Caesar Civil War I
Caesar Civil War I
Caesar Civil War I
I think it needless to say any thing here, in opposition to those who pretend, that the
following Commentaries, concerning the Civil War, were not penned by Caesar himself.
We have not only the express testimony of Suetonius to the contrary, but the very style
sufficiently declares, that Caesar alone could be the author of the work. There is room
however to suspect, from the abrupt manner in which the subject is introduced, that the
beginning of this first book is wanting: for history takes notice of several previous facts, of
which no mention is made here. I have therefore collected out of Plutarch, Appian, and
Dion, as much as was necessary to connect this and the former Commentary, and fancy it
will not be disagreeable to the reader, to offer it here by way of preface. Gaul being wholly
reduced, Caesar, upon his arrival inLombardy, thought proper, for many reasons, to send
deputies to Rome, to demand the consulship, and a prolongation of his command.
Pompey, who, though averse to Caesar's interest, had not yet openly declared against him,
neither furthered nor opposed his request. But the consuls Marcellus and Lentulus, who
had already joined the party of his enemies, resolved by every method in their power to
frustrate the design. Marcellus scrupled not to add other injuries to that of which we
speak. For Caesar had lately planted a colony at Novocomum in Cisalpine Gaul; and
Marcellus, not satisfied with stripping the inhabitants of the privilege of Roman citizens,
seized one of their chief magistrates at Rome, ordered him to be scourged, and then
dismissed him to carry his complaints to Caesar, an ignominy from which all free citizens
were expressly exempted by the laws. While affairs were in this train, C. Curio, tribune of
the people, came to Caesar in Gaul. This nobleman, after many attempts in behalf of the
commonwealth, and to promote Caesar's interest; finding at length all his endeavours
without effect, fled from Rome, to avoid the malice of his enemies, and informed Caesar
of all that was transacted against him. Caesar received him with great marks of respect, as
well on account of his rank in the commonwealth, as the many services he had done
himself and the state; and thanked him for the signal zeal he had shown in his cause. But
Curio advised him, since his enemies were now openly preparing for war, to draw his
army together without delay, and rescue the commonwealth from the tyranny of an
aspiring faction. Caesar, though fully satisfied of the truth of Curio's report, resolved to
sacrifice all other considerations to the public tranquillity, that no man might justly charge
him with being the author of a civil war. He therefore only petitioned by his friends, that
the government of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with the command of two legions, might
be continued to him, in all which his principal aim was, by the equity of his demands, to
induce his enemies to grant peace to the commonwealth. These offers appeared so
reasonable, that even Pompey himself knew not how to oppose them. But the consuls still
continuing inflexible, Caesar wrote a letter to the senate, wherein, after briefly
enumerating his exploits and services, he requested them not to deprive him of the
benefit of the people's favour, who had permitted him to sue for the consulship in his
absence. He protested his readiness, if such was the resolution of the senate and people of
Rome, to dismiss his army, provided Pompey did the same: but could by no means
resolve, so long as he continued in command and authority, to divest himself of troops,
and lay himself open to the injuries of his enemies. Curio was commissoned to carry this
letter, who travelling with incredible despatch, reached Rome in three days (a distance of
a hundred and sixty miles,) before the beginning of January, and ere the consuls could get
any thing determined relating to Caesar's command. Curio, upon his arrival, refused to
part with the letter, resolving not to deliver it but in full senate, and when the tribunes of
the people were present: for he was apprehensive, should he do otherwise, that the
consuls would suppress it.
Caesar's letter being delivered to the consuls, the tribunes, with much difficulty, procured
it a reading in the senate; but could by no means prevail to have his demands brought
under deliberation. The consuls proposed to debate upon the state of the republic. "
Lentulus promised to stand by the senate and the people, if they would deliver their
sentiments with freedom and courage; but if they regarded Caesar, and affected to court
his friendship, as had been the practice for some time past, he knew, he told them, what
he had to do, and was determined to disclaim their authority; not doubting but he would
find a ready admittance to the favour and protection of Caesar." Scipio spoke much to the
same purpose: "That Pompey was firmly bent not to abandon the republic, if he found the
senators ready to support him; but if they cooled, or were remiss in their resolves, it
would be in vain for them to expect his aid, if they saw cause afterwards to apply for it."
This speech of Scipio, as the senate was held in the city, and Pompey resided in the
suburbs, was considered as coming from Pompey's own mouth. Some were for following
milder counsels, of which number was M. Marcellus, who gave it as his opinion: "That it
was not proper to enter upon the present deliberation, till troops were raised over all Italy,
and an army got ready, under whose protection the senate might proceed with freedom
and safety in their debates." " Callidius was for sending Pompey to his government, to
take away all occasion of discord; because Caesar had reason to fear, as two of his legions
had been taken from him, that Pompey retained them in the neighbourhood of Rome,
with a view to employ them against him." M. Rufus nearly agreed with Callidius. But they
were all severely reprimanded by the consul Lentulus, who expressly refused to put
Callidius's motion to the vote. Marcellus, awed by the consul's reprimand, retracted what
he had said. Thus the clamours of Lentulus, the dread of an army at the gates of Rome,
and the menaces of Pompey's friends, forced the greater part of the senate, though with
the utmost reluctance and dislike, into a compliance with Scipio's motion: " That Caesar
should be ordered to disband his army before a certain day then fixed; and that in case of
disobedience, he should be declared an enemy to the republic." M. Antonius and Q.
Cassius, tribunes of the people, opposed their negative to this decree. Immediately a
debate arose, upon the validity of their interposition. Many severe speeches were made
against them; and the more warm and passionate any one appeared, the more was he
applauded by Caesar's enemies.
In the evening the senate rose; and Pompey sending for all those of his party, commended
the forward; confirmed them in their resolutions; reproved and animated the more
moderate. Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly served under him, flocked to him
from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities. A great number of
officers belonging to the two legions lately returned by Caesar, had likewise orders to
attend him. Romewas filled with troops. Curio assembled the tribunes to support the
decree of the people. On the other hand, all the friends of the consuls, all the partizans of
Pompey, and of such as bore any ancient grudge to Caesar, repaired to the senate: by
whose concourse and votes the weaker sort were terrified, the irresolute confirmed, and
the greater part deprived of the liberty of speaking their mind freely. L. Piso the censor,
and L. Roscius the pretor, offered to go and acquaint Caesar with the state of affairs,
demanding only six days for that purpose. Some were for sending deputies to him, to
inform him of the senate's disposition.
But all these proposals were rejected, because the consul, Scipio, and Cato, declared
against them. Cato was incited by the remembrance of an old quarrel, and the
disappointment he had sustained in standing candidate for the pretorship with Caesar.
Lentulus was oppressed with debt, and flattered himself with the command of armies, the
government of provinces, and the largesses of the kings for whom he should procure the
title of allies and friends of the Roman people. He was besides wont to boast, among those
of his own party, that he doubted not of becoming a second Sylla, in whom the whole
authority of the commonwealth should centre. Scipio entertained the same hope of
commands and governments, which he expected to share with his son-in-law Pompey:
added to this his dread of a prosecution; his vanity and selfconceit; and the flatteries and
applauses of his friends, who at that time bore a considerable sway in the commonwealth
and courts of justice. Pompey himself, instigated by Caesar's enemies, and not able to
endure an equal dignity, was now entirely alienated from him, and had joined with their
common adversaries, most of whom Caesar had contracted during his affinity with
Pompey. Beside, the fraudulent step he had taken, in detaining, for the purposes of his
own ambition, the two legions destined to serve in Asia andSyria, determined him to use
all his endeavours to bring on a civil war,
Thus nothing but tumult and violence was to be seen in the public debates. Caesar's
friends had no time given them to inform him of what passed. Even the tribunes
themselves were not exempt from danger, nor durst they have recourse to that right of
intercession, which Sylla had left them, as the last bulwark of liberty; insomuch that the
seventh day after entering upon their office, they saw themselves obliged to provide for
their safety; whereas in former times, the most turbulent and seditious tribunes never
began to apprehend themselves in danger, till towards the eighth month of their
administration. Recourse was had to that rigid and ultimate decree which was never used
but in the greatest extremities, when the city was threatened with ruin and conflagration:
"That the consuls, the pretors, the tribunes of the people, and the proconsuls that were
near Rome, should take care that the commonwealth received no detriment." This decree
passed the seventh of January; so that during the first five days in which it was permitted
the senate to assemble, after Lentulus's entrance upon the consulship, (for two days are
always appropriated to the holding of the comitia,) the most severe and rigorous
resolutions were taken, both in relation to Caesar's government, and the tribunes of the
people, men of eminent worth and dignity. The tribunes immediately quitted the city,
and fled to Caesar, who was then at Ravenna, waiting an answer to his late demands,
whose equity he hoped would dispose all parties to entertain thoughts of peace.
The following days the senate assembled without the city, where Pompey confirmed
everything he had before intimated by the mouth of Scipio. He applauded the resolution
and courage of the senators, acquainted them with the state of his forces, that he had ten
legions already in arms, and was besides well informed, that Casar's troops were by no
means satisfied with their general; nay, had even refused to support and follow him. It
was then proposed in the senate, that troops should be raised over all Italy; that Faustus
Sylla should be sent propretor into Mauritania; that Pompey should be supplied with
money out of the public treasury, and that king Juba should be declared friend and ally of
the people of Rome: but Marcellus opposed the last of these; and Philippus, tribune of the
people, would not agree to the propretorship of Sylla. The other motions were approved by
the senate. The affair of the provinces was next decided; two of which were consular, the
rest pretorian. Syria fell to the share of Scipio, and Gaul fell to L. Domitius. Philippus and
Marcellus were set aside, through the private views of the prevailing party. The rest of the
provinces were assigned to men of pretorian rank; who waited not to have their
nomination confirmed by the people, as had been the custom in former years, but after
taking the usual oath, departed for their several commands in a military habit. The
consuls left the city, a thing unheard of till that time, and lictors were seen walking before
private men in the forum and capitol, contrary to the express practice of former ages.
Troops were levied over all Italy, arms enjoined, money demanded of the colonies and free
towns, and even taken from the very temples; in fine, neither divine nor human rights
were regarded.
Caesar having intelligence of these proceedings, addressed himself to his troops: "He took
notice of the many injuries he had received on all occasions from his enemies, who had
alienated Pompey from him, by filling him with an envy and jealousy of his reputation,
though he had done every thing in his power to promote his glory, and favour his
advancement to the highest dignities. He complained of the new precedent introduced
into the commonwealth, in checking, and hindering by arms, the opposition of the
tribunes, which of late years had been restored to its wonted force. That Sylla, who had
almost annihilated the tribuneship, had yet left it the liberty of opposition; whereas
Pompey, who valued himself upon the re-establishment of that office, deprived it now of a
privilege it had always enjoyed. That the decree enjoining the magistrates to provide for
the safety of the commonwealth, which implied an order to the Roman people to repair to
arms, was never wont to be used but on occasion of dangerous laws, seditious measures
pursued by the tribunes, or a general secession of the people, when they possessed
themselves of the temples and places of strength ; crimes, which in former ages had been
expiated by the fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi. That at present nothing of this kind
had been attempted, nor so much as thought of; no law promulged, no endeavour used to
seduce the people, no appearance of revolt or disaffection. He therefore conjured them to
defend against the malice of his enemies, the honour and reputation of a general, under
whom they had served nine years with so much advantage to the commonwealth, gained
so many battles, and subdued all Gaul and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth
legion, who were present, and whom he had sent for in the beginning of the troubles, (the
rest not being yet arrived,) cried out, that they were determined to maintain the honour
of their general, and to revenge the wrongs done to the tribunes.
Being assured of the good will of the soldiers, he marched with that legion toRimini,
where he was met by the tribunes of the people, who had fled to him for protection He
ordered the other legions to quit their winter quarters, and follow him with all expedition.
While he was at Rimini, young L. Caesar, whose father was one of his lieutenants, came to
him; and after acquainting him with the occasion of his journey, added, that he had a
private message to him from Pompey, "who was desirous of clearing himself to Caesar,
that he might not interpret those actions as designed to affront him, which had no other
aim but the good of the commonwealth: that it had been his constant maxim, to prefer the
interest of the republic to any private engagement: that it was worthy of Caesar, to
sacrifice his passion and resentment to the same noble motive; and not prejudice the
commonwealth, by pushing too far his revenge against his private enemies." He added
something more to the same purpose, mingled with excuses for Pompey. The pretor
Roscius joined likewise in the negotiation, declaring he was commissioned so to do.
Though all this tended little to redress the injuries of which Caesar complained, yet
considering these as proper persons by whom to transmit his thoughts, he begged of
them, that as they had not scrupled to bring Pompey's demands to him, they would
likewise carry back his proposals to Pompey; that, if possible, so small a labour might put
an end to mighty differences, aad deliver all Italy from the fear of a civil war. He told them
"That the interest of the commonwealth had always been dearer to him than life; but he
could not help grieving at the malice of his enemies, who had frustrated the good
intentions of the Roman people in his favour, by cutting off six months from his
command, and obliging him to return to Rome to sue for the consulship, though a law had
been made dispensing with his personal attendance; that he had yet, for the sake of the
commonwealth, patiently submitted to this assault upon his honour; that even his
proposal of disbanding the armies on both sides, which he had made by a letter to the
senate, had been rejected: that new levies were making over all Italy: that two legions,
which had been taken from him, under pretence of the Parthian war, were still retained in
the service of his enemies: that the whole state was in arms. What could all this aim at but
his destruction ? That, nevertheless, he was ready to agree to any proposal, and expose
himself to any danger, for the sake of his country. Let Pompey go to his government: let all
the armies be disbanded: let every body throughout Italy lay down their arms: let every
thing that participates of terror and force be removed: let the elections of magistrates he
made with perfect freedom; and let the republic be administered by the authority of the
senate and people. And the better to settle all these articles, and corroborate them with the
sanction of an oath, let either Pompey himself draw nearer; or suffer Ceesar to approach
him; as all their differences may be most easily terminated by a conference."
Roscius and L. Caesar, having received this answer, departed for Capua, where they found
Pompey and the consuls, and laid before them Caesar's proposals. After deliberating upon
the affair, they sent a reply, in writing, by the same messengers, the purport of which was:
"That Caesar should quitRimini, return to Gaul, and disband his army; which conditions
performed, Pompey would go into Spain. In the meantime, till Caesar gave security for
the performance of what he had promised, neither Pompey nor the consuls would
discontinue the levies."
It was, by no means, a fair proposal, that Caesar should be obliged to quiteRimini and
return to Gaul, while Pompey held provinces and legions that were none of his: that he
should dismiss his army, whilst the other was levying troops: and, that only a general
promise of going into Spain should be given, without fixing a day for his departure; by
which evasion, was he to be found in Italy, even at the expiration of Caesar's consulship,
he could not yet be charged with breach of faith. His forbearing too to appoint a time for a
conference, and declining to approach nearer, gave little reason to hope for a peace. He
therefore sent Antony to Arretium, with five cohorts; remained himself at Rimini, with
two, where he resolved to levy troops; and seizingPisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, left a
cohort in each for a garrison.
Meantime, being informed that Thermus the pretor had entered Iguvium, with five
cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the town; as he knew the inhabitants to be well
inclined to his interest, he detached Curio thither, with three cohorts, drawn from
Lisaurum and Rimini. Upon this, Thermus, who could not confide in the townsmen,
retired with his cohorts, and quitted the place: but his troops abandoning him in their
march, returned severally to their own homes. Curio was received into the place with
great demonstrations of joy: which being reported to Caesar, as he found he had the good
will of the colonies and free towns, he drew the cohorts of the thirteenth legion out of
garrison, and marched to Auximum, which Attius held with a body of troops, and whence
he had despatched senators to levy forces overall Picenum. Caesar's arrival being known,
the chief citizens ofAuximum went in a body to Attius Varus, and told him: " That it did
not belong to them to determine on which side justice lay; but that neither they, nor the
other municipal towns, could endure to see their gates shut against Caesar, who by his
great actions had deserved so well of the commonwealth: that therefore he would do well
to consult his own safety and reputation." Attius, moved by this speech, drew off his
garrison and fled. But some of Caesar's first ranks pursuing him, obliged him to stop; and
a battle ensuing, he was deserted by his men. Some of the troops returned home; the rest
went over to Caesar, and brought along with them L. Pupius, first centurion of the legion,
who had formerly held the same rank in Pompey's army. Caesar commended Attius's
soldiers: dismissed Papius: returned thanks to the inhabitants of Auximum; and
promised to retain always a grateful remembrance of their attachment.
These things being reported at Rome, the consternation was so great over the whole city,
that when the consul Lentulus came to the treasury, to deliver out the money to Pompey,
in consequence of the decree of the sepate, he scarce waited the opening of the inner door,
but precipitately left the place, upon a false rumour, that Caesar was approaching, and
some of his cavalry already in view. He was soon followed by his colleague Marcellus, and
the greater part of the magistrates, Pompey had left the town the day before, and was
upon his way to Apulia, where he had quartered the legions he had received from Caesar.
The levies were discontinued within the city, and no place appeared secure on this side
Capua. Here, at last, they took courage and rallied, and began to renew their levies in the
colonies round about, which had been sent thither by the Julian law. Lentulus summoned
into the forum the gladiators whom Caesar had ordered to be trained up there, gave them
their liberty, furnished them with horses, and commanded them to follow him. But being
afterwards admonished by his friends that this step was universally condemned, he
dispersed them into the neighbouring town ofCampania, to keep garrison there.
Caesar meanwhile leaving Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum; where he
was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who furnished his army with every
thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, a town founded by Labienus, and built at his own
expense, sent deputies to him, with an offer of their submission and services. He
demanded a certain number of soldiers, which were sent immediately. Meantime the
twelfth legion joined him; and with these two he marched to Asculum, a town of Picenum.
Here Lentulus Spinther commanded with ten cohorts; who, hearing of Caesar's approach,
quitted the place with his troops, who almost all deserted him upon the march. Being left
with only a few, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum to
encourage his followers in those parts. Vibullius understanding from him the state of
affairs in Picenum, dismissed Lentulus, and took the soldiers under his command. He
likewise drew together from the neighbouring provinces as many as he could meet with of
Pompey's levies: among the rest, Ulcilles Hirus, who was flying, with six cohorts, from
Camerinum, where they had been quartered. Out of all these he formed thirteen cohorts,
with which he posted, by great journeys, toCorfinium, where Domitius Ahenobarbus
commanded; whom he informed that Caesar was approaching with two legions. Domitius
had already got together, with great expedition, twenty cohorts from Alba, the country of
the Marsi, Peligni,and the neighbouring provinces.
Caesar having made himself master of Asculum, and obliged Lentulus to retire, ordered
the soldiers who had deserted him, to be sought after, and new levies to be made. He
remained only one day there, to settle what related to provisions, and then pursued his
march to Corfinium. Upon his arrival there, he found five cohorts, whom Domitius had
detached from the garrison, employed in breaking down a bridge about three miles
distant from the town. But Caesar's advanced parties attacking them, they quickly
abandoned the bridge, and retired to Corfinium. Caesar having passed with his legions,
halted before the town, and encamped under the walls.
Upon this, Domitius engaged, by great rewards,persons well acquainted with the country,
to carry letters into Apulia to Pompey, wherein he earnestly requested him to come to his
aid. He told him, "That it would be easy, in that close country, to shut up Caesar between
two armies, and cut off his provisions: that unless this course was followed, he himself,
with above thirty cohorts, and a greatnumber of senators and Roman knights, would be
exposed to imminent danger." Meanwhile,having encouraged his men, he disposed
engines along the walls, appointed every one his particular post, and, the more to animate
them, promised each soldier four acres of land out of his own estate, and, in proportion, to
every centurion and volunteer.
Meantime Caesar was informed that the people of Sulmona, a town seven miles distant
from Corfinium, desired to put themselves under his protection, but were restrained by
Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who held them in subjection with a
garrison ot seven cohorts. He therefore despatched M. Antony thither, with five cohorts of
the seventh legion, whose ensigns were no sooner descried from the walls of Sulmona,
than the gates were thrown open, and the whole people in a body, both soldiers and
townsmen, came out to congratulate Antony on his arrival. Lucretius and Attius
endeavoured to escape over the wall: but Attius being taken, and brought to Antony,
"requested that he might be sent to Caesar. Antony returned the same day, bringing along
with him the cohorts and Attius. Caesar joined these cohorts to his army, and set Attius at
liberty.
Caesar resolved to employ the three first days in strongly fortifying his camp, in procuring
corn from the neighbouring towns, and waiting the arrival of the rest of his forces. During
this space, the eighth legion joined him, with two and twenty cohorts of new levies from
Gaul, and about three hundred horse from the king of Noricum. This obliged him to form
a second camp on the other side of the town, under the command of Curio. The remaning
days were spent in drawing a line with redoubts round the place, which work was nearly
completed when the messengers, that had been sent to Pompey, returned.
Domitius, perusing the despatches, thought proper to dissemble the contents, and
declared, in council, that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance. Meantime he
exhorted them to behave with courage, and provide every thing necessary for a vigorous
defence. He conferred, however, privately with a few of his most intimate friends, and, in
concert with them, determined upon flight. But as his looks and speech were found to
disagree; as he behaved not with his usual composure and firmness; and was observed,
contrary to custom, to be much in secret conference with his friends; avoiding public
appearances, and councils of war: it was not possible for the truth to remain any longer
concealed. For Pompey had wrote back, "That he could not put all to hazard for his sake;
that he had neither advised nor consented to his shutting himself up in Corfinium; that
he must therefore endeavour to extricate himself as well as he could, and come and join
him with all his forces." But as Caesar had invested and carried his lines round the place,
this retreat was now become impracticable.
Though Caesar was fully sensible of how great importance it was to get possession of the
town immediately, and join the garrison to his own army; lest by largesses, promises of
speedy relief, or false reports, any change should be produced; as in war great revolutions
often arise from very trifling causes: yet, fearing that if he introduced his soldiers in the
dark, they would take that opportunity to plunder the town, he sent back the deputies,
with thanks for their proffer, resolving to have the walls and gates watched with great care.
To that end he disposed his men along the works, not at a certain distance, as usual, but in
one continued rank, so as to touch each other, and completely invest the town. He ordered
the military tribunes, and officers of the cavalry, to patrol about the works, and not only be
on their guard against sallies, but even take care to prevent the escape of particular
persons. And indeed so alert and vigilant were our soldiers, that not a man closed his eyes
that night; each expecting the event with impatience, and carrying his thoughts from one
thing to another; what would be the fate of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of
Lentulus, and the other illustrious persons in the place: in fine, what was like to be the
issue of so complicated a scene.
About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther called from the wall to the guard,
and desired to be conducted to Caesar. His request being granted, he came out of the
town, attended by some of Domitius's soldiers, who never left him till they had conducted
him into Caesar's presence. "He begged him to spare his life, and pardon the injuries he
had done him, in consideration of their former friendship. He owned the many
obligations he had laid him under, in procuring him an admission into the college of
priests, obtaining for him the government of Spain, after the expiration of the pretorship,
and supporting him in the demand of the consulship." Caesar interrupted him by saying:
"That he was not come out of the bounds of his province, with an intent to injure any
body; but to repel the injuries done him by his enemies; to revenge the wrongs of the
tribunes; and to restore to the Roman people, who were oppressed by a small faction of
the nobles, their liberties and privileges." Lentulus, encouraged by this speech, asked
leave to return into the town, "where, he said, the assurances he had obtained of his own
safety, would contribute not a little to the consolation of others, some of whom were so
terrified, that they were ready to take desperate resolutions." Leave being granted, he
departed for the town.
As soon as it was light, Caesar ordered before him all the senators, senators' sons, military
tribunes, and Roman knights. There were ofsenatorian rank, L. Domitius, P. Lentulus
Spinther, L. Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus, questor, L. Rubrius; also Domitius's
son, and many young men of quality, with a great number of Roman knights, and some
decurions, or senators of the neigbouring municipal towns, who had been sent for by
Domitius. As soon as they appeared, he gave orders to secure them from the insults of the
soldiery; and, addressing them in a few words, remonstrated: "That they had made a very
ill requital for the many signal services received at his hands." After which, he set them at
liberty. He likewise restored to Domitius six millions of sesterces, which that general had
brought with him to Corfinium, and deposited in the hands of the two treasurers of the
town, who surrendered it to Caesar. As this was public money, assigned by Pompey to pay
the forces with, Caesar might justly have seized it; but he was willing to show himself
generous, as well as merciful. He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the usual oath to
him, decamped that very day; made the ordinary march; and after staying in all seven
days before Corfinium, arrived inApulia, through the territories of the Marrucini,
Frentani, and Larinates.
Having dismissed him with these instructions, he arrived before Brundusiumwith six
legions, three of which were composed of veteran soldiers, and the rest of new levies
drawn together upon his march; for as to Domitius's troops, he had sent them directly
from Corfinium to Sicily. He found the consuls were gone to Dyrrhachium with great part
of the army, and that Pompey remained in Brundusium with twenty cohorts. Nor was it
certainly known whether he continued there with design to keep possession
ofBrundusium, that he might be master of the whole Adriatic Sea, the extreme parts of
Italy, and the country of Greece, in order to make war on both sides the gulf; or for want of
shipping to transport his men. Fearing, therefore, that it was his intention to keep footing
in Italy he resolved to deprive him of the advantages he might receive from the port of
Brundusium. The works he contrived for this purpose were as follows: He carried on a
mole on either side the mouth of the haven where the entrance was narrowest, and the
water shallow. But as this work could not be carried quite across the port, by reason of the
great depth of the sea, he prepared double floats of timber, thirty feet square, which were
each secured by four anchors from the four corners, to enable them to resist the fury of the
waves. These, extending all the way between the two moles, were covered over with earth
and fascines, that the soldiers might pass and repass with ease, and have firm footing to
defend them. The front and sides were armed with a parapet of hurdies, and every fourth
float had a tower of two stories, the better to guard the work from fire and the shocks of
the vessels.
Against these preparations, Pompey made use of several large ships which he found in the
port of Brundusium: and having fi ted them with towers of three stories, which he filled
with a great number of engines and darts, let them loose upon Caesar's floats, to break
through the staccado, and interrupt the works. Thus daily skirmishes happened with
darts, arrows, and slings, at a distance. Amidst these hostilities, Caesar's thoughts were
still bent upon peace; and though he could not but wonder that Magius, whom he had sent
with proposals to Pompey, was not yet returned with an answer; and even saw his designs
and undertakings retarded by his frequent offers of this kind, he nevertheless still
persevered in these peaceable resolutions. Accordingly, he despatched Caninius Rebilus,
one of his lieutenants, a relation and intimate friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with
him on this subject. He charged him to exhort that nobleman to think seriously of peace,
and, if possible, procure an interview between him and Pompey. Could this be effected,
he showed there was the greatest ground to believe that peace would soon be concluded on
reasonable terms; the honour and reputation of which would in a manner wholly redound
to Libo, if, by his mediation, both parties slould be prevailed with to lay down their arms.
Libo, after conferring with Caninius, waited on Pompey: soon after he returned with this
answer; that the consuls were absent, without whom Pompey had no power to treat of an
accommodation. Thus Caesar having often tried in vain to bring about a peace, thought it
now time to drop that design, and bend all his thoughts to war.
Caesar having spent nine days about his works, had now half finished the staccado, when
the ships employed in the first embarkation, being sent back by the consuls from
Dyrrhachium, returned to Brundusium. Pompey, either alarmed at Caesar's works, or
because from the first he had determined to relinquish Italy, no sooner saw the transports
arrive, than he prepared to carry over the rest of his forces. And the better to secure
himself against Caesar, and prevent his troops from breaking into the town during the
embarkation, he walled up the gates, barricaded the streets, or cut ditches across them,
filled with pointed stakes, and covered with hurdles and earth. The two streets which led
to the port and which he left open for the passage of his men, were fortified with a double
palisado of very strong well sharpened stakes. These preparations being made, he ordered
the soldiers to embark with great silence, having placed on the walls and towers some
select archers and slingers, who were to wait till all the troops had got aboard, and then
retire, upon a signal given, to some small ships that waited them at a convenient distance.
The people of Brundusium, provoked by the affronts they had received from Pompey, and
the insults of his soldiers, wished well to Caesar's cause; and having notice of Pompey's
intended departure while the soldiers were busied with the care of embarking, found
means to signify it from the tops o their houses. Caesar, upon this intelligence, ordered
scaling ladders to be prepared, and the soldiers to repair to their arms, that he might not
lose any opportunity of acting Pompey weighed anchor a little before night, and gave the
signal for recalling the soldiers that were upon the walls, who repaired with all expedition
to the ships prepared for them. Meantime the scaling ladders are applied to the walls, and
Caesar's troops enter the town. But being informed by the Brundusians of the snares and
ditches provided for them by the enemy, they were obliged to take a great circuit, which
gave Pompey time enough to put to sea. Two transports only, impeded by Caesar's mole,
were taken with the troops on board.
Though Caesar was fully sensible, that to finish the war at a blow, he must pass the sea
immediately, and endeavour to come up with Pompey, before he could draw
histransmarine forces together; yet he dreaded the delay and length of time that such a
project might require; because Pompey having carried with him all the ships on the coast,
rendered the present execution of the design impracticable. He must therefore wait the
arrival of ships from Picenum, Sicily, and the remoter coasts of Gaul, which was a tedious
business, and, at that season of the year, subject to great uncertainty. It appeared likewise
of dangerous consequence, to suffer a veteran army, and the two Spains, one of which was
wholly devoted to Pompey, to strengthen themselves in his rival's interest; to let them
grow powerful by levies of horse and foot, and leave Gaul and Italy open to their attacks in
his absence. He determined, therefore, to lay aside, for the present, the design of pursuing
Pompey, and turn all his thoughts towards Spain. He ordered the magistrates of the
municipal towns to assemble all the vessels they could, and send them to Brundusium. He
sent Valerius, one of his lieutenants, into Sardinia, with one legion, and the propretor
Curio into Sicily with three, ordering him, as soon as he had mastered Sicily, to pass over
with his army into Africa.
M. Cotta commanded in Sardinia; M. Cato in Sicily; and Africa had fallen by lot to Tubero.
The inhabitants of Cagliari, hearing of Valerius's commission, of their own accord, before
he had left Italy, drove Cotta out of their city; who terrified by the unanimous opposition
he met with from the province, fled into Africa. In Sicily, Cato applied himself with great
diligence to the refitting of old ships, and building of new. He sent his lieutenant to raise
forces in Lucania, and the country of the Brutians, and ordered the states ofSicily to
furnish him with a certain number of horse and foot. When these preparations were
almost completed, being informed of Curio's arrival, he called his chief officers together,
and complained, " That he was betrayed and abandoned by Pompey, who, without any
previous preparation, had involved the commonwealth in an unnecessary war; and upon
being questioned by himself and others in the senate, had assured them, that he was
abundantly able to sustain it." Having thus declared his mind, he quitted the province,
which by this means submitted without trouble to Curio, as Sardinia had before done to
Valerius. Tubero arriving in Africa, found Attius Varus in possession of that province,
who, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum, as we have shown above, had fled into those
parts, and, with the consent of the natives, taken upon him the command. Here he had
found means to levy two legions, by his knowledge of the people and country, where he
had been governor some years before, after the expiration of his pretorship. Tubero
coming before Utica with his fleet, was forbid the harbour and town; nor could he even
obtain leave for his son to land, though he had a fit of sickness upon him, but was obliged
to weigh anchor and be gone.
These affairs despatched, Caesar that his troops might enjoy some repose, cantoned them
in the nearest towns, and set out himself for Rome. There he assembled the senate, and
after complaining of the injuries of his enemies, told them, "That he had never affected
extraordinary honours, but waited patiently the time prescribed by the laws, to solicit for
a second consulship, to which every Roman citizen had a right to aspire: that the people,
with the concurrence of their tribunes, (in spite of the attempts of his enemies, and the
vigorous opposition of Cato, who endeavoured, according to custom, to spin out the time
in speaking,) had permitted him to stand candidate though absent, and that even in the
consulship of Pompey; who, if he disapproved of the decree, why did he let it pass? But if
he allowed it, why now oppose the execution ? He set before them his moderation, in
voluntarily proposing that both parties should lay down their arms, by which he must
have been himself divested of his government and command. He displayed the malice of
his enemies, who sought to impose terms on him, to which they would not submit
themselves; and chose rather to involve the state in a civil war than part with their armies
and provinces. He enlarged upon the injury they had done him, in taking away two of his
legions, and their cruelty and insolence, in violating the authority of the tribunes. He
spoke of his many offers of peace, his frequent desire of an interview, and the continual
refusals he had received. For all these reasons, he requested and conjured them to
undertake the administration of the republic, jointly with him. But if they declined it
through fear, he had no intention to force so great a burden upon them, and would take
the whole charge alone. That in the mean time it would be proper to send a deputation to
Pompey, to treat of an accommodation: nor was he frighted at the difficulty Pompey had
started some time before in the senate; that to send deputies was to acknowledge the
superiority of him to whom they were sent, and a sign of timidity in the sender. That this
was a little low way of thinking; and that, in the same manner as he had endeavoured at a
superiority in action, he would also strive to be superior in justice and equity."
The senate liked the proposal of a deputation to Pompey; "but the great difficulty was, to
find deputies; every one, out of fear, refusing to charge himself with that commission. For
Pompey, at his departure from Rome, had declared in the senate, "That he would esteem
those who stayed beind, as no less guilty than those in Caesar's camp." Thus three days
were spent in debates and excuses. The tribune L. Metellus had likewise been suborned
by Caesar's enemies to traverse his design, and hinder whatever he should propose.
Which Caesar coming to understand, and that he only wasted his time to no purpose; he
set out from Rome, without effecting what he intended, and arrived in farther Gaul.
Here he was informed, that Pompey had sent into Spain Vibullius Rufus, the same who, a
few days before, had been made prisoner at Corfinium, and set at liberty by Caesar; that
Domitius was gone to take possession ofMarseilles, with seven galleys, which he had fitted
out at Igilium and Cosanum, and manned with his slaves, freedmen, and labourers; that
the deputies of the above-mentioned state, young men of the first quality, (whom
Pompey, at his departure from Rome, had exhorted not to suffer the memory of his past
services to their country to be blotted out by those lately received from Caesar,) had been
sent before, to prepare the way for his reception. In consequence of their remonstrances,
the inhabitants of Marseilles shut their gates against Caesar, and summoned to their
assistance the Albici, a barbarous people, who had long been under their protection, and
inhabited the adjoining mountains. They brought provisions from the neighbouring
country and castles, refitted their navy, and repaired their walls and gates.
Caesar sending for fifteen of the principal men of the city, exhorted them not to be the
first to begin the war, but to be swayed rather by the authority of all Italy, than the will of
one particular person. He forgot not such other considerations as seemed most likely to
bring them to reason. The deputies returning into the town, brought back this answer
from the senate: "That they saw the Romans divided into two parties, and it did not
belong to them to decide such a quarrel: that at the head of these parties were Pompey
and Caesar, both patrons of their city, the one having added to it the country of the Vulcae
Arecomici and Helvians; the other after the reduction of Gaul, considerably augmented its
territories and revenues; that as they were therefore equally indebted to both, it became
them not to aid the one against the other; but to remain neuter, and grant neither an
admittance into their city nor port.
Whilst these things were in agitation, Domitius arrived at Marseilles with his fleet, and
being received into the town, was appointed governor, and charged with the whole
administration of the war. By his order, they sent out their fleet to cruise round the coasts;
seized and brought in all the merchant vessels they could find, and made use of the nails,
rigging, and timber, of such as were unfit for service, to repair the rest. They deposited in
public granaries, all the corn that was to be found in the city, and secured whatever else
they thought might be serviceable to them in case of a siege. Caesar, provoked at these
preparations, brought three legions before the town, began to erect towers and galleries,
and gave orders for building twelve galleys at Arles, which being finished, launched, and
brought to Marseilles, within thirty days from the cutting of the wood they were composed
of, he put them under the command of D. Brutus, and having directed the manner of the
siege, left the care of it to C. Trebonius, his lieutenant.
During these orders and preparations, he sent C. Fabius before him intoSpain, with three
legions that had wintered about Narbonne, charging him to secure with all diligence the
passage of the Pyrenean Mountains, which was at that time guarded by a party of
Afranius's army. His other legions, whose quarters were more remote, had orders to
follow as fast as they could. Fabius, according to his instructions, having made great
despatch, forced the passes of the Pyrenees, and by long marches came up with Afranius's
army.
Pompey had then three lieutenants in Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro. The first of
these was at the head of three legions, and governed the nearerSpain. The other two had
each two legions, and commanded, the one from the Castilian Forest to the Anas; the other
from the Anas, quite throughLusitania, and the territories of the Vettones. These three
lieutenants, upon the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Spain, as we
have, seen above, consulted together, and agreed, that Petreius should join Afranius with
his two legions, and that Varro should stay and secure fartherSpain. These resolutions
being taken, Petreius levied horse and foot inLusitania, and Afranius in Celtiberia, and
the barbarous nations bordering upon the ocean. When the levies were completed,
Petreius speedily joined Afranius, through the territories of the Vettones; and both
resolved to makeLerida the seat of the war, because the country lay convenient for their
purpose.
We have already observed that Afranius had three legions, and Petreius two. Besides
these, there were about eighty cohorts, some light, some heavy armed, and five thousand
horse, raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions before him into Spain, with
six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, who had served under him in all his
former wars, and he was furnished with the like number from Gaul, all chosen troops. For
hearing that Pompey was coming with his whole force through Mauritania into Spain, he
sent circular letters to all the Gallic states, inviting by name those of the most known and
approved valour, and in particular a select body of mountaineers from Aquitain, where it
borders upon the Roman province. At the same time he borrowed money from the
military tribunes and centurions, which he distributed among the soldiers. This policy
was attended with two great advantages: it bound the officers to him by the obligation of
interest, and the soldiers by the tie of gratitude.
Two days after, Caesar arrived in the camp with nine hundred horse, which he had kept
for a body guard. He began by re-establishing in the night the bridge which had been
broken down, and was not yet quite repaired. Next day he took a view of the country, and
leaving six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and the baggage, marched with all his
forces in three lines toLerida, and stopped near Afranius's camp, where he remained
some time under arms, and offered him battle on an even ground. Afranius drew out his
troops, and formed them before his camp, half way down the hill. Caesar, finding that he
declined an engagement, resolved to encamp within four hundred paces of the foot of the
mountain; and to hinder his troops from being alarmed or interrupted in their works, by
sudden incursions from the enemy, ordered them not to throw up a rampart, which must
have appeared and betrayed them at a distance, but to cut a ditch in front, fifteen feet
broad. The first and second lines continued in order of battle, as had been resolved from
the beginning, and the third carried on the work behind them unperceived. Thus the
whole was completed, before Afranius had the least suspicion of his design to encamp
there.
In the evening, Caesar retreated with his legions behind the ditch, and passed the whole
night under arms. Next day he carried the intrenchment quite round his camp, and
because materials for a rampart must have been fetched from a great distance, he
contented himself for the present with a naked ditch, as the day before, allotting a legion
to each side of the camp, and keeping the rest of the troops under arms, to cover those that
worked. Afranius and Petreius, to alarm our men and disturb the works, advanced with
their troops to the foot of the mountain, and threatened to give battle, But Caesar, trusting
to the three legions under arms, and the defence of the ditch, still persisted in his design.
At last, after a short stay, and without daring to come forward into the plain, they
retreated again to their camp. The third day, Caesar added a rampart to his camp, and
brought into it the six cohorts, with the baggage which he had left in his former camp.
Between the city of Lerida, and the hill where Petreius and Afranius were encamped was
a plain of about three hundred paces, in the midst of which was a rising ground, which
Caesar wanted to take possession of; because, by that means, he could cut off the enemy's
communication with the town and bridge, and render the magazines they had in the town
useless. In this hope, he drew out three legions, and having formed them in order of
battle, commanded the first ranks of one of them to run before, and gain the place.
Afranius perceiving his design, despatched the cohorts that were upon guard before the
camp, a nearer way to the same eminence. The contest was sharply maintained on both
sides: but Afranius's party, who first got possession of the post, obliged our men to give
ground, and being reinforced by fresh supplies, put them at last to rout, and forced them
to fly for shelter to the legions.
The manner of fighting of Afranius's soldiers was, to come forward briskly against an
enemy, and boldly take possession of some post, neither taking care to keep their ranks,
nor holding it necessary to fight in a close compact body. If they found themselves hard
pushed, they thought it no dishonour to retire and quit their posts, following in this the
custom of the Lusitanians, and other barbarous nations, as it almost always happens, that
soldiers give in to the manners of the country where they have long been used to make
war. This manner of fighting, however, as it was new and unexpected, disordered our
men, who seeing the enemy come forward, without regard to their ranks, were
apprehensive of being surrounded, and yet not think themselves at ensigns, or quit their
post, without some very urgent cause. The first ranks therefore being put into disorder,
the legion in that wing gave ground, and retired to a neighbouring hill.
Caesar, contrary to his expectation, finding the consternation like to spread through the
whole army, encouraged his men, and led the ninth legion to their assistance. He soon put
a stop to the vigorous and insulting pursuit of the enemy, obliged them to turn their backs,
and pushed them to the very walls of Lerida. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, elated
with success, and eager to repair the loss we had sustained, followed the runaways with so
much heat that they were drawn into a place of disadvantage, and found themselves
directly under the hill where the town stood, whence when, they endeavoured to retire,
the enemy again facing about, charged vigorously from the higher ground. The hill was
rough, and steep on each side, extending only so far in breadth as was sufficient for
drawing up three cohorts; but they could neither be reinforced in flank, nor sustained by
the cavalry. The descent from the town was indeed something easier for about four
hundred paces, which furnished our men with the means of extricating themselves from
the danger into which their rashness had brought them. Here they bravely maintained
the fight, though with great disadvantage to themselves, as well on account of the
narrowness of the place, as because being posted at the foot of the hill, none of the enemy's
darts fell in vain. Still however they supported themselves by their courage and patience,
and were not disheartened by the many wounds they received. The enemy's forces
increased every moment, fresh cohorts being sent from the camp through the town, who
succeeded in the place of those that were fatigued. Caesar was likewise obliged to detach
small parties to maintain the battle, and bring off such as were wounded.
The fight had now lasted five hours without intermission, when our men, oppressed by
the multitude of the enemy, and having spent all their darts, attacked the mountain sword
in hand, and overthrowing such as opposed them, obliged the rest to betake themselves to
flight. The pursuit was continued to the very walls of Lerida, and some out of fear took
shelter in the town, which gave our men an opportunity of making good their retreat. At
the same time the cavalry, though posted disadvantageously in a bottom, found means by
their valour to gain the summit of the mountain, and riding between both armies,
hindered the enemy from harassing our rear. Thus the engagement was attended with
various turns of fortune. Caesar lost about seventy men in the first encounter, among
whom was Q. Fulginius, first centurion of the Hastati of the fourteenth legion, who had
raised himself by his valour to that rank, through all the inferior orders. Upwards of six
hundred were wounded. On Afranius's side was slain T. Caecilius, first centurion of a
legion; also four centurions of inferior degree, and above two hundred private men.
Yet such were the circumstances of this day's action, that both sides laid claim to the
victory; the Afranians, because, though allowed to be inferior in number, they had long
sustained our attack, kept possession of the eminence which occasioned the dispute, and
obliged our men at first to give ground: Caesar's troops, because they had maintained a
fight of five hours, with a handful of men, and in a very disadvantageous post; because
they had attacked the mountain sword in hand ; because they had driven their
adversaries from the higher ground, and compelled them to take shelter in the town.
Meantime Afranius fortified the hillock which had been the subject of dispute, with a
great number of works, and posted there a large body of troops.
Two days after, a very unfortunate accident happened. For so great a storm arose, that the
water was never known to be higher in those parts; and the snow came down in such
quantities from all the mountains round about, that the river overflowed its banks, and in
one day broke down both the bridges Fabius had built over it. Caesar's army was reduced
to great extremities on this occasion. For his camp, as we have before observed, was
between the Sicoris and Cinga, two rivers that were neither of them fordable, and
necessarily shut him up within the space of no more than thirty miles. By this means,
neither could the states that had declared for him supply him with provisions, nor the
troops that had been sent beyond the rivers to forage, return, nor the large convoys he
expected from Gaul and Italy get to his camp. Add to all this, that it being near the time of
harvest, corn was extremely scarce and the more, as before Caesar's arrival, Afranius had
carried great quantities of it to Lerida; and the rest had been consumed by Caesar's
troops. The cattle, which was the next resource in the present scarcity, had been removed
to places of security, on the breaking out of the war. The parties sent out to forage and
bring in corn, were perpetually harassed by the Spanish infantry, who being well
acquainted with the country, pursued them every where. The rivers themselves did not
impede them, because they were accustomed to pass them on blown-up skins, which they
always brought with them into the field. Afranius, on the contrary, abounded in all things.
He had large magazines of corn already laid up, was continually receiving fresh supplies
from the province, and had plenty of forage. The bridge of Lerida furnished all these
conveniences without danger, and opened a free communication with the country beyond
the river, from which Caesar was wholly excluded.
The waters continued several days. Caesar endeavoured to re-establish his bridges, but
could not get the better of the obstacles occasioned by the swelling of the river, and the
enemy's forces stationed on the opposite bank. They found it the easier to prevent his
design, as the river was deep and rapid, and they could discharge their darts all along the
bank, on that particular spot where our men were at work: whereas it was extremely
difficult on our side to struggle with the force of the stream, and, at the same time, guard
ourselves against the assaults of the enemy.
Meanwhile Afranius was informed that a large convoy, which was on its way to join
Caesar, had been obliged to halt at the river side. It consisted of archers from Rovergue,
Gaulish horse, with many carts and much baggage, according to the custom, of the Gauls,
and about six thousand men of all sorts, with their domestics and slaves; but without
discipline or commander, every one following his own choice, and all marching in perfect
security, as if they had nothing more to apprehend than in former times. There were
likewise many young gentlemen of quality, senators' sons, and Roman knights, with the
deputies of the states of Gaul, and some of Caesar's lieutenants; who were all stopped
night, with three legions, and all his cavalry; and sending the horse before, attacked them
when they least expected it. The Gaulish squadrons, forming with great expedition, began
the fight. While the contest was upon equal terms, the Gauls, though few in number, bore
up against the vast multitude of the enemy; but seeing the legions advance, and having
lost some of their men, they retreated to the neighbouring mountains. This delay saved
the convoy, for during the skirmish, the rest of the troops gained the higher ground. We
lost that day about two hundred archers, a few troopers, and some servants and baggage.
All this served to enhance the price of provisions, a calamity inseparable from present
scarcity, and the prospect of filture want. Corn was already at fifty denarii a bushel, the
soldiers began to lose their strength, and the evil increased every moment. Nay, so great
was the change produced in a few days, and such the alteration of fortune, that while our
men were in the utmost want of all kind of necessaries, the enemy had plenty of every
thing, and were accounted victorious. Caesar left nothing untried to remove the present
scarcity: he dismissed all the useless mouths, and applied to the states that had declared
for him, desiring them to send him cattle where they wanted corn.
These things were greatly exaggerated by Afranius, Petreius, and their friends, in the
letters they sent, upon this occasion, to Rome. Nor was fame backward in adding to the
account; insomuch that the war appeared to be almost at an end. These couriers and
letters having reached Rome there was a great concourse of people at Afranius's house,
many congratulations passed, and multitudes of the nobility flocked out of Italy to
Pompey; some to carry the first accounts of this grateful news; others, that they might not
be so late as to subject them to the reproach of having waited for the event of things.
Affairs being in this extremity, and all the passes guarded by Afranius's parties, without a
possibility of repairing the bridges; Caesar ordered the soldiers to build some light boats,
in imitation of those he had formerly seen in Britain, whose keel and ribs were of wood,
and the rest of wicker, covered with leather. When he had got a sufficient number, he sent
them by night in waggons, twenty-two miles off from his camp. In these he embarked a
good number of soldiers, and sent them over the river; took possession unexpectedly of a
hill adjoining to the bank on the other side; threw up a fortification before the enemy
thought of hindering him; posted a legion in this fortification; and then threw a bridge
over the Sicoris in two days. By this means he recovered his foragers, secured the convoy,
and opened a passage for future supplies. The same day he detached a great part of his
cavalry over the river; who, falling unexpectedly upon the enemy's foragers, dispersed up
and down, without a suspicion of danger, made a considerable capture of men and horses;
and observing some Spanish cohorts on the march to their assistance, skilfully divided
themselves into two bodies; one to secure the booty; the other, to receive and return the
enemy's charge. One of their cohorts, which had rashly separated from the rest, and
advanced too far before the main body, was surrounded and cut to pieces by our men, who
returned over the same bridge to the camp, without loss, and enriched with a considerably
booty.
Whilst these things passed at Lerida, the people of Marseilles, by the advice of L.
Domitius, equipped seventeen galleys, eleven of which were covered. To these they added
a multitude of smaller vessels, that they might strike a terror into our fleet by their very
number; and manned them with archers, and the mountaineers we have already
mentioned, whom they encouraged to perform their part by great rewards and promises.
Domitius desired some of these ships, and filled them with the shepherds and labourers
he had brought thither with him. Thus furnished and equipped, they sailed with great
confidence, in quest of our fleet, which was commanded by Decimus Brutus, and rode at
anchor at an island over against Marseilles. Brutus was much inferior to the enemy in
number of ships; but Caesar had manned them with his best soldiers, chosen out of all the
legions, and headed by centurions of distinguished bravery, who had petitioned him for
this service. These had provided themselves with hooks and grapplingirons, and a great
number ofdarts,javelins, and offensive weapons of all sorts. Thus prepared, upon notice of
the enemy's arrival, they stood out to sea, and attacked their fleet. The conflict was sharp
and vigorous. For the mountaineers, a hardy race, habituated to arms, and trained up in
war, scarce yielded to the Romans in bravery; and, having but just parted from Marseilles,
still retained a lively sense of the promises so lately made them. The shepherds too,
animated by the hopes of liberty, and fighting under the eye of their master, did wonders
to merit his approbation. The townsmen themselves, confiding in the nimbleness of their
ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded the shock of our vessels, and baffled all their
attempts. As they had abundance of sea-room, they extended their line of battle, in order
to surround our fleet, or attack our ships singly with a number of theirs, or in running
along-side, sweep away a range of oars. If they were compelled to come to a closer
engagement, setting aside the skill and address of their pilots, they relied wholly on the
bravery of their mountaineers. Our men were but indifferently provided with rowers and
pilots, who had been hastily taken out of some merchant ships, and knew not so much as
the names of the tackle. They were incommoded too by the weight and lumpishness of
their vessels, which being built in haste, of unseasoned timber, were not so ready at
tacking about. But when an opportunity offered of coming to close fight, they would boldly
get between two of the enemy's ships; and grappling them with theirhooks, charge them
on each side, board them, and cut to pieces the mountaineers and shepherds that defend
them. In this manner they sunk part of their vessels, took some with all the men on board,
and drove the rest into the haven. In this engagement, the enemy had nine galleys sunk or
taken.
The report of this battle reaching Lerida, and Caesar having finished his bridge over the
Sicoris, affairs soon began to put on a new face. The enemy dreading the courage of our
horse, durst not disperse about the country as formerly; but either foraged in the I
neighbourhood of the camp, that they might the sooner make good their retreat; or, by a
long circuit, endeavoured to avoid our parties: and upon receiving any check, or even
descrying our cavalry at a distance, they would throw down their trusses, and fly. At last,
they were reduced to omit foraging several days together, and resolved to pursue it of war.
In the mean time the Oscenses and Calagurritani, jointly sent deputies to Caesar. with an
offer of their submission and services. The Tarraconenses, Jacitani, and Ausetani, and not
many days after, the Illurgavonenses, who inhabit along the banks of the Iberus, followed
their example. He only required them to supply him with corn, to which they readily
agreed; and having got together a great number of carriage-horses, brought it to his camp.
A cohort of the Illurgavonenses, hearing of the resolution taken by their state, deserted
from the enemy, and came over to Caesar's camp. The change was sudden and great; for,
the bridge being finished, provisions secured, this rumour of Pompey's march through
Mauritania extinguished, and five considerable states having declared in his favour; a
great number of distant provinces renounced their engagements with Afranius, and
entered into new ones with Caesar.
These things having struck a terror into the enemy; that he might not be always obliged to
send his cavalry so far about to forage, the bridges lying about seven miles from his camp,
he bethought himself of draining the river, by turning some of its water into canals thirty
feet deep, so as to make it fordable. The work being almost completed, Petreius and
Afranius grew extremely apprehensive of being entirely cut off from their provisions and
forage, because Caesar was very strong in cavalry. They therefore thought proper to quit a
post that was no longer tenable, and to carry the war into Celtiberia. What contributed still
further to confirm them in this resolution was, that of the two contrary parties, concerned
in the late war,those who had declared for Sertorius, still trembled at the name of the
conqueror, and dreaded his power, though absent; and those who had attached
themselves to Pompey, continued to love him for the many services he had done them:
but Caesar's name was hardly known among these barbarians. Here they expected
considerable reinforcements of horse and foot; and doubted not, by taking the advantage
of places, to be able to protract the war till winter. In order to execute this plan, they
collected all the boats to be found on theIberus, and ordered them to be brought to
Octogesa, a city on that river, about twenty miles from their camp. Here they commanded
a bridge of boats to be built; and, having sent two legions over the Sicoris, fortified their
camp with a rampart of twelve feet.
Caesar, having notice of this by his scouts, laboured day and night at his drains with the
utmost diligence; and had already so far diminished the water of the Sicoris, that the
cavalry could, with some difficulty, pass over: but it took the infantry as high as the
shoulders, who had therefore both the depth of the river, and the rapidity of the stream to
struggle with. Meanwhile it was known, that the bridge over the Iberus was almost
finished, and Caesar's ford in great forwardness. This was a fresh motive to the enemy to
quicken their march: wherefore, leaving two auxiliary cohorts, for a garrison, at Lerida,
they crossed the Sicoris with all their forces, and joined the two legions they had sent over
before. Caesar had now no other remedy left but to harass and fatigue them with his
cavalry: for if he went with his whole army over his bridge, he lengthened his march
prodigiously, and gave Afranius time enough to get to the Iberus. Accordingly the horse
having forded the river, came up with Petreius and Afranius's rear, who had decamped
about midnight; and making a motion to surround them, began to stop and retard their
march.
At day-break we discovered from the hills near the camp, that the enemy's rear was
greatly harassed by our cavalry. Sometimes they obliged them to halt, and disordered
their ranks: at other times, the enemy facing about, charged with all their cohorts at once,
and forced our men to give ground; who, wheeling again as soon as they began to march,
failed not to renew the attack. At this sight, the legionary soldiers, running up and down
the camp, complained that the enemy would escape out of their hands, and the war
necessarily be prolonged. They addressed themselves to the centurions and military
tribunes, and desired them to beg of Caesar not to spare them; that they feared neither
danger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the river as the horse had done. Caesar, moved
by their alacrity and entreaties, though he saw some danger in exposing his army to the
rapidity of a deep river, judged it yet proper to attempt and make trial of the passage.
Having therefore withdrawn from every company such as were weak of body, or of less
courage than the rest, he left them in the camp with the army happily passed the river, by
the assistance of a double line of cavalry, placed above and below them. Some of the
infantry were carried away by the violence of the current; but they were picked up and
saved by the horse below them; so that no one man was lost. Having passed the river
without loss, he drew up his army in order of battle, and began to pursue the enemy in
three lines: and such was the ardour of the soldiers, that notwithstanding the army was
obliged to make a circuit of six miles, notwithstanding the time necessarily lost in crossing
the river, they got up at the ninth hour of the day to the enemy, who had set out at
midnight.
When Afranius and Petreius perceived them at some distance, being with reason
intimidated, they suspended their march, halted on an eminence, and formed in order of
battle. Caesar would not hazard an action with his troops, thus fatigued, and halted
likewise in the plain. On this the enemy resumed their march, and he the pursuit; which
obliged them to encamp earlier than they designed. Hard by was a range of mountains,
and about five miles farther, the ways were difficult and narrow. The enemy retired
among these mountains, to avoid the pursuit of the cavalry; and having placed parties in
all the passes, to stop Caesar's army, hoped, by this means, to continue their march to the
Iberus, without fear or danger. This was their great affair, and what before all things they
should have endeavoured to effect but, being fatigued by a long march, and their continual
skirmishes with Caesar's cavalry, they deferred it till next day. Caesar likewise encamped
on a hill that lay near him.
About midnight, the cavalry having surprised some of the enemy, who had adventured a
little too far from their camp in quest of water; Caesar was informed by them, that
Pompey's lieutenants were decamping without noise. Immediately he ordered the alarm
to be sounded, and gave his army the signal to march. The enemy, finding they should be
pursued, kept still; being afraid of a nocturnal flight, wherein they would have had greatly
the disadvantage, on account of their heavy baggage which they had with them, and the
superiority of Caesar's cavalry. Next day, Petreius went privately out with a party of horse,
to take a view of the country. Caesar pose, under the command of Decidius Saxa. Both
made the like report in their several camps; that for five miles together, the country was
level and open, but after that rough and mountainous; and that whoever should first get
possession of the defiles might easily prevent the other army from approaching them.
Upon this, a council of war was held by Petreius and Afranius, to deliberate about the time
of beginning their march. The greater number were for setting out by night, in hopes of
reaching the defiles before Caesar ould have notice of their departure. Others argued
against the possibility of decamping privately, by the alarm given in Caesar's camp the
night before: "That the enemy's cavalry were continually patrolling in the night, and had
beset all the ways and passes: that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoided, because, in
a civil war, the soldiers were more apt to listen to their fears, than the obligations of the
military oath: that shame and the presence of the centurions and tribunes, the great
instruments of obedience and military duty, could have their proper effect only in the
light, which rendered it of infinite importance to wait the approach of day; that in case of
a disaster, yet the bulk of the army would escape, and be able to possess themselves of the
post in question." This opinion prevailed in the council, and they resolved to set out the
next morning by break of day.
Caesar having taken a view of the country, decamped as soon as it was light, taking a
considerable circuit and observing no particular route; for the direct way to the Iberus and
Octogesa lay in the rear of the enemy's camp. He was therefore obliged to march through
valleys and precipices, and over steep rocks, which the soldiers could not climb, but by
disencumbering themselves of their arms, and returning them afterwards to one I
another. But not a man murmured at these difficulties, in hopes of seeing a speedy end of
all their labours, if they could but gain the Iberus before the enemy, and intercept their
provisions. As in this march we pursued at first an opposite course, and seemed to turn
our backs upon the enemy, Afranius's soldiers who observed us from their camp, came
forth with joyful looks, and insulted us on our supposed flight, imagining the want of
provisions obliged us to return toLerida. Their generals applauded themselves upon their
resolution of not decamping, and were confirmed in the notion of our retreat, as they saw
we had neither horses nor carriages; whence they concluded the scarcity must be
exceeding great. But when they saw us, after some time, turn to the right, and that our
advanced guard had already gained the ground beyond their camp, there was not a man
so tardy or indolent, as not to perceive the necessity of decamping and opposing our
march. Immediately they ran to arms, and leaving a few cohorts to guard the camp, sallied
in a body, pursuing their way directly to the Iberus.
All depended upon despatch, and getting the first possession of the defiles and mountains.
Our troops were retarded by the difficulties of the way, and Afranius's by the continual
attacks of Caesar's cavalry. But such was the situation of the Afranians, that even
supposing them to gain the hills first, they could only secure their own retreat, without a
possibility of preserving their baggage, and the cohorts left to guard the camp; because
Caesar's army getting between, cut them off from all communication with their own men.
Caesar arrived first at the place in question; and having found a plain beyond the rocks,
formed his men in order of battle against the enemy. Afranius, who now saw our army in
his front, at the same time that his rear was continually harassed by the cavalry, halted on
an eminence, from whence he detached four Spanish cohorts, to take possession of the
highest mountain thereabouts; ordering them to make all the despatch they could to seize
it, that he might get thither himself with the rest of his forces, and changing his route,
march them over the hills to Octogesa. The Spaniards wheeling obliquely, to take
possession of the place, were perceived by Caesar's cavalry; who charged them furiously,
broke them at the first onset, surrounded, and cut them in pieces in sight of both armies.
Caesar had now an opportunity of giving the enemy an effectual blow; whose army, in the
present consternation it was under, would, he was sensible, make but a faint resistance;
more especially as it was surrounded on all sides by the cavalry, and would be obliged to
fight on equal ground. He was pressed, on all hands, to give the signal. The lieutenants,
centurions, and military tribunes got round him, urging him not to delay the engagement:
"That the soldiers were all eager for a battle; whereas, on the contrary, the Afranians had
given many marks of fear: that they had neither dared to support their own detachment,
nor offered to descend from the hill, nor been able to withstand the very first charge of our
cavalry; that they had brought their ensigns all into one place where they crowded
confusedly round them, without observing ranks or order: that if he was afraid to attack
them on the eminence, he would soon have an opportunity of more equal ground, as
Afranius would be obliged to remove for want of water."
Caesar was in hopes of terminating the affair without bloodshed, or a battle; because he
had intercepted the enemy's provisions. Why therefore, even supposing the event to be
prosperous, should he unnecessarily lose any of his men? Why should he expose to
wounds, soldiers who had so well deserved of him? Why, in fine, should he tempt fortune?
especially as it redounded no less to the honour of a good general, to gain the victory by his
conduct, than by the force of his arms. He was also touched with compassion for Afranius's
soldiers; who after all, were fellow-citizens, and whom he must have slaughtered, when he
could equally succeed without touching their lives. This resolution was not at all relished
by the army; who, in their discontent, openly declared, that since Caesar did not lay hold
of so favourable an opportunity, nor let them fight when they had a mind, they would not
fight when he had a mind. But nothing could shake him. Nay, he even retreated a little, to
give Afranius and Petreius liberty to regain their camp, which they did. He then posted
troops on the mountains, to guard the defiles. and came and encamped as near the enemy
as possible.
The day after, Pompey's lieutenants, disturbed at finding their provisions cut off, and all
the ways to the Iberus intercepted, consulted what was proper to be done. They had it still
in their power to return to Lerida, or march toTarraco. But while they were debating this
matter, notice was brought them, that our cavalry had fallen upon their parties sent out in
quest of water. Upon this intelligence, they formed several posts of horse and foot,
intermixed with legionary cohorts; and to the place where they watered, that the soldiers
might pass and repass under cover, without fear, and without a guard. Afranius and
Petreius divided this work between them, and went to give directions about it in person.
In their absence, their soldiers found frequent opportunities of conversing with our men,
and sought out every one his fellowcitizen and acquaintance. They began by thanking
them for having spared them the day before, owning they were indebted to them for their
lives. Afterwards they asked them, if they might trust to Caesar's honour; testifying much
grief at being obliged to fight with their countrymen and relations, with whom they were
united by the strictest ties. At last they stipulated even for their generals, whom they
would not seem to betray: and promised, if the lives of Petreius and Afranius were
granted them, to change sides. At the same time they sent some of their principal officers
to negotiate with Caesar; and these preliminaries to an accommodation being settled, the
soldiers of both armies went into one another's tents, so that the two camps were now in a
manner one. A great number of centurions and military tribunes came to pay their court
to Caesar, and beg his protection. The Spanish chiefs, who had been summoned to attend
Afranius, and were detained in the camp as hostages, followed their example. Every man
sought out his acquaintance and friend, who might recommend and procure him a
favourable reception from Caesar. Things were carried to such a length, that Afranius's
son, a young gentleman, treated with Caesar, by the mediation of Sulpicius, to desire he
would give his word for his life, and that of his father. The joy was general; they mutually
congratulated each other; the one, in that they had escaped so imminent a danger; and the
other, in that they had brought to a happy conclusion so important an enterprise, without
striking a blow. Caesar, in the judgment of all, was upon the point of amply reaping the
fruits of his wonted clemency, and every body applauded his late conduct.
Afranius, having notice of what passed, quitted the work he was engaged in, and returned
to the camp; prepared, as it would seem, to bear with an equal mind not wanting to
himself. He armed his slaves; and joining them to a pretorian cohort of target-bearers,
and some Spanish horse, his dependents, whom he always kept about him to guard his
person; he instantly flew to the rampart, broke off the conferences of the soldiers, drove
our men from the camp, and put all of them he could find to the sword. The rest flocked
together; where, alarmed at the danger to which they saw themselves exposed, they
wrapped their cloaks round their left arms, drew their swords, and, trusting to the
nearness of their camp, defended themselves against the Spanish target-bearers and
cavalry, till they had retreated to our advanced guard, who screened them from any
further assault.
After this he went through the whole camp, begging his troops, with tears, to have pity on
him, and Pompey their general; and that they would not deliver them both up to the cruel
vengeance of their enemies. Every one upon this flocks to the head-quarters. There
Petreius proposes to the army to bind themselves by a new oath, not to abandon nor
betray their commanders, nor to act separately, but all in concert, for the common good.
He himself took this oath first, and then exacted it of Afranius, afterwards of the military
tribunes and centurions, and lastly of all the companies, man by man, At the same time an
order was issued that all who had any of Caesar's soldiers in their tents should signify it,
that they might be put to death in the sight of the whole army. But the majority detesting
this bloody order, carefully hid those who were under their protection, and procured them
means to escape in the night. However, the terror they had been thrown into by their
generals, the severity shown in punishing, and the new oath they had been obliged to take,
defeated, for the present, all hopes of a surrender, changed the soldiers' minds, and
reduced the war to its former state.
Caesar ordered diligent search to be made after such of the enemy's soldiers as had come
to his camp during the time of conference, and carefully sent them back. Some military
tribunes and centurions voluntarily chose to stay with him; whom he afterwards treated
with great distinction; promoting the centurions to higher ranks, and honouring the
Roman knights with the office of military tribunes.
The Afranian troops were destitute of forage, and could not water without much difficulty.
The legionary soldiers had, indeed, some provisions, because they had been ordered to
bring two and twenty days' corn with them fromLerida; but the Spanish infantry and
auxiliaries had none; for they neither had opportunities of supplying themselves, nor
were their bodies inured to carry heavy burdens. Accordingly, they every day deserted in
shoals to Caesar. In this extremity, of the two expedients proposed, that of returning to
Lerida appeared the safest, as they had still some provisions in that city, and might there
concert what further measures to pursue. Tarraco was at a greater distance, and they
would of course be exposed to more accidents by the way. This resolution being taken they
decamped. Caesar sent the cavalry before, to harass and retard them in their march; and
followed himself with the rest of the army. The cavalry gave the enemy no respite, being
continually engaged with their rear.
The manner of fighting was thus: Some light-armed cohorts formed the rearguard, which,
in a plain, halted from time to time, and made head against our cavalry. When they fell in
with an eminence, the very nature of the ground furnished them with the means of
defending themselves, because those who were first could, cover them behind. But when a
valley or descent came in the way, the van could give no assistance to the rear, and our
cavalry annoyed them with their darts from the higher ground, which put them in
imminent danger. In this case, the legions were obliged to halt, and endeavour to drive
back the cavalry a good way, after which they ran down the valley precipitately, until they
came to the opposite eminence. For their cavalry, of which they had a considerable
number, was so terrified by their ill success in former skirmishes, that, far from being of
any service, they were forced to place it in the centre to secure it; and if any of them
chanced to straggle from the main body, they were immediately taken by Caesar's horse.
During these continual skirmishes, in which the enemy were often obliged to halt, in
order to disengage their rear, it is easy to perceive that their march could not be very
expeditious. This was in fact the case; so that after advancing four miles, finding
themselves greatly incommoded by the cavalry they halted on an eminence, and drew a
line before them, as it were to encamp, but did not unload their beasts of burden. When
they saw that Caesar had marked out his camp, pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to
forage; suddenly, towards noon, they resumed their march briskly, hoping to be rid of the
cavalry which had so much incommoded them. But Caesar set out immediately with his
legions, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, and sent orders to his cavalry to return
with all diligence. The cavalry returned accordingly, and having overtaken the enemy
before the close of day, attacked their rear so vigorously, that they were almost routed, a
great number of soldiers, and even some centurions being slain. Caesar's whole army
came up, and threatened them with an immediate attack.
As they could then neither choose a proper place for a camp, nor continue their march,
they were forced to halt where they were, far from any water, and on very
disadvantageous ground. Caesar did not offer to attack them, for the reasons mentioned
before: he would not even permit any tents to be pitched that day, that he might be the
readier to pursue with all his forces, should they attempt to escape either by night or by
day. The Afranians perceiving the disadvantage of their situation, employed the whole
night in throwing up intrenchments, and disposed their camp directly fronting ours. The
same they did the following day, from sun-rise till evening. But the farther they extended
their camp, and produced their lines, in order to better their position, the farther they
went from water, and to avoid one inconvenience, fell into another. The first night nobody
went out of the camp for water, and the next day the whole army was obliged to do it in
order of battle, so that they could not forage that day. Caesar waited to humble them by
these misfortunes, and reduce them by want and necessity rather than force. He began,
however, to draw lines round the camp, the better to check their sudden sallies and
irruptions, to which he foresaw they would be obliged to have recourse at last. Want, soon
constrained them to kill all the beasts of burden.
Two days were spent in forming and executing those resolutions; on the third, Caesar had
considerably advanced his works. Afranius and Petreius, sensible of the consequences,
drew all their forces out of the camp, and formed them in order of battle. Caesar
previously called in his workmen, assembled his cavalry, and put his army in a condition
to receive them, for he was aware of the hurt his reputation might sustain, if, contrary to
the opinion of the troops, and the earnest expectations of all, he should still seem to
decline an engagement. However, for the reasons already mentioned, he resolved to keep
only upon the defensive; and the rather, because the distance between the two camps was
so small, that should he even put his adversaries to rout, he could not flatter himself with
the hopes of a complete victory. In fact, from camp to camp was not above two thousand
feet; the armies were posted on each side of this space, which was left void for the mutual
charge and assault of the soldiers. On supposition therefore of a battle, the nearness of
their camp furnished an easy retreat to the vanquished. For this reason he resolved to
wait the enemy's charge, and not enter the first into action.
Afranius's troops were ranged in two lines, consisting of five legions, and the cohorts wont
to be stationed in the wings, formed a body of reserve. Caesar's army was upon three
lines; in the first of which were posted four cohorts, detached out of each of the five
legions; in the second three; and in the third the like number, all from their respective
legions: the archers and slingers were disposed in the midst, and the cavalry on the two
wings. The armies being drawn up in this manner, each general kept firm to his
resolution; Caesar, not to engage, unless forced to it; and Afranius, to prevent the progress
of our works. In this posture they continued till sun-set, when both armies returned to
their several camps. The next day, Caesar prepared to finish his lines; and Pompey's
lieutenants, as their last resource, endeavoured to find a fordable place in the Sicoris. But
Caesar, penetrating their design, sent his light-armed Germans, with part of good bodies
of troops along the banks, at a small distance from one another.
At last, having no hope left, and being in want of every thing, wood, water, forage, corn,
they demanded an interview, and that it might be, if possible, in some place out of the
sight of the soldiers. Caesar denied the last part of their request, but offered to grant them
a public interview; whereupon Afranius, having given his son for a hostage, went to the
place appointed by Caesar, where, in the presence of both armies, he addressed him to
this effect: "That it was no just matter of blame, either in him or his soldiers, to have
preserved their fidelity to their general, Pompey; but that they had now sufficiently
acquitted themselves of their duty, and suffered enough in his cause, by the want of all
kind of necessaries; that like wild beasts caught in a toil, they were deprived of the most
common enjoyments, having their bodies oppressed by want, and their minds
overwhelmed with ignominy, that they therefore acknowledged themselves vanquished,
and besought and conjured him, not to make a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the
lives of his unhappy countrymen." This speech was delivered with all possible marks of
humility and submission.
Caesar replied, "That he of all mankind, had least reason to complain, or implore
compassion: that all the rest had fully done their duty; himself, in forbearing to attack
him, with all the advantages of time and place, that the way to an accommodation might
be the more open; his army, in returning untouched, the men that were in their power,
after injuries received, and the massacre of their comrades: in fine, even his own troops,
in endeavouring to conclude a peace, whereon they thought their safety depended. Thus
all orders had shown an inclination to treat, while Afranius and Petreius alone opposed an
accommodation, refusing both interview and truce, and barbarously murdering those
whom the faith of a conference had enticed to their camp: that it had therefore happened
to them, as frequently happens to men of obstinacy and arrogance, and they were forced to
have recourse to those conditions, and earnestly solicit the very same terms, which not
long before they had despised. However, he would not take advantage of their present
submission, or the favourable circumstances in which he found himself, to demand any
thing tending to the increase of his own power, but only that they would disband those
troops which they had now for so many years kept on foot against him. For with what
other view had six legions been sent into Spain; a seventh levied there, so many powerful
navies equipped, so many able and experienced officers sent over. These mighty
preparations could not be meant against Spain, or to supply the wants of the province,
which having enjoyed a long run of peace, had no occasion for such extraordinary forces.
Their real aim was to pave the way to his destruction; to effect which, a new species of
power had been introduced into the commonwealth, and the same man appointed to
command in Italy, at the gates of Rome, and hold for so many years, though absent, the
government of the two most potent provinces of the republic. For this reason the
magistrates were stripped of their prerogatives, and not suffered to take possession of
their provinces, at the expiration of the pretorship or consulship, as had always been the
custom; but particular governors were sent, by the choice and management of a faction.
For this reason even the excuse of old age was disallowed; and those who had merited a
discharge by their past services, were compelled to take arms again, to complete the
number of their troops. In fine, for this reason, he alone had been denied that justice,
which was never refused to any general before him; that after having successfully served
the commonwealth, he should be allowed to return home, and disband his own army, with
some marks of honour, orat least without ignominy. All which, nevertheless, he had
hitherto borne, and still resolved to bear with patience; nor was it now his design, to take
from them their soldiers, and enlist them, as it would be easy for him to do, but to prevent
their employing them against him. Therefore, as he had already intimated, they must
resolve to quit Spain, and disband their forces, in which case he would injure no man.
This was his final resolution, and the only condition of peace they were to expect."
These conditions were agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, who, instead of being punished, as
they feared, were in some sort rewarded by the discharge procured them. They plainly
showed their satisfaction. For, while the place and time of their dismission were debating,
they signified by their gestures and cries from the rampart, where they stood, that they
desired to be disbanded immediately; because no sufficient security could be given for
the performance of what was put off till another time. After some discussion of that article
by Caesar and Afranius, it was regulated, that those who had houses or possessions in
Spain, should be discharged on the spot; and the rest near the Var, a river between Gaul
and Italy. Caesar, on his side, declared, that he would hurt nobody, nor force any one to
take on in his service.
Caesar undertook to find them in corn until they got to the Var. He even promised to
restore to them all they had lost in the war, that could be known again; himself
indemnifying his own soldiers, who hereby lost quired their confidence to such a degree,
that he was arbiter of all the disputes they had, either among themselves, or with their
commanders. The soldiers being ready to mutiny about their pay, because Petreius and
Afranius affirmed it was not yet due, the matter was referred to Caesar, who determined
it to the satisfaction of both parties. About a third of the army was disbanded during the
two days they continued here, after which the rest set out for the Var in this order. Two of
Caesar's legions marched at the head, the others in the rear, and the vanquished troops in
the middle. Q. Fufius Calenus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, presided over the march. In
this manner they continued their route to the Var, where the remainder of the troops
were disbanded.