Hamza Alavi, The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh (1974)

The object of this article is to raise some fundamental questions about the classical Marxist
theory of the State in the context of post-colonial societies. The argument is premised on
the historical specificity of post-colonial societies, a specificity which arises from structural
changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignments of classes and by the
superstructures of political and administrative institutions which were established in that
context, and secondly from radical re-alignments of class forces which have been brought
about in the post-colonial situation. I will draw examples from recent developments in
Pakistan and Bangladesh. There are, necessarily, some particular features which are specific
to that context. But the essential features which invite a fresh analysis are by no means
unique. In particular the special role of the militarybureaucratic oligarchy has become all too
common a phenomenon in postcolonial societies. This role now needs to be interpreted in
terms of a new alignment of the respective interests of the three propertied exploiting
classes, namely the indigenous bourgeoisie, the Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisies,
and the landed classes, under Metropolitan patronage a combination which 59 is not unique
to Pakistan. If a colony has a weak and underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie, it will be
unable at the moment of independence to subordinate the relatively highly developed
colonial State apparatus through which the Metropolitan power had exercised dominion
over it. However, a new convergence of interests of the three competing propertied classes,
under Metropolitan patronage, allows a bureaucratic-military oligarchy to mediate their
competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands. By that token it acquires a
relatively autonomous role and is not simply the instrument of any one of the three classes.
Such a relatively autonomous role of the state apparatus is of special importance to the
neo-colonialist bourgeoisies because it is by virtue of this fact that they are able to pursue
their class interests in the post-colonial societies. A fundamental distinction can be seen
between that situation and the situation which followed the bourgeois revolutionin
European societies on which the classical Marxist theory of the state is based. A distinction
may also be made between cases such as that of Pakistan which experienced direct colonial
rule and other countries which experienced colonial exploitation under indirect rule. My
analysis is confined to an example of the first type. Perhaps comparative analysis will throw
light on the similarities and the differences between it and cases of the other type. Such
comparative and critical studies are needed before we can hope to arrive at a general
theory of the State in post-colonial societies. The purpose of this article will have been
served if it focuses on fresh questions that require to be asked in relation to post-colonial
societies.

Classical Marxist Theory

A focus on the central role of the bureaucracy and the military in the government and
political development of post-colonial societies raises some fundamental questions,
especially with reference to the classical marxist theories. What Miliband calls the primary
marxist view of the State ‘finds its most explicit expression in the famous aphorism of the
Communist Manifesto: “The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie,” and political power is “merely the organized
power of one class for oppressing another.”’1 Miliband adds: ‘This is the classical marxist
view on the subject of the State and it is the only one which is to be found in marxism-
leninism. In regard to Marx himself, however, . . . it only constitutes what may be called a
primary view of the State... for there is to be found another view of the State in his work . . .
This secondary view is that of the State as independent from and superior to all social
classes, as being the dominant force in society rather than the instrument of the dominant
class.’ This secondary view of the State in Marx’s work arises from his analysis of the
Bonapartist State. Miliband concludes: ‘For Marx, the Bonapartist State, however
independent it may have been politically from any given class, remains, and cannot in a class
society but remain, the protector of an economically and socially dominant class.’ 60 1 R.
Miliband, ‘Marx and the State’, in R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds): Socialist Register 1965. In
the post-colonial society, the problem of the relationship between the State and the
underlying economic structure is more complex than the context in which it was posed even
in the Bonapartist State or other examples which arose in the context of the development of
European society. It is structured by yet another historical experience and it calls for fresh
theoretical insights. The military and the bureaucracy in post-colonial societies cannot be
looked upon, in terms of the classical marxist view, simply as instruments of a single ruling
class. The specific natures of structural alignments created by the colonial relationship and
re-alignments which have developed in the post colonial situation have rendered the
relationship between the state and the social classes more complex. The two patterns of
historical development are quite different. In Western societies we witness the creation of
the nation state by indigenous bourgeoisies, in the wake of their ascendant power, to
provide a framework of law and various institutions which are essential for the development
of capitalist relations of production. In colonial societies the process is significantly different.
The bourgeois revolution in the colony insofar as that consists of the establishment of a
bourgeois state and the attendant legal and institutional framework, is an event which takes
place with the imposition of colonial rule by the metropolitan bourgeoisie. In carrying out
the tasks of the bourgeois revolution in the colony, however, the metropolitan bourgeoisie
has to accomplish an additional task which was specific to the colonial situation. Its task in
the colony is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established
in the metropolitan country itself. Additionally, it has to create state apparatus through
which it can exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might
be said that the ‘superstructure’ in the colony is therefore ‘over-developed’ in relation to
the ‘structure’ in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which
it is later separated at the time of independence. The colonial state is therefore equipped
with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which
enable it through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes. The post-
colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state (army) and its
institutionalized practices through which the operations of the indigenous social classes are
regulated and controlled. At the moment of independence weak indigenous bourgeoisies
find themselves enmeshed in bureaucratic controls by which those at the top of the
hierarchy of the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state are able to maintain and even
extend their dominant power in society, being freed from direct metropolitan control.

The Essential Problem

The essential problem about the state in post-colonial societies stems from the fact that it is
not established by an ascendant native bourgeoisie but instead by a foreign imperialist
bourgeoisie. At independence, however, the direct command of the latter over the colonial
state is ended. But, by the same token, its influence over it is by no means brought to an
end. The metropolitan bourgeoisie, now joined by other neo-colonialist bourgeoisies, is
present in the post-colonial society. Together they constitute a powerful element in its class
structure. The relationship between neo-colonialist bourgeoisies and the postcolonial state
is clearly of a different order from that which existed between the imperialist bourgeoisie
and the colonial state (IS IT??). The class basis of the post-colonial state is therefore
complex. It is not entirely subordinate to the indigenous bourgeoisie(really?), in view of the
power and influence of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie. Nor is it simply an instrument of any of
the latter, which woiuld have the implication that independence is a mere sham. Neither
bourgeoisie excludes the influence of the other; and their interests compete. The central
proposition which I wish to emphasize is that the state in the post-colonial society is not the
instrument of a single class. It is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the
competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisies,
the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf
of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the
institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production.
The multi-class relationship of the state in post-colonial societies calls for specific
explanation, and an examination of its implications. In this situation the military-
bureaucratic oligarchies, the apparatus of the state, furthermore assume also a new and
relatively autonomous economic role, which is not paralleled in the classical bourgeois state.
The state in the post-colonial society directly appropriates a very large part of the economic
surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of
promoting economic development. These are conditions which differentiate the post-
colonial State fundamentally from the state as analysed in classical marxist theory (how).
The apparatus of state does not, however, consist only of the bureaucratic-military
oligarchy. Where democratic forms of government operate, politicians and political parties
too form a part of it. Where political leaders occupy the highest offices in the state, formally
invested with authority over the bureaucracy and military, the role of the bureaucratic-
military oligarchy cannot be evaluated without a clear understanding of the precise role of
politicians and political parties in the state, and the extent of their powers and their
limitations. Politicians and political parties stand at the centre of a complex set of
relationships. On the one hand, they are expected (ideally) to articulate the demands of
those from whom they seek support; they are supposed to attempt to realize those
demands by their participation in the working of government. On the other hand, they also
play a key role in manipulating public relations on behalf of those who do make public
policy, to make it acceptable to the community at large. For that they channel public
grievances and seek to promote an ‘understanding’ of the situation concerning public issues
which would diminish potential opposition. Their relationship with the bureaucratic-military
oligarchy is, therefore, ambivalent; it is competitive as well as complementary. The
ambivalence is greater where politicians who occupy high public office can influence the
careers of individual members of the bureaucracy or the military.

The Mantle of Legitimacy

There are many variants of the distribution or sharing of power between political leadership
and bureaucratic-military oligarchies in postcolonial societies. Political parties at the
vanguard of the movement for national independence inherit the mantle of legitimacy and
the trappings of political power. Nevertheless, in a large number of postcolonial countries
there has been in evidence a progressive attenuation of their power and correspondingly
there has been expansion in the power of bureaucratic-military oligarchies, which has often
culminated in an overt ‘seizure’ of power by the latter. In general, however, there has been
accommodation as well as tension between political leadership and bureaucratic-military
oligarchies. The former do serve a useful purpose for the latter. They grant the duty of
political legitimacy on regimes and, through the charade of democratic process, they absorb
public discontent and channel grievances. The role of political parties does not necessarily
rule out the relative autonomy of bureaucratic-military oligarchies. The essential issue is
that of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus as a whole and its mediatory role as
between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the domestic
bourgeoisie, the metropolitan bourgeoisies and the landowning classes. Insofar as a political
leadership participates in the performance of that mediatory role and in the preservation of
the relative autonomy of the state apparatus, it is valuable for the purposes of the
bureaucratic-military oligarchy; it becomes their partner i.e. a third component of the
oligarchy. It is only where political parties seriously challenge that relative autonomy and
along with it the mediatory role of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy that conflicts arise in
which, so far, the latter have prevailed. We have yet to see a clear case of unambiguous
control of state power by a political party in a capitalist post-colonial society. The case of
India comes nearest to that. But even in India the situation is ambiguous. The ruling
Congress Party is by no means a party of a single class; it participates with the bureaucracy
in mediating the demands of competing propertied classes, which at the same time
participating with it in using state power to uphold the social order which permits the
continued existence of those classes, despite the socialist rhetoric of the Congress Party.
Even with regard to foreign capital, the actual performance of the government of India is
very different from the rhetoric of the Congress politicians. (State (govt officials)---Congress
(Elected)---People [Mediatory Role of Congress] )

What is crucial to the present analysis is that behind the apparent power of Congress
politicians, the Indian bureaucracy does enjoy a very wide margin of autonomy, on which
recent research has thrown some light. To understand the way in which relationships
between the bureaucratic-military oligarchies and politicians have evolved in India and
Pakistan one must look at the historical background of the development of their mutual
relationships and especially the institutionalization of a wide measure of bureaucratic and
military autonomy.

Before independence, members of the bureaucracy and the military were the instruments
of the colonial power. One of their principal functions was to subordinate the various native
classes and to repress the nationalist movement on behalf of their colonial masters. During
the freedom struggle, they were on opposite sides of the political barricades from the
leadership of the nationalist movement. After independence, the same political leaders
whom it was their task to repress were ensconced in office, nominally in authority over
them. A new relationship of mutual accommodation had to be established. The experience
of partial transfer of power by stages during the twenties and the thirties had, however,
already institutionalized procedures by which the bureaucracy could by-pass the political
leaders who had been inducted into office, on sufferance under the umbrella of British
imperial rule. These institutionalized procedures were extended and consolidated by the
proliferation of bureaucratic controls and the fact that, by and large, members of the public
have extensive direct, routine dealings with the bureaucracy which do not admit of
mediation by political parties. (Muslims part of the bureaucracy started demanding rights
from their political leaders?) An exception occurs only when individual politicians seek
favours from officials for some of their supporters, in which case their relationship vis-a-vis
the bureaucracy is weakened rather than strengthened. Politicans are reduced to playing
the role of brokers for official favours. This mediation between the public and the
bureaucracy is one of the important sources of political power in India as in other parallel
cases. The politician can, however, ill afford to lose the good will of the official, and this
influences the overall balance of their collective relationship. The strength of the
bureaucracy rests on the extensive proliferation of administrative controls and the direction
of a vast array of public agencies engaged in a variety of activities.

Indonesia and Pakistan

The actual pattern of the evolution of relationships between political leaders and
bureaucratic-military oligarchies varies from country to country according to differences in
historical background and the evolution of political forces. In Indonesia, for example, a long
period elapsed before the emergence of the overt power of the bureaucratic-military
oligarchy after the overthrow of Sukarno. The underlying factors in that case are complex,
but a part of the explanation must be that the bureaucracy and the military in Indonesia had
to be radically re-structured after independence and it took sometime for the oligarchy to
be consolidated. In India and Pakistan, by contrast, powerfully organized bureaucratic and
military structures were inherited. In Pakistan, the military was, it is true, in bad shape at
the time of independence, but the organization and bases of political parties were still
weaker. The ruling Muslim League party leaned heavily on the stature and authority of its
leader, Quaide Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who died soon after independence. By that
time the Muslim League had begun to disintegrate and its leadership had become isolated
from its bases. In Pakistan two facts stand out in sharp relief in its 25 year history. 64 4 This
‘middleman’ role of Politicians has been analysed in numerous studies, cf. F. G. Bailey,
Politics and Social Change—Orissa 1959, London 1963. One is the dominant position of the
bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the state; it has been in effective command of state power
not, as is commonly believed, after the coup d’etat of October 1958 but, in fact, from the
inception of the new state. In the first phase politicians and political parties, who provided a
facade of parliamentary government, were manipulated by them and were installed and
expelled from office as it suited the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. When in 1958 the
prospects of the impending general elections appeared to pose a challenge to the
supremacy of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, those who already held the reins of power
‘seized power’ by abolishing the institutions of parliamentary government through which
the challenge was being mounted. But, nevertheless, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy
needed politicians, who fulfil a complementary role, and by 1962 the politicians were put to
work again in a parody of democratic politics under Ayub Khan’s system of ‘Basic
Democracy’. That phase ended with the fall of Ayub Khan in 1969, after a great national
political upheaval. But still the reins of power were left securely in the hands of the
bureaucratic-military oligarchy. The latter still needed politicians to fulfill a complementary
role in government. President Yahya Khan promised restoration of ‘constitutional
government’ subject to his own veto. An election was held in December 1970 which ended
in the political crisis which culminated in the secession of Bangladesh. It is a complex history
which I have examined in some detail elsewhere.

In its first phase, the period of ‘parliamentary government’, the true role of the
bureaucratic-military oligarchy was obscured by the political fiction under which it operated.
After 1958, its dominant and decisive role became manifest. What remains problematic is
the social character, affiliations, and commitments of the bureaucraticmilitary oligarchy, or
those of different sections of it, vis-a-vis the various social classes in Pakistan and its
different regions, including the metropolitan bourgeoisies which have re-appeared, in the
plural, after British colonial rule was ended. The second outstanding fact about Pakistan’s
political history is that the most powerful challenges to the dominant central authority of
the bureaucratic-military oligarchy came primarily from political movements that drew their
strength from people of underprivileged regions and voiced demands for regional autonomy
and for a fuller share for the regions in the distribution of material resources as well as in
state power. It was not only from East Bengal but also from Sind and Baluchistan and the
North West Frontier Province or NWFP—the land of the Pathans—that such challenges
were mounted. Support for regional autonomy became an article of faith with the radical
and left wing political groups—indeed most of them were embedded in regionalist
movements. It appeared, on the surface, that the radical politics of Pakistan were
conditioned primarily by ethnic or linguistic solidarities, rather than class solidarities
stretching across regional boundaries. True, radical challenges were directed against class
privileges. But such privileges were identified primarily in regional 65 5 Hamza Alavi, ‘The
Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan Polities’, in A. Abdel Malek (ed): Armée et Nations
dans les Trois Continents (forthcoming). Written in 1966, this article was privately circulated.
terms. Politically the demands of radical and left-wing political movements were for a
federal parliamentary system of government and for a representation in the upper echelons
of bureaucratic (and military) appointments of people from underprivileged regions. These
two outstanding facts about Pakistan politics, namely the dominance of a bureaucratic-
military oligarchy and the regional basis of challenges directed against it, are essentially two
aspects of a single reality of the political situation in Pakistan which centres around the role
of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. Until 1958, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in
Pakistan made and unmade ‘Governments’ with a succession of Prime Ministers. In 1956 it
even instigated the creation of the Republic Party. A new type of constitution was
introduced by Ayub Khan in 1962, after his ‘seizure of power’ through a coup d’etat, in 1958.
Politicians were put to work again; under Ayub Khan their manipulation was perfected to a
fine art. But what is significant here is the anxiety of the military leaders to retain a facade
of political government. Thus, after the re-imposition of Martial Law in 1969, President
General Yahya Khan was very keen that a political leadership should be installed in office as
soon as possible although under the hegemony of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. He
promised elections for that purposes and immediately installed a chosen group of civilians
as interim ministers. Some of his most influential military advisers were particularly insistent
that without politicians in office, the military would become directly the object of public
disaffection, that it would lose its mantle of political legitimacy, and that as a consequence
its assumed right to intervene at every moment of crisis would be jeopardized. Thus it
would be simplistic to take for granted that the bureaucratic-military oligarchy necessarily
prefers to rule directly in its own name. It often prefers to rule through politicians so long as
the latter do not impinge upon its own relative autonomy and power. For the bureaucratic-
military oligarchy in Pakistan the elections of December 1970, however, had disconcerting
results, and the crisis of 1971 ensued, resulting in the secession of Bangladesh.

Bhutto and the Army

The assumption of power by President Bhutto after the defeat of the Pakistan army in
Bangladesh can be seen in a similar light. Here was a traumatic moment of crisis. It was a
moment when the oligarchy more than ever needed a political leadership which would be
able to manipulate an explosive political situation. Bhutto’s political position in the country
and the fact that his services were indispensable for the oligarchy gave him a degree of
freedom. Nevertheless the dismissal by him of a clutch of generals after the assumption of
power should not be taken simply as evidence of a final defeat of the bureaucraticmilitary
oligarchy, for Bhutto is closely allied to powerful factions in the oligarchy and his actions
reflect the demands of those factions. (Was Bhutto really an ally or felt threatened by the
power of army?) Bhutto ‘dismissed’ General Yahya Khan and his associates and appointed
his friend General Gul Hassan as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army, having himself
assumed the office of President. But it would be a mistake to assume that General Gul
Hassan was a political nonentity whom President Bhutto installed in office simply as his own
nominee. General Gul Hassan in fact belonged to a powerful faction in the military
establishment. As early as October 1968, before the massive political agitation against
President Ayub Khan which followed a month later, was even anticipated, it was already
being whispered in the corridors of power in Rawalpindi and Islamabad that Ayub would be
removed and that his mostly likely successor would be General Gul Hassan who was then
Corps. Commander at Multan, one of the two seniormost field appointments in the Pakistan
army. In the event, President Ayub outmanoeuvred the faction which was being aligned
against him, by resigning and handing over the office of President to the man of his own
choosing whom he had appointed as his Commander-in-Chief, namely General Yahya Khan.
In turn Yahya Khan successfully protected Ayub Khan from retribution, which was being
demanded not only by an angry public but also by powerful elements in the army itself.
With Yahya Khan’s fall, events had turned a full circle. In the crisis after the military debacle
in Bangladesh, the intervention of the political leadership was indispensable for the military-
bureaucratic oligarchy. At this moment the political leadership did assume some
weight.EXAMPLE The fact that the critical struggle for power still lay within the military-
bureaucratic oligarchy was, however, soon made manifest when Bhutto had to dismiss
General Gul Hassan from the post of Commander-in-Chief and instal in his place the
powerful General Tikka Khan, a leader of the ‘hawks’ in the army who had master-minded
the military action in Bangladesh. It could not but have been an unpalatable decision for
Bhutto for the appointment was most inept in the context of the political necessity for
Bhutto to negotiate with India and Bangladesh for the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of
war, but the supremacy of the army Junta was evidently decisive. Big Business and the
Generals Factions in the military are based on personal groupings and allegiances, but there
are underlying structural factors which influence the gravitations of groups into broader
alliances. One can therefore distinguish, on the one hand, ‘Conservative Right Wing’
Generals. They either come from the wealthier landed families or else they (or their very
close relatives) have made substantial fortunes in business. Others have made money in
collusion with foreign businesses and foreign powers. Big businessmen in Pakistan have
adopted the practice of awarding profitable directorships to retiring Generals, and thus they
have tried to establish relationships with factions in the army. As regards dealings with
foreign powers, a remarkable fact about the political situation in Pakistan has been the
ability of the army to have direct dealings with foreign powers (notably the USA) over the
heads of the Government in office. These varieties of affiliations and interests have resulted
in powerfully entrenched positions within the army on behalf of the various vested
interests. The case of the bureaucracy is parallel, for many bureaucrats come from landed
families and have acquired extensive business interests; some have become millionaires.
There is, however, another influence in the army which tends to promote radicalism; but
this is potentially radicalism of the right as well as 67 of the left. The evidence so far, in fact,
suggests that ultra right-wing radicalism is the preponderant element in this group. This
radicalism derives from the fact that the army is recruited from one of the most
impoverished and congested agricultural regions of the country, namely the unirrigated
area consisting of Rawalpindi Division of the Punjab and parts of the NWFP . Whereas big
farmers in some parts of the country, such as the Canal Colony Districts of the Punjab, have
prospered enormously through the so-called ‘Green Revolution’, the smallholders in the
unirrigated region have not benefited from it. Their tiny unproductive holdings do not yield
even a bare minimum for their livelihood. Their sons must therefore find outside
employment and it is from these districts that the army draws its soldiers and junior officers.
These men have strong social grievances, especially because of inflation and the
deterioration of their economic situation in recent years, but they have little political
education. In general they subscribe to a conspiracy theory of society and imagine, for
example, that inflation is due simply to the greed of a few businessmen (the so-called
twenty families); they do not see roots of the problem in the economic system itself. (Is it
true?) The solution therefore, in their eyes, is not to be found in radical economic policies
and a transformation of the social system but rather merely in the brutal punishment of
‘miscreants’. The same idea of dealing with ‘miscreants’ was applied by them in Bangladesh.
Politically these men have been reared on chauvinism and religious ideology of the extreme
right wing. The influence of the Jamaat-eIslami has been quite considerable amongst them.
In recent years, however, the radical rhetoric of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party has caught
their imagination. Through them, Bhutto’s political position is strongly rooted in the rank
and file of the army.

‘Hawks’ have Objective Basis

There is also a group of Generals who have close affinities and links with the above
mentioned second category of army officers and rank and file soldiers. These are the ‘army
generals’ for whom the interests of the army as such take precedence over other
considerations. It is among them that the ‘hawks’ in the army are to be found. The concept
of army ‘hawks’ is not a psychological one as suggested by Tariq Ali. Rather that term
describes commitments which are rooted in the objective conditions and interests of the
army. The ‘Hawks’ have been able to exploit the grievances of the army rank and file and
therefore have a powerful position in the army. They thrive on chauvinism, for only on the
basis of an aggressively chauvinistic ideology can they enforce increasing demands on
national resources for a larger and better equipped (and more privileged) army. The massive
re-armament and re-organisation of the Indian army in the last decade, following its
confrontation with China, has altered the military balance in South Asia, a fact which was
brought home to the Pakistani oligarchy in no uncertain terms after the debacle in
Bangladesh. This will make the old policy of confrontation with India no longer credible. This
confrontation has been a source of embarassment to the two super-powers, the USA and
the USSR, who have attempted for more than a decade to bring about a rapprochement
between India and Pakistan. They will no doubt use their influence to restrain the ‘hawks’ in
the army and to strengthen the hands of the ‘conservative right-wing’ Generals to this end.
Nevertheless, the fact that the oligarchy has so far resisted the efforts of the two super-
powers in this respect despite pressure for over a decade, reflects its relative autonomy;
such a rapprochement would encroach on the interests of the army. Both the bureaucracy
and the military in Pakistan are highly developed and powerful in comparison with their
indigenous class bases. Capitalist development in Pakistan has taken place under their
corrupt patronage and close control by the bureaucracy. Because of bureaucratic controls,
business opportunities have been restricted to a privileged few who have established the
necessary relationship with the bureaucracy, essentially based on the cash nexus. In the late
sixties the Chief economist to the Government of Pakistan revealed that 20 privileged
families owned 66 per cent of Pakistan’s industry, 79 per cent of its insurance and 80 per
cent of its banking and that most of the rest was owned by foreign companies. That
revelation, in a pre-election year, is itself an indication of the ambivalent relationship
between the bureaucracy and the indigenous bourgeoisie. Even so, the local monopolists do
not control any political party which can be said to represent them as a class. Indeed, the
bases of political parties are primarily rural. The influence of the business community on the
conduct of public affairs is primarily through its direct contact with and influence on the
bureaucracy itself.

Landowning and Party Politics

Under parliamentary democracy landowners, who hold sway over the countryside,
monopolize the field of party politics. They are elected to places in the national and
provincial legislatures. (Even in East Bengal, where there are no big landowners comparable
to those in West Pakistan, ‘Sardari lineages’ of rich landholders control the local votes.) The
bureaucracy and the army recruit their senior officers largely from rich rural families and
therefore the landowning classes have a built-in position within the oligarchy. (Why?) The
bureaucrats have a direct stake in the privileges of the landed classes. This link has been
greatly reinforced by the grant of land to civilian and military officers, who have thereby
become substantial landowners in their own right when they were not so already. Because
of that fact landowners have been able to pursue their class interests effectively, despite
occasional attempts by the indigenous bourgeoisie and the Metropolitan bourgeoisies to
alter that state of affairs. Agricultural incomes for example, are exempt from income tax. For
two decades the bourgeoisie and their foreign allies have pressed the demand that these
huge incomes be subjected to tax in order to raise resources for a larger development plan,
in which their own interests lie. The landed classes have not only resisted that attempt
successfully; they have also obtained large subsidies of which the lion’s share goes to the
rich farmers and the big landlords. Nevertheless, landlords as a class, despite their close and
effective links with the bureaucracy and their dominant role in party 69 politics, cannot be
said to have command over the bureaucracy. Many instances can be shown in which the
interests of landowners as a class have been subordinated to those of the bourgeoisie, for
example in the price policy for raw cotton, which has worked to the disadvantage of the
landowners and to the benefit of the business magnates who own textile mills.

Foreign Business and the Oligarchy

Foreign businessmen like others, have sought bureaucratic favours, and have not failed to
obtain them. In their case, private corruption is reinforced by governmental pressure; the
greatest pressure is exercised by the Government of the United States. I have examined
elsewhere ways in which US Aid has been used to enforce policies on Pakistan in support of
US business to the detriment of domestic interests.7 Competition exists not only between
US and indigenous business interests but also between competing Metropolitan
bourgeoisies, viz British, German, French, Japanese, Italian and others. None of them has
complete command over the bureaucracy nor do they command it collectively. Neo-
colonialism is, however, probably the greatest beneficiary of the relative autonomy of the
bureaucratic-military oligarchy. It is precisely such a relatively autonomous role that renders
the government of the post-colonial society sufficiently open to admit the successful
intrusion of neo-colonialist interests in the formulation of public policy. Great emphasis is
therefore placed by western ideologues on the importance of the bureaucracy as an ‘agent
of modernization’ (speaking british rather than American English). Every effort is made to
influence the bureaucracy ideologically in favour of policies which are in conformity with
metropolitan interests. This ideology is expressed in the form of ‘techniques of planning’
and it is presented as an objective science of economic development. The western educated
bureaucrat is regarded as the bearer of western rationality and technology and his role is
contrasted with that of ‘demagogic’ politicians who voice ‘parochial’ demands. Considerable
resources are devoted in the metropolitan countries to imparting training to bureaucrats of
the post-colonial countries. But there are also more direct methods of influencing their
outlook and policy orientations. International agencies and aid administrating agencies who
vet viability of projects, advise on development planning and channellize policies of post-
colonial governments along lines which suit the metropolitan countries. Influence on state
policy through foreign aid as well as private corruption of bureaucrats makes this possible,
even when some of the policies are blatantly against the interests of the country. Those who
tend to assume the existence of mutuality in the processes of international negotations and
who suppose that if a government of a post-colonial country has agreed to a certain course
of policy, it must therefore be in the interest of their country, should recognize this
disjuncture between the interests of the country (however defined) and those of the
corrupt bureaucracy and individual bureaucrats.. Pakistan’s experience suggests that none
of the three propertied classes in that post-colonial society namely, the indigenous
bourgeoisie, the neo-colonialist metropolitan bourgeoisies nor the landowning classes,
exclusively command the state apparatus; the influence and power of each is offset by that
of the other two. Their respective interests are not mutually congruent or wholly
compatible. They do have certain basic interests in common; above all, that of the
preservation of the existing social order, based upon the institution of private property. But
they make competing demands on the post-colonial state and on the bureaucratic-military
oligarchy which represents the state. The latter mediates and arbitrates between the
competing demands of the three propertied classes. This is a historically specific role of the
military and the bureaucracy, the apparatus of the state in post-colonial societies. The
reason for its distinctive role stems from the fact that in contrast to the ascendant
bourgeoisie in an independent Capitalist state or the metropolitan bourgeoisie in a colony,
both of which establish their dominance over other social classes/, in post-colonial societies
none of the three propertied classes exclusively dominates the state apparatus or
subordinates the other two. This specific historical situation confers on the bureaucratic-
military oligarchy in a post-colonial society a relatively autonomous role.

A Distinct Relative Autonomy

There are two senses in which the idea of ‘relative autonomy’ of elements of the
superstructure (such as the state), in relation to the underlying ‘structure’ i.e. the economic
foundations of society (the relations of production) has been discussed in marxist literature,
which might be clarified at this point. One is a basic philosophical sense, namely that
historical materialism does not mean that elements of the ‘superstructure’ are determined
mechanistically by the underlying structure; but that the formative influence of the latter
although mediated in a complex way, is the ultimate determinant of the superstructure. This
was emphasized by Engels in his well-known letter to Joseph Bloch in which he criticized
mechanistic and deterministic interpretations of ‘vulgar Marxism’. This fundamental,
philosophical, issue should be distinguished from another, theoretical, issue. The idea of
‘relative autonomy’ of the superstructure is put forward in this second context as a theory,
i.e. as an explanation of the relationship between the state and the underlying ‘structure’ in
certain (exceptional) historical situations. Marx’s analysis of the bonapartist State deals with
the most extreme case of the relative autonomy of the State from amongst such historical
examples analysed by Marx and Engels. However, in classical marxism, in the fundamental
philosophical sense as well as in the specific theoretical sense, the idea of the ‘relative
autonomy’ of the superstructure (or the state) was conceived of explicitly within the
framework of a society subject to the hegemony of a single ruling class. The issue in relation
to the post-colonial societies is fundamentally different and should be distinguished clearly
from the issues which underlay earlier discussions. The classical position is summed up by
Poulantzas who wrote: ‘When Marx designated Bonapartism as the “religion of the
bourgeoisie”, in other words as characteristic of all 71 forms of the capitalistic State, he
showed that this State can only truly serve the ruling class in so far as it is relatively
autonomous from the diverse fractions of this class, precisely in order to organize the
hegemony of the whole of this class.’ (emphasis added)8 Such a proposition cannot apply to
a discussion of post-colonial societies in ‘which the problem arises not with reference to
‘diverse fractions’ of a single class, the bourgeoisie, but rather with reference to three
different propertied classes, which do not constitute ‘a whole’, for they have different
structural bases and competing class interests (pluralism, modernist writers, is class
fragmentation true?). In post-colonial societies the phenomenon of the relative autonomy
of the state apparatus is therefore of a different order to that which is found in the historical
cases on which the classical Marxist theory of state is based. The role of the bureaucratic-
military oligarchy in postcolonial societies is only relatively autonomous, because it is
determined within the matrix of a class society and not outside it, for the preservation of
the social order based on the institution of private property unites all the three competing
propertied social classes. That common commitment situates the bureaucratic-military
oligarchy within the social matrix. Nevertheless, the role of the bureaucratic-military
oligarchy is relatively autonomous because, once the controling hand of the metropolitan
bourgeoisie is lifted at the moment of independence no single class has exclusive command
over it. This relative autonomy is not predicated on that negative condition alone. It derives
also from the positive conditions which stem from the far reaching interventions by the
state in the economies of post-colonial countries, both by way of a network of controls, in
which the vested interests of the bureaucracy are embedded, and a direct appropriation
and disposition of a substantial proportion of the economic surplus (DIDN’T UNDERSTAND).
These constitute independent material bases of the autonomy of the bureaucraticmilitary
oligarchy. There are perhaps parallels here in the changing role of the state in metropolitan
societies also; a question which we cannot pursue here. It could be argued, however, that
given the role of the State in ‘promoting economic development’ in post-colonial societies,
the difference between the two situations is of a qualitative order. This role, it should be
added, is closely interlinked with imperialist interventions in post-colonial societies,
especially through the administration of economic and military aid.

Mediating Three Interests

The mediating role (what exactly does it mediate upon? Examples? ) of the bureaucratic-
military oligarchy between the competing demands of the three propertied classes is
possible in the post-colonial situation because the mutual interests of the latter and their
inter-relations are aligned in a qualitatively different way from that which is experienced in
other historical circumstances, on which the classical marxist theory of the state is
premised. In the post-colonial situation their mutual relations are no longer antagonistic and
contradictory; rather they are mutually competing but reconcilable. In the colonies, the
classical theory envisages a coalition between the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the native
‘comprador’ bourgeoisie (composed of merchants whose activities complement those of the
metropolitan bourgeoisie) and the ‘feudal’ landowning class. The theory also envisages the
interests of the rising native ‘national’ bourgeoisie to be fundamentally opposed to those of
the metropolitan bourgeoisie.( Different interests but they come together as a coalition) The
colonial liberation is therefore characterized as the inauguration of a bourgeois-democratic
revolution, ‘anti-imperialist and anti-feudal’ in character, which is premised as a necessary
historical stage in the development of the liberated colonial society. The post-colonial state
is taken to be the instrument of the ascendant native national bourgeoisie through which its
historical purpose is finally accomplished. But this is not what we have actually witnessed in
the post-colonial societies. This was noted, for example, by Paul Baran who wrote: ‘Its
capitalist bourgeois component, confronted at an early stage with the spectre of social
revolution, turns swiftly and resolutely against its fellow traveller of yesterday, its mortal
enemy of tomorrow (i.e. the industrial proletariat and the peasantry). In fact it does not
hesitate to make common cause with the feudal elements representing the main obstacle
to its own development, with the imperialist rulers just dislodged by the national
liberation, and with comprador groups threatened by the political retreat of their former
principals’ (DIDN’T UNDERSTAND). It is true that unprecedented challenges from
revolutionary movements constitute a most important element in the post-colonial
situation in which the three propertied classes stand united in the defense of the
established social order.(This is the reality whereby the three classes are just in competition,
not necessarily opposing interests but similar interests yet not forming a coalition,.each
exerting its own interest. The new nationalist bourgeoisise class is not anti-colonist nor anti-
feudalist but is working in collaboration with these classes. Hence, classical theories and
Marx’s theory of one state representing the interest of only one class fails. These classes
together work to maintain the status quo or established social order.) But their political
unity would not be possible if they were still divided by irreconcilable contradictions. That is
possible because of fundamental differences in the underlying structural alignments, which
differentiate the post-colonial situation from other historical parallels. The suggestion by
Baran that the new unity of the propertied classes for the defence of the established social
order represents a retreat from and an abandonment by the native national bourgeoisie of
its historic anti-feudal and anti-colonial role because of its fears of the revolutionary
challenge which it cannot confront alone, overlooks the fundamental differences in the
underlying structural alignments in the post-colonial societies from those in the colonial
situation on which the classical theory of the role of the native ‘national bourgeoisie’ was
premised. An accomodation between the native bourgeoisie and the ‘feudal’ landowning
classes is now possible because the task of winning national independence is completed and
the structure of the nation state and the institutional and legal framework necessary for
capitalist development, products of the bourgeois revolution, already exist, for they were
established by the metropolitan bourgeoisie.So what must be understood is that this
friendly competiton between the three classes is a distinctive feature of the post-colonial
society only because now independence has been achieved and there is no need to oppose
the colonist anymore. The mode of production of goods by the capitalists has already been
installed by the colonists. The native bourgeoisie is not confronted with the historical task of
the European bourgeoisie of subordinating feudal power for the purpose of establishing the
nation state. On the contrary, now the ‘feudal’ landowning class complements the political
purposes of the native bourgeoisie in the ‘democratic’ running of the post-colonial state,
because it plays a key role in establishing links between the state at the national level and
the local-level power structures in the rural areas which it dominates. At that level it also
‘contains’ potentially revolutionary forces and helps to maintain the ‘political equilibrium’ of
the post-colonial system. So it basically entails that the anti-colonist sentiment or the anti-
feudal sentiment was an element of the colonial society to stir a revolution against the
ruling class? But does it not instead require the unity of the proletariat and bourgeoisi
against the colonists? Why is this coalition only relevant in the post colonial society?

The ‘Green Revolution’

As regards economic aspects too, the specific nature of the relationship between the native
bourgeoisie and the ‘feudal’ landowning classes in post-colonial societies, especially in the
context of the growth of capitalist farming under the auspices of the big landowners rather
than in conflict with them, has made it un-necessary for the native bourgeoisie to seek the
elimination of the ‘feudal’ landowning class for the purposes of capitalist development. (If
the machinery for capitalist mode of development was installed by the colonists. Now the
capitalists needed support from the fedualists to provide them with the inputs for
production) The position and the interests of the ‘feudal’ landowning classes, however,
challenged both from within the rural society as well as from ‘radical’ urban forces. In
response to such pressures, perfunctory efforts were made in some countries, soon after
independence, to introduce land reforms. By and large, these measures were ineffective,
but their ineffectiveness has by no means impeded the development of the native
bourgeoisie. In recent years in South Asia, the so-called ‘Green Revolution’ based on an elite
farmer strategy has further helped to resolve the basic problem (for the native bourgeoisie)
of increasing the agricultural surplus needed to sustain industrialization and urbanization as
well as expanding the domestic market for manufactured goods. Pressures for radical action
have diminished and those for mutual accommodation have increased. Contradictions
remain, nevertheless, for the elite farmer strategy is having a disruptive effect on the fabric
of rural society which may have consequences which reach beyond its confines. This growth
of socially ‘disruptive’ forces in the rural areas, which may contribute powerfully to
revolutionary movement, occasions concern on the part of the bourgeoisie, which seeks to
consolidate the conservative alliance with the ‘feudal’ landowning classes to preserve the
existing social order rather than contributing to the forces which seek to overthrow the
power of the landowning classes in the rural areas. (does it mean the religion card is played
to subjugate or to calm the anti-capitalist notion or anti-feudal notion amongst the rural
class. What does conservative alliance mean?) As regards the relationship between the
metropolitan bourgeoisies and the indigenous or ‘national’ bourgeoisies of the post-colonial
societies, their mutual relationship is also quite different from that which is premised in the
classical marxist theory. The classical marxist theory postulates a fundamental contradiction
between the two. It therefore concludes that the ‘bourgeois-democratic’ revolution in the
colonies, of which independence is only the first phase and which continues in the post-
colonial situation, necessarily has an ‘anti-imperialistic’ character. It is true, of course, that
the native bourgeoisie plays an anti-imperialist role and contributes to the national
independence movement against the colonial power, but only up to the point of
independence. In the post-colonial situation there is a double reorientation of alignments,
both of the indigenous bourgeoisie and of the erstwhile ‘comprador’ class of merchants,
building contractors and the like. The latter, unable to compete on equal terms with giant
overseas concerns, demand restrictions on the activities of foreign businesses, particularly in
the fields in which they aspire to operate. They acquire a new ‘antiimperialist’ posture. (only
by the merchants of the home country not bourgeoisie) On the other hand, as the erstwhile
‘national’ bourgeoisie grows in size and aspires to extend its interests and move from
industries which involve relatively unsophisticated technology, such as textiles, to those
which involve the use of highly sophisticated technology such as petro-chemicals and
fertilisers, etc., they find that they do not have access to the requisite advanced industrial
technologies. Their small resources and scale of operation keep the possibility of developing
their own technology, independently, out of their reach. For access to the requisite
advanced industrial technology they have to turn for collaboration therefore, to the
bourgeoisies of the developed metropolitan countries, or to socialist states. (This explains
how the metropolitan and the native bourgeoisie cooperate and compete although it
creates a lot of dependency on the metropolitan bourgaoisie) This they do despite the fact
that the terms on which the collaboration is offered are such that it hamstrings their own
independent future development. As it grows in size and extends its interests the so-called
‘national’ bourgeoisie becomes increasingly dependent on the neo-colonialist metropolitan
bourgeoisies. © Are we really a dependent nation? Did we really depend only upon the
colonists? What about the alliance with US?

Unequal Collaboration

The concept of a ‘national’ bourgeoisie which is presumed to become increasingly anti-

imperialist as it grows bigger, so that its contradictions with imperialism sharpen further, is
one which is derived from an analysis of colonial and not post-colonial experience. The
mutual relationship of the native bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisies is no longer
antagonistic; it is collaborative. The collaboration is, however, unequal and hierarchical,
because the native bourgeoisie of a postcolonial society assumes a subordinate, client,
status in the structure of its relationship with the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The erstwhile
‘antiimperialist’ character of the native ‘national’ bourgeoisie changes in the post-colonial
situation to a collaborationist one. The metropolitan bourgeoisies value their collaboration
with the native bourgeoisies of post-colonial societies because that provides a channel
through which they pursue their economic interests without political risks attendant on
direct investments by themselves (did not understand). Their agreements with the native
bourgeoisie establish captive markets for their products as well as for their technologies.
The conditions which underlie the collaboration between the native bourgeoisies and the
neo-colonial metropolitan bourgeoisies are therefore embedded not only in super-structural
conditions namely, the threat of revolutionary movements to which Baran refers, but also in
structural conditions namely, access to technology for their economic operations. It must be
emphasized that even though the indigenous ‘national’ bourgeoisie and the metropolitan
bourgeoisies are brought together into a close collaborative and hierarchical relationship
they are by no means, by that token, merged into a single class. The concept of
collaboration implies and describes the fact of their separateness, and hierarchy implies a
degree of conflict between their interests and a tension which underlies their relationship.
Convergence of their interests does not dissolve into an identity of interests. It is this
element of mutual competition which makes it possible, and necessary, for the
bureaucratic-military oligarchies to play a mediatory role .

Because of the powerful role of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in postcolonial societies,

positions in the oligarchy are of crucial importance, especially for aspiring educated middle
class groups; and their political demands are focused on shares of positions in the oligarchy.
Where the oligarchy is recruited from a narrow social or regional base, as for example is the
case in Pakistan, the unprivileged educated middle class groups who are denied access to
positions of influence and power in the oligarchy organize political opposition. ‘Moral’
principles and ideologies are invoked both by the ruling oligarchy as well as by the
opposition to justify their respective interests and to rally public support on their own
behalf. Differences of caste, ethnic origin, religion or language dominate the politics of
postcolonial societies particularly for that reason. Opposition groups raise slogans of cultural
or linguistic identity. On the other hand, the particular ethnic or linguistic (or other
sectional) group which has a dominant position in the ruling bureaucratic-military oligarchy
invokes in defence of its own particularistic privileges the ideology of ‘national solidarity’
and denounces the opposition as narrow-minded and divisive particularism. The campaign
on behalf of their group is mounted by the bureaucratic-military oligarchy itself. Political
issues arising out of the sectional or regional character of the bureaucraticmilitary oligarchy
are therefore merged with broader issues of public policy as they concern different classes
of people and in the political debate which ensues, political questions which concern the
underlying social and economic issues are often expressed in the idiom of cultural, linguistic
or regionalist demands. (oligarchy creates this image that the reason for economic ills is the
ethnic conflict while the truth is that the army itself perpetuates the interests of only one
class.) In Pakistan, the ruling, predominantly Punjabi, bureaucratic-military oligarchy has
taken over and put to its own particular use the slogans of Muslim nationalism, that is the
slogans of the movement on the strength of which Pakistan was brought into being. It extols
the virtues of ‘Islamic solidarity’ and denounces linguistic or regionalist opposition
movements as divisive provincialism. In this way, after the creation of Pakistan, the nature
and political role of Muslim nationalism and the significance of its slogans have altered.
HOW? Muslim nationalism in India propagated the cause of the under-privileged Muslim
educated middle classes of India, who were numerically small and educationally less
advanced than those of the Hindus. The creation of Pakistan, the separate homeland of the
Muslims, was the fulfillment of that cause. Therefore after the state of Pakistan had been
created, the raison d’etre of that movement ceased to exist.
(FALL OF M-L) At that point the Muslim League, the principal organ of the movement,
disintegrated. The surviving faction, which appropriated the mantle of the Muslim League,
now began to propagate its ideology on behalf of the privileged groups, especially the
Punjabi oligarchs, in opposition to regionalist challenges. The ideology of Islamic unity was
now employed to deny the validity of the claims and demands of the less privileged groups,
namely Bengalis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis, for the recognition of their distinct identity
and needs. Is this really the truth? I mean isn’t it true that we need to overlook these
differences and represent the voices of all the people?

Bengali Aspirations

The aspirations of Bengalis who (amongst others) challenged the domination of the ‘Punjabi
bureaucracy’, were expressed in the secular idiom of the Bengali Language Movement
which began with the birth of Pakistan itself. It had its first martyrs in 1952. Although the
focus of the Movement was on the issue of national language, an issue which by its nature
was closest to the hearts of students and the educated lower middle class, it was
nevertheless instrumental in creating a radical consciousness which extended beyond the
immediate interests of those who voiced the slogans of the language movement and gave it
leadership Meaning?. With an urban population of only 5 per cent of the total population,
the educated middle class of Bengal is drawn overwhelmingly from villages and maintains
close contact with the rural society. Under conditions of widespread public discontent, the
problems and demands of the impoverished rural population influenced the cadres and
leaders of the Language Movement and their slogans. But the aspirations of the leadership
were concerned primarily with the issue of the regional share in government jobs and,
especially, places for themselves in the bureaucratic establishment. There were, therefore,
two traditions in the Bengali movement. One was a petty bourgeois elitist tradition, of those
who hoped to rise to senior positions in the bureaucracy or to become members of the
newly created business community in Bengal on the strength of governmental financial
support and subsidy. The other was a rural populist tradition which articulated the
frustrations and aspirations of the long suffering sections of the extremely poor Bengal
peasantry. The two traditions were intertwined, but they remained distinct. The educated
sons of rich peasants had other aspirations than those of the peasantry in general. In the
early fifties, the Bengali Language Movement embraced them both; at the vanguard
(Frontline) of that movement was the old Awami League, in the form in which it was then
constituted. At the head of the elitist faction of the Awami league was Shurawardy, who
aspired to public office at the cost of popular objectives. As Prime Minister of Pakistan he
was an ardent supporter of imperialist powers and went to the extent of openly and
vigorously supporting the AngloFrench-Israeli intervention against Egypt at Suez as well as
the US alliance. Sheikh Mujib was a protege of Suhrawardy and was schooled by him in
politics; his political commitments were firmly with the elitist group. On the other hand,
there was a populist tradition in the Awami League, which flourished under the umbrella of
Maulana Bhashani. The elitist leadership was largely concentrated in the towns and cities.
The populists had large numbers of cadres on the ground in villages. As the communist party
was illegal, there was also a solid core of marxists in the Awami League. Under their
influence many of the populist cadres had moved towards explicitly marxist ideas. In
February 1957, at the Conference of the Awami League at Kagmari, the conflict between the
elitist leadership and the populist cadres was brought to a head on the issue of Prime
Minister Suhrawardy’s foreign policy. That led to a break, and the ousting of populist cadres
of the Awami League along with their leader Maulana Bhashani. They later formed the
National Awami Party. The character of the Awami League, which was left in the hands of
Suhrawardy and the elitist group, and was deprived of its populist and marxist cadres, was
thus transformed. It is crucial to the understanding of the Awami League in its new form
that although its populist cadres were eliminated, its mass populist base amongst the rural
people remained with it. By a mistimed and badly managed precipitation of the party crisis,
it was the populist cadres who were isolated. In the retention of the Party’s hold over the
masses, the role of Sheikh Mujib was crucial. This was because, notwithstanding his firm
commitments to the elitist group, his rhetoric and even his personal style of life were
populist in character. He was a man with whom the people could identify. He bridged the
gap between the elitist leadership of the Awami League and its populist mass base. As the
Bengali movement progressed, reluctantly, but inevitably, the dominant Punjabi
bureaucratic elite yielded some of the demands of the movement for a fair share of jobs and
promotion. As a consequence, by the late sixties, the provincial administration in East
Bengal was almost wholly staffed by Bengali civil servants at all levels. Bengali progress was
less remarkable in the Central Government. It was not until 1969 that for the first time a few
Bengali officers were installed as Secretaries to the Central Government, at the head of
some minor Ministries. The bastions of power, namely, the Ministries of Defence, Finance
and the Planning Commission and the Establishment Division were still retained securely in
trusted West Pakistani hands. The Bengali movement for equitable treatment reached a
new level when, in the late fifties, demands began to be made for a fair and a adequate
share in the allocation of economic resources for development for East Bengal. East Bengali
economists prepared excellent detailed studies which demonstrated the steady exploitation
of East Bengal from West Pakistan. Their argument that there should be a radical
reallocation of development resources and a re-alignment of economic policies, as well as
demands for bureaucratic appointments, replaced the issue of the language as the principal
issue in the Bengali movement. There was also a progressive radicalization of the movement
and socialist ideas began to gain ground.

Creating a Bengali Bourgeoisie

In the sixties, President Ayub decided to foster in East Bengal a Bengali bourgeoisie, which,
he believed, would provide him with a political base in the province and counter the
influence of socialist ideas. This endeavour was blessed and backed by the Pakistani
bourgeoisie. But to create a bourgeoisie the regime had to put money into the hands of men
who had too little of it. Two categories of people from East Bengal were drawn into the
process of ‘capital formation’ which was devised by the Ayub Regime, to whom we can refer
respectively as the ‘contactors’ and the ‘contractors’. The ‘contactors’ were educated
Bengalis with influential bureaucratic contacts (especially those who were relatives of
bureaucrats or influential politicians) who were granted all kinds of permits and licenses,
which had a ready cash value because they could be sold to West Pakistani businessmen
who needed them to be able to engage in profitable business transactions. This process
transferred money into the pockets of a parasitic group of people, at the expense of the
ordinary consumer who ultimately paid for this corruption in the forms of inflated prices.
The ‘contactors’ lived expensively, and few of them contributed to capital accumulation or
built up industries. The ‘contractors’ were different. They were small businessmen who
were awarded construction contracts, etc., by the Government at deliberately inflated rates.
The excess profits made by them were ploughed back into their businesses. They were later
encouraged by generous loans and official support to become industrialists. For some
industrial projects, for example, the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, which was set
up for the purpose, would advance about two-thirds of the investment funds required and
the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation would provide half of the remaining
third of the total amount. The remaining sixth of the amount had to be raised by the
prospective industrialist from his own pocket (already filled with public money) or from the
stock exchange. In fact a substantial part of this equity was also subscribed by the State
sponsored National Investment Trust and the Investment Corporation of Pakistan. To set up
an industry, therefore, the budding Bengali industrialists needed barely 10 per cent (or less)
of the capital needed. But profits were so high that it did not take long before they became
sole owners of their industries and began to multiply their new found fortunes. The attitude
of the newly created nucleus of the Bengali bourgeoisie towards the politics of Bengali
nationalism was one of qualified support. They profited greatly from the pressures created
by that politics. But, at the same time, they were apprehensive because of its leftward
gravitation. Moreover, their extraordinary privileges were brought into existence because
there was a Central Government which could be pressured. The continuance of their
privileges in an independent East Bengal was perhaps a little problematic. Not all of them
supported the movement wholeheartedly; they also provided support for right wing
movements in East Bengal, and collaborated with the ruling oligarchy. They were
particularly demoralized after the Winter of 1968–9, when nationwide protest against the
Ayub Regime, which brought about is downfall, threatened to develop into a revolutionary
movement, especially in East Bengal. Many of them transferred substantial amounts to safer
investments in politically more ‘stable’ West Pakistan or, illegally, abroad. While they
supported a movement for regional autonomy and diversion of a larger share of economic
resources to East Bengal, they also looked upon the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, which is
based in West Pakistan, as a bulwark for the defence and protection of their own class
interests; they therefore valued the link with West Pakistan. The movement for the
independence of East Bengal cannot, therefore, be explained by reference principally to the
aspirations of the Bengali bourgeoisie. Moreover, in assessing the class basis of that
movement, one must take into account the fact that the movement existed and flourished
before the Bengali bourgeoisie was brought into being. The class base of that movement
was essentially petty bourgeois. The massive electoral success of the Awami League in the
election of December 1970 was guaranteed by a third category of people who had jumped
on the bandwagon of the Awami League. That was the rural elite in Bengal, which was
previously divided into many factions. The countryside in Bengal is dominated by lineages
of big farmers, the ‘Sardari lineages’. Their wealth, status and power, much of which is
derived from moneylending, enabled them to have access to the bureaucracy, on the
strength of which they mediated on behalf of their factional supporters and thus further
consolidate their local political power. These locally powerful rich farmers aligned with the
elitists of the Awami League; the latter were after all their sons who had been given a
university education and who aspired to big jobs in the bureaucracy. Despite the radical
rhetoric of the elitists in the Awami League, their intensions vis-a-vis the West Pakistan
based oligarchy were quite ambivalent. This was because the elitist leaders were
apprehensive about the radical aspirations of their own populist political base. While, on the
one hand, they exploited the latter’s radical sentiments in order to generate some force
with which to confront those who were in power in West Pakistan and to gain some
concessions, they had little wish to allow the radicalism of their followers to overwhelm
them and to threaten the social order to which their own elitist aspirations committed
them. It is this ambivalence which explains the anxiety of Sheikh Mujib to continue
negotiations with General Yahya Khan in the first few weeks of March 1971 for autonomy
within Pakistan, notwithstanding the fact that, as a consequence of an effective general
strike in East Bengal, he was already in de facto control of state power in the province; and
that at a time when the Pakistan army was numerically weak and was unprepared for the
action which it later launched against the people in East Bengal. This was testified to by
Tajuddin Ahmed, the Prime Minister of the Bangladesh Provisional Government who, on the
eve of his return to liberated Dacca, told newsmen that ‘The original demand for autonomy
within the framework of Pakistan had been raised by the Awami League as a whole but the
demand for independence grew when Pakistan not only refused to grant autonomy but also
unleashed a reign of terror on the people of East Bengal.’

The Making of Bangladesh

Since the creation of Bangladesh, the confrontation between the elitist element in the
Awami League and its populist bases has re-emerged on a new level. Whereas the elitist
leadership found a safe haven in Calcutta, the populist and marxist political cadres, who
were once isolated, now established a new relationship with the people in the course of
their armed liberation struggle. The organization and strength of the armed resistence was
not yet strong enough to overthrow the Pakistani army; but it was growing. Moreover the
position of the Pakistani army was reaching a point of crisis because the weak economy of
West Pakistan could not sustain the long military campaign. There was an economic crisis in
West Pakistan and outbursts of discontent. That opened up new prospects for the advance
of the liberation forces in Bengal. It was precisely at that moment that the Indians chose to
intervene, to forestall the liberation of Bangladesh by popular forces and to install the
Awami League elitist leadership in power. The picture in Bangladesh today is fundamentally
different from that which existed in Pakistan at the time of its independence in 1947. The
Bengali bureaucracy exists and the Awami League regime has identified itself with it and
with the privileged groups in the country, but these are not backed by substantial military
forces. On the other hand, the populist forces have experienced armed struggle and in the
course of it they have developed organizationally. Large quantities of arms are in their
possession. (So one can argue that populist forces are the de facto military, No?) True, ‘anti-
insurgency groups’ were also given training in India and were armed to prepare for the day
after the liberation of Bangladesh. For the present all the political skill of Sheikh Mujib is
directed to persuading the popular forces to hand over their arms or to become integrated
in the organized military forces of Bangladesh— but with little success. It may yet be that a
new bureaucratic-military oligarchy with outside aid will consolidate its position and power
in course of time in Bangladesh. But it is equally possible that Bangladesh will be plunged
into an armed revolutionary struggle, for the instruments of coercive state power at the
disposal of the Awami League and the Bengali bureaucracy are weak and the economic crisis
runs deep.