Conchita Gloria and Maria Lourdes Gloria-Payduan vs. Builders Savings and Loan Association, Inc.

G.R. No. 202324; June 4, 2018

Ponente: Del Castillo, J. (1st Division)

Facts:
 Spouses Juan and Conchita Gloria are registered owners of a parcel of land located in Kamuning, Quezon City.
 Maria Lourdes Gloria – Payduan was their adopted daughter.
 Juan passed away in 1987, and so Conchita and Lourdes filed before the RTC against respondent, Builders Savings
and Loan Association, and Benildo Biag for declaration of null and void real estate mortgage, promissory note,
cancellation of notation in the transfer certificate of title an damages with prayer for injunctive relief.
 Petitioners claimed:
o Biag duped them into surrendering the TCT to him because he will verify the title, however, he used it to
mortgage the property to Builders Savings.
o Biag deceived Conchita that her daughter requested her to sign the subject loan and mortgage
documents, as well as, a promissory note which also contained the signature of Juan who was already
long deceased as mortgagor and co-maker.
o Biag and Builders Savings colluded to foreclose the property and sold it at an auction.
 Builders Savings contested:
o Lourdes had no capacity to sue nor authority and interest for she was not legally adopted by the spouses.
o Conchita neither signed the verification attached to the complaint nor executed a special power of
attorney to authorize her daughter Lourdes.
o Builders Savings presented its Credit Investigator Danilo Reyes who testified that he personally met
Spouses Juan and Conchita Gloria, Maria Lourdes and her husband, and Benildo Biag when they went to
their office to apply for a loan.
 RTC granted in favor of the petitioners:
o Declared the mortgage and promissory note null and void.
o Directing the Builders Savings to return the title free from all liens an encumbrances
 CA however ruled in favor of Builders Savings:
o When an alleged heir sues to nullify a document which would impair her interest as such heir, her
successional rights must first be determined in a special proceeding.
o Moreover, Conchita failed to sign the certification against non-forum shopping thrice, which resulted to
dropping her from the case as plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or not Lourdes as a co-owner of the subject real property is a real party in the case.

Ruling:

Yes. Article 777 of the Civil Code specifically provides that successional rights are transmitted from the decedent to his/her
heirs from the moment of death of the former; that even if there were no pending settlement proceedings for the distribution
of a decedent's estate, there was no need for a prior declaration of heirship before the heirs may commence an action arising
from any right of the deceased, such as the right to bring an action to annul a sale.

In this case, Lourdes was not legally adopted by the spouses but a natural child. Being the daughter of the deceased Juan and
Conchita, Lourdes has an interest in the subject property as heir to Juan and co-owner with Conchita. The fact that she was not
judicially declared as heir is of no moment, there was no need for a prior declaration of heirship before heirs may commence
an action arising from any right of their predecessor, such as one for annulment of mortgage. No judicial declaration of
heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.

Thus, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the
present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying
debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself
to his heirs. As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or
any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even
without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
Abigael An Espiña-Dan vs. Marco Dan
G.R. No. 209031; April 16, 2018

Ponente: Del Castillo, J. (1st Division)

Facts:
 Abigael is a Filipina and Marco an Italian national met on a chatroom on the internet. They tied the knot in 2006.
During their honeymoon, she noticed that he was not circumcised and he refused circumsicion. (He got a big dick
tho)
 When the couple lived together in Italy, she found that he was addicted to video games and marijuana (naomi likes
it too). During several confrontations, she end up getting hit by him. He was also dependent on his mother and he
had poor hygiene. He would only give her money for food and spent most of his income for video games.
 In 2007, Abegael flew back to the Philippines. Since then, there was no communication between them. She took this
as lack of interest on Marco’s part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file the petition.
 Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist was presented. With only examining the petitioner and her mother and not
Marco, she made a conclusion that Abigael was not suffering from any psychological incapacity while Marco, based
on Abigael’s description, is suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Anti-Social Trait. (Marco
is an ass like Alfred)
 Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to satisfy the requirements to declare the marriage null
and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to annul the marriage.

Ruling:

No. Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than
a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

In this case, Abigail admitted that before and during their marriage, Marco was working and giving her money; and he was
even sweet and they enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that the respondent was psychologically unfit
for marriage. Addiction to video games and cannabis are not incurable condition and petitioner has not shown that she helped
her husband overcome them – as part of her marital obligation to render support and aid to respondent.

In addition, with the declared insufficiency if the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the weight of proving psychological
incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag’s expert findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews
conducted on respondent himself – but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. Lastly, the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts – identical in most respects – are entitled to respect and finality. The same being correct, this Court finds no need to
disturb them.
Saluday v. People
G.R. No. 215305. April 3, 2018

Ponente: Carpio, Acting C.J. (En Banc)

Facts:
 Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint to
check the presence of contraband, illegal firearms or explosives and suspicious individuals.
 A bag, small but too heavy for its size, belonging to Marcelo G. Saluday, was found by SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco).
Saluday was arrested for failure to produce authority to carry firearms and explosives.
 In an inquest conducted, the Prosecutor of Davao City found probable cause for violation of PD 1866 for carrying
firearms, explosives and ammunition.
 Both the RTC and CA ruled against Saluday, declaring Saluday in actual or constructive possession of firearm and
explosive without authority or license and was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
firearm, ammunition, and explosives under PD 1866.

Issue: Whether or not the search was illegal.

Ruling:

No. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution applies only to unreasonable searches or seizures. The prohibition of unreasonable
search and seizure emanates from one’s right to privacy. When a person displays an expectation of privacy, which the society
is ready to recognize as reasonable, the State cannot violate a person’s right against unreasonable search or seizure (Katz vs.
United States). In addition, one’s expectation of privacy to be reasonable, it must counter the safety and welfare of the people.

In this case, Saluday’s contentenion that his failure to object to the search cannot be construed as an implied waiver does not
have merit. Constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that can be waived.
However, the waiver should be voluntary, clear, specific and intelligently given, absent any duress or coercion. Furthermore,
the elements of the crime committed, particularly the possession or ownership of the firearm, explosive or ammunition, and
lack of license to own or possess said firearm, explosive or ammunition, raises questions of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the finding of the trial court; hence, there was no need to disturb the latter’s findings. Thus, Saluday is guilty of violating PD
1866.
Leviste Management System, Inc., vs. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc
G.R. No. 199353; April 4, 2018

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro J. (1st Division)

Facts:
 Legaspi Towers is a condominium in Makati City which consisted of seven floors with a unit on the roof deck and
two levels above it called Concession 2 and 3.
 Concession 3 was originally owned by Leon Mercado, which was then bought by Lemans through Mr. Leviste.
 In 1989, Lemans decided to build another unit (Concession 4) in Concession 3.
 Despite Legaspi Corporation's notice that the construction of Concession 4 was illegal, Lemans refused to stop its
construction. Due to this, Legaspi Corporation forbade the entry of Lemans' construction materials to be used in
Concession 4 in the condominium.
 Legaspi Corporation similarly wrote letters to the Building Official Nelson Irasga asking that the building permit of
Lemans for Concession 4 be cancelled. Irasga, however, denied the requested cancellation, stating that the applicant
complied with the requirements for a building permit and that the application was signed by the then president of
Legaspi Corporation.
 RTC ruled in favor of Legaspi Towers, deciding that Lemans is not the owner of the air space above its unit. Its claim
of ownership is without basis in fact and in law. The air space which is not on top of its unit but also on top of the
condominium itself, owned and operated by defendant Legaspi Towers.
 CA reversed the decision and applied Depra vs Dumlao, and ruled that while Concession 4 is indeed a nuisance,
Lemans has been declared a builder in good faith, and noted that Legaspi Towers failed to contest this declaration.
Since Concession 4 was built in good faith, it cannot be demolished.

Issue: Whether or not Lemans owns the air space above its condominium unit and as owner of the said air space, its
construction of another floor was in the exercise of its rights.

Ruling:

No. Article 448 of the Civil Code and the Depra case should not be applied in this case. As a general rule, Article 448 on builders
in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties. It may be well to state here the
following provisions of Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act should be applied.

In this case, it is Legaspi Towers which owns the air space above Concession 3 as the same is in keeping with the facts and the
applicable law. The the air space wherein Concession 4 was built is not only above Concession 3, but above the entire
condominium building. The Lemans’ ownership of Concession 3 does not necessarily extend to the area above the same, which
is actually the "air space" of the entire condominium building. The ownership of the air space above Concession 3 is not a
necessary incident of the ownership of Concession 3.

Thus, to allow the petitioner's claim over the air space would not prevent the petitioner from further constructing another unit
on top of Concession 4 and so on. This would clearly open the door to further "impairment of the structural integrity of the
condominium building" which is explicitly proscribed in the Master Deed. Being builders in bad faith, Lemans should remove
Concession 4 at its own expense.

Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the
Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject
property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation). This
Court has ruled that upon acquisition of a condominium unit, the purchaser not only affixes his conformity to the sale; he also
binds himself to a contract with other unit owners.