1 | Page Criminal Law II - Week 2

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING,

owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE
vs.
JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge,
RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City,. et al

G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000 

FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B.
Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of
wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.

The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of
Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that Savage’s products are the object of unfair
competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Savage contends however, that there was no existence of offense leading to the issuance of a search
warrant and eventual seizure of its products.

ISSUE: Whether or not unfair competition involving design patents are punishable under Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: To provide a clear view, the Intellectual Property Code took effect on January 1, 1998. The
repealing clause of the IPC provides that Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
Presidential Decree No. 49, are hereby repealed The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition"
as a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered
moot and academic by the repeal of the article. Hence, the search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue
of a possible violation of the IPR Code.

There is no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the controlling
provisions on Unfair Competition of the RPC. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for
the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

The court is are prevented from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair
Competition found in the IPR Code, to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent
infringement as defined by the same Code

Although the case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of the IPR Code, Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such application
would be beneficial to the accused. Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the possibility of any
criminal liability attaching to the acts alleged, then RPC provisions must be applied.
2 | Page Criminal Law II - Week 2

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau,
Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications
and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized
materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor
Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA. 

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary andcommon sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and
that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by
it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and
to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved
on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;
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Gonzales v Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985

Facts:

Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated for adults
only by a subcommittee of the movie review board together with the required cuts and scene deletions.
He justified that these requirements were without basis and were restrains on artistic expression. He
adduced that the film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now
offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis
even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.

He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decision of the sub committee.

When Gonzales appealed to the Supreme Court, the board claimed that the deletions were removed and
the requirement to submit the master negative was taken out but the film was still rated for adults only.
The petition was amended to contest the rating only.

Issue: Was the rating made with grave abuse of discretion?

Held: No. Petition was dismissed. There was no grave abuse of discretion DUE TO LACK OF VOTES

Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the
artistic impulse. Censorship doesn’t full cover free speech or there might bean emasculation of basic
rights. However, there must be in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of
such right without denying the freedom from liability. Freedom from censorship is a settled principle in
our jurisdiction. Mutuc- board of review is limited to classification of films to safeguard other
constitutional objections, hence the GP, PG, or R-18 ratings.

That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The
power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. The
test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger
of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be
clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if
such danger be only probable.

Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable

only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest.

But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young
people. They might misunderstand the scenes.  The respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners
would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused.

The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of
this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so
because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home
where there is a set. It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult
population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an
attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
5 | Page Criminal Law II - Week 2

Lt. Col. PACIFICO G. ALEJO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. NO. 173360 : March 28, 2008]

Facts:

That on or about June 8, 1992, in Nueva Ecija, Philippines, Lt. Col. Pacifico G. Alejo, the said accused,
a public officer, being then the Commanding Officer of the Real Estate Preservation Economic Welfare
Center, and accountable for confiscated illegal logs he received by reason of his position and office, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate,
embezzle and take away 1,000 board feet of logs confiscated by elements of the 56th IB, 7th ID, PA,
valued at P20,000.00 Philippine Currency and converted for his own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.

As gathered from the combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution was able to
establish that at the time of the commission of the crime, petitioner was the Commanding Officer of the
Real Estate Preservation Economic Welfare Center (REPEWC), 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
Palayan City. As a higher unit, REPEWC controls smaller units, one of which is Task Force Sagip Likas
Yaman (TFSLY). TFSLY is composed of the military, as the armed component, and the Office of the
Community Environment and Natural Resource of the Department of Environment and Natural Resouces
(DENR), as the civilian element, in the drive against illegal logging. Petitioner was the Task Force
Commander of the TFSLY. Being the commanding officer of the REPEWC and the task force
commander of the TFSLY, petitioner was involved in the anti-illegal logging campaign. Witnesses
Rodolfo Estremos, Amrodin Sultan, and Nelson Flores were among his subordinates.

Issue: Is the accused guilty of the crime Malversation of Public Property under Art 217 of the RPC?

Ruling:

Yes. It is beyond dispute that petitioner, during the time relative to the case, was a public officer, as he
was then the Commanding Officer of the REPEWC, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and the Task
Force Commander of the TFSLY. The evidence of the prosecution had sufficiently shown that TFSLY
was created pursuant to the 23 September 1991 MOA between the 7th ID of the Philippine Army and the
DENR, Region III. Under the MOA, it is the 7th ID of the Philippine Army, specifically the Task Force
Commander of the TFSLY, which has the duty to accept custody of confiscated logs and other forest
mineral products

The elements of malversation of public property, essential to the conviction of an accused under the
above penal provision, are:

1. That the offender is a public officer;

2. That he has the custody or control of the property by reason of the duties of his office;
3. That the property is a public property for which he is accountable; and
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented to, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
6 | Page Criminal Law II - Week 2

People of the Philippines v Pantaleon

GR No. 158694-96, 13 Mar. 2009
FACTS:
                In 1998, Mayor Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr. and Municipal Treasurer Jaime conspired to illegally
disburse and misappropriate the public funds of Castillejos, Zambales by falsifying the supporting
documents relating to 3 fictitious or "ghost" construction projects.  It further alleged that the vouchers
were not signed by municipal accountant and budget officer; that the SB did not adopt a resolution
authorizing Mayor Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr. to enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken
Swan Tiu; and that no project was actually undertaken. Sandiganbayan convicted the appellants of
complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents (Art. 217, 171,
and 48).

ISSUE:
                W/N the appellants committed the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents.

HELD:
                Yes.  Falsification of public documents is a necessary means to commit the crime of
malversation.

Elements of Malversation (Art. 217)

1. Offender be a public officer;

Appellants were mayor and municipal treasurer

 He had the  custody of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
Any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval

 The funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable;
The funds disbursed belongs to the municipality and were under the collective custody of the officials who
had to act together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal use.

 He appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,

permitted another person to take them.
The project was never implemented.
                The appellants were guilty under Art. 171, pars. 2 and 5. Par. 2 is committed when (a) the
offender causes it to appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or a proceeding;
and (b) that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding.  Vallejos filled
up the spaces for the voucher number and the accounting entry which were required to be filled up by
Nida as the municipal accountant.
                 Since appellant committed a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
7 | Page Criminal Law II - Week 2

ULEP vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 183373. January 30, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was a government employee serving as money order teller at the Fort Bonifacio Post
Office with a salary grade lower than grade 27. She was charged with the crime of malversation
of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 132. Subsequently, she was convicted as charged and was sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 19 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum, to pay a fine of P113,768 and to pay Philippine Postal
Corporation the same amount.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court is correct in not ordering the transfer of the records of the case
to the Sandiganbayan instead of dismissing her appeal outright.
Held:

Petitioner did not even have to specify the court to which her appeal was to be taken.
Moreover, it appears that petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was
inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had
more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of
jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the
proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the
pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases
involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit
regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of
procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should
be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully observed this
responsibility specially in cases such as this where a persons liberty was at stake.
8 | Page Criminal Law II - Week 2

FLORENCIO B. CAMPOMANES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161950, December 19, 2006

Facts:

In an Information dated 1 April 1997, Hechanova and Campomanes were charged as follows:
 
That, on or about August 25, 1992, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Cecilio G. Hechanova, a public officer, being then the Chairman of the Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC), and as such was accountable for public funds disbursed by his office,
conspiring and confederating with Florencio B. Campomanes, President of the
Federacion [sic] Internationale des Echecs (FIDE), a private organization, to whose
custody and possession was entrusted PSC funds to be used in connection with the World
Chess Olympiad in Manila, hosted by the Philippine Government from June 6-25, 1992,
amounting to PESOS: TWELVE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX
THOUSAND EIGHT (P12,876,008.00), Philippine Currency, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to render account on the disbursement thereof,
within the period provided for by law and the rules and regulations of the Commission on
Audit, preventing the auditors from fully establishing the cash accountabilities of both
accused and/or the offices they represent to the prejudice of the Government.

Campomanes entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment on 24 July 1997 and filed a motion for
reconsideration the next day. On 14 January 1998, Special Prosecution Officer II Cicero D. Jurado, Jr.
recommended the dismissal of the case. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto overruled the recommendation.
 
During trial, the prosecution presented Mendoza as its sole witness. Hechanova and Campomanes
testified on their own behalf.

Issue:

Even assuming that the Sandiganbayans findings were alleged in the Information, petitioner is not
required by law to render an accounting and therefore did not violate Article 218 of the RPC.

Ruling:

There are four elements of the crime under Article 218. First, the offender is a public officer. Second, he
must be an accountable officer for public funds or property. Third, the offender is required by law or
regulation to render accounts to the COA, or to a provincial auditor. Fourth, he fails to render an account
for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.
 
Campomanes is clearly not a public officer. He is the president of the FIDE, a private foreign corporation
with whom the PSC, through Hechanova, negotiated to conduct the 1992 Chess Olympiad and Congress
in Manila. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Campomanes is not a public officer and applied Article
222 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 218. The Sandiganbayan enumerated the elements of
the crime as applied to Campomanes.

Campomanes was aquitted because of the failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of Article
218, in relation to Article 222, of the Revised Penal Code.Because of this failure, we deem it unnecessary
to rule on the other issues raised by both parties.
9 | Page Criminal Law II - Week 2

LUCIA F. LAYOLA, vs. JUDGE BASILIO R. GABO, Jr.

[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524. January 26, 2000]

Facts: An information for murder was filed against SPO2 Leopoldo M. German for the killing of
complainant's son. The information which categorically stated that no bail was recommended was raffled
as Criminal Case No. 209-M-97 to respondent judge. During the course of the trial, respondent judge, on
motion, released said accused to his immediate supervisor, the Chief of Police of Sta. Maria Police
Station, without conducting a hearing. This was assailed by complainant as a violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 for rendering an unjust interlocutory order and for gross ignorance of the law. The Office of
the Court Administrator to which the complaint was referred to for investigation, report and
recommendation found no sufficient basis for the charge of unjust interlocutory order but found
respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for granting release of the accused without hearing.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the charges of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust
interlocutory order is barren of merit.

2. Whether or not the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in connection with the
denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration is unfounded.

Ruling:

As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the OCA
stressed that the important element of the offense, which is damage or injury to the complainant, or
manifest partiality shown to any party, is anemic of evidentiary support. There is no allegation of any
injury suffered by the complainant as a result of the conduct or actuation of the respondent judge, nor was
there any showing of undue benefit or advantage given to the adverse party under the orders complained
of.

Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) that the offender is a judge;
2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or
decree; or b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence
or ignorance.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral
certainty and does not suffice to convict.[6] Here, the allegations of the complaint-affidavit are
unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounced guilty on the basis of bare
allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction can be anchored. The evidence must truly be
beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Basilio R. Gabo GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P20,000.00, with the stern warning that a commission of similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charges of graft and corruption under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and of issuing unjust interlocutory
order are DISMISSED for lack of merit and for insufficiency of evidence.
10 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

SAMANIEGO vs AGUILA
334 SCRA 438 (2000)

Facts: 

The Office of the President granted the exemption from the coverage of the "Operation Land
Transfer Program" the land owned by X. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition questioning
the decision of the Office for failure to implead the Office of the President, as they should be
considered as indispensable parties. 

Issue: Whether the Office of the President should be considered as an indispensable party and
must therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules. 

Held:

No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action without that party being impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such an
interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that the
court cannot proceed without their presence. "Interests" within the meaning of this rule, should
be material, directly in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from a mere
incidental interest in the question involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is
one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest on the
subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of
pleadings require the presence of such party on the record. In the case at bar, the failure to
implead the Office of the President does not warrant the dismissal of the case as such is
considered as a pro forma party.
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Salvador De Vera vs. Honorable Pelayo

GR No. 137354, July 6, 2000

Facts:

Salvador De Vera filed a criminal case against Judge Pelayo for knowingly rendering unjust
judgment and malicious delay in the administration of justice before the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman referred the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. P assails the referral
of the case to the Supreme Court arguing that the Ombudsman, not the Supreme Court, is the one
vested with jurisdiction to resolve whether the crime charged was committed by the judge.

Issue: 

Whether the referral of the case to the Supreme Court is correct

Held: 

Yes. Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 can be
entertained, there must first be “a final and authoritative judicial declaration” that the decision or
order in question is indeed “unjust.” The pronouncement may result from either: (a) an action of
certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or (b) an
administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an
unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously
delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function.
12 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 150129, April 6, 2005

FACTS:

Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds, appellant Abdulla is before
the Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Appellant’s co-accused, Aguil and Darkis, were both
acquitted.  Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special
disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas
innocence of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Is there a presumption of criminal intent in malversation cases?

RULING:

No. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here,
appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State
College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under
existing civil service laws. In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by
competent evidence that appellant’s act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu
State College was done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.

Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM
for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu
State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in
RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only.  In fine, the third
and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this
case.  Acquittal is thus in order.
13 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 156643; 156891 | June 27, 2006

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the
Sandiganbayan.

On December 17, 1993, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together
with a reporter went to the house of Takao and Bethel Aoyagi to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12.
Hernandez told Takao, through his wife Bethel, that there were complaints against him in Japan that he
was a suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.

Takao showed his passport and signed an undertaking issued by Hernandez, stating his promise to appear
in an investigation at the BID and that as a guarantee of his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to
Hernandez. Bethel called Expedito Perlas and informed him of the taking of Takao’s passport. Perlas
referred them to Atty. Lucenario of the Lucernario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law firm.
Following the advice of the latter, they did not appear before the BID.

Meanwhile, Hernandez prepared a progress report and submitted it to the Chief of Operations and
Intelligence Division, Ponciano Ortiz, who recommended that Takao be placed under custodial
investigation.

On January 11, on account of the alleged demand of 1million pesos for the return of Takao’s passport,
Pelingon called BID Commissioner Zafiro Espicio of Davao. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica
Somera, an NBI agent. An entrapment operation was arranged.

On January 12, Hernandez returned the passport at the coffee shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI team
arrested Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing
marked money.

ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of direct bribery?

HELD:

YES, accused are guilty of Direct Bribery. The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)
agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present; 2)
accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains
from the performance of official duties.

In sum, the Court found that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, the offense was
committed by BID Agent Hernandez who extorted money from Aoyagi for the return of the passport and
the promise of assistance in procuring visa. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which
Acejas received for the group and gave it to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the
return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return
of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties.

For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as principals. A
conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific
acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design.
14 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008

FACTS:

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.

On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged for violation
of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.

Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against
Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando
filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted him of the crime
charged.

The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:

Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and
any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy,
the Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a
grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.
15 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

LICYAYO vs PEOPLE
GR No. 169425 March 4, 2008

FACTS:

Roberto Licyayo was charged for the crime of homicide, which is the death of Rufino Guay. That
on February 16 1992, the victim together with his friends Jeffrey and Joel, attended a wedding. The
petitioner and his friends Aron, Paul and Oliver were also present at the wedding. That after the reception,
the group of the victim and the accused had a drinking session in a store, drinking bottles of gin. Later,
the petition, Paul and Oliver left the store, and the victim and his friends likewise adjourned their session
and left. Rufino and his friends dropped by another store where the group of the petitioner was also
present. A brawl suddenly occurred between Rufino and Aron. Rufino fell on the ground and Aron placed
himself on top and punched Rufino several times. Officers Danglay and Buyayo, upon hearing a call for
police assistance, approached the commotion. Upon arriving, they then saw petitioner holding a six-inch
double bladed knife. They tried to pacify the petitioner, but they were also threatened by the weapon. The
petitioner then approached Rufino, who was wrestling Paul, and stabbed Rufino several times. Roberto
Licyayo was disarmed and brought to the station, while Rufino was taken to the hospital but later on died.

The petitioner claim that there was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim as in his
version of the incident, Rufino was the one who first attacked his brother, Aron as he grabbed the latter’s
collar and punched his left cheek. The victim’s friends also punched Aron while he was lying on the
ground. The petitioner fought back but he was overpowered, and can no longer recall any subsequent
event that transpired. The petitioner also said that he was intoxicated and claims the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication as they have consumed alcohol prior the incident of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
and intoxication.

HELD:

No. The petitioner cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation because it
was not convincingly shown that there was alleged provocation on the part of Rufino. The court has no
evidence as to how the quarrel arose. The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and
Aron started the brawl which resulted to the stabbing of Rufino by the petitioner. What is only evident is
that Rufino and Aron suddenly and unexpectedly grappled during the Incident.

The petitioner cannot also be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication because
although they have consumed alcohol prior to the commission of the crime, it was not established that the
amount of alcohol consumed was enough to impair his reason and affect his mental faculties. On the
contrary, the petitioner can even recall the details that transpired during and after his drinking session
with his friends. That is the best proof that he still knew what he was doing despite the alcohol he
consumed.
16 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant,
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987 - 153 SCRA 735

FACTS:

That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban Leyte Philippines, the accused
Francisco Abarca went to the bus station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter in the
morning.  Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2 pm because of his failure to catch the trip plus the
engine trouble which causes him to proceed at his father’s house, and then later went home. When he
reaches home the accused caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with Khingsley Koh in the
meantime his wife and Koh notice him, that makes her wife push her paramour and got his revolver.
Abarca peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the
PC soldier’s house to where he got the M-16 rifle. The accused lost his wife and Koh in vicinity at his
house and immediately proceeded to a mahjong house where he caught the victim aimed and shoot Koh
with several bullets on his different parts of his body causing Mr. Khingsley Koh’s instantaneous death. 
By that time, Arnold and Lina Amparado had inflicted multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr.
Amparado’s one and one-half month loss of working capacity including his serious hospitalization and
the latter’s wife who had slighter physical injuries from the incident. The RTC hereby sentenced Abarca
to death for Murder with double Frustrated Murder and must indemnify the Amparado Spouses and Heirs
of Kho.

 ISSUE:

Shall the accused suffer the penalty of arresto mayor subject by his criminal liability?

RULING:

The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro to arresto mayor from the lower
court sentencing four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying Amparado
spouses for expenses and damages.

The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule,
one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act
done amounts to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility performing an
illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely without fault. It appears that before
firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words which is not enough of a precaution to absolve him for
the injuries sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of
murders as a consequence, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will; nonetheless, the Court finds negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part, second
paragraph, of Article 365 that is less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence.
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses impose upon the accused-appellant arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum period to being the graver penalty.
17 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

G.R. No. 108491 July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SERGIO AMAMANGPANG

In the early morning of 8 November 1991, SPO1 Placido Flores, a member of the Philippine
National Police in Carmen, Bohol, was fatally hacked with a scythe and shot with a .38 caliber revolver in
the home of appellant Sergio Amamangpang in Guadalupe, Carmen, Bohol. On 17 January 1992,
appellant was charged with the murder of Flores. For his part, appellant admitted killing Flores but
claimed that he did it in defense of his wife's honor. As an alternative defense, appellant contended that
his action was justified under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, after he caught his wife, Sinforiana
and Flores engaged in the sexual act on that fateful day.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not killing is justified as an act of defense of honor.

2. Whether or not the killing has the character of death under exceptional circumstances as provided for
under Art 247 of the RPC.

HELD:

No. The killing was not an act of defense of honor nor can it be entitled to exceptional
circumstances.

Appellant testified that he caught Flores on top of his wife in their bedroom on the second floor
and that he reacted by hacking Flores with his scythe. But when the scythe's handle broke off, appellant
jumped on Flores' back and they grappled for possession of Flores' gun. When Dr. Añana and the
investigators arrived, however, they found no signs of struggle in the second floor bedroom. Dr. Añana
testified that "the things inside the room was still in order, the Sto. Niño and the lamp."

Likewise, when Dr. Añana discovered Flores' body, she found his pants by his left foot and his
underwear stripped down to his ankles. But how could Flores have his underwear around his ankles at the
time his body was found when appellant specifically stated that Flores was not wearing his trousers and
briefs when he chased appellant and the latter shot him. Thus, the only explanation for this is that
appellant indeed altered the physical evidence so as to make it conform to his defense. It must be pointed
out that nobody reported the crime. The police became aware of the incident only after appellant
surrendered himself. Hence, appellant had the time and opportunity to move the body, remove the pants,
strip the underwear down to the ankles and concoct the story of defending his wife from the lecherous
intentions of Flores.

He asserts that his action was the result of anger and passion after discovering his wife and his
friend, Flores, engaged in sexual intercourse in his own home. Appellant's assertion is unmeritorious. His
two bases for exoneration are markedly inconsistent with each other. On one hand, he claims that he was
defending his wife from Flores who was trying to force himself upon her. On the other, he gives the
implication that his wife and Flores were having an illicit affair. Such contradictory theories are a
manifest indication that appellant's defenses are nothing but mere concoctions. Besides, appellant's
alternative defense is inconsistent with the testimonies of his wife (Sinforiana) and daughter (Genalyn)
that Flores threatened to kill them if they refused to accede to his wishes.
18 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

G.R. No. 132925 - December 13, 2006

MARCIAL SIENES, BENITO SIENES, RICO SIENES and ROGER BANAYBANAY
v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On October 15, 1981, in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, herein petitioner Marcial
Sienes, along with his three (3) sons and co-petitioners, Benito Sienes (@ Baby Sienes), Roger
Banaybanay (@ Boboy Sienes) and Rico Sienes were charged with the crime of Murder for the death of
one Felipe de la Cruz, Sr., allegedly committed, per the indicting Information, as follows:

“That on or about the 15th day of May, 1981, at Barangay Kabulacan, Municipality of Sta. Catalina,
Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and acting in concert, with evident
premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab Felipe de la Cruz, Sr. with the use of canes long bolo and jungle
knife with which said accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon the body of said
victim injuries.”

ISSUE: Is there any conspiracy to aggravate that the crime was murder?

RULING:

No. There was no conspiracy between and among the three accused-petitioners and their father.
Conspiracy cannot be inferred from their acts. The fast sequence of unexpected events leading to the
killing of the victim elicited the spontaneous, though erroneous reactions of the three. Their impulsive
acts cannot but produce the conclusion that the same were triggered without prior or evident deliberation.
The killing was not the result of a previous plot or sinister design to end the life of the victim. Conspiracy,
like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and the mere presence of a person at the
scene of the crime does not make him a co-conspirator.
19 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

Urbano v. People G.R. No. 182750 January 20, 2009

FACTS:

While victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner Rodel Urbano, were inside the compo und, the
two had a heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled ins ulting remarks at
petitioner. Reacting, petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drun k, has the penchant of insulting
petitioner. The exchange of words led to an exc hange of blows, and petitioner delivered a lucky
punch which made Tomelden toppl e down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on
the ground had their co mpanions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however,
caused Tomeld en s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious. This later on led to diagnosed
th e victim suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage"
and his death. The defense denied having any intention to kill, ass erting that hypertension, for
which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the ca use of the latter s death. The RTC found
Urbano guilty of Homicide.

ISSUE: W/N Urbano is guilty of homicide

RULING:

One of the prosecution witness testified about petitioner s lucky punch hitting To melden right
smack on the face. And even if Tomelden s head did not hit the ground as his co-workers averted
that actuality, that punch gave him a bleeding nose a nd rendered him unconscious. From then
on, Tomelden was in and out of the hospit al complaining of headache, among other pains, until
his demise 12 days after th e blow that made Tomelden unconscious. Petitioner s suggestion that
Tomelden succu mbed to heart ailment and/or that his death was the result of his malignant hype
rtension is untenable, given that the post-mortem report yields no positive indi cation that he died
from such malady. Thus, petitioner is guilty.
20 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

People of the Philippines vs SP01 ERNESTO ULEP

(GR no. 132547)

Facts:

On Dec 22 1995, Buenaventura Wapili appeared to have gone crazy and kept on running without any particular
direction. SPO1 Ulep, together with Espadera and Pillo, arrived at the scene armed with M-16 rifles and saw the naked
Wapili approaching them. The police claimed that Wapili was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili’s
relatives and neighbours said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told
Wapili to put down his weapons ar they would shoot him. When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters away from them,
SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim slumped to the
ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.

Issue:

W/n accused should be acquitted on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was in the course of the
performance of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense.

Held:

It cannot be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary consequence of accused-appellant’s due
performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. The evidence does not favour his claim of self-defense.
Accused-appelant SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of Homicide, instead of murder.

The accused must prove the presence of 2 requisites: (1) that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or an office, and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of the duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

There were two stages of the incident:

1. The victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing towards them. Up to that point, his
decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim’s further advance was justified under the circumstances.

2.When he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after the latter slumped to the
ground due t multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. He cannot be exonerated from
overdoing his duty.

The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that
moment, there was no longer any danger to his life. No treachery, thus the offense is only murder. Victim was given
more than sufficient warning before he was shot. Art. 69 of RPC is applicable Incomplete justification is a special or
privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the
penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. The instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par 5 had
the two conditions therefore concurred.
21 | P a g e Criminal Law II - Week 2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs

ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO
G.R. No. 172326 | 2009-01-19

FACTS: The conviction of accused-appellant stemmed from an Amended Information dated February
23, 2001, filed with the RTC for the crime designated as Rape with Homicide and Robbery. During trial,
the defense presentedas witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).

Said witness testified on the result of the DNA analysis which she conducted on the specimens submitted
by the trial court consisting of the victim's vaginal smear and panty. According to her, no DNA sample
from the suspect was present on the aforesaid specimens. On cross-examination, she declared that based
on DNA testing, she could not determine if a woman was raped or not. She further declared that in this
case, it was possible that the stained vaginal smear prevented a complete and good result for the DNA
profiling. Upon being questioned by the court, the forensic chemist confirmed that DNA testing on the
subject specimens was inconclusive and that the result was not good, as the specimens submitted, i.e., the
stained vaginal smear and the dirty white panty, had already undergone serological analysis.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. Hence, accused-appellant
seeks for a final review of his case and makes much of the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the
NBI that his profile was not in the victim's vaginal smear. As such, he argues he is innocent of the crime
charged. 

ISSUE: Does the result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal? 

RULING: In People v Yatar, the Supreme Court held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, while the DNA analysis of the victim's vaginal smear showed no complete profile of
the accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive considering that said specimen was already stained or
contaminated which, according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a complete and
good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her testimony that generally, with the vaginal smear, they
could see if there is a male profile in the smear. However in this case, when they received the vaginal
smear on the stained slide, the same had already undergone serological analysis. Hence, according to the
chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the specimen subject of this case was inconclusive. In light of this
flawed procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant to an
acquittal.