The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican
The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican
The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican
RESOLUTION
TINGA , J : p
The special civil action for certiorari stemmed from a complaint led by Ma.
Krissyl Asparen with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City for nulli cation of
disciplinary sanctions, damages with prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO)/injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 0512512, entitled "Ma. Krissyl M. Asparen
v. St. Mary Mazzarrello and Sr. Maria Pacencia Bandalan, FMA, Department of
Education". The school involved in the case had imposed disciplinary sanctions on its
student, Ma. Krissyl M. Asparen, but the same was lifted upon the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction by Hon. Elumba, the presiding judge of the trial court. The
matter was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which issued a TRO, penned by
respondent Justice, preventing the enforcement of the order and writ of the trial court.
Immediately thereafter, complainant and Ma. Krissyl Asparen sought the
inhibition of respondent from the case on the ground that the latter had previously
represented various religious organizations and institutions during his practice of law
and the petitioner school in the case is run by a religious organization while petitioner
Sr. Bandalan is a nun belonging to said organization. 2
In a Resolution dated 1 April 2005, respondent Justice admitted on record that
he once served as counsel of religious organizations but denied that such circumstance
affected his impartiality in the case. Respondent Justice, however, found it proper to
voluntarily inhibit himself to disabuse the mind of the student and complainant of any
suspicion as to his impartiality. 3
Despite his inhibition, respondent Justice allegedly participated again in the case
when his name appeared as one of the signatories of a Resolution dated 21 November
2006 of the Court of Appeals admitting the memorandum of the petitioner school and
which deemed the petition as submitted for decision. 4 As such, complainant led on 5
December 2006 a Manifestation and Motion for respondent Justice to maintain his
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earlier inhibition. On 28 September 2007, complainant again led a Reiterative Motion
for Justice Dicdican to Maintain His Earlier Inhibition from the Present Case. 5
Complainant alleged that respondent Justice's actions showed his manifest bias
and prejudice against his client in the case — a blatant disregard of Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. 6
For his part, respondent Justice maintained that he never participated again in
the case after his inhibition therefrom on 1 April 2005. In fact, he never received any of
the manifestations and motions led by complainant subsequent to his inhibition
because the case le was no longer with him and the case documents were not
forwarded to him. Respondent Justice likewise averred that the assailed Resolution of
21 November 2005 was promulgated based on the agendum which was actually
signed by Justices Barza, as ponente, Baltazar-Padilla and Gonzales-Sison. This is
clearly shown in the Report made by the Court of Appeals Division Clerk dated 25 April
2008. CHDAEc
Moreover, records show that on 9 May 2005, Division Clerk of Court May Faith
Trumata forwarded to the Ra e Committee of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station
the rollo of the case for rera ing to another justice in view of respondent Justice's
inhibition therefrom. The case was rera ed on 11 May 2005 and was assigned to
Justice Enrico Lanzanas. Then on 2 February 2006, Justice Lanzanas penned a
resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda. On 1 June 2006, however,
Justice Lanzanas was transferred to the Court of Appeals of Manila. Consequently, the
case was reassigned as part of his initial case load to Justice Romeo F. Barza, a junior
member of the 18th Division. As a result of a reorganization in August 2006, Justice
Barza became a senior member of the 19th Division of which respondent Justice is the
Chairman. Considering that respondent Justice could no longer participate in the case,
Justice Marlene Sison was designated as third member of the 19th Division.
On 21 November 2006, the assailed Resolution was promulgated with
Stenographer Agnes Joy S. Nobleza mistakenly including respondent Justice as one of
the signatories. Proof of this inadvertence is the letter of apology dated 8 November
2007 sent to respondent Justice by Stenographer Nobleza.
Clearly, respondent Justice asserted, the charges leveled against him are devoid
of factual basis. Respondent Justice strongly contended, in fact, that complainant
should be the one made to answer for the false accusations and insults he had made
against the court.
The Court nds the instant administrative complaint devoid of merit and should
accordingly be dismissed.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the
complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action fails to show in
a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under
no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court
employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed his duties will prevail. 7
In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of
impropriety and partiality against respondent Justice. Aside from his naked allegations,
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conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any other evidence to prove his
charges. Hence, the presumption that respondent regularly performed his duties
prevails. On the other hand, respondent Justice adequately explained that since his
voluntary inhibition from the case, he no longer participated in the case and his
perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a
typographical mistake.
It also bears reiteration that a party's remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a
magistrate lies with the proper reviewing court, not with the O ce of the Court
Administrator by means of an administrative complaint. 8 It is axiomatic that, where
some other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular. 9 CHEIcS
Footnotes
Rule 2.01 — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CTcSAE
Rule 2.03 — A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
2. Rollo, p. 14.
3. Id. at 14-15, 147-148.
4. Id. at 148.
5. Id. at 15-16.
6. Id. at 16.
7. Suarez-De Leon v. Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1935, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 37, 44.
8. Atty. Hilario v. Hon. Ocampo III, 422 Phil. 593, 606 (2001) citing Dionisio v. Escano, A.M.
No. RTJ-98-1400, February 1, 1999, 302 SCRA 411; See Geriatrics Foundation, Inc. v.
Layosa, 416 Phil. 668 (2001).
9. Atty. Hilario v. Hon. Ocampo III, supra, citing Santos v. Orlino, Adm. Mat. No. RTJ-98-
1418, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 101. ETIcHa