties
with India. It is also not sure whether the US will retain interest in Afghanistan after Barack Obama leaves office or would
there be a repeat of past events.
Q3 third

Pakistan-Indonesia Relations

Located in Far East, consisting of seventeen thousand large and small islands, Indonesia the farthest south part of Asia is
extended over seven hundred thirty-five thousand three hundred fifty five kilometers. Its heavenly beautiful islands
link Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean which holds an increasingly significant place on domestic and international level
particularly because of dynamic location.
The tourist resorts in Indonesia attract tourists from all over the world. The National Monument, Central Jakerta, Toba
Lake of North Sumatra, Umang Island, Raja Ampat Island, and Ball Island are most reputed one for their beauty and
attraction. Indonesia earned a large sum of nine billion dollars from tourist industry in 2011.

The international market is profoundly attracted by constant economic growth of Indonesia. The powerful
economic lyceums like United States of America and China are also pursing policies to double their trade with
Indonesia in future when the economic paradigm will be shifting from west to east.Indonesia will gain more volume
of its economic growth owing to its geography and human resources. The current GDP (gross domestic product) of
Indonesia is six percent approximately.
Indonesia had to face economic crises by end of 20th century but with sound planning it was controlled to great extent.
The traces of the crises still remain obvious and inability to get rid of it completely is attributed to
IMF (International Monitoring Fund). The negative effect of these crises has also affected the agriculture and increased
unemployment.
This slump was created by the western economic monopolist, as they were afraid of greater and emerging economic
powers in Far East. Mahathir Muhammad stated details of the same in his book “The Case of Asia”.
The natural calamities have also posed great threats for economy; the earthquake of magnitude 9.1 at Richter scale in
2004 caused a terrible Tsunami that killed two hundred thirty three thousand people. The large scale destruction
caused by Tsunami devastated the Indonesian economy and a huge portion of population was turned homeless.
The literacy rate in Indonesia is almost 91%. Indonesia is the largest palm oil producing country in the world. The
important agricultural yields of Indonesia include coffee, palm oil rubber etc. Japan, India and China are the major
beneficiaries of Indonesian Coal. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are the world’s twelfth largest resources of gas as
this amount 4 trillion cubic meters. The annual exports of Indonesia are almost one hundred eighty billion dollars while
imports volume touches one hundred ninety billion dollars.
Indonesia occupies a special place among the Islamic world especially because Muslims constitute eighty six percent of
two hundred and fifty million populations.

On the basis of population Indonesia is second largest Islamic country, although larger number of the Muslims is
residing in India. Since Hindu mindset and numeric superiority predominates in India, Indonesia is placed as largest
Islamic country in the world. Indonesia is venerable member of OIC(Organization of Islamic Cooperation) as well
pioneer and leading member of ASEAN. Indonesia was among the first countries to raise voice against atrocities
committed in Burma against Muslims in Burma. Indonesia’s National Assembly speaker Marzuki Alai, while
addressing UNO (United Nations Organizations) stated openly that genocide of Muslims is being committed in
Burma. Probably he was only Muslim leader to use the bold term of Genocide for massacre of Muslims in Burma.
The Islamic attitude has been shaped from typical fine arts and specific ways living. Indonesian architecture is unique in
its character especially its famous mosques are worthy of attraction because of their different architecture. Viewed
historically the advent of Islam can be traced from seventh century when Muslim traders came to this region. But the
majority of population was Hindu and Buddhist and they enjoyed political, economical and numeric superiority till 13th
century.
The emerging Sufi Movement in thirteenth and fourteenth century played a vital role to spread Islam and like other
Islamic States, Sufis played a major to spread Islam here also. The prominent among these Sufis was Hazart Noor
uddin Bin Ali Alreenary of Qadaria order of Sufis. The famous Sufi poet Shiekh Hamza Al-Fahsory‘s spiritual poetry
played a significant role to invigorate this movement.
Almost in 16th century, Islam and Muslims were strengthened as consequence of this movement. But a century later the
ghost of colonialism devastated many civilizations of the world which resulted into Dutch occupation of Indonesia. In
1942 when Japan occupied Indonesia during the Second World War according to UN (United Nations) report four
million Indonesian people were killed. In 1945 Japan surrendered before America and its allies when atom bomb was
dropped on Japanese cities.
The Indonesian leader Dr. Ahmed Sukarno announced the freedom of Indonesia on August 17, 1945.After the
departure of Japan, Dutch government once again tried to establish itself here. However they had to face Indonesian
resistance and foreign pressure.
After a continuous struggle of Indonesian masses at last Dutch government accepted Indonesia’s right of self-
government. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as President of All Indian Muslim League in 1945, motivated
the Muslims to protest against colonial aggression in Indonesia, when the freedom movement was on full swing. He
also asked Indian Muslims to extend practical help to their Indonesian Muslim brothers. It was result of his motivations
that six hundred Muslims from British Indian Army proved their support for Indonesian brethren with their active
participation in freedom struggle there. Five hundred of these soldiers embraced martyrdom, one hundred of them
survived. Some of them returned and some continued living there.
Quaid-e-Azam ordered the detention of Dutch airplanes on Karachi Airport which were being sent to help Dutch army.
This step taken by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah established strong ties between Indonesia and Pakistan
and set an example of Muslim brotherhood. These actions of Quaid-e-Azam also manifested his disapproval of the use
of our land against other Muslims. He helped Muslim countries as far as possible. About the Dutch planes advancing
towards Indonesia, Pakistan’s first foreign minister Sir Zafarullah Khan said that the advancement of Dutch planes
towards Indonesia was tantamount to attack on the soul of Asia. On August 17, 1995 when Indonesia celebrated their
golden jubilee, the soldiers who fought with Indonesian freedom fighters for liberty of the Indonesia on order of Quaid-e-
Azam, were given highest military awards in reorganization of their sacrifices. In order to recognize Quaid-e-Azam’s
love for Indonesian brothers he was presented with “Adipura”, highest civil award.
Historically Pakistan and Indonesia have always enjoyed good relationships. Pakistan has sound relationships with
Indonesia in terms of commercial and agricultural trade, tourism, and defense. Presently Pakistan and Indonesia are
having bilateral trade of worth one billion dollar which is expected to increase to two billion dollar till end of this year.
Pakistan and Indonesia have tremendously helped each other in hard times, as Quaid-e-Azam had taken deep interest in
Indonesia’s freedom war, Indonesia also supported Pakistan in September 1965 war. As Pakistan helped Indonesian
brothers on devastating Tsunami, the Indonesian brothers also helped Pakistani earthquake victims in 2005. They helped
Pakistan with one million dollar worth medicines and food items. Pakistan provides educational facilities to
Indonesian students for education in Pakistani Universities. Due to vision and practical efforts of founder of Pakistan, both
the brother Islamic countries Pakistan and Indonesia enjoy durable relations and both countries need to improve their
relationship.
Particularly a comprehensive policy must be devised to meet challenges faced by Muslim Ummah. As Quaid-e-Azam
extended all possible support for freedom of Indonesia, we should also make effective and solid efforts to strengthen
relationship amongst Islamic countries to solve problems of this region as well as of Muslims worldwide

The IRAN-PAKISTAN Relations

Kaveh L Afrasiabi
News of the kidnapping of Iranian guards at the Iran-Pakistan border and Iran’s accusation of US complicity with Sunni
extremists operating from within Pakistan have ignited renewed interest in the ups and downs of relations between Iran
and Pakistan.
Historically, different factors have affected Iranian-Pakistani political relations since the creation of Pakistan. As
neighbors and Muslim countries, the two have always had close relations.
Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan soon after its independence in August 1947.
During the first decade of independence, successive Pakistani governments attached high priority to establishing
bilateral relations with Iran. In the early 1970s, Pakistan’s success in ending a powerful separatist insurgency in
the province of Balochistan, bordering Iran, would not have been possible without the support of the Iranian
military. This, in fact, set the precedence for Pakistan’s involvement in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during
the 1980s.
During the 1990s, relations between the two countries declined as a result of two concurrent developments: the rise
of anti-Shi’ite terrorist activities in Pakistan and the assassination of Iran’s counsel general, Sadeq Ganji, in
Lahore in 1990, and subsequently the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
When the Taliban captured the Afghan city of Maza-e-Sharif, they not only massacred thousand of Hazara
Shi’ites, they also murdered scores of Iranian diplomats, straining Iran’s bilateral ties with Pakistan, which at the
time backed the Taliban.
When General Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999, he visited Tehran and promised to address the terrorist activities
in Pakistan; subsequently relations between the two countries improved. After the execution of Ganji’s assassin by the
Pakistani government in February 2001, Iran gained a new level of confidence in Pakistan’s determination to curb anti-
Shi’ite extremism in that country.

Still, as long as the Taliban remained in power in Kabul, supported by Pakistan, and Iran was committed to backing the
anti-Taliban forces, relations between Iran and Pakistan were held hostage to some extent by the developments
inside Afghanistan. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent fall of the
Taliban paved the way for the mending of bilateral relations.
Immediately after the Taliban’s demise, Iran’s foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, paid a two-day visit to Islamabad and
reached an understanding with his Pakistani hosts on the situation in Afghanistan. Both sides agreed to assist in the
establishment of a broad-based multi-ethnic government in Afghanistan under the United Nations’ auspices.

Another important turning point in Iran-Pakistan relations transpired with president Mohammad Khatami’s visit
to Pakistan in December 2002, the first by an Iranian president in 10 years. During the visit, both sides discussed
how to improve bilateral relations and regional security, focusing especially on Pakistani-Indian relations, in the
light of Iran’s declared willingness to mediate between them. As a result of Khatami’s visit, Iran and Pakistan
signed four agreements and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) aimed at enhancing their bilateral
relationship, mainly in the fields of trade, plant quarantine, science and technology.
Pakistan’s prime minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, paid a return visit to Iran in October 2003, and reached a
landmark preferential trade agreement. Another agreement was on the revitalization of a trilateral commission among
Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan aimed at pushing for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Jamali visited Iran again in
February 2004 to attend the Developing Eight (D-8) meeting.

In March 2004, Iran’s first vice president, Reza Aref, visited Pakistan. His talks centered on further strengthening the
existing cooperation between the two countries. The following agreements were signed during Aref’s visit: a preferential
trade agreement; an MoU between the export promotion bureaus of the two countries; an MoU to establish a joint
investment company; an instrument of ratification of the agreement for avoidance of double taxation; and a customs
cooperation agreement.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS
The most important issue in Iranian-Pakistani economic relations is the low level of economic exchange; both countries
need to encourage and increase relations in this sphere. Trade between Pakistan and Iran during 2005 was barely
more than half a billion US dollars. Still, this must be considered an improvement over the previous years: trade
between the two countries declined in 2001-02 from $394 million to $166 million. Pakistan lost Iranian markets for
transport equipment and leather because of reports of delays in shipments of the poor quality of products.
A report prepared by the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry stated that the erection of
unnecessary trade barriers caused a reduction in Pakistan’s exports to Iran in 2002. Iran canceled an order for Pakistani
wheat because of its poor quality. The main reason for the trade deficit between the two countries lay in the differential
between Pakistan’s exports to Iran and its importation of crude petroleum and furnace oil from Iran at a cost of $141
million (in 2002). In late 2002, Pakistan began to import Iranian electricity for Balochistan province.

On a more positive note, the recent economic reforms in Iran have improved the climate for foreign investment, including
by Pakistani companies. Also, Iran has been encouraging the private sector to do business with the neighboring countries.
In this regard, the Mutual Economic Cooperation Commission has prepared the ground for economic ties between Iran
and Pakistan. The 13th session of this commission, held in December 2002 in Islamabad, completed its work with a note
of success, pushing for the enhancement of opportunities for the private sectors of both countries to increase their
exchanges.

During 2003-04, the volume of bilateral trade was about $376 million. Trade and economic cooperation was
discussed in detail at the 14th session of the Joint Economic Commission held in Islamabad in March 2004. The
whole range of economic activity between the two countries was reviewed and ways and means to enhance
cooperation were discussed.
The second issue that affects Iranian-Pakistani economic relations is the problem of petroleum smuggling between the two
countries. The problem has increased in recent years, fueled by the differential in oil prices across the common border.
While several rounds of negotiations have taken place between Iranian and Pakistani officials, they have yet to yield
results.

Without doubt, boosting security is important for encouraging commercial relations and preventing cross-border
smuggling, notwithstanding the alarming news of kidnapping of more than a dozen Iranian guards at the Iran-Pakistan
border this month.
In spite of the above-mentioned problems, there are hopeful signs that the economic and other ties between Iran and
Pakistan will improve, particularly if the much-talked-about “peace pipeline” between Iran and India transiting
through Pakistan turns into reality; the estimated profit for Pakistan is one-half billion dollars annually. This aside,
the two countries are now laying the emphasis on the establishment of a fiber-link network and improved communications
and transport links, including the railway systems.

IMPACT OF REGIONAL ISSUES

While Iran and Pakistan are neighbors, their regional outlooks are somewhat different as a result of the different type and
nature of national security challenges and threats facing each country.

India: Relations with India are an important issue that affects Iranian-Pakistani relations. Pakistan is concerned about
the North-South Corridor that Iran and India seek to establish together with Russia. In the light of Iran’s good
relations with India, Pakistan is concerned about the impact of those relations on its disputes with India – over the
core issue of Kashmir as well as other regional and geopolitical issues. Iran has declared its willingness to mediate
between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. In his visit to Pakistan, Khatami stated: “We will do everything possible to
remove tensions between India and Pakistan.” In 2004, when tensions between India and Pakistan escalated, Iran was the
first country to contact Musharraf and Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee with a view to defusing the crisis.
The proposed Iran-India gas pipeline via Pakistan remains problematic. On the one hand, this could act as an ideal
platform for initiating regional economic interdependence. Iran is the fifth-richest country in mineral reserves, possessing
some 10% of world’s oil reserves and 14.9% of the world’s natural-gas reserves, simultaneously serving as the connection
link among a diverse set of regions, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the South Asian
subcontinent. In both India and Pakistan, energy demands exceed supplies, while Iran is in an ideal position to play
the role of supplier.
While in principle there is no problem between Iran and Pakistan over the proposed gas pipeline, India’s lingering security
concerns, eg concern that Pakistan would use it as security leverage in the future, hamper the realization of this important
project.

Afghanistan: Pakistan and Iran have shared the fallout of decades of upheaval in Afghanistan, partly in the form
of millions of Afghan refugees, many of whom have not returned to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s downfall in
2001. Since then, Iran and Pakistan have tried to improve relations strained for a decade by policy differences over
Afghanistan, both sides coming to a recognition of the fact that sustained peace and stability are in their interests
and not only those of the people of Afghanistan.
As a result, both Tehran and Islamabad gave support to the political process initiated in Afghanistan by the Bonn
Agreement (among the Afghan political factions) while extending a helping hand to President Hamid Karzai’s
government in its efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. A first step was the signing of the Kabul Declaration on Good
Neighborly Relations by Iran and Pakistan on December 22, 2002.
A serious problem affecting Iran and Pakistan from Afghanistan is the burgeoning drug traffic, which has served as the
main financial source for extremist groups, including the remnants of the Taliban. The illicit drug-smuggling networks
also serve as a conduit for the transfer of small arms and explosives and for human trafficking. Drug traffickers
have been using Iran’s territory as the shortest major land route for the transit of narcotics from Afghanistan and
Pakistan to Europe.
Iran spends $400 million annually in its effort to control the drug traffic, and Iran and Pakistan need to bolster their
security cooperation in their fight against this menace. Both countries could cooperate in attracting international aid on
this project as its has much greater repercussions than purely regional ones. On the contrary, the matter affects many
countries around the globe, requiring a globalized strategy led by the regional states.
Security cooperation: Over the past few years, Iran and Pakistan have taken several concrete steps to increase their
security cooperation, including:
The Pakistani-Iranian Joint Ministerial Commission on security was established in November 2001 to deal with the
problems of terrorism, smuggling, sectarian violence, extremism and narcotics. The initial meeting of this
commission was held in September 2002.
There has been a renewal in consultations between the foreign ministers of both countries on bilateral relations and on
regional and international developments. The first of such consultations was held in July 2001.
Regular interactions between Pakistani and Iranian intelligence officials have been ongoing since October 2001. These
interactions are held between senior-level Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Iranian intelligence officials and focus on
the future of Afghanistan, Iran’s role in seven cultural centers in Pakistan, cross-border broadcasts, etc.
Both countries have agreed to solve security and border issues in a special security committee.
Presence of foreign powers: Iran and Pakistan have somewhat divergent perspectives with respect to the presence of
foreign powers in the region. Iran is concerned about the post-September 11 military cooperation between the US and
Pakistan. However, both countries share long-term perspectives on how to deal with the intrusiveness of foreign powers in
the region. Both Iran and Pakistan, for instance, opposed the United States’ unilateral action in Iraq, calling for a central
role for the UN.
However, although Iran and Pakistan have reached a basic geostrategic understanding regarding both Afghanistan and
Iraq, their relations may be harmed as a result of the hostility between Iran and the US and Pakistan’s close relations with
both the US and Israel; repeatedly during 2005, Pakistani officials stated their steadfast opposition to any US military
strike against Iran via Pakistani territory and/or airspace.

NUCLEAR COOPERATION:
During the past couple of years, the revelations concerning the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran by the Pakistani
network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan have ignited heated debates and discussions about the nature of nuclear cooperation
between the two countries. Iran is concerned about the reports of Pakistan’s nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia.
Iranian concern is fueled by, among other things, unconfirmed reports of a secret Saudi-Pakistani agreement, harking back
to a high-level visit to Pakistan by a Saudi prince in 2003 after a Saudi defense official’s visit to Pakistan’s nuclear
facilities, prompting serious speculations in Tehran that the Pakistani nuclear network headed by Khan might have traded
far more sensitive nuclear technology and know-how to the Saudis than it did to Iran. After all, Khan has visited Saudi
Arabia on a number of occasions, albeit for the benign purpose of attending conferences, and the Sunni connections
between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia run pretty deep.
Saudi officials have denied rumors of an oil-for-nukes pact between Riyadh and Islamabad, but Iranian policymakers are
put on guard by such rumors, deemed credible in the light of Pakistan’s history, its close ties to Saudi Arabia, and its cash
dependency on the oil-rich Saudis. Without doubt, a potential motivating factor, other than Israel, for a Saudi nuclear-
weapons program is the alleged existence of such a program in Iran, which in turn may have been influenced by the
threats of Saudi nuclearization.
Iran is pleased by the recent statements by Musharraf that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are under strict custodial controls and
that any clandestine proliferation network has been dismantled.
In conclusion, Iran’s and Pakistan’s concerns and interests are interlinked in the new regional and international
climate. New problems as well as new opportunities have been created for both countries, affecting their bilateral
and multilateral relations, since the events of September 11, 2001. Both countries need to devote more energy to
boost their economic trade, enhance their security cooperation, and to identify practical ways to tackle the
problems facing the region.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and
co-author of “Negotiating Iran’s Nuclear Populism”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume X11, Issue 2, Summer
2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd)

Q4 Relations: Iran and Pakistan | Yasmeen Aftab Ali

Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan as a sovereign state with the Shah of Iran being the first Head of State to
visit Pakistan. The relationship between Iran and Pakistan however, changed with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

Post Iran-Revolution saw the emergence of a strong Shia regime based on religion that practically remodeled Iran as an
Islamic theocratic republic. ‘Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984. Despite its pledge to support the
stabilization of Iraq, Iran continued to provide lethal support, including weapons, training, funding, and guidance, to Iraqi
Shia militant groups targeting U.S. and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians.’ (US Department of State Country Report on
Terrorism 2011: July 31, 2012)
Before the revolution, relationships between the two dynasties in Iran and Saudi Arab were on an even keel with both
countries cooperating on many levels. However, post revolution Iran relationship turned for the worst. Ties between
Riyadh and Tehran had a profound impact on the relationship between Islamabad and Tehran owing to Islamabad’s
closeness with Riyadh.
Emergence of Saudi Arab’s support of Wahabiism and efforts at making space in Pakistan and Afghanistan have led to
creation of two distinct camps within Islam over the world-both vying for greater leverage. Both Iran and Saudi Arab have
supported their groups within Pakistan particularly post 1999.

Increasing costs of petroleum, a direct result of 1973 embargo, led to Arabs refusing to sell to US as a protest against
American support towards the Isreal Army. ‘The Saudi-based Muslim World League opened offices in every region
inhabited by Muslims, and the Saudi ministry of religion printed and distributed Wahhabi translations of the Quran,
Wahhabi doctrinal texts and the writings of modern thinkers whom the Saudis found congenial, such as Sayyids Abul-
A’la Maududi and Qutb, to Muslim communities throughout the Middle East, Africa, Indonesia, the United States and
Europe. In all these places, they funded the building of Saudi-style mosques with Wahhabi preachers and established
madrasas that provided free education for the poor, with, of course, a Wahhabi curriculum.’ (New Stateman)
Relationship between Tehran and Islamabad have been rocky- owing to these developments, also the closeness between
Nawaz Sharif’s family with Saudi Arabia- is viewed by Iran with suspicion. This entire scenario has created a troubled
triangle between the three countries. Sharif had emphasized upon maintaining good relationships with Iran among other
nations as part of the foreign policy.

Realistically speaking, with a falling graph of Saudi-Iran relationship, Pakistan’s closeness to Saudi-Arab, a state of
turmoil in Afghanistan, Iran’s historical closeness with India, and efforts to have her stakes in Afghanistan if Taliban take
a seat, “Mullah Mansour’s taxi was obliterated from the sky as he returned to Pakistan from Iran. News reports said he
went there for medical treatment, but one expert told The Times that Iran has been quietly helping the Taliban for several
years, as a hedge in case the militants regain power in Kabul,” (New York Times Editorial May 25, 2016) it has not been a
honeymoon between the two neighbors.
Pakistan and Iran have supported different camps post-cold war. The Gulf States along with Pakistan actively supported
US and her allies trying to effectively curtail Soviet influence in Central Asia, especially Afghanistan. Selig
Harrison, from the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars states, “The CIA made a historic mistake in
encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan.” The US provided $3 billion for building up
these Islamic groups, and it accepted Pakistan’s demand that they should decide how this money should be spent.” Iran on
the other hand has a history of good relationship with Russia. A country India too is close to.
The biggest challenge to Pakistan is to balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Refusal to have boots on ground in Yemen
as per Saudi request was a commendable effort in effort to maintain n equilibrium.

However, in 2013, Pakistan joined the international sanctions against Iran under the aegis of its Premier Nawaz Sharif, in
direct conflict with his stated foreign policy. In 2015, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif twice visited
Pakistan. The purpose was to set off agreed projects as well as get a head start on other issues of mutual interests ie
security, economic and cultural relations between the two countries.

Pakistan through its offensives via Zarb-e-Azab is focused on dealing with the security position within its borders to be
able to help in the take off for CPEC. This project can offer huge transit benefits not only to China but also to
Afghanistan, Iran and hopefully India once completed.

With Pakistan being close to US, Saudi Arab and China, her relationship with Russia, Iran and India were on low ebb.
This is changing slowly but gradually over time. Relations with Russia are definitely better. This shows a maturity on part
of Pakistan’s approach towards a radically different relationship with Russia a few decades ago.

With Iran, Pakistan signed nine bilateral cooperation agreements in May 2014 when Nawaz Sharif visited Tehran. These
included provisions for countering terrorism and enhancing border security.

Iran must be disturbed by Islamabad’s closeness to Riyadh. By the same coin, Islamabad must be perturbed by Tehran’s
closeness to Delhi. “Because Pakistan thinks that India is using Afghan soil to support the Baluch nationalist insurgency
in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province and anti-Pakistan Taliban militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas, Iranian cooperation with
India in Afghanistan could serve as a major irritant in Pakistani-Iranian ties.” (An Analysis of emerging Pak-Iran Ties:
Norwegian PeaceBuilding Resource Center)

Both Iran and Pakistan need to understand that for a peaceful region, their cooperation and commitment to attain the goal
is important. Both need to address the concerns felt by both in all sincerity.
Q5 Pakistan-Russia Relations

Pakistan’s relations with the Russian Federation, which emerged as the successor state to the USSR after its dissolution in
December 1991, are quite naturally inseparable from the legacy of more than four decades of Pak-Soviet relations.
Historically these relations were unsatisfactory. USSR perceived Pakistan in the military aspects sponsored by the US and
Pakistan’s friendship with China in the context of the Cold War, while Pakistan felt threatened due to USSR close
relations with India.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan once again dealt a serious blow to Pak-Soviet relations. Pakistan felt a
direct threat to its security from the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan while USSR demanded accommodation in
Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan and predicated the entire bilateral relationship on its response. The collapes of Soviet
Union provided an opportunity for a new beginning in Pak-Russia relations, which was taken up by both sides. High-level
bilateral contacts took place between Pakistan and the Russian Federation immediately thereafter. In November 1991.
Pakistan’s minister of state for economics affairs visited Moscow followed by his well-Known tour of the Central Asian
States. It was the first ministerial visit from Pakistan to the Russian Federation after years of neglect by past government
and contributed significantly to the opening a new chapter of relations with Russia.

Several high-level exchanges of trips have taken place between the two sides since then, which include the visits of the
vice-president (December 1991), foreign minister (July 1993) and first deputy foreign minister (May 1994) to Pakistan
and those of Pakistan’s then secretary-general of foreign affairs (September 1992) and the foreign minister (July 1994). A
broad range of bilateral issues was discussed during these visits, which, besides other areas of co-operation, also included
collaboration in the fields of defense outer space technology and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The exchange of these
visits in indicated the Russian desire to upgrade relations with Pakistan and was a radical departure from the previous
Soviet policy.

There are several other indication to show that Pakistan’s desire for a normal relation-ship with Russia, which is also
reciprocated by Russian Federation. Pakistan had been appreciative of Russian balanced approach towards South Asia and
attached independence significance “to its relations with Pakistan.” While Russian tried to maintain its traditionally close
cooperation with India, it may not have a special relationship with that country at the expense to its ties with Pakistan. The
Indians were not pleased with the development but the fact was that India has lost it strategic value. After the end of the
cold war and the normalization of china-Russia relations, India no longer enjoyed the importance.

The relation between Pakistan and Russia began to develop, when Russia made concern on Kashmir issue, non-
proliferation or the sale of defense equipment by Russia to Pakistan. Russia had moved away from its unconditional
support to India on these issues. Russia’s expression of deep concern in October 1993 over the aggravation of the human
rights situation in connection with the Hazartbal siege and its call upon all sides to work for a positive solution through
peaceful means. This new development received the considerable concern in India. The Indians were also disappointed
when the Russian leader made no statement on the Kashmir issue during Indian Prime Minister visit to Moscow in July
1994.

The Russian Federation did not oppose Pakistan’s resolution in the UN General Assembly on the nuclear-free zone in
South Asia for the first time in 17 years in 1991. But it voted in favour of the proposal of Pakistan for first time in history
Pakistan and Russia also pleaded for promotion of peace and stability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Russia demanded for
the containment of turmoil to Central Asian States. Pakistan also sought tranquility and peace and to develop mutually
beneficial co-operation with Afghanistan and Central Asian States.

Pakistan and Russia co-operated in the UN-sponsored talks on Tajikistan. Russia had been using its influence over the
Tajik government while Pakistan doing the same. These rounds of talks held in Tehran and Islamabad in 1994. The
Russian president extended the invitation to Pakistan’s Premier to visit Russia, which showed a balanced approach for the
established of good relation with Pakistan.

At minister level many trips visited both the countries for normalization of relations between Russia and Pakistan. New
era of co-operation of scholars had played an important role in normalization of relations between the both countries.
Leader of the Russian Parliament visited Pakistan in September 1998 and disclosed that Russia was ready to supply
military hardware to Pakistan. He also said the Russian technology could find its way into many fields of Pakistan
markets.

In April 1999 the Pakistan Prime Minister visited Moscow, which was the first visit to Russia by a Pakistani Head of
Government after twenty five years and the first ever between Pakistan and the Russian Federation. During the visit many
important bilateral issues, as well as a whole range of regional and global issues of common concern, came under
discussion. Some important documents were signed. Inter-Governmental Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-
operation and an agreement on co-operation between the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the two countries were
concluded. It was also agreed to establish a Joint Inter-Government Ministerial Commission on Economic. Trade,
Scientific and Technological Co-operation.

Recently Pakistan purchased transport helicopters from Russia. Another big deal involving “Kamaz” trucks in the being
negotiated while a joint venture for producing small cars is in the offing. Although, trade between Pakistan and Russia has
declined in recent years owing to the economic crises in both the countries, serious efforts are being made to revive the
bilateral trade as well.

Pakistan attaches great importance to its relations with Russia, which it feels has an important role to play in peace and
stability in Asia and particularly in South Asia. It is desirous of expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia in
all spheres, which can contribute to the peace and stability of region. Russia shares this desire and also recognize the
importance of Pakistan in peace and stability of south Asia and South Central Asia. Based on their keenness for close and
cooperative relations, the two countries are moving towards a more fruitful relationship. Pakistan welcomes the fact that
Russia is in the process of evolving a more even handed approach towards the major countries in South Asia and believes
that Russia could act as a mediator for the establishment of a congenial atmosphere in South Asia conducive to the
economic development of the region.

Realizing the importance of Pakistan in the region. Russia intended to improve relations with Pakistan by offering help to
ailing economic condition of Pakistan. It also offered to Pakistan to sell its armaments. The danger of National Missile
Defense programme of United States also made Russia closer to Pakistan along with China.

On the invitation of Russian Government the President of Pakistan visited Russia on an official visit in February 2003 and
concluded many pacts of friendship and mutual understanding. Thus Pakistan began to enjoy a pivotal position in the
region.

PAK-RUSSIA DEFENSE RELATIONS BY MUHAMMAD SARMAD ZIA

The emerging defence co-operation between Pakistan and Russia, the erstwhile Cold War antagonists may seem rather
odd in the backdrop of Russia’s 70 year-long close strategic partnership with India, a longstanding adversary of Pakistan.
But this is a reality that defies conventional wisdom and it is being eyed with interest and speculation as well as
apprehension by the regional and global powers.
This new arrangement is essentially a paradigm shift in the global policy framework.
Old allies such as US and Pakistan are drifting away amid changing geo-political world situation.
Russia’s cozying up to Pakistan is indeed a sign of Pakistan’s rising importance in the emerging international arena.
The lifting of the arms embargo against Pakistan in 2015 clearly signifies that Russia is getting comfortable with the idea
of co-operation with Pakistan. It can further be explained by understanding the burgeoning relationship between the two
states.
To help fathom this new convergence of the two states, some points cannot be overlooked.
Firstly, the Crimean annexation and trouble in East Ukraine put Russia under several stringent economic sanctions by the
European Union and the United States.
This resulted in Russia turning to China as well as other countries to stabilise its economy.

Additionally, it is possible that the Chinese interest in Pakistan’s strategic location in terms of the Pak-China Economic
Corridor, highly crucial for China’s trade and security, may also have tickled Russia’s fancy of reaching the warm waters
of Indian Ocean.
Secondly, India’s growing close association with the US is also a factor compelling the Russian Federation to look for
alternative allies in South Asia. Thirdly, since Russia’s major arms importers such as India, Vietnam and Venezuela have
also been doing more than window-shopping for arms elsewhere, it needs new buyers for its defence equipment. It is
imperative for Russia to sign arms deals with other countries to boost its economy.

After all, its arms exports amounted close to a staggering $15 Billion in the year 2015. Since Pakistan is the world’s 7th
biggest arms importer, it could be a promising buyer of Russian arms.

Fourthly, a close scrutiny of the containment of the Soviet Union by the US and its allies provides a deep insight into how
in the future, a similar approach could be applied by the Western countries to contain Russia once again. Keeping the
recent history in mind, Russia should follow China’s example whose assessment of a possible containment policy might
have also led to its seeking a route to the Arabian Sea through CPEC.

It is also pertinent to mention that the global power center is now shifting to Asia and Russia realises this strategic change.
Both Pakistan and China are Nuclear powers and retain huge armies. Therefore, it is in Russia’s interest to forge new
alliances in the region. The official narrative of Russia’s defence, however, remains somewhat ambivalent.

It is possible that Russia does not want to estrange India at the moment despite the latter’s budding relationship with the
US. However, a quick glance at the Russian foreign policy of 2008, under President Medvedev, shows that Pakistan was
listed as a leading regional state with which Russia sought to further develop relations in bilateral and multilateral formats.

The recent turn of events, wherein Russia lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan to sell four Mi-35 attack helicopters to
Pakistan and talks of selling SU-35 and Su-37 fighter jets; Russia’s joint military exercise with Pakistan inside Pakistan’s
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region; and its silence in joining India in blaming Pakistan for terrorism during the BRICS Summit
in India indicates a policy change in the Kremlin.

It is important to analyze that days before the joint military exercise titled Druzhba-2016 (Friendship-2016) took place,
the Uri attack was conducted by militants in the Indian Occupied Kashmir for which India as usual was quick to accuse
Pakistan.

Despite India’s pressure to postpone these joint exercises with Pakistan, Russia did not budge and expedited the process.
A few months later, at the BRICS Summit, Russia did not support the Indian claim of Pakistan perpetrating terrorism into
India. In the realm of defence cooperation, both the countries can prove to be reliable allies.

Russia’s technological expertise, it’s advanced weapons systems and experience in terms of conventional war can prove to
be highly beneficial for Pakistan.

Its use of ‘hybrid war’ where it uses not only its military but also local population, media and propaganda to push its case
was very effective in Crimea.

In fact, Pakistan can use this experience within its own territory to combat militancy on its western border. Likewise,
Russia deems Pakistan’s experience in fighting militancy, insurgency and terrorism to be very important and the recent
joint military exercise validates it.

Moreover, Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians can be trained in Russia and prove to be mutually beneficial. It
can thus be concluded that Russia and Pakistan are seeing an unprecedented era of convergence between them. Though
still in a nascent stage, it signals a promising prospect for both states.

Pakistan needs allies that are both technologically advanced as well as reliable not only to enhance but also better the
standards of its defence production.

The use of Russian RD-93 engine in Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder is an example of such co-operation. Through this
diversification of arms producers, Pakistan will be in a better position to defend itself against a foreign or internal threat.
Of course this will have positive ramifications for Russia; Pakistan’s improving economy could afford a market for its
innovative weapons and defence systems.

Lastly, it goes without saying, that a Russia-Pakistan-China alliance would be formidable enough to cater to any threat
posed by the US and its allies.

Q7 Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Relations

Relationship between Saudi Arabia and Islamic Republic of Pakistan are close and friendly.
As two of the world’s leading Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have sought to develop extensive
commercial, cultural, religious and strategic relations.
A Muslim-majority state, Pakistan has sought to develop close bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia, the largest country on the
Arabian Peninsula and home to the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina and the destination of Muslim
pilgrims from across the world.

Development of bilateral relations:

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are leading members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
Saudi Arabia was one of the strongest supporters of Pakistan during Pakistan’s wars with India, especially
opposing the creation of Bangladesh from Pakistan’s eastern wing in 1971.
While it had supported Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir conflict, it has since endorsed the Indo-Pakistani peace process.

With Pakistan, it provided extensive financial and political support to the Afghan mujahedeen fighting the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, Pakistan sent troops to protect the Islamic holy sites in Saudi Arabia.
Along with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were the only states to recognize Taliban rule in
Afghanistan.
In May 1998, before Pakistan’s Chagai-I nuclear tests, Saudi Arabia promised to supply 50,000 barrels per day of free
oil to help Pakistan cope with likely economic sanctions in the aftermath.
Military cooperation:

Pakistan maintains close military ties with Saudi Arabia, providing extensive support, arms and training for the Military
of Saudi Arabia.
Pilots of the Pakistan Air Force flew aircraft of the Royal Saudi Air Force to repel an incursion from South Yemen in
1969.

In the 1970s and 1980s, approximately 15,000 Pakistani soldiers were stationed in the kingdom. Saudi Arabia has
negotiated the purchase of Pakistani ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
It is also speculated that Saudi Arabia secretly funded Pakistan’s nuclear program and seeks to purchase atomic
weapons from Pakistan to enable it to counteract possible threats from arsenals of the weapons of mass destruction
possessed by Iran, Iraq and Israel.
Both nations have received high-level delegations of scientists, government and military experts seeking to study the
development of a nuclear program.

Cultural and commercial ties:

Saudi Arabia has also provided extensive religious and educational aid to Pakistan, being a major contributor to the
construction of mosques and madrassas (religious schools) across Pakistan.
The Faisal Mosque (dedicated to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan.
The major Pakistani city of Lyallpur was also renamed Faisalabad in honour of King Faisal in 1977.
Saudi Arabia remains a major destination for immigration amongst Pakistanis, the number of whom living in Saudi
Arabia stands between 900,000 and 1 million.
Saudi Arabia was a major supporter of the “Islamisation” program of the military ruler Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in the
1970s.
In 2006, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was awarded the Nishan-e-Pakistan, the highest civilian decoration of
Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia is the largest source of petroleum for Pakistan.
It also supplies extensive financial aid to Pakistan and remittance from Pakistani migrants to Saudi Arabia is also a
major source of foreign currency.
In recent years, both countries have exchanged high-level delegations and developed plans to expand bilateral
cooperation in trade,education, real estate, tourism, information technology, communications and agriculture.
Saudi Arabia is aiding the development of trade relations with Pakistan through the Gulf Cooperation Council, with
which Pakistan is negotiating a free trade agreement; the volume of trade between Pakistan and GCC member states in
2006 stood at USD 11 Billion.

What Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Want from Each Other: An Outsider’s Analysis
“Unfounded, baseless and untrue,” said Pakistan’s foreign secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry earlier this month, when
asked whether his nation was considering the sale of nuclear arms to Saudi Arabia. Earlier this spring, Defense Minister
Khawaja Mohammad Asif reiterated Pakistan’s “pledge to protect Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity” in response to a
request for military assistance against the House of Saud’s Houthi foes next door. But within days, Pakistan’s parliament
voted unanimously not only against sending troops to Yemen, but also against even taking sides in the conflict. Despite
decades of lavish funding to Pakistan, the Saudis might wonder what they are getting for their riyals. And Pakistanis, with
all the problems they face in their own neighborhood, might be amazed that anyone would expect them to plunge into the
treacherous miasma of the Middle East. What to make of the warm-but-not-too-warm friendship between the wealthiest
state in the Sunni Muslim world, and its most heavily armed one?

This question is an important one for a simple reason: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are each other’s wild cards. Each is the
other’s out-of-region game-changer, a factor that must play into the calculations of all other players in the Middle East
and South Asia alike. Think you’ve got the complex equation sorted out of Arabs vs. Persians, Sunnis vs. Shi’a, Ba’athists
vs. Islamists? Well, if Pakistan decides to throw its weight around the Middle East, you’ll have to re-tabulate your odds.
Think you understand the delicate balance between New Delhi, Islamabad, Kabul, and Beijing? Well, Riyadh has long
been staking one particular player at this table, and whether it chooses to double down or fold on its investment will affect
everyone else’s bets. To understand the strategies of both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, one must understand what underlies
their durable but lopsided relationship.

WHAT SAUDI ARABIA WANTS

Maintaining a deep relationship with Pakistan advances Saudi Arabia’s ambition of expanding its ideological reach
beyond the Arab world. Riyadh tries to achieve this goal globally, both through highly visible investments and by more
covert means. With great fanfare, the Saudi government builds grand mosques and endows humanitarian charities; more
quietly, it spreads its Salafist doctrine by funding ideologically focused madrassas, and by paying for clerics and opinion-
shapers to visit, study, or conduct pilgrimages to the Kingdom. For the Saudi royal family, Pakistan is the ultimate prize:
It has the world’s second largest population of Muslims, and, unlike first-ranked Indonesia, is constitutionally an “Islamic
Republic.” Pakistan was founded explicitly to provide a homeland for South Asian Muslims. Unlike Muslim-majority
countries such as Bangladesh, the Central Asian Republics, and Turkey; near-majority ones like Nigeria; or massive-
minority ones such as India, Pakistan has a Muslim identity as part of its national identity and mission. How that mission
is translated into practice, however, is very much up for grabs. And the Saudis would very much like to grab it.

Saudi Arabia sees Pakistan as a crucial component of its plan to constrain Iran. Additionally, Saudi Arabia sees Pakistan
as a crucial component of its plan to constrain Iran. Every Saudi ruler has, as part of his official title, the designation
“Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques:” that is, guardian of Mecca and Medina, the two most sacred sites in the Muslim
world. The regime’s identity is not merely that of an oil-rich Arab nation, but also as the standard-bearer for Islam. The
most potent challenger to this identity, in both spiritual and political terms, is Iran—a nation that is also oil-rich and
theocratic, but is Persian rather than Arab and Shi’a rather than Sunni. From the Saudi perspective, one of the best ways to
keep Iran off-balance is to bolster a powerful Sunni rival on its eastern border. How intense is the rivalry? In 2008, Saudi
King Abdullah was quoted in a cable published via Wikileaks urging the U.S. to attack Iran and “cut the head off the
snake.”
Pakistan says it won’t provide nuclear technology to the Saudis, and Saudi Arabia says it has no interest in asking for it.
Of course they do. But the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, ran the most extensive proliferation ring the
world has ever seen, and remains a national hero. In 2004, after intense U.S. pressure on Pakistan’s military ruler General
Pervez Musharraf, Khan admitted to selling nuclear information and technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea; he
received an immediate pardon, was confined to his luxurious home, and has lived freely ever since his release in 2009.
The Saudis might well feel that an operation, which was once termed a “Nuclear Walmart,” will not keep its doors shut
for long. And with an $80 billion military budget, the Saudis might see any tab as “Always Low Prices.”

WHAT PAKISTAN WANTS

The best things in life are free, but Pakistan feels these are best left to the birds and bees. What it wants is money, and the
Saudis have provided a lot of it: No comprehensive tally is available publicly, but over the past four decades the Kingdom
has supplied Pakistan with many billions of dollars in aid through cash, credit, and cut-rate oil. During the 1980s, Saudi
Arabia delivered perhaps half of the multi-billion-dollar stream channeled through Pakistan to the anti-Soviet mujahideen.
In 1998, when Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was deliberating about whether to answer India’s nuclear test with
one of his own, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah reportedly promised 50,000 barrels of oil per day to help Islamabad
weather any potential sanctions.

In addition to cash, Pakistan is hoping to boost its credibility in the Islamic world. Pakistan was founded with a Muslim
identity—but not necessarily an Islamic one. What is the distinction? It’s the difference between culture and faith. When
arguing for a nation separate from India, Pakistan’s founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah said that Islam and Hinduism
“are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders.” Jinnah was himself
hardly a rigorous observer of Islamic practices, and his nation’s transition from homeland for Muslims to Islamic
Republic occurred only after his death. By far the most significant period of Islamization was the 1977–88 tenure of
General Zia-ul Haq—a period that corresponded, whether by intent or coincidence, with the blossoming of the
relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Sharif was reported to have “become a member of the Saudi
royal family” when, according to a diplomatic cable, his daughter married a grandson of King Fahd.

Unlike the assistance provided by Washington, Saudi Arabia’s infusion came with no strings attached. And unlike the
offer made by Beijing, all of Saudi Arabia’s promised funding actually materialized. Beyond boosting the nation’s Islamic
credentials, Pakistan is looking to diversify its stock of superpower supporters. Although China is said to be Pakistan’s
“all-weather friend,” the precise meaning of this friendship is elusive. Has China stood beside Pakistan in tough
diplomatic struggles? Not really. For example, it stood on the sidelines during the 1999 Kargil crisis. Does China bail
Pakistan out of economic hardship? Perhaps it will in the future (if President Xi makes good on recent promises), but it
has not often done so in the past. Did China actively support Pakistan during its three wars with India in 1948, 1965, and
1971? No, no, and no. United States, meanwhile, is Pakistan’s—well, nobody is quite sure what. Friend?Enemy?Both?
Neither? Even if Pakistan is not going to walk away from either of its two traditional patrons, it is pleased to have Saudi
Arabia as a third. Just last year, for example, Riyadh helped Islamabad stave off a financial crisis with a $1.5 billion soft
loan. Unlike the assistance provided by Washington, Saudi Arabia’s infusion came with no strings attached. And unlike
the offer made by Beijing, all of Saudi Arabia’s promised funding actually materialized.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

The relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has had its ups and downs. Ties tend to be closer when Pakistan is
governed either by the military (under Generals Zia and Musharraf) or the Pakistan Muslim League (led by Sharif—a Zia
protégé who tried to grant himself the power to enforce sharia). After Musharraf ousted Sharif in 1999, the once-and-
future prime minister and his family spent seven years in exile, living comfortably in the seaside city of Jeddah.

Games of chance are officially banned in both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—but the governments of both nations know the
importance of keeping a wild card in the hole. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), rival of both the Muslim League and the
military, has historically been less close to the Saudis. The PPP has produced three national leaders of note: Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto (from 1971 until his execution by Zia in 1977), his daughter Benazir Bhutto (who served two terms as prime
minister in the 1990s and was killed in a 2007 terrorist bombing), and her widower, Asif Ali Zardari (who led the first,
and so far only, democratically-elected government in Pakistan to complete a full term). One of the bases of support for
the PPP has traditionally been the country’s Shi’a minority, which represents about one-fifth of the population. The
Bhuttos have traditionally been more favorably disposed toward Iran than the Saudis might like, and their periods in
power have seen a slight cooling between Islamabad and Riyadh.

Cooperation against terrorism has also ebbed and flowed. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have both been the victims of
terrorism, and have also served as its incubators. Both governments have launched tough campaigns against Al Qaeda, but
extremely well-connected individuals in both nations have supported the group, too: Osama bin Laden was the scion of
one of Saudi Arabia’s most powerful families, and for the last half-decade of his life, he found sanctuary right outside
Pakistan’s military academy in Abbottabad. Private Saudi funds fuel some of the most bloodthirsty terrorist groups based
in Pakistan, including Lashkar-e Jhangvi (a Sunni sectarian force, which directs most of its violence at Shi’a) and
Lashkar-e Taiba (whose primary target is India and was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack). While the Pakistani
government is usually upset by Saudi support for sectarian militias on its soil, Lashkar-e Taiba is another matter. In the
past, the group has been supported by Pakistani intelligence for reasons of political expediency (it served as a de facto
proxy in Kashmir throughout the 1990s, and arguably even after its 2002 banning by Musharraf), and by Saudi patrons for
reasons of ideology (the Ahl-e Hadith school, which it follows, is part of the Salafi pathway rather than any ideology
indigenous to South Asia).

Whatever overlapping interests they may have in dangerous groups like Lashkar-e Taiba, the Saudis and Pakistanis have
much bigger reasons for seeking each other’s friendship. These reasons may be largely transactional, but the transaction
has been a mutually beneficial one for nearly 40 years. There is little reason to believe that relations will get markedly
better in the near future—or, for that matter, markedly worse.

What, then, to make of Pakistan’s reluctance to join the Saudi campaign against Shi’a rebels in Yemen? Or to open the
door to nuclear cooperation in the event that Iran manages to join the world’s most exclusive club? What, exactly, did the
Saudis buy for their $1.5 billion bailout—and how much more will they be willing to pay?
For the answers to these questions, perhaps the best place to look would be a poker-table: Games of chance are officially
banned in both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—but the governments of both nations know the importance of keeping a wild
card in the hole.

Q8 pakistan-Turkey Relations

Pakistan has pretty adequate relations with several other countries, particularly with Muslim nations. Turkey is one of
them. Pakistan and Turkey have been close friends for over half a century, having a multidimensional relationship. Both
nations have close historical cultural and also military relations. The clothing style of both countries in Central Asia also
has common origins. The etymology of the word “Urdu” connects it back to the Turkish (Mughal) rail. Moreover, the
common cultural effects on Pakistan and Turkey span many decades, as many Iranians and Turkish peoples ruled the
Middle East and Central & South Asia. These historical ties further deepened under the President Tayyip Erdoğan’s
Islamic-rooted political approach, as he termed Pakistan “home away from home”. He is the only foreign leader who has
addressed Pakistani Parliament more than once, doing so three times. In 2016, it was President Erdoğan’s 7th visit to
Pakistan.
In 1947, soon after the independence of Pakistan, Turkey established diplomatic relations. On 4th of March 1948 Quid-e-
Azam, at the appointment of first Turkish ambassador stated that: ‘I really can assure you excellence that the Muslims of
Pakistan will entertain sentiments of affection and esteem for your country and now Turkey and Pakistan both as free,
sovereign and independent countries can strengthen their ties more and more for the good of both’.

In Joint Communiqué on 19 February 1954, issued in Ankara and Karachi; according to which Pakistan and Turkey
pledged to closer cooperation in the economic, political, and cultural departments, and both nations will put their sincere
efforts for development. At present, the number of agreements signed between both countries is more than 50.
Pakistan has long had military ties with Turkey. Pakistan air force officers are training in Turkey to upgrade their F-16
fleet. Pakistan and Turkey had signed a treaty of cooperation and friendship, on 2nd April 1954. Both countries have
linked-up the US-led Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The organization is aimed to support and strengthen military
and deliberate long-term cooperation and counter the increase of communism, socialism and Soviet influences in the
region. Relationships regarding defense are also very powerful between Pakistan and Turkey, consisting of a
substantial portion of the Pakistan Navy’s fleet and joint practices. Turkey is currently a major arms seller to Pakistan.
Turkey had previously purchased arms and also proceeded to buy parts of minor aerial weapons from Pakistan. As a
consequence, the two nations have enjoyed strong military and diplomatic relations, which are now strengthening more
towards economic cooperation.
In February 2007, Turkey started a trilateral negotiation process between the two states and Afghanistan. Following a visit
by Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to Islamabad, Pakistani deputy Humair Hayat Khan Rokhri confirmed:

According to Gül

“We are all brothers who need to support each other, in order to bring security and stability to the region.”

A meeting of all three countries’ leaders held on 1st April 2009, was carried out as part of the trilateral Ankara
cooperation process. The three countries committed to increasing coordination of their political, intelligence and
military ties in the fight against terrorism and militancy. Chairman of the Turkish – Pakistani Friendship Association
Burhan Kayatürk had stated:
“It is the first time that the military and intelligence chiefs of Afghanistan and Pakistan have attended the trilateral
summit, which is a reflection of the deeper commitment to work together.”

Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir conflict is openly supported by Turkey. It also recognizes Jammu and Kashmir as part of
Pakistan and the Turkish ambassador spent a week in the capital of Azad Kashmir (Pakistani Administrated Kashmir)
Muzaffarabad, to show Turkish solidarity with Pakistan. In the recent address of Erdoğan in Parliament, he said:
“We are well known for the pain and problems of Kashmiris and we condemn the brutality of India in Kashmir”.
Pakistan has reciprocated by supporting Turkey over the Northern Cyprus issue. In 1963, when Pakistan’s Foreign
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attended UN General Assembly session, he represented the full concern and commitment of
the Pakistani nation for their Turkish brethren. Moreover, In November 1974 and November 1976, Pakistan again
supported Turkey at UN General Assembly debate on Cyprus.

Turkey also maintains military and political support during the wars with India. Both nations have sought to expand
cooperation to fight terrorism. Large numbers of Turks volunteered to fight for Pakistan against India and a number of
nurses to serve Pakistan flew in from there. In December 1965, President Ayub Khan visited Turkey and expressed his
profound gratitude to the Turkish President Gural for the moral and material support provided to Pakistan during Indo-Pak
war of 1965.
‘Regional Co-Operation for Development’ was an organization created by Pakistan, Turkey & Iran to set up
cooperation in all kinds of fields. On March 15, 1965, all three countries agreed to develop RCD joint shipping lines. In
1965, Pakistan and Turkey started a program for technical education. First RCD flight of Pakistan International Airline
(PIA) between Karachi, Tehran and Istanbul started in November 1966. On July 1967, an RCD joint venture was
inaugurated in Karachi for printing bank notes. It was a key step towards the expansion of intraregional trade.
Pakistan and Turkey are founding members of ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) and also part of the
Developing 8 Countries (D-8) organization. A highly remarkable venture was inaugurated between Pakistan, Iran, and
Turkey in 2009 as a project of ECO. At the occasion of 14th August; Prime Minister of Pakistan Yousuf Raza Gilani
launched container train service between Islamabad and Istanbul. The first train carried twenty containers with a
capacity of around 750 tons and traveled 6,500 km (4,000 miles) from Islamabad, passing through Balochistan, then
Tehran, Iran and on to Istanbul in two weeks. At that time, Minister for Railways Ghulam Ahmad Bilour had said,
“After the trial of the container train service, a passenger train will be launched”. It is also expected that the route will be
linked to Europe and Central Asia, to carry passengers.

Both countries have worked together to notably proliferation investments and trades, especially in telecommunications,
transport, tourism, manufacturing and several other industries. Both nations have pursued to increase the volume of
bilateral trade to more than $1 billion from $690 million by 2010. Pakistan’s exports to Turkey include sesame, rice,
leather, seeds, fabrics, textiles, medical equipment and sports goods. Turkish exports include wheat, lentils,
chickpeas, chemicals, diesel, machinery, transport vehicles and energy products. Turkey’s private corporations also
have invested appreciably in construction and industrial projects developing highways, canals, and pipelines. Mutually
both countries are negotiating Turkey – Pakistan Free Trade Agreement, which is aiming to increase the bilateral trade
volume to $10 billion by 2020.
After the 2005 earthquake, Turkey helped the Pakistani people in the affected areas. Turkey announced a $150 million
package for the quake victims. A mosque was constructed by Turkish aid organization Kizilay in Azad Kashmir region.
An Ottoman Style mosque is being built in Pakistan’s Bagh District. Pakistan also supplied aid to Turkey in the aftermath
of the 1999 earthquake and during 2011 Van earthquake.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was regarded with great admiration as a great leader in Turkey and a major Caddesi of the capital
of Turkey, Ankara and the “Cinnah Caddesi” is named after him, while roads in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar,
and Larkana are named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Rajab Tayyip Erdoğan was awarded the “Nishan-e-Pakistan” on
26th October 2009. Erdoğan said that “Pakistan had always occupied a special place in the hearts and minds of the
Turkish government and people”.

Pakistan has an embassy in the Capital of Turkey, Ankara and Consulate General in Istanbul and the honorary consulate
in Izmir. And Turkey has an embassy in Islamabad and Consulate General in Karachi and honorary consulates in Lahore,
Sialkot, Peshawar and Faisalabad. Due to the religious, cultural, historical and geopolitical links between these countries,
bilateral relations are becoming closer increasingly.

Q9 Pakistan-US Relations

NOW that the initial government-encouraged euphoria over the recent offer by Washington to sell F-16 aircraft to
Islamabad has subsided to some extent and the heady feeling of being a major non-NATO ally of the US is being replaced
by growing concerns over the fast developing US-India strategic partnership as evidenced by the US-India Defence Pact
signed at the end of June and the subsequent Indo-US nuclear deal, time has come to take an objective and detached look
at Pakistan-US relations.

Historically speaking, Pakistan’s relations with the United States have gone through several phases of close cooperation
and estrangement. The current phase of close Pakistan-US relations began with the U-turn in Pakistan’s pro-Taliban
policy in the wake of the events of 9/11 leading to the full resumption of the US economic and military assistance to
Pakistan and its designation as a non-NATO ally.

Pakistan-US relations have seen many ups and downs, and there is no guarantee that the future course of this relationship
is going to be any different despite the reassuring statements made from time to time in both Washington and Islamabad.
The strength of this relationship obviously will depend on the convergence of the national interests of the two countries:
the greater the convergence, the stronger with this relationship be.

Let us see what the US global and regional interests in South Asia are and the extent to which they converge with
Pakistan’s national interests.

The over-arching US strategic objective since the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union is to remain the
predominant global power as it is now and to prevent the rise of another power capable of challenging its global
supremacy. President Bush couldn’t have said it more unequivocally when he declared at West Point on June 1, 2002, “
America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of
other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”

In other words, the main US strategic objective is to keep this world unipolar as long as possible and to block or at least to
slow down the emergence of a multipolar world. US strategic objectives in various regions basically flow from the main
goal of establishing the US global hegemony or Pax Americana.

Although it has almost become a cliche to say that the 21st century would be the Asian century, it still is a valid statement.
Asia, currently with the second largest economy in the world (Japan), the fast growing economy of China with the
estimated GDP of $1.78 trillion, with two of the biggest countries in the world in terms of population (China and India),
with the fast growing military muscle of China, Japan, India and South Korea, with most of the world oil and gas reserves,
and with the dynamic economies of the Asean and South Korea, is a continent which is destined to play an increasingly
important role in international politics in the 21st century.

It is understandable, therefore, that the US would like to be actively involved in the security architecture in Asia.
According to a senior US official quoted recently in New Delhi, “The worst outcome for the US is an Asia from which we
are excluded… The key challenge for the US over the past 100 years has been to remain engaged everywhere and not
allow any other industrial power to dominate a given region. If I were China, I would be working on kicking the US out of
Asia. Right now, we have a lot of alliances but there is no architecture embedding us in Asia. This worries us.”

The US views China as posing in due course a challenge to its power and influence in Asia as the latter’s economic and
military power grows further. Washington is therefore engaged in building up a security structure aimed at containing
China. The US alliances with Japan and South Korea will play this role in the Far East. The developments of the past few
years clearly indicate that the US has decided to build up India in the hope that it will ultimately emerge as a
counterweight to China on the Asian continent and help in containing China on its southern periphery.

Conversely, India needs the support of the US for building itself up as a major global power and establishing its
hegemony in South Asia. The fast growing strategic partnership between the US and India neatly dovetails the strategic
objectives of a global hegemon and an aspiring regional hegemon. (In view of the recent Indo-China agreement
establishing a strategic partnership between them, it remains to be seen how India will play its cards in dealing with the
two contradictory partnerships.). India is also a big market for the US exports and armaments.

The landmark event in the fast developing US-India strategic partnership, in the wake of the announcement from
Washington in March this year that the US intended to help India become a “major world power in the 21st century” was
the signing in Washington on June 28, 2005, of “the new framework for US-India defence relationship” by the defence
ministers of the two countries. This defence pact, which talks about the common belief of the two largest democracies in
freedom, democracy and the rule of law, will support, and will be an element of, the broader US-India strategic
partnership.

It commits the two countries to cooperation in missile defence, combating terrorism and violent religious extremism,
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, technology transfer and defence trade. It also mentions that
the US-India defence cooperation in a short span of time had advanced to unprecedented levels unimaginable in 1995.
There are already reports of the offer by the US to sell to India F-16 and F-18 aircraft, and the Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile
system.

The US-India defence pact was soon followed by a nuclear agreement between the two sides, concluded during Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the US. This would enable India to acquire nuclear reactors and technology for
peaceful purposes in disregard of the restrictions imposed by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and the guidelines of
the nuclear suppliers’ group. Interestingly, the US officials commenting on the Indo-US nuclear deal have indicated that
the Bush administration is unlikely to offer a similar deal to Pakistan.

In short, the US is developing its strategic partnership with India in pursuance of its grand design for Asia in which India
is expected to play a key role. The concept of a strategic partnership implies an element of equality between the two
partners. Consequently, India will expect the US to be sensitive to its ambition of emerging as a great power — something
which the US has already conceded in the hope of establishing its hegemony in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

It is also likely, despite the assurances given by the US secretary of state to our foreign minister and by president Bush to
our president, that the US in its efforts to build up India as a counterweight to China will ignore the requirements of a
strategic balance in South Asia.

In contrast with the US-India strategic partnership, which is based on the convergence of the long-term fundamental
interests of the two countries, the current Pakistan-US relationship has a shaky foundation. As far as common beliefs are
concerned, Pakistan’s track record in practising democracy is far less appealing than that of India as we still appear to be
groping for a democratic system which suits the genius of our people. Pakistan’s all-weather friendship with China has
been a pillar of strength and security. It has neither the capacity nor the desire to counter China in any way. Therefore, it
cannot help in fulfilling the most fundamental US strategic objective on the Asian continent of containing China.

The US willingness to build up India as a major power runs contrary to Pakistan’s consistent efforts to oppose Indian
hegemony in South Asia. The wave of religious extremism, which has fractured and brutalized our society in the
aftermath of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation and the subsequent militancy in Afghanistan and Kashmir,
remains a source of concern to the US as numerous articles and stories in its media indicate. As for the peaceful settlement
of Kashmir, which is the core issue for Pakistan in its relations with India, the US interest does not go beyond mere verbal
encouragement to the two sides to try to reach a negotiated settlement of all their differences as the recent pronouncement
by President Bush during the visit of the Indian prime minister to Washington indicates. Its real objective is to prevent
Pakistan from doing anything which would raise tensions in Pakistan-India relations.

It is true that the US appreciates the important role that Pakistan is playing in the war against terrorism and has rewarded
us with economic and military assistance as well as the status of a major non-NATO ally. However, going through the
articles and commentaries appearing in the US, one gets the uneasy feeling that Washington regards Pakistan both as a
problem and as an important ally in the war against terror.

No wonder there is constant pressure on Pakistan to do more than what it has already done in ridding its society of the
scourge of violent religious extremism, in combating which both the US and India are committed to cooperate under the
US-India defence pact of June, 2005.

By now it is crystal clear that behind the facade of “dehyphenating” US relations with India and Pakistan as Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice described it or having “individual relationships” with these two countries as US Under-Secretary
of State Nicholas Burns recently put it, Washington has decided to place its relations with India at a higher plane in terms
of priority and importance than those with Pakistan.

The current US-Pakistan relationship, therefore, suffers from serious limitations and uncertainties. First of all, there is no
question of an element of equality in an alliance between a superpower and a middle-ranking country like Pakistan. The
grant of the non-NATO ally status to Pakistan basically means that it has accepted a subordinate role in the service of the
US strategic interests in return for economic and military assistance. Secondly, the convergence of their strategic interests
is currently limited to the war on terror in which we are playing a key role in collaboration with the US instead of Pakistan
being a part of any grand US strategic design.

This makes the relationship extremely fragile and uncertain, especially keeping in view the internal societal convulsions
through which Pakistan is passing and the past US track record. Thirdly, the promised sale of F-16 aircraft and other US
military equipment to Pakistan may meet our essential needs for maintaining a credible deterrent. However, looked at
more closely from the US point of view, it is meant to keep Pakistan, especially its military establishment, on a tight leash
in the service of the US strategic interests in the foreseeable future.

This is the reality that we face behind the smokescreen of empty rhetoric and assurances which are full of sound and fury
signifying nothing. It is time to face the realities as they are so as not to be confronted with disappointments and
unpleasant surprises down the road. Our objective should be to adopt a new mix of internal and external policies which
would safeguard our national interests and provide a more solid and durable foundation for our friendship with the US as
we cannot afford to be on less than friendly and cordial terms with it.

It is axiomatic that we must keep our national interests supreme in the management of Pakistan-US relations. Therefore,
while there are several factors relevant to Pakistan-US relations which we cannot change, there are others that we can
modify to our advantage in strengthening this vital relationship. The promotion of a stable democratic order in Pakistan,
based on national consensus, is one such factor which is not only desirable in its own right but would also help in bringing
the two countries closer together. The same is true of improving the performance of the economy, raising the standard of
human development in the country, particularly through increased attention to education and health, and ridding ourselves
of the scourge of obscurantism, retrogression and religious extremism.

In the realm of foreign affairs, we need to broaden our options at the regional and global levels while persisting in our
policy of friendship with the US. However, we should not develop our relations with it, marked as it as by serious
limitations and uncertainties, at the expense of our friendly relations with neighbours such as China and Iran.

As the saying goes, one can choose one’s friends but not one’s neighbours. A coherent regional policy should be the
central element of our over-all foreign policy. In particular, we should avoid a repetition of the strategic blunders of the
1990s when we pursued the pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan which isolated us regionally and globally besides
encouraging religious extremism and klashnikov culture in our society. We are still living with the disastrous
consequences of that ill-conceived policy both internally and externally.

Pak-US relations: A very analytical history

The United States first established diplomatic relations with Pakistan on 20 October 1947.

The relationship since then has been based primarily on US economic and military assistance to Pakistan which Pakistan
never seems to get enough of.

Pakistan is a major non-Nato ally of the United States, even though, for some odd reason, it keeps pretending that it is one
of the biggest anti-US, super-duper power in the world.

The United States is the second-largest supplier of military equipment to Pakistan and largest economic aid contributor
but Pakistanis refuse to acknowledge this and insist that the equipment and the aid actually come from Saudi Arabia via
Dubai on flying camels.

In 1955 Pakistan became a member of the US-run Central Treaty Organisation (also known as Central Free Treats
Organisation). The promise of economic aid from the US was instrumental in creating the agreement. Getting the
enigmatic Coca-Cola formula was also a motivation.

During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the US did not provide Pakistan with military support as pledged. This generated a
widespread feeling in Pakistan that the United States was no longer a reliable ally.

According to the US it cut off weapons supplies because Pakistan military had started the war with India by using its
soldiers disguised as Kashmiri Mujahideen.

However, the Americans did consider nominating these Pakistani soldiers for the Oscars in the Best Character Actor
category. They lost due to the obvious Christian-Jew bias in Hollywood.

In 1971 Pakistanis were angry at the US again for not bailing them out from yet another war they started against India.

Just why Pakistanis kept testing their friendship with the US by starting hopeless wars with India is anybody’s guess, but
some experts believe Pakistanis found bullets and bombs better tasting than the Betty Crocker chocolate chip cookies the
US send instead for the Pakistani war effort.

In April 1979, the United States suspended most economic assistance to Pakistan over concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear
program under the Foreign Assistance Act.

The Pakistan government, then under the benevolent dictatorship of General Ziaul Ghaznavi, retaliated by banning the
sale of Betty Crocker chocolate chip cookies and publicly flogging over 200 young men just for the heck of it.

However, since God works in mysterious ways and (according to the Pakistan Ideology) is more akin to listening to the
prayers of pious military generals, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced the US to rethink about its Pakistan policy.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan (inspired more by smuggled John Wayne movies than Karl Marx), highlighted the
common interest of Pakistan and the United States in opposing the evil Soviet Union.

In 1981, Pakistan and the United States agreed on a $3.2 billion military and economic assistance program aimed at
helping Pakistan deal with the heightened threat to security in the region and its economic development needs. The deal
was code named ‘LOL!’
The poised, pious, powerful Zia regime distributed the military aid among the Pakistan military, Afghan mujahideen,
enterprising gunrunners, drug barons, university students and wedding planners; whereas the economic aid was used to
develop Pakistan’s economic infrastructure by building madrassas, madrassas, madrassas and mosques.

Pakistan with US, Saudi and divine assistance armed and supplied anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan, eventually
defeating the Soviets, who withdrew in 1988 but left behind a number of bored Arab, Afghan and Pakistani fighters.

These fighters wanted to recreate Afghanistan not like what it was just before the Soviet invasion but what Afghanistan
was like on the eve of the first Bronze Age.

After the Cold War

Prior to the September 11 attacks in 2001, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were key supporters of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The Taliban were a large group of herdsmen who were convinced that goats were more valuable than women and sheep
had more feelings than human beings.

By 1996 they were ruling Afghanistan.

The Pakistan-Saudi support to these unkempt herdsmen was an integral part of the Pakistan military’s “strategic depth”
objective vis-a-vis India, Iran, Russia and the Vatican City.

After some reckless piloting by some Arabian camel jockeys who went on joyrides on planes, eventually ramming them
into New York’s World Trade Centre, Pakistan, led by General Puppu Musharraf, reversed course and dumped the
herdsmen after he was put under pressure by the US.

US president, George W. Wuss, had threatened Musharraf, growling that the US would bomb Pakistan back into Stone
Age if he didn’t dump the herdsmen. What Wuss didn’t realise was that a back-to-Stone Age scenario was exactly what
the herdsmen and their supporters in Pakistan were working for. Hee Hee.

Nevertheless, imagining an age when the military was made up of club carrying half-naked ape men, and when macho
men and petite women didn’t have a uniform fetish, and when Coca-Cola was yet to be invented, Musharraf joined the US
in its “Error on Terror” as an ally.

Having failed to convince the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin There Done That and other members of al-Calendar,
Pakistan provided the US a number of military bases for its attack on Afghanistan, along with other logistical support such
as double-talk, half-baked cakes, diarrhea pills and a pair of poodles.

Since 2001, Pakistan has arrested over 500 al-Calendar herdsmen and handed them over to the US, but they have kept the
more muscular and pious looking ones for themselves, lodging them on the mountains of Pakistan’s rugged rock ‘n’
rolling tribal areas to tend to the military’s strategically depth sheep.

In return for its support, Pakistan had sanctions lifted and has received about $10 billion in US aid since 2001, primarily
military, whereas rest of the aid is used in growing juicy grass which a majority of Pakistanis eat so that their military can
keep eating cake.

In June 2004, President George W. Wuss designated Pakistan as a major non-Nato ally, making it eligible, among other
things, to purchase advanced American military technology and Betty Crocker chocolate chip cookies with extra icing.

Pakistan has lost thousands of lives since joining the US Error on Terror. Most were killed by the irritated Taliban
herdsmen (approximately 35,000) and some by American drone attacks (approximately 9000). But many Pakistanis
believe most were killed by the drones (approximately 2 million) while the rest by innocent men with an abnormal
combustion condition in which normal, peace loving and pious men suddenly combust in and outside mosques, shrines
and markets.
This condition is blamed on the tempered polio drops these poor souls were given in childhood by Zionist agents
masquerading as NGO workers.

Ruing its strategic mistakes in the area, new US president, Barack Obamarama, conceded that the US had made the
mistake of “putting all its eggs in one basket” in the form of General Pappu Musharraf.

In Pakistan, Musharraf was eventually forced out of office under the threat of impeachment, after years of political
protests by lazy lawyers, confused civilians, overexcited politicians and bored mullahs.

With Obamarama coming into office, the US promised to triple non-military aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion per year over
10 years, and to tie military aid to progress in the fight against militants. This has rubbed the military in the wrong way
which, along with its allies in the shape of fat pious men, has claimed that such non-military progress in Pakistan is
against the Pakistan Ideology.

The military might have a point here because some extremely brilliant media men such as the scholarly and judicious
Sangsar Abbasi (author of the acclaimed books, ‘Jews Must Die’ and ‘The Wonders of Flogging Women in Public on the
Pretext of the Shariah Wah, Wah, Wah’) have warned that non-military progress in Pakistan can lead to moral corruption
and obscenity in the society and all that juicy grass that most Pakistanis eat will go to waste.
The purpose of the new aid is to help strengthen the democratic government led by President Asif Ali Bhutto Zardari
Bhutto and to help strengthen civil institutions and the general economy in Pakistan, and to put in place an aid program
that is broader in scope than just supporting Pakistan’s military. BLASPHAMYYYYYYYYYYY!!!!!

Sorry about that. Present US-Pakistan relations are a case study on the difficulties of diplomacy and policy making in a
multi-polar world (especially by men with assorted bipolar disorders).

The geopolitical significance of Pakistan in world affairs attracts attention from both India and China (and for some odd
reason, from Surinam as well), making unilateral action almost impossible from the US. This was explained in an article
titled ‘Grrrr…’ by an American policy expert.
In February 2011, the US administration suspended high-level contacts with Pakistan after ‘The Everybody Loves to Hate
Raymond Davis’ incident occurred.

Raymond Rambo Davis, an alleged private security contractor and Sushi expert, was on an American diplomatic mission
in Pakistan when he shot dead two Pakistani locals and claimed that it was in self-defense after the two attempted to rob
him.

Pakistan acted tough on Davis despite US demands for him to be freed because he enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
However, the Pakistanis eventually let the bugger go when the US promised to increase its supplies of Betty Crocker
chocolate chip cookies, but this time according to the dictates of Islamic law. That’s why Betty Crocker cookies now have
the word ‘Halal’ inscribed on them.

On May 2, 2011, shortly after 1 am the head of al-Calendar, Osama Bin There Done That was killed by a United States
special forces unit led by an army of T-1000 Terminators, in the Pakistani city of Abburstabad.

The operation, codenamed Operation Neptune Spear and Other Phallic Symbols, was ordered by the United States
President Barack Obamarama.
Numerous allegations were made that the military of Pakistan had shielded Osama Bin There Done That. Critics cited the
very close proximity of Bin There’s heavily fortified compound to the Pakistan Militancy Academy, I mean, Pakistan
Military Academy.

US government files, leaked by Trikileaks, disclosed that American diplomats had been told that Pakistani security
services were tipping off Osama Bin There Done That.
Most Pakistanis were scandalised. They were sure that the American accusations were part of a huge international
Reptilian conspiracy funded by western multinationals, Jewish bankers and Congo bongo players against the Pakistan
military and its fat pious allies.

Al-Calendar threatened to kidnap Betty Crocker and subject her to the torture of listening to Ali Azmat talk about the
political, social, cultural, scientific, spiritual and psychological Zionist plot behind Einstein’s E=MC2 followed by hours
and hours of taped Deepak Chopra lectures.

Nevertheless, Pakistan remains to be a major non-Nato ally as part of the US Error on Terror. A leading recipient of US
military assistance, Pakistan expects to receive approximately $20 billion, slurp.

Perhaps, if the US simply reduced this aid to a couple of stacks of West Virginian grass for Pakistanis to eat?

However, in the aftermath of the Osama incident, Pakistan Army cancelled a $500 million training program and sent all
135 US trainers home, but not the hundreds of Uzbek, Chechen, Afghan and Arab trainers training Pakistani herdsmen in
the tribal areas of Pakistan.

But who’s counting.

Q10 pakistan’s Role In Regional And International Organizations

 An international organization is an organization with an international membership, scope, or presence.
There are three main types:

 International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that operate

internationally. There are two types:
 International non-profit organizations.
o Examples include the World Organization of the Scout Movement, International Committee of the Red Cross
 International corporations, referred to as multinational corporations.
o Examples include The Coca-Cola Company and Toyota

 Intergovernmental organizations, also known as International Governmental Organizations (IGOs): the type of
organization most closely associated with the term ‘international organization’, these are organizations that are made
up primarily of sovereign states (referred to as member states).
 Notable examples include the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
Council of Europe (CoE), European Union (EU; which is a prime example of a supranational organization), and
World Trade Organization (WTO). The UN has used the term “intergovernmental organization” instead of
“international organization” for clarity.

SAARC
Member-state and observer state

 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an organization of South Asian nations, which
was established on 8 December 1985.
 The government of Bangladesh , Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka formally adopted its
charter.
 The promotion of economic and social progress, cultural development within the South Asia region and also for
friendship and cooperation with other developing countries.
 It is dedicated to economic, technological, social, and cultural development emphasizing collective self-reliance.
 Its seven founding members are Sri Lanka, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
 Afghanistan joined the organization in 2007. Meetings of heads of state are usually scheduled annually; meetings of
foreign secretaries, twice annually.
 It is headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal.
 Four Founder States
 To promote the welfare of the people of South Asia and to improve their quality of life;
 To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals
the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential;
 To promote and strengthen selective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia;
 To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems
 To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
 To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;

ROLE OF PAKISTAN:
 Since the Association’s start, Pakistan has been a supporter of SAARC objectives and has remained an active player
on the SAARC platform.
 It has contributed meaningfully to the establishment institutions and progress of the Association.
 Pakistan supported a step by step approach for enhancing cooperation and stresses the need for better coordination of
programs and consolidation of the progress made so far.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

 The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an inter-governmental organization involving seven Asian and
three Eurasian nations part of the South-central Asian Union.
 It provides a platform to discuss ways to improve development and promote trade, and investment opportunities.
 The common objective is to establish a single market for goods and services, much like the European Union.
 ECO’s secretariat and cultural department are located in Tehran, its economic bureau is in Turkey and its scientific
bureau is situated in Pakistan.
 The organization was founded by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
 Economic Cooperation Organization is an inter-governmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran,
Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the member
states.

PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN ECO

 ECO currently is engaged in energy crisis resolution and meetings are being held in Tehran.
 And by resolving this problem all the members will facilitated by it specially Pakistan. Because besides the
potentiality of the country in many a sectors still they are not operating at an efficient level which is required
according to the current need of the scenario.
 Pakistan’s potential in telecommunication, agriculture, food, industry, trade and many other sectors made it
significant as it can play its role for the betterment of rest of the member nations by providing them with assistance
financially and technically both.

UNO
 The United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization with the stated aims of promoting and facilitating co-
operation in International law, International Security, Economic Development , Social Progress, Human Rights, Civil
Rights, Civil Liberties, Political Freedoms, Democracy, and the achievement of lasting world peace.
 The UN was founded in 1945 after World War II to replace the League of Nations, to stop wars between countries,
and to provide a platform for dialogue.
 It contains multiple subsidiary
organizations to carry out its missions.

 Pakistan officially joined the United Nations (UN) on 30 September 1947 just over a month after its independence
from the British Empire.
 Today, it is a charter member and participates in all of the UN’s specialized agencies and organizations.
 Pakistan maintains a permanent mission to the UN, which is currently headed by Ambassador Abdullah Hussain
Haroon in New York.
 There is a second mission based at the UNO office in Geneva, Switzerland.
 The Pakistani military has played a key role in the UN’s peacekeeping programme in different parts of the world,
most prominently in Somalia , Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Congo and Liberia.
 The UN continues to remain a keen observer of the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India, centring around the
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.
 Since the transfer of power to both countries in 1947 of the divided territory, the UN has played an extensive role in
regulating and monitoring the dispute

ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION

 The Organization of Islamic Cooperation is an international organization consisting of 57 member states. The
organization states that it is “the collective voice of the Muslim world” and works to “safeguard and protect the
interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony“.
 The OIC has a permanent delegation to the United Nations, and is the largest international organization outside the
United Nations.
 The official languages of the OIC are Arabic, English and French.
 Leaders of Muslim nations met in Rabatto establish the OIC on 25 September 1969.

Role of Pakistan in OIC

 In line with OIC strong stance against the occupation of Palestine by Israel, Pakistan has continuously adopted a
stance against Israel, while maintaining moral solidarity with Palestine
 Military Cooperation
 Pakistan is thought to have developed its atomic bomb programme with millions of dollars of contributory aid from
(mostly) Saudi Arabia and Libyan oil wealth
 Pakistan has always used OIC as a platform to gather support on the Kahmir conflict against the Republic of India. In
1969 King Hassan of Morocco invited the Government of India for the 1969 Summit in Rabat
 As a goodwill gesture of China’s veto power in support of Pakistan at the UN Security Council, for example the
Chinese opposition of UNSC resolution at Pakistan’s behest demanding a ban on the militant organization Jama’at-
ud-Da’wah following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Pakistan assured China, that the OIC will not pass any resolution
condemning China’s ‘strike hard’ campaign against the Uighur Muslim minority. Pakistan therefore act as a contact
point for China’s engagement with the OIC.

WTO and its Implications for Pakistan

By Dr. Zafar Mueen Nasir(The writer is Chief of Research and Dean Business Studies Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics (PIDE) Islamabad)

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization that intends to supervise and liberalize international trade. The
organization officially commenced on January 1, 1995 under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in late 40s. Along with International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as World Bank) for freer and predictable
trade between countries. It tries to provide market access to countries for their products and services and promotes
friendly investment policies by eliminating trade distortions between countries, trimming down tariff and non-tariff
barriers, removing quotas and abolishing subsidies in a phased manner. It also has rules that protect local businesses and
industry from foreign goods and services using unfair practices like dumping or transfer pricing mechanisms. The WTO
has rules to address quality issues, labor standards, environmental aspects, government regulation, and legal frameworks.
It is important to understand the evolution of WTO and how its rules affect developing countries such as Pakistan.

The need for an institution to promote rule based trade was felt when in 1930s world suffered through the Great
Depression and World War II. The Great Depression had profound effect on the people and nations who lived through it.
This economic mayhem started with the 1929 Stock Market Crash wiping out savings of people and creating
unemployment of the highest level in Western World. That great Depression resulted into WWII and destroyed many
European countries. After the WWII, reconstruction of the Europe was top most priority of the US and that promoted,
along with other steps, to create some international institutions to facilitate and promote trade and development. In
January 1948, 23 nations organized the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Geneva providing
opportunity to start the tariff negotiations. This first round resulted in 45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion
(about 1/5th of the world trade). In the next 47 years, the basic legal text of the GATT remained the same as it was in
1948, with some additions in the form of “plurilateral” — voluntary membership — agreements and continual efforts to
reduce tariffs in a series of “trade rounds” till the inception of World Trade Organization on 1st January, 1995 in the 8th
round at Uruguay. The agendas of the eight rounds of the GATT from 1947 to 1994 can be glanced through the following
table.

The WTO is an institution with the broader legal and constitutional elements that incorporate and standardize the
strategies for global economic integration. Its basic objective is to create a liberal and open trading system under which
business enterprises from respective member countries can trade with one another in a fair and undisclosed competitive
system with an agenda to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume
of real income and effect demand and developing the full sense of the resources of the world and expanding the
production and exchange of goods. These objectives are to be achieved by following the optimal use of the world’s
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner which is consistent with their respective needs and
concerns at different levels of economic development. In other words, the WTO facilitates the implementation,
administration and operation, and further the objectives of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and also provides
framework for the implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. It provides the
forum for negotiations among its members concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the
agreements and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the
Ministerial Conference. The WTO administers the Understandings on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of
Disputes. It administers the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). With a view to achieving greater coherence in
global economic policy-making, the WTO cooperates, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and its affiliate agencies. The four basic
rules of WTO are
1. Protection to Domestic Industry through Tariffs.
GATT requires the member countries to protect their domestic industry/production through tariffs only. It prohibits the
use of quantitative restrictions, except in a limited number of situations.

2. Binding of Tariffs
The member countries are urged to eliminate protection to domestic industry/ production by reducing tariffs and removing
other barriers to trade in multilateral trade negotiations. The reduced tariffs are bound against further increases by listing
them in each country’s national schedule and the schedules are an integrated part of the GATT legal system.

3. Most Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment

The rule lays down the principles of non-discrimination amongst member countries. Tariff and other regulations should be
applied to imported or exported goods without discrimination among countries. Exceptions to the rules are to regional
arrangements subjected to preferential or duty free trade agreements, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) where
developed countries apply preferential or duty free rates to imports from developing countries.

4. National Treatment Rule

The rule prohibits member countries from discriminating between imported products and domestically produced goods in
the matter of internal taxes and in the application of internal regulations.

Pakistan and WTO

Pakistan joined WTO in 1995 when the organization came into being. As a developing country Pakistan has enjoyed the
extra time given for preparations to abide by the Agreements of WTO upto 2005. The implications to adopt the free
liberalization under WTO has many pros and cons but until now there has been no comprehensive study to capitulate the
total impact in economic terms focusing overall and individual sectors of the economy in particular. To enter into the
intricacies of WTO Agreements and applying them on sectors of the economy is a huge and difficult task and out of scope
of this essay. In simple terms, WTO negates anything which blocks the way of free movement of goods and services from
one market to another on a basic assumption of improving the human lifestyle. It demands open market access for foreign
goods and services in the local market without any discrimination by creation of tariff or non-tariff barriers. Pakistan is
required to provide a Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to all trading partners which means non-discriminatory treatment
among the members implying on any imports or exports origination from respective countries. If Pakistan provides an
MFN status to India for example, then Pakistan has to provide an equitable treatment to all imports originating from India
which will restrict Pakistan to impose any kind of qualitative or quantities restriction on Indian products. Now this implies
to the question why like India Pakistan is not reciprocating to given the same MFN status. The major reason is that the
total GDP of Pakistan is approximately $80 billion and if India can subsidize all its imports of an equal amount this will
create havoc for the Pakistani industry. In case of GATT, it requires all countries to reduce their respective rates to a given
limit, and here WTO provides special preferential treatment to the developing and least developed countries by giving
them more time and more flexibility to adjust to the global trade liberalization system. But in reality, with specific
reference to Pakistan under IMF conditionality and structural adjustment program, Pakistan has to reduce its tariff from
65% to 30% gradually, and WTO also requires the same. Under WTO it is partly the mutual consent of the negotiating
parties to determine tariff bind and tariff bound rates but under IMF it is more enforcement of the loan requirements.

In case of a dispute the case is to be presented to the Dispute Settlement Body of WTO. This requires preparation of the
case in context with the legalities of WTO rules. A developing country like Pakistan which does not have ample resources
or know-how of the subject of WTO rules and references usually are trapped to pay hefty foreign exchange to
international lawyers which are almost unaffordable. An ideal example is of Basmitti Rice, which was initially patented
by a U.S. firm has been challenged by India, where Dispute Settlement Body favored India. Now, India having the sole
patents refrains all Pakistani rice exports to be referred as “Basmitti” until the patents rights are paid for.

Take any industry or sector of economy i.e., textile, fertilizer, pharmaceutical, oil & gas, ship building, sugar, banks,
insurance, leasing, and agriculture — WTO directly effects the local industry both at the import and export ends from the
beginning to end focusing more on quality standards, hygienic conditions, and the very existence of a product or service
through intellectual property clauses.

The Way Forward

The negotiation ground of WTO, we must be ready and fully prepared with complete set of briefings on impacts of WTO
Agreements and its agenda on all sectors of Pakistani economy and industry. Pakistan should have a vision i.e. what it
would like to achieve from other nations before reciprocating market access to respective countries. Like all other
relations, trade relations are friend and foe oriented and are glued with the broader national goals of the country. Trade
relations have become so influential that they have become either source of normalization of other diplomatic
relationships, or creating more belligerent associations with other countries. If Pakistan has to choose between the options
international trade relationship can work wonders for Pakistan, making it possible for Pakistan to normalizing
relationships with countries where the advantage is.

In additions, as it has been emphasized from the beginning that exports are function of domestic production strength.
Pakistan should also develop an indigenous model of economic development based on local stakeholders rather than
following blindly the policies and guidelines of WTO, WB and IMF. Ban gladesh is a key example in this respect which
has achieved formidable success in developing socio-economic strategies focusing the Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs) of the country. Gramine Bank and Gramine Telecom of Dr. Younas are an epic story of mobilizing the poorest
fraction of the country especially women by providing credit loans to them to invest in local self-employment and
business opportunities, and accessing market information using communication facilities.

To what extend the tariff should be bound, to what extend the subsidies to be provided, to what extend Pakistan can win
preferential treatment, win anti-dumping and safeguard cases, secure intellectual property rights, to choose to give MFN
status, to apply national treatment to foreign products, to acclaim developing country provisions, to ensure a level playing
field for domestic industry — is not an easy task for Pakistani Mission to Geneva in WTO at least for now!

As regards agriculture, Pakistan being an agrarian economy is still a net importer of food items. The Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA) is perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of WTO. The issues in AoA include subsidies,
domestic support and market access. The developing countries and the developed world are at loggerheads over
agriculture. The developing countries require an AoA that is fair just to meet both ends, while the developed countries
require that they maintain their status quo to protect their handful of farmers through subsidies and domestic support. As
far as Pakistan is concerned, Pakistan has comparative advantage in many primary commodities. But in order to fully
utilize our comparative advantage, we need to focus on and solve the problems in supply side (domestic requirements).

Pertaining to TRIPS agreements, different varieties of plants and animal species and traditional pharmaceutical and herbal
knowledge need to be registered to take full advantage of them. All valuable export brands like Basmati rice, varieties of
mangoes, oranges, etc need to be protected under different provisions of TRIPS agreement. Furthermore we need to
exploit our comparative advantage in the production of halal meat, dairy products, fruits, vegetables etc. Same is the case
with the services which are the largest and most dynamic component of both developed and developing economies.

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

ESTABLISHMENT

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with
the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
Brunei Darussalam then joined on 7 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July
1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, making up what is today the ten Member States of ASEAN.
In 2010, its combined nominal GDP had grown to US$1.8 trillion. If ASEAN was a single entity, it would rank as the
ninth largest economy in the world.

AIMS AND PURPOSES

As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours
in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful
community of Southeast Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship
among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social,
cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional,
technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of
their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their
transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies; and
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar
aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Member States have adopted the following fundamental principles, as contained in the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1976:
1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;
2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner;
5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
6. Effective cooperation among themselves.

ASEAN COMMUNITY
The ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted by the ASEAN Leaders on the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN, agreed on a shared
vision of ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity,
bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies.
At the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, the ASEAN Leaders resolved that an ASEAN Community shall be established.

At the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, the Leaders affirmed their strong commitment to accelerate the
establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 and signed the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the
Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015.

The ASEAN Community is comprised of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN
Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Each pillar has its own Blueprint, and, together with
the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan Phase II (2009-2015), they form the
Roadmap for and ASEAN Community 2009-2015.

ASEAN CHARTER
The ASEAN Charter serves as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing legal status and
institutional framework for ASEAN. It also codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values; sets clear targets for ASEAN;
and presents accountability and compliance.
The ASEAN Charter entered into force on 15 December 2008. A gathering of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held
at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to mark this very historic occasion for ASEAN.
In effect, the ASEAN Charter has become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN Member States.
ENLARGEMENT OF ASEAN:-
During the 1990s, the bloc experienced an increase in both membership and drive for further integration.

In 1990, Malaysia proposed the creation of an East Asia Economic Caucus comprising the then members of ASEAN as
well as the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea, with the intention of counterbalancing the growing
influence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and in the Asian region as a whole.
This proposal failed, however, because of heavy opposition from the United States and Japan. Despite this failure,
member states continued to work for further integration and ASEAN Plus Three was created in 1997.
After the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, a revival of the Malaysian proposal was established in Chiang Mai, known
as the Chiang Mai Initiative, which calls for better integration between the economies of ASEAN as well as the ASEAN
Plus Three countries (China, Japan, and South Korea).
Aside from improving each member state’s economies, the bloc also focused on peace and stability in the region. On 15
December 1995, the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty was signed with the intention of
turning Southeast Asia into a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The treaty took effect on 28 March 1997 after all but one of
the member states have ratified it. It became fully effective on 21 June 2001, after the Philippines ratified it, effectively
banning all nuclear weapons in the region.
Early 2011, East Timor planned to submit a letter of application to the ASEAN Secretariat in Indonesia to be the eleventh
member of ASEAN at the summit in Jakarta. Indonesia has shown a warm welcome to East Timor.
Q11International Security

Changing Conceptions of Security in the 21stCentury:

Power, Institutions, and Ideas1
Amitav Acharya

Many security scholars are now accepting that our understanding of what security means, what constitute threats to
security, and how best to achieve security, is changing in important ways. But the catalysts of this change remain under-
theorized. This is an important gap for two important reasons. First, without an understanding of its catalysts, we would
not be sure whether some of the alleged redefinitions of security are transformative or fad-like. Second, we need a sense
of the relative importance of the various catalysts of security redefinitions so as to visualize what the emerging and future
security order might look like. As leaders and academics continually look for new security concepts and approaches for
the 21st century, it is useful to start by examining what causes changes to our definition and conception of security. This
paper is a modest step towards understanding why security changes. I do so with the help of six major catalysts of change
and briefly examine how they play out in the contemporary global and Asian security context.

1. New ideas about international relations

2. Emergence of new threats and perceptions of threats
3. Shift in the distribution of power and new international leadership
4. New Warfare (including technological changes that bring it about)
5. Domestic political change (including regime security and not necessarily democratization)
6. Advocacy by international institutions Table 1: Basic Definitions

National security (NS)is protection of a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity fromexternal military attack.
Non-traditional security (NTS) is protectionof a state’s institutionsand governing capacityfrom non-military threats.
Comprehensive security (East Asia): NS + NTS.
Human security is people’s freedom from fear, want and indignitycaused by domesticand/or externally sources.
Common Security is security with (as opposed to security against) a potential or actualadversary realized through
transparency, mutual confidence and conflict resolution measures and mechanisms.
Cooperative Security: Asia-Pacific rendering (localization) of common security (minus humanrights)
Homeland security: internal security measures against terrorism
New Ideas
1
Paper prepared for the Conference on “The Nexus Between Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Dynamic: Chinese
Experiences Meet Global Challenges”, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, 18-20 September 2009.
It is commonplace to assume that security concepts emerge or change in response to new events or threats. But ideas can
be ahead of ‘realities”. They can drive change, instead of simply reflecting change. Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking”
and the Palme Commission’s idea of common security both emerged well before the end of the Cold War. They
contributed, rather than responded, to the end of the Cold War which in turn affected the global security paradigm in
significant ways. Gandhi’s concept of nonviolence was not a response to his experiences in South Africa or simply
inspired by a desire to end colonialism there or in India. It was a prior idea deeply ingrained in his personal belief system,
as a result of his upbringing among non-violent Jain communities in the native Gujurat state.
In contemporary East Asia, China’s “new security concept” comes to mind. There are also new security ideas from India
and Japan, including the notion of Japan as a “normal state” and India’s “post-Nehruvian” turn in foreign and security
policy. But whether these represent a fundamental rethinking of national security can be doubted. (More on this later.)
Whereas Gorbachev’s “new thinking” represented the relinquishing of an empire and acknowledging a failing economy
and power base, the new security formulations of China, Japan and India reflect, and may be read more of a
rationalization of their growing power and ambition, if not empire-seeking.

Asia of course has had its doctrine of comprehensive security, which many Asian see as a precursors to the ideas about
non-traditional and human security. Japan and Malaysia adopted the exact language of comprehensive security.
Indonesia’s during the Suharto period coined the terms ‘national resilience’ and ‘regional resilience’, which became
ASEAN’s security mantras. Singapore developed and pursued the idea of ‘total defence’. Unlike Japan’s, the Southeast
Asian formulations were no so much state-centric as being motivated by regime legitimation and survival concerns. But
they were also not inspired by security for the people, hence should not be conflated with human security. Hence, it is not
surprising that the idea of human security, which entered the scene 1994 onwards, was received with considerable
misgiving in Southeast Asia. Even Japan, one of the most vocal proponents of human security in the international arena,
would stress the economic and developmental aspects of human security, in contrast to the emphasis placed by Western
countries like Canada and Norway on its political and military dimensions. Enough has been written on this debate to
merit further elaboration here, but the fact remains that non-traditional security and human security, although both
embrace a wider variety of threats than the concept of national security they seek to supplant, are not identical. Asia’s
other major powers, China and India, are yet to adopt the idea of human security. In Asia, no nation has adopted the
concept of human security if and when it seemed to compete with state (regime and national) security imperatives, and
especially when it demanded regulating on curtailing the power and prerogative of the state.
But Asia is hardly alone in this. The United States, even under the Obama administration, is yet to make human security
part of its new security policy lexicon, whereas it has supplanted the war on terror with “overseas contingency
operations”). The Obama adminstration has reconstituted the National Security Council to take note of a wide range of
challenges, in which the National security adviser would be the “integrator for an unprecedented range of policy issues —
security, military, economic, energy, environmental.”2 National Security Adviser Jim Jones speaks of ‘non-traditional

2
I. M. Destler, “Jonestown: Will Obama’s National Security Council Be “Dramatically Different?”, Foreign Affairs
Online, 30 April 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/node/65077. See also:“Obama
security’ threats as one of his primary concerns. “Every single day we’re handling a half a dozen serious issues
simultaneously. The threats that are coming at us are coming at us in waves. They are very asymmetric, they’re very
different than in the 20th century….It is not just about a war on terror…It has components relating to proliferation, to
climate and energy, economic security, cyber security, the illegal trafficking of humans, narco-terrorism, any number of
things.”3
But the idea of human security is yet to enter the vocabulary of the new administrations despite potential advocates like
Susan Rice and Samantha Power in high policy positions. It appears that while the international community is now willing
to embrace non-traditional security, the same cannot be said about human security, which remains alive mainly in
academic discourses and in the statements of a handful of international institutions like the UNDP and UNHCR.

New Threats

Now to return to the more conventional view: how ideas respond to events, including new or newly newly perceived
threats, crises, wars, and revolutions. The 1973 oil crisis (the Arab oil embargo in response to the Arab-Israeli Yom
Kippur War) catalysed the prominence of economic security. Growing signs of environmental degradation, such as urban
air pollution, acid rain, and deforestation was behind another redefinition of security in the 1990s, when environmental
security emerged. Now climate change, though a long-term phenomenon (believers in “abrupt climate change” may
disagree) and still debated as to its extent and implications, has been brought to the forefront of security concerns in the
West. Pandemics are another example, especially in the wake of SARS, Bird flu and Swine flu. Crisis situations are, as
might be expected, particularly important in redefining security concepts. The 9/11 attacks had a dramatic effect on
Western thinking about security, halting the post-Cold War advance of the human security agenda, and returning national
security concerns and approaches to the centre-stage. It marked the ascendancy of homeland security at the expense of
human security. In East Asia, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2002 Bali Bombings, the 2003 SARS outbreak and the
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, all individually and collectively affected perceptions of security. Despite important
differences among these events, they could be collectively labelled as non-traditional security threats.

New Powers

Neorealists are not the only ones who argue that the shifts in the distribution of power has a major effect on security
concepts and practices, although they are more likely (than liberals or to revamp National Security Council: report”, 7
February 2009, Reuters, Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51704S20090208.

3
Al Pessin, “National Security Adviser Helps Obama With ‘Waves’ of Global Threats”, Voice ofAmerica News, 29 May
2009, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-05/2009-05-28-
voa55.cfm?CFID=286018508&CFTOKEN=96897101&jsessionid=8830883f39bbf49b12ef1fb7523342294f68
(constructivists) to view these changes as system-wide, focus their analysis on states, rather than individuals or societies,
and make the balance-of-power the key tool of investigating the nature and impact of change. A problem in using the
distribution of power as the main catalyst of changing security concepts is that we are frequently unsure, especially since
the end of the Cold War, as to how exactly power is being redistributed. Even the Cold War consensus that the system
was bipolar was subject to challenge, especially in the regional context of East Asia, due to the presence of China. Since
the end of the Cold War, we have seen major debates as to whether the system has been unipolar or multipolar, or neo-
bipolar (US-China replacing US-USSR). While unipolarity might now be regarded as having been a moment albeit a long
one), rather than an era, its decline has triggered another round of debate about the shape of the coming power
configuration in world politics: thanks to a proliferation of terms like “polycentric” (Joseph Nye), “nonpolar” (Richard
Haas), apolar (Niall Fergussion), neopolar (The Economist), etc. etc.
Does it matter? How does the changing distribution of power, actual or imagined, affect our understanding of security?
Perhaps very little. By itself, change to the distribution of power does not change the concept of security people and states
have. Some of the biggest changes to the idea of security occurred without changes to the distribution of power – for
example the broadening of security from a strictly military-oriented notion to economic and environmental security all
occurred during the era of bipolarity. Human security was influenced by the end of the Cold War, which is not the same as
end of bipolarity. But it is possible that a plurality of powers, or the absence of a global hegemon dominant in all issue
areas of international relations might mean or encourage alternative views about security to emerge. Hence the rise of the
EU as an international actor confronts the concept of collective security (represented by NATO) with an alternative, more
normative-oriented notion, as symbolized in the increasingly fashionable designation of EU as a “normative power”.

The key question about shifts in the distribution of power is not whether it will generate more or less stability (in the
manner of the old debate about whether bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity), but whose concept of security will
matter more or most. Change to power structures means room of new leadership, which may make the real difference to
how the concept of security is defined and undetood. Common to all conceptualizations of power today is the decline if
not the end of Western dominance, and the growing weight of some non-Western countries –China, India, Brazil, Japan,
Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Iran, Egypt, etc. etc., – in world affairs. Even if one selects only a handful of them, say
China, India and Brazil, as the emerging global powers of the 21st century, does it not mean that their respective ideas
about security will affect how the concept is understood in the academic literature and policy discourse? Will the
Americano-centric or Western-centric definition of security be imbued with, if not quite replaced by, something that
reflects the vantage-point and perspective of these emerging powers?
To take a particularly important example, for over more than a decade, the Chinese have promoted what they call “a New
Security Concept”. According to the Chinese government’s official position paper on the subject, the New Security
Concept includes the following:
-To conduct cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other widely
recognized norms governing international relations, and give full play to the leading role of the United Nations;

–To peacefully resolve territorial and border disputes and other controversial issues through negotiations;

–To reform and improve the existing international economic and financial organizations and promote common prosperity
in line with the principle of reciprocity and mutual benefit and common development;

–To place emphasis on non-traditional security areas such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes, in addition to
the traditional security areas like preventing foreign invasion and safeguarding territorial integrity;

–To conduct effective disarmament and arms control with broad participation in line with the principle of justice,
comprehensiveness, rationality and balance, prevent the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, uphold the
current international arms control and disarmament regime and refrain from arms race. 4
Even a superficial glance at the paper will quickly reveal that few of the elements of the New Security Concept are really
“new”. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence goes back to the 1950s. The demand for reforming international
institutions to make them more attuned to reciprocity and mutual benefit (and less dominated by the West) is a familiar
slogan from the developing nations bloc with which China has for long self-identified. Hence, the NSC is not even new
for the Chinese themselves. Moreover, while the position paper mentions “non-traditional security areas”, such as
terrorism and transnational crime, it does not mention human security, even if the concept had been around for almost a
decade. So what is really new about the NSC? It may well be that the NSC is offered as an alternative to the “Cold War
mentality” (guess whose?), another Chinese construct. Moreover, it signals and reflects China’s visible turn to Asia-
Pacific multilateralism, after an initial period of doubt and suspicion. The NSC may also be seen as an effort to legitimize
China’s growing power and role in international affairs, and to address concerns raised by the West’s “China threat
theory” much in the same way as Japan’s “comprehensive security” doctrine was seen by many as an attempt to mask
increasing defence spending, legitimize its efforts to develop a more expansive security perimeter, and address regional
concerns about a possible Japanese remilitarisation.

There are several reasons to doubt that between them, the emerging powers like China or India are willing or able to
reshape the concept of security. The new powers of the world are not a very homogenous lot, even within Asia. They do
not have a uniform view on security and order in the national and international context. Second, the tools and medium of
security discourse, the research centers, journals, publishing houses, the media with a global reach, are still heavily
centred in the West. And even if they do have an influence on how security is defined in the 21st century, this might well
mean a return to the traditional definition of security a kind of neo-Westphalianism. Indeed, India and China both hold a
rigid view of sovereignty and reject post-Westphalian notions such as

4
“China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept”, July 31, 2002. Posted at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Website: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15319.htm.
humanitarian intervention or human security. Critics might wonder whether these countries or their academic centres
might bring into the debate over the meaning of security ideas and approaches that are likely to be self-serving or geared
to rationalizing and promoting their own respective interests. As a result, conceptual competition is likely and will dilute
their impact in reshaping the meaning of security

New Warfare

The “new warfare” is also a major catalyst of change in the way security is defined and understood. There is a growing
debate over whether warfare is being rendered obsolete, or at least becoming less destructive of human lives. While one
might agree with Margaret Mead that warfare is a social invention, it might well be a permanent invention. Few believe, a
la John Mueller, that warfare is going out of style in the manner of slavery or duelling, once socially acceptable and
commonplace. But just as slavery and honour killing have taken on new forms, war may simply be taking on new forms,
rather than disappearing altogether.

To many, a more serious claim would be whether war is becoming less frequent and/or costing less lives. This concern
with the human cost of conflict is a central theme of the concept of human security. The first Human Security Report,
issued by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia in 2005 (the report has since moved to Simon
Fraser University), caused a good deal of controversy by suggesting that there had been a sharp decline in armed conflicts
and that war is taking less lives than ever before. It also suggested several reasons for this trend: such as the end of the
Cold War, increasing UN peace operations, rising economic interdependence among nations, the impact of norms, etc.
But not everyone is convinced. Aside from the fact that intra-state conflicts have increased significantly relative to inter-
state conflict (a trend recognized in the Human Security Report, 2005), critics argue that the decline in warfare has not
been as pronounced as claimed, and that the trend is not irreversible. Moreover, analysts and leaders from the developing
world feel that the old warfare (inter-state conflict) is simply being offset by new forms, such as humanitarian
intervention.
Central to the notion of new warfare is of course technological change. It was no coincidence that the concept of national
security came about when technology had advanced sufficiently to be able to cause or threaten to cause substantial
damage or total destruction of the whole territories of nation states from across vast distances. Technology creates new
forms of insecurity. It changes the nature of warfare. It makes warfare more destructive. The chemical defoliants used in
the Vietnam War, a precursor to contemporary concerns about environmental security, were one example of how new
technologies of war could cause new forms of insecurity. The notion of “global security” is a direct offshoot of
globalisation, which is substantially driven by technology diffusion. New technologies of information and cyber warfare
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction make it more meaningful to speak of global security, rather than
national security. Technology has placed an ever increasing power of destruction in their hands of an ever decreasing
number of actors. Similarly, new forms of small arms with increasing killing potential and ease of affordability
underscores one reason why the concept of human security has gained resonance among some of its advocates.

Military build-ups and arms races are usually a throwback to the old notion of national security, although some would
claim that the revolution of military affairs (RMA) reduces the human costs of

violent conflict. New military technologies do save lives, and even makes warfare more humane. Hence, it is argued that
human security may well depend not just on making war or violence less likely, but also on reducing the human costs of
conflicts that cannot simply be avoided. In other words, solutions to the problem of human security in conflict zones can
be found within the new technologies of warfare. But the recent experience in Afghanistan, where highly advanced
weapons have not prevented significant collateral damage, does not inspire much confidence in this view.

The ongoing military modernization in East Asia, which is assuming ever greater proportions, features both conventional
weaponry as well as RMA related technologies. China, Japan, India, as well as several ASEAN members, have
undertaken a major upgrading of their air and naval forces. China is investing massively on information warfare
technologies. In Northeast Asia and South Asia, this military build-up is motivated primarily by traditional security
concerns, i.e. inter-state rivalries. While a good deal of modern weaponry can be dual-purpose, meaning it can be used to
combat traditional as well as non-traditional threats (pirates, terrorists), there is a contradiction between East Asia’s
apparent embrace of non-traditional security and the contours of the regional arms build-up that suggests the continuing
primacy of traditional security threats. The introduction of a variety of new generation weapons has meant a reemphasis
on national security concerns.

Domestic Politics and Political Change

Domestic politics and political change can be added to the list of forces that can spur new security thinking. However, two
important caveats about domestic politics are necessary here. First, a central element of domestic politics is regime
survival and strategies of regime legitimation, rather than state security per se. Thus, as discussed before, while
comprehensive security and non-traditional security are both domestic politics oriented, the former is historically more
associated with regime legitimation and survival rather than security of the state as a whole. When China adopted the
notion of non-traditional security recently, it did so with the purpose of shoring up both the security of the state from a
host of new threats, as well as to enhance the legitimacy and ensure the continued survival of communist party rule.
Second, domestic politics and political change as a catalyst of new security thinking does not equate with democratisation.
New security concepts can be associated with any type of shift in domestic politics. Southeast Asia’s collective descent
into authoritarian rule in the 1960s and 70s paved the way for new security concepts such as national and regional
resilience in Indonesia, total defence in Singapore and Malaysia’s comprehensive security doctrine. China’s embracing of
non-traditional security is closely tied to domestic politics and regime legitimation, but not reflective of democratization,
the evidence for which is far from certain. Lately, East Asia offers some signs that democratic governments are more
likely to adopt a human security framework; as seen in the case of Japan, Thailand after the outbreak of the Asian
financial crisis in 1997 and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. But this is not to say that democratic governments
always adopt human security ideas, as the case of India shows.

International Institutions and Epistemic Communities

International institutions, new or old, as well as epistemic communities, play an important role in (re)defining security.
They can create and diffuse new security ideas and norms and institutionalize them. The concept of human security was in
a sense invented by an international institution: the United Nations Development Programme. Aside from UN agencies
like UNDP and UNHCR, regional organizations are increasingly attuned to the idea of human security. The idea of
common security,though articulated by the Palme Commission, was institutionalized by the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). ASEAN and its epistemic counterpart, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and
International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) diffused the notion of comprehensive security originally coined in Japan. The
ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) institutionalised the
cooperative security idea. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) group, and the Network of East Asian Think Tanks is playing a
similar role with respect to the non-traditional security concept,

Academics are often quick to reconceptualize security after policymakers have made their “speech acts”. But in Asia,
“pure” academic discourses (i.e., debates for the sake of generating new theories and concepts, as opposed to Track-II
networking and conferencing aimed at serving the information needs of governments) have not played as important a role
in redefining security as in the West, particularly in Europe, although the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Issues
in Asia (NTS-Asia), set up by this author and modelled after the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security
(CANCAPS), constitutes an important exception. NTS-Asia did much to debate securitization theory and examine its
relevance in the Asian context; in that sense it was both academic and policy oriented. Following the lead of NTS-Asia,
other centres to promote non-traditional security have been established, including the Centre for Non-Traditional Security
at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (which is also hosted the secretariat of NTS-Asia, although NTS-Asia,
funded by the Ford Foundation was strictly a pan-Asian, rather than Singaporean, entity). The Center for Non-Traditional
Security and Peaceful Development Studies at Zhejiang University, the host of this conference, and the first centre on
NTS in China, is another example of epistemic intervention in promoting change in security thinking and
conceptualization in East Asia.

International institutions have also been in the forefront of implementing new security agendas. Many non-traditional
security issues, such as environmental degradation, refugees, drug trafficking and money laundering, are being addressed
through institutions, although often not with a great deal of effectiveness. In Asia, regional institutions have an increasing
role in non-traditional security issues. ASEAN has created a Food Security Reserve, negotiated a transboundary pollution
treaty, and a counter-terrorism convention, and is developing humanitarian assistance mechanism to address natural
disasters (but not yet to deal with violence associated with internal conflicts). The ARF has reoriented itself towards non-
traditional security issues, especially curbing transnational financial crime and maritime security challenges. APEC has
been concerned with environmental security issues. APT is central to regional economic and financial security concerns.
But Asian institutions, still wedded to Westphalian sovereignty, have a long way to go before emerging as instruments for
implementing new security concepts.

China’s Regional Security Doctrine

The Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, held annually since 2002, is Asia’s preeminent gathering of senior defence
officials. The 9th Dialogue was held in Singapore during 4-6 June, 2010. Defence officials from 28 countries attended,
including the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, for whom this was the fourth such dialogue in a row. Also present
was the Deputy Chief of the Peoples’
Liberation Army of China, the National Security Adviser of India, and defence ministers of UK, Australia, Japan, South
Korea, Indonesia and a host of other Asia Pacific countries. The keynote speaker was South Korea’s President, Lee
Myung-Bak, who gave a clear-headed exposure of his
response to the unprovoked sinking on 26th march of a South Korean navy ship by a North Korean torpedo which killed
46 of sailors.
A highlight of the 9th Dialogue was a statement outlining Chinese concepts of security, by General Ma Xiaotian, a senior
PLA official. It gave a window not only into the Chinese security philosophy, but also the difficulties of putting it into
practice and applying it to the vital US-China relationship.
According to the Chinese Security Doctrine, a rising China will not seek hegemony, although it recognizes that such
worries are understandable. Instead, China seeks the “common security of international community.” China is
increasingly interdependent with the entire Asia-Pacific region. It cannot maintain its own prosperity and security alone.
The only true path to security lies in building a harmonious Asia-Pacific community, one which recognizes and tolerates
the diversity of cultures and traditions.

China’s new security doctrine outlines a new type of relationship (“partnership”) with other nations and consists of five
key elements. These are:

 Integrated security, calling for a comprehensive partnership, with intertwined traditionaland non-traditional security
threats. It suggests a close link between economic development and security. Non-traditional security such as food
shortages, climate changes and pandemics will be viewed as major threats side-by-side with traditional security
challenges such as inter-state conflict.
 Common security. No country can address transnational security threats alone. But atthe same time, security can only
be achieved on partnerships with other countries that is based on equal terms, without any nation dominating over
others.
 Inclusive security, the third element, emphasizes the need for mutual trust, and rejectsexclusive military alliances
(reference to US alliances with Japan, South Korea and other Asia Pacific countries) which are targeted against other
countries (read China). Such alliances are damaging and outdated. What is called for instead is full respect for each
other’s core interests. As an alternative, China holds up the “ASEAN Way” of consultations and consensus and
peaceful engagement of all nations as “a role model for new type of partnership”. China is actively participating in all
Asia-Pacific multilateral forums, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, which in China’s view has made a
significant contribution to regional peace and stability.
 Cooperative security, implies that security is to be achieved through cooperation, whichwould involve mutually
beneficial partnerships and leads to a “win-win” situation for all involved. But security cooperation could start from
relatively easy areas, such as economic cooperation and humanitarian disaster reliefs and gradually expand to cover
more difficult political and strategic issues. During this process, interconnected interests and a sense of
interdependence will emerge and guide further cooperation.
 Evolving security, the final element, strikes an optimistic note, suggesting that theunderstanding of security by China
and other nations is not static, or dependent on short-term calculations or single incident, but a long-term process
subject to changes that will overcome historical animosities.

How can China’s new security approach help managing the obstacles to a more stable US-China relationship? A clear hint
of the difficulties came from the conflicting positions of the two sides on the role of US military alliances in the region
and the issue over recent US arms sales to Taiwan.

China’ General Ma sees a “Cold War mentality” in recent US moves to refocus and strengthen its alliances in the region.
For China, such moves are contrary to the spirit of “inclusive security”. US

Secretary of State Gates on the other hand asserted that the US military presence in Asia Pacific, which is maintained
primarily on the basis of its alliances with countries like Japan and South Korea, are a regional a public good, protecting
free access to global commons, including critical sealanes through which much of the region’s commerce flows. Gates
justified these alliances and the US military build-up in the region as a part of a policy of strong and effective “extended
deterrence”, which protects both the US allies from the threat of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile. He
maintained that the US is shifting to a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and political sustainable
strategic posture in the region.

Gates accused China of breaking military ties with the US over the Obama administration’s decision to sale arms to
Taiwan. He insisted that such sales are consistent with long-standing US policy and that the weapons being sold were
carefully selected to bolster Taiwan’s defensive capability against a growing Chinese military build-up. But China views
US arms sales to Taiwan as a direct challenge to its “core national interests”, and evidence of the US failure to honor its
past commitments, such as the 1982 China-US Communique which stipulated gradual reduction in US arms sales to
Taiwan. One silver lining from this exchange was that China rebuttal of Gates’ claim that US-China military ties were
“broken”. China has only temporarily suspended such ties at high levels. But low level visits continue.

The conflicting perspectives of China and the US on security have serious implications for Asia Pacific on regional
security. Canada should not only be paying attention but playing an active role in this debate. But while Canada’s major
security partners such as the US, Australia, Japan and South Korea chose to send their highest defence officials to the
9th Shangri-La Dialogue, Ottawa’s highest official here was its Vice Chief of Defence Staff. Such neglect entails serious
costs. Recently, another major forum of regional defence and security in Asia Pacific was announced. This would be a
meeting of the defence ministers of 10 ASEAN members plus eight others, including the US, China, Australia, New
Zealand, India, South Korea, Russia, and Japan. Canada was not invited.

Conclusion
An interesting point that emerges from the foregoing is that many of the recent redefinitions of security have come about
as the result of factors other than the shifts in the distribution of power. Although the notion of human security did receive
a lift from the end of the Cold War, its real origin lay in longer-term forces predating the end of the Cold War, such as the
development economists’ dissatisfaction with orthodox measures of economic development (in terms of GDP growth
rates), the Human Development Report, the legacy of past commissions such as the Palme and Bruntland commission,
and the rise of internal conflicts many of them unrelated to the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the movement towards a
broader notion of security has progressed steadily through conflicting shifts in the distribution of power, including the rise
and fall of the unipolar moment.

A more influential factor has been changing ideas about security. It is interesting that the emergence of concepts such as
common security, comprehensive security, and human security was not

necessarily due to any major or sudden crisis. (Non-traditional security in Asia might have been different; it was
influenced by a series of regional crises such as Bali terrorist bombings, SARS, and the Indian Ocean Tsunami.) Instead,
these concepts were slow-moving, voluntary and evolutionary constructions featuring ideas and debates that
fundamentally reflected dissatisfaction with the orthodox notions of security. A closely related factor is the changing
international leadership, especially the role of Middle Power advocacy typified by Canada, Australia and Norway, which
is not the same as changes to the distribution of power. Indeed, the combination of changing ideas about security and
leadership could be the most important reason why security has been and will continue to the redefined in the 21st century.
The emergence of new threats, actual or perceived, is insufficient by itself to alter prevailing notions of security in the
absence of prior ideational shifts. Damage to the environment, or poverty and underdevelopment, are longstanding, but
they could not have been seen as security challenges in the absence of new conceptions of security such as non-traditional
or human security. A related conclusion of this paper is that while crisis might serve as a catalyst for new security
thinking, this does not necessarily mean a broadening of the security framework. The 9/11 attacks spawned the “new”
doctrine of homeland security, which to many was nothing other than the return of the national security state. Although
terrorism could be in theory framed as a threat to civilians and common people (hence to human security), terrorism
experts and national security officials in West and Asia alike lost little time in advocating a response that is
overwhelmingly “national security”-like in its orientation and instruments, most vividly illustrated in the Bush
administration’s doctrine of pre-emption and “war on terror”.
Finally, one might ask: what is the most relevant and appropriate concept of security for Asia and the world in the
21st century? Which concept best captures the referent objects (who is being protected), threats (protected from what), and
the impact zones (from where is the threat coming from and where is the response being directed) of security now and in
the coming decades? Looking at developments associated with new warfare and the growing academic and policy
prominence of non-traditional security concepts, Asia seems still wedded to the idea of national security, the policy
rhetoric of and speech acts by leaders and Track-II conferences notwithstanding. National security remains especially
dominant in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, while non-traditional security (although it does not necessarily conflict
with national security) appears increasingly important in Southeast Asia. The rise of China, India and Japan is unlikely to
change this equation, although China, driven by domestic concerns, is striving to achieve a balanced mix between national
and non-traditional security. It seems to be dealing with its North East Asian neighbours in mainly national security terms,
while adopting a primarily non-traditional security approach towards Southeast Asians. All this while, human security, the
most direct opposite of national security, remains a distant prospect in Asia.
But national security is no longer subject to a strict territorial logic. Globalization, rising levels of regional economic
interdependence, RMA, nuclear proliferation, and the growing power projection capabilities of East Asian countries,
means that inter-state and international conflicts and war in traditional security complexes such as India-Pakistan, the
Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Straits, can no longer be a strictly bilateral or subregional affairs without larger
regional and global implications. War as a national security referent is not dead, but its effects would reverberate ever
more than before across national and sub-regional, even regional boundaries.

Thus, while national security as a concept and practice is far from obsolete, it is increasingly difficult to conceptualize
security solely in terms of the traditional notion of national security. Non-traditional security, although not a direct
antithesis of national security, is gaining support. As noted, NTS subsumes the older notion of comprehensive security,
but whether it is simply old wine in new bottle can be debated. Both comprehensive security and NTS are fundamentally
state-centric, although comprehensive security is more regime security oriented. Responses to NTS issues tend to
securitize them as national security challenges, rather than human security ones. The idea of non-traditional security in
this sense will remain a misnomer if it continues to be fundamentally threat-driven without a prior or corresponding
change in ideas that might render it less of a state-centric notion. But non-traditional security issues are also increasingly
regional in scope and manifestation and responses to them are increasingly regionalised, with regional institutions
adopting tasks geared to addressing such threats. Asian countries, as their counterparts in other regions of the world, are
finding it easier to cooperate on NTS issues than over strictly national security issues.

Hence, in Asia today, the prevailing security paradigm consists of no single concept, but an interplay of national, non-
traditional and human security ideas and approaches. Perhaps the new security concept for Asia and the world in the
21st century is better described as transnational security, incorporating national security events and instruments that have
wide regional and international implications (especially in Asia where the emerging regional powers are also potential
global players, as China and Japan already are), non-traditional security issues that challenge state institutions and
governance capacity, and human security concerns that are fundamentally geared towards security, well-being and dignity
for the people.

Table 2: Changing Security Discourses

Concept Time Frame Catalyst Main National,

Institutional and
epistemic
advocates in Asia
National Security 1940s Technological US, SEATO, Five
change/New Power Defence
warfare Arrangements
Comprehensive 1960s Domestic politics Japan, Malaysia,
Security and regime Indonesia,
legitimation ASEAN, ASEAN-
ISIS
Common/ 1970s/1980s Ideational prior, ARF, CSCAP
Cooperative institutions
Security
Human Security 1990s-2000s Ideational prior, Canada, Norway,
 institutions, Japan, Thailand,
domestic political ASEAN
change Secretariat(since
Surin Pisuwan)
Non-Traditional 1990s-2000s New Threats China, ASEAN Plus
Security Three, NEAT

Q12

International Political Economy

What is International Political Economy?

 The Politics of Global Economic Relations
 The study of a fundamental tension between and the dynamic interaction of two spheres of life, which we can
variously call “society and individuals”, “politics and economics”, or “states and markets”.
 Any way you say it, political economy is about the lines that both connect and divide national interest from individual
self interest.
 One way to understand the basics of IPE is to pick apart its name.
 It is INTERNATIONAL meaning it deals with issues that cross national borders and with relations between and
among nation states.
 It is POLITICAL in that it involves the use of state power to make decisions about who gets what, when and where in
a society. The political process is complex and multi layered, involving nation states, bilateral relations among nation
states and many international organizations, regional alliances, and global agreements.
 Lastly, IPE is about the ECONOMY or economics which means that it deals with how scarce resources are allocated
to different uses and distributed among individuals through the decentralized market process.
 Economic analysis and Political analysis often look at the same questions but economic analysis focuses less on
issues of power and national interest and more on issues of wealth and income and individual interest.
 Political economy, therefore, combines these two ways of looking at the world in order to grasp more fully society’s
fundamental nature.

First Principles: States and Markets

 Think of political economy as the field of study that analyses the problems and questions arising from the parallel
existence and dynamic interaction of “state” and “market”in the modern world.
 Political economists focus on the basic conflict that exists between the interests of the individual and the broader
interests of the society in which that individual exists.
 To put this in another way, political economy is the study of the tension between the market, where individuals
engage in self interested activities and the state, where those same individuals undertake collective action which is in
the national interest or in the interest of a broadly defined community or ‘society’.
 In short, political economy looks at the fundamental tension between economics and
CASE STUDY: The United States, China and the MFN Issue
WASHINGTON, May 26-President Clinton’s decision to renew China’s trade benefits was the culmination of a
titanic clash between America’s global economic interests and its self image as the world’s leading advocate of
human rights. In the end, economic interests won the day.
The New York Times, Friday 27 May 1994
 The issue is complex but clearly important.

 President Clinton had to chose between two conflicting national interests. The economic interests of both the US and
China would be best served by granting Chinese goods favorable entry into the US market, a condition termed most
favorable nation or MFN status. China, however, had a record of violating human rights as they are defined by
western culture. It was a long standing US policy to deny MFN status to countries that violate human rights standards.
 President Clinton’s dilemma was an example of the tension between economics and politics, two spheres of human
life that often intersect.
 In making his choice, President Clinton had to take into account the many to account many types of interactions
between China and the US, and the impacts they have on other nations. He also had to weigh historical factors and
deep cultural differences.
 In the end, he chose to extend MFN status to China, satisfying some economic and political interests despite China’s
lack of progress on human rights.

Susan Strange: IPE Defined

 Professor Susan Strange at the London School of Economics and Political Science has written that IPE

Concerns the social, political, and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and
distribution and the mix of values reflected therein. Those arrangements are not divinely ordained, nor are they
outcome of blind chance. Rather they are the result of human decisions taken in the context of man made institutions
and sets of self set rules and customs.
 This definition of IPE gives equal weight to social, political and economic arrangements and stresses that IPE is not
just the study of institutions or organizations but also of the values they reflect.
 States and markets are connected by “global systems of production, exchange, and distribution” which are termed as
the STRUCTURES of the IPE.
 IPE therefore, looks at the ways that the states and the markets of the world are connected to one another and the
arrangements or structures that have evolved to connect them.
 These arrangements reflect history, culture and values. They change, and will continue to change in the future.

The Structures of International Political Economy

 The international political economy is a network of bargains between and among states (that deal in power) and
markets (that deal in wealth). These bargains determine the production, exchange, and distribution of wealth and
power.
 Bargains can take many forms. Some are formal agreements signed, ratified and enforced. Other bargains are merely
conventions, understandings or rules of thumb.
 Some IPE bargains reflect what Professor Strange calls RELATIONAL POWER, which is the power of one player
to get another to do or not do something.
 However, what is increasingly important in IPE, according to Professor Strange is STRUCTURAL POWER, which
she defines as ‘the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other
states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and their scientists and professional people have to
operate’.
 In a sense, these structures are the institutions and arrangements that govern the behavior of states and markets in the
international political economy, which together produce, exchange and distribute wealth and power.

The Security Structure

 Security from natural forces or from the threats and actions of others is perhaps the most basic human need.

 When one person or group provides security for another or contributes to that security, a security structure is created.
 The nature of the security structure was a contributing factor in the debate over China’s MFN status in 1994.
Sometimes China has been thought of as a threat to US security interests, at other times it has been seen as a part of a
trilateral balance of power along with the US and the Soviet Union.
 Until the 1970s, all trade with China was forbidden for national security reasons. Although this ban is now gone, it is
clear that uncertainty and doubt remain regarding what threat, if any, China represents to the US. This security
question tempers to some degree relations between the US and China in all areas.

The Production Structure

 The Production Structure can be defined as the sum of all arrangements determining what is produced, by whom and
for whom , by what methods and on what terms. Production is the act of creating wealth and wealth is nearly always
linked to power. The issue of who produces what and for whom therefore lies at the heart of international political
economy.
 Recent decades have seen dramatic changes in the production structure with the production of certain high value
products such as cars shifting from the US to Japan and now to other countries including Korea, Mexico and China.
 These structural changes affect the distribution of wealth and power in the world and therefore impact the other
structures of IPE.

The Finance Structure

 The pattern of money flows between and among nations.

 Defines who has access to money, how and on what terms.

 Money directly amounts to wealth and is therefore central to IPE.

The Knowledge Structure

 Knowledge can lead to wealth for those who can use it effectively.

 Who has knowledge and how it is used is therefore an important factor in IPE.
 Nations with poor access to knowledge in the form of industrial technology, scientific discoveries, medical
procedures, or instant communications for example, find themselves at a disadvantage relative to others.
 One reason China desired MFN status in 1994 was that it hoped that increased economic interaction with the US
would give it greater access to industrial technology. To move up in the international production structure, China
needed to accelerate its acquisition of science,technology and know how from abroad.

What is International Political Economy?

International Political Economy (IPE) is a social science that attempts to understand international and global problems
using interdisciplinary tools and theoretical perspectives. Although it originally developed as a sub-field of International
Relations, it has in recent years taken on a life if its own. At the University of Puget Sound, 30 to 40 students graduate
with a bachelor of arts degree in IPE each year.

The growing prominence of IPE is one result of the continuing breakdown of boundaries between economics, politics, and
other social science disciplines. Increasingly, the most pressing problems that scholars and policy-makers confront are
those that can best be understood from a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, or transdisciplinary point of view. IPE pulls
down the fences that restrict intellectual inquiry in the social sciences so that important questions and problems can be
examined without reference to disciplinary borders.

IPE is the study of a problématique, or set of related problems. The traditional IPE problématique includes the political
economy of international trade, international finance, North-South relations, transnational enterprises, and hegemony.
This problématique has been broadened in recent years to issues raised by globalization and climate change.

International Economics and International Politics

The interaction of International Politics and International Economics is today widely appreciated and the subject of much
theoretical research and applied policy analysis. Nation-states clearly affect international trade and monetary flows, which
in turn affect the environment in which nation-states make political choices and businesses make economic decisions.

Yet scholars and policy-makers often think about International Economics without much attention to International Politics
and vice versa. Economists often assume away state interests while political scientists sometimes fail to look beyond the
nation-state. Two noteworthy Cold War era exceptions to this rule stand out: economist Charles Kindleberger’s work on
hegemony and political scientist Kenneth Waltz’s attempt to integrate economics into politics in his path-breaking book
Man, the State, and War.

Dramatic events in the 1970s made plain how tightly international economics and politics were intertwined. The oil
embargoes of the 1970s and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system were key events in IPE’s development
as a field of study. Moreover, subsequent events such as the Third World debt crisis, the fall of communist regimes, the
rise of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICS), the expansion of the European Union, and the financial crises in
Mexico, Russia, and East Asia made showed that simple divisions between state and market, domestic and international,
and politics and economics were no longer tenable. An increasingly complex world required a complex approach to
analysis, which IPE provided.

The IPE Problématique

IPE in the 1970s and 1980s was centered in the International Relations community and took the form of the analysis of
what was called in book titles and course catalogues “The Politics of International Economic Relations” or “The Political
Economy of International Relations.” In this period, five sets of questions dominated the agenda: international trade,
international finance, North-South relations, MNCs, and the problem of hegemony. A sixth concern — globalization —
was added to the list in the 1990s. Since the 2000s, IPE has devoted significant attention to global threats and crises,
including climate change and worldwide financial instability.

International Trade
Politics and Economics approach international trade from different points of view using completely different analytical
frameworks. The problem is that states think in terms of geography and population, which are the relatively stable factors
that define its domain, while markets are defined by exchange and the extent of the forward and backward linkages that
derive therefrom. The borders of markets are dynamic, transparent, and porous; they rarely coincide exactly with the more
rigid borders of states. A few markets today are even global in their reach. When trade within a market involves buyers
and sellers in different nation-states, it becomes international trade and the object of political scrutiny.

International trade has always been at the center of IPE analysis and is likely to remain so in the future. It is a mirror that
reflects each era’s most important state-market tensions. In the Cold War, for example, international trade was
simultaneously a structure of US hegemony and a tool of East-West strategy. In the 1980s and 1990s, trade through
regional economic integration was a tool to consolidate regional interests. With the advent of globalization and the
creative economy powered by information technologies, trade in intellectual property rights became me a controversial
IPE issue.

International Finance

International Finance presents the second set of problems that have traditionally defined International Political Economy.
The IPE of International Finance includes analysis of exchange rate policies, foreign exchange systems, international
capital movements, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Seemingly technical aspects of international finance often hide profound political implications, a fact that has attracted
scholars such as Susan Strange and Benjamin J. Cohen to this field. Political scholars may hesitate to engage in this
analysis because of the necessity to master difficult theories and arcane terminology, but there is no riper area for IPE
analysis. Some issues of current importance in IPE studies of finance include: political struggles over how to respond to
the post-2007 global financial crisis; how the complexity of financial markets affects economic stability; and debates over
how states should regulate financial markets.

Hegemony
The theory of hegemonic stability was arguably IPE’s most important contribution to Cold War international relations
theory. A hegemon is a powerful state that supplies public goods to the international system. These public goods include
stable money, security (such as freedom of the seas), and a system of free trade that can be shared by all. Providing these
public goods is costly, but the hegemon gains even if it disproportionately bears the expense alone. If the world system
prospers, the hegemon necessarily prospers as well. In fact, this provision of public goods may be a strategy to secure or
extend the hegemon’s dominant position.

The theory of hegemonic stability holds that the world system is most prosperous when a hegemon exists to organize the
international political and economic system and coordinate the provision of international public goods. Periods of Dutch
(1620-72), British (1815-73), and U.S. (post-1945) hegemony are commonly cited as evidence of this link between
hegemony and prosperity. When hegemony breaks down, however, the international system falls into disorder and
conflict, with the resulting decline in peace and prosperity. One can think of the theory of hegemonic stability as a theory
of U.S. Cold War economic statecraft, with the Bretton Woods system and the Marshall Plan its clearest manifestations.

Some scholars argue that hegemony is a self-defeating and therefore temporary condition. While the hegemonic state
bears the burdens of organizing the international system and supplying public goods, free-rider states prosper and increase
the burdens on the hegemon. At some point the hegemon finds itself over-committed and unable to bear the costs of the
system it has created. Either it begins to put domestic interests over its international obligations or it becomes too weak to
honors its widespread commitments. Britain’s decline in the late 19th century and early 20th century is an example of this
dynamic. The Iron Curtain’s fall in 1989 can also be seen as the implosion of Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern
Europe.

Hegemony is a state-centered concept that includes security as a critical element, but that draws upon the analysis of
international trade and international finance to provide a richer and more complex explanation of the rise and fall of great
powers. One important question in IPE today is whether China will challenge U.S. hegemony and threaten the liberal
international order. Another is whether Germany will move to establish itself as a hegemon within the European Union.

North-South Relations
The Cold War analysis of less-developed countries (LDCs) was focused on the East-West bipolar alliances and the place
of LDCs in geopolitical strategy. LDCs were strategic pawns in the Big Power Cold War game. As international trade and
international finance were increasingly used to expand and strengthen the Cold War alliances (especially but not
exclusively on the western side), IPE scholars pursued the impact of economic relations generally on LDCs. Or, in the
terms associated with Immanuel Wallerstein, they probed the relationship between Core and Periphery.

The IPE problématique therefore expanded to encompass a critique of economic development, an analysis of neo-
colonialism and imperialism, and a general study of Core-Periphery relations. Security and geopolitical issues were not
excluded from this North-South analysis; they merely lost the privileged position that they enjoyed in traditional
International Relations research. In recent years, IPE scholars have focused on sustainable development, the reasons why
failed states have formed, and how the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) is reshaping North-South
relations.

Multinational Corporations
Multinational corporations (MNCs)—also called transnational corporations—have always been objects of interest to IPE
scholars and practitioners. During the Cold War, MNCs were often viewed as being linked with their home government
by an “invisible handshake.” The home country government created opportunities for these businesses and opened
markets abroad (in “host countries”) for them. The businesses, in turn, advanced the economic and political interests of
their home country.
With the end of the Cold War, analysis of MNC behavior quickly spread to issues well beyond their role in Cold War
geopolitics. The rise of Asia’s newly-industrializing countries and the increasing globalization of production and finance
spurred research on the role of MNCs in the allocation of capital and the control of technology. It became apparent that
some MNCs undertook business strategies that were not obviously in the interest of their home country. The distinction
between home country and host country also grew less clear. All countries are now host countries in the sense that all
countries compete for capital, technology, and jobs in the global market.

IPE scholars have increasingly directed their research towards developing an IPE of Global Value Chains (GVCs). GVCs
are complex networks that link independent businesses into a coordinated production and distribution process. New
information technology allows firms to coordinate their activities to an extent that was previously possible only within a
large enterprise, thereby facilitating the expansion of GVCs. Companies like Nike, Apple, and Wal-Mart coordinate vast
GVCs; they focus on design, marketing, logistics, and retailing. Much of the actual manufacturing of products has been
outsourced to independent firms in countries such as China, Vietnam, and Malaysia. The IPE of global value chains
challenges our understanding of both markets and states and represents an advancing frontier of IPE research.

Globalization

The globalization problématique is quite different from the traditional state-centered concerns of International Relations,
which is one reason some IPE scholars consider IPE a distinct academic discipline, not just a sub-field of International
Relations. As a process driven by the global expansion of production and finance, globalization forces us to look at the
interrelationships between politics, business, culture, technology, the environment, and migration, to name only the most
obvious areas.

At the heart of the globalization problématique is the question of the state. Many scholars argue that the nation-state is
increasingly incapable of dealing with global issues and has lost significant power relative to other actors in the global
economy. For example, MNCs can easily move capital from one country to another, and this mobility has allowed them to
reduce the taxes they pay.

Globalization has forced IPE scholars to search for new theories to explain complex global interactions. One of the most
recent theories is constructivism, which focuses on the power of ideas to shape how states and institutions perceive and
respond to global problems. An outgrowth of this perspective is literature on how globally-coordinated groups of non-
state, non-business actors—called transnational advocacy networks—have been able to convince governments to care
more about problems such as human rights and environmental destruction.

It is clear that globalization has generated an array of social and environmental problems that demand the attention of IPE
scholars. Growing economic inequality has had profound effects on the quality of democracy and social stability. The rise
of China and the creation of the euro currency have reshaped geopolitics. Most importantly, globalization has helped
produce serious threats and crises that states and international institutions seem incapable of controlling, such as global
warming, financial turmoil, and refugee flows. The challenge for IPE is to develop theories and concepts that help us
make sense of what is now truly a “global political economy.”

*”What is International Political Economy?” is based upon an article written by Michael Veseth in 2004 for a UNESCO
international encyclopedia project. © Michael Veseth, 2004. He updated it in March 2007. Bradford Dillman revised and
updated it in December 2015
Q13 Human rights
A right may be defined as something to which an individual has a just claim. The American Declaration of Independence
states that “all men… are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness.” This is a brief statement about human rights in contrast to civil rights. Human rights are
those that individuals have by virtue of their existence as human beings. The right to life itself and the basic necessities of
food and clothing may be considered fundamental human rights.

Civil, or legal, rights are those granted by a government. The right to vote at age 18 is a civil right, not a human right
(see Civil Rights). In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries there was a broadening of the concept of human rights to
include many rights formerly regarded as civil.
Historical Background
The term human rights came into common use only after World War II. It was made current by the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, published in 1948. As a term human rights replaced natural rights, a very old
concept, and the related phrase rights of man, which did not necessarily include the rights of women.

Most scholars trace the origin of the concept of natural rights to ancient Greek and Roman thought. In the literature and
philosophy of both Greece and Rome there are abundant statements acknowledging laws of the gods and of nature, and
such laws were understood to take precedence over laws made by the state.

The human-rights concept, however, can actually be traced to an earlier period. The Hebrew Bible (called the Old
Testament by Christians) relates the story of ancient Israel, and in it are abundant inferences about human rights. There is
no well-developed statement on the issue, but there are significant scattered passages that give clear evidence of a point of
view at least as advanced as Greek and Roman philosophy. The Ten Commandments, by the prohibition of murder and
theft, give implicit recognition of the right to life and property. This recognition is considerably broadened by later
elaboration of the laws and by the passionate discourses on justice by such prophets as Amos.

If the concept of human rights is very old, the general recognition of their validity is not. Throughout most of history,
governments failed to accept the notion that people have rights independent of the state. This is called statism, and it
implies the supremacy of the state in all matters pertaining to the lives of subjects. Statism is still a potent concept in the
20th century. Germany under Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union during the rule of Joseph Stalin are prime examples, and
there are other equally valid instances that still exist.

The modern development of the human-rights concept began during the late Middle Ages in the period called the
Renaissance, when resistance to political and economic tyranny began to surface in Europe. (For a survey of the historical
development, see Bill of Rights.) It was during the 17th and 18th centuries, a period called the Enlightenment, that
specific attention was drawn by scientific discoveries to the workings of natural law. This, in turn, seemed to imply the
existence of natural rights with which the state should not be allowed to interfere.
By the time of the American and French revolutions, a complete turnaround had taken place in the relationship of
governments to human rights. The point of view elaborated by the American Founding Fathers, as well as by the French
revolutionaries, is that government’s purpose is to protect and defend rights, not to dispense or exploit them. James
Madison went so far as to assert that “as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may equally be said to have a
property in his rights.” And further, “Government is instituted to protect property of every sort.” The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France, 1789) states that, “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights,” and “The
aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and inprescriptible rights of man.”

Such advanced views of human rights were not without their critics. From the end of the 18th century through the third
decade of the 20th, outspoken and influential theorists attacked the human-rights concept. Edmund Burke in England
denounced what he called “the monstrous fiction” of human equality. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham stated that only
imaginary rights can be derived from a law of nature. These thinkers were joined, in the course of 100 years, by
Bentham’s disciple John Stuart Mill, the French political theorist Joseph de Meistre, the German jurist Friedrich Karl von
Svaigny, the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, and others. By 1894 the British writer F.H. Bradley could exalt
the concept of statism by saying: “The rights of the individual today are not worth consideration. . . . The welfare of the
community is the end and is the ultimate standard.”

The critics, however, were going against the tide of history. In the United States and many parts of Europe, there was
distinct progress in the development of human rights. These instances might not have been sufficient without the
laboratory of human rights abuse that Nazi Germany provided for all the world to see. The appalling crimes against
humanity, most evident in the extermination of millions of people in concentration camps, horrified the civilized world
and helped bring human rights to their present level of acceptance (see Genocide; Holocaust).
Definitions of Rights
The general acceptance of human rights led to a widespread agreement on certain fundamental assumptions about them:
(1) If a right is affirmed as a human right rather than a civil right, it is understood to be universal, something that applies
to all human beings everywhere. (2) Rights are understood to represent individual and group demands for the sharing of
political and economic power. (3) It is agreed that human rights are not always absolute: they may be limited or restrained
for the sake of the common good or to secure the rights of others. (4) Human rights is not an umbrella term to cover all
personal desires. (5) The concept of rights often implies related obligations. Thomas Jefferson noted that eternal vigilance
is the price of liberty. Therefore, if individuals would maintain their freedom, their duty is to guard against political,
religious, and social activities that may restrict their rights and the rights of others.

Acceptance of fundamental assumptions has not lessened disagreement on which rights can be classified as human rights.
Historically the debate has been carried on about three categories: individual, social, and collective. Individual rights
refers to the basic rights to life and liberty mentioned in the Declaration of Independence. Social rights broadens this
concept to include economic, social, and cultural rights. Collective, or solidarity, rights has come into prominence since
the end of World War II, the collapse of old colonial empires, and the emergence of many new nation-states. These
particular forms of rights are best described by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Individual rights.
These rights were best described by the 17th- and 18th-century political theorists—such men as John Locke in England,
Montesquieu in France, and Jefferson and others in the United States. They are the rights to life, liberty, privacy, the
security of the individual, freedom of speech and press, freedom of worship, the right to own property, freedom from
slavery, freedom from torture and unusual punishment, and similar rights as spelled out in the first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution. Basic to individual rights is the concept of government as a shield against encroachment upon
the person. Little is demanded from government but the right to be left alone. Government is not asked for anything
except vigilance in safeguarding the rights of its citizens.

Social rights
This concept of rights grew out of the socialist and Communist criticisms of capitalism and its perceived economic
injustices: low wages, long working hours, unsafe working conditions, and child labor, among others. Social rights make
demands on government for such things as quality education, jobs, adequate medical care, social-insurance programs,
housing, and other benefits. Basically they call for a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of the
individual and the family.

Collective rights.
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on Dec. 10, 1948. It
urged the right to political, economic, social, and cultural self-determination; the right to peace; the right to live in a
healthful and balanced environment; and the right to share in the Earth’s resources. It also pledged the rights of life,
liberty, and security of person—the basic human rights.

Q14

Environment: Global Warming, Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Accord

What is Rio Summit/ Earth Summit ?

 It was a United nations summit, held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1992.
 It led to creation of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

What is the UNFCCC?

 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

 Created because of the Rio Summit/ Earth Summit of 1992.

 It is an international treaty for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
 Nearly every country on Earth is a party to the UNFCCC.
What is Conference of the Parties (COP)?
 The nations, who’ve signed UNFCCC convention, meet every year to discuss climate change strategy.

 These meetings are called Conference of the Parties (COP)

 The first COP (COP 1) was held in Berlin.
 Third COP (COP 3) held in Kyoto, Japan. It was here the famous Kyoto Protocol came in to existence.
 2011: COP held in Durban, S.Africa.
 2012: COP will be held in Doha, Qatar in November 2012 (so it becomes important topic for next prelims!)

What is Kyoto Protocol?

 1997: third meeting of UNFCC nation (also known as Conference of Parties/COP3),

 In this meeting Kyoto Protocol was created.

 Kyoto protocol wants the Industrialised nations to reduce their green house gas emission by around 5.2% by 2012.
(measured against 1990 levels)
 Before dwelling much into Kyoto, some important terms.

What is “common but differentiated responsibilities”?

 The developed countries such as US,UK have already polluted the atmosphere with greenhouse gases (GHGs)
through industrialization. So they’re the one who created/started global warming and all the mess.
 While Developing countries (India and Brazil) have started polluting the world only recently.
 Therefore, the developing countries such as India, Brazil should share less of the burden of lowering overall
emissions.
 And Developed countries (US,UK) should bear more responsibility in fixing this global warming mess etc. because
they’re the one more responsible for it.
 So, while it is the “Common” responsibility of every nation of this world, to reduce Green house gas emission, but
there should be some difference between the responsibility given to developed countries and developing countries.
 Kyoto Protocol follows that principle and assigns separate responsibilities to the countries.

Kyoto Protocol
 Ok, so far we learned that

 In Earth Summit, Rio De Janero, Brazil, they formed a treaty called UNFCCC
 The UNFCCC gangsters meets every year, there is item song, gun-firing, consumption of desi-liquorand deliberations
on how to fix the global warming problem and these meetings are called Conference of Parties “COP”.
 In third such COP meeting @Kyoto, Japan, they come up with an idea under which
o Developed nations like US, will compulsorily reduce their green house gas (GHG) emission by 2012.
o Developing nations like India, should reduce GHG emission but not compulsory.
 Although various countries signed Kyoto Protocol in 1997, it did not came into force immediately.
 Kyoto protocol came into force only after required number of Annex 1 Countries ratified it.
 So this was achieved only in 2005.
 Thus, Kyoto although signed in 1997, came into force in 2005.

Kyoto protocol: How does it actually work?

 Suppose Abdul, Bhide and Champak (ABC) goto a Gujarati dining hall. This hall serves only ‘fixed dish’ i.e. 1 sabji,
4 roti,dal and rice. And each dish costs Rs.50. If you want more roti then you’ll have to pay extra 5 rupees per roti.
 Now Champak is an old man so he cannot eat all the 4 rotis served in his plate. He eats only two rotis.
 On the other hand, Abdul and Bhide are quite hungry, so they want more, they take 1-1 roti each from Champak’s
plate and agree to pay 5-5 rupees to him.
 Another example: You know how broadband internet billing works= there are plans for example 2GB plan for Rs.500
That means as long as you download music, movies etc. worth less than or equal to 2GB then you’ll get bill of Rs.500
but if you download more files above 2GB quota, then company will charge you Rs.1 per MB of extra download.
 Similarly, Under Kyoto Protocol, each Annex-B country is given emission target “quota” (Kyoto Units).
 For example, for the year 2009, Australia’s allowed quota was 2,957,579,143 Kyoto units. (each unit is equivalent to
1 ton of carbon dioxide)
 Now, as long as Australia emits that much green house gas= no problem.
 So first of all, Australian Government should do all steps to make sure it doesn’t cross that quota for example
o Making compulsory anti-pollution laws: for example a Tire making company with daily output of 200 tires must
not emit more than 200 tonnes of green house gas per year.
o Promoting solar energy, reducing tax on solar cells, wind mill equipments etc.
o If a family buys second car then it will have to pay higher tax (just like China’s one child policy but with cars!)
o if a kid is found bunking his college lecture and loitering on his motorbike then he’ll be fined for polluting the
environment.
 But even after all these measures, if Australia wants to emit more green house gas, then it will have to buy additional
‘quota or units’ from another country. Kyoto Protocol allows three mechanisms to do so
#1 Emissions Trading / Carbon Trading

 Suppose two Annex B parties are Japan and Australia.

 Japan was given quota of 100 units
 And Australia was given quota of 200 units.
 But Austrialian Government is unable to maintain this limit and Australia emits 210 units of green house gas, in given
year.
 On the other side, Japanese Government takes very strong steps to control emission and hence they only emit 90 units
of Green House gas. So it has spare 10 Kyoto Units.
 Now, under Emission trading system, Australia can buy this 10 spare kyoto units from Japan and thus remain within
its limit.
 In real life scenario, each annex B country makes law giving fixed quota to the companies.
o Suppose steel factory cannot emit more than 1 ton of Green house gas
o Tire company cannot emit more than 2 tonnes of green house gas.
o So if tire company owner buys superfine machinaries that produce less gas so he has some spare credit/quota
(say 1 ton)
o While Steel factory emits more than its allowed quota (suppose it was allowed 2 tonnes but emitted 3 tonnes)
o Then the steel company can pay the tire company and get a certificate that we’ve purchase 1 ton quota from this
xyz tire company. This Is the essence of “Carbon Trading.”
 Here are some charts to understand it better. But the text in below image is hard to read (because the original images
were in low quality). Solution =just hold down “Ctrl” Key on your keyboard and move your mouse-wheel upwards
and it’ll zoom the image.
#2 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
 Suppose Annex B country Australia is given emission quota of 200 units, but it emits 210 units of green house gas.

 But Australia can finance a solar power project in some village of India (Non-Annex or developing Country) and get
certificate that the solar plant led to reduction of 10 units of green house gas. In this way, Australia will remain in its
quota/limit.
 Similarly, suppose Australian Government has passed a law that a steel production company with output of 200
tonnes of steel per a day, must not emit more than 10 units of green house gas in a year.
o But this company wants to produce more steel, then its green house gas emission has increased to 11 units. (1
more unit above the quota)
o So this company can also do some solar-projects in India, Brazil etc. and get a certificate that it has led to
reduction of 1 unit of GHG emission. = problem solved.
#3 Joint Implementation (JI)
 This is identical to CDM.

 In CDM, Australia can do good project in a non-Annex country (developing country) e.g. India.
 In Joint Implementation, Australia can do the good project in another Annex B country e.g. Japan to meet the quota.
Why USA did not ratify Kyoto Protocol?
 US President George W Bush refused to ratify Kyoto protocol saying that it would gravely damage the US economy.

 for example a US steel company would need to either buy Carbon Credits from another company or invest in some
projects in a developing country), while an Indian or Chinese Steel company has no such obligation so their cost of
production = low, hence they can sell their products @lower MRP = US steel company will loose customers.
 So US Government feels is that the treaty is fatally flawed, because it does not require developing countries
(especially India and China) to commit to emissions reductions.
 After President Bush, President Obama too, didn’t ratify Kyoto protocol for the same reason. (plus we should also
understand that the powerful US industrialist lobby may stop election funds to a candidate, if he is in favor of Kyoto
protocol, so USA is unlikely to ratify Kyoto or any such future protocols that are legally binding!)
Canada Quits Kyoto protocol
 In 2011, Canada, becomethe first country to quit the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, saying the 1997 accord
was handicapped because top green house emitters like the United States and China not covered by it.
 Because USA has refused to ratify the treaty and China being an Annex II country –has no compulsory responsibility
to cut down emission.
What is the Copenhagen Accord?
 Recall that UNFCCC countries meet every year and it is called Conference of Parties (COP).
 15thsuch meeting was held @Copenhagen, Denmark = COP15
 In the meeting, the BASIC bloc—Brazil, South Africa, India and China—and the U.S., came up with a political
agreement.
 This agreement is known as the Copenhagen Accord.
 It says all countries should pledge to reduce Green House Gas (GHG) emission but all of the pledges made under the
Copenhagen Accord are voluntary; There are no binding obligationsplaced on these pledges by the UNFCCC or any
other international body.
 UNFCCC acknowledged the Copenhagen Accord and has assisted in collecting the GHG reduction pledges of various
countries.
 Copenhagen Accord also lays the groundwork for financial commitments from developed countries (US,UK) to
developing countries (India,Brazil etc) for climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.
Important Players in climate change
 The First commitment period of Kyoto will end in 2012.

 That’s why, the next meeting (COP18, Doha, Qatar in Nov’2012) becomes very critical.
 So nowadays UNECC nations are trying to form factions (small gangs) to discuss what should be their stand in that
meeting?
o either extend commitments under Kyoto or
o create a successor of Kyoto Protocol: a post-2012 international climate treaty.
United States
 China is the world leader in total annual Green House Gas emissions

 S. is second.
 EU is third.
 United States is the only Annex I country that has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
 In line with the Copenhagen Accord, the U.S. has pledged a 17% reduction in GHG emissions, against a 2005
baseline, by 2020. (but this is not legally binding).
 As we saw earlier, US is not in favour of any legally binding commitments. Besides, Obama has to face election in
November.
BASIC Countries
 Brazil, South Africa, India and China,

 this group includes the world’s major emerging economies and some of its largest emitters
 together, the group accounts for around 30% of global GHG emissions.
 BASIC countries, along with the US, were the authors of the Copenhagen Accord and will continue to be some of the
most influential players in the negotiations.
 All of the BASIC countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
 But they’re not under any binding obligation to meet a specified target. (because these countries are not part of Annex
B countries of Kyoto Protocol).
 Under the Copenhagen Accord, China and India have pledged to reduce their carbon intensity—the amount of GHG
emissions per unit GDP—by 40-45% and 20-25%, respectively, against 2005 levels by 2020. (again not legally
binding).
 BASIC countries recently met in Brazil in September 2012, and declared their intentions (what they want in COP
meeting @Doha, Qatar in Nov.2012):
1. rich countries should take on more of a burden to reduce emissions because of their historical contribution to
global warming.
2. new agreement should “respect the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities,”
3. new Kyoto commitment period should start on January 1, 2013
European Union (EU)
 EU is a Party to both the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.

 EU is the 3rd largest GHG polluter, accounting for about 12% of global emissions
 EU states have ratified Kyoto.
Alliance of Small Island State (AOSIS)
 Not really a ‘player’, these are the future victimsif green house gas emission is not reduced.
 AOSIS is an team of 43 small island and low-lying coastal countries (Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba etc.)

 More green house gas = rise in global temperature = ice melts= sea level rise =many of these areas to become
uninhabitable.
Population
It took hundreds of thousands of years for the world population to grow to 1 billion – then in just another 200 years or so,
it grew sevenfold. In 2011, the global population reached the 7 billion mark, and today, it stands at about 7.5 billion.

This dramatic growth has been driven largely by increasing numbers of people surviving to reproductive age, and has
been accompanied by major changes in fertility rates, increasing urbanization and accelerating migration. These trends
will have far-reaching implications for generations to come.

UNFPA helps countries identify and understand such trends, which are critical to development. UNFPA is one of the
world’s largest funders of population data collection. UNFPA also advises countries that the best way to ensure
sustainable development is to deliver a world where every pregnancy is wanted, every birth is safe, and every young
person’s potential is fulfilled.

Population prospects

The UN has developed three population projections, called variants – one high, one low, and one in between. Of these, the
medium variant suggests that the world population will grow to nearly 10 billion by the middle of this century, and will
level off at around 11 billion by the end of it. However, if fertility declines by less than assumed, the world population
could grow to about 16.5 billion by the end of the century. If fertility falls by more than assumed, the world population
could slightly fall over current levels to about 7 billion.

The UN publishes its population projections every two years, and over the past decades, the medium variant of the
projections has often been corrected upward, meaning the population has grown more quickly than expected. The most
recent projections were released in July 2015.

Megatrends

The recent past has seen enormous changes in fertility rates and life expectancy. In the early 1970s, women had on
average 4.5 children each; by 2014, total fertility for the world had fallen to around 2.5 children per woman. Meanwhile,
average global lifespans have risen, from 64.8 years in the early 1990s to 70.0 years today.

In addition, the world is seeing high levels of urbanization and accelerating migration. 2007 was the first year in which
more people lived in urban areas than in rural areas, and by 2050 about 66 per cent of the world population will be living
in cities.

These megatrends have far-reaching implications. They affect economic development, employment, income distribution,
poverty and social protections. They also affect efforts to ensure universal access to health care, education, housing,
sanitation, water, food and energy. To more sustainably address the needs of individuals, policymakers must understand
how many people are living on the planet, where they are, how old they are, and how many people will come after them.

Why is the population growing so quickly?

The huge growth in the world population over the past two centuries is largely the result of advances in modern medicines
and improvements in living standards. These have significantly reduced infant, child and maternal mortality, contributing
to an increase in life expectancy. Although fertility levels have declined, they have not fallen at the same pace as mortality
levels.

The world population will continue to grow for decades to come. This is the result of ‘population momentum’: Because of
improved survival rates and past high fertility levels, there are more women of reproductive age today. This will
contribute to a relatively large number of births, even if those women have fewer children on average. Although
population growth is, today, largely attributable to population momentum, after 2060 it will almost exclusively be driven
by fertility levels in the world’s least developed countries.

A varied landscape

General population trends mask considerable differences between countries. On the one side stand the world’s least
developed countries, which continue to have high fertility levels. According to conservative projections, the population of
the world’s least developed countries will double by 2050, and in some countries it will even triple. On the other side are
high-income and rising-income countries, which are experiencing slow population growth or no population growth at all.
Whereas the former continue to have large, growing, populations of young people, the latter have large, growing
populations of older persons. (There are some countries experiencing a decline in population size. However, in most cases
this is not only the result of low fertility, but also the result of high mortality and emigration due to weak and deteriorating
economic, social and political conditions.)

While demographics vary considerably at national levels, the overall trends have global implications for sustainable
development. The global climate will change no matter where greenhouse gases are emitted, for example. Efforts to
sustainably meet the needs and desires of a growing world population will have implications for all countries – as will
failure to meet these needs.

While surges in population will bring challenges, they also represent humanity’s success. The move from higher to lower
mortality and fertility reflects achievements in health, education and human rights. Falling fertility levels also create
opportunities for countries to realize a demographic dividend – the economic growth that can occur when there is an
increase in the number of people of working age and a decrease in the number of dependents.

Human rights

Population dynamics can be shaped by policies. But these policies must strengthen, rather than weaken, fundamental
human rights and freedoms. Population dynamics are the cumulative result of individual choices and opportunities, and
they are best addressed by enlarging these choices and opportunities – especially those related to sexual and reproductive
health and rights. When couples can freely decide the number, timing and spacing of their children, evidence shows more
children survive and thrive, and overall fertility levels trend downward.

Sexual and reproductive health and rights also make an enormous difference in the health and lives of all people,
especially women, by dramatically reducing maternal and infant mortality rates, helping to prevent the spread of
communicable diseases such as HIV, and empowering women to live more self-determined lives.

What UNFPA is doing?

UNFPA is one of the world’s largest supporters of population data collection. In addition to supporting censuses and
surveys, UNFPA works with policymakers, civil society, health-care providers and educators at all levels to promote
sexual and reproductive health and rights – including voluntary family planning.

Q15 Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

1. Introduction
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or
social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate noncombatant victims (Enders
and Sandler, 2012, p.4). The two essential ingredients of terrorism are its violence and its political or social motive.
Terrorists tend to employ shockingly violent acts, such as beheadings, downing of commercial airlines, bombings in
public markets, and armed attacks in public places, to intimidate an audience. Their unpredictable and horrific attacks are
meant to make everyone feel at risk even though the true likelihood of falling victim to a terrorist incident is rather
minuscule, roughly equivalent to that of drowning in one’s bathtub (Mueller, 2006). Terrorists seek to circumvent normal
channels for political change by traumatizing the public with brutal acts so that governments feel compelled to either
address terrorist demands or divert public funds into hardening potential targets. Terrorist campaigns are more prevalent
in liberal democracies, where the government’s legitimacy hinges on its ability to protect the lives and property of its
citizens (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994).

The four airplane hijackings on 11 September 2001 (9/11) are terrorist acts since the perpetrators were members of al-
Qaida, a subnational terrorist group, bent on pressuring the USA to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia, which was al-
Qaida’s primary political goal at the time. These skyjackings intimidated a global audience, caused huge temporary losses
to the major stock exchanges (Chen and Siems, 2004), and created $80–90 billion in direct and indirect damages
(Kunreuther et al., 2003). Even though stock exchanges recovered lost values in just over a month, the death of almost
3,000 people caused rich industrial countries to allocate more resources to counterterrorism, shook insurance markets, and
made an indelible impression on virtually the entire world. Heinous terrorist incidents continue to capture headlines with
recent newsworthy incidents involving al-Shabaab’s armed attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on 21
September 2013; Chechen separatists’ suicide bombings of a train station and a trolley in Volgograd, Russia, on 29 and 30
December 2013, respectively; and Boko Haram’s kidnapping of more than 200 female students in Chibok, Nigeria, on
14–15 April 2014. These and countless other incidents since 9/11 indicate that the government must allocate resources in
an effective and measured manner to counterterrorism activities so that terrorists cannot circumvent legitimate political
processes or cause significant economic losses. These losses may involve reduced foreign direct investment (Enders and
Sandler, 1996; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008), lower economic growth (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein and
Tsiddon, 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008, 2011), less trade (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004), reduced tourism
(Enders et al., 1992; Drakos and Kutan, 2003), or lost values of stock and bond indexes (Kollias et al., 2013). Economic
impacts of terrorism are greatest in small terrorism-plagued countries and developing countries (Keefer and Loayza,
2008; Sandler and Enders, 2008). Modern industrial economies can insulate themselves through judicious fiscal and
monetary policy, rapid counterterrorism responses, and the transference of economic activities (Enders and Sandler,
2012). The latter involves economic activities moving from terrorism-prone sectors and regions to safer areas, which
advanced, diversified economies allow. Thus, economic activity may switch from the tourism sector to other sectors when
the former is targeted. In Spain, economic investment switched from the Basque Country to other Spanish provinces
because of Euskadi ta Askatasuna attacks (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).
Modern-day econometric methods—time series, panel, and discrete-choice models—lend themselves to the quantification
of these economic losses as shown in this special issue by Choi (2015), Egger and Gassebner (2015), and Younas (2015).
Additionally, game-theoretic models can display counterterrorism interactions among terrorists and governments as in the
contributions in this issue by Carter (2015) and Kaplan (2015). In fact, game theory is an excellent tool to study
interactions among targeted governments, between rival terrorist groups, between a terrorist group and its sponsoring
state, and among the media, the terrorist group, and the public.1
The purpose of this article is to provide the requisite background to the studies in this special issue of Oxford Economic
Papers. This task requires a fuller discussion of the notion of terrorism and its two primary subdivisions—domestic and
transnational terrorism—in Section 2. The three event data sets employed in empirical studies, including seven of the
eight articles in this issue, are briefly presented in Section 3. In Section 4, two of these data sets are used to display some
recent trends and aspects of domestic and transnational terrorism during the last four decades. Essential concepts of
counterterrorism are then presented in Section 5, where proactive measures are distinguished from defensive actions. Key
findings of the four terrorism and four counterterrorism articles contained in this special issue are highlighted in two
summarizing tables in Section 6. Concluding remarks follow in Section 7.
2. On terrorism
I now return to the definition of terrorism, given at the outset of this article. Any definition of terrorism involves much
debate (Hoffman, 2006; Enders and Sandler, 2012). The research community is converging to a consensus based on an
operational definition on which to construct event data sets to test theoretical propositions. The article puts forward a
definition that is consistent with that used by the main event data sets and relied on by researchers. Also, this definition
possesses the main ingredients that are agreed on by economists, political scientists, and political economists.

The three stakeholders in this definition are the perpetrators, the victims, and the audience. By limiting terrorism to
subnational agents including individuals or a ‘lone wolf’, my definition rules out state terror in which a government
terrorizes its own people. The definition, however, does not rule out state-sponsored terrorism where a government
clandestinely assists a terrorist group through various means, including supplying weapons, safe haven, intelligence,
training, funding, or safe passage (Mickolus, 1989; Bapat, 2006). There was a lot of state sponsorship of terrorism during
the final decade of the Cold War with groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization serving as a terrorist group for hire
(Hoffman, 2006).2 The most controversial element of my definition is the victim, since some definitions exclude
combatants, so that attacks against an occupying army, such as US forces in Iraq or Afghanistan, are not viewed as
terrorism. Generally, an attack against peacekeepers, such as the 23 October 1983 suicide bombing of the US Marines
barracks at Beirut International Airport, is considered an act of terrorism. The barracks’ bombing had the political
objective of removing peacekeepers from Lebanon, which happened in February 1984. Attacks against US soldiers and
their dependents stationed in Germany constitute terrorist incidents, because these targeted individuals were
noncombatants when attacked. ‘Audience’ refers to the collective that terrorists seek to intimidate through their wanton
brutality. With sufficient and sustained intimidation, the audience will apply pressures on the besieged government to
concede to the terrorist group’s political demands or alternatively to take decisive action to annihilate the group. 3 In the
latter case, the Italian authorities dismantled the Italian Red Brigades in the 1980s.
There are some crucial distinctions to draw between terrorism and related concepts. For instance, there is the distinction
between terrorism and crime. A kidnapping for ransom is a criminal act of extortion when the kidnappers are not pursuing
or financing a political agenda. If a political motive is tied to the kidnapping, then it is a terrorist incident even with
ransom demands being made. The hijacking of a commercial airliner by a deranged person is a crime but not terrorism. In
the absence of a political motive, an armed attack by a student on fellow students or teachers is a criminal action. Next
consider an insurrection, which ‘is a politically based uprising intended to overthrow the established system of governance
and to bring about a redistribution of income’ (Sandler and Hartley, 1995, p. 307). Leaders of insurrections recruit from
the peasantry and general population in the hopes of challenging the government’s hold on power (Grossman, 1991).
Successful rebel operations can generate new recruits and may ideally cause the government to impose draconian
measures on its citizens, which subsequently create more support for the insurgency. If a tipping point is attained, then the
government may be sufficiently challenged to lose its power to the rebels.

In distinction to insurrections, guerrilla warfare generally involves a band of rebel forces (e.g., the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia [FARC], Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or Shining Path in Peru) that controls a sector of the country,
from which to dispatch its operatives to confront government forces. Some guerrilla wars take place in urban centers. In
contrast to most terrorist groups, guerrilla groups are larger in number and organized like a military force. Some guerrilla
groups engage in terrorist acts, such as the three just-mentioned groups, to raise funds to secure their operations and
pursue their political aims. For example, FARC kidnaps government officials and others for ransoms. Unlike an
insurrection, guerrilla groups are not bent on overthrowing the government or engaging in propaganda to gain popular
support (Hoffman, 2006). Shining Path and FARC apply threats and harsh measures to gain the compliance of the people
in the territory that they control. Guerrilla groups rely on surprise and cover to harass numerically superior government
forces. Terrorism is a tactic employed by both insurrections and guerrilla movements. As a consequence, many guerrilla
groups are listed as terrorist groups despite their control of territory. Often, countries with jungle cover or mountainous
terrain provide remote areas where guerrillas can conduct training and operations. In this special issue, Carter (2015) is
interested in the interaction between a guerrilla group and the government, as the former chooses between terrorism and
the control of territory and the latter chooses between defensive counterterrorism actions and proactive military responses
to influence the group’s decision.

2.1 Domestic versus transnational terrorism

Domestic terrorism is homegrown and home-directed, and represents the most common form of terrorism. For domestic
acts of terrorism, the perpetrators, victims, and audience hail from the venue country, where the attack takes place.
Domestic terrorist incidents include Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City on 19 April 1995 or Eric Rudolph’s anti-abortionist bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, on 27
July 1996. Civil wars often involve numerous domestic terrorist attacks before and during the conflict by the adversaries
(Findley and Young, 2012).4 These terrorist acts are more apt to be domestic when an intervention by a third party from
outside the country is not involved. Boko Haram’s kidnapping of more than 200 female students is a domestic terrorist
incident, which involves victims and perpetrators from the venue country of Nigeria. Boko Haram is an Islamic jihadist
terrorist group that controls territory in the northeast portion of Nigeria. Given the country’s limited military capabilities,
its government sought some assistance from the USA in terms of military advisors and intelligence in addressing the
significant threat that Boko Haram poses. At times, Boko Haram crosses into Chad. If one or more of the schoolgirls are
moved into a neighboring country, then the kidnapping becomes a transnational terrorist incident. In general, poor
countries may request foreign assistance if they cannot properly confront an indigenous terrorist group that may attack at
home or abroad (Azam and Thelen, 2010; Fleck and Kilby, 2010; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011, 2014; Young and Findley,
2011).
Terrorism is transnational when an incident in the venue country concerns perpetrators or victims from another country. If
a terrorist attack in the UK is perpetrated by terrorists from Yemen, then the incident is one of transnational terrorism.
When a terrorist attack in France harms Dutch citizens, the attack is transnational. If one or more victims or perpetrators
are not citizens of the venue country, then the terrorist attack is transnational. The kidnapping in January 2002 and
subsequent murder of US reporter Daniel Pearl in Pakistan is classified as a transnational terrorist incident. The same is
true of the near-simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998. Terrorist attacks
against another country’s embassy, even when perpetrated by citizens of the venue country, are transnational terrorist
events because an embassy’s grounds represent foreign soil. Similarly, terrorist attacks against international organizations’
personnel or property are considered to be transnational terrorist acts. An important transnational terrorist incident is the
August 2006 plot to use liquid explosives to blow up 10 or more transatlantic flights departing the UK for the USA and
Canada. A skyjacking originating in one country that is diverted to another country for political purposes is a transnational
terrorist event. If a politically motivated hijacked plane has citizens from more than one country, the event is transnational
terrorism even if the flight is domestic and ends in the country of origin. On 9/11, the four skyjackings are transnational
terrorist acts since the victims were citizens from upward of 80 nations and the perpetrators were foreigners. The
kidnapping of US journalist James Foley in Syria on 22 November 2012 and his beheading on 19 August 2014 is a
transnational terrorist act. The victim was American, whereas the murderer is allegedly a British citizen from the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as Islamic State (IS).

Transnational terrorist incidents frequently imply transnational externalities—for example, perpetrators from one country
impose uncompensated costs on the victims of another country. If a country provides safe haven to a transnational terrorist
group that attacks other countries’ interests, then transnational externalities ensue.5 The Taliban in Afghanistan had given
safe haven to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida, which planned and executed the events of 9/11. When the Taliban would not
surrender bin Laden to the USA following 9/11, the USA led an invasion of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 (Enders and
Sandler, 2012). In this extreme case, the transnational externality resulted in a military invasion with the intent to defeat
the Taliban and al-Qaida. Transnational externalities also arise from counterterrorism policies of targeted countries, which
result in inefficient levels of these policies (Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita,
2007). Actions by one targeted country to secure its borders and ports of entry may merely transfer the attack abroad,
where borders are more porous (see Section 5). Since 9/11, few transnational terrorist incidents occur on US soil but 35%
to 40% of such incidents involve US people or property in other countries (Enders and Sandler, 2006, 2012).
2.2 Some historical considerations of transnational terrorism
Hoffman (2006, pp.63–5) traces the modern era of transnational terrorism to the 22 July 1968 hijacking of an Israeli El Al
flight en route from Rome to Athens by three armed members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
terrorist group. This skyjacking was motivated by the intention of the PFLP terrorist to trade its hostages for Palestinian
prisoners held by Israel. This event is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, through its protracted 40-day
negotiations, the Israelis were forced to negotiate with the Palestinian terrorists, which the Israelis had hitherto vowed
they would never do (Hoffman, 1998, p.68). Second, the media coverage demonstrated to terrorists worldwide that such
incidents could garner worldwide attention for their cause. Not surprisingly, transnational terrorist attacks increased
greatly in numbers during the years following this incident (see the figures in Section 4). Third, there was evidence of
state sponsorship after the diverted plane landed in Algiers as Algerian forces secured the hostages and held some Israeli
hostages until 1 September 1968 when a deal was concluded (Mickolus, 1980, pp.93–4). Fourth, Israel eventually traded
16 Arab prisoners from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War for the remaining Israeli hostages. This trade showed terrorists that
hostage taking could yield significant concessions.

Transnational terrorist groups were primarily nationalists/separatists or leftists (socialists) during the late 1960s until the
late 1980s (Rapoport, 2004). Even the Palestinian terrorists were secular until the end of the 1980s with the rise of Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other groups. After the mid-1990s, the religious fundamentalists came to dominate and
increased the carnage (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2014). The phenomenon of religious-based
transnational terrorism is not novel and can be traced back to the Sicarii or Zealots, a Jewish sect that conducted a terror
campaign against the Romans and their Jewish collaborators in Judea from CE 48 to 73 (Rapoport, 1984; Bloom, 2005).
Sicarii terrorists engaged in daytime assassinations in public places that typically resulted in the death of the assassin. As
such, their dagger attacks were an early form of suicide terrorism, since the perpetrator had little chance of escape. 6 From
1090 to 1256, the Islamic Assassins opposed Sunni rule in Persia and Syria, with the intent to set up their own community
and state of believers in the region (Bloom, 2005). Although the Assassins’ terrorist campaign was on a much smaller
scale, their goal was similar to that of ISIS. Like the Sicarii, the Assassins relied on politically motivated assassinations,
performed with a dagger. Perpetrators usually sacrificed their own lives by making no efforts to escape after the deed.
3. Event data sets
In the beginning of the 1980s, the first terrorist event data set—International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events
(ITERATE)—was made available to researchers. ITERATE only includes transnational terrorist attacks. Coverage starts
in 1968, the beginning of the modern era of transnational terrorism, and runs until the end of 2012, with annual updates in
August (Mickolus et al., 2013). ITERATE codes many variables—for example, incident date, country start location,
country end location, attack type, target entity, terrorist group, perpetrators’ nationalities, number of deaths, number of
injuries, victims’ nationalities, logistical outcome, US victims, state sponsorship, and scene of attack—in its Common File
of over 40 variables. In addition, there is a Fate File indicating the fate of the terrorists—for example, the number of
terrorists captured, the number of terrorists sentenced, and their length of incarceration. There is also a Hostage File,
which has invaluable observations used by researchers to analyze logistical and negotiation success of hostage taking
(Santifort and Sandler, 2013). If an attack is completed as planned, then it is a logistical success. For hostage missions,
securing one or more hostages is deemed a logistical success. The Hostage File of ITERATE is currently updated through
2010. Finally, there is a Skyjacking file with additional observations, and variables on skyjacking missions such as the
duration of the incidents, airline involved, and negotiation strategies used. ITERATE, like the other event data sets, relies
on the news media—print, broadcast, and digital—for the observations of its variables.
An initial focus of empirical studies was on transnational terrorism because ITERATE was the most extensive data set
available throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Its lengthy series of daily data were ideal for time-series studies, which
dominated the research landscape except for a few survival studies, the first being Atkinson et al.’s (1987) study of the
duration of hostage-taking incidents. Today, panel studies are prevalent including those in this special issue—Berrebi and
Ostwald (2015), Choi (2015), Egger and Gassebner (2015), Gries et al. (2015), and Younas (2015).
Another competing event data set, modeled after ITERATE, is the RAND (2012)data set, which currently codes incidents
for 1968–2009 and is not being updated. Gaibulloev (2015) uses the RAND event data in conjunction with Jones and
Libicki’s (2008) classification of terrorist groups’ ideologies in his study of groups’ location decisions. For 1968–97,
RAND event data only include transnational terrorist attacks; after 1998, RAND data distinguish between transnational
and domestic terrorist attacks in a manner consistent with my early definitions. Compared to ITERATE, RAND data code
fewer variables and, for transnational terrorist incidents, have more limited coverage than ITERATE as demonstrated
by Enders (2007).

The third event data set, germane to this special issue, is that of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which records both
domestic and transnational terrorist incidents (La Free and Dugan, 2007; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Response to Terrorism, 2013). Although GTD recorded both kinds of incidents, until 2013 it did not distinguish
between the two kinds of incidents. Enders et al. (2011) devised a five-step procedure for distinguishing between
domestic and transnational terrorist incidents in GTD for 1970–2007 and made their breakdown available to researchers.
This division is now applied to 2008–2012 (see Enders et al., 2014). A breakdown of terrorism into its two components is
essential because the two types of terrorism may affect economic variables and counterterrorism differently—for example,
economic growth or foreign direct investment is more influenced by transnational terrorism (Gaibulloev and Sandler,
2008). Moreover, the influence of other variables on domestic and transnational terrorism may differ (Sandler,
2014; Choi, 2015). The Enders et al. (2011) procedure does a much better job in distinguishing between the two types of
events than recent GTD efforts, based on the authors’ method without attribution. GTD has tens of thousands of
unclassified incidents compared to Enders et al. (2011).
There are some things to note about GTD. First, it has changed its coding conventions a few times, most recently for the
2012 data. Coding was also changed after the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(2013), based at the University of Maryland, took charge of the data around 2005. As shown by Enders et al. (2011), there
are periods of undercounting and overcounting of incidents, which can be addressed by these authors’ calibration
methods. Second, GTD data for 1993 are very incomplete because in an office move by Pinkerton, which originated the
database, the box containing 1993 fell off of the truck! Third, perpetrators’ nationalities are not identified. Fourth, GTD
does not contain any hostage negotiation variables, making the study of hostage-taking incidents impossible with this
database. Fifth, GTD coverage of some kinds of domestic incidents, such as kidnappings, is virtually nonexistent prior to
the late 1990s (Enders et al., 2011).
Table 1 indicates key empirical or theoretical aspects of the terrorism and counterterrorism articles contained in this
special issue. For each study, the table identifies the type of terrorism studied, the method employed, the unit of analysis
used (if applicable), the terrorism data source applied, and the years and countries covered. As shown, there are two
theoretical studies that address aspects of counterterrorism. Currently, there are no global counterterrorism data sets
available with a wide range of counterterror variables. ITERATE has some counterterror variables, such as negotiation
responses of the authorities. Specific countries—for example, Israel—maintain data sets of their counterterrorism
responses; these data sets are difficult to acquire.

Table 1.
Key aspects of the articles for the special issue
 Unit of Data
Article Type of terrorism Methods Years/countriess
analysis sources
Terrorism studies
RAND 1970–2006
Group-base
Gaibulloev Transnational Conditional logit Jones and
country 113 countries
Libicki
1970–2008
Egger and Poisson pseudo- Country- 30 OECD
Transnational ITERATE
Gassebner maximum likelihood month
181 partner
countries
Berrebi and Panel/IV, first 1970–2007
Total and domestic Country-year GTD*
Ostwald differences 170 countries

Panel negative 1984–2008

Gries et al. Transnational Country-year ITERATE
binomial, SGMM 126 countries
Counterterrorism studies
Domestic or Queuing theory Not 2002–2011
Kaplan GTD*
transnational Game theory applicable USA
Domestic or Not Not
Carter Game theory Not applicable
transnational applicable applicable
Total, domestic, Panel/SGMM 1976–2008
Younas Country-year GTD*
transnational Panel/FGLS 120 countries
Domestic, Panel negative 1970–2007
Choi transnational, binomial, Rare event Country-year GTD*
suicide logit 127 countries
Notes: *denotes that Enders et al. (2011) breakdown of GTD into domestic and transnational terrorist incidents was used.
ITERATE = International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events; GTD = Global Terrorism Database.
A variety of empirical techniques are applied by the six empirical articles. In his cross-sectional study of the location
choice of terrorist groups, Gaibulloev (2015) relies on a conditional logit estimator. To account for the count nature of the
dependent terrorism variable, Choi (2015) and Gries et al. (2015) apply a negative binomial panel estimator. Endogeneity
between the dependent variable and one or more independent variables is addressed in various ways: the Berrebi and
Ostwald (2015) article employs instrumental variables (IV), consisting of lagged domestic terrorist attacks in neighboring
countries, whereas the Younas (2015) article uses system generalized method of moments (SGMM) to augment his
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimates. The Gries et al. (2015) article addresses endogeneity with lagged
values of the independent variables and also SGMM estimates. The Choi (2015)article primarily uses lagged independent
variables to partly handle the endogeneity concern.
5. Counterterrorism
This special issue contains articles on terrorism and counterterrorism. Given my discussion of terrorism and its concepts,
it is now instructive to introduce some basic concepts and concerns that are associated with the practice of
counterterrorism.

Quite simply, counterterrorism corresponds to actions to ameliorate the threat and consequences of terrorism. These
actions can be taken by governments, military alliances, international organizations (e.g., INTERPOL), private
corporations, or private citizens. Counterterrorism comes in two basic varieties: defensive and proactive measures.

Defensive countermeasures protect potential targets by making attacks more costly for terrorists or reducing their
likelihood of success. When, however, successful terrorist attacks ensue, defensive actions also serve to limit the resulting
losses to the target. Defensive measures have generally been reactive, instituted after some successful or innovative
terrorist attacks. In the USA, airline passengers are now required to remove their shoes when being screened, following
the innovative, but fortunately unsuccessful, attempt by Richard Reid to bring down American Airlines flight 63 en route
from Paris to Miami on 22 December 2001 with explosives hidden in his shoes. Before the installation of metal detectors
to screen passengers at US airports on 5 January 1973, there were on average over 25 skyjackings each year in the USA
(Enders et al., 1990). After their installation, attempted US skyjackings dropped to fewer than four a year. The success of
these metal detectors in US airports led to their installation worldwide over the next six months. Following the downing of
Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988 and the downing of UTA flight 772 over Niger on 19
September 1989, bomb-detecting devices were used to screen checked luggage. Defensive or protective counterterror
actions may involve more than technological barriers. Other instances of defensive measures include target hardening,
such as defensive perimeters around government buildings or embassies, or guards at key points of a country’s
infrastructure. Defensive measures can also take the form of issuing terrorism alerts, enacting stiffer penalties for
terrorism offenses, enhancing first-responder capabilities, and stockpiling antibiotics and antidotes for biological and
chemical terrorist attacks. This list of defensive actions is by no means exhaustive.
By contrast, proactive measures are offensive as a targeted government directly confronts the terrorist group or its
supporters. Proactive measures may destroy terrorists’ resources (e.g., training camps), curb their finances, eliminate their
safe havens, or kill and capture their members. In recent years, the Obama administration has relied on drone attacks to
assassinate terrorist leaders and operatives. Proactive operations may assume myriad other forms, including a retaliatory
raid against a state sponsor that provides resources, training, sanctuary, logistical support, or intelligence to a terrorist
group. On 15 April 1986, the USA launched a retaliatory bombing raid on targets in Libya for its alleged support in the
terrorist bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on 4 April 1986, where 3 died and 231 were wounded,
including 62 Americans (Mickolus et al., 1989, vol. 2, pp.365–7). Another proactive measure takes the form of a
preemptive attack against a terrorist group or a harboring country, such as the US-led invasion of Afghanistan four weeks
after 9/11. A preemptive strike differs from a retaliatory raid because the former is more sustained and meant to severely
compromise the capabilities of the terrorists to conduct future missions. Such strikes or raids concern transnational
terrorism where a targeted country confronts the foreign threat. Other proactive measures include infiltrating terrorist
groups, engaging in military action, conducting propaganda campaigns against the terrorists, and gathering intelligence to
foil terror plots (Kaplan, 2015). ‘Military action’ generally refers to operations by the host government against a resident
terrorist group as in Carter (2015). Actions that improve the economy, which in turn reduces grievances, can also be
proactive (Choi, 2015). Younas (2015) demonstrates empirically that increased globalization of a country’s economy may
also be proactive by limiting harmful and therefore grievance-causing effects of terrorism on economic growth. In this
special issue, the four counterterrorism articles primary address aspects of proactive measures. Only Carter
(2015) considers both defensive and proactive counterterrorism responses.
The game-theoretic literature on counterterrorism draws some fascinating strategic contrasts between defensive and
proactive countermeasures. Suppose that two or more countries are confronted by the same Islamic jihadist terrorist
group—for example, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In this transnational terrorism scenario, each at-risk
country is inclined to work at cross-purposes by engaging in a defensive race in the hopes of transferring the terrorist
attacks to other targeted countries (Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Arce and Sandler, 2005). In the process, the countries
engage in too much defense since the negative transference externality is not internalized. The only check on this adverse
‘defense race’ stems from the countries having large interests abroad, which may be hit when attacks are transferred
abroad—recall Fig. 3 and attacks against US interests (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2011; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011).
Next consider proactive measures in these multicountry scenarios. Any country’s actions to confront the common terrorist
threat confer purely public (nonrival and nonexcludable) benefits to all potential target countries. As a result, there is too
little proactive response as each country tries to free ride on the actions of other countries. Thus, defensive measures are
strategic complements as one country’s actions encourage those of other countries (i.e., reaction paths are upward-
sloping), whereas proactive measures are strategic substitutes as one country’s actions inhibit those of other countries (i.e.,
reaction paths are downward-sloping) (Eaton, 2004; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). Moreover, leadership can be shown to
curb the defensive race, whereas leadership exacerbates the free-riding underprovision of offensive measures (Sandler and
Siqueira, 2006). Thus, there is no simple fix for these concerns among sovereign targeted nations.

For domestic terrorism, countries possess the proper incentives to choose defensive and proactive measures judiciously,
because all associated costs and benefits are internalized (Enders and Sandler, 2012). Thus, Kaplan’s (2015)finding that
the USA staffs about the right number of intelligence analysts to intercept terror plots is consistent with past game-
theoretic findings regarding domestic counterterrorism optimality. Carter’s (2015) article is also geared to domestic
terrorism, whereas Choi (2015) and Younas (2015) may involve economic-based countermeasures for either type of
terrorism.
6. Findings of the articles of the special issue
Tables 2 and 3 summarize some of the most important findings of the articles of this special issue. Table 2 does so for the
terrorism articles, and Table 3does so for the counterterrorism articles. Every article is rich in results, so those listed in the
tables are not exhaustive.

Table 2.
Key findings of terrorism studies

· Terrorist groups are attracted to base their operations in countries with other terrorist groups
that possess a similar ideology. This is particularly true for left-wing terrorist groups.· Risk of
state failure and/or political instability is conducive for terrorist groups to establish their home base.
· Generally, terrorist groups locate closer to where they conduct their attacks abroad. However,
Gaibulloev the distance consideration is nonlinear.

· Cooperation is needed between host and venue countries to address a common terrorist threat.

· There is little or no immediate or short-run effect of transnational terrorism on international

trade when monthly data are used.· Transnational terrorism impacts bilateral and unilateral
trade, if at all, in the medium term, about one and a half years after incidents.
· The analysis intends to remove measurement errors when terrorism is aggregated over a year
Egger and or else general equilibrium effects are ignored.
Gassebner
· Authorities should look beyond trade as to where to counter the adverse economic effects of
terrorism.

· Terrorist attacks reduce both total fertility and crude birth rates owing to stress and intervening
factors.· The author’s findings account for endogeneity with an instrumental variable
accounting for lagged domestic terrorist attacks in neighboring countries.
· The findings are robust over myriad model specifications, accounting for fixed effects and
Berrebi and first differences.
Ostwald
· This article shows that terrorism can have consequences beyond economic considerations.

· US aid-recipient countries’ characteristics (e.g., human rights violations) can affect or

motivate US-directed attacks.· A positive association between anti-American terrorism and US-
associated economic and military aid is somewhat attenuated by local oppression in the client
(recipient) state.
· There is no evidence that US assistance curbs anti-American attacks even in oppressive
Gries et al. regimes.

· These results hold when accounting for potential endogeneity between US aid and anti-
American terrorist attacks.

Table 3.
Key findings of counterterrorism studies

· Assuming a proportional hazard function, the article computes how many agents are necessary to
Kaplan detect an acceptable percentage of terrorist plots.· Terrorists select their optimal number of plots given
the socially optimum staff. Thus, the terrorists move first, followed by the government’s staffing choice.
 · Based on event data for the USA, the article computes the socially efficient number of detections.

· A numerical example shows that the USA is close to a socially efficient optimum based on
calculated benefits and costs.

· State first allocates between defensive and proactive countermeasures, followed by the group’s
choice between terrorism and controlling territories in guerrilla operations.· Under weak assumptions,
the more capable governments confront more terrorism as they employ more boots on the ground to protect
against guerrilla warfare.
· When it is optimal for a group to employ both terrorist incidents and guerrilla attacks, the state
Carter generally focuses on limiting the group’s capture of territory in guerrilla operations.

· Corner solutions with the government protecting against guerrilla war are likely, which can fuel
more serious terrorist attacks.

· Globalization lessens the negative impact of total, domestic, and transnational terrorism on
economic growth in developing countries.· The author finds, when relevant, the critical value where
globalization completely offsets the harmful growth effects of terrorism.
· The analysis is robust to the use of disaggregate measures of openness.
Younas
· Globalization can be a counterterrorism tool.

· High industrial economic growth reduces domestic and transnational terrorist incidents.· High
agricultural economic growth has little or no impact on domestic and transnational terrorist incidents.
· High industrial economic growth can, however, be associated with more suicide terrorism, which
seeks out hard targets.
Choi
· Generally, high industrial economic growth is favorable to reducing terrorism, especially since few
countries suffer suicide terrorism.

This special issue contains many noteworthy advances in the study of terrorism. Gaibulloev (2015) is the first article to
address terrorist groups’ base location choice; currently, the study of terrorist group survival is an active area of
research. Berrebi and Ostwald (2015) is the initial study to examine the impact of terrorism on fertility. Younas
(2015) and Choi (2015)refine the relationship between terrorism and growth; Egger and Gassebner (2015) show that
terrorism has less of an effect on trade than conventionally believed. Kaplan (2015) investigates the social efficiency of
intelligence staffing in intercepting terror plots. Carter’s (2015) analysis is novel because the terrorist group must decide
between terrorist attacks and holding territory in reaction to the government’s countermeasures. The interface between
terrorism and other forms of political violence is seldom studied. Finally, the Gries et al. (2015) study extends knowledge
of the determinants of anti-American terrorist attacks, which comprise 35–40% of all transnational terrorism.
7. Concluding remarks
Terrorism remains an active research area in economics, political economy, and political science. Given the
microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences of terrorism, its study is a fitting topic for a general economics journal
such as Oxford Economic Papers. Following 9/11, industrial countries engaged in a huge reallocation of resources toward
counterterrorism, whose efficacy can be best studied and understood with the theoretical and empirical tools drawn from
economics.
The rise of ISIS and the considerable threat that its Western fighters pose for their home countries means that terrorism
will remain a policy concern. AQAP’s war on the USA and its allies is yet another terrorist threat. Just as Africa appears
to be achieving sustained economic growth in select countries, significant terrorist challenges arise from Boko Haram and
al-Shabaab in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively. Failed states—for example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and
Yemen—supply safe havens for terrorist groups that threaten Western interests. It is my hope that this special issue on
terrorism and counterterrorism will stimulate further research in these two topics.

Acknowledgements
The present collection arises from a set of papers presented at the sixth conference on Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Policy at the University of Texas, Dallas. Held between 21 May and 24 May 2014, this conference invited many leading
contributors to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. Past conferences resulted in special issues published
in Economics &Politics(November 2009), Journal of Conflict Resolution (April 2010), Journal of Peace Research (May
2011), Public Choice (December 2011), and Southern Economic Journal (April 2013). While assuming full responsibility
for any remaining shortcomings, this article has profited from comments from Anindya Banerjee, who also advised me on
the special issue. Khusrav Gaibulloev read and commented on an earlier version. Finally, I thank all of this special issue’s
reviewers, most of whom are major contributors to the study of terrorism. These reviewers provided rigorous reviews in a
timely fashion. All articles went through a careful and demanding prescreening process, followed by two rounds of
reviews by two to three anonymous referees. I appreciate the understanding of those authors whose papers did not make it
into the special issue.
Q16 The Geo-Politics of Energy

The Geo-Politics of Energy

By Michael Brenner
The current turmoil in the greater Middle East confirms the region’s centrality in world affairs as the place where
ideological and strategic political forces intersect the established patterns of economic interdependence. Energy and
finance are the twinned dimensions of that deep and intricate connectedness that are vulnerable to disruption by conflict,
impaired government authority or calculated attempts to use control of energy resources as a diplomatic weapon.

Consider these plausible scenarios that could arise from current crises. State failure due to civil strife a la Syria in a major
oil exporter: Libya, Iraq, Algeria, Nigeria. Military conflictthat leads to a physical blockage of oil commerce: war with
Iran accompanied by a closing of the straits of Hormuz. Accession to power of a regime so hostile to the West as to
curtail exports: Saudi Arabia, Russia. Interference with major pipelines: Russia, Syria.
As a consequence of turbulent political conditions, the element of uncertainty in international energy markets has
increased markedly. That is the result of political developments that impinge, directly or indirectly, on the security of
supply. They are the Arab Spring and its aftermath of instability in major oil exporting countries; the stringent boycott
placed on oil and natural gas exports from the Islamic Republic of Iran; the heightening of regional tensions across the
Middle East associated with the contest between loosely configured Shi’ite and Sunni blocs led by Iran and Saudi Arabia
respectively. Adding to the uncertainty over the middle and longer term are market developments. These include growth
in demand from the burgeoning economies of China, India and other Asian economies; and the increase in the supply of
hydro-carbon fuels through the exploitation of new sites and the application of new production techniques, e.g. hydraulic
fracturing. Those new sites, and the distribution pipelines being constructed and negotiated to major consumers, are also
located in areas of political uncertainty: Central Asia and the Caspian Basin, and Russia.

The foreign policy and energy policy issues that arise from the intersection of energy’s political geography and other
international concerns of a security and political nature are multiple and multi-dimensional. A variable but everywhere
substantial element of indeterminacy marks the future even as the saliency of these issues becomes more acute. The
questions of analysis, interpretation and policy choice that we face have precedent in the oil crises of the 1970s and early
1980s. At that time, it was the OPEC oil embargo and the Iran Revolution whose repercussions forced a
reconceptualization of energy security and a rethinking of strategies to anticipate, avoid and cope with supply crisis.
Moreover, the restructuring of the world oil markets had lasting effects on the dynamics among suppliers, consumers and
intermediaries. Analyses done during that period clarified new patterns of interaction and laid the basis for responses at
both the national and multilateral level.

Today a similar effort is in order. It would begin with identification of new geopolitical factors. The next step is to trace
the implications for established arrangements and policies. An important ancillary element would be design of monitoring
devices for following changes of key variables in the external and policy environment and tracing their chain of effects.
On those foundations, one is in a better prepared to formulate and assess policy choices.
So what generalizations does this situation permit us?

One important implication is that a close monitoring of fluid politics, fluid policy, and a shuffling of government elites is
imperative. With less to be taken as given, premiums should be placed on first-hand knowledge as to the state of play
among factions and personalities within governments, developments in particular sectors of national economies, in the
interplay among domestic and regional/international trends.

CONTEXT
A snapshot of the energy universe as it exists today shows a number of noteworthy features.

The International Energy Agency has published comprehensive statistics in two reports that provide us with the requisite
illustrative data.1 Conveniently, one presents a times series that uses 1971 as a baseline, and the latest data is from 2010.
The World Energy Outlook 2012, the other, updates and assesses a comprehensive data set. The most salient points are
these.
1. World demand for energy has doubled over the past 40 years.
2. Supply also has doubled. Therefore, net price variations do not express significant shifts in the supply/demand ratio.
3. Energy consumption worldwide has risen to 88 mbd. It is projected to grow to nearly 100mbd by 2020. The
breakdown of principal consumers indicates a significant shift in regional shares represented by the drastic increase in
use by the rapidly developing economies of Asia. China alone accounted for nearly 50% of the global rise in energy
consumption between 1990 and 2008.2
4. The largest contribution to increases in supply as well as demand stems from dramatic changes in China – by far. The
second largest production increase has occurred in the United States. Oil production in the United States has risen to
nearly 11 million barrels per day, placing it second only to Saudi Arabia. It is expected to surpass Saudi Arabia in the
next few years. US production has increased at a rate of 7% per annum – due primarily to the rapid exploitation of
shale oil. Moreover, a more dramatic expansion of natural gas extraction using hydraulic fracturing has meant that
North American energy production is growing faster than another other region.
5. On a regional basis, the main changes are a decline of 19% in the share of OECD countries, a 12% increased share in
China and a 6.5% increase elsewhere in Asia.
6. In the oil sector, regional shares have been relatively constant with a 5% decline in the Middle East share being the
only noteworthy change.
7. The United States imports 45% of the oil it consumes. That is a drop from the high of 54 % reached in 2006. In 1973,
it imported 23%. In absolute terms, U.S. imports have declined by 17% from 2006 to 2012. The IEA forecasts the
United States becoming a net oil exporter by 2030.
8. Oil production capacity has increased to 93 mbd, of which:*
o Crude Oil, 78

o NGLs 15
 The progressive increase in demand follows a trajectory that deviates noticeably only in the two years following the
great financial crisis**
 The shares of world total primary energy supply by major fuel (Mtoe) since 1971 have not been constant. Oil’s share
drops by 12%; natural gas sees a roughly 5% increase as does nuclear.
 Exports to the United States from Canada have risen substantially in both absolute and relative terms (i.e. as a fraction
of U.S. imports).
 “Fossil fuels will remain dominant in the global energy mix” between today and 2035.
 “Iraq makes the largest contribution by far to global oil supply growth.”3
 Water availability will be the main constraint on the viability of expanded energy projects.
*For shares of energy production and consumption by source, see Appendix A.
**“From 2001-2010, world oil demand increased by a compounded average growth rate of 1.4 percent. In that decade,
demand faced two years of negative increases in 2008 and 2009, as a consequence of the global financial crisis, and two
years of spikes, when it exceeded a 3 percent growth year-on-year: in 2003, due to a recovery after two years of poor
increases, and in 2010, when it
bounced back after the financial turmoil. In any case, the average growth of demand registered in the 2000s was
remarkably similar with that of 1990s.” (Leonardo Maugere,Geopolitics of Energy Project Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, June 2012, Discussion paper #2012-10)

THE GEO-POLITICS OF ENERGY circa 2012

At the geopolitical level, there have been some dramatic changes. Foremost among them is the break-up of the Soviet
Union accompanied by autonomy for former satellite countries in Europe. Among the former Soviet Republics that have
become independent number major producers of oil and natural gas are: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan. They are experiencing varying, and fluctuating degrees of political stability. All have perpetuating the
authoritarian patterns and personalized leadership inherited from the old USSR. Their relative poverty has meant that
issues of financing exploration and development have come to the fore. Their relatively limited access to sophisticated
technology creates an analogous need for foreign assistance. Their location in the interior of the Asian landmass heightens
issues of export distribution via pipelines.

The routing of pipelines is a contentious matter involving the economic interests of large and energy hungry nations of
Japan, China and India.

Other stakeholders motivated by a combination of political and economic/energy concerns include a Russia bent on
maximizing its influence in the region and beyond via its own energy exports and control of distribution networks, Turkey
which harbors an ambition to become an energy hub as well as to secure energy for its own development, the European
Union seeking to expand and diversify sources of energy, and the United States which sees its global position and political
interests, as well as energy security, bound up with all these developments.

Energy Security
Energy security – in simplest terms – can be defined as the dependable provision of the energy resources requisite for
meeting a country’s needs. This limpid formulation leaves much unstated. The various forms of energy must be stipulated:
petroleum, natural gas, coal, hydro-electric, non-conventional – along with sub-categories that have a bearing on
accessibility and utilization. The degree of fungibility among these energy types also is important. All of the above noted
can be used to generate electricity; only one can be used to power vehicles. The latter statement is valid for any policy
relevant time frame. Then there is the matter of time horizons.

The three standard methods for buffering oneself against supply shortfall (caused by whatever reason) are: substitution,
diversification of suppliers, and conservation. To be effective, any of them needs years to be implemented. They cannot
be put in place to deal with sudden emergencies. The sole exception is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) maintained
by the United States and other industrial nations.4
There is the further question of what exactly constitutes needs. By one measure, it can be defined as the energy required to
keep economic infrastructure and crucial sectors of the economy functioning close to the existing level. How close can
only be assessed by circumstances, including domestic socio-political ones. Even a marginal reduction in supply will
result in sub-optimal economic performance. An additional consideration in this regard is energy use for convenience and
comfort which may not register directly in the economic statistics. Fuel for private automobiles is the outstanding
example. During the oil emergencies of 1973-74 and 1979, there were mandated cutbacks on gasoline purchases through
various indirect rationing methods. They greatly inconvenienced motorists although the restrictive measures fell far short
of full blown rationing. More dire steps could generate a level of popular discontent that would result in high pressure
lobbying which carries the potential to impinge of national policy choices. Whether it does reach a high degree of
intensity, and how officials react to it, would turn on the popular sense of national need and the threat to it.

A final point of elaboration concerns the relevant unit of analysis. From a detached vantage point, one could view the
global economic system as an integral entity while noting patterns of cause and effect. Those causes and effects should be
broken down by country. National governments are the only effective decision-makers, the only legitimate decision-
makers, and the only accountable decision-makers. They operate within a context where they both wield more power
within the confines of the state (and, for the strongest, on others) and – equally important – their actions are scrutinized by
the populace for whose welfare they are supposedly exercising their authority.

There is a vital qualifier to this concept of sovereignty. In an integrated world economy, particularly in the energy domain,
governments’ ability to manage their affairs are constrained by the workings of world markets – and by the actions of
other governments. Most obviously, a calculated move by producer governments to curtail supply (as occurred in 1973) is
a move that impinges on and constricts the policy options of consumer states. There is also the possibility that consumer
states will follow beggar-thy-neighbor policies that militate against a concerted strategy of managing distribution of
available supplies on an equitable basis, i.e. shares set as a fixed fraction of pre-crisis use. The British government of
Edward Heath took this tack in pressuring BP to favor its home country in divvying up reduced supply. He failed because
BP, a vertically integrated MNC that dealt with a wide range of countries, had compelling commercial interest not to go
along.

BP’s Board of Directors responded to mounting pressure from 10 Downing Street by offering to adjust supply allotments
in the U.K.’s favor if the PM were ready to stipulate the countries and quotas – and then BP would inform those
governments that the cutbacks had been decided by Her Majesty’s Government. Mr. Heath folded his cards. He integrated
world energy market at the same time defeated the plan of the Arab OPEC members to target particular countries,
especially the Netherlands and the United States. The producers simply could not direct the passage of oil from the
wellhead through several downstream stages to its delivery at a given national port.5
The conclusion, reinforced by subsequent developments, is that governments have lost a very significant measure of their
influence over crucial elements in the economic equation. They have lost it not to one another but to the market. The
market is an amorphous, largely undirected and wholly unaccountable entity. This is a cardinal feature of the global
energy picture. Economic interdependence has a bearing on economic security in yet another respect. Economic
conditions in one country are heavily dependent on economic performance in other major national economies. If the
European Union, Japan, China or the United States experiences a downturn, it will have an adverse effect on everyone
else. The precise degree of sensitivity to external developments varies. Some countries, e.g. Germany, have a larger share
of their economic activity directly associated with imports and exports than some others, e.g. the United States. For the
former it is 44%, for the latter it is 16%. But even the United States is unable to insulate itself from macroeconomic
developments among the largest national economies. So, by implication, energy security for the United States
encompasses the energy security of the developed world generally – if the measuring rod is performance of the global
macro economy.

It has been argued that the evolution of the global economy can be understood in terms of the implicit contest between
State and Market. Certainly, it is the latter whose influence in shaping and directing international intercourse has grown
markedly in relative terms. This multi-faceted phenomenon is correlated with the most sustained, and widespread,
expansion of economic activity that the world has ever known. It also has led to the incongruity of a world where
countries are functionally integrated while political authority remains fragmented. That discrepancy is the source of a
generalized sense of insecurity and vulnerability that can be somewhat mitigated through prudent action by national
government but cannot be eliminated.

The systemic efficiency for the world viewed as one integrated world system has been maximized by the progressive
opening to the free flow of goods, resources, capital, and technology without regard to political boundaries. By
concentrating on the efficiency standard alone, however, we do pay a price in stability. That is because the international
markets in every economic sphere are not self-equilibrating; no more so than national markets. Rule setting and regulation
are essential to their smooth functioning and the lowering (if not total elimination) of the risks that they pose. Yet
mechanisms for doing so are at best rudimentary. The most significant innovations involving the relinquishing of some
measure of sovereign power to an international body are the IMF in the monetary sphere and the World Trade
Organization in the commercial sphere. There are no counterparts in the energy sphere that set and enforce codes of
conduct other than on an informal basis. Moreover, the dispersion of political authority opens the possibility for unilateral
intervention by national governments for their self-interested purposes that may or may not serve the interests of other
countries and/or market stability. Those hypothetical interventions may be direct (embargo/boycott) or indirect
manipulations of prices through subvention, tariffs or non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade. In addition, the motivations for
taking such action could be political as well as economic, e.g. the 1973 oil embargo. Today, the world oil market is being
manipulated by the United States and its allies through a boycott of Iranian oil exports. It covers as well investment in
development of the country’s entire energy sector and is supplemented by other measures severely restricting Iran’s
ability to avail itself of world financial markets and banking services. Its adverse effects on consumers are being alleviated
by the willingness of Saudi Arabia along with other Gulf producers to raise output in a to date successful effort to keep oil
prices from skyrocketing. Those producer states are motivated by the same political concerns as is the United States.

The general point to bear in mind is that in an international system populated by sovereign states there is a ubiquity of
conflict situations – even though conflict in any particular instance will have particular causes. In other words, the current
structure of the world political economy provides the necessary condition that allows economically disruptive action to be
taken while the sufficient condition is provided by the attitude and will of the system’s component political units. Set in
this analytical context, the energy sector demonstrates some singular features. They are most striking in regard to
petroleum. First, a disproportionately large share of reserves and existing production capacity is located in politically
volatile regions; the Persian Gulf, North Africa, the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the North Sea. In addition, the
world’s second largest producer/exporter, Russia, has a leader who sees energy as a principal instrument of foreign policy.
Post-Soviet Russia being a state discontented with the present international status quo – and keen to increase its influence
across the domain of the defunct USSR – this is strong incentive to interfere with energy market dynamics. Moscow had
pursued a relentless, two-pronged strategy aimed a binding the energy rich countries of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Russia: encouraging the development of pipeline networks that run through Russian
territory; and countering energy sector investment by offering favorable deals with state directed Russian companies. This
phenomenon confirms the precept that political volatility takes two forms, internal and external. The latter encompasses
major security interests of both regional and great powers. Furthermore, domestic turbulence and external strains intersect
in multiple ways.6
Second, commerce in hydrocarbon fuels is marked by the combination of a very high degree of functional integration and
the dominant position of very large multination corporations. The latter are vertically integrated and operate
transnationally. Their degree of national identity, and susceptibility to guidance by home governments, differs
considerably. They can be placed along a continuum of autonomy from governmental influence with China’s China
National petroleum Company (CNPC and Russia’s Gazprom, Rosnet and Lukoil at one end and Shell at the other). These
powerful entities not only have great market power; they also possess technological and financial assets that can be
leveraged to enhance their role in winning contracts, in exploration and exploitation of new energy sites.

Hydro-carbon fuels in Central Asia? Valuable, certainly. Do American companies have to own or lease them we have to
own them, or control the governments of producing states? No. How important is preventing China or Russia from doing
so? Somewhat. To deny either a major direct stake there is to set ourselves another impossible dream. Furthermore, the
global oil market’s integration makes all oil fungible. The geo-strategic fears voiced in some circles have an oddly stale
smell about them, redolent of early 20th century intrigue in the area around Baku. Still, it is worthwhile supporting the
domestic stability and autonomy of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the modest degree that we can. The
relative stability of the first two, we should note, correlates with the absence of major American involvements of a
tangible kind. By contrast, Washington’s intervention in the roiled politics of Kyrgyzstan to protect its stake in the Manas
air base (promoting disgraced ex-president Bakiyev) has contributed to the bloody civil strife. Following our current
course has the potential only to undermine rather than strengthen such stability as exists in the region.

The Energy Weapon

Nation states remain the most important actors in the geopolitics of energy. They retain the power and at home the
authority for initiating actions that derive from their self-defined national interests. At the same time, they are enmeshed
in a complex energy international system wherein petroleum and gas become increasingly fungible as they move
downstream through a number of stages from lifting/extraction to sale of consumable products. The readiness of a given
state to use energy dealings as a tool to advance a strategic agenda – diplomatic or economic – will be determined by two
sets of factors: the tangible and intangible. The tangible include its economic needs and capacities. The intangibles cover a
range of considerations from its tactical calculations through broad national interests to domestic political contingencies.
There are internal and external aspects to both.

Among the internal elements in the policy mix is the revenue needs of an exporting country. Any significant reduction in
earnings decreases the funds available to a government. The factors influencing how salient the impact on policy-making
include: its capital reserves, its degree of economic diversification, its standard of living and the populace’s sensitivity to
any manifest or latent danger to its reduction. By these criteria, there is a striking contrast between Saudi Arabia and Iran
– for examples. The former has enormous reserves.
Little diversification, a relatively high standard of living combined with a quiescent population. Saudi leaders’ anxieties as
to the last point in the aftermath of the Arab Spring have prompted them to raise public spending for social programs and
general stimulus at a time of global economy is sluggish. Iran, by contrast, has depleted its reserves, commerce has been
curtailed across the board, and there is a wide gap between living standards and expectations that already has cut tolerance
for further stringencies to the bone.
The question of a country’s ability to use the “oil weapon” depends in part on its degree of influence in the world market.
Among suppliers, the larger a country’s share of aggregate exports, the greater its potential influence. That can be
compounded by acting in concert with other exporters. That is what occurred in 1973 when the Arab members of OPEC
together cut back on petroleum exports while trying to target specific countries.

1. The readiness of a given state to use energy dealings as a tool to advance a strategic agenda – diplomatic or economic
– will be determined by two sets of factors: the tangible and intangible. The tangible include its economic needs and
capacities. The intangibles cover a range of considerations from its tactical calculations through broad national
interests to domestic political contingencies. There are internal and external aspects to both.
Among the internal elements in the policy mix is the revenue needs of an exporting country. Any significant reduction in
earnings decreases the funds available to a government. The factors influencing how salient the impact on policy-making
include: its capital reserves, its degree of economic diversification, its standard of living and the populace’s sensitivity to
any manifest or latent danger to its lowering. By these criteria, there is a striking contrast between Saudi Arabia and Iran –
for examples. The former has enormous reserves. Little diversification, a relatively high standard of living (sustained by
government programs) combined with a quiescent population. Saudi leaders’ anxieties as to the last point in the aftermath
of the Arab Spring have prompted them to raise public spending for social programs and general stimulus at a time when
the global economy is sluggish. Iran, by contrast, has depleted its reserves, commerce has been curtailed across the board,
and there is a wide gap between living standards and expectations that already has cut back severely tolerance for further
stringencies.

1. The question of a country’s ability to use the “oil weapon” depends in part on its degree of influence in the world
market. Among suppliers, the larger a country’s share of aggregate exports, the greater its potential influence. That
can be compounded by acting in concert with other exporters. That is what occurred in 1973 when the Arab members
of OPEC together cut back on petroleum exports while trying to target specific countries.
At the present time, the picture is especially complicated by the turbulence in the Middle East that has unsettled regional
politics and domestic politics alike. For Saudi Arabia, a more acute sense of vulnerability on a number of fronts makes the
promotion of stability its priority. That pertains certainly to international energy markets. Its stepping forward to raise
production as an offset to the loss of boycotted Iranian oil conforms to its thinking about the imperative to ensure market
stability. It conforms as well to its political interest in bringing the Iranian leadership to heal. By so using its surge
capacity, Saudi Arabia also nurtures its image as an international good citizen devoted to global stability and not only to
advancing its national interests.

Generally speaking, nearly all major oil producers are in a position where there is an overwhelming economic logic to
maximize revenues – on a stable basis. Variations in standards of living and forms of government do not exercise enough
independent influence on policy-makers to alter that logic to any marked degree. This includes Kuwait, other Gulf
producers, Iraq, Libya and, beyond the Middle East, energy surplus countries in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia.

The same holds true for Nigeria, Indonesia, Mexico and Venezuela where the need to generate national income to meet
the needs of a poorer population are even more exigent.

In these latter regions, external interests are salient only insofar as they impinge on internal politics. The Central Asian
leaders, heirs to the centralized power of Soviet era secular regimes, see fundamentalist Islamic forces as the one threat to
their rule. Hence, their acute concern about developments elsewhere, e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq. In those
places, they are partisans of stability and opponents of Salafist movements in all forms.
See Appendix B for an Appraisal of the Political Outlook in the Middle East

HOW TO THINK ABOUT SECURITY & RISK

The purpose of political risk analysis is quite simple: to provide decision-makers with an additional tool to aid them in
making decisions about the allocation of investment resources among various alternative opportunities. 7 For government
leaders, crucial decisions involve defining and prioritizing stakes, designing strategies to advance them, deciding on how
to distribute political capital among purposes and policies, and preparing contingency plans. For an international business,
the counterparts are taking crucial decisions involve the structuring of its asset portfolio by degree of risk and
concentration; the preferred relationship between return and the assessment of country risk; and the development of a
marketing strategy.
The design of a system for political risk assessment is not a purely academic task. It must be guided by, and structured to
meet the requirements of the business organization that will be using it. Methods employed, data sources, and the form of
the system’s output should reflect, to a substantial degree, that organization’s interests and its capabilities. However, the
system should not sacrifice quality of product for the sake of organizational convenience.

Most political risk systems share certain characteristics. They use diverse measures to determine the extent of
political/social disorder and the current or potential level of political instability. They seek, thereby, to make an estimate
of the political risk to business interests. Finally, they normally attempt to rank countries against each other by some
numerical rating. These objectives can be easily stated, but they are not so easily met.

The obstacles to building a stringent, effective analytical system for evaluating political risk are three in number. Data is
often either unavailable or inherently ambiguous. Social theories and models are not refined enough to allow for
unqualified judgments as to the significance of social and political phenomena, however diligently the data is collected
and skillfully assayed. Also, political forecasts must always be discounted for unpredictable events and individual
decisions. Accepting these limitations does not negate the value of systematic, informed political assessment.

A properly designed system can reduce uncertainty about political conditions, and clarify prospects. By so doing, it lowers
worry costs, permits more measured and deliberate business decisions, and facilitates the monitoring of country
conditions.

Under the changeable and uncertain conditions that are a feature of the Middle East, and other major oil producing
regions, there is value in having available formal analytical devices for making more informed tactical decisions and
drafting longer term plans. As noted, uncertainty is a compound of information scarcity, unpredictability, and
“discretionary response potential.” The last refers to the ability of a
n institution to influence: a) the occurrence of a particular event and/or how it registers on the relevant policy
environment; and b) the capacity to adapt to the resulting changes. Logically speaking, the more knowledge available in a
timely fashion about key elements in the equation makes prediction more reliable, thereby increasing DRP. Positive DRP,
in turn, enables one to catalogue and winnow information more effectively. That instills confidence in the decisions taken
since their analytical basis is made explicit; moreover, one is reasonably confidence that the decision taken is the ‘best’
possible under the circumstances. That reduces worry costs. The term worry costs refers to the amount of management
time that must be devoted to continual monitoring and reassessing of conditions that could impact a political or financial
commitment.
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
DIVERSIFICATION
In the realm of foreign policy, a strategy of political diversification turns on the ability to replace one partnership with
another at tolerable diplomatic cost. The classic world of balance of power (operative roughly from the 17th through the
19th century) was conducive to the making, unmaking and remaking of alliances. Changing partners was not promiscuous
but commonplace. The enabling features of that ‘system’ were : the considerable number of players several of whom were
of approximately equal strength and none of whom towered over the others; all were authoritarian monarchies which
concentrated power in the hands of a few individuals who could make these decisions with little regard to public opinion –
however the relevant “public” was defined; political ideology was not an issue and therefore did not stand in the way of
realpolitik calculations; statesmen shared a high culture and, even more important, a political culture; popular nationalism,
too, was still on the distant horizon and therefore not a factor; and there was no one (piece of real estate) location so vital
that it greatly constrained the game of shifting alliances.

Today’s geopolitics of energy displays nearly antithetical traits on every count. So diplomatic diversification offers many
fewer possibilities. Oil and natural gas reserves are where they are. Strategy in those areas has the energy stake as its
pivot. Other considerations of a less concrete nature do come into play: terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the Palestinian
issue being the outstanding ones. Whereas they influence and in turn are influenced by the energy stake, they are
subordinate to it. So what are the opportunities for political diversification – however limited they might be?

Three are identifiable. First, one can seek to minimize the value of a given energy rich state for achieving other objectives.
That is to say, where ties of energy dependence are reinforced by security cum diplomatic needs, loosening of the former
has collateral costs. Where non-energy needs are not salient, the United States gains some flexibility in bilateral dealings
insofar as one set of interests is not held hostage to another. For example, a United States that did not have critical military
facilities in Bahrain could be less inhibited in speaking candidly about the Khalifa family’s violent crackdown on its
Shi’ite population. A chance in the American position would have two salutary effects: it could some credibility to its pro-
democracy image, and it could convey the message that the United States will not always subordinate its political interests
to its admittedly multi-dimensional interest in having Saudi Arabia as a its critical strategic energy partner and swing
producer.

A major incentive behind the United States’ push to accelerate production of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Basin and
Central Asia is to shift the locus of export capability farther from the volatile Persian Gulf. The building over the
necessary pipelines through the territory of countries who have friendly relations with the United States are a requirement
for maximizing the benefit from this part of a diversification strategy. Hence, a priority is given to prevent tie-up of new
sources with existing or envisaged pipelines that pass through Russia. A similar logic explains the lack of enthusiasm for
construction of large capacity lines to China. A latent fear of politically motivated control of energy supply, at any stage,
still lurks in the back of many minds. This holds despite the reality that, in a world where hydrocarbon energy supplies are
fungible in a highly integrated global market, increased production anywhere will have a desirable effect on prices while
reducing the shock effect of supply disruption (for whatever reason) in any one region. The more direct and unimpeded
the access to major sources does in itself enhance energy security.

SUBSTITUTION
Substitution understood as replacement of sources encounters most of the same constraints and limitations as does a
diversification strategy. Indeed, it is a more drastic measure. For it connotes than another party could provide whatever the
existing party now provides on a par basis. That is unrealistic in today’s world for the reasons cited earlier.

Substitution understood as generating and developing new forms of energy, by contrast, could shift the parameters of the
global energy system. For were those forms within the control of the United States, and each major consuming country,
the resulting decrease in the reliance on external sources would move the consumer/supplier balance strongly in favor of
the consumer. The ramifying effects would be profound- economically and politically.

We should be cautious, though, is assessing what that conjectured gain would be. Lowered dependence can be measured
in physical terms. Gauging what it means in terms of the politics and psychology of a relationship is far more difficult.
This is especially so where there is a complicated interlacing of security/ political interests and economic ones.

CONSERVATION
Conservation as a foreign policy concept has two meanings: the husbanding of political capital so that it is available for
application in the most important ventures where the national stakes are highest; and, seeking the most cost effective
means to achieve objectives. The parsimony principle governs both. Occam’s Razor tells us that the simplest method to
achieve stipulated objectives should be preferred. Their application to American foreign policy in reference to places rich
in energy resources would mean observing these precepts:

 Be assiduous in discriminating between those aspects of a relationship that have a direct bearing on the meeting of
national interests and those of a marginal nature. One example is provided by the oil-rich Arab states of the Persian
Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates. A parsimonious approach would stress their political stability which
translates into secure agreements that militate toward mutually beneficial commercial dealings. It would downplay the
value and/or super imposing political values and institutions uncongenial to local circumstances. The United States’
security stake in the region points to a similar logic.
 Other interests should also be taken into account. Two stand out. First, by its close identification with autocratic
regimes the United States risks alienating alienating potentially significant political forces. Violent salafist groups, i.e.
jihadis, would be more inclined to target the United States – thereby raising the risks of terrorism. That is the context
of al-Qaeda’s emergence as a menace to the United States. A second quite different force is represented by
democratic secularists (or, more accurately democrats whose interpretation of Islam is compatible with more or less
secular, constitutional governance). Their too would see the United States as an obstacle to achieving their ambitions.
In their case, the danger is not retaliation but rather the lessening of an opportunity to see the coming to power of
people whose compatibility with the United States and the West) goes beyond narrow utilitarian interests.
 The inevitable trade-offs that arise from these circumstances should be made pragmatically rather than derived
through a deductive reasoning process that disregards or downplays variations of national position and conditions.
 A sober recognition of the limitations on the extent to which the United States can influence the outcomes of internal
politics should permeate our foreign policy. The overwhelming evidence of the past twelve years highlights the heavy
 penalties that the United States pays by acting on the sanguine conviction that it is within our power to shape the
affairs of other societies. This is especially so in the Islamic world where there is little in the way of shared history,
culture or political philosophy.
 A parsimonious approach benefits from the cultivation of personal relationships in places where authority resides
largely in the hands of a few individuals. Drawing on those relationships can facilitate the reaching of practical
objectives with less expenditure of financial capital or political capital in the form of grandiose (and costly) projects
that entail more imposition than cultivation. Tradeoffs are inescapable. It also spares us the highly public
demonstration of what we are about which can, and has, resulted in the loss of credibility and status when things go
awry.
LOWERING THE STAKES
The elements of the strategy sketched under the heading of conservation imply a lowering of stakes. Or, more exactly,
applying our efforts to a more narrowly construed set of concerns which are grounded on our central interests and goals.
Everything is connected to everything else in this world – especially in the intricate world of Middle Eastern affairs.
Consequently, one can see how a wide array of factors have a bearing on those attitudes and actions which engage directly
our interests. Prudence suggests that we refrain from trying to inflect more than a handful of most important elements
concentrated on those operate closest to points of tangible action. Resources and capabilities are limited, the environment
is not congenial to our promiscuous interventions, and the often silent costs of unrewarded (and/or unwelcome)
interference can be prohibitively high.

A few points in this regard can be made with some confidence. First, the costs incurred by United States’ political
engagements in the Greater Middle East along with its accompanying military presence are high. Resolution or even
significant amelioration of the problems associated with them would have a salutary effect on our energy dealings in the
region. As argued above, the net effect of having multiple interests at stake is to weaken our hand in the energy sphere.
Yes, the dependence of the Saudis and others on the United States for defense also gives us some leverage. But the
manifest risk to the United States are greater because they are two-fold. At one and the same time, we can be more readily
manipulated into acting as if the interests of local parties are ipso facto the same as our own; and our presence generates a
considerable amount of anti-America sentiment among those who bear us ill will and can exercise influence on regional
governments. It follows that deactivation of the neuralgic conflict with Iran, the festering Palestinian situation, and the
easing of Sunni-Shi’ite tensions would be to the American advantage in the energy sphere.

Second, the ability to position the United States so that it could deal with energy supplier states in strictly commercial
terms would have the further beneficial effect of reducing openings for other powers to exploit diplomatic frictions that
stem from our heavy engagement.

CONCLUSIONS
 The number of factors in the energy security equation is growing, their points of intersection increasing, and causal
chains lengthening
 This is related to deepening economic interdependence globally. That integration creates mutualities of economic
interest
 Progressive constricting of economic autonomy creates a conservative bias that places premiums on international
stability in all domains
 States they see themselves as challenged domestically have an interest in maximizing export revenues on a stable
basis
 Those states are inclined to contain/avoid international political conflict except where paramount national interests are
engaged
 A reduced United States reliance on energy imports to meet national needs does not in itself automatically increase
leverage on exporters for either commercial or political purposes
 The correlation between import dependence and political autonomy is vague and indirect
 There is no identifiable threshold of dependence below which concrete advantages accrue
 Given the integration of global energy markets with a wider context of economic interdependence, attention must be
paid systemic characteristics as well as national ones
 The feasibility of targeting a particular country for boycott or embargo will turn on the tightness of the market and the
availability of producer surge capacity on a world-wide basis

Q17 Introduction to Nuclear Security

 Terrorists have stated their desire to use nuclear weapons.

 Acquiring weapons‐useable nuclear material is the key step in constructing a nuclear weapon.
 Weapons‐usable nuclear material exists at hundreds of sites in 25 countries.
 Not all sites are well secured against terrorists or criminals and nuclear security is only as strong as the weakest link.
 Once a terrorist has acquired weapons‐useable nuclear materials, countermeasures have limited effectiveness.
Over the last 20 years there have been 1000s of nuclear smuggling incidents, of which ~ 20 involved highly enriched
uranium or plutonium.

 It’s likely that many more cases were undetected.

 There have been numerous lapses in security that, under different circumstances, , could have been catastrophic: – Y‐
12 (U.S.) security breach (2012) – P li d b Pelindaba (S h out Af i ) r ca b k rea ‐in (2007) – Kurchatov Institute
(Russia) accounting problem (2001)

Nuclear Security Definition

As defined by the IAEA, nuclear security is:

[T]he prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious
acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

Global Nuclear Security System

Nuclear security is historically viewed as the sovereign responsibility of individual states.

 Each country’s regulatory systems were often developed independently. – Often variable
 There is no comprehensive global system for tracking, protecting, and managing nuclear materials in a way that
builds confidence. – The existing international system is a patchwork of agreements, guidelines, and multilateral
engagement mechanisms. – It encompasses only civilian materials (15% of total weapons‐ useable nuclear materials).

IAEA s’ Security Role

 The principle objective is to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy…”
 It administers a safeguards system to detect diversion for military purposes.
 Nuclear security is a relatively new mission.
 IAEA develops nuclear security guidelines and provides numerous nuclear security advisory services. • The scope of
responsibility is civilian materials, largely outside the five nuclear weapons states.

Nuclear Security Summits

Nuclear Security Summits were held in Washington (2010) and Seoul (2012).

 They focused high‐level attention on the issue.

 They led to a non‐binding communiqué, a work plan, and commitments by states and groups of states. • The third was
held in 2014 in the Netherlands, and fourth in the U.S. in 2016.

What Type of Global System Is Needed?

 The system should be comprehensive; it should cover all weapons‐usable nuclear materials and facilities in which
they might be present, at all times.
 The system should employ international standards and best practices, consistently and globally.
 At a national level, each state’s system should have internal assurance and accountability mechanisms. • Globally, the
system should facilitate a state’s ability to provide international assurances that all nuclear materials and facilities are
secure
 The system should work to reduce risk through minimizing or, where feasible, eliminating weapons‐usable material
stocks and the number of locations where they are found.

What Is Limiting Progress?

There are differing views on the magnitude of the threat and how best to secure materials.

 There is the view that nuclear security is a sovereign responsibility.

 There are sensitivities regarding sharing of security arrangements.
 There exists regional and other nuclear (e.g., nonproliferation) issues
Q18

Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

 Most countries participate in international initiatives designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
 The international safeguards system has since 1970 successfully prevented the diversion of fissile materials into
weapons. Its scope has been widened to address undeclared nuclear activities.
 The IAEA undertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities and audits the movement of nuclear materials
through them.
 Safeguards are backed by diplomatic and economic measures.
The initial development of nuclear technology was military, during World War II. Two nuclear bombs made from
uranium-235 and plutonium-239 were dropped on Japan’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively in August 1945 and these
brought the long war to a sudden end. The immense and previously unimaginable power of the atom had been
demonstrated. Then attention turned to civil applications. In the course of half a century nuclear technology has enabled
access to a virtually unlimited source of energy at a time when constraints are arising on the use of fossil fuels. The
question which frames this paper is: To what extent and in what ways does nuclear power generation contribute to or
alleviate the risk from nuclear weapons?
In the 1960s it was widely assumed at there would be 30-35 nuclear weapons states by the turn of the century. In fact
there were eight – a tremendous testimony to the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its
incentives both against weapons and for civil nuclear power, despite the baleful influence of the Cold War (1950s to 80s)
which saw a massive build-up of nuclear weapons particularly by the USA and the Soviet Union.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is much more than the NPT, although this is the pre-eminent international treaty on
the subject. The regime includes treaties, conventions and common (multilateral and bilateral) arrangements covering
security and physical protection, export controls, nuclear test-bans and, potentially, fissile material production cut-offs.
The international community can apply pressure to states outside the NPT to make every possible effort to conform to the
full range of international norms on nuclear non-proliferation that make up this regime. This was seen over 2007-08 with
India.

The NPT Origins and Objectives

Over the past 35 years the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into
military uses. It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil uranium, plutonium and
associated plants are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons
programs. In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely. Its scope is also being widened to include undeclared nuclear
activities.

Most countries have renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possession of them would threaten rather than enhance
national security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology
only for peaceful purposes.

The successful conclusion, in 1968, of negotiations on the NPT was a landmark in the history of non-proliferation. After
coming into force in 1970, its indefinite extension in May 1995 was another. The NPT was essentially an agreement
among the five nuclear weapons states and the other countries interested in nuclear technology. The deal was that
assistance and cooperation would be traded for pledges, backed by international scrutiny, that no plant or material would
be diverted to weapons’ use. Those who refused to be part of the deal would be excluded from international cooperation
or trade involving nuclear technology.

At present, 189 states plus Taiwan are parties to the NPT. These include all five declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)
which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon before 1967: China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and
the USA. The main countries remaining outside the NPT are Israel, India and Pakistan, though North Korea has moved to
join them. These all have weapons programs which have come to maturity since 1970, so they cannot join without
renouncing and dismantling those. In 2008 special arrangements were agreed internationally for India, bringing it part
way in, and its ratification of the Additional Protocol in 2014 put it on a similar footing to the five NWS. In mid-2013,
181 states plus Taiwan had safeguards agreements with IAEA in force.

The NPT’s main objectives are to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, to provide security for non-nuclear weapon
states which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons.

The most important factor underpinning the safeguards regime is international political pressure and how particular
nations perceive their long-term security interests in relation to their immediate neighbours. The solution to nuclear
weapons proliferation is thus political more than technical, and it certainly goes beyond the question of uranium
availability. International pressure not to acquire weapons is enough to deter most states from developing a weapons
program. The major risk of nuclear weapons’ proliferation will always lie with countries which have not joined the NPT
and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities, and those which have joined but disregard their treaty
commitments.

For further information on India and Pakistan, see the respective papers in this series. For information on Iran, North
Korea, Israel and Iraq, see the Appendix to this paper.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The IAEA was set up by unanimous resolution of the United Nations in 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements. This provides assurance to the
international community that individual countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and
facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation
supplied to it. The agency checks inventories and undertakes sampling and analysis of materials. Safeguards are designed
to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the
export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group. Safeguards are backed up by the threat of international sanctions.

Scope of safeguards
It is important to understand that nuclear safeguards are a means of reassurance whereby non-nuclear weapons states
demonstrate to others that they are abiding by their peaceful commitments. They prevent nuclear proliferation in the same
way that auditing procedures build confidence in proper financial conduct and prevent embezzlement. Their specific
objective is to verify whether declared (usually traded) nuclear material remains within the civil nuclear fuel cycle and is
being used solely for peaceful purposes or not.

Non-nuclear-weapons state parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures applied by the IAEA. These
require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and
transactions involving nuclear material. Almost 900 nuclear facilities and several hundred other locations in 57 non-
nuclear-weapons countries are subject to regular inspection. Their records and the actual nuclear material are audited.
Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

The aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximising the
risk of early detection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the international community that countries are
honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this way
safeguards are a service both to the international community and to individual states, who recognise that it is in their own
interest to demonstrate compliance with these commitments.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful
activities. The system relies on;

 Material Accountability – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility.
This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, review and verification of operating
records.
 Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site of use.
 Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported
movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.
All NPT non-weapons states must accept these ‘full-scope’ safeguards, which apply to all nuclear facilities in the country.
In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply to
relevant plants (see further section below). IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and
accuracy of records.

Uranium supplied to nuclear weapons states is not, under the NPT, covered by safeguards. However normally there is at
least a “peaceful use” clause in the supply contract, and in the case of Australia, a bilateral safeguards agreement is
required which does cover all uranium supplied and all materials arising from it (as “Australian obligated nuclear
materials” – AONM). Neither the peaceful use clause nor the bilateral treaty mean that materials are restricted to facilities
on the state’s list of facilities eligible for IAEA inspection.

The NPT is supplemented by other safeguards systems such as those among certain European nations (Euratom
Safeguards) and between individual countries (bilateral agreements) such as Australia and customer countries for its
uranium, or Japan and the USA.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as
shown in Iran and North Korea, safeguards are backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.
Safeguards problems 1980s-90s
Iran, Iraq and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting
safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq and Iran had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium,
in Iraq’s case, to weapons grade. North Korea used research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and
a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.
The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as
fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the key nuclear facilities concerned were built by the countries
themselves without being declared to the IAEA or placed safeguards arrangements. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to
declare all facilities but did not do so. Nor, more recently, did Iran. In North Korea, the activities concerned took place
before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement, using a Russian “research” reactor and clandestine reprocessing
plant.

Nevertheless, the activities were detected and in Iraq and North Korea, brought under control using international
diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process, but North Korea posed possibly the most intractable situation
confronted by the IAEA. This has since been matched by Iran.

So, while traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s
attention turned to what might not have been declared, outside the known materials flows and facilities.

Addressing undeclared nuclear activities – the Additional Protocol

Following discovery of Iraq’s clandestine programme, in 1993 a programme was initiated to strengthen and extend the
classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. This was to boost
the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA’s existing legal authority through
safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional
Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to their existing comprehensive
safeguards agreement. NPT Weapons States (and India) have also agreed to accept the principles of the model Additional
Protocol, though the function there is different.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

 The IAEA is given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R&D,
production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded) and nuclear-related imports and exports.
 IAEA inspectors have greater rights of access. This includes any suspect location, at short notice (e.g. two hours), and
the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
 States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can
communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
All these elements enhance the IAEA’s ability to provide assurances that all nuclear activities and material in the country
concerned has been declared for safeguards purposes.

As of October 2016, 129 states plus Taiwan, Greenland and Euratom had Additional Protocols in force, and 17 more
including Belarus and Iran had them approved and signed but not yet in force. Iran has said it was applying the Additional
Protocol provisionally from January 2016. There are 70 states plus Taiwan with significant nuclear activities. Those
remaining without an Additional Protocol include Israel, Pakistan and North Korea – all outside the NPT anyway. (See
IAEA webpage on Status of the Additional Protocol.)
Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind
of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective
methodologies which reassure NPT States.

Where non-weapons states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and an Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA is
able to say each year not only that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful activities, but also that there are no
undeclared nuclear materials or activities.
For Nuclear Weapons States, the purpose of the Additional Protocol is different, namely to provide the IAEA with
information on nuclear supply to, and cooperation with, non-weapons states. Such information assists the IAEA in its
objective of detecting any undeclared activities in non-weapons states. (In this context India is understood to be
effectively a Nuclear Weapons State, and the Additional Protocol for it was agreed by the IAEA in March 2009, and
ratified by India in June 2014.)

Limitations of safeguards

Apart from situations addressed by the Additional Protocol, the greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation lies with
countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and
Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.
A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under
full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements such as insisted upon by Australia and
Canada for sale of uranium address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of
these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN
Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.

IAEA safeguards together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by
countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact the worldwide
application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of
nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear
materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.

By mid-2004 a total of 57 countries plus Taiwan had ratified the Additional Protocol. However, of 71 countries with
significant nuclear activities, 25 have yet to bring it into force.

However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, four NPT parties have not yet signed the Additional Protocol
and another ten have not fully ratified it (another four of the 71 are outside the NPT).

Safeguards in countries with nuclear weapons

In Nuclear Weapons States, IAEA safeguards apply under a “voluntary offer agreement”. Where offered, facilities are put
on each state’s “list of facilities that are eligible for IAEA safeguards” and it is up to the IAEA to decide which (if any) to
inspect. However, all these facilities must maintain IAEA-standard accounting.

First
weapons Safeguards situation for nuclear power
test
All civil nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards. The National Nuclear Safety
USA 1945 Administration (NNSA) applies some materials accounting to all fuel cycle facilities and
communicates with the IAEA.
UK 1952 All civil nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards.
Russia 1949 IAEA safeguards not generally applied, though this is changing*.
All civil nuclear facilities are under Euratom safeguards, all civil facilities containing
France 1960
safeguards-obligated nuclear material are subject to IAEA safeguards.
All imported nuclear power plants are under IAEA safeguards, as is the Russian-supplied
China 1964
Shaanxi centrifuge enrichment plant.
14 civil power reactors are under IAEA safeguards, along with all future civil facilities,
India 1974
pursuant to 2008 US-India agreement and 2014 Additional Protocol.
 First
weapons Safeguards situation for nuclear power
test
Pakistan 1998 Civil power reactors under item-specific IAEA safeguards.
Israel nil No nuclear power.
North
2006 No nuclear power.
Korea
* To date civil facilities have not been made subject to IAEA safeguards unless they are of value to IAEA, e.g. for training
or experience. However, Angarsk international fuel cycle centre is to be made subject to IAEA safeguards, and an
increasing number of civil facilities are expected to be made subject to IAEA safeguards in the future due to increasing
commerce.
India’s emergence as de facto weapons state under NPT

India’s situation as a nuclear-armed country excluded it from the NPT* so this and the related lack of full-scope IAEA
safeguards meant that India was isolated from world trade by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (see below). A clean waiver to
the trade embargo was agreed in September 2008 in recognition of the country’s impeccable non-proliferation credentials.
India has always been scrupulous in ensuring that its weapons material and technology are guarded against commercial or
illicit export to other countries.

* India could only join the NPT if it disarmed and joined as a Non Nuclear Weapons State, which is politically
impossible.

In December 2006 the US Congress passed legislation to enable moves towards nuclear trade with India. Then in July
2007 a nuclear cooperation agreement with India was finalized, opening the way for India’s participation in international
commerce in nuclear fuel and equipment and requiring India to put most of the country’s nuclear power reactors under
IAEA safeguards and close down the CIRUS research reactor by 2010. It would allow India to reprocess US-origin and
other foreign-sourced nuclear fuel at a new national plant under IAEA safeguards. This would be used fuel arising from
those 14 reactors designated as unambiguously civilian and under full IAEA safeguards.

The IAEA greeted the deal as being “a creative break with the past” – where India was excluded from the NPT. After
much delay in India’s parliament, it then set up a new and comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, plus an
Additional Protocol. The IAEA board approved this in July 2008, after the agreement had threatened to bring down the
Indian government. The agreement is similar to those between IAEA and non nuclear weapons states, notably Infcirc-66,
the IAEA’s information circular that lays out procedures for applying facility-specific safeguards, hence much more
restrictive than many in India’s parliament wanted.

The next step in bringing India into the fold was the consensus resolution of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) in September 2008 to exempt India from its rule of prohibiting trade with non members of the NPT. A bilateral
trade agreement then went to US Congress for final approval. Similar agreements followed with Russia and France. The
ultimate objective is to put India on the same footing as China in respect to responsibilities and trade opportunities, though
it has had to accept much tighter international controls than other nuclear-armed countries.

The introduction to India’s safeguards agreement with IAEA says that India’s access to assured supplies of fresh fuel is an
“essential basis” for New Delhi’s acceptance of IAEA safeguards on some of its reactors and that India has a right to take
“corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign
fuel supplies.” But the introduction also says that India will “provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear
material from civilian use at any time.” In the course of NSG deliberations India also gave assurances regarding weapons
testing.

In October 2008 US Congress passed the bill allowing civil nuclear trade with India, and a nuclear trade agreement was
signed with France. The 2008 agreements ended 34 years of trade isolation on nuclear materials and technology. The
CIRUS research reactor was shut down on 31 December 2010.
India’s safeguards agreement with IAEA was signed early in 2009, though the timeframe for bringing the extra reactors
under safeguards still had to be finalised. The Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement was agreed by the IAEA
Board in March 2009 and signed in May 2009 by India. The decision to ratify was announced under the new government
in June 2014, with 20 facilities listed, including six at the Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad and two stores at Tarapur,
plus 12 reactors. The Additional Protocol came into force on 25 July 2014, giving the IAEA enhanced access to India’s
civil power facilities.

In April 2012 India told the UN Security Council that given its ability and willingness to promote global non-proliferation
objectives, and that it already adhered to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), “as a country with the ability and willingness to promote global non-proliferation
objectives, we believe that the next logical step is India’s membership of the four export control regimes.” The other two
‘regimes’ are the informal Australia Group (re chemical and biological weapons) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on
export control for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. India also supports the early commencement of
negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Following ratification of
the Additional Protocol, India will pursue membership of these four export control regimes.

Apart from safeguards, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is designed particularly to cap the production of weapons-grade
fissile materials in both NPT Nuclear Weapons States and India, Pakistan and Israel. India has expressed support for a
verifiable Cut-off Treaty, China, Pakistan and Iran are opposed to one. The USA is not keen on such a Treaty being
verifiable.

Other IAEA developments

In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of
any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty agreed in 1996 and
to codify commitments made by USA, UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting
a similar ban on China. This treaty would also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international
verification.

Another initiative relates to plutonium (Pu) and spent fuel. For uranium, safeguards take account of its nature: natural,
depleted, low-enriched or high-enriched (above 20% U-235) and the corresponding degree of concern regarding
proliferation. A similarly differentiated approach is being considered for plutonium. Two or three categories are possible:
degraded Pu (eg in high-burnup fuel), low-grade Pu (eg separated from spent fuel of normal burnup) and high-grade Pu
(eg from weapons or low-burnup fuel). The first two correspond to what is generally known as a reactor-grade plutonium,
sometimes defined as having more than 19% non-fissile isotopes.

Additional arrangements

There are also several other treaties and arrangements designed to reduce the risk of civil nuclear power’s contributing to
weapons proliferation.

Implementation of IAEA safeguards in the non-nuclear weapon states of the EU is governed by a Verification Agreement
between the country concerned, EURATOM and the IAEA. Safeguards activities are carried out jointly by the IAEA and
EURATOM, and a 1992 agreement enables the IAEA itself to deploy more of its resources in member states where
independent regional safeguards systems are not in place.

Shortly after entry into force of the NPT, multilateral consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment of
two separate mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports: the Zangger Committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) in 1975.

The Zangger Committee, also known as the Non Proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, was set up to consider how
procedures for exports of nuclear material and equipment related to NPT commitments. In August 1974 the committee
produced a trigger list of items which would require the application of IAEA safeguards if exported to a non Nuclear
Weapons State which was not party to the NPT. The trigger list is regularly updated. The Zangger Committee now has 31
member states.
Sensitive Nuclear Technologies

While nuclear power reactors themselves are not a proliferation concern, enrichment and reprocessing technologies are
open to use for other purposes, and have been the cause of proliferation through illicit or unsafeguarded use, as outlined in
the Appendix to this paper. This problem is largely addressed in the Additional Protocol, as described above, and in fact
such sensitive nuclear technologies (SNT) are largely confined to NPT weapons states plus Japan. For most countries they
would make no economic sense, and several recent initiatives focus on how to create conditions which make them
unattractive propositions.

The NPT itself refers to the “inalienable” right to use nuclear energy, but does not guarantee the right to develop SNT.
Nor, however, does the it explicitly limit the development of SNT, other than by the fundamental obligations of Non
Nuclear Weapons States not to acquire (or seek to acquire) nuclear weapons, and to place all their nuclear material under
IAEA safeguards.

Current approaches to control the spread of SNT have focused on measures against the transfer of equipment,
components, special materials and technology, through national export controls and multilateral coordination within the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (see below). Also of course any enrichment or reprocessing plant in an NPT Non Nuclear
Weapons State must be fully safeguarded. However, these approaches do not fully address the problems of illicit
acquisition of enrichment technology and clandestine development of indigenous enrichment technology. Over the next
five to ten years, illicit nuclear trade is likely to be conducted by Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan, and possibly other
nations seeking nuclear capabilities or wanting to maintain or improve existing nuclear weapons arsenals. Additional
states in regions of proliferation concern may utilise smuggling methods to acquire advanced, ostensibly civilian, nuclear
technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium production and separation capabilities. Stopping this trade will
remain difficult, but is imperative.*

* Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) 2013.

While safeguards are an essential part of international confidence-building, they cannot alone provide assurance about a
country’s future intent. The concern is that an enrichment or reprocessing facility under safeguards today could be used as
the basis for break-out from non-proliferation commitments in the future, and Iran epitomizes this concern. In the case of
enrichment, a centrifuge plant using LEU feed could produce sufficient HEU for a nuclear weapon in a relatively short
time. Hence there is some diplomatic pressure to limit the countries with SNT facilities to those regarded as presenting a
low proliferation risk. One initiative to this end is the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC),
formerly know as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) – see separate paper.
These matters are being addressed both politically and technically, and a useful account is in the 2007-08 Annual
Report of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, pp9-12.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The NSG, formerly known as the London Group or London Suppliers Group, was set up in 1974 after India exploded its
first nuclear device. The main reason for the group’s formation was to bring in France, a major nuclear supplier nation
which was not then party to the NPT. It included both members and non-members of the Zangger Committee. The group
communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978.

The NSG Guidelines were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were
required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of
sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened re-transfer provisions.

The NSG began with seven members – the USA, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan – but
now includes 46 countries. It was a key to bringing India more fully under safeguards in 2008 and opening up trade on
condition that its weapons-related facilities were quarantined. India’s membership of the NSG is now under consideration,
and a decision may be made in 2012, though it is not a signatory of the NPT.

Conclusion
Civil nuclear power has not been the cause of or route to nuclear weapons in any country that has nuclear weapons, and no
uranium traded for electricity production has ever been diverted for military use. All nuclear weapons programmes have
either preceded or risen independently of civil nuclear power*, as shown most recently by North Korea. No country is
without plenty of uranium in the small quantities needed for a few weapons.

* An exception may have been South Africa. See also individual case studies.
Former US Vice-President Al Gore said (18/9/06) that “During my eight years in the White House, every nuclear weapons
proliferation issue we dealt with was connected to a nuclear reactor program. Today, the dangerous weapons programs in
both Iran and North Korea are linked to their civilian reactor programs.” He is not correct. Iran has failed to convince
anyone that its formerly clandestine enrichment program has anything to do with its nuclear power reactor under
construction (which is fuelled by Russia), and North Korea has no civil reactor program. In respect to India and Pakistan,
which he may have had in mind, there is evidently a link between military and civil, but that is part of the reason they are
outside the NPT.

Perspective is relevant: As little as five tonnes of natural uranium is required to produce a nuclear weapon. Uranium is
ubiquitous, and if cost is no object it could be recovered in such quantities from most granites, or from sea water – sources
which would be quite uneconomic for commercial use. In contrast, world trade for electricity production is almost 70,000
tonnes of uranium per year, all of which can be accounted for.
There is no chance that the resurgent problem of nuclear weapons proliferation will be solved by turning away from
nuclear power or ceasing trade in the tens of thousands of tonnes each year needed for it.

Nuclear materials:

Uranium processed for electricity generation is not useable for weapons. The uranium used in power reactor fuel for
electricity generation is typically enriched to about 3-4% of the isotope U-235, compared with weapons-grade which is
over 90% U-235. For safeguards purposes uranium is deemed to be ‘highly enriched’ when it reaches 20% U-235. Few
countries possess the technological knowledge or the facilities to produce weapons-grade uranium.

Plutonium is produced in the reactor core from a proportion of the uranium fuel. Plutonium contained in spent fuel
elements is typically about 60-70% Pu-239, compared with weapons-grade plutonium which is more than 93% Pu-239.
Weapons-grade plutonium is not produced in commercial power reactors but in a ‘production’ reactor operated with
frequent fuel changes to produce low-burnup material with a high proportion of Pu-239.

The only use for ‘reactor grade’ plutonium is as a nuclear fuel, after it is separated from the high-level wastes by
reprocessing. It is not and has never been used for weapons, due to the relatively high rate of spontaneous fission and
radiation from the heavier isotopes such as Pu-240 making any such attempted use fraught with great uncertainties.

Q19
Nuclear politics in South Asia
Through the Cold Start Doctrine, India envisions that, in case of war, it can divide Pakistan into two halves by
separating Sindh or the Pakistani part of Kashmir from Punjab
On the nuclear front, no other region of the world has been experiencing developments quite like the South Asia region
has. The decade of the 1990s prompted its de facto nuclearisation when the region’s two giants, India and Pakistan, went
nuclear in May 1998, though India had tested its nuclear weapon in 1974.

The Brasstacks crisis of 1987 and the Kashmir insurgency crisis of 1990 — when there was witnessed massive
deployment and maneuvering of troops by India and Pakistan along their shared border — could not mature into a war
between them because of presumed nuclear deterrence, as India had overt nuclear capability while Pakistan had opaque
nuclear capability. Similarly, the Kargil war in 1999 and, in the wake of a five-man militant attack on the Indian
parliament, the large scale military stand-off in 2001-2002 between the armies of India and Pakistan could not ripen into
an across-the-border war because of affirmed nuclear deterrence expressed by both the countries. This was the time when
India practiced the Sundarji Doctrine (1981-2004), which was primarily defensive or counter-offensive in nature. In this
way, nuclear deterrence (by having large-yield strategic nuclear weapons deliverable through long-range ballistic missiles
or airplanes) served its purpose of establishing regional peace by raising the fear that conventional war might turn into
nuclear war.

Now, it seems that the space hogged by nuclear deterrence to avert a conventional war in South Asia has shrunk. India
claims to have not only created some space to launch a limited sub-conventional war (predicated on the element of
surprise) against Pakistan but that it also has the ability to sustain it below the nuclear-threshold level. Replacing the
Sundarji Doctrine, India has declared the Cold Start Doctrine, which derives its strength from the blitzkrieg strategy used
by India in December 1971 against Pakistan’s army in East Pakistan to hasten the emergence of an independent
Bangladesh. Through the Cold Start Doctrine, India envisions that, in case of war, it can divide Pakistan into two halves
by separating Sindh or the Pakistani part of Kashmir from Punjab in a quick and powerful manner, besides holding the
occupied limited area for some time to bargain with. Lately, a modified version of the doctrine has been tossed around.
This version detaches itself from the war-time-only limitation and unlocks the possibility for a peacetime swift, potent but
short duration surprising assault. The probable, identified areas in Pakistan are those that come under the sway of the
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), an internationally banned organisation notorious for attacks inside India to liberate Indian-held
Kashmir.

Pakistan has not fully realised yet that the Mumbai attacks in 2008 changed India. The books written on Ajmal Kasab, the
then sole survivor from amongst the attackers, describe the plan in detail, besides establishing the relationship of all the
attackers to Pakistan. Lately, it has been reported in the media that, on the visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz
Sharif to the US in October this year, the US authorities presented Nawaz Sharif with the evidence implicating three
Pakistanis in the attack, which took place on July 27 this year on a passenger bus and in a police station in the Gurdaspur
district of India and which consumed the lives of about one dozen Indian civilians and policemen. On their way to the
police station, the attackers thankfully failed to explode a railway track on a bridge, though they had planted a mine there.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) sets recovered from the attackers (after they were killed in a gun battle) indicated
Sargodha (in Pakistan) as the starting point of their journey on July 21. Incidents such as these ratchet up the possibility of
provoking India into thinking out-of-the-box ways of avoiding war in the face of nuclear deterrence. The projected
modified version of the Cold Start Doctrine seems to have a solution for this emerging scenario, which India calls
Pakistan’s asymmetric war against it. The likelihood of any such attack is in the Pakistani part of Kashmir where,
reportedly, the India-specific LeT also has its bases.

Pakistan has recently declared that it has developed low-yield (battlefield) tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) attached to
short-range missiles such as the Nasr (developed in 2011 and carried by a shoot-and-scoop delivery system) to counter
India’s Cold Start Doctrine. Clearly, Pakistan is basking in the impression that India’s doctrine is wartime specific and no
modified version of it is available in the market for any peacetime confrontation. Secondly, Pakistan believes that its
TNWs, in whatever form, are a substitute for any method to counter the quick, sub-conventional Indian offensive, whether
the target of the offensive is Mureedke, the headquarters of the LeT in Pakistan (near the India-Pakistan border) or any
distant safe haven such as Sargodha. Thirdly, Pakistan thinks that India cannot deploy its TNWs such as the Prahaar
missile (developed in 2011) to neutralise Pakistan’s reaction. Fourthly, Pakistan thinks that India cannot have access to an
Iron Dome, which is an anti-missile air defence system.

Against this backdrop, it is apparent that Pakistan is devoid of any anti-Cold Start Doctrine; instead, Pakistan takes refuge
in the term ‘offensive-defence’. Secondly, Pakistan has failed to reign in non-state actors using its land to attack India.
Thirdly, Pakistan is still undervaluing the importance of the element of surprise on which India has been relying. Fourth,
Pakistan is still not realising that the success in having TNWs and the presence of Islamic militants on its land is a lethal
combination the world is scared of, not to say South Asia.

South Asian politics are fraught with unpredictability. It is not known when Pakistani non-state actors cross the border,
carry out any atrocious act and prompt a reaction from India. Similarly, it is not known why Pakistani civilians should be
ready to become victims of the collateral damage caused by any TNW, even if it is launched to counter any version of
India’s Cold Start Doctrine.

Q20
Nuclear battles in South Asia

Pervez HoodbhoyZia Mian

The armies of Pakistan and India are practicing for nuclear war on the battlefield: Pakistan is rehearsing the use of nuclear
weapons, while India trains to fight on despite such use and subsequently escalate. What were once mere ideas and
scenarios dreamed up by hawkish military planners and nuclear strategists have become starkly visible capabilities and
commitments. When the time comes, policy makers and people on both sides will expect—and perhaps demand—that the
Bomb be used.

Pakistan has long been explicit about its plans to use nuclear weapons to counter Indian conventional forces. Pakistan has
developed “a variety of short range, low yield nuclear weapons,” claimed retired General Khalid Kidwai in March 2015.
Kidwai is the founder—and from 2000 until 2014 ran—Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which is responsible for
managing the country’s nuclear weapons production complex and arsenal. These weapons, Kidwai said, have closed the
“space for conventional war.” Echoing this message, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry declared in
October 2015 that his country might use these tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict with India. There already have been
four wars between the two countries—in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999—as well as many war scares.
The United States, which at one time deployed over 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe aimed at Soviet
conventional forces, has expressed alarm about Pakistan’s plans. Amplifying comments made by President Barack
Obama, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest explained in April 2016 that “we’re concerned by the increased
security challenges that accompany growing stockpiles, particularly tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use on
the battlefield. And these systems are a source of concern because they’re susceptible to theft due to their size and mode
of employment. Essentially, by having these smaller weapons, the threshold for their use is lowered, and the[re is] risk
that a conventional conflict between India and Pakistan could escalate to include the use of nuclear weapons.”
Responding to US concerns, Kidwai has said that “Pakistan would not cap or curb its nuclear weapons programme or
accept any restrictions.” The New York Timesreported last year that so far, “an unknown number of the tactical weapons
were built, but not deployed” by Pakistan.
India is making its own preparations for nuclear war. The Indian Army conducted a massive military exercise in April
2016 in the Rajasthan desert bordering Pakistan, involving tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, and 30,000
soldiers, to practice what to do if it is attacked with nuclear weapons on the battlefield. An Indian Army
spokesman told the media, “our policy has been always that we will never use nuclear weapons first. But if we are
attacked, we need to gather ourselves and fight through it. The simulation is about doing exactly that.” This is not the first
such Indian exercise. As long ago as May 2001, the Indian military conducted an exercise based on the possibility that
Pakistan would use nuclear weapons on Indian armed forces. Indian generals and planners have anticipated such
battlefield nuclear use by Pakistan since at least the 1990s.
Driving the current set of Indian strategies and capabilities is the army’s search for a way to use military force to retaliate
against Pakistan for harboring terrorists who, from time to time, have launched devastating attacks inside India. In 2001,
Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed credit for an attack on India’s parliament. India massed troops on the border,
but had to withdraw them after several months. International pressure, a public commitment by Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf to restrain militants from future strikes, and Pakistan’s threat to use nuclear weapons if it was attacked caused
the crisis to wind down. Following the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai by Pakistan-based militants, General Deepak
Kapoor, then India’s army chief, argued that India must find a way to wage “limited war under a nuclear overhang.”
Paths to destruction. It could come to pass that Pakistan’s army uses nuclear weapons on its own territory to repel
invading Indian tanks and troops. Pakistan’s planners may intend this first use of nuclear weapons as a warning shot,
hoping to cause the Indians to stop and withdraw rather than risk worse. But while withdrawal would be one possible
outcome, there would also be others. It is more likely, for instance, that the use of one—or even a few—Pakistani
battlefield nuclear weapons would fail to dent Indian forces. While even a small nuclear weapon would be devastating in
an urban environment, many such weapons may be required to have a decisive military impact on columns of well-
dispersed battle tanks and soldiers who have practiced warfighting under nuclear attack.
India’s nuclear doctrine, meanwhile, is built on massive retaliation. In 2003, India’s cabinet declared nuclear weapons
“will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere … nuclear
retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.” According to Admiral Vijay
Shankar, a former head of Indian strategic nuclear forces, such retaliation would involve nuclear attacks on Pakistan’s
cities. Kidwai describes such Indian threats as “bluster and blunder,” since they “are not taking into account the balance of
nuclear weapons of Pakistan, which hopefully not, but has the potential to go back and give the same kind of dose to the
other side.” For nuclear planners in both countries, threatening the slaughter of millions and mutual destruction seems to
be the order of the day.
There are also risks short of war, of course. Nuclear weapon units integrated with conventional forces and ready to be
dispersed on a battlefield pose critical command-and-control issues. Kidwai believes that focusing on “lesser issues of
command and control, and the possibility of their falling into wrong hands is unfortunate.” He claims “Our nuclear
weapons are safe, secure and under complete institutional and professional control.” The implication is that
communications between the nuclear headquarters and deployed units in the field will be perfectly reliable and secure
even in wartime, and that commanders of individual units will not seek—or have the capability to launch—a nuclear
strike unless authorized.
It is difficult to believe these claims. Peering through the fog of war, dizzied by developments on a rapidly evolving
battlefield, confronting possible defeat, and fuelled by generations of animosity towards India as well as a thirst for
revenge from previous wars, it cannot be guaranteed that a Pakistani nuclear commander will follow the rules.

Add to this the risks in what now passes for peacetime in Pakistan. The Strategic Plans Division may dismiss fears that its
nuclear weapons will be hijacked. However, the military has rarely succeeded in anticipating and preventing major attacks
by militant Islamist groups in Pakistan. Look no further than the May 2011 attack on Karachi’s Mehran naval base. The
attackers, who may have numbered up to 20 and had insider help, “scaled the perimeter fence and continued to the main
base by exploiting a blind spot in surveillance camera coverage, suggesting detailed knowledge of the base layout,” The
Guardian reported. It took elite troops 18 hours to regain control of the base.
It is also unclear how the officers who are in charge of Pakistan’s military bases and those who make security-clearance
decisions are chosen, and whether their own commitment to fighting Islamic radicalism is genuine. In 2009, the former
commander of Pakistan’s Shamsi Air Force Base was arrested for leaking “sensitive” information to a radical Islamist
organization. In 2011, a one-star general serving in Pakistan’s General Headquarters was arrested for his contacts with a
militant group. In a religion that stresses its own completeness, and in which righteousness is given higher value than
obedience to temporal authority, there is room for serious conflict between piety and military discipline.
Grasping at straws? A first step to reducing all these nuclear dangers is to prevent an escalation of tensions. This must
start with Pakistan tackling the threat of Islamist militancy at home and preventing militant attacks across the India-
Pakistan border. The outlook is mixed on both fronts. Pakistan’s army accelerated its war against radical Islamist groups
after a 2014 attack on an army school in Peshawar that killed more than 140 students and staff. Despite military claims of
success, though, responding with massive force and inflicting countless deaths will not resolve what is at its core a
political and social problem. Ending the threat of radical Islam in Pakistan will require sweeping changes in public
attitudes and major policy reversals in many areas. These are nowhere in sight.
To its credit, Pakistan has recently been more forward-leaning in dealing with militants who attack India. Following the
assault on India’s Pathankot airbase in January 2016, Sartaj Aziz, foreign affairs adviser to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,
made the surprising revelation that a mobile phone number used by the attackers was linked to the militant group Jaish-e-
Mohammed based in Bahawalpur, Pakistan. To collect evidence for possible legal action against Jaish-e-Mohammed
leaders, Pakistan sent a fact-finding mission to Pathankot with the approval of the Indian government. This kind of
cooperation by the two governments is unprecedented.
Rather than limit cooperation to crisis management after an attack, Pakistan and India could agree on a South Asian
version of the Open Skies Treaty to provide each with limited access to the other’s air space for surveillance purposes.
India has an interest in monitoring possible militant camps within Pakistan and border areas where militants may cross.
Pakistan seeks early warning in case India is preparing to mount a surprise attack. The 1992 Open Skies Treaty, covering
the United States and fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and Russia and its former Soviet and Eastern
European partners, allows for controlled surveillance flights with agreed instruments such as photographic and video
cameras, radar, and infrared scanners. The goal is to promote “greater openness and transparency in their military
activities” and “to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements and to
strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management.” The United States and other parties to the Open
Skies Treaty could share their technical tools and flight management experience with Pakistan and India, as well as what
they’ve learned about the value of the agreement.
The two countries should also prepare in case things go wrong. The 1999 Lahore Agreement committed Pakistan and
India to “notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could
create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two
countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being
misinterpreted by the other.” The question is, who will each side call and how? One possibility is a direct line of
communication—a hotline—from Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division chief to the head of India’s Strategic Forces
Command. There are other hotlines, and they are not always used or used wisely, but in a crisis this may be better than
relying on television, Facebook, Twitter, or Washington.
Progress towards even such limited measures will confront the fact that in both India and Pakistan, nationalist passions
forged over seven decades are being reinforced by the institutional self-interests of emerging nuclear military-industrial
complexes and their political patrons and ideological allies. The United States and Soviet Union saw such deepening
militarization during the Cold War. The institutional forces and ideas—what the great English anti-nuclear activist,
thinker, and historian E.P. Thompson called “the thrust of exterminism”—proved so strong that even when the Cold War
ended, and the Soviet Union fell, the Bomb remained. With expansive and costly nuclear arsenal modernizations
underway in the United States, Russia, and the other established nuclear weapon states, the Bomb now seems ready for a
second life. Increasingly subject to the same exterminist forces, South Asia may be locked in its nuclear nightmare for a
very long time.

Q21

The Doha Development Round and Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations

The Doha Development Round and Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations

On Saturday, December 7th, 2013, the 9th World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference concluded in Bali
with the first agreement after 12 years of negotiation. The Bali Package featured agreement on four overarching areas:
trade facilitation, agriculture, cotton and development. Without some sort of achievement in Bali, many argued the
multilateral trade regime would become irrelevant. For instance, prior to the Bali conference, incoming WTO Director-
General Roberto Azevêdo noted that in the absence of an agreement, the world would “move on” relegating the WTO to
an “empty building” with “empty chairs” (Kanth 2014). As such, the Bali Package was a much needed life-line for the
WTO. Following the conference, world leaders expressed similar sentiments: US President Barack Obama praised the
agreement as a “rejuvenation of the multilateral trading system,” while EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso
stated that “the WTO is back on track and delivering reform” (“Success” 2013). However, critics of the Bali Package, and
the WTO negotiation process in general, are quick to note that the agreement papers over the tough issues, such as
agricultural subsidies, making meaningful agreement on those issues in the future much more unlikely. Furthermore, loose
language is prominent throughout the agreement. This essay will use realist assumptions to theoretically analyze the
structural challenges facing negotiators at the WTO.

Understanding International Trade Negotiations

Realists view international disagreements between states as the consequence of a rational pursuit of power (Waltz 1989,
40). Rational theories assume that state actors are instrumentally rational; they seek to maximize self-interest and act of
the basis of cost-benefit calculations. Trade is an opportunity to secure wealth from abroad through positive trade
balances. Thus, trade negotiations are a forum for the exercise of competing self-interested national preferences rather
than an arena for cooperation and mutual gain. As such, realists view international trade as a distributive, zero-sum game,
where one state’s gain is another’s loss. In this system, states must follow realpolitik in economic relations: be self-
serving and maximize wealth and relative gains (Doyle 1997, 18). Failure to do so threatens the state because a
disproportionate accumulation of material wealth by another state can serve as a basis for political power. States must aim
to promote key strategic industries and promote the domestic economy, even through the use of trade distorting measures
such as subsidies or tariffs. Realists view the international system as a jungle whereby each state is subject to threats from
others and must do what is needed to survive (Waltz 1989, 45). International relations between states is unlike domestic
politics because a central authority does not exist internationally to regulate the actions of power-seeking states. This
system is anarchic; conflict and the inability of states to cooperate internationally is a symptom of anarchy. Anarchy
further relegates countries to a permanent state of self-help. The most powerful[1] states define the contours of economic
cooperation in a manner that favours their interests. International institutions, such as the WTO, are an extension of the
power of dominant states.
Explaining State Behaviour in Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Negotiation theory distinguishes between distributive and integrative international negotiations: distributive negotiations
attempt to resolve conflicts of interest and feature positional and hard-bargaining strategies whereas integrative
negotiations[2] attempt to find common or complementary interests and solve problems confronting both parties (Odell
2009, 620). Most international negotiations feature elements of both distributive and integrative negotiation. However,
certain issues, such as conflicts over divisible issues[3], have less integrative potential and are less conducive to
cooperative behaviours. Odell, citing Walton and McKersie, argues that negotiations over economic issues are less likely
to generate integrative behaviours because these issues are inherently distributive or win-lose in nature: one side’s gain is
the other’s loss (Odell 2009, 620). Thus, in these conditions, realist assumptions regarding the zero-sum nature of
international negotiations are much more salient. As such, predictably, negotiations in the Doha Round have yielded much
more positional, hard-bargaining tactics amongst states despite the opportunities for mutual gains. For instance, in the
second day of talks, India, on behalf of the G33 – a coalition[4] of 46 states that have large domestic farm population –
caused an uproar when it made its acceptance of any agreement conditional on developing countries receiving an
indefinite waiver to continue food subsidy programs. India in effect adopted a positional approach and a ‘game-of-
chicken’ tactic. Indeed, through the consensus norm, the threat to block agreement is the most significant distributive
move (Odell 2009, 625). Moreover, because of the monolithic nature of the G33, its size and the relative weight of India
in trade negotiations, the threat was certainly credible. India sought to mitigate the implications of multilateral agreements
on its domestic food security programs and appease its constituents, especially in the midst of an upcoming general
election. The hard bargaining that ensued led to India receiving a temporary extension for certain trade distorting
measures to the benefit of its local industries. Consequently, protectionist policies and distributive tactics impede progress
in the WTO.
International trade has long been shown to contribute to welfare gains for the countries involved [5](Krugman and Obstfeld
2003, 3). The economic argument is that market distortions reward inefficient enterprises and divert resources (labour,
capital, etc.) to uneconomical production processes that would otherwise be used in the production of more efficient
goods. In this sense, although adversely affecting certain domestic sectors, free trade is optimal because it increases
overall output. Domestic industries are able to specialize in the areas where they have a comparative advantage
internationally. Nonetheless, as the Doha Round has demonstrated, the potential for mutual benefits has not pushed states
toward meaningful multilateral concessions or concrete agreements on contentious issues. Many states continue to defend
sizeable protectionist trade policies. Europe, for instance, will continue to spend approximately 50 billion euros a year
until 2020 on farm subsidies – eating up the largest share of the EU budget at 38% (Dunmore 2013). Despite reductions in
EU farm subsidies in recent years, countries such as France continue to forcefully defend its domestic agricultural sector,
which would be threatened by competition in world markets. In fact, agricultural trade is a cornerstone of the distributive
impasse at the WTO and trade disagreements in general. For instance, during negotiations under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – the predecessor to the WTO – the majority of trade disputes regarded agriculture (Davis
2004, 153). Economist Paul Krugman notes protectionist measures do “not make sense on any level… but nonetheless
govern actual policy” (1997, 115). Consequently, even though trade agreements intrinsically produce mutually beneficial
outcomes seemingly congruent with integrative enlarging-the-pie strategies, states continue to pursue relative gains
through the use of distributive negotiation tactics. These conditions increase the likelihood of paralysis during negotiation
especially in a multipolar setting.
Multilateral Negotiations and the Effect of Uncertainty and Complexity
In 1947, 23 countries were involved in the first world trade negotiations. In 2013, Laos and Tajikistan acceded to the
WTO. A year earlier, Russia, Montenegro, Samoa and Vanuatu joined the WTO. Today, WTO membership stands at 159
countries and accounts for 97 per cent of global trade (WTO 2013). The number and influence of non-state actors has also
increased, such as multinational corporations, epistemic communities and nongovernmental organizations. The sheer
number of participants increases the level of uncertainty and complexity as well as the likelihood of conflicting interests
and positions. As many developing countries have joined the WTO, they bring their own offensive and defensive concerns
(Polaski 2006, vii). Some want further access to the agricultural, textile or apparel sectors of wealthy nations, whereas
others want to maintain trade barriers for domestic manufacturing and services sectors. On the other hand, not
surprisingly, certain developed countries want the opposite. Indeed, as Krugman notes, it is a “game scored according to
mercantilist rules in which an increase in exports – no matter how expensive to produce in terms of other opportunities
foregone – is a victory, and an increase in imports – no matter how many resources it releases for other uses – is a defeat”
(1997, 115).

The opposing priorities within the Doha Round reflect important variations in the economies of developed and developing
nations. Generally, developing countries are abundant in unskilled labour and raw materials, whereas wealthy nations are
abundant in capital, the provision of services and heavier advanced industries. As a result, differing economies generate
differing national preferences in international trade negotiations – a condition that was not as prevalent in earlier trade
rounds with fewer developed actors dominating the talks. Those trade rounds featured more commonalities – not only in
economic priorities but also in culture – between the leading industrial economies. Polanski argues, with China joining the
WTO in 2001 and India and other developing countries much more engaged, it is “inevitable that current and future
bargaining rounds will be more complex and difficult than past negotiations” (Polaski 2006, vii). In fact, each round of
multilateral trade talks over the last 70 years has taken longer than the one that preceded it. Hampson and Hart concur
with Polanski, arguing that the greater the number of participants in a given negotiation setting, the less likely an
agreement can be reached that accommodates the interests of all parties (1995, 28-29). What’s more, if increasing the
number of actors in a given negotiation setting reduces the capacity to produce an agreement favourable to all, then the
inherent nature of such trade negotiations implies that there will be either winners and losers or no agreement at all. As
such, states must pursue self-help positional negotiation tactics during the Doha Round as decisions about which sectors
to liberalize or protect can make a significant difference in the distribution of wealth (Charlton and Stiglitz 2005, 295).
This makes reaching agreement much more challenging.

An increase in the number of actors also increases the volume of information. It becomes increasingly difficult for
negotiators to identify solutions, trade-offs or concessions to reach an agreement. The increasing interlinkages among
issues[6] and interconnections among states and coalitions within the multilateral trade system present significant data-
gathering and information-processing challenges, especially for weaker states with fewer negotiation resources (i.e.
number of staff or access to information). Communication becomes harder and the likelihood of misunderstanding
increases, particularly given the variations in culture and language. Even more mundane, parties may simply lose track of
key information. Therefore, rather than negotiation taking the form of a process of convergence toward a zone of
agreement, multilateral negotiations take on a character of puzzle-solving (Hampson and Hart 1995, 28-29). Such was the
case during the pre-negotiation phase leading up to the Bali Ministerial. Director-General Azevêdo sought to secure
consensus on key areas in advance of the Bali conference. However, despite significant negotiations, the parties failed to
reach consensus, leaving many complex technical issues in brackets prior to the Ministerial (“The WTO” 2013). This
puzzle-solving atmosphere is not conducive to agreement as states are less likely to support an agreement in the presence
of uncertainty. In addition, under conditions of heightened complexity and uncertainty, governments are more likely to
adopt ideological positions or simplified but firm goals (Hampson and Hart 1995, 31). Smaller states are more susceptible
to this as they are less likely to have the resources, such as manpower or access to information, to mitigate conditions of
complexity and uncertainty. Negotiating on the basis of ideology increases the likelihood of rigidity in one’s position and
is less conducive to integrative problem-solving approaches.
The Consensus Norm and the Role of Power
Davis notes that realist conceptions of power and interest alone cannot account for the behaviours of states during
negotiations (2004, 153). In this sense, strong states cannot always persuade weaker states to open their markets. In the
WTO, the consensus norm reduces the effects of power asymmetries and increases stability in negotiation (Pfetsch and
Landau 2000, 22). Zartman argues that weaker parties often use such procedural manipulations in the absence of structural
equality (1985, 122). For instance, on December 7th – a day after the negotiations in Bali were set to end – Cuba, whose
GDP per capita is 117th in the world, threatened to oppose any deal that did not ease America’s Cuban embargo (“The
WTO” 2013). Cuba, backed by other members of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (Bolivia, Nicaragua and
Venezuela), succeeded in adding language regarding the virtue of non-discrimination in the Ministerial Declaration. In
this sense, power is mediated through the institution.

Although these institutional features strengthen the bargaining position of weaker states, it nonetheless empowers
blocking coalitions[7] or those who seek to delay, hold up or block an agreement. These conditions are magnified as the
number of actors increases. With an increase in actors, not only does the potential for dissatisfaction increase but the zone
of agreement where all parties can be satisfied with the outcome decreases. Consequently, more actors entails a greater
potential for agreements to falter. What’s more, the agreements that do emerge from consensus often are more ambiguous
in order to conceal underlying disagreements. As Hampson and Hart argue, “consensus or mixed rules of procedure,
therefore, have a tendency to increase the risks of suboptimal outcomes in large groups where collective goods are
concerned” (1995, 32-33). Indeed, while the Bali Package is a noteworthy achievement, it leaves a lot on the table in
terms of suboptimal market distortions. As long as one country can impede an entire agreement the probability of reaching
meaningful progress on the most contentious issues through the WTO is low. For this reason, parties abandoned the single
undertaking approach – the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed to entice tough concessions – and
came to an agreement on the less contentious agenda items. This also makes agreement in the future on the tough issues
much more unlikely.
The Bali Package and the American BATNA
While the WTO reduces the effects of power asymmetries, critics of the Bali Package argue that the agreement
nonetheless disproportionately favours developed nations (Kanth 2014). Foremost, the agreement on Trade Facilitation
requires developing countries and LDCs to make legislative as well as infrastructure changes to reflect practices already
common in industrialized economies and streamline market access for foreign firms (Kanth 2014). Furthermore, while the
agreement calls for the provision of technical and financial assistance by wealthy nations, these terms are non-binding. In
reference to the development issues, negotiations took place between Nepal (representing the LDCs), the US and the
WTO Director-General Azevêdo. Kanth notes that the US adopted a take-it-or-leave it approach and Nepal walked away
from those discussions without receiving any binding commitments or any concrete, tangible and measurable benefits
(2014). The text is full of mitigating language, such as ‘should endeavour to’ and “most of the decisions essentially
reaffirm previous commitments” (“The WTO” 2013). As Kanth puts it, “the poorest countries agreed to the outcomes with
which they remained unhappy” (2014). One has to also acknowledge the role of power here: in a closed-door negotiation
between the US and Nepal, it is unsurprising that the US was able to use hard power tactics effectively. As such,
developed nations have received what they’ve long campaigned for – trade facilitation – without having to make tough
concessions in agriculture or development issues[8].
Certainly, realists would argue power asymmetries are one explanation for this outcome. However, power alone cannot
account for the agreement given the aforementioned mitigating effect of the consensus norm. Alternatively, Albin argues
the higher the value of a party’s Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), the less dependent the party is on
reaching an agreement and “the more it can afford to concede little, take risks and wait out the other side” (1999, 260).
The BATNA – the worst deal a negotiator will accept – defines the potential zone of agreement. Odell argues that how
parties perceive the alternatives to a negotiated agreement will affect behaviour (2009, 622). He goes on to hypothesis that
“a worsening in a party’s perceived outside option during talks will lead the negotiator to shift her strategy in the
integrative direction” (622). Indeed, the value of each country’s BATNA was subtly put into context prior to the Bali
Conference by Director-General Azevêdo. In addition to painting the grim picture of a vacant WTO, Azevêdo stated that
without an agreement the world “will move on with choices that will be not as inclusive or efficient as the deals
negotiated within these [WTO] walls” (Kanth 2014).

Undoubtedly, Azevêdo was putting the pressure on the developing countries to make greater concessions alluding to the
industrialized world moving on and negotiating outside of the WTO. For instance, many of the world’s leading economies
have pushed ahead with bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade agreements while negotiations at the WTO have stalled.
At the end of 2012, WTO members reported 546 such agreements. In fact, Mongolia is the only WTO member not to be a
part of one or more RTAs. Furthermore, prior to leaving, outgoing WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy indicated that
more will be done to align these agreements with the multilateral trade regime (WTO 2013, 14). As such, developing
countries and especially LDCs face a growing threat of having to accede to these agreements or face isolation from the
global trade system. Therefore, LDCs placed more emphasis on the importance of preserving the multilateral trade system
by reaching an agreement rather than pushing for additional concessions, thereby reducing the value of their BATNA
relative to that of the US (“The WTO 2013). In this sense, although developing countries are able to borrow power
through procedural tactics, the underlying systemic power dynamics still influenced the outcome of the negotiations by
strengthening the alternatives for the developed economies. After all, as articulated by Azevêdo, countries like the US do
not require meaningful multilateral trade agreements considering their success negotiating on a selective bilateral or
regional basis. Evidently then, the perceived alternatives to an agreement are a suitable predictor of state behaviour but
nonetheless underlying power dynamics remain influential.

The WTO: Moving Forward

If, as realists argue, power does play a significant role in multilateral trade negotiations, what will happen to the
multilateral trade system if international power dynamics shift? In 2012, for the first time in economic history, the GDP of
developing countries surpassed that of the developed economies (WTO 2013). In a blunt statement, the WTO noted that
“the essence of future world growth will come from developing countries” (WTO 2013). This entails that the distribution
of global power is shifting toward emerging markets, especially economies like China, India and Brazi (Wilkinson 2012,
400; Hopkins 2012). If the last 12 years is any indication, it is likely that a further shift in power will result in more
paralysis in the Doha Round. Wilkinson argues that paralysis at Doha is a symptom of the rise of these countries along
with the growing complexity of trade negotiations and the growing consensus that the global economic system requires
significant reform to address inequality. He states, the “only way to move beyond this is to provide answers to more
foundational questions about the purpose, function, future and value of the WTO” (Wilkinson 2012, 400). Yet, through
the current liberal world economy, the US elevated itself to a position of nearly unrivalled world leadership. And, it is
unlikely to capitulate to the demands of emerging economies. As a consequence, the trend toward preferential trade
agreements and regionalism will continue, as will paralysis at the Doha Round.
The WTO and the Bali Package
Abstract
Since the creation of the WTO by the Marrakech Agreement in 1994, the organization has assumed critical importance to
international trade. At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001 the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA) was created in an attempt to reform the international trading system. However, despite numerous
meetings an impasse developed that threatened the WTO’s very existence. However, in the Ninth Ministerial Conference
of the WTO in Bali, Indonesia on December 3-7, 2013 the Bali Package was created to resolve the DDA impasse.
Although all the remaining issues were to be resolved by July, 2014, impasse once again occurred. Only after the
Director General issued dire warnings on the potential impact to the WTO, was an agreement reached at a meeting of the
General Council on November 27, 2014 to accept the Bali Package and insert the changes into the WTO agreement.

Introduction

From 1995 to 2013 total international trade including exports and imports has grown in current dollars from $10.5 trillion
to $37.7 trillion or 360% (WTO, 2014). International trade is globalization’s driving force. “For decades, world trade has
grown on average nearly twice as fast as world production (U.S. Trust, 2014).” At the heart of this unprecedented trade
increase are the international trade agreements of NAFTA, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Eurozone, and
hundreds of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), bilateral agreements, Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), as well as
multilateral agreements.

International trade agreements not only bring the world’s family of nations closer together in a tight network, but are also
reshaping international politics. The 2014 Ukraine uprising began as Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych disregarded
financial assistance from the European Union instead choosing to receive financial assistance from Russia. This resulted
in the overthrow of Ukraine’s President Yanukovych, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and extensive hostilities with
Ukraine’s eastern provinces. The impact of trade relationships was emphasized when President Putin gave a speech at the
meeting of the Customs Union Heads of State with the newly elected President Poroshenko of Ukraine and European
Union representatives on August 26, 2014 where he stated:

…Ukraine is deeply integrated into

the CIS(Commonwealth of Independent States)

economic space.

We have developed unique production chains and created technological alliances. Russian capital represents about 32
percent of the Ukrainian banking system. In 2011, a free trade zone agreement (with Ukraine – comment added) was
signed within the CIS framework.

Russia has stated on numerous occasions that full acceptance by our Ukrainian friends of all the tariff liberalisation (sic)
requirements and the adoption of the European Union technical, sanitary and veterinary norms will have a negative impact
on the scope and dynamics of trade and investment cooperation in Eurasia (Putin Speech, August 26, 2014).

The international financial sanctions and trade restrictions against Russia as a result of the Ukrainian hostilities is having a
major economic impact on the country. The impacts on Russia lead to lower GDP growth, and an extremely restrained
national budget. While the sanctions and trade restrictions were the result of a major military conflict, the fundamental
issue was Ukraine’s choice between two different trade agreements, the CIS and the European Union. It is impossible to
separate trade agreements, regardless of their shape or form, from national as well as international political issues.
1994 and 1995 were critical years for international trade. In 1994 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was created and implemented, while the WTO was created by the Marrakech Agreement signed by 123 nations on April
15, 1994, basedon the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade Agreement (GATT) created in 1947, and was
implemented on January 1, 1995.

NAFTA’s membership consists of three nations: Canada, Mexico and the United States. As of June 26, 2014 the WTO
has 160 member nations. The WTO “deals with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure
that trade flows smoothly, predictably and freely as possible” (WTOc, 2014).

The WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001 initiated the Doha Rounds listing 21
separate trade subjects the terms of which had to be negotiated using the “single undertaking” concept whereby nothing is
agreed to unless all is agreed to. However, “… agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional
or a definitive basis” (WTOb, November 14, 2001). But the Single Undertaking concept has proven to be a challenge for
the Doha Development Agenda. At the WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva in December 2011 a statement was
released saying:

1. Ministers deeply regret that, despite full engagement and intensified efforts to conclude the Doha Development
Agenda single undertaking since the last Ministerial Conference, the negotiations are at an impasse.
2. Ministers acknowledge that there are significantly different perspectives on the possible results that Members can
achieve in certain areas of the single undertaking. In this context, it is unlikely that all elements of the Doha
Development Round could be concluded simultaneously in the near future (WTOc, December, 2011).

The Bali Package

Things looked very bleak indeed for the future of the Doha Rounds as well as threatening the future of the WTO itself.
However, in the WTO’s Ninth Ministerial Conference at Bali adopted the Bali Ministerial Declaration, and on December
7, 2013 a reaffirmation statement was made as part of the ‘Bali Package’:

We reaffirm the principles and objectives set out in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
We also recall the Declarations and Decisions we adopted at Doha and at the Ministerial Conferences we have held since
then and reaffirm our full commitment to give effect to them.

We particularly welcome the advances made in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), as represented by the Decisions
and Declarations we have adopted at our present session. These Decisions and Declarations signify that we have taken a
major step forward in the negotiations and attest to our strong resolve to complete the DDA (WTOe, December 2013).

The ministers attending the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference were ecstatic stating “With the Bali package you have
reaffirmed not just your commitment to the WTO — but also to the delivery of the Doha Development Agenda,” Mr
Azevêdo (Director-General) said. “The decisions we have taken here are an important stepping stone towards the
completion of the Doha round” (WTOe, December 2013). The ministers had worked around the clock from December 4th
until the early hours of December 6th to produce the ‘Bali Package,’ and they felt they had finally broken through the
deadlock of the original Doha meeting in 2001 where a broad agenda was developed that achieved little progress until this
conference. The Bali package was an important step forward for the Doha rounds which were previously dubbed the
“Dead Talking Rounds” when over tenyears of meetings resulted only in further disagreements usually between the
developed and underdeveloped national WTO members.
Basically the Bali Package includes three main areas. The first is Trade Facilitation and Least Developed Countries
(LDC). This is a critical area in international trade, which is an agreement to simplify customs procedures by reducing
costs and improving their speed and efficiency. “It will be a legally binding agreement and is one of the biggest reforms of
the WTO since its establishment in 1995” (WTOf, December, 2013). The major objectives of the trade facilitation
agreement is to accelerate customs procedures; facilitate trade by improving execution and costs; make trade more
transparent, reduce bureaucracy and corruption, and use technological advances. It also has provisions on goods in transit,
an issue particularly of interest to landlocked countries seeking to trade through ports in neighboring countries.
Additionally the trade facilitation package would provide assistance for developing and least developed countries by
updating their infrastructure, train customs officials, and associated costs. It is estimated by the WTO that the benefits
from the Trade Facilitation package to the world economy would range from $400 billion to $1 trillion by “reducing costs
of trade by between 10% and 15%, increasing trade flows and revenue collection, creating a stable business environment
and attracting foreign investment” (WTOf, December, 2013). As described by the WTO the trade facilitation decision is:

 a multilateral deal to simplify customs procedures by reducing costs and improving their speed and efficiency. It will
be a legally binding agreement and is one of the biggest reforms of the WTO since its establishment in 1995.
The objectives are: to speed up customs procedures; make trade easier, faster and cheaper; provide clarity, efficiency and
transparency; reduce bureaucracy and corruption, and use technological advances.

Part of the deal involves assistance for developing and least developed countries to update theirinfrastructure, train
customs officials, or for any other cost associated with implementing the agreement (WTOg, December, 2013).

Trade facilitation is a major obstacle for the LDCs, particularly those landlocked developing countries that have to cross
multiple borders to reach their markets. A World Bank study found that, on average, “ the cost of transporting a container
from an LLDC (Land Locked Developed Country – comment added) to a developed country port was about US$4,500,
about 20 percent more than from a coastal country” (World Bank, 2008). The net result of increased trade costs for the
LLDCs is depressed per capita income and slow gdp growth.
The second major area of the Bali Package is Agriculture and Cotton. This has been one of the most difficult and
controversial areas of the Doha Rounds. At the Bali meeting the WTO members worked on four proposals out of a much
larger number that were on the table in the Doha Round agriculture negotiations since 2008. The major areas of
contention and negotiation are:

1. Export subsidies (in the broadest sense) Agricultural export subsidies have been a major area of disagreement
between the developed and developing countries. This was a very difficult area of discussion for the Bali meeting.
The intention of the agreement is to have members “exercise utmost restraint” when implementing any form of export
subsidy. It is stated that they will “ensure to the maximum extent possible” that progress be made in eliminating all
forms of export subsidies, actual subsidies will be well below the permitted levels, and that disciplines will apply to
export policies that may have the same effect as subsidies.
2. Tariff quotas (also known as tariff-rate quotas, TRQs) are where import duties are lower on quantities within the
quotas and higher for quantities outside. There are issues regarding the sharing of quotas and related information to
exporting countries.
The lack of quota sharing including related information allegedly can cause an additional trade barrier. A 2012 quota
proposal remains on the table with Bali that exporters would either “accept quantities within the quotas, first come first
served, at the importing ports until the quota limit is reached, or they (importing nations – comment added) would issue
import licenses for every request (“automatic license on demand”) up to the quota limit.” (WTOh, Bali, 2013).

 Stockholding for food security. This occurs when governments buy food from farmers at supported prices to build up
food stocks for domestic consumption. This counts as “Amber Box” domestic support since, under the Amber Box
definition buying food from farmers could distort trade by affecting market prices and the quantities produced, and
therefore is subject to reduction commitments. Thus Amber Box support is limited up to 10 per cent of production.
However, the G-33, a coalition of
46 WTO developing nations, aka “Friends of Special Products” in agriculture, circulated a petition in November 2012 that
this would be renamed “Green Box” where support would be

unlimited (WTOi. Bali, 2013). However, this was too controversial to be agreed to in time for the Bali Conference, and
members began working on an interim solution to this issue where more flexibility would be provided in the Amber Box
definition, and members would temporarily refrain from implementing legal complaints to the WTO.

 General Services List. In this fourth category of the Bali agreement the G-33 developing nations want to expand the
list of general services to be included under the “Green box” definition providing unlimited support for land
rehabilitation, soil conservation and resource management, drought management and flood control, rural employment
programs, issuing land
ownership titles and settlement programs. However, in order for this to be supported by the WTO it must be proven that it
does not violate Section 2 of Annex 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture that they “have no, or at most
minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production” (WTOj, Uruguay Round).

The third area of the Bali Package is Development. This part of the package is basically unchanged from their original
Geneva versions. The provisions include duty-free, quota-free access for LDCs to export to developed country markets. It
also attempts to simplify preferential rules of origin for the LDCs that would make it easier for these countries to identify
products as their own goods, and qualify for preferential treatment in importing countries. It would also provide also
provide a ‘monitoring mechanism’ consisting of meetings and other methods for monitoring special treatment given to
developing countries (WTOg, December, 2013).

These three issues of the Bali package have been consistent areas of concern for the WTO. Of the three areas of the Bali
package, the agricultural negotiations have always been and still are the most difficult and tenacious for the Doha Rounds.

In the Bali agreement members agreed to adopt the Trade Facilitation protocol by July 31, 2014, but this date came and
went without any adoption by the members of the package. In fact progress on the Bali mandates did not move forward in
any of the three major areas of Trade Facilitation, Agriculture, or Development and LDC Issues. On October 16, 2014 the
Chairman of the General Council at a formal meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee summarized the progress of
the implementation of the Bali Decisions and Declarations by stating:”…the implementation of the Bali mandates in all
areas is not unfolding in a “business-as-usual” scenario. This impasse has already had a “freezing” effect on the Bali
implementation work in a number of bodies – and its impact may well further deepen and affect other areas of work”
(Statement, October 16, 2014). Each area had separate issues, but the end result was a “freezing” effect on the Bali
implementation work.

The seriousness of this impasse to the WTO was stated by the Director-General Roberto Azevedo:

As I see it (sic) the situation is clear as day:

First, we have not found a solution for the impasse. The deadline on the Trade Facilitation Agreement passed more than
two months ago. We are on borrowed time.

Second, as I feared, this situation has had a major impact on several areas of our negotiations. It appears to me that there is
now a growing distrust which is having a paralysing (sic) effect on our work across the board.

So we have to think about the consequences of the situation we’re in — and consider how this organization can work.
Again, this is something you have to talk about.

This could be the most serious situation that this organization has ever faced. I have warned of potentially dangerous
situations before, and urged Members to take the necessary steps to avoid them. I am not warning you today about a
potentially dangerous situation — I am saying that we are in it right now (Azevedo, October 16, 2014).

Furthermore, in an aside, the Director-General made an even more foreboding statement: “Frankly, we know that
Members have been talking about the other, non-multilateral options that are open to them. We may see these Members
disengaging.We may see that these Members pursue other avenues. We may see that these Members explore other tracks
— inside the WTO or outside (italics added) (Azevedo,October 16, 2014).
So, in the October 16, 2014 formal Trade Negotiations Committee meeting the Director General framed the Bali impasse
for the WTO as a make or break scenario. The risk seemed quite clear. Either progress would be made implementing the
Bali decisions, or the future of the WTO itself could be jeopardized. This would be a stark reality unless all areas of the
Bali package were unanimously accepted by the WTO membership.

On November 8, 2014 the Director-General in a speech before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members
states that the Bali “impasse has shut down multilateral negotiations in the organization” (Azevedo(a), November 8,
2014). He spoke about how there was an ongoing process of intensive consultations, and that three potential scenarios
emerged from these consultations. The first scenario was the development of a rapid solution for the impasse, which
would be the most desirable. The second scenario would be a continuing process of searching for an impasse solution,
which is where the WTO has essentially been since July 31, 2014 with the risk that the longer the process took the more
members would begin to disengage from the WTO. The third scenario is that WTO members would begin to look for
alternative ways to make progress with “any kind of non-multilateral approach” (Azevedo(a), November 8, 2014). The
latter scenario had two sub-scenarios where a plurilateral agreement would be developed either outside or inside the
WTO. This third scenario included the possibility that the terms of the Bali Package were put in place in a non-
multilateral agreement only with those members who agree leaving aside those who do not. An inside agreement could
also occur with only those members who concur. This currently is the case, for example, with the Information Technology
Agreement (ITA) which is a non-multilateral inside agreement with 52 WTO members.

However, the Director-General again states “without a solution to the impasse you could see the discussion on other
alternatives intensify in the coming weeks. In fact there is clearly already an active discussion taking place between
members on what the precise options might be” (Azevedo(a), November 8, 2014).

The hope was that the dire consequences of not reaching an agreement on the Bali package would incentivize the
members to move quickly toward a resolution. This would play out quickly.

Indeed, at a meeting of the General Council on November 27, 2014 the Director-General congratulated the WTO
members for adopting decisions related to public stockholding for food security purposes, the Trade Facilitation
Agreement and the post-Bali work. The Director-General stated “We have delivered today on a promise we made in Bali.
Now let’s make it count” (WTOk, November 27, 2014). Thus, the entireties of the Bali Ministerial Mandates were
affirmed breaking the critical impasse that existed after the December 2013 Bali ministerial meeting.

The Trade Facilitation protocol now allows the WTO to operationalize the Trade Facilitation training facility in Arusha,
Tanzania to enable LDCs in Africa to integrate into the global economy utilizing support from the UN Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, the International Trade Centre (ITC), as well as the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set by the Secretary General to conclude all the work of the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA). Additionally all ministerial agreements must be ratified by two thirds of the WTO member nations.

Bali Agreement Alternatives and their Consequences

The creation of the WTO in 1995, standing on the shoulders of the GATT agreement, provides at least three major
benefits for international trade. The first is the reduction, if not elimination, of protectionist measures and barriers by the
international trade community including tariffs. The second major contribution is the creation of the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) that evolved from the GATT’s dispute settlement procedure (DSP), although it is significantly strengthened,
and is regarded by the WTO as the central pillar of the multilateral trading system. The third major step is assisting
developing countries (LDCs) in building international trade thereby improving their economies as well as the provision of
special treatment and assistance for their development including provisions aimed at increasing trade opportunities
throughmarket access as well as providing flexibility in the implementation of WTO rules and commitments.

Of course, the breakthrough Bali agreements announced by the Director-General on November 27, 2014 removed a major
obstacle to further Bali Agreement progress as well as achieving agreement on the remaining issues of the DDA. The
importance of this was emphasized by the Director General when he expressed his concern on November 8, 2014 that
WTO members might begin to consider non-multilateral alternatives should the Bali Package fail to achieve consensus by
the WTO members. As discussed this could include either a plurilateral agreement, such as the WTO plurilateral
agreement on Government Procurement to which not all WTO members are a part, or spinoff non-multilateral agreements
either inside or outside the WTO.

But the major concern was the hundreds of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements including Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs), which are currently in place that could become the work around for a failed Bali agreement. These include the
trilateral NAFTA accord, the European Union and Eurozone members as well as hundreds of other agreements such as
Caricom in the Caribbean, Mercosur in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), the Common Market
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of west Africa States (ECOWAS), and numerous
others. Additionally, numerous other trade agreements are in progress. For example the United States is attempting to
complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region as well as the
Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) that would create a trans-Atlantic free-trade area covering Europe and North
America. An agreement between the US and the European Union has also been under negotiation since 2013 known as
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the intention of incorporating the NAFTA nations as well. This
“spaghetti bowl” of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral agreements reflects the lack of consensus that was the key issue
with the Doha rounds as well as the Director General’s previous concerns over the lack of progress with the Bali Accords.

If the Bali agreement failed to achieve consensus within the WTO in a relatively short time line, the WTO would enter a
new era threatening its very existence. The proliferation of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral agreements has been
created in part because of the more than ten years of the Doha Round stalemate. The all too convenient and practical fall
back for many of the member nations has been to simply create a trade agreement with their primary international trading
partners. However, this has added more complexity to an already complex global trading environment, as well as creating
potential push back against fulfillment of the Bali Package by those nations who are satisfied with their own trade
agreements creating possible resistance to upsetting these trade relationships by implementing the Bali package.

Nonetheless the November 27, 2014 consensus was reached based on the principles of the Bali agreement and the DDA.
In reality the Bali Package “represents … the first truly multilateral agreement negotiated under the auspices of the 20-
year-old organisation (sic), in what was seen by many as the last opportunity to save the Doha talks” (Bellman, 2014). By
inference the status of the already agreed upon and implemented “spaghetti bowl” of trade agreements could be negotiated
and managed at a future time, and the specter of overlapping and possibly conflicting trade agreements with the WTO
could be resolved within the general consensus of the Bali Package. Of course, in international trade this would simply
turn out to be another agenda item within the WTO. Over time the international trade “spaghetti bowl” could simply be
melded together assuming the WTO reached an agreement with the Bali package and the remaining DDA issues.

Opening up the “spaghetti bowl” to others would not only further enhance the strength and authority of the WTO, but also
open world of trade to all nations including the very challenged LDCs. All of this would be possible if the WTO utilizes
the single undertaking protocol by leveraging the success of the Bali Package on issues that have

challenged it ever since the initiation of the Doha Rounds in 2001. The Bali Agreement, with the excellent leadership of
the Director-General, has provided the impetus needed to achieve this goal.

At the General Council meeting of November 27, 2014 the three parts of the Bali Package were formally adopted
including their insertion into the WTO agreement. The final steps for the WTO are to reconcile all the remaining issues by
July, 2015, and have two thirds of the membership accept the Bali Package where each consenting member’s nation
completes an “instrument of acceptance” whereby “the head of state, the head of government, or the minister for foreign
affairs (the “Big Three”)” issues and signs the instrument” (WTOl, Trade Facilitation Agreement).

The final membership acceptance of the Bali Package will be a major step forward for the WTO whereby its power as a
trade resolution and administrative body will be greatly enhanced and empowered. This will revolutionize its ability to
strengthen and grow international trade using the unparalleled ability of its membership to reach consensus and overcome
overwhelmingly challenging obstacles for today and tomorrow.

Of course, more needs to be done to implement the Bali package, as well as to develop a post-Bali agenda for a newly
empowered WTO that no doubt will include how to manage the numerous external trade agreements.
Q22

Competition in the Indian Ocean

China and India increasingly vie for strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean, while also cooperating on some transnational
security issues.
Introduction
The Indian Ocean is the world’s third-largest body of water and has become a growing area of competition between China
and India. The two regional powers’ moves to exert influence in the ocean include deep-water port development in littoral
states and military patrols. Though experts say the probability of military conflict between China and India remains low,
escalated activities (such as port development and military exercises) and rhetoric could endanger stability in a critical
region for global trade flows. But the diverse nontraditional security challenges in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) also
offer areas of potential collaboration for China and India, as well as other regional actors.

What is the importance of the Indian Ocean?

The Indian Ocean covers at least one fifth of the world’s total ocean area and is bounded by Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula (known as the western Indian Ocean), India’s coastal waters (the central Indian Ocean), and the Bay of Bengal
near Myanmar and Indonesia (the eastern Indian Ocean). It provides critical sea trade routes that connect the Middle East,
Africa, and South Asia with the broader Asian continent to the east and Europe to the west. A number of the world’s most
important strategic chokepoints, including the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca through which 32.2 millions of barrels of
crude oil and petroleum are transported per day—more than 50 percent of the world’s maritime oil trade—are found in the
Indian Ocean Region, which itself is believed to be rich with energy reserves. Nearly 40 percent of the world’s offshore
petroleum is produced in the Indian Ocean, coastal beach sands and offshore waters host heavy mineral deposits, and
fisheries are increasingly important for both exports and domestic consumption.

Why is the Indian Ocean a source of competition?

China and India are dependent on energy resources transported via the secure sealanes in the Indian Ocean to fuel their
economies. India imports nearly 80 percent of its energy, mostly oil from the Middle East, and is due to overtake Japan as
the world’s third-largest energy consumer (behind China and the United States). According to a U.S. Department of
Defense report, 84 percent of China’s imported energy resources passed through Strait of Malacca from the Indian
Ocean in 2012. As Beijing and New Delhi press to maintain economic growth, their dependency on the safe transport of
resources will likely intensify. China’s growing global influence and India’s rapid economic rise have heightened the
ocean’s strategic value. Meanwhile, the United States’ rebalance to Asia—shifting from a foreign policy dominated by the
Middle East to one more centered on Asia—has also been a contributing factor elevating concern over Indian Ocean
security. Diverse security challenges affect the region ranging from natural disasters to concerns over energy security,
piracy, and military posturing.

How are China and India competing in the Indian Ocean?

Both countries have developed initiatives to bolster infrastructure and other connections in the region, which the World
Bank describes as among the “least economically integrated.” Competition between Beijing and New Delhi is not
necessarily overt, but each country is seeking to strengthen ties with smaller regional states to secure their respective
security and economic interests.

Beijing’s regional vision, backed by $40 billion of pledged investment, outlines its One Belt, One Road plan—combining
the revitalization of ancient land-based trade routes, the Silk Road Economic Belt, with a Maritime Silk Road. China’s ties
with regional states have deepened, including the influx of Chinese capital into construction projects in Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Since launching counterpiracy operations in 2009, Beijing has become increasingly
active in the region. China has also undertaken efforts to modernize its military, particularly its naval deployment
capabilities to protect overseas interests like personnel, property, and investments. Experts also argue that Beijing’s forays
into what is at times described as India’s neighborhood are driven by China’s excess capacity challenges—incentivizing
Chinese firms out of domestic markets to compete in and open new markets abroad.

For its part, India sees itself as the natural preeminent regional power. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has doubled-down
on fostering stronger diplomatic, economic, and security ties with IOR maritime states as a means to strengthen India’s
economy, establish its role a driver of regional growth , and simultaneously diminish China’s growing appeal, writes
CFR’s Alyssa Ayres.
“It is India’s neighbourhood that holds the key to its emergence as a regional and global power,” writes former Indian
foreign secretary Shyam Saran. Though Beijing deflects claims of hegemonic aspirations, it identifies security in the IOR
as a primary concern for Chinese “core interests.” In 2015, a white paper charting China’s military strategy indicated a
shift of People’s Liberation Army Navy to focus on both offshore water defense and open seas protection. Chinese
behavior suggests that Beijing seeks to establish a persistent regional maritime presence. It now boasts a semipermanent
naval presence through its counterpiracy activities in the Indian Ocean and has more aggressively asserted itself in the
Pacific with extensive patrols and land reclamation projects in disputed waters.

It is India’s neighbourhood that holds the key to its emergence as a regional and global power.

Shyam Sara, Former Indian Foreign Secretary

China’s ambitions in the region have been described by many scholars by the “string of pearls” metaphor, which holds
that China is taking on economic and investment projects with Indian Ocean states to secure ports or places where its
military forces could set up naval facilities or at the very least, refueling and repair stations. Chinese experts dismiss this,
claiming that China seeks access, not bases, for economic gain. C. Raja Mohan, director of Carnegie India, a regional
center of the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment think tank, argues that as rising powers, China and India’s pursuit of
partnerships with smaller regional states is inevitable. “Everyone is playing this game,” he says. “Bases is going to be the
name of the game in the Indian Ocean, and that game is going to be pretty attractive in the coming years.”

Still, “maritime competition between China and India is still nascent and should not be overblown,” cautions CFR’s
Daniel S. Markey in a Contingency Planning Memorandum. Still, he writes that a “tit-for-tat politico-military escalation”
is possible in the larger Indo-Pacific, a region spanning both the Indian and Pacific oceans.

What fuels China-India tensions?

China-India relations are fraught, colored by historical disputes and the perceived threat to India of China’s rise. Tensions
have persisted despite overtures by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Much of the
friction stems from a longstanding dispute along a 2,400-mile border in India’s Arunachal Pradesh and China’s Tibet and
the legacy of the 1962 Sino-Indian War along the Himalayan border.

The expansion of a Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean has heightened India’s concerns. Beijing says its activities are
commercially motivated and intended to better protect its interests and people abroad. However, Brahma Chellaney of the
Center for Policy Research (CPR), an independent Indian think tank, argues a ramped up Chinese presence in the Indian
Ocean and elsewhere is consistent with Xi Jinping’s intention of making maritime power central to achieving Chinese
dominance in Asia.

While China’s aims are disputed, both sides continue to ramp up military capabilities in the ocean region. China continues
to deploy greater numbers of naval forces to support counterpiracy operations in the western Indian Ocean, and invests
and sells arms, including tanks, frigates, missiles, and radar, to India’s neighbors. Beijing is currently restructuring its
military: Xi Jinping announced in September 2015 that the People’s Liberation Army would cut 300,000 of its troops to
redistribute resources to sea and air capabilities. As China adapts its military force to meet its global ambitions, its
posturing has grown bolder. In October 2015, China finalized the sale of eight submarines to Pakistan, and in recent years,
Chinese submarines have docked at the Sri Lankan port of Colombo and the Pakistani port of Karachi. More still,
Beijing’s land reclamation efforts and assertive behavior in the Pacific could bleed into the region, suggest the U.S. Naval
War College’s Andrew Erickson and Kevin Bond.

Bases is going to be the name of the game in the Indian Ocean, and that game is going to be pretty attractive.

1. Raja Mohan, Director, Carnegie India

India is also reinforcing its regional maritime presence. “Activating partnerships and expanding capabilities in the Indian
Ocean has been central to our quest for security,” said Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar at the launch
of Carnegie India in April 2016. The country has vowed to spend billions to build up its navy, including anti-submarine
capabilities, has sent vessels to visit the South China Sea, and called for freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution
of territorial disputes as part of its Act East policy. The construction of military bases, modernized equipment and fleets,
new maritime assets, and the expansion of security ties are all part of New Delhi’s push to assert itself as the region’s
leader. Modi initiated the first bilateral India-Australia exercises and India participated in multilateral naval games in the
Bay of Bengal with the United States, Australia, and Japan. David Brewster of Australian National University says there
is little doubt that despite India’s traditional principle of nonalignment, outreach to the United States, Australia, and Japan
are calculated moves that could play a significant role in counterbalancing China.

What other countries have strategic interests in the IOR?

Small regional states, such as Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles and Sri Lanka, are recipients of both Chinese
and Indian aid and investment, primarily for transport and infrastructure development. The majority of their foreign policy
ties are determined by what deals can be made to help them meet their national development goals, says Nilanthi
Samaranayake of Virginia-based CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization.

Global powers from outside of the region also have an interest in maintaining the ocean’s security. The United States
operates a naval support facility—Diego Garcia—on UK-leased territory in the central Indian Ocean, while France
maintains a presence in the region from Reunion, its Indian Ocean island outpost. Australia has a modern naval force
operating in the ocean, and the IOR is increasingly featured in defense, national security, and maritime strategies
developed in Canberra.

What are transnational concerns in the ocean?

Despite the rise in competition, multilateral cooperation involving China, India, and other states, takes place on issues
including piracy, disaster relief, and drug smuggling. The following areas show potential for expanded cooperation:

Counterpiracy: Piracy has been costly to ocean-faring traders but global and regional responses have shown success.
Oceans Beyond Piracy, a Colorado-based non-profit, estimates that the economic cost of piracy off the Somali Coast
amounted to $2.3 billion in 2014, a drop from the estimated $5.7–$6.1 billion loss two years prior.

Counterpiracy efforts near the Gulf of Aden have been the most successful manifestation of regional cooperation. More
than eighty countries, organizations, and industry groups participate in operations in the IOR under the auspices of the ad
hoc, voluntary Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), created in January 2009 in response to UN
Security Council Resolution 1851 on Somali piracy and armed robbery at sea. Since military cooperation began, the
volume of attacks has shrunk. Yet experts warn that pirates have turned to more sophisticated equipment and if naval
pressure in the western Indian Ocean is reduced, pirate activity would rise again.

China and India carry out anti-piracy activities independently, deploying naval vessels to escort merchant ships, provide
protection, conduct rescue operations, and confiscate contraband. In April, China dispatched its twentieth naval escort task
force to the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, India has prevented forty piracy attempts and developed an online registration
service for merchants to request Indian naval escorts.

Search and Rescue: Another recent example of cooperation was the search effort for the Malaysia Airlines Flight 370,
which disappeared en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing in March 2014. At the height of operations, twenty-six
countries, including China and India, contributed to the search mission. Wreckage believed to be from the flight was
discovered in July 2015.

Disaster Relief: There is room for growth on humanitarian aid and disaster relief cooperation. After the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami, governments, including Australia, France, India, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the UK, and
the United States, participated in extensive relief and rehabilitation efforts. Separately, China disbursed more than $62.2
million in aid, shipped supplies, and dispatched medical and rescue teams. More than a decade later, the IOR’s
vulnerability to natural disasters and the subsequent effects of climate change could provide impetus for more extensive
collaboration.

Fisheries: Consumers in Indo-Pacific countries on average obtain 20 to 50 percent of their animal protein from fish, and
industrial fishing is an important export for smaller countries in the IOR. Regional players identify overfishing and
environmental degradation as serious risks to sustainable economic development and food security, but mechanisms to
establish sustainable fisheries have not been effective. The Stimson Center’s David Michel blames challenges to
cooperation on the region’s existing security architecture: the majority of institutions, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission, only operate at a sub-regional level or focus on specific species.

What are the prospects for improved regional governance?

Experts say there is a growing need for an effective regional security architecture, similar to extant mechanisms among
major powers in the East and South China seas, to address the IOR’s diverse challenges. Regional multilateral
organizations, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which facilitates the exchange of military views to
enhance communication and transparency across the region’s naval forces, do exist. However, experts say IOR members
must undergo an extensive region-building project for countries to be willing to act together more effectively.

China and India have expressed eagerness to assume greater responsibility in policing maritime global commons and to be
recognized as major powers. China’s activities are likely to expand in conjunction with its One Belt, One Road initiative,
but this does not have to come at India’s expense, say some experts. “India is going to have to come to terms with China’s
entry into the Indian Ocean,” states CNA’s Samaranayake. New Delhi could also benefit from partnering with Beijing to
integrate the region. Broader initiatives like the BRICS Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) are also pulling India into to a larger leadership role alongside China.

The biggest challenge to creating coordinated effective action across the Indian Ocean is the lack of institutions of
governance that cover the whole space, says CFR’s Alyssa Ayres. “It may sound mundane, but institutionalized
organizations with a regular diplomatic calendar and senior officials meeting to work on an agenda drive processes of
consultation and action.”
Q23

Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Ocean

INTRODUCTION
The arenas of dispute here are South China Sea and East China Sea. South China Sea (SCS) is the largest marginal sea in
the West Pacific region. It covers an area of 3.5 million square kilometers. It is located south of mainland China and the
island of Taiwan, west of the Philippines, north of Kalimantan and Sumatra, and east of the Malay and Indo-China
peninsulas. It is linked with the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca in the southwest. Its importance can be judged
from the fact that $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes through it every year. This implies that about 30 percent of all
maritime trade passes through the South China Sea every year, including about $1.2 trillion worth of goods bound for
American ports. Moreover, the seabed is a potentially rich source for oil and natural gas. China claims most of the South
China Sea. Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei have overlapping claims. In the East China Sea, Beijing is
at loggerheads with Japan over a group of uninhabited islands.

SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE: RECENT SCENARIO

China argues it has sovereign authority around each of its newly built islands within a 12-mile boundary, an argument
rejected by neighboring countries as well as by the United States. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea — which
Beijing has signed — does not recognize artificially constructed outposts as legitimate islands. China claims most of the
South China Sea. Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei have overlapping claims (as shown in the figure
above). The United States and its partners in Southeast Asia have grown increasingly worried by China’s massive
reclamation in the Spratly Islands (shown above). According to the Pentagon, in less than two years, China built outposts
on top of seven reefs covering more than 3,000 acres. In August 2015, a Pentagon report on Pacific maritime security
concluded: “China has now reclaimed 17 times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past
40 years, accounting for approximately 95 percent of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands”. Other countries over the
years have also dredged up sand and piled it on top of reefs or rocks to support their claims. But land reclamation carried
out by Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines adds up to an area of less than 200 acres (as of 2016), and it
occurred, as per the US, over decades — not months.

Washington has accused Beijing of militarising the South China Sea after creating artificial islands. Beijing, in turn, has
criticised increased US naval patrols and exercises in Asia as the violation of China’s sovereignty.

China has built three airstrips on its outposts in the Spratlys, installed radar and communication gear, and dredged deep
ports that could accommodate large warships. U.S. officials said the construction work appears aimed at creating a
military network on the man-made islands, which they fear could be used to coerce smaller countries into bowing to
Beijing’s territorial ambitions. In such a scenario, China could declare an Air Defense Identification Zone, orADIZ, in the
area, as it did a few years ago in the East China Sea — where Beijing is at loggerheads with Japan over a group of
uninhabited islands. Under an ADIZ, Beijing could demand all aircraft entering the area provide their flight route and
abide by instructions from the Chinese military. This could threaten the US interests.

Beijing has repeatedly said the construction work is mainly for civilian purposes. But satellite images of the islands
published by the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies show a host of facilities with the
potential for military applications being developed, including as many as three runways. One of these is 3,000 metres
long.

The map below shows why so many countries are worried about China’s actions in the South China Sea. From Hainan
Island just off the Chinese coast to militarized outposts in the Spratly and Paracel island groups, China has sketched a
triangle of potential domination which could enable air defense zones, aggressive naval patrols, and radar and air defense
stations.

Q24

Millenium Development Goals

At the Millennium Summit in September 2000 the largest gathering of world leaders in history adopted the UN
Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a
series of time-bound targets, with a deadline of 2015, that have become known as the Millennium Development Goals.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the world’s time-bound and quantified targets for addressing extreme
poverty in its many dimensions-income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion-while promoting
gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability. They are also basic human rights-the rights of each person
on the planet to health, education, shelter, and security

The world has made significant progress in achieving many of the Goals. Between 1990 and 2002 average overall
incomes increased by approximately 21 percent. The number of people in extreme poverty declined by an estimated 130
million 1. Child mortality rates fell from 103 deaths per 1,000 live births a year to 88. Life expectancy rose from 63 years
to nearly 65 years. An additional 8 percent of the developing world’s people received access to water. And an additional
15 percent acquired access to improved sanitation services.

But progress has been far from uniform across the world-or across the Goals. There are huge disparities across and within
countries. Within countries, poverty is greatest for rural areas, though urban poverty is also extensive, growing, and
underreported by traditional indicators.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the epicenter of crisis, with continuing food insecurity, a rise of extreme poverty, stunningly high
child and maternal mortality, and large numbers of people living in slums, and a widespread shortfall for most of the
MDGs. Asia is the region with the fastest progress, but even there hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme
poverty, and even fast-growing countries fail to achieve some of the non-income Goals. Other regions have mixed
records, notably Latin America, the transition economies, and the Middle East and North Africa, often with slow or no
progress on some of the Goals and persistent inequalities undermining progress on others.

The Eight Millennium Development Goals are:

1. to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;

2. to achieve universal primary education;
3. to promote gender equality and empower women;
4. to reduce child mortality;
5. to improve maternal health;
6. to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;
7. to ensure environmental sustainability; and
8. to develop a global partnership for development.
Q25

What Is Globalization?

Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of different
nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. This process has
effects on the environment, on culture, on political systems, on economic development and prosperity, and on human
physical well-being in societies around the world.

Globalization is not new, though. For thousands of years, people—and, later, corporations—have been buying from and
selling to each other in lands at great distances, such as through the famed Silk Road across Central Asia that connected
China and Europe during the Middle Ages. Likewise, for centuries, people and corporations have invested in enterprises
in other countries. In fact, many of the features of the current wave of globalization are similar to those prevailing before
the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

But policy and technological developments of the past few decades have spurred increases in cross-border trade,
investment, and migration so large that many observers believe the world has entered a qualitatively new phase in its
economic development. Since 1950, for example, the volume of world trade has increased by 20 times, and from just 1997
to 1999 flows of foreign investment nearly doubled, from $468 billion to $827 billion. Distinguishing this current wave of
globalization from earlier ones, author Thomas Friedman has said that today globalization is “farther, faster, cheaper, and
deeper.”

This current wave of globalization has been driven by policies that have opened economies domestically and
internationally. In the years since the Second World War, and especially during the past two decades, many governments
have adopted free-market economic systems, vastly increasing their own productive potential and creating myriad new
opportunities for international trade and investment. Governments also have negotiated dramatic reductions in barriers to
commerce and have established international agreements to promote trade in goods, services, and investment. Taking
advantage of new opportunities in foreign markets, corporations have built foreign factories and established production
and marketing arrangements with foreign partners. A defining feature of globalization, therefore, is an international
industrial and financial business structure.

Technology has been the other principal driver of globalization. Advances in information technology, in particular, have
dramatically transformed economic life. Information technologies have given all sorts of individual economic actors—
consumers, investors, businesses—valuable new tools for identifying and pursuing economic opportunities, including
faster and more informed analyses of economic trends around the world, easy transfers of assets, and collaboration with
far-flung partners.

Globalization is deeply controversial, however. Proponents of globalization argue that it allows poor countries and their
citizens to develop economically and raise their standards of living, while opponents of globalization claim that the
creation of an unfettered international free market has benefited multinational corporations in the Western world at the
expense of local enterprises, local cultures, and common people. Resistance to globalization has therefore taken shape
both at a popular and at a governmental level as people and governments try to manage the flow of capital, labor, goods,
and ideas that constitute the current wave of globalization.

To find the right balance between benefits and costs associated with globalization, citizens of all nations need to
understand how globalization works and the policy choices facing them and their societies.

Q26

Middle East crisis

What you must know about the schisms fueling today’s violent upheavals.
The seemingly sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria, ISIS) in the summer of 2014 to be- come the Middle East region’s most dangerous threat has shocked and puzzled
most Western observers. Although the “Arab Spring,” the upheavals across the Muslim world that began in earnest in
2011 and continue in various forms today, created the immediate conditions for the emergence of ISIL, the root causes
date back decades – even centuries. Indeed, over the centuries, the strong bonds formed by kinship and religious solidarity
have too often been used by those with violent agendas to create schisms within the Muslim world that include but go well
beyond the split between Islam’s two major denominations, Sunni and Shia, whose antagonism began over 1,300 years
ago in A.D. 642.

Therefore, any attempt to understand today’s Middle East crisis must begin with examining the schisms – essentially the
civil war within Islam – that are fueling the ongoing violent clashes.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE COLLAPSE

The war within Islam was reignited with the dissolution of the caliphate, the vast Muslim empire that at its height
encompassed the Middle East, North Africa, southwest Asia and parts of Europe. The Ottoman Turks took over the
caliphate in 1299, transforming it into the Ottoman Empire. The empire peaked in the 1500s but the tide turned against it
when the 1683 Ottoman siege of Vienna failed. Centuries of decline followed until it reached its nadir at the beginning of
the 20th century when the once mighty empire became known as the “Sick Man of Europe.” By the eve of World War I,
the Ottomans had lost their ability to impose Sharia (Islamic law) on the empire’s non-Muslim population, thus changing
the nature of its rule from an Islamic caliphate to a de facto secular state.

World War I was the final straw that broke the empire’s back. When the European war broke out, Germany’s kaiser
appealed to the sultan of the Ottoman Empire for his support to spread the war with Britain and France beyond Europe.
Sultan Mehmed V obliged by declaring jihad against the British, French and Russian occupiers of his former lands.
However, the decision to side with Germany and the Central Powers proved disastrous. With the Central Powers’ defeat
in 1918, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its remaining imperial possessions beyond Anatolia (modern Turkey).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged as the leader of Turkey in the aftermath. Atatürk wanted to bring Turkey into the modern
era by transforming it into a European-style state. In 1922 he abolished the sultanate, sending Mehmed into exile, and in
1924 he officially replaced Sharia with secular law for Turkey’s Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire took with it the last vestiges of the caliphate. The resulting separation of mosque
and state, however, seemed catastrophic to many Muslims who considered that such a separation threatened the religious
and cultural lives of the faithful.

MILITANT ISLAMISM BORN

The dissolution of the caliphate triggered the birth of militant Islamism. The Egyptian Hasan al-Banna declared Atatürk’s
actions “the greatest crime in human history” while chafing under the rule of the Egyptian Wafd Party. Al-Banna blamed
the Muslim decline on Western influence and secularism as personified in the “treason” of Atatürk. The only way out of
the downward spiral, al-Banna claimed, was to return to Islamic purity and Sharia. Therefore, he founded the Muslim
Brotherhood in 1928 as the engine of change to make it happen, and the group operated as an Islamist underground
opposition to the ruling Egyptian government. Al-Banna became an enemy of the state and was eventually assassinated in
1949.

One of al-Banna’s acolytes, Sayyid Qutb, emerged as the Muslim Brotherhood’s most influential theorist and prolific
writer. He codified the doctrine that inspires the Brotherhood and al-Qaida to this day. Qutb believed that the Muslim
world could return to its former greatness by overthrowing the “Near Enemy” (the region’s secular dictators and their
apostate regimes) and by driving out the “Far Enemy” (the West with its un-Islamic democracy and man-made law). He
also advocated the acceptability of killing Muslims who were insufficiently Islamic.

The Near Enemy autocratic states were too powerful to overthrow, so the Islamists shifted their focus to the Far Enemy.
They believed that if they could chase Western influence out of the Middle East, they would eliminate the Near Enemy’s
backers, exposing them to defeat. Obviously, Qutb became an enemy of the state, and he was hanged in 1966 for his part
in a plot to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The Muslim Brotherhood persisted in the shadows, backing Palestinian unrest in Israel while scheming against Egypt’s
“pharaonical” rulers. Muslim Brotherhood member Ayman al-Zawahiri participated in the plot to assassinate Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat in 1981, was jailed, and eventually ended up in Afghanistan, where he joined Osama Bin Laden
and became al-Qaida’s spiritual adviser.

SHIA ISLAMISM
Militant Shia Islamism struck its first major blow by over- throwing the Shah of Iran and taking over his nation in 1979.
In a familiar pattern, the originally moderate anti-shah uprising was co-opted by radicals led by the exiled Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, thereby converting the Iranian Revolution into the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini became the man
behind the movement, preaching rule of the jurist (the supreme leader) and Sharia over secular law. Khomeini rejected the
secular provisional government of Shapour Bakhtiar by declaring, “I shall kick their teeth in. I appoint the government.”

Khomeini picked his own prime minister, warning that disobedience to him was a “revolt against God.” The Shia Islamic
Republic was born. Khomeini built a “dual state” with a conventional government consisting of executive and legislative
bodies acting as Iran’s face to the world. The real power, however, resided in Iran’s Islamist shadow government of
imams, mullahs and ayatollahs – the face of Iran to the Muslim world.

In 1980 Khomeini exported the Islamic Revolution to Iraq, precipitating a bitter eight-year war against Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated regime. In 1985 Khomeini inserted Islamism into the Lebanese conflict by creating
Hezbollah. Hezbollah united the Lebanese Shia, undermined Lebanon’s government, introduced suicide bombing and
served as Iran’s proxy, waging jihad against Israel from terrorist bases in Lebanon.

SUNNI ISLAMISM
Militant Sunni Islamism, ever present in the Wahhabi tribal community of Saudi Arabia, found its inspiration on the
battlefields of Afghanistan. From 1979-92 Islamists fought the Soviets, and from 1992-96 Sunni and Shia Islamists fought
each other. The Afghan seesaw gave birth to the Taliban and, of course, al-Qaida, as it inflamed Sunni Islamism in the
region and around the world. The Taliban ruled from 1996- 2001 when they were unseated by Operation Enduring
Freedom, giving way to the current fight between militant Islamists and moderates in Afghanistan.

Islamists lost the 1992-2004 Algerian Civil War when leaders of the two main opposition groups (the Salafst Group for
Teaching and Combat, and the Armed Islamic Group) were killed. Despite the loss, however, the conflict sparked the
birth of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which continues to seek to overthrow the Algerian government and to
establish an Islamic state that would encompass much of North Africa. (See Special Feature, September 2013 issue
of ACG.)
ARAB SPRING
The wave of demonstrations, protests, riots and civil wars known as the “Arab Spring” began as a moderate revolution
against the region’s autocrats and dictators, and it aspired to install modern democratic governments. However, the Arab
Spring became an “Islamist Winter” – a religion-driven sectarian counterrevolution designed to install Islamist
governments. It has transitioned back to a moderate counter-counterrevolution designed to preserve the original intent of
the Arab Spring. But during this latter stage, the season of change began to morph again into a Muslim civil war.

The timeline of revolution, counterrevolution and counter-counterrevolution that the Arab Spring has unleashed across the
Muslim world reveals the ebb and flow of the competing movements:

 Iran, 2009: Moderates lost the presidential election, then contested the results; the Green Movement protesting the
fraudulent election was repressed.
 Tunisia, 2010-11: Dictator Zine el Abidine Ben Ali was ousted; Islamist-leaning government of Mohamed
Ghannouchi took over.
 Egypt, 2011-13: Dictator Hosni Mubarak was ousted; Islamist Mohamed Morsi took over; Morsi and the Islamists
were ousted by a coup led by Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi.
 Libya, 2011-14: Dictator Moammar Gadhaf was ousted; moderates under Mustafa Abdul Jalil created a “transitional
government”; factional power struggle continues.
 Yemen, 2011-14: Dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down; moderates came in under Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi;
civil war between al-Qaida and al-Houthi continues.
 Syria, 2011-14: Crushed uprising against dictator Bashar al-Assad led to the formation of the moderate Free Syrian
Army (FSA); FSA successes prompted Iran to back the Assad regime; ill-equipped, unsupported FSA gave way to
well-equipped, well-trained Islamists (ISIS) seeking Assad’s overthrow; civil war between Assad regime, Iran’s
proxies, FSA and Islamists continues.
 Bahrain, 2011-14: The Sunni monarchy clashed with its Shia subjects who were demonstrating for greater political
freedom and respect for human rights; inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, protesters held their ground until a brutal
crackdown arrested nearly 3,000 Shia oppositionists; some protests continue.

ENTER THE ISLAMIC STATE

The Islamic State (ISIL, or ISIS) was the first Islamist terrorist group to make the leap to pseudo-state/“statelet” status, but
it was a long journey to that point. The group went from near extinction to near domination in some seven years and it
elevated the Sunni-Shia schism to all-out civil war. While most Sunni states hesitate to challenge Shia-led Iran, ISIL has
said it will fight the Iranians and that it will begin by killing all its apostate Shia supporters in Iraq.

The Islamic State was founded in 2004 by Jordanian jihadi Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as a terror start-up group called the
Organization of Monotheism and Jihad. Al-Zarqawi’s bloody operations made headlines and attracted the attention of
terror group leaders in Pakistan who arranged a merger, prompting al-Zarqawi to swear loyalty to Osama Bin Laden and
al-Qaida. The group then changed its name to the Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers. This
clunky name was too hard to remember so the world just called them Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). Al-Zarqawi grabbed
international headlines with his 2004 video of the beheading of American Nicholas Berg. He also drew scrutiny from U.S.
forces in Iraq, which killed him in 2006.

Al-Zarqawi’s death brought in Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi as leader and a new group name, the Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI).Baghdadi was as vicious as his predecessor, earning his group theire of the notoriously independent tribes of
Iraq’s Anbar province,who joined the United States against it. Baghdadi was killed in 2010and was replaced by a new
Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, thecurrent boss. ISI barely avoided total defeat by the Anbar Awakeningby moving to
Syria to join the fight against Assad.

In 2013 ISI changed its name again, becoming the Islamic Stateof Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The name was intended to unite
Syrian and Iraqi Sunni jihadis against Assad’s Shia state. It was an overt challenge to the Iranian-sponsored Shia Crescent
of Iran operating in Iraq and Syria. ISIS/ISIL’s combat experience in Iraq served it well as it racked up a series of
successes, from the conquest of Aleppo to Raqqa in Syria. Beheadings, shootings, crucifixions, hangings and sex slavery
followed, with Shia soldiers and civilians of Syria and Iraq suffering as badly as Christians but in greater numbers.So ISIL
decided to become what it was emulating by declaring itself as the new caliphate. Baghdadi became Amir al-Mu’minin
Caliph Ibrahim of the Islamic State.

ISIL is composed of true Salaf fundamentalists, similar to the Taliban. They have been blowing up Shia mosques and
Christian churches while also destroying graveyards and burial tombs. ISIL’s notorious and bloodthirsty mass shootings
of captured enemy soldiers, Yazidi Shia apostates and infidels are eerily similar to the infamous
Nazi einsatzgruppen death squad operations on the Eastern Front during World War II.
The Islamic State has resurrected dhimmitude (subjugation of nonbelievers), Sharia, religious apartheid, open-ended war
on infidels, state-sanctioned slavery and hatred for Shia apostasy. The bloodbath it has unleashed is shocking but serves
its purposes – ISIL beheads Americans and Britons to provoke the West, while it shoots Shia soldiers and civilians en
masse to provoke Iran and Iran’s Shia proxies throughout the Middle East. The Muslim internal war has taken a new turn
to internecine sectarianism.

WHO’S WHO
A multitude of nationalities are embroiled in today’s Middle East fighting, including Arabs, Turks, Persians, Pashtuns,
North Africans, Kurds and many others. With the emergence of the Islamic State, Western Islamists from the United
States, Britain, Australia and other countries have joined ISIL’s ranks – raising Western fears of what might happen when
these individuals return to their home countries.

There are three major Muslim sectarian factions: Sunni, Shia and Sufi. The smallest group, Sufi, is sitting this one out,
while the largest group, Sunni, is locked in a geopolitical and sectarian struggle with the second largest sect, Shia. There
are dozens of subsects: Alawites, Yazidis, and Twelvers on the Shia side; and Salafis, Wahhabis, and Daesh on the Sunni
side. The players include the Shia state of Iran and its satraps, Iraq and Syria, and its stateless terror group proxies,
Hezbollah and (although Sunni) Hamas. On the Sunni side, the leaders are the stateless hordes under the Islamic State and
many other Sunni groups with the tacit support of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. This list is not all encompassing; it
merely presents the main actors. This complex mosaic includes numerous subgroups, but the three main groups with
distinct worldviews and aims are moderates, Islamists and hegemons:

Moderates – No Sharia: Moderates are semi-secular, claiming a degree of tolerance for other faiths as long as the others
remain generally subordinate to Islam. They are wary of unrestrained Western-style democracy, free press, free speech
and freedom of religion. Moderates include nationalists, technocrats, modernists, professionals and businessmen. They do
not want to return to the 14th century to be ruled by clerics and subject to uncompromising Sharia. Atatürk’s Turkey is the
model moderate Muslim state, with el-Sissi’s Egypt being its closest modern-day equivalent.
Islamists – Pro-Sharia: Islamists are utopians seeking the restoration of Islamic purity and regional dominance, with
global dominance an ultimate goal. They desire to impose strict adherence to Sharia and total rejection of all non-Islamic
man-made influence. They are revisionists, revanchists and irredentists who dream of a resurrected Islamist Empire – a
caliphate – that is ever expanding and is all-inclusive of the world’s ummah (Muslim faithful). They seek to eventually
extinguish all competing faiths and worldviews, to include secularism and atheism. Islamists are the jihadis’ religion-
fueled warriors who advance their cause through terrorism, insurgency or cultural/financial (petro-dollar funded)
influence operations. ISIL, al-Qaida, Hamas and Saudi Arabia are Islamist entities.
Sunni Islamists seek a micro-caliphate led by Salafis who reject Persian innovations. They seek a caliphate cleansed of
Shia and Sufi apostasy. They seek perfect, and harsh, Sharia. They will subjugate Christians and Jews under the writ of
dhimmitude and will seek the extinction of their co-religionist rivals.

Shia Islamists seek Shia-dominated pseudo-states/statelets – independent, autonomous, economically self-sufficient

entities completely under their merciless control. They tolerate and use Sunnis while suppressing Christians in their midst
along the same lines as the Sunnis. The Shia rally around Iran and, although not Persian, are under Iranian influence or
outright control. They also seek the annihilation of Israel, a goal shared by their Sunni brethren though not as high a
priority. The Shia also harbor genuine millenarians who seek the Apocalypse as the tool that will provoke the return of the
Mahdi (the Muslim Messiah), who will cleanse the earth of non-Muslims.

Hegemons – Khalifa: The hegemons are the wannabe leaders of the ummah, whether the lead entity is called a caliphate
(Sunni), imamate (Shia) or hegemonic state. The principal difference between hegemons and Islamists is the issue of who
leads as khalifa (caliph). Hegemons are empire builders. Modern-day Iran is the lead hegemon with its creation,
Hezbollah, often acting as its violent proxy.

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
Now that the Muslim Middle East is thoroughly embroiled in civil war, the question is, how will this end. If the moderates
win, then we could see either a return to the pre-Arab Spring status quo or we might see a proliferation of semi-
democratic Islamic republics. If the Islamists win, then we’ll see a hotbed of hostile sectarian city-states and statelets that
are perpetually at war with the West and Israel. If the hegemons win, we’ll see the rise of a dominant regional power,
likely Iran. Assessing the possible outcome reveals:

Moderates Win: Under this scenario, el-Sissi’s move to reclaim Egypt succeeds. The Egyptian military and judiciary
team up to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood and deny its return to power. It would not be a reset of the status quo,
however. For the Egyptian moderates to matter, they need to usher in a reasonably democratic government that, by
necessity, bars only the Islamist political parties. They also need to embrace religious tolerance of the country’s Coptic
Christians, reject Hamas, back the peace initiatives with Israel, and support modernity and the rule of law. This model is
exactly the one used by Atatürk to guard his creation, secular Turkey. He established the military, in partnership with the
judiciary, as the guardians of modern, secular, semi-democracy. The system worked until 2003 when Turkish Prime
Minister (now President) Recep Erdogan outmaneuvered Turkey’s generals and judges and began his gradual Islamization
process.
If Egypt can accomplish the above, it can inspire similar movements throughout the Middle East. The great appeal of such
a move is its promise of justice and political participation. Protests in Turkey and Iran indicate that there is a thirst for
modernity and rule of law.

Islamists Win: Under this scenario, the Islamic State wins in Syria and Iraq, while the Muslim Brotherhood retakes Egypt
or keeps it embroiled in internal conflict. To do this, the Sunni Islamists must defeat Assad and his Iranian backers and el-
Sissi and the Egyptian military. If the Islamists win, they would establish Muslim theocratic pseudo-states/statelets ruled
by Sharia. These entities would be repressive, xenophobic, misogynous, sectarian apartheid states similar to Afghanistan’s
Taliban government. Hostility toward Israel and the West would ensure a near continuous state of tension and conflict
within the region.
Hegemons Win: Under this scenario, Iran wins Syria’s civil war for Assad, thus eliminating any vestiges of autonomy
that may remain. The Iranians would also have to crush growing Sunni and Druze opposition to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The result would be Iranian-dominated governments in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Geographically, Iran would have built a
contiguous “Shia Crescent” running from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and from Afghanistan to Israel’s
northern border. Bolstered with the unfettered development of nuclear weapons, Iran would be the de facto regional
hegemon that must be accommodated and appeased.
Stumbling blocks to Iran achieving such regional hegemony, however, include Sunni Turkey’s conventional military
might and its NATO membership, Saudi/Gulf Cooperation Council petro-dollars expended to deny Iranian Shia
dominance, and the potential for Israel to take unilateral military action to protect itself from the threat of an Iranian
nuclear weapon.

No One Wins … Yet: The most likely outcome in the foreseeable future is that no one wins. Factors preventing any one
side from achieving total victory include: the Sunni Islamists, both state and non-state, are divided and not disposed to
cooperate or coordinate their actions; and the Sunni-Shia schism makes it highly unlikely that either denomination would
ever submit to rule by the other willingly. If neither side wins outright, then the ongoing sectarian civil war will continue.

2015 AND BEYOND

It appears ever more likely that the Muslim world is embarking upon a Middle East version of Europe’s destructive Thirty
Years’ War – the 1618-48 conflict that was also fueled by religious, ethnic and political schisms. Already, Shia Islamists
fight Sunni Islamists and both of them fight moderates. The fight will include state against state, stateless against stateless,
and states against stateless. It likely will end with the belligerents’ exhaustion and the rise of a leader or party with a
unifying vision – whether that vision be sectarian or secular. We will either see a modern-day Atatürk emerge to lead a
Muslim Reformation or another Khomeini rise up to lead an Islamist Resurgence. We can only hope for the former. The
United States’ and the West’s current hands-off, hands-on, sporadic policy of engagement or lack of engagement risks us
having little influence in the struggle.

John Sutherland is a retired U.S. Army infantry lieutenant colonel, a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies, and currently a senior operations and intelligence analyst at the
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) group in the Joint Staff. He was a senior analyst and contributor on the
June 2012 JCOA “Decade at War” study, which can be read online at tinyurl.com/DecadeAt War. Sutherland also is the
author of the book “Wiki War: the Progressive Regression of 21st Century Jihad,” due for release in January 2015 by the
History Publishing Company.
Q27

Palestine Crisis

Israelis and Arabs have been fighting over Gaza on and off, for decades. It’s part of the wider Arab Israeli conflict.
After World War II and the Holocaust in which six million Jewish people were killed, more Jewish people wanted their
own country.

They were given a large part of Palestine, which they considered their traditional home but the Arabs who already lived
there and in neighbouring countries felt that was unfair and didn’t accept the new country.

In 1948, the two sides went to war. When it ended, Gaza was controlled by Egypt and another area, the West Bank, by
Jordan. They contained thousands of Palestinians who fled what was now the new Jewish home, Israel.

Israel’s recognition
But then, in 1967, after another war, Israel occupied these Palestinian areas and Israeli troops stayed there for years.
Israelis hoped they might exchange the land they won for Arab countries recognising Israel’s right to exist and an end to
the fighting.

Israel finally left Gaza in 2005 but soon after, a group called Hamas won elections and took control there. Much of the
world calls Hamas a terrorist organisation. It refuses to recognise Israel as a country and wants Palestinians to be able to
return to their old home – and will use violence to achieve its aims.

Since then, Israel has held Gaza under a blockade, which means it controls its borders and limits who can get in and out.

Life in Gaza
Life for the many of the 1.5 million Palestinians who live in the Gaza Strip is difficult.

Israel controls its coastline and all the entry and exit crossings into Israel. There is another crossing point into Egypt.
There is no working airport. Because access is so restricted, not many goods get into or out of Gaza. Food is allowed in,
but aid agencies say families are not eating as much meat or fresh vegetables and fruit as they used to. There are often
power cuts.

Large numbers of people are unemployed because businesses can get very few of their products out of Gaza to sell, and
people don’t have much money to buy things.

Palestinian refugees
During the 1948 and 1967 wars hundreds of thousands of Palestinians left, or were forced out of, their homes and moved
to neighbouring countries to become refugees.
More than 4.6 million Palestinians are refugees and their descendants, many living in camps in the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. They get help from the United Nations.

Violence in Gaza
Though the Palestinians don’t have an army, rockets are regularly fired from Gaza into Israel. Israelis living in border
towns are used to having to take shelter and adapting their lives to deal with the rockets.

In the years since Israel withdrew its troops in 2005, Gaza has seen several Israeli offensives. Israel says these were aimed
at putting a stop to rocket fire.

 In 2008, Israel sent soldiers into Gaza. An estimated 1,300 people, many of them civilians, were killed in Gaza before
a ceasefire was declared; 13 Israeli soldiers also died.
 In 2012, at least 167 Palestinians and six Israelis were killed during an Israeli operation. After eight days a ceasefire
was declared with both sides promising to stop attacks.
 Most recently in July 2014, authorities said over 2,200 people were killed – most of them Palestinians – and many
more injured, during 50 days of violence. A ceasefire was agreed between Israel and Hamas on 26 August.

Peace Process
Other countries, particularly America, have worked hard to settle the fighting between the Arabs and Israelis but so far
nothing has worked. Many people want Gaza and the West Bank to be turned into a new country – Palestine. Israel won’t
agree to this unless it feels safe – and Hamas accepts its right to exist. The other sticking points are what will happen to
Israelis who’ve settled in the West Bank, who will run Jerusalem and what will happen to the Palestinian refugees.
Q28

5 Years Solved MCQs

(i) The world highest Mountain is in

(a) Nepal
(b) Italy
(c) Sri Lanka
(d) China

(ii) On the map of the world which country appears as long shoe?
(a) Italy
(b) Malta
(c) Croatia
(d) Moldova

(iii) The Headquarter of Red Cross are in:

(a) London
(b) New York
(c) Berlin
(d) Geneva
(iv) Diamer-Bhasha Dam has been planned on the river:
(a) Jehlum
(b) Chenab
(c) Indus
(d) None of these
(v) Hajj Scam 2010 struck a blow to:
(a) Fazal-ur-Rehman
(b) Azam sawati, Hamid Saeed Kazmi
(c) Ishaq Dar
(d) Inamullah
(vi) Who was the special representative of USA for Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs?
(a) Richard Holbrook
(b) Joan Alizabeth
(c) Gen. Mc Arthur
(d) None of these

(vii) AFPAK policy was announced in:

(a) 2008
(b) 2009
(c) 2007
(d) None of these
(viii) Ship mounted energy project (activated in Pakistan: 2010) is sponsored by:
(a) Saudi Arabia
(b) China
(c) Turkey
(d) None of these

(ix) Asian Development Bank was established in

(a) 1964
(b) 1966
(c) 1968
(d) 1960
(x) Who were the three statesmen who formulated Non-aligned Movement?
(a) Gandhi, Naseer, Tito
(b) Nehru, Naseer, Tito
(c) Chou-en-lai, Bhutto, Nehru
(d) Soe Karno, Naseer, Tito
(xi) The permanent secretariat of SAARC is established at:
(a) Kathmandu
(b) Dhaka
(c) Delhi
(d) Islamabad
(xii) Which of the following is the largest emitter of Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere?
(a) China
(b) America
(c) Russia
(d) India

(xiii) The Rio conference on sustainable development was convened in:

(a) 1972
(b) 1992
(c) 2002
(d) None of these

(xiv) World Trade Organization was established in:

(a) 1992
(b) 1993
(c) 1994
(d) 1995
(xv) How many official working language are recognized by UNO?
(a) 8
(b) 6
(c) 7
(d) 4

(xvi) The first UN conference on sustainable development happened in:

(a) 1952
(b) 1962
(c) 1972
(d) 1982
(xvii) Mirani Dam Exist in:
(a) Sindh
(b) Baluchistan
(c) Punjab
(d) None of these
(xviii) The founder of Wiki-leaks scam belongs to:
(a) America
(b) England
(c) Australia
(d) Austria
(xix) There are how many non-permanent members of Security Council?
(a) 12
(b) 13
(c) 14
(d) 10

(xx) Pakistan has become non-permanent member of Security council for:

(a) Five times
(b) Two times
(c) Three times
(d) Six times
CURRENT AFFAIRS 2012
PART-I
MCQ’s

1) The first constructed barrage of Pakistan is

a) Jinnah barrage
b) Sukkur barrage
c) Tunsa barrage
d) None of these

2) Where was Jesus Christ born?

A) Iraq
b) Jerusalem
c) Mecca
d) None of these

3) RAW is an abbreviation of
a) radical army wing
b) research and warning
c) research and analysis wing
d) none of these

4) Who was the first viceroy of India?

A) Lord Ripon
b) Lord Canning
c) Lord Curzon
d) None of these
5) According to Rousseau legitimate political authority is based on
a) slavery
b) force
c) social conduct
d) none of these
6) East India company was established in
a) 1603
b) 1602
c) 1600
d) none of these
7) British government sold Kashmir to Gulab sing in
a) 1846
b) 1845
c) 1843
d) none of these
8) Gymnophobia is the fear of
a) nudity
b) gyms
c) hotels
d) none of these

9) Mac Mohan is the border between

a) India and China
b) India and Nepal
c) India and Bangladesh
d) none of these
10) Places experiencing equal impact of an earthquake are called
a) snowlines
b) seismic belts
c) seismic lines
d) none of these

11) Which is the deepest ocean in the world

a) Arctic
b) Atlantic
c) Pacific
d) none of these

12) Largest Airport of the world is

a) New York airport
b) Frankfurt airport
c) Dubai airport
d) none of these

13) “Wafa” news agency belongs to

a) Palestine
b) Jordan
c) Syria
d) none of these

14) “FBI” of America was established in

a) 1901
b) 1902
c) 1903
d) none of these(1908)
15) Who was the founder of republican party of USA
a) Alexander Hamilton
b) Franklin Roosevelt
c) George Washington
d) none of these(Thomas Jefferson)
16) Who was the first chief minister of Baluchistan from may 1972 to February 1973?
A) Sher Bux Murree
b) Sardar Attaullah Mengal
c) Nawab Akbar Bugti
d) none of these

17) Who was the first Muslim chief of air staff of Pakistan?
A) Air Marshal Asghar khan
b) Air marshal Noor khan
c) Air marshal Feroz khan
d) none of these

18) Which country is the biggest producer of uranium in the world?

A) France
b) South Africa
c) Canada
d) none of these

19) In Pakistan the first martial law was imposed on

a) August 1958
b) September 1958
c) October 1958
d) none of these
20) the federal government established Thar coal authority in which year
a) 2008
b) 2007
c) 2009
d) none of these
CURRENT AFFAIRS 2013
PART-I
MCQ’s
1. The International Day of Peace, sometimes unofficially known as World Peace Day, is observed
annually on:(a) 21st September(b) 23rd September (c) 12th October (d) None of these
2. International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women is observed annually on:(a) 25th December
(b) 23rd November (c) 25th November(d) None of these
3. International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is observed annually on:(a) 23rd May (b) 21st
March (c) 01st March (d) None of these
4. Martin Luther King, Jr. was an clergyman, activist, and leader. He is famous for:

(a) Civil Rights Movement using non-violent civil disobedience in USA.

(b) Civil rights Movement using violence in South Africa.
(c) Civil Rights Movement using non-violent civil disobedience in India.
(d) Civil rights Movement using non-violence in Costa Rica.
5. Which of the following Country has absolutely no military forces?(a) Costa Rica (b) Japan (c) Iceland(d) None of
these
6. NATO Headquarters are located in:
(a) Birmingham (b) Barcelona (c) Baltimore (d) None of these(Brussels, Belgium)
7. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an organisation of South
Asian nations. Which of the following countries is not a member of SAARC?(a) Maldives (b) Myanmar(c)
Bhutan (d) None of these
8. The UN uses the Human Development Index to:
(a) predict, in order to prevent, which countries are most likely to engage in ethnic cleansing.
(b) demonstrate how well a country is providing for its people’s welfare and security .
(c) predict the percentage of displaced people that will leave a failed state.
(d) prove that the Global South is not as poor as some have argued.
9. Which of the following states has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?(a) Canada (b)
France (c) United States (d) None of these
10. The most significant greenhouse gas is:(a) Ozone (b) Chlorofluorocarbons (c) Carbon Dioxide (d) None of these
11. An index that estimates the true rate of exchange among currencies is called:(a) Human Development Index (b)
Exchange Rate (c) Purchasing Power Parity (d) None of these
12. The idea that leaders initiate foreign conflicts in order to distract public opinion from controversial domestic
policies is called:

(a) Diversionary Theory of War (b) Democratic Peace Theory (c) Autocratic Rule (d) None of these
13. The lowest percentage of Internet users is found in:(a) North America (b) Africa (c) Australia (d) None of these
14. The most prosperous members of the Global South, which have become important exporters and markets for
the major industrialized countries, are known as:
(a) Newly industrialized countries. (b) Developed nations. (c) Asian Tigers. (d) None of these
15. In International Relations, a global system containing two dominant powers is labeled with which of the
following terms?
(a) Bipolar (b) Nationalist (c) Isolationist (d) None of these
16. The Axis powers in World War II did not include:
(a) Germany (b) the Soviet Union (c) Italy (d) Japan
17. The proposition that a single dominant power can promote world peace comes from ________ theory.
(a) balance-of-power (b) Socialist (c) Hegemonic stability (d) None of these
18. The US ambassador, J. Christopher Stevens was killed by militants in
(a) Tripoli, Libya (b) Misrata, Libya (c) Benghazi, Libya (d) None of these
19. ____________explains how rational self-interested behavior by individuals may have a destructivecollective
effect.
(a) Tragedy of the commons (b) Population implosion (c) Carrying capacity (d) None of these
20. The process through which a country increases its capacity to meet its citizens’ basic human needs and raise
their standard of living is known as:
(a) Self-determination (b) Democratization (c) Development (d) None of these