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Radio's Digital Future: Preserving the Public Interest in the Age of New Media
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After outlining the contours of the new digital transmission systems, I will
assess how well they might perform in relation to today's form of radio broad-
casting in terms of both signal quality and service to audiences. Finally, I will
examine the possibility that these technologies might also provide space on the
electromagnetic spectrum for noncommercial content whose aim is to render
public service-to serve listeners who conceive of themselves as citizens rather
than consumers. Understanding this distinction is crucial to an understanding of
American radio broadcasting, whose stations are nominally mandated to serve
in "the public interest, convenience and necessity" (Witherspoon and Kovitz 4).
Commercial broadcasters, with their own economistic interpretation of the term
"public interest," have dominated the spectrum since the time of AT&T's first
experiment with advertising support in 1922. Nonprofit educational broadcast-
ers offered an alternative to commercially driven programming, yet these and
other radio reformers were subsequently excluded from effective participation
in the broadcast spectrum for the next fifty years. The commercial radio lobby,
working in concert with sympathetic congressmen and regulators, saw to it that
most nonprofit broadcasters were relegated to time-share arrangements on mar-
ginal frequencies. They were later moved to the FM band-well before many
Americans had FM receivers (McChesney, Telecommunications 20-27; Barnouw
122; Witherspoon and Kovitz 6-10).
In the late 1920s and early 1930s various groups of broadcast reformers agi-
tated against the growing dominance of commercial interests in American
radio. Briefly, these groups sensed that radio content backed by commercial
sponsorship would soon be dominated by the discourse of sales and marketing,
and that important normative goals such as the provision of quality news, pub-
lic affairs, and educational programs would fall by the wayside. These critics
anticipated concerns about America's dominant commercial broadcasting sys-
tem that persist today, namely, that for-profit broadcasters treat audience mem-
bers as mere consumers who might please the station's sponsors by parting with
a bit of their hard-earned cash. Stations that follow this path may well pad their
bank accounts, but in the process they also cripple their own ability to stimulate
listener involvement in community affairs-the very essence of citizenship
(Hoynes 35-37; McChesney, "Public" 10-11; Brown 103-7). With the coming
change to digital broadcast technologies, then, it is incumbent upon media
scholars to revisit the public interest standard and to see whether technical
advances in radio will be capable of providing listeners with something like an
electronic public sphere-a salon or coffeehouse of the airwaves.
The central principle for the move toward digital radio is the notion that analog
broadcasting, the traditional transmission of electromagnetic waves through the
Michael P. McCauley
atmosphere, will give way to the encoding of audio signals in digital, or binary,
form. The radio signal of the future will be actually a series of high-speed "snap-
shots" of the original audio content, encoded, transmitted, and received as a
stream of Os and ls-much like the internal language that computers use. If dig-
ital signals are encoded and distributed in precise numerical fashion, the recep-
tion of those signals will entail a clear, unmistakable replication of the original
broadcast. The second major principle at work here is that of convergence, the
notion that once encoded, any digital content-from radio stations, computers,
video sources, and so on-is theoretically interchangeable with content pro-
duced on other platforms. Thus the digital revolution is already spawning many
novel means of audio reception: music and talk shows on the Internet, "boom-
boxes with browsers" (Pizzi, "Boombox"), and car radios that also display certain
visual images, to name a few. In this section I will briefly detail the ways in which
each of the developing digital audio transmission technologies works, in terms
of delivering a high-quality signal to audiences.
The concept of DAB was first developed in 1981 at the Institut fiir
Rundfunktechnik-a research center in Munich, Germany-and refined after
1987 when a consortium of thirty-eight European companies began to develop
and market the transmission system known as Eureka 147 ("Frequently" 6; "NAB
Backs" 6). This system, which has since become the standard in many parts of the
world, offers CD-quality sound, improvements in tuning, and the capability for
broadcasting other data (e.g., song titles, traffic information, weather warnings)
besides the traditional radio signal. The creators of this system note that it over-
comes one vexing problem with traditional FM signals, multipath interference.
Anyone who listens to the radio while driving is all too familiar with this problem,
which manifests itself as occasional hisses and pops. Multipath interference is cre-
ated when the primary FM signal bounces off buildings, trees, or hills and enters
a radio receiver in competition with overlapping, reflected signals. Eureka 147
engineers overcame this problem by making technical adjustments on both the
transmitting and receiving ends of the broadcasting process ("Frequently" 2, 4-5).
Some four hundred digital audio broadcasters around the world use the
Eureka 147 system at present, and they have a potential audience of more than
230 million people ("Did You Know?" 1). In Great Britain the BBC has been
broadcasting with such a system since September 1995; it was joined in
November 1999 by Digital One, a commercial venture that has now become the
single largest DAB broadcaster in the world ("Country" 14-15 ) . Canada has also
jumped on the Eureka bandwagon by launching DAB services in five cities,
including Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. CBC stations in these markets are
distributing ancillary data through the Eureka system, including graphical men-
Radio's Digital Future
tion of song titles and artists, and CBC/Toronto has also begun streaming news,
weather, and program schedules through this new service (Stimson 4).
Eureka 147 burst onto the scene in the United States in early 1991, when the
Radio Board of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) voted unani-
mously to endorse the system. The NAB originally wanted the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to designate Eureka as the official US stan-
dard for DAB transmission, and also developed plans for the association's profit-
making arm to license the technology to American stations for a fee ("NAB
Backs" 6). Though Eureka was the only operating DAB system at the time-and,
by all accounts, functioned very well-a collection of radio station group owners
soon expressed concern over the Radio Board's actions. The chief complaint
voiced by industry insiders has been that the Eureka system, which relies on the
allocation of new portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, would bring new
broadcasters into direct competition with existing commercial operators. Radio
industry officials have cited several other reasons for the sudden about-face on
Eureka, including spectrum scarcity, the prospect of consumer confusion, and
the possibility that American technology firms might want to develop other,
competing DAB systems ("DAB" 43-44; Lambert 10; US, FCC Comments 19-23).
But at the bottom of all these rationales lie three primal fears: that a "new spec-
trum" radio system would undermine the high market values enjoyed by many
analog stations; that this potential for devaluation would hamper the ability of
station owners to profit by purchasing and selling radio properties; and that any
reallocation of spectrum to new broadcasters (i.e., competitors) would, by defi-
nition, be a bad allocation (Masters 85-86; Leanza 10). 1
As the Eureka proposal fell apart in the United States, a new company
entered the scene with another proposal for a DAB standard. USA Digital Radio
(USADR) was formed as a partnership of the Gannett and CBS/Westinghouse
media empires, both of which have amassed powerful holdings in the US broad-
casting industry ("NAB Amenable" 6). 2 This company's product represents an
in-band, on-channel (IBOC) approach to the coming digital audio conversion.
An IBOC system would not require a new spectrum allocation, as would the
Eureka system; instead, it would allow any present-day broadcaster to deploy a
new, compressed signal at the upper and lower edges of its current frequency
allocation, while simultaneously broadcasting the old analog signal from the
center of that same piece of spectrum. 3 In theory, the manufacturers of IBOG
compatible radio transmitters and receivers could minimize the financial pain
of the digital transition by permitting the broadcast of both analog and digital
signals until the time when a critical mass of Americans purchases new digital-
only sets. If IBOC becomes the digital audio standard in this country, each existing
AM and FM broadcaster would continue to use the same frequency allocation,
with the eventual goal of a full digital conversion several years down the road
(Lambert 1O; Smith, \Vright, and Ostroff 10-11, 25-26).
510 Michael P. McCauley
Until recently USADR and Lucent Digital Radio were competitors in the race
to define an IBOC DAB standard for the United States. Spurred on by competi-
tion from other technologies, these two companies announced a merger in July
2000. The formation of iBiquity Digital Corporation may, according to company
officials, enable consumers to purchase DAB receivers for in-car use by late 2001.
iBiquity also claims the merger will one day enable the delivery of !BOC-based
digital audio to cell phones and personal digital assistants such as the PalmPilot
("Lucent Technologies" 3; "Lucent Digital Radio" l; "Lucent Merges" 1).
Besides the support of Lucent Technologies' Bell Labs, iBiquity is backed by
an impressive array of investors including fifteen of the nation's top twenty radio
broadcasting groups. Even before the merger, USADR could claim that its
investors operated more than two thousand radio stations, served thousands of
other affiliate stations, beamed signals to a potential audience of more than llO
million people, and took in nearly half of all radio industry revenues in the
United States ("USA" l; see also note 1). In August 2000 iBiquity further
enhanced its financial prospects by securing a commitment by Visteon, the
world's second largest supplier of automotive components and integrated sys-
tems, to invest in its operations ("Visteon" 1).
The IBOC standard proposed by iBiquity will use a data compression tech-
nology known as Perceptual Audio Coding (PAC). Developed and patented by
Lucent, this algorithm is heralded as the highest-quality compression system in
the industry, with some observers predicting it will eventually supplant MP3 as
the technology of choice for those who download digitally encoded music
("Lucent Technologies" 2; "Let's Make" 1). While iBiquity's adoption of PAC is
a positive development, some fear it could lead to an unfortunate technological
trade-off. Because Lucent will already contribute PAC to the new company's
technological mix, it may be forced to give up another of its own developments,
namely, an interference-reduction technology known as multistreaming. This
technology splinters a broadcaster's digital signal into four parts, so three of
those parts, for example, could add up to a usable signal if one digital stream
fails. This technology would also enable a station to simultaneously program dif-
ferent content on analog and digital signals, as long as the analog transmission
system remains in use. On the other hand, USADR's system requires the simul-
casting of programs in analog and digital formats; if the digital signal fails, the
station would simply revert to the analog signal. This technology allows for qual-
itative improvements in radio broadcasting but also cuts down on the potential
number of new signals in the digital era (Janssen). If a public radio station used
USADR's interference reduction technology, for example, that station would be
prevented from using its current frequency allocation to "stream a digital music
channel and an analog news channel" at the same time-something that would
be attractive to broadcasters who place a premium on maximizing public serv-
ice content (5).
Radio's Digital. Future
These technical choices aside, most observers agree the creation of iBiquity
Digital Corporation will hasten the acceptance of an IBOC DAB standard. If and
when an IBOC DAB standard is accepted by the FCC, industry officials are con-
fident that fifty top-market stations will soon offer digital signals, with radio sets
capable of receiving them hitting the market about a year later (US FCC,
Comments 25-26; Masters 85). In spite of these rosy predictions, others who have
followed the circuitous development of this technology feel the political squab-
bling that has delayed its deployment by at least a decade may have already
mired the terrestrial DAB industry in a position of competitive disadvantage.
One critic calls IBOC "a business and allocation plan in search of technology,"
and says it is sure to fail if a simulcast-only system is chosen (Pizzi, "vVhat's
Wrong"). This observation may have merit, as a new, competitive force--one
that promises to bypass the traditional radio broadcasting system entirely-will
enter the fray very shortly.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s several American companies formed for the
purpose of delivering digital audio content directly to motorists and other ~.;ers
through methods entirely different from terrestrial broadcasting. Two firms are
worthy of special mention. David Margolese, a Canadian telecommunications
executive, and Robert Briskman, an engineer and manager with COMSAT,
formed Satellite CD Radio in 1989 for the purpose of developing a cablelike
audio service for motorists. The other firm, American Mobile Radio
Corporation, formed in 1992 to develop its own technologies for piping satellite-
based audio content into cars and home~.
Both companies have matured in recent years, with each realizing a series
of technical breakthroughs and reinventing itself with a new corporate name
and image. In 1992 Satellite CD Radio, now known as Sirius Satellite Radio, and
American Mobile Radio, now called XM Satellite Radio, petitioned the FCC to
allocate new swaths of spectrum for their services (Sukow 42). Both services
achieved their goal in a spring 1997 spectrum auction. Sirius, which paid $83.3
million for its portion of the satellite radio spectrum, has since launched three
satellites and has been developing terrestial repeater station to help ensure cov-
erage in America's "steel canyons"-those urban areas where audio signals are
often blocked by tall buildings and other structures. Sirius began experimental
broadcasts from its new 100,000-square-foot digital facility in New York's
Rockefeller Center in early 2001 ("DARS Winners" 9; "Sirius Radio Sets" l; "At
a Glance" 1; "Sirius Radio Completes In-Orbit" 1; "Sirius Radio Completes
Satellite").
XM, which paid $89.8 million for its chunk of spectrum,4 launched both of
its satellites in early 2001, and was scheduled to begin broadcasts from its new
512 Michael P. McCauley
Internet Radio
Amid all the techno-speak and revelry surrounding new audio media, the pur-
veyors of these technologies sometimes forget the principle that supposedly
underlies American broadcasting and that should, by logical extension, under-
lie the coming digital revolution. The Radio Act of 1927 clearly stated that all
broadcasters must serve in "the public interest, convenience, and necessity" (US
Congress), but this standard has often been used and abused in ways that tend
to protect the status quo. Over the years broadcasters in the United States have
typically used the terms "public interest" and "public service" to describe the
advertiser-supported fare offered by most radio and 1V stations. The "service"
rendered to the public under this system does entail some degree of format
diversity across the nation, but those formats are typically marketed to groups of
consumers who have a fair amount of money and are susceptible to advertising
and the regular purchase of consumer products (Hurwitz 237-39). Explicit serv-
ice to marginal demographic groups is less common, along with broadcasting
that supports social justice causes-the brand of community-level radio that
aims to promote citizenship through greater participation in local and national
politics (Barlow 101).
To date there have been no explicit formulas for enhancing the public
interest in digital audio broadcasting. No new spectrum allocation has been
authorized for DAB at this point; indeed, current plans for IBOC technology-
with its proposed one-for-one swap of analog and digital allocations-would not
permit any additional entrants to the radio portion of the spectrum. In this
sense one may find little basis for developing further public interest regulations
for digital radio, for if current broadcasters have their way, the future of radio
will entail, for all purposes, the same kinds of content offered by the same com-
panies. But some experts have begun to imagine a more progressive future for
the American broadcast industry as a whole. For example, we can refer to a tem-
plate offered by a blue-ribbon government panel formed to study America's
conversion to digital television. The Advisory Committee on Public Interest
Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters was formed in October 1997.
Commonly known as the Gore Commission, because of Albert Gore Jr. 's partic-
ipation as titular head, the twenty-two-member panel- delivered its recommen-
dations to President Clinton in December 1998.
Some of the Gore Commission's recommendations were crafted specifically
for television, yet others could be used to fashion a program of public interest
reforms for digital audio broadcasting as well. In the process of imagining radio's
digital future, then, I propose that the users of each new delivery system be
Radw 's Digital Future
A number of advocates for better broadcasting sat on the Gore Commission but
by most accounts they were overpowered by strong representatives of the com-
mercial broadcasting lobby. Not surprisingly, the commission recommended
that the NAB draft a new voluntary code of conduct. To supplement this code,
members said, the FCC should adopt a set of minimum public interest require-
ments for digital broadcasters and require them to disclose their performance
in this regard quarterly. These requirements would also apply to the ascertain-
ment of community interests and the broadcast of public service announce-
ments and public affairs programs.
In analyzing these suggestions, we must first note that broadcast licensees are
already required to document the airing of public affairs programs that impact
their communities and to make these records available for public inspection. The
Go1·e Commission report does suggest the development of other public interest
standards; in assessing the chance they will actually come to pass, however, we
must note that the record of American broadcasters in fashioning effective per-
formance guidelines is, in a word, unimpressive. The NAB did develop a self-reg-
ulatory code for radio programming and advertising in the late 1920s, issued its
first television code in the early 1950s, and made periodical revisions to both codes
for years afterward. These codes suggested limits on advertising and on the airing
of sexual and violent <;:ontent during family viewing hours. But in these matters
and others, the NAB codes had no teeth (Smith, Wright, and Ostroff 463; Head et
al. 359). Loaded with general shoulds and should nots, the only penalty for vio-
lating these codes was the loss of a station's right to display the NAB's seal of
approval. In 1979 the Justice Department charged that recommended limits on ad
time "depriv[ed] ad\'ertisers of the benefits of free and open competition," and
the NAB disbanded its code-making operations altogether in 1982 (Sterling and
Kittross 192-93, 334, 433-34; Head et al. 359).
The ideas embodied in other Gore Commission recommendations have also
been tried and abandoned O\'er the years. Starting in 1949 the FCC began to spell
Michael P. McCauley
out concrete expectations for broadcasting in the public interest In its famous
Blue Book, a primer on this very topic, the FCC listed five factors that constituted
good public service: (1) a sense of "balance" in advertiser-supported material; (2)
the airing of programs whose nature would make them unsupportable; (3) the
serving of minority tastes and interests; (4) catering to the needs of nonprofit
organizations; and (5) allowances for experimentation with new types of programs
(Sterling and Kittross 304). Though many commercial broadcasters blasted the
authors of the Blue Book-likening them to Communists or fascists, depending
on the mood of the critic-this report, along with other legal and regulatory rul-
ings, did evolve over the years into a narrower set of programming guidelines
known as the Fairness Doctrine (Smith, Wright, and Ostroff 54-55, 445-47;
Sterling and Kittross 426-27). This doctrine generally held that stations broad-
casting stories about matters of public controversy should air the views of all com-
peting interests. But the Reagan years in Washington brought an attack on the
Fairness Doctrine, with champions of broadcast deregulation arguing that any
such guidelines would produce a "chilling effect" on stations-resulting in the air-
ing of no controversial material at all. The FCC, under Reagan appointee Mark
Fowler, scrapped major portions of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, in spite of a
lack of evidence that any chilling effect on programming a_ctually occurred
(Aufderheide 67). Also meeting its death in 1984 was the requirement that
broadcasters regularly ascertain community needs as a prelude to program plan-
ning (Creech 112). One common theme underlies the gradual weakening and
demise of all the program guidelines mentioned above. In each case these devel-
opments unfolded rather quietly, behind the scenes, and with little or no chance
for public debate-a scenario common to all major regulatory decisions affect-
ing US telecommunications since 1927 (see McChesney, i.uch Media 63-67, 281).
In all likelihood the only public interest standard today's analog broadcast-
ers will carry over into the digital age is the public service tally the NAB now
computes each year from member station data. At its spring 2000 national con-
vention, the powerful trade group reported that American radio and TV stations
contributed the equivalent of more than $8.l billion in public service efforts
from August 1998 through July 1999. NAB president Edward Fritts claimed
these contributions include "the dollar value of airtime local broadcasters
devoted to public service announcements (PSAs), in addition to money raised
for charity, needy individuals and disaster relief and prevention efforts." Fritts
added that the $8.l billion figure is conservative, because it does not include the
value of airtime donated for news coverage, breaking weather emergencies, and
off-air charitable services (Brilliant 1).
Doubtless most radio and television stations behave like other American
businesses in terms of contributions to the United Way and other charitable
causes. It is also undeniable that public service announcements include proso-
cial messages designed to raise awareness about AIDS, alcohol and drug abuse,
Radio's Digiial Future
family violence, and other important problems ("Broadcasters"). But the method
the NAB uses for calculating the amount of donated services is questionable, to
say the least. First, the statewide data collected and fed to the NAB come from
surveys that exhibit a low response rate, especially where radio stations are con-
cerned. Data from stations that do respond are then used to project statewide
figures that cannot logically be derived from the information supplied. Nowhere
in these survey reports can one find the precise method through which the
opportunity cost of running public service announcements is calculated; this
method should be open to scrutiny, as PSAs are most often run at off-peak times
that would not warrant the use of high figures for the potential loss of advertis-
ing dollars ("Executive Summary"; McConnell). Finally, it is also worth noting
that the NAB's template for conducting public service research was developed
and administered by Public Opinion Strategies of Alexandria, Virginia, a
Republican "political and public affairs survey research company" that, among
other things, conducted research for the infamous "Harry and Louise" TV com-
mercials-the ads that helped destroy Hillary Clinton's plans for health care
reform ("Partner"). The Web site for this firm touts its expertise in "combat mes-
sage development-the science of creating effective messages for issues in which
the opposing side is aggressively engaged" ("Overview"). Aside froo these dubi-
ous qualifications, the work of Public Opinion Strategies has been challenged by
two other studies of local public service broadcasting-one by the Media Access
Project (MAP) and the Benton Foundation in 1998, and the other by a profes-
sor in Fordham University's Graduate School of Business Administration in
2000. Both studies show that local public affairs programs-including coverage
of ongoing issues of public debate, minidocumentaries, panels, roundtables,
and extended coverage-"made up less than one half of one percent of the fare
offered by commercial [TV] broadcasters" in the markets studied. The Fordham
study, based on randomly sampled markets and stations, showed consistent
results regardless of competitive conditions, market demographics, and individ-
ual station characteristics. The MAP /Benton study, with a sample designed to
reflect all market sizes and diverse geographic locations, showed that 35% of TV
stations had no local news, while 25% had no local public affairs programming
whatsoever ("Action Alert" 2; "What's Local").
The Gore Commission report implies that broadcasters should seize the oppor-
tunities inherent in digital radio technology to substantially enhance program
diversity. Accordingly, any new audio service should provide programs targeting
audiences that lie outside the socioeconomic mainstream. At least some new
audio services must reach out to groups of listeners who may not initially be able
to afford a particular delivery platform or subscription-based program senrice.
520 Michael P. McCauley
Funding
Digital radio broadcasters who use portions of their former analog allocations
for services aside from the main broadcast channel, and in so doing reap
enhanced economic benefits, should have the flexibility to choose between pay-
ing a fee, providing a channel for public interest purposes, or making an in-kind
contribution. Also, Congress should create a trust fund to ensure enhanced and
permanent funding for public broadcasting, to help it fulfill its potential in the
digital radio environment, and to remove it from the vicissitudes of the political
process.
First of all, we must repeat that the prevailing !BOC DAB standard would
preclude the opening of any new channels for digital audio broadcasting-for
public service or any other purpose. Second, as we have already seen, the NAB
argues that its members already do quite enough in the area of public service.
Radio's Digital Future
These developments aside, there seems little hope that our future digital broad-
casting system will be structured around any imperatives other than those of rat-
ings success, advertising revenue and programming for economically attractive
demographic groups. It's not that broadcasters can't afford to fund more public
service efforts, the kind detailed in the FCC's Blue Book. In 1997 alone the
American radio industry posted revenues of more than $13.6 billion; at the same
time, the owners of radio stations paid only $9.3 million for their use of the air-
waves in terms of regulatory fees, and another few million in license application
fees (US CBO). All told, then, radio operators paid a tiny fraction of their gross
revenues in 1997-probably less than 1 %-for the right to stay in business.
These figures show that commercial radio broadcasters clearly can afford to sup-
port noncommercial programming as part of their public interest obligations.
Considering the profitability of the radio industry and current estimates of a
large federal budget surplus, one broadcast reform group has suggested the cre-
ation of a Public Broadcasting Trust (PBT) to support noncommercial pro-
gramming in perpetuity. Citizens for Independent Public Broadcasting argues
that a 2% annual spectrum usage fee, coupled with small taxes on the sale of dig-
ital TV sets, the sale or transfer of commercial broadcast licenses, broadcast
advertising revenues, and the proceeds of spectrum auctions, would produce a
sufficient amount of money to create the PBT, which would replace the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (Starr 276-79).
A poll conducted in December 1998 showed that 79% of the American pub-
lic favored a plan that would have commercial broadcasters pay 5 percent of
their revenues into such a trust fund ("CIPB"). If proposals such as this one
come to pass, public broadcasting could remove itself from dependency on the
federal government and corporate sponsors. Unfortunately, the creation of a
Public Broadcasting Trust is politically impossible at the moment. The idea has
been floated for many years in Washington and even came close to fruition in
the 1990s; yet the federal government, commercial broadcasters, and public
broadcasters themselves have thus far been unable to agree on the source and
amount of seed money (Witherspoon and Kovitz 49-50, 86-88, 110-11).
In summary, we can find a few promising pockets of programming at the
edges of today's radio industry-program sources that will be mapped directly
onto the worlds of satellite and Internet radio and, perhaps, terrestrial DAB.
Fundamental change in the prevailing definition of public interest or public
service broadcasting, however, seems no closer than it was in the 1930s. Self-
regulation has, over the years, conferred a sense of benevolence on the
nation's largely commercial broadcasting system. Yet even a novice economist
can see that self-regulation in any industry most often involves weak preemp-
tive measures by firms whose fear of economic loss is most acute. These reali-
ties, and the inability of the Gore Commission to successfully grapple with
them, prompted one of its dissident members to put the matter into historical
Michael P. McCauley
Conclusion
In writing about the coming digital television conversion, Nolan Bowie and
Hugh Carter Donahue note that digital media "could begin the slow fade out of
broadcast network economics in which broadcasters vie over advertising rev-
enues for delivering the largest numbers of an increasingly fragmented mass
audience through duplicative programming" (128). It is small wonder, then,
that these authors see the digital transition-looking through the eyes of today's
commercial broadcasters-as a frequency grab that offers little hope for new
entrants into the business, and almost no possibility that digital spectrum will be
returned to the American public (129). Certain new program streams aside, the
same can be said about the future prospects of public service broadcasting via
digital radio. Public broadcasters and a handful of other vendors will offer use-
ful content, especially in the area of political communication. But many
Americans will not, for financial and other reasons, rush to buy receiving equip-
ment capable of handling content from satellite or Internet providers. Also,
public radio in the United States now offers a relatively limited form of public
service; only one in ten Americans now listens to it, and those listeners can gen-
erally be described as well educated, well-off, and mostly white (Witherspoon
and Kovitz 98-99).
Perhaps a better pathway for democratizing America's digital radio system is
the development of a greater number of small-scale, listener-responsive outlets.
Stations that carry programs from the Pacifica network have generally been con-
sidered part of the community radio movement, an alternative form of broad-
casting designed to fill the programming needs of people who are missed by
commercial, mass-marketed formats. More recently, variations on this theme
have come even closer to delivering the sort of content that is most important
to low-income and underserved Americans: "content about employment, edu-
cation and business development; information that can be clearly understood by
limited-literacy users; information in multiple languages; and opportunities [for
listeners] to create content and interact with it so it is culturally appropriate"
("Content" 1). Some current NPR affiliates, such as KUNM in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, carry the network's marquee newsmagazines while also running
more progressive programs such as· Pacifica's Democracy Now!!, David Barsamian's
Alternative Radio and Native America Calling ("KUNM"). Other stations-espe-
Radio's Digital Future
cially those that belong to the Grassroots Radio Coalition-aspire to these same
ideals with shows that are tied more closely to the local community and, in most
cases, drawn from a universe of programs that lie outside of NPR's orbit. For
instance, WERU in Blue Hill, Maine, offers a wildly eclectic schedule of music
shows, mixed with locally produced programs such as Economic Literacy 101,
Science and Society, and Talk of the Towns ("WERU").
These community-based stations aspire to truly democratic forms of radio-
program schedules that seek to level the informational playing field that lies
between society's haves and have-nots. While templates for this sort of radio
already exist, the prospect of growing a disparate band of stations into a stronger
national movement in the digital age presents clear logistical challenges. The
"educational" portion of the FM dial is already overcrowded in mid- and large-
sized American cities, with multiple NPR affiliates in the top markets. Thus the
spread of grassroots or community radio in the new millennium will necessarily
be tied to (1) the maintenance of NPR and Pacifica affiliates that already build
their schedules around community needs, (2) the construction and licensing of
new full-power community stations in rural and other underserved areas, (3) the
procurement of funds to help these stations change to digital transmission tech-
nologies, and (4) the further development of low-power FM (LPFM).
LPFM stations, which would operate on the neighborhood scale with power
of 100 watts or less, are seen by former FCC chairman William Kennard as an
important vehicle for giving schools, churches, social service agencies, and other
community groups a chance to make programs that ordinarily would not air on
other stations (see Microradio.org). One FCC official reports that the prospect of
low-power FM has triggered more mail, e-mail, and phone messages to the
agency-much of it from LPFM supporters-than any other telecommunica-
tions issue in decades (Stewart). However, America's commercial and public
radio broadcasters have opposed the FCC's decision to license LPFM stations,
claiming they would interfere with their own broadcast signals. FCC engineers
have refuted these claims, and the agency has in fact cleared the way for the
granting of 255 LPFM licenses. However, Congress severely reduced the scope
of LPFM deployment in late 2000; thus, the future of this small-scale radio alter-
native is in the hands of various interest groups that continue to pressure law-
makers in Washington (US FCC Statement, "Over 500," 2).
Perhaps it is time for those Americans who wish to enhance radio's public
service function in the digital era to borrow a favorite term from corporations
that have consolidated rapidly in other deregulated fields: the "grand alliance."
It would be truly fascinating to see progressive NPR and Pacifica affiliates, com-
munity and grassroots stations, and new LPFM licensees unite for the purpose
of producing, sharing, and broadcasting programs that meet the needs of those
not served by other radio stations. In order for this to happen, a wide cross sec-
tion of concerned citizens must work to rebuild a viable broadcast reform
Michael P. McCauley
movement in the United States. This task would entail the building of coali-
tions among minority, low-income, labor, and other interested groups, along
with an analysis of why other broadcast reform efforts have failed (Mosco).
Such a process of coalition-building could take several years, but if it is done
carefully, this sort of effort could one day enable the creation of a Public
Broadcasting Trust, which in turn would provide a certain percentage of annual
funding for community-scale radio stations. Daunting as this task may seem,
groups such as Citizens for Independent Public Broadcasting have shown that
the PBT ideal is more than just a passing fancy. Whatever the specific pathway,
advocates for better radio must now move beyond the "baby steps" of intellec-
tual commitment to active participation in a movement to renew public service
commitments at the systemic level. Only through this level of change-and of
corresponding change in America's overall political culture-will the ideal of
good citizenship come to enjoy the same status in media discourse that con-
sumerism now does.
Notes
I. To be fair, the Eureka system would require stations in a given region to share trans-
mission facilities and adopt the same power and coverage configurations. Deployment of this
system would thus entail another reallocation of radio spectrum and would, in a very real
sense, change the valuation of radio properties. This much is true; radio broadcasters who
vilify the Eureka system, however, are making a statement about policy preference and not
about an irrefutable social fact.
2. Gannett's support for USADR marked its first foray into radio broadcasting, though
the company has many other media holdings. Gannett is, for example, the largest American
newspaper group, and also owns and operates twenty-two TV stations. The broadcasting
properties formerly owned by Westinghouse are now pan of the Viacom/CBS empire, which
either operates or provides programs for more than 7,500 radio stations through its various
subsidiaries. USADR (now iBiquity Digital Corporation) is also owned in part by ABC. For
further details, see the Gannett Web site <http:/ /www.gannett.com/map/gan007.htm>, the
Westwood One (Viacom) site <http://www2.cbsradio.com/wwl/index.htm>, and the
USADR site <http:/ /www.usadr.com/aboutus.html>.
3. For a fuller textual and graphical depiction of an IBOC system under development, see
the comments that USADR filed in response to the FCC's Notice of Proposed Ru/,e Mailing
regarding DAB (US FCC, Comments).
4. The XM allocation is less susceptible to interference and thus has been deemed to
hold greater profit potential (see "DARS Winners").
5. Broadband is a term used to describe any transmission medium that can simultaneously
handle hundreds of audio and video channels, telephone calls, and a wide variety of high-
speed data applications end to end. These services are most commonly delivered by cable
and telephone companies and other "telcos" that have begun to use fiber-optic technology.
"Wireless broadband" refers to the same sort of high-speed transmissions outlined above, but
without the need for wires or cables (see McNamara).
6. These suggested reform measures, described more fully in the following pages, were
culled from a larger list of recommendations by the Gore Commission and augmented by
the autl10r's own research. A complete text of the Gore Commission's report is available at
<http:/ /www.benton.org/PIAC/report.htmi>. An excellent summary of this report is also
available through Current Online at <http:/ /www.current.org/ dtv/ dtv823g.html>.
Radio's Digital Future
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