GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. 184528

April 25, 2012

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,

vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
1
2
Procedure of the Decision dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution
dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA." The Court of
3
Appeals issuances affirmed the Order dated September 27, 2006 and the
4
Order dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed
petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for guardianship over the properties of his
father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed
as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.
The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been
afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years
already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his
judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his
hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to
have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage
his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey
for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa
Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set
the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social
case study and submit a report thereon.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her
social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court
Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the
(respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental
Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his
testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
(respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29,
2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of
evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to
have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his
Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the
Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the
Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents)
Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to
5
Evidence dated July 23, 2006. (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his
personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to
6
Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an
Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant
has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to
establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and
to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27
September 2006.

GUARDIANSHIP

Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal
was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14,
8
2006 are AFFIRMED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008.
Hence, the instant petition was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON
AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT
9
WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to
be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court
of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible
error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly
disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondents
incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,
guardianship in the following wise:

10

we laid out the nature and purpose of

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one

person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to
further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve
the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate
care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but
11
those of one in loco parentis as well.
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who,
though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who
are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be
12
anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence."
We consider that
evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore,
13
should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum the
following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been
sickly for over ten (10) years already;
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes
Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his
former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children
knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient
to cover his medical expenses;
c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to
lack of care and management;
d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid
and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to
pay the necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta
car for the reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle,
but when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another

GUARDIANSHIP

vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of
the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under
his name and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen
knife to stab himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend during one of their
fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of
14
groceries and furniture, despite protests from his children.
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack
of material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner
did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would
attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due
to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent
points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he
is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties.
Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological
15
16
Screening," were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum to illustrate that
said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and
participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his
responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his
articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that
were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep
track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuoconstructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles.
Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing
Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest
17
effective solutions to problem situations. x x x.

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof
of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself
and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal
properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under
their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical
testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of
action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a
formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of
certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and his
sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of
real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to
his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical
document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological
Screening" which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never
identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report,
as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also
contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was
indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the
proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity
of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons
18
state of mental sanity will suffice."
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September
27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own
documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court
made known its own observation of respondents physical and mental state, to
wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states
that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical
capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors evidence
includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen.
Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were
tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to
problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning

GUARDIANSHIP

and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still

19
sharp, alert and able. (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a
20
petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts." We
21
only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;
however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long settled
that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts
are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on
22
this Court when supported by the evidence on record." We therefore adopt the
factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the
grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If
his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
23
issue." We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment
on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his
part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not
24
entitled to the relief sought." 1wphi1
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for
guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely
because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a
cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his
evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated
September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. 109557

November 29, 2000

No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo
City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA,

petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
1

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals
2
and its resolution denying reconsideration reversing that of the Regional Trial
3
Court, Iloilo, Branch 32 and declaring void the special proceedings instituted
therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the
comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of
the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their
daughter and son in law, for the ostensible purpose of "financial need in the
personal, business and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on
the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-inlaw, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other
hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s
suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of
any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein
respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda
Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza
spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991,
filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present
physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from
competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and
dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a
court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein
that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent
Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further
prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be
negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot

"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself
filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of
the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties, and authorization to sell the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the
petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her
husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the
Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole
powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her
husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up,
accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she
urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and
its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said
property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued
an Order (Annex "C") finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient
in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The
scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda
Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and
Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s
attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered
its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was
necessary to defray the mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization.
The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L.
Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings
sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June
13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated
and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal properties;

GUARDIANSHIP

"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of

administration of their conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey
of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the
names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings
standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to
the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner
being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on
the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for
consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument that
the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules
governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require
procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted
by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective
one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be
impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his
share in the conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings. He then
restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with
Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291
and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial
obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that
the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million
Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He
also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a
monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and service to his
fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family.
Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid

assets to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient
cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set
against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on
installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s attending physicians
are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement
to his motion for reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated his contention that
summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions
on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under
the heading on "Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife" which
contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he
argued that were one spouse is "comatose without motor and mental faculties,"
the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by
absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma.
Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by
a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111,
Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for
approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely
filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of the petition; (2)
the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the
motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he
would have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court,
who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime
formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex "I"). The case
was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and approving respondent
Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said court
ruled that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by "oppositor",
Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel,

GUARDIANSHIP

this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del RosarioBenedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly observed
the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the
Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor" Teodor
L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the instant petition
considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition, belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both
still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L.
Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among
others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral
Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the
names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building
standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted
and the deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and
between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee,
is hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to
register the sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the
vendee.
"SO ORDERED."

On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing

the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special
5
proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void.
6

On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, however,

on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent
7
and compelling reason to disturb the decision.
Hence, this appeal.

The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their
conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel
of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the

approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own

daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.,
the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the
Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take
care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had
rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial
guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93,
Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such
a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The
situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact
or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such
rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a
victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties,
9
and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court.

GUARDIANSHIP

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law
provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same
10
powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator
of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards
estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the
Revised Rules of Court.1wphi1 Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus,
the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it
did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be
heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.
The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process
suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government
11
the impress of nullity. A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio
12
and may be attacked directly or collaterally. "A decision is void for lack of due
13
process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard." "A
void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or
collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any
14
action or proceeding where it is invoked."
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-23096

April 27, 1972

MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,

vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY
and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376

April 27, 1972

DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and,

LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.
Estanistao A. Fernandez for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the rights
1
acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon
arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more or less, situated in
Malaking Kahoy, Paraaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the
widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children, Dionisio,
2
Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes,
who thereafter
challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their contention that
notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate court on June 2,
1953, it could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move.
Moreover, the guardianship proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was
heard without the two elder children, Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being
notified although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of
3
Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question,
intervened in such action. In the lower court decision, they were adjudged coowners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the property, the sale by the widow
being considered null and void insofar as they were concerned. The rights of the
Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the threefourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the
spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its decision,
now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of sale executed by the
mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon as to the

whole three-fourths, without prejudice however to the children demanding from

their mother their participation in the amount paid for the sale of such property. It
thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged orders,
starting with the two elder children not being notified of the petition for
guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as pointed out and stressed
in their petition for review. There is need then for the exercise of the corrective
power of this Court. The original decision of the lower court has much more to
recommend it. Thereby, the rights of the children are fully respected. With a
restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court, there is a
corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. So we
decide.
The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus: "After
hearing the evidence, the lower court handed down decision on June 24, 1961,
finding that in the guardianship proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction
over the persons of the minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of
them being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by the
guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly
authorized its sale, and the total absence of the requisite notice necessarily
rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the defendant, Martin S. Nery, a
lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion
of the land belonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the sisters
of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the deed of sale ... upon her death in 1952, her
1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest relatives, the third-party plaintiffs
who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose action had not prescribed
'because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the thirdparty complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed'; and that
the remaining 3/4 of the land in question was the conjugal property of Leoncio
Lorenzo and his wife, Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2 of which, upon the demise of
Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida and the other half to their children, the
4
herein plaintiffs, in equal shares."
Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was explained this
way: "It is unquestioned that the property in question formerly belonged to
Florentino Ferrer and his three sisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and
brother, Meliton. When, after the death of Florentino, that is, on December 6,
1943, the document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ... was
executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of Agueda and
married to Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the children of
Meliton, already deceased, said Leoncio merely acquired the participation of
said sellers, equivalent to 3/4 undivided part of said land, and became a coowner to that extent with Silvestra who did not execute said document and,
therefore,did not sell her 1/4 undivided portion of the said land, which 1/4
undivided portion passed, upon her demise in 1952, to her nearest relatives who

GUARDIANSHIP

are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo,
Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the children of her deceased sister,
Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew
of this purchase made by her deceased husband, and she had no right to
mortgage the whole land which, for taxation purposes was declared in her
husband's name, without the consent of aforenamed successors-in-interest of
Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the same afterwards to the defendant spouses,
Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon, even if authorized by the guardianship
court, said authority having been granted upon her misrepresentation, contained
in her petition of May 26, 1953, that her minor children, the plaintiff's herein,
were the owners in common of 1/2 portion of the land in question, the other 1/2
pertaining to her. However, inasmuch as the said minor plaintiffs were really the
owners in common of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided part of the said land, and the other
1/2, to their mother and guardian, the orders of the guardianship court
authorizing the guardian to sell the real property of the minors, and approving
the deed of sale executed in accordance with said authority must be construed
5
as referring to the correct real property of the said minors."
Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the appealed
judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the deed of sale ..., executed by
Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the defendants valid only insofar as the
undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned, as to which portion,
the defendants are declared owners, and that the third-party plaintiffs, Rosario,
Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad, all surnamed
Lorenzo, are declared owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion
of the said land. In all other respects, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed.
6
No Costs."
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of the
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, not being
satisfied with the above decision instituted the petitions for review. As noted at
the outset, the failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the
grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its
judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the
children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be
maintained. In that sense, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
subject to modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the lower court decision
7
sustaining the claim of the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, it is free from any infirmity.
1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it was
the lower court and not the respondent Court of Appeals that yielded obeisance
to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded thus: "When a petition for the
appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if

above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general
8
or special notice thereof to be given." The late Chief Justice Moran was quite
explicit as to its jurisdictional character. These are his words: "Service of the
notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is
jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a
9
guardian."
The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First
10
Instance, a 1915 decision. As was therein made clear: "There is no need for
interpretation or construction of the word in the case before us. Its meaning is so
clear that interpretation and construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to
leave untouched the meaning with which the English language has endowed the
word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would accord to it on
reading a sentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle
refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial
theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused
so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in
considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the
English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature
ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them
meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing
and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the
meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court
11
for its 'interpretation and construction.' "
Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its assumption
that the probate court could have authorized the sale in question. The
jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome. It was the lower court that
acted correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as we do considering that
the rights of minors are involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that is
quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its solicitude
is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely their
stage of immaturity calls for every procedural principle being observed before
their interest in property to which they have a claim could be adversely affected.
It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811, in
12
Salunga v. Evangelista,
Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother
13
could have an "interest opposed to that of her children."
That may not have
been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from the facts as found by
the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have been better protected if
they were notified as is required by law. If there is any occasion then why there
should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a jurisdictional
requirement, this is it.

10

GUARDIANSHIP

Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is
cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age
or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as
they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It
cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most
beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
14
themselves."
2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and
15
respondent Court of Appeals as to the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer being entitled
to
one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the deceased
Leoncio Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such property in the capacity
of trustee for them. At the time then that the settlement of his estate was
pending in the probate court, his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could
not assert any other right, except that traceable to her late husband.
Respondent Court of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer.
As a member of the bar, he could not have been unaware that his vendor could
not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose of. It is much too late in the
day to depart from the well-settled principle as to a trustee being incapable of
acquiring interest opposed to that of his principal. So it was announced in
16
Severino v. Severino. That is in conformity with an overmastering requirement
of equity and conscience. He should thus be held to the strictest degree of
acccountability. The law would lay itself open to well-deserved criticism if a
principle other than the above were followed. The Nery spouses ought to be
aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its authoritative force whenever
called for.
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate its
inapplicability by the two principal errors assigned, namely, that Silvestra Ferrer
did sell her share of the property as far back as 1943 and that even if it were not
so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and thereafter his widow, Bienvenida de la
Isla did assert rights of ownership therein. It is obvious that on the face of such
alleged errors that they are essentially factual. We are thus precluded from
inquiring into their veracity as on such a matter what was decided by respondent
Court of Appeals is binding on us. Moreover, as to the alleged prescription, the
issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower court in this fashion: "The action of
said children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet prescribed because from the

death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on

September 3, 1958, barely six years had elapsed. Moreover, there is no clear
and satisfactory evidence that Leoncio Lorenzo and his successors-in-interest
had been in continuous, adverse, and open possession, and under claim of
ownership, of the one-fourth portion corresponding to Silvestra Ferrer as to
17
acquire same by acquisitive prescription."
Consequently, it was appropriate
for the Court of Appeals to affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it
recognized the rights of the heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the land sold.
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth
that Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all
surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida
de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of the three-fourths of
the property in question, as was decreed by the lower court, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against Martin Nery and
Leoncia L. de Leon.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

11

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-45622

May 5, 1939

JUAN GOROSTIAGA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUELA SARTE, defendant-appellant.
Calleja and Sierra for appellant.
Bonto and Gutierrez Lora for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
On May 27, 1936, Juan Gorostiaga, plaintiff-appellee, institutes an action
against Manuela Sarte to recover the sum of P2,285.51. An answer was filed by
Attorney Gregorio A. Sabater in the name of the defendant, wherein a general
denial was made, and several defenses interposed, among them, that the
defendant was physically and mentally incompetent to manage her estate. At
the trial, the defendant did not appear in court and her non-appearance had no
been accounted for. On September 21, 1996, judgment was rendered
sentencing the defendant to pay the amount claimed. On December 23, 1936, a
motion under section 113 of Act No. 190 was filed by the general guardian of the
defendant, praying that all the proceedings had against the defendant be
declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The motion was
denied; hence, this appeal.
There is no question about the facts. On May 18, 1936, that is, nine days prior to
the institution of the action against the defendant, a petition for guardianship was
filed with the lower court in favor of the defendant, on the ground that she was
incompetent to manage her estate by reason of her physical and mental
incapacity. After hearing the petition, wherein the depositions of alienists were
presented, the court issued an order declaring that the defendant Manuela Sarte
"se halla ficica y mentalmente incacitada para administrar sus bienes poe razon
de debelidad senil, cuya inteligencia si bien le permite sostener una
conversacion por algunos minutos de una manera satisfactoria, no tiene la
consistencia necesaria para atender a sus necesidas y administrar sus propios
bienes."
Although this order was issued on December 3, 1936, it relates to the incapacity
alleged in the petition of May 18, 1936. Consequently, the incapacity thus
declared existed at least at the date of the filing of the petition, that is, on May
18, 1936, nine days prior to the institution of the action in the present case. In
fact, according to the evidence relied upon by the lower court, the defendant
was incompetent to manage her affairs for about two or three years prior to her
examination by the alienists. It appears thus clear that during all the proceedings
in the case at bar, from the time of the filing of the complaint to the rendition of

the judgment, the defendant was physically and mentally unfit to manage her
affairs, and there having been no summons and notices of the proceedings
served her and her guardian, because no guardian was then appointed for her,
the court trying the action acquired no jurisdiction over her person (sec. 396, No.
4, of Act No. 190).
It is argued that Attorney Gregorio A. Sabater appeared for the defendant in the
case and filed an answer in her behalf and that the attorney's authority is
presumed as well as the capacity of the defendant giving the authority. But this
presumption is disputable and it is here entirely rebutted by no less than an
order of the same court declaring the defendant physically and mentally unfit to
manage her estate since at least May 18, 1936. If the defendant was thus
incompetent, she could not have validly authorized the attorney to represent her.
And if the authority was given by her relatives, it was not sufficient except to
show the attorney's good faith in appearing in the case.
It is contended that the issue as to the incapacity of the defendant was pleaded
in defendant's answer and was squarely decided and that therefore it cannot be
reopened unless on the ground of newly discovered evidence. That answer was,
however, filed by an attorney not validly authorized to appear for the defendant
who had never been in court except when her guardian filed a motion to quash
all the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. In matters of this kind, affecting the
jurisdiction of the court and the validity of all proceedings, the court, instead of
observing a passive attitude, should take the initiative of, and exercise utmost
care in, ascertaining the facts. And although the evidence gathered at the trial is
insufficient, if, after judgment, the lack of jurisdiction is clearly shown, and there
has been no waiver thereof, as in this case where a waiver could not have been
possible, it is the duty of the court to set aside all the proceedings, take the
necessary steps to acquire jurisdiction, and grant a new trial. The position taken
by the lower court in this case can hardly be reconciled with its position in the
guardianship proceedings.
Appellee contends that in the motion filed by the guardian under section 113 there is
no showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable negligence as grounds
for relief provided therein. It is, however, more than a surprise to the defendant that
she be tried and sentenced without valid summons or notice. And as to the affidavits
of merit required to be attached to a motion under section 113, they are not
necessary, as we have already held, where the court acted without jurisdiction over
the defendant's person. (Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446.)
Judgment is reversed, all the proceedings had in the lower court are hereby
declared null and void, and the case is remanded to the court below for new trial
after the guardian making him a party defendant. With costs against appellee.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

12

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-27962

February 14, 1928

VICENTE G. SINCO, PILAR G. SINCO, assisted by her husband

JOSE E. ROMERO, and MARIA DESAMPARADOS G. SINCO, plaintiffsappellees,
vs.
AGAPITO LONGA and AGUEDA LONGA, assisted by her husband
MANUEL TEVEZ, defendants-appellants.
Del Rosario & Del Rosario and DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for appellants.
Abad Santos, Camus, Delgado & Recto, Manuel Briones, Vicente G. Sinco and
Jose E. Romero for appellees.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted on July 16, 1926, in the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Negros by Vicente G. Sinco, Pilar G. Sinco, and Maria Desemparados
G. Sinco with whom is joined Jose E. Romero, as husband of Pilar G. Sinco,
against Agapito Longa and Agueda Longa, with whom is joined the latter's
husband, Manuel Tevez, for the purpose of annulling a sale of an undivided third
interest formerly pertaining to the three first-named plaintiffs in the hacienda
Rosario, situated in the municipality of Bais, Oriental Negros, said sale having
been effected with judicial approval in November, 1910, by the then guardian of
said plaintiffs, one Emilio Tevez, and for the purpose of compelling the
defendants, who are now the registered owners of said hacienda, to convey to
the plaintiffs the undivided third of the hacienda claimed by the plaintiffs, or in
default thereof to pay the just value of the same property, and in either case to
pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P160,000, with lawful interest from
the date of the filing of the complaint, with costs.
Upon hearing the cause the trial judge resolved the controversy in favor of the
plaintiffs and ordered a division of the hacienda into three equal parts one of
which should be delivered to the plaintiffs. He also ordered the defendants to
pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P2,000, as a third part of the estimated value of
machinery and improvements on the hacienda at the time of the sale, and
further ordered that the defendants deliver to the plaintiffs certain live-stock, or
its equivalent in money to the extent of P833.33, and to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P71,162.08 as indemnization for the produce harvested by the
defendants from the plaintiffs' third of the land since the sale referred to was
consummated. From this judgment the defendants appealed.
It appears that the hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don Rafael Sinco
y Librado, the plaintiffs great grandfather, from whom, it passed to his son
Escolastico G. Sinco who died prior to 1901, probably during the troubled period

of the Filipino revolution under the Spanish regime. Escolastico G. Sinco left a
widow, Saturnina Lopez, and three children, namely, Sergio, Maria Paz, and
Coloma Sinco. Of these Sergio and Maria Paz are still living, but Coloma died in
1904, leaving the three children who are the plaintiffs in the present case,
namely, Vicente, Pilar, and Desemparados.
The estate off Escolastico G. Sinco appears to have been encumbered with
debts to the extent of some P14,000; and in order to liquidate this indebtedness,
the widow and the three children, in the year 1901, leased the property for seven
years at an annual rental of P3,000 to Agapito Longa and Trinidad Diago,
widow, with the understanding that the lessees would assume the indebtedness
then existing against the estate and apply the rent due under the lease to the
satisfaction of said indebtedness until it should be completely paid. In July,
1903, the seven-year lease was extended by the same parties at the same
stipulated rent for a further period of two years. On October 7, 1907, the same
lessors, with the exception of Coloma, who had died in 1904, entered into an
agreement with the Longas for a further extension of the lease for one year. This
contract also called for P3,000 as rent for the additional year, and of this amount
the sum of P1,500 was advanced to meet pressing needs of the lessors. In
August, 1909, Saturnina Lopez died, and she is supposed to have left a will
acknowledging an encumbrance to the extent of P3,000 on the hacienda
Rosario in favor of her three grandchildren, the present plaintiffs. Proceedings
for the probate of this will were at one time contemplated or begun but were
subsequently abandoned. Sergio and Maria Paz, uncle and aunt of the plaintiffs,
appear to have questioned the right of their nephew and nieces, the present
plaintiffs, as heirs to the share of their mother Coloma, but in the end the claims
of the three children maintained and the opposition on the part of uncle and aunt
subsided. Nothing more was done in the matter of enforcing their claim to the
P3,000 mentioned in the will of their grandmother. Part explanation of this may
possibly be found in the fact that the hacienda in question had been the
separate property of Escolastico G. Sinco, and the widow's share therein was
less than it would have been had the property been of a ganancial character
between her and her deceased husband.
After the death of Saturnina Lopez, her son Sergio Sinco was hard pressed for
money to sustain a numerous family, and he proposed to Agapito Longa to sell
to the latter his one-third undivided interest in the hacienda. Longa appears at
first to have taken languid interest in the suggestion and told Sergio that the
guardian of the three children would have to be consulted. Finally, Longa, in
conjunction with his kinswoman, Trinidad Diago, widow of Mateo Longa, agreed
to buy the property if Maria Paz, the sister of Sergio, would join in selling her
share, it being understood furthermore that the part of the three minors would
also be sold by the guardian, upon the approval of the sale by the court. The
assent of Maria Paz and her husband, Tiburcio Chavez, having been obtained to
this suggestion, steps were taken for the consummation of the sale. One reason

13

GUARDIANSHIP

why the Longas insisted in acquiring the whole undivided interest in the
property, instead of the undivided third of Sergio, was that he was Longas
looked to the Tabacalera Company for funds to purchase the property, and this
entity was averse to lending its money upon the security of an undivided third in
the property. As regards the sale of the portions pertaining to Sergio and Maria
Paz the transaction was consummated in February, 1910, while as regards the
interest of the minors the sale was not consummated until November 17, 1910,
owing to the fact that the approval of the court to the sale was not obtained until
immediately before said date.
The deed of sale (Exhibit 1) executed in favor of the Longas by Sergio Sinco
and his sister, Maria Paz, bears date of February 12, 1910, For the purposes of
said conveyance it is therein declared that the hacienda, with its improvements,
is valued at P23,600; and since the two grantors were respectively conveying
only their undivided thirds, the consideration of the conveyance was declared to
be two-thirds of the above-mentioned sum, or P15,733.32, which is
acknowledged to have been received by the grantors.
On the same date a number of other documents were executed by Sergio Sinco
and Maria Paz which have a bearing upon the principal transaction. Among
these we note a contract by which Sergio and Maria Paz agree to sell the
remaining one-third of the hacienda to the Longas in case it should be judicially
determined that they are the owners of said third. This instrument of course has
reference to the controversy between Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz Sinco on the
one hand and their minor nephew and nieces on the other, with respect to the
right of the minors to inherit the undivided third of the hacienda which had
pertained to their mother Coloma (Exhibit G). In another document the same
grantors (Sergio and Maria Paz) enter into an undertaking with the Longas to the
effect that the undivided two-thirds sold by them to the Longas as already
started shall not be adversely affected by any judicial decision which might be
reached with respect to the title of the hacienda (Exhibit A). In still another
document, Sergio Sinco and Maria Sinco guarantee that they will interpose no
obstacle to the sale of the remaining third part of the hacienda, in case the court
should decide that the minor children of Coloma Sinco are owners of the same,
and they agree to answer in damages for breach of this guaranty (annotation
335, Exhibit C).
In addition to the foregoing documents the Longas issued two receipts (Exhibits
H and I), which cannot be understood without reference to certain past financial
occurrences between the Sincos and the Longas which have not as yet been
mentioned. After Coloma had died but while her mother, Saturnina Lopez, was
still living, the latter united with her son Sergio and daughter Maria Paz in the
execution of a mortgage on the hacienda Rosario in favor of Trinidad Diago,
widow of Mateo Longa, to secure a sum of money, and on February 3, 1909, the
court authorized Emilio, Tevez, guardian of the minors, to join in said instrument,

thereby binding the plaintiffs' share to the extent of said mortgage. At the time
the mortgage amounted to P8,800, and the debt bore interest at the rate of 10
per cent per annum.
After the death of Saturnina Lopez, her son Sergio fell into embarassed
circumstances; and since he could not look to the hacienda Rosario for means
of support, owing to the fact that the rent was tied up for years ahead, he was
driven to borrow money from Agapito Longa. As lessee of the hacienda Longa
doubtless looked ahead, and he must have considered his advances to Sergio
Sinco safe, as he probably counted upon future extensions of the lease to
recover such indebtedness. The amount of these advances was apparently
considerable as may be inferred from the first of two receipts executed by
Agapito Longa on February 12, 1910, or contemporaneously with the sale to the
Longas of the interests of Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz in the hacienda. In the
document now referred to (Exhibit H) Agapito Longa acknowledges having
received from the Sincos the sum of P10,000 owing to him by reason of the
cancellation of a lease of the hacienda Rosario extending to 1915. The language
of this document is doubtless intentionally obscure, but the insinuation is that the
mother (Saturnina Lopez) and her three children had made a lease of the
hacienda until 1915 for the purpose of securing an indebtedness. The only
actual lease of the hacienda known to this record is that executed first in 1901
for the period of seven years and later extended for the additional periods of two
and one year, as already mentioned in this opinion. The suggestion in Exhibit H
that a lease of the hacienda had been made for the period from 1911 to 1915
thus appears to be false; but it is of course possible that the grantors of the
supposed lease may have had some sort of understanding with Longa that his
advances would be secured in this way. Such an agreement, if made, was of
course not binding upon the minors. The Exhibit H accordingly states that the
sum of P10,000 therein mentioned had been paid by Sergio and Maria Paz
exclusively. It is then declared that, in so far as they were concerned, the
contract of lease was cancelled for the future. But as to the other third it was
stated to be still encumbered by said lease and would so remain until the
conflicting claims between the two Sincos and the minors should be adjusted.
Meanwhile the part of the rent pertaining to said undivided third of the
uncancelled portion of the lease was to be left with Longa for future delivery to
the person to whom it might lawfully belong. It was further stipulated that if
Sergio and his sister should win in the controversy, Longa would pay them the
sum of P7,333.33 for said undivided third and that they in turn would pay the
proportionate part of the mortgage encumbering the same.
In the other receipt (Exhibit I) Agapito Longa as attorney-in-fact of Trinidad
Diago, acknowledged that he had received from Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz
Sinco the sum of P7,333.33 in full payment of the two-thirds part of the
mortgage encumbering the hacienda. From this it will be seen that the amount of
the mortgage was then estimated at P11,000, a sum somewhat in excess of the

14

GUARDIANSHIP

amount which would have been due had the principal truly been P8,800, as
elsewhere stated in this opinion, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per
annum. The payment of this P7,333.33 left, so the receipt states, leaves a
mortgage for P3,666.66 upon the undivided third pertaining to the minors.
The documents above mentioned completed the sale, of the hacienda Rosario,
in so far as relates to the interest of Sergio Sinco and his sister Maria Paz. In
order to accomplish the transfer of the remaining third it was necessary to obtain
a deed from the guardian, Emilio Tevez; and to this end a petition was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros by the guardian on November 7,
1910. Among the substantial recitals of this petition we note the presence of the
following statements, namely, first, that the undivided interest of the minors was
encumbered by its proportional share of the mortgage for P8,800, with interest
at 10 per cent; secondly, that in addition to said mortgage, the hacienda was
rented to Agapito Longa as far into the future as 1915 and that the rent up to
that date had been received by the predecessor in interest of the minors and the
coowners, to the extent of P11,900, with the result that the estate was
encumbered, by the obligation just mentioned and that of the mortgage, to the
extent of P21,000; thirdly, that Saturnina Lopez, grandmother of the minors, died
intestate in the municipality of Bais, Oriental Negros, in the month of August
1909, and that the minors had inherited from her and their father an undivided
third interest in the hacienda; fourthly, that the true value of the hacienda is
P33,600 and that after deducting the encumbrances chargeable to the property,
there would remain a balance of P12,600, of which one-third, or P4,200 would
belong to the minors; fifthly, that in view of the fact that interest on the
indebtedness was increasing and of the further fact that the owners could not
themselves cultivate the property, owing to lack of capital, the two adult owners
had decided to sell the part of the hacienda pertaining to them, and had in fact
sold the same, for the sum of P22,400 leaving the share of the minors
untouched; sixthly, that the minors have no cash assets to meet their
subsistence and education and that one of them was in fact then being
maintained in Silliman Institute by one of his kinsmen; and seventhly, that it is
convenient and in the interest of the minors to sell the part of the hacienda
pertaining to them on the basis of a valuation of P33,600 in order to free said
share from the mortgage and rent encumbrance, and that thereby the minors
would obtain a liquid capital which would be put out at interest in order to take
care of their education and subsistence.
On November 16, 1910, or nine days after the filing of the application, the court
issued its order authorizing the guardian to make the sale as requested; and on
the next day a deed of conveyance was executed by the guardian in favor of the
Longas (Exhibit 2). The order authorizing this sale recites that Sergio Sinco,
Maria Paz Sinco, and the latter's husband, Tiburcio Chavez, coowners of the
property and next of kin of the minors, had appeared before the court and
ratified the facts alleged by the guardian, and stated that it would be in the

interest of the minors that the sale be made. It is also stated therein that Vicente
Sinco, the elder of the three minors, he being then 16 years of age, had
appeared and testified in similar terms. Vicente Sinco, it may here be stated,
admits that he was brought into court from the Silliman Institute, which he was
then attending, and that he was asked some questions in which he took title
interest and about which he had less knowledge, relative to the property and his
situation.
It should be stated that all the records of the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Negros were destroyed by fire, after the order above-mentioned was made and
only fragmentary portions of the proceedings in the guardianship have been
subsequently collected, fortunately a copy of the petition and the decree.
A little reflection upon the foregoing incident is suggestive to the effect that the
rights of the present plaintiffs, then minors were really in a dangerous position,
since no one intervened in the transaction who could have had any real and
unbiased interest in protecting them. Sergio Sinco was being urged by his
supposed necessities to sell his own share in the property, a purpose that could
only be consummated by his attaining a sale of the whole. The Longas were of
course interested in securing the property since they would thereby collect the
mortgage of Trinidad Diago and the advances that had been made to Sergio
and probably his sister Maria Paz. If we may accept the statements of Sergio
Sinco, even the guardian, Emilio Tevez, was not a disinterested protector, since
he is said to have been anxious to get the minors' share in cash into his hands
in order to meet some urgent claims against himself; and it is fact that after he
had obtained the money, he applied it to his own uses, instead of lending it upon
interest to some third person. But he appears to have been solvent, and the
money thus retained was paid out of the estate of Tevez to another guardian of
the minors after Tevez had died.
The statements in the petition for leave to sell the property are untrue uncandid
in more than one particular as may discovered by comparing the statements
contained in said petition with the data already supplied in this opinion. In
particular, the petition erred in exaggerating the necessities of the minors, for
they had inherited other property from which subsistence for them could be
obtained. In fact they got along in the succeeding years without any help from
what had been obtained in the sale now in question. In the light of the proof
before us it seems undeniable that the sale was unwise and was accomplished
to some extent without a fair and true exposition to the court of the actual
situation. But it must be remembered in this connection that the shares of the
elder owners were sacrificed by adults in the full possession of their powers, and
we see no reason to doubt why Maria Paz Sinco at least and her husband,
Tiburcio Chavez, should not be considered competent to deal for themselves in
this matter. Years after this sale was effected the Bais Sugar Central was
established in the neighborhood of the hacienda Rosario and the values of

15

GUARDIANSHIP

agricultural property in this section then increased enormously. In the light of

these events anyone case see that the sale of the minors' share was unwise in
the extreme. Indeed, from a perusal of the testimony of Sergio Sinco, in
connection with the documents above referred to, it is not difficult to conclude
that sinister forces were at work against the true interest of the minors in
bringing about this sale, and for the purposes of this decision it may be admitted
that there was an imposition on the court, and that the sale may have been
tainted by fraud.
We are of the opinion, however, after a careful study of the documents, in
connection with the testimony of Sergio Sinco, that this fraud, if fraud it be, has
not been brought home to the Longas. The plaintiffs place much emphasis upon
the notarial annotation 335, of Exhibit C, wherein Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz
Sinco (in conjunction with her husband Tiburcio Chavez) agreed to interpose no
obstacle to the sale of the share of the minors in the hacienda Rosario. From it
is argued that the purpose of Agapito Longa in securing this document was to tie
the hands of the uncle and aunt of the minors who were the very persons who
should, in contemplation of law, be looked to for advice with respect to the
interest of the minors, and that this act was preparatory to the carrying into effect
of the conspiracy by which the Longas would obtain the children's share of the
hacienda. But the name of Longa does not appear in annotation 335 as that of
the person in whose favor the instrument was executed. It may be true, as
stated by Sergio Sinco, that said instrument may have been made at Longa's
request; but it looks very much as if it might have been made by anxious sellers
angling for any purchaser who could be induced to take the property off of their
hands. The testimony of Sergio Sinco is rambling and confused, as might
perhaps be expected from a person testifying about acts that had occurred
nearly seventeen years previously of which he had become heartily ashamed.
His insinuation that the sale was obtained by fraudulent conspiracy instigated by
the Longas cannot be accepted as the true interpretation of the transaction. The
real source of danger to the children in those days, it must be remembered, was
the attitude of their uncle and aunt, who had steadily opposed the claim of the
children to share in the hacienda and who were only too anxious to be rid of all
connection with the property.
In passing upon controversies of this character experience teaches the danger
of accepting lightly charges of fraud made many years after the transaction in
question was accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the
principal actors and changes effected by time may have given a totally different
color to the cause of controversy. In the case before us the guardian, Emilio
Tevez, is dead. The same is true of Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendant
Agueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now living in Spain. It will be borne in
mind also that, in so far as oral proof is concerned, the charge of fraud rests
principally of the testimony of a single witness who, if fraud was committed, was
a participant therein and who naturally would now be anxious so far as

practicable, to put the blame on others. In this connection it is well to bear in

mind the following impressive language of Mr. Justice Story:
* * * But lenght of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as
it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the
nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in
favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be
unreasonable, after a great lenght of time, to require exact proof of all
the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory
explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be
incumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the
parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is that
the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if
the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol
agreements the most that we can hope is to arrive at probable
conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to
the living; for, the legal presumption is the other way; and as to the
dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height
of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of
the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U. S.], 481, 498.)
The attorneys for the appellees criticize the order of the court of November 16,
1910, authorizing the sale of the share of the minors in the hacienda as irregular
and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. We are unable to concur in this view.
The petition presented by the guardian stated a case, we think, for a sale of a
portion of the guardianship estate for reinvestment, as contemplated in section
569 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the petition it was clearly set forth that the
income of the children's property was insufficient property to maintain and
educate them and that it was for their benefit that their share should be sold. It
was also therein stated that the property was encumbered. Admitting that these
statements of the petition were untrue the jurisdiction of the court to authorize
the sale was not thereby affected, because the jurisdiction of the court rests on
the averments of the petition and not upon the truth of those averments (28 C.
J., 1178; Scott vs. Gypsy Oil Co., 112 Okla., 13; 239 Pac., 887). The suggestion
that the order was irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court because
publication was not made over the whole period required by law losses its force
in view of the fact that the next of kin of the minors are stated in the order to
have personally appeared in court.
In the view we take of the decisive points above discussed it becomes
unnecessarily to consider the bearing of the statute of limitations on the right of
action in this case and certain other important questions that would have

16

GUARDIANSHIP

acquired solution if the plaintiffs' right of action against the purchasers had been
considered to have been established.
The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendants absolved from
the complaint. It is so ordered, without costs.
Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real JJ., concur.

17

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. 163707

September 15, 2006

established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and
KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES,
respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1

This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated
2
3
July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss;
4
and its May 25, 2004 Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille
Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a
5
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled
Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992,
leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal
properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children,
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private
respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime,
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a
6
Certification Against Forum Shopping signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez.
7

The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private
respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have
executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be
settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,

petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been
paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios'
June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her
minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of
Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the
duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right
occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected
petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional
Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17,
2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby
DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the
private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille
Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate
of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.

10

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this
petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on
certification against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim

18

GUARDIANSHIP

executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate
of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not
have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as
they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance
with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered
substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and
that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum
shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private
respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private
respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of nonforum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure
to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case.
However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of
11
justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that while a
petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was
signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be
12
overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. So it is in the present
13
controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an intention to
violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to
temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar
private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective,
a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to
him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly
14
and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release
and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It
merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for
her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any
and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late
15
Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not specifically mention

private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be

construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of
the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may
accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be
accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the
persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and
distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article
1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their
wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
16
alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect
the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and
Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents
from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and
waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
17
misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied
that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule
that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not
have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private
respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private
respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect,

19

GUARDIANSHIP

the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article
285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied)
18

We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at
the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by
19
the passage of the Family Code.
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which
superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

survive

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in

the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission
of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by
the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the
type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation.
However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has
been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters
may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of
administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private
respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
20
including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be
21
joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. As held in Briz v.
22
Briz:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can
in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a
natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the
character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be

20

GUARDIANSHIP

answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions

justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in
the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action
in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of
heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated
by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior
decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine
must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to
compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs.
Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya,
13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior
decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might
take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship
is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of
petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario,
J.J., concur.

21

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-33152

January 30, 1982

LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), CALAUAG, and
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal Guardian of the Incompetent
SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the
1
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 which revived and
2
declared in full force and effect its decision on August 20, 1970 dismissing the
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. No. 43732, entitled
"Luis Parco, et al. vs. Hon. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
3
Branch IV, Calauag, et al., " and pray that the decision dated April 15, 1969
4
and all subsequent orders issued by respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag,
Court of First Instance of Quezon in Special Proceedings No. 2641 be declared
as null and void.
This case, G. R. No. L-33152, started from Special Proceedings No. 2641. a
guardianship proceedings for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez of Sriaya,
Quezon, which originally pertained to Branch 1, Court of First Instance of
5
Quezon, then presided by the late Hon. Judge Vicente Arguelles, later on
succeded by Hon. Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (now Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court). In 1966, respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Hon. Union C. Kayanan, took cognizance of
Special Proceedings No. 2641 when the Secretary of Justice authorized
respondent Judge to help unclog the docket of Branch I at Lucena City, Quezon.
For clarity, We have hereunder summarized the sequence of events and
material dates as it appears in the records from the time respondent Judge of
Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon took cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 2641.
On December 20, 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon
motion of Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez), hereinafter
referred to as private respondent, the sale to Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista,
hereinafter referred to as the petitioners, of Lot Nos. 3437 (613 sq. meters) and
4389 (4,068 sq. meters) covered by TCT Nos. 16939 and 18035, respectively,
for the sum of P4,400.00 for the support, maintenance and medical treatment of
the ward Soledad Rodriguez.

On January 6, 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized, upon

motion of private respondent, the sale to petitioners of Lot No. 1207 covered by
TCT No. 16944 containing an area of 63,598 sq. meters, more or less, for the
same reason. All the sales of the three (3) lots being absolute, new transfer
certificates of title were issued in the name of petitioners.
On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval of the
sale of Lot Nos. 3437, 4389, and 1207, private respondent filed an urgent
petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, invoking
Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court, praying that an order be
immediately issued requiring petitioners to appear before the court so that they
can be examined as regards the three (3) lots in question which are allegedly in
danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon failure to
do so or to comply with any order that may be issued in relation therewith to hold
them in contempt of court. The pertinent allegations read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That as legal guardian (private respondent) of the
abovenamed incompetent and upon authorization by this Hon.
Court he has transferred in good faith to the spouses LUIS
PARCO and VIRGINIA (UY) BAUTISTA, both of Atimonan,
Quezon, the titles over the following realties belonging to his
ward, namely:
a. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3437 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) with the
improvements thereon situated in the
Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of
Six Hundred Thirteen (613) sq. meters, more or
less;
b. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4389 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in the
Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of
Four Thousand And Sixty-Eight (4,068) sq.
meters, more or less;
c. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1207 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in the
Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of
Sixty-three Thousand Five Hundred and Ninetyeight (63,598) sq. meters, more or less.

22

GUARDIANSHIP

2. That anent the first TWO (2) PARCELS above-described he

transferred the titles thereto in favor of the recited spouses
under a loan agreement (not an absolute sale thereto and with
the express commitment in writing that he can recover the same
within three (3) months from December 19, 1966, ...
That prior to the expiration of the cited period of three months,
he tried to recover the stated two parcels of land from them,
however, the same was not carried out because he was then
transacting with them the sale of PARCEL THREE and under
the Agreement that they will not sell cede, or convey the
mentioned two (2) lots to anyone (except to petitioner now
private respondent herein) and once the stated PARCEL
THREE has been sold at the price of P48,000.00 the borrowed
amount of P4,400.00 shall be deducted therefrom and said two
parcels shall be returned to him;
3. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple, in bad faith
and in violation of their agreement and of the trust and
confidence which he had reposed upon them, have fraudulently
ceded and transferred the titles over the stated two parcels of
land to another person, allegedly for a price of (over
P30,000.00) and in spite of his repeated request upon them to
reconvey to him the titles thereto or to turn over to him the total
proceeds they have received (minus the sum of P4,400.00),
they have maliciously and unjustly refused to do so, and are
intending to keep and retain said amount for their own personal
use and benefit;
4. That as already adverted to in the previous paragraph hereof,
the mentioned couple induced him to transfer to them the title of
parcel three, so that they can sell the same for the agreed price
of P48,000.00 and believing in good faith that the cited spouses
are honest and trustworthy, he agreed and executed the
requisite document transferring the title to them subject to the
following conditions:
a. They shall pay to him the amount of Twelve
Thousand (Pl2,000.00) Pesos after they have
secured a buyer of the property, ...
b. They shall pay to NIEVES ALCALA and
PURA
AGCAOILE
(who
are
private
respondent's agents and representatives in

negotiating the sale of parcel three) the sum of

Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos after
they have sold the realty, ...
5. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple have
already sold and ceded the mentioned parcel three to another
person, and despite his repeated request upon them to pay and
deliver to him or to Nieves Alcala the sum of money specified in
the foregoing paragraph, they have maliciously and unjustly
failed and refused to do so, and have fraudulently retained the
said amount of money for thier own personal use and benefit;
6. That the enumerated parcels of land together with all the
proceeds derived therefrom, undeniably belonged to his ward
as trust properties, which are subject to the disposition of this
Hon. Court, and due to the mentioned fraudulent, malicious and
dishonest acts of the above- named couple, are in danger of
being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled;
xxx xxx xxx
In an answer dated June 5, 1968, petitioners contended mainly, among others,
that the three lots have been conveyed to them by deeds of absolute sale which
were duly approved by the guardianship court.
Pre-trial hearings were set for possible amicable settlement beginning on
September 6, 1968 but was postponed and reset to October 9, 1968 on
petitioners' counsel motion. On October 9, 1968, both parties and their counsels
appeared but failed to reach any amicable settlement. Again, the pre-trial
hearing was reset to November 28 and 29, 1968 but was likewise postponed to
January 8, 1969 at petitioners' counsel motion.
On January 8, 1969, for failure to petitioners and their counsel to appear
although there was a telegram requesting for postponement, respondent Judge
6
issued an order, authorizing private respondent to present evidence before the
Clerk of Court who was instructed to make the corresponding report which shall
be made as the basis of this decision.
In a petition dated January 30, 1969, petitioners prayed for the reconsideration
of the order of January 8, 1969 pointing out, among others, that there was a
7
First Order dated July 29, 1968, issued by then Judge Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Quezon that said branch
"will henceforth take cognizance of this case" and thus, asked for the transfer of
the incident sought before Branch IV to Branch I for proper action.

23

GUARDIANSHIP

On February 20, 1969, respondent Judge, finding the petition for reconsideration
well-grounded, issued an order directing the Clerk of Court to transmit the
records of the case to the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Lucena City, quoted
below:
ORDER
Acting on the Petition for Reconsideration filed by counsel for
the respondent on February 4, 1969, considering that Hon. A.
Melencio-Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch 1, CFI, Lucena
City, issued an order on July 29, 1968, the dispositive portion of
which is quoted as follows. 'WHEREFORE, it is hereby
confirmed that this court will henceforth take cognizance of this
case,' and considering that this special proceedings actually
belongs to Branch I, although incidents therein were taken
cognizance of by the Presiding Judge of CFI, Branch IV when
he was holding court session in Lucena City and
notwithstanding Administrative Order No. 261 dated October 7,
1968 which states that 'This administrative order shall not apply
to cases pending in the different salas which have been partially
tried and shall remain therein for final disposition', because to
case was originally filed during the incumbency of the late
Judge Vicente Arguelles, finding therefore the said petition to be
well-grounded, the Clerk of Court is hereby authorized to
transmit these records to the Deputy Clerk of Court, CFI,
Branch I, of Lucena City.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Calauag, Quezon this 20th day of February, 1969.
(SGD.) UNION C. KAYANAN Judge
On March 24, 1969, Private respondent, without the assistance of a counsel,
filed before Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon an amended petition
praying that the three (3) lots subject matter of the original urgent petition be
ordered reconveyed to the ward in said Special Proceedings No. 2641 for he
was informed that petitioners win transfer and properties to third person.
On March 26, 1969, the Clerk of Court of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of
Quezon, issued the notice of hearing of the amended petition filed by private
respondent dated March 24, 1969 notifying counsel for both parties that the
case will be heard before Branch IV on April 10, 1969 at 2:30 p.m. at Calauag,
Quezon. On the date set for hearing, counsels for both parties appeared but for

failure of the petitioners to appear respondent Judge issued an order

reiterating its previous order dated January 8, 1969 allowing private respondent
to present his evidence ex-parte and considered the case submitted for
resolution.
9

On April 15, 1969, respondent Judge rendered a decision on the basis of the
report of the Clerk of Court dated February 19, 1969 ordering petitioners to
reconvey the three (3) parcels of land to private respondent.
On June 14, 1969, petitioners moved to reconsider the decision stating, among
others, that respondent Judge has no authority to take cognizance of the case
which, according to petitioners, is an issue raised in the petition for
reconsideration of the court order of January 8, 1969, and that the decision was
without legal basis. Petitioners prayed that the case or incident be transferred to
the proper court which had taken cognizance of this case.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge denied the petition for reconsideration for
lack of merit. Petitioners' counsel received the said order of denial on June 26,
1969.
Meanwhile, on June 21, 1969, private respondent filed an urgent motion in
Branch IV praying that petitioners be required to appear before the court to be
examined as regards the properties of the ward and to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for not complying with a final order of the court
directing the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of land to private respondent.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge, acting on the urgent motion, issued an
10
order directing petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for contempt
of court pursuant to par. (b) Section 3 Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On June 27, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion claiming that the urgent
motion for contempt of court was premature considering that the decision
ordering the reconveyance of the properties in question has not yet become final
and executory and is still subject to appeal. In their prayer for the setting aside of
the order of June 23, 1969, petitioners informed the court that they win appeal
the decision to the Court of Appeals and that the corresponding notice of appeal,
appeal bond and the record on appeal will be filed in due time.
The following day, June 28, 1969, petitioners filed the notice of appeal and
appeal bond with a manifestation that the record on appeal will be filed in due
time.
11

On July 3, 1963, respondent Judge issued an order denying for lack of merit
petitioners' urgent motion of June 27, 1969, thus declaring that the order dated

24

GUARDIANSHIP

June 23, 1969 stands considering that petitioners' right to appeal has already
lapsed. In the same order, petitioners were given ten (10) days upon receipt to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt pursuant to Section 4, Rule 71
in relation to Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On July 7, 1969, petitioners filed a petition for extension of ten (10) days to
12
expire on July 20, 1969 within which to file the record on appeal. In an order
dated July 9, 1969, respondent Judge denied the said petition for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period.
On July 10, 1969, petitioners filed an unverified second petition for
reconsideration of the decision dated April 15, 1969 and the order of July 3,
1969 contending that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over the raise from the time
the order dated February 20, 1969 was issued by Judge A. Melencio- Herrera;
that the proceedings under Section 6 Rule 96 do not authorize the Hon. Court
(Branch IV) to determine the question of right over the property or to order
delivery thereof; that the purpose is merely to elicit information or secure
evidence from the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed away any personal property of the ward; that if the court finds
sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of
the guardian to bring the proper action.
On the other hand, on July 17, 1969, a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated July 9, 1969 was filed by petitioners claiming that all the pleadings related
to the intended appeal were filed within the period allowed by the Revised Rules
13
of Court. After an opposition was filed, respondent Judge issued an order on
July 18, 1969 denying the second petition for reconsideration for lack of basis
and on the ground that the period to appeal either the decision or any of the
previous orders had already expired.
On August 20, 1969, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction pleading nullity of the decision of the Court
of First Instance, Branch IV,
Quezon dated April 15, 1969 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse
of discretion in denying their right of appeal.
On September 27, 1969, the Court of Appeals dismissal the petition for lack of
14
merit.
On motion by petitioners, the dismissal was reconsidered in a split
resolution dated December 15, 1969 thereby giving due course to the petition,
and private respondent was required to answer.

After private respondent filed their answer and the parties submitted their
15
respective memoranda, the Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote decision
dated August 21, 1970 dismissed the petition.
On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in a split
16
resolution dated October 10, 1970 granted the motion for reconsideration and
set aside the decision dated August 20,1970.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the Court
17
of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote resolution dated January 20, 1971, reverted
to its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissing the petition.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
I
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
RETENTION BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF BRANCH IVCALAUAG OF THE CASE OF BRANCH I-LUCENA CITY
AFTER HE ORDERED THE RETURN OF THE CASE TO
BRANCH I,LUCENA CITY TO WHICH THE CASE BELONGS
AND AFTER THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH I
LUCENA CITY HAD RESUMED AND EXERCISED HER
JURISDICTION OVER SAID CASE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COULD
LEGALLY AND VALIDLY RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY DESPITE THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ADVERTED TO IN THE FIRST ASSIGNED
ERROR, THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE
JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SANCTIONING THE RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ASSUMPTION
OF JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP AND/OR ORDER RECONVEYANCE OF
PETITIONERS' PROPERTY SOLD TO THEM AND TITLED IN
THEIR NAMES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITED
JURISDICTION OF A GUARDIANSHIP COURT.

25

GUARDIANSHIP

III
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE SALES
ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE VALIDITY AND REGULARITY
OF SAID SALES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEIR
SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST.
IV
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING BY
SILENCE
THE
QUESTIONED
ORDER
OF
THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE ENFORCING HIS DECISION BY
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS.
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING
DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO APPEAL.
This petition was given due course in view of the peculiar incidents during its
trial stage where, as borne out by the records, two (2) branches of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon Province, 9th Judicial District assert jurisdiction over
Special Proceedings No. 2641, which, when the decision rendered by one
branch was brought in the Court of Appeals on certiorari with preliminary
injunction, the Special Division of Five Justices, in a three-to-two vote resolution
in four (4) occasions after its dismissal for lack of merit on September 27, 1968,
reconsidered the same and was given due course on December 15, 1968, again
dismissed on August 21, 1970, but again reconsidered on October 10, 1970,
until finally dismissed on January 20, 1971 when the Special Division of Five
reverted to its August 21, 1970 resolution. The Special Division was equally split
on the issue whether or not the Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Calauag,
Quezon, acting with limited jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6
Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, has the authority to adjudicate the question of
ownership and order the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of land in
question to private respondent, guardian of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. On
these two (2) principal issues, We are called upon to finally resolve the legal
controversy peculiar on this case.
After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the case was deemed
submitted for decision on October 28, 1971.

18

In a Resolution
of this Court dated November 29, 1978, the urgent
manifestation and motion of Leonisa S. Rodriguez, the surviving spouse of
Mario Rodriguez (brother of the ward) that the ward Soledad Rodriguez died on
September 15, 1970 and private respondent Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. died on
October 24, 1973; and that the heirs of the ward be substituted as the private
respondents in this case was noted. To begin with, the principal issue al hand is
whether or not respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch IV-Calauag has the authority or power to take further action in Special
Proceedings No. 2641 after the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch I-Lucena City asserted its jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders
dated July 29, 1968 and respondent Judge correspondingly ordered the return
of the case to Branch I in an order dated February 20,1969.
Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance
of Quezon has no power or authority to retain jurisdiction over Special
Proceedings No. 2641 which, at its inception, originally pertained to Branch ILucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon. To support such chum,
petitioners contend that the Second Order dated July 29, 1968 requiring private
respondent for an inventory and accounting of the ward's property confirms that
the Presiding Judge of Branch I has resumed its jurisdiction over said case,
more so, when respondent Judge ordered on February 20, 1969 the transmittal
of the records of the case to the Deputy Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance,
Branch I-Lucena City.
Private respondent, on the other hand, justifies the retention of jurisdiction by
respondent Judge over Special Proceedings No. 2641 contending, among
others, that the two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 issued by then Judge A.
Melencio-Herrera are not sufficient bases for claiming that Branch IV has been
deprived of its, jurisdiction because jurisdiction is vested upon the court not upon
any particular branch or judge thereof and the issuance of such orders constitute
undue interference with the processes and proceedings already undertaken by
respondent Judge; that petitioners are guilty of estoppel when they failed to
raise the issue of jurisdiction from the very beginning and when they voluntarily
appeared before respondent Judge, filed their answer and other pleadings, and
moved for postponements of the scheduled dates of hearing.
We sustain petitioners' stand. Of course, jurisdiction is vested in the court not in
any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of
the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal
19
courts one branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference
by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the
language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a
province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising
as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or

26

GUARDIANSHIP
20

judgments.
A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and might
seriously hinder the administration of justice. A judge is competent to act so long
as the case remains before him, but after it passed from his branch to the other,
21
the case could be acted upon by the judge of the latter branch. Otherwise, an
anomalous situation would occur at the detriment of the party litigants who are
likewise confused where to appear and plead their cause.
In the case before Us, there is no dispute that both Branch I and Branch IV of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon, have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
a guardianship proceedings under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court and
Section 44(a) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. While it is recognized that when a
case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
22
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches, We are of the
view however, considering the unusual circumstances and incidents attendant in
this case the situation in the case at bar is different. Here, it must be noted that
the Presiding Judge of Branch I asserted and resumed its prior jurisdiction by
issuing two (2) orders, one of which requires private respondent to render an
inventory and accounting of the property of the ward. On the other hand,
respondent Judge of Branch IV, in confirmation of such resumption of
jurisdiction, ordered the return of the records of Special Proceedings No. 2641 to
Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon, but, instead of regularly
relinquishing jurisdiction over the case, respondent Judge continued to take
further action on the case in total disregard of the two (2) orders of the Presiding
Judge of Branch I. Should one branch be permitted to equally assert, assume or
retain jurisdiction over a case or controversy over which another coordinate or
co-equal branch has already resumed its jurisdiction, We would then sanction
undue interference by one branch over another. With that, the judicial stability of
the decrees or orders of the courts would be a meaningless precept in a wellordered administration of justice.
There is no question that the prior proceedings had in Branch IV by respondent
Judge were valid and regular as they were admittedly authorized by the
Secretary of Justice. It must be emphasized however, that Branch IV lost its
jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 when respondent Judge ordered
the return of the records to Branch I after having been informed in a motion for
reconsideration filed on January 30, 1969 of the existence of the two (2) orders
issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch 1. From that point of time, all
subsequent proceedings and processes in connection with or related to Special
Proceedings No. 2641 undertaken by the respondent Judge became irregular. It
amounted to an undue interference with the processes and proceedings of
Branch I.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the pertinent law on the matter, it may be
observed that the detail of respondent Judge of Branch IV stationed
permanently in Calauag, Quezon to Branch I in Lucena City, Quezon

authoritatively rests on the provision of Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948

which reads:
Section 51. Detail of judge to another district or province.Whenever a judge stationed in. any province or branch of a
court in a province shag certify to the Secretary of Justice that
the condition of the docket in his court is such as to require the
assistance of an additional judge, or when there is any vacancy
in any court or branch of a court in a province, the Secretary of
Justice may, in the interest of justice, with the approval of the
Supreme Court and for a period of not more than three months
for each time, assign any judge of any court or province, whose
docket permits his temporary absence from said court, to hold
sessions in the court needing such assistance or whether such
vacancy exists. No judge so detailed shall take cognizance of
any case when any of the parties thereto objects and the
objection is sustained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Apparently, when the circumstances contemplated under Section 51 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 occur, the detailed Judge holds sessions in the court
needing such assistance or where such vacancy exists as if he is the presiding
judge of that particular branch where the clogged docket or vacancy exists. The
detailed Judge does not hold sessions therein as if he is the Presiding Judge of
the branch where he is originally or permanently designated. In the case before
Us, respondent Judge Kayanan was duly authorized to help unclog the docket of
Branch I stationed in Lucena City, Quezon which at that time was rendered
vacant due to the death of Judge Vicente Arguelles. When respondent Judge
Kayanan took cognizance of the cases left by Judge Arguelles, pending the
designation of a replacement, he merely sits as a judge of Branch I, Court of
First Instance of Quezon Province. In the event of designation of a new
Presiding Judge of Branch 1, accepted practice and procedure of speedy
administration of justice requires that the detailed judge turns over the cases he
took cognizance of to the new Presiding Judge. Justification for the continued
retention of jurisdiction over those cases in the case at bar appears to be not
convincing.
We find no plausible indication how estoppel could operate against petitioners. It
is true that petitioners filed their answer to the urgent petition of private
respondent and appeared before respondent Judge of Branch IV without
questioning the latter's authority to hear the case. The answer to the urgent
petition of private respondent dated May 13, 1968 was filed by petitioners on
June 5, 1968 or almost two (2) months before Judge Melencio-Herrera of

27

GUARDIANSHIP

Branch I issued the two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 asserting jurisdiction over
the case. The appearances of petitioners and counsel in the sala of respondent
Judge during the intervening period from July 29, 1968 were apparently due to
the fact that petitioners came to know only of the two orders of Branch I when
they examined the records of the case prompted by the manifestation of the
counsel of private respondent, in the course of the proceedings in Branch IV, to
submit for an accounting in connection with the administration of the properties
of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. Petitioners manifested such information to
respondent Judge in a petition for reconsideration of the order of January 8,
1968 authorizing the presentation of evidence ex parte. The silence or inaction
of petitioners was therefore due to their lack of knowledge of respondent
Judge's lack of authority to retain or take further action on the case. Such lack of
authority was confirmed when respondent Judge, acting on the petition for
reconsideration dated January 30, 1969, issued on February 20, 1969 an order
authorizing the return of the records of the case to Branch I. In claiming that the
records referred to by the order concern the first portion of the records of Special
Proceedings No. 2641 and not the second portion containing the urgent petition
filed by private respondent on May 13, 1968, private respondent would then
encourage split jurisdiction of courts which is abhorred by the law.
Assuming that Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon has
jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 notwithstanding the attendant
circumstances adverted to earlier, We now dwell on another issue, which
standing alone would decisively resolve the assigned errors raised in this
petition, that is, whether or not Branch IV exercising limited and special,
jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court has jurisdiction to order the delivery or reconveyance of the three parcels
of land in question to the ward, represented herein by private respondent.
In two leading cases, Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 and Cui vs. Piccio et
al, 91 Phil. 712, this Court laid the rule on the issue raised before Us as
interpreted in the light of Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling
or concealing property of the ward. Upon complaint of the
guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective
interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise,
that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or
conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or a written
instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may
cite the suspected person to appear for examination touching
such money, goods, interests, or instrument, and make such
orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement,
concealment or conveyance.

In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the
purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually
order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed
or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases,
where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been
23
already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary
action and not in guardianship proceedings.
In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether
or not, on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title
or right of the ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels of land in
question is clear and undisputable. What is certain here is the fact that the sale
of the properties in question were duly approved by the respondent Judge in
accordance with the provisions on selling and encumbering of the property of
the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that while the
original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the examination of
petitioners herein regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and
embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24,
1969 asked for reconveyance.
Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of
the first two lots was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while that
of the third lot was subject to condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On
the other hand, according to petitioners, the sales were all absolute and
protected by the Torrens System since new transfer certificate of titles were
issued in their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better
right or title to the disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the
determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a
separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui vs.
Piccio supra.
The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private
respondent finds no application in the instant case. As differentiated from the
case at bar, in Castillo case, the right or title of the ward to the property in

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GUARDIANSHIP

dispute was clear and undisputable as the same was donated to her through
compromise agreement approved by the court which title had the authority of res
judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of the ward to the properties in
question is in dispute and as such should be determined in a separate ordinary
action.
Furthermore, private respondent's claim that petitioners are barred by laches to
raise the issue of jurisdiction is without merit. In support of such claim, private
respondent invoked the exception laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
29, to the rule that the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings; that it is conferred only by law, and in
the manner prescribed by law and an objection on the lack of jurisdiction cannot
be waived by the parties; and the infirmity cannot be cured by silence,
24
acquiescence, or even by express consent, or win of the parties.
The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra, and in the latter case of
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 419 is not applicable in the case at
bar. In Tijam case, the appellant had all the opportunity to challenged the court's
jurisdiction in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals but instead
invoked its jurisdiction to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered
by the Court of Appeals and fifteen (15) years later from the inception of the
case that it finally chose to raise the question of j jurisdiction. I t is clear that t the
circumstances present in Tijam case are not present here. The petitioners in the
instant case challenged the authority of the trial court to take further cognizance
of the case the moment they become aware of Branch I assuming jurisdiction.
The lack of jurisdiction was raised in a petition for reconsideration of the order
dated January 8, 1969, in a petition for reconsideration of the decision dated
April 15, 1969, in a second petition for reconsideration of the said decision, and
alleged as an additional ground in the petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. In any case, the operation of the principle of estoppel on the question
of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may
25
not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel.
As respondent trial court has no jurisdiction, We deem it unnecessary to pass
upon the assigned errors raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971
is hereby reversed and set aside, and the decision rendered by respondent
Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon dated April 15,
1969 and the orders issued thereafter are declared null and void, and the case

is hereby remanded to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon

for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Ericta and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.

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GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-58319

June 29, 1982

PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte; FELICIANA
CALLE, court-appointed guardian of the minors Shirley and Leandro, both
surnamed HOMERES; the SOLICITOR GENERAL; THE CITY FISCAL OF
TACLOBAN; and, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Tacloban City, respondents.
RESOLUTION

In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and
two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot No.
3085-G situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City, covered by TCT No. 12138. This
lot which he had inherited from his deceased father, Felizardo Homeres, has an
area of one thousand seven hundred one (1,701) square meters.
On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita
Dumdum for P10,000.00.
On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over
the persons and estate of the minors. The petition was granted on August 9,
1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her oath as guardian on September 13, 1977,

GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an April
24, 1981 order of the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Leyte which required the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum to
give and deposit with the clerk of this court the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (PI0,000.00) more as additional
consideration of Lot No. 3085-G of the Tacloban Cadastre
which the court believes to be fair and reasonable price of the
property. This amount should be deposited with the clerk of this
court on or before June 24, 1981; otherwise TCT No. T-13238
in the name of Patria Paciente now subject of a mortgage in
favor of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to
guarantee an obligation in the amount of P30,000.00, dated
December 27, 1978, will be cancelled.
as well as the validity of its resolution dated August 21, 1981 which denied the
motion for reconsideration of the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum of the
aforesaid order and directed the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
to cancel TCT No. 13238 of Patria Paciente and issue in lieu
thereof a new transfer certificate of title to the following present
owners of Lot 3085- G of the Tacloban Cadastre: Patria
Paciente, of legal age, Filipino, married, residing in Tacloban
City, 1/3; Shirley Homeres, 10 years old, residing in Tacloban
City, 1/3; and, Leandro Homeres, 10 years old, residing in
Tacloban City, Philippines, 1/3, subject to the mortgage lien of
the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.
because of their failure to comply with the same aforestated order. The facts of
the case are as follow:

On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which had
been titled in her name under TCT No. T-13121, to petitioner Patria Paciente for
the amount of P15,000.00. Consequently, Patria Paciente was issued TCT No.
T-13238 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corporation for P30,000.00.
On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
filed a manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is the
subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name of the
petitioner under TCT No. T-13238 and that it was mortgaged to the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee petitioner's loan of
P30,000.00.
Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court issued
an order on November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the manager of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to appear before the court on January
21, 1981 and show cause why TCT No. T-13238, covering a parcel of land coowned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should not be cancelled for
having been alienated without authority from the court.
When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corporation did not appear before the court. Instead, Conchita
Dumdum appeared and explained to the respondent court that she sold the lot
which she acquired from Lilia S. Homeres to the petitioner without obtaining the
approval of the court because she was not aware of such requirement regarding
the properties of the minors. On the same date, the respondent court again
issued an order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corporation to explain why TCT No. T- 13238 should not be

30

GUARDIANSHIP

cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial authority before disposing of the
said property.
At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's husband, apprised
the court that the petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in
question. Respondent court then issued the questioned order.
A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum having been
denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent court acting as a guardianship
court has jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer
certificate of title of petitioner and to order the issuance of a new title to include
the minors as co-owners with the petitioner for her having failed to comply with
the court's order directing her to pay the minors the reasonable price of their
property that their mother alienated without authority of a competent court.
Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and Parco and
Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, petitioner
contends that respondent court in hearing a petition for guardianship is not the
proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title. In the Cui case, this Court
ruled:
... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have some
relevancy is that of Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839. In this
case, the court made a distinction between the provisions of
sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil Procedure which now
correspond to section 6, Rule 88 and section 6 of Rule 97 of the
Rules of Court. This Court in that case said in effect that while in
administration proceedings the court under section 709 may
only question the person suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed away property belonging to the estate,
section 593 of the same Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the
Judge or the court to issue such orders as maybe necessary to
secure the estate against concealment, embezzlement and
conveyance, and this distinction is now given emphasis by
respondents' counsel. the way we interpret section 573 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97, section 6
of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid down in the
case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that the court may
issue an order directing the delivery or return of any property
embezzled, concealed or conveyed which belongs to a ward,
where the right or title of said ward is clear and indisputable.

xxx xxx xxx

In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction to issue his order of September 5, 1951, in the
guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the
rentals collected by them to the guardian and authorizing the
latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that the
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily,
is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of
obtaining information which may be used in action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and
that only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to
the ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially
decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows:
In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held that the
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily,
is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of
obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward.
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited
jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of
the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a
categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where
property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto
has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its
delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or
return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the
ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui
case, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of
the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed
the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action
and not in a guardianship proceedings.
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or
return of the property conveyed are concerned, We find the orders of the
respondent court valid. The petitioner's contentions in this regard are untenable.
Even the aforecited cases relied upon do not support her argument. While it is
true that in these two cases We ruled that where title to any property said to be

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GUARDIANSHIP

embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of said title

or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a
separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, We also
emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and
indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and
indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The
sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their mother without the authority
of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de Pua vs. San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7,
16).
In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did
not exceed its jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons under
disability.
The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional consideration
of P10,000.00 is a different matter. It was issued without a hearing to determine
not only the valuation of the property but the time frame for fixing said valuation
which is not clear. It is, consequently, null and void.
It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to give the
additional amount, the second order directing the cancellation of the petitioner's
title may be said to have superseded or cancelled the first order. The second
order directed the issuance of a new title over the land inherited by Leandro
Homeres from his late father with each heir getting title to one-third of the
property. Considering, however, the petitioner's protestations of violations of due
process and the guardianship court's unusual procedures in dealing with the
properties under guardianship, the respondent court is directed to conduct
regular hearings and take evidence on the reasonable price of Lot No. 3085-G, if
its alienation is found to be in the best interests of the wards and consistent with
the rights of all parties involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in Special
Proceedings No. JP-0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte
is hereby ordered to conduct further hearings of the case as above indicated.
SO ORDERED,
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

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GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. 116835

March 5, 1998

ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI,
RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A.
VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua,
respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101,
promulgated on 19 April 1994 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special Procedure Case No. 331.
As culled from the records, the following facts have been established by
evidence:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple
begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard
Pride Alonzo.
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City a Petition1 which is reproduced hereunder:

FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,

Petitioner
PETITION
COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this
Honorable Court most respectfully states:
1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her
husband and residing at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City, Philippines;
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner
lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union
they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who
was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride
Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox
copy of the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex "A"
and "B", respectively.
3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both
staying with herein petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue,
Cotabato City;
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died
intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and
personal worth P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:

IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION

OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER

a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT

No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at
P50,000.00

THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF

MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331
and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT

No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq. m. 50,000.00
c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00

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GUARDIANSHIP

e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at

30,000.00
f) Residential house in Davao City valued at 600,000.00
g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393
210,000.00
h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor
No. 4G37-GB0165 545,000.00
i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248
110,000.00
j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor
No. DA640-838635 350,000.00
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148
350,000.00
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value
estimated at 3,335,000.00
Total P5,000,000.00
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate
descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert
Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with
herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
(Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors
are the following, to wit:
Names Relationship Ages Residence
1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue,
Cotabato City
2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 Rosary Heights,
Cotabato City

3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas

Fishing Exporation
Co. Inc., Matina,
Davao City
6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation
of law are to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua under the
provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, it is
necessary that for the protection of the rights and interest of Robert
Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and
heirs of deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the persons and
properties of said minors be appointed by this Honorable Court.
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said
minors is also competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors
Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua both
staying and living with her; that petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a guardian.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed:
1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring
minors ROBERTO RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE
ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate estate of deceased ROBERTO
LIM CHUA;
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the
administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;
3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and
estate of minors ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD
PRIDE ALONZO CHUA;
4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate
estate of Roberto Lim Chua be distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors
in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines.
5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may
consider fit and proper in the premises.
Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992.

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GUARDIANSHIP

(Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO

(Petitioner)
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August
1992 and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing
to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss2 on the
ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's
death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is the proper forum.
Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss3 dated July 20,
1992 based on the following grounds:

IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE

ESTATE OF ROBERTO L. CHUA, DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP,
GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF
MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
Petitioner.
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows:
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a
resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original petition.

(1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the
petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and
under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the
place where the minor resides;

Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of
said motion on 24 July 1992, private respondent's counsel allegedly admitted
that the sole intention of the original petition was to secure guardianship over the
persons and property of the minors.6

(2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City:

(3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor
oppose in the granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total
stranger to the minors Robert Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo,
all surnamed Chua.
(4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of
the above-named minors with the petitioner in this case;
(5) That movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse
of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter
since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he
died.
On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an
Amended Petition4 "in order that the designation of the case title can properly
and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in
the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the
nature and real intent and purpose of this petition." The amended petition5
contained identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus:.

On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order7 denying the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no
personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of
the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased
was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was concurrent venue among
the Regional Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of
Cotabato had already taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's
estate to the exclusion of all others. The pertinent portions of the order read:
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for
movant Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her
allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter
resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was the xerox
copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the
petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the
timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is
the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot
produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the
following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no
such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a letter from
Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the
alleged marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.

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GUARDIANSHIP

Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among others of Transfer Certificate of

Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta
Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988
and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was
born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in
Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married;
passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his
residence was Davao City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the
admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to
establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and
Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract.
They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to
show that Davao City was the business residence of the decedent.
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to
support her allegation that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato
City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate children with
the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns
filed in Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he
was single; birth certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the
decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent issued in Cotabato City;
Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his
residence is Cotabato City.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth
of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best
evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to
produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when
the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no
personality to file the subject motion to dismiss.
On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death,
the decedent as a businessman has many business residences from
different parts of the country where he usually stays to supervise and
pursue his business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be
denied that Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged
illegitimate children also reside.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate
of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of

venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming that
there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places
where the decedent has residences, the Regional Trial Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule
73). It was this Court which first took cognizance of the case when the
petition was filed on July 2, 1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
331 and an order of publication issued by this Court on July 13, 1992.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby
denied for lack of merit.
On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an
order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special
administrator of the decedent's estate.8
On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing Florita
Vallejo as guardian over the persons and properties of the two minor children.9
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 199310 praying that the
letters of administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of
administration be issued to her. She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 November
199311 to declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both motions were denied by the
trial court in its Order dated 22 November 1993. 12 Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 13
December 1993.13
Assailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) with the respondent Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101, alleging that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in:
(1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not
guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding;

treating,

the

(2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without jurisdiction and

without any notice to herein petitioner whatsoever; and
(3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that
herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331
questioning the highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex-parte by
the public respondent R.T.C. without notice to the petitioners.

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GUARDIANSHIP

Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her
opposition to petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open
court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial
court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration over
the estate of Roberto L. Chua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate
proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of
general circulation as required by Section 3, Rule 79.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on 19 April 1994,14 denied
the petition ratiocinating that the original petition filed was one for guardianship
of the illegitimate children of the deceased as well as for administration of his
intestate estate. While private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to
the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that the
very allegations of the original petition unmistakably showed a twin purpose: (1)
guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was
unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only
reason stated in the motion for leave: so that the "case title can properly and
appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the
body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the
nature and real intent and purpose of this petition," which was for guardianship
over the persons and properties of her minor children and for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the decedent who was their father. In other words, there
being no change in the material allegations between the original and amended
petitions, the publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation
sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal requirements of notice.
Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from
the orders complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not
certiorari and prohibition.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to this
Court contending that the appellate court committed the following errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION
(Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A TWIN PURPOSE, TO WIT: FOR
GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;

II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE
AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE THEREBY CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND
THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE ORDERS (Annex "P" to "T")
PRECIPITATELY
ISSUED
EX-PARTE
BY
THE
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING OR NOTICE TO
HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LATTER
(ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS AND
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
IV
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY
IS APPEAL.15
In support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the original petition was one for guardianship and
administration of the intestate estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand,
asserting that the original petition failed to allege and state the jurisdictional facts
required by the Rules of Court in petitions for administration of a decedent's
estate, such as: (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his
death; (b) names, ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names and
residences of the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her
argument regarding private respondent's alleged admission that the original
petition was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of
administration, pointing to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July
1992, where the private respondent alleged.
1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the
petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and
under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the
place where the minor resides.16

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GUARDIANSHIP

as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during
the 24 July 1992 hearing on the motion to dismiss:

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed;

ATTY. RENDON:

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration. (emphasis ours).

We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this
is a petition for guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings. So
this is a case where the mother wanted to be appointed as guardian
because she is also the litigant here. Because whenever there is an
intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the
Rules of Court in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the
place where the minor is actually residing.17

The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of

administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of
death in the province where the probate court is located; and (3) if the decedent
was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that the
decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting.19
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:

The petition is devoid of merit.

The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which
includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS,
GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF
MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all surnamed
CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.18
Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the
administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
reads:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent'
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;.

(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died
intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the
omission was cured by the amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now
reads:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a
resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City.20 (Emphasis in the original.)
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be
stated in the petition for letters of administration. Consequently, there was no
need to publish the amended petition as petitioner would insist in her second
assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as
she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate
as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration Any interested
person, may by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the
ground of incompetency of the person for whom letters of administration
are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the
administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any
competent person or persons named in the opposition..
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the

38

GUARDIANSHIP

estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or
contingent.21
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which
Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the
photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a
violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of
evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and
other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. . . .22
Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued
its orders, Annexes "P" to "T" without prior hearing or notice to her, thus,
depriving her of due process.
The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing
Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the
estate; Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing private respondent as guardian
over the person and property of the minors; Order dated 5 August 1993,
directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from Davao City to
Cotabato City; Order dated 6 September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a
Mitsubishi Gallant car owned by the estate of the deceased to the special
administrator; and Order dated 28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to
break open the deceased's house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of
the properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to the house by
the driver and maid of petitioner.
Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of
the trial court, not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the
deceased, or of her interest in the estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner
categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25 October 1993 she filed a
motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by the trial
court and another motion dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings
conducted by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders
relative thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further stated that her
motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 21, 1993

and that on 30 November 1993 she filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13 December 1993.
Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual
hearing should always and indispensably be held.23 The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard.24 Here, even granting that the
petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court marked as Exhibits "P"
to "T," inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall letters
of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a "mistrial,"
which motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1993.25 A motion
for the reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial
court but was denied in its Order of 13 December 1993.26
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had
the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.27
As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
proper remedy of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a
special civil action for certiorari; which can be availed of if a party has no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Except for her bare
allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record would
indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted.
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the
ruling of the Court of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for
both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling in
Gomez vs. Imperial,28 which the petitioner quotes:
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function
pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another
proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action
before the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did
not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While in the
case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and
settlement of estate.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero and Purisima, JJ., concur.

39

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-10050

January 6, 1915

LUIS R. YANGCO, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIVISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE CITY OF
MANILA PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE A. S. CROSSFIELD AS
JUDGE, and TEODORO R. YANGCO, respondents.
Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco for petitioner.
Haussermann, Cohn and Fisher for respondents.
MORELAND, J.:
This is a proceeding to obtain a writ of certiorari directed to the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila requiring it to send to this court the record made in
a proceeding to declare the petitioner for the writ in this case a spendthrift and to
appoint a guardian for his property and for a complete review of said record to
the end that the judgment decreeing the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing a
guardian of his property be declared null and void and of no effect upon the
ground that the proceedings were had and the decree entered without notice to
the petitioner, the alleged spendthrift, and were and are, therefore, void, the
court having acted without jurisdiction in the premises.
The question presented for determination arise out of the issue framed by the
answer to the order to show cause issued on the petition in this case. The
record of the court below having been sent to this court and the petition and
answer presenting an issue of law, and the parties having been fully heard
thereon and having finally submitted the case, we proceed to its determination.
The material facts are undisputed. The petitioner herein was a young man, 21
years of age, the owner of property valued at nearly P1,000,000, and
temporarily traveling abroad at the time the proceedings were had which
terminated in the declaration that he was a spendthrift and the appointment of a
guardian of his property.
The proceedings were begun by the respondent Teodoro R. Yangco in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, he himself making the petition as a relative
and friend. It is conceded that no notice was given to the petitioner herein
personally, the only notice of any kind in the proceedings being that set forth in
the answer of respondent to the other to show cause issued upon the filing of
the petition in this proceeding. The answer says in that regard:
That upon the filing of said petition hereinabove referred to (meaning the
petition to have the petitioner declared a spendthrift and a guardian

appointed for his property), the said Court of First Instance, in the
continued absence from the jurisdiction of said court of the said plaintiff,
and acting under and in pursuance of the judicial discretion upon said
court conferred by law, required that notice of said guardianship
proceedings be given unto Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal
Regidor, the mother-in- law and brother-in-law, respectively, of the
plaintiff, the latter being the acting manager of the business of the
plaintiff.
It is undisputed that, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, the petitioner for the
writ is a resident of the Philippine Islands and that he was temporarily absent
therefrom traveling abroad at the time the proceedings complained of were
instituted and the decree obtained.
We are of the opinion that the decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and
appointing a guardian for his property was and is void for lack of jurisdiction. In
proceedings of this case notice as required by the statute is jurisdictional and
the lack of it deprives the court of power to make a valid decree in the premises.
Section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires personal notice to the
alleged spendthrift when he is a resident of the Philippine Islands. It provides:
When it is represented to a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof,
by petition verified by oath of any relative or friend, that any person who
is an inhabitant or resident of the province, is insane or is a spendthrift,
incompetent to manage his estate, praying that a guardian may be
appointed for such person, such court or judge must cause a notice to
be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and
place of hearing the petition, not less than five days before the time so
appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be produced on the
hearing.
The statute does not authorized a substitute service except in cases where, as
provided in section 572, the person for whose property the guardian is sought to
the appointed is a resident of a foreign country. Personal notice being essential
under the statute, the notice to the mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the
alleged spendthrift was of no legal value. (Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal., 626;
North vs. Joslin, 59 Mich., 624; Ex parte Dozier, 4 Baxt., Tenn., 81; Coolidge vs.
Allen, 82 Me., 23; Hathaway vs. Clark, 5 Pick., Mass., 490; Chase vs.
Hathaway, 14 Mass., 222; Shumway vs. Shumway, 2 Vt., 339.)
To declare a person of full age to be imcompetent to manage his affairs and
thereby deprive him of the possession of and right to hold and manage his
property is a serious thing. It takes from him one of the greatest privileges of life
in contravention of those fundamental rights which all men naturally have to

40

GUARDIANSHIP

possess, control, manage and enjoy their own property. It is for this reason that
the courts generally hold that the statute permitting a declaration incompetency
and the appointment of guardians for the property of incompetents must be
strictly followed, and any material departure therefrom, especially with respect to
notice, results in a loss of jurisdiction. (See cases already cited.) So careful was
the Legislature to see to it that no one should be declared an incompetent and
deprived of his property without full opportunity to be heard that, in framing
section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it not only required personal notice
to the alleged incompetent but also provided that he shall be present in court
during the proceedings, if he be able to attend; and the ability to attend does not,
in our judgment, relate to absence but to physical condition.
It has been urged that section 572 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the
practice adopted in this case. We do not think so. That section provides;: "When
a person liable to be put under guardianship, according to the provisions of this
chapter, resides without the Philippine Islands, and has estate therein, any
friend of such person, or anyone interested in his estate, in expectancy or
otherwise, may apply to the judge of Court of First Instance in any province in
which there is any estate of such absent person, for the appointment of a
guardian, and if, after notice given to all interested, in such manner as such
court orders, by publication or otherwise, and a full hearing and examination, it
appears proper, a guardian for such absent person may be appointed; and
every guardian appointed under this section shall have the same powers, and
perform the same duties with respect to the estate of the ward found within the
Philippine Islands, and with respect to the person of the ward, if he shall come to
reside therein, as are prescribed with respect to any other guardians appointed
under this chapter."
The word "resides" as used in that section has, as a matter of language, a
meaning perfectly clear and definite and requires no interpretation or
construction to give it full significance. That the petitioner in this case did not
reside "without the Philippine Islands" is unchallenged by the facts in this case.
He resided here and his absence was for travel and not for residence.
While it is contended and courts have perhaps held that the word "resident" may
mean this, that or the other thing, dependent upon the circumstances of the
case, we know of no decision which holds that, under the admitted facts of this
case, the word "resident" could be juggled into meaning that the petitioner was a
nonresident within the purview of section 572. There is no need for interpretation
or construction of the word in the case before us. Its meaning is so clear that
interpretation and construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave
untouched the meaning with which the English language has endowed the word;
and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would accord to it on reading
a sentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle refinements
which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are

not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand
and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with English
language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature
ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them
meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing
and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the
meaning of a given statute or contract until it had been submitted to some court
for its "interpretation and construction." As we said in the case of Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Yap Tico (24 Phil. Rep., 504, 513):
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The
majority of the laws need no interpretation or construction. They require
only application, and if there were more application and less
construction, there would be more stability in the law, and more people
would know what the law is.
See also Lambert vs. Fox (26 Phil. Rep., 588).
These considerations are especially forcible when it appears that subtle
refinement and metaphysical interpretation and construction are invoked for the
purpose of declaring a resident of the country an incompetent and of depriving
him of the control and management of his estate without notice or opportunity to
be heard. If construction and interpretation are ever to be left unused, it should
be in such a case.
But even if it be conceded that section 572 is applicable, still the notice required
by the section has not been given. That section requires notice "to all interested,
in such manner as such court orders, by publication or otherwise." No notice
whatever was given to the alleged incompetent, either by publication or
otherwise, and he certainly is one of the parties "interested."
Another matter of grave importance in this case should be noted. Although no
personal notice was given to the alleged spendthrift, the only notice given at all
being, as we have seen, solely to his mother-in-law and brother-in-law, the
court, nevertheless, made a decree declaring him a spendthrift and appointing a
guardian of his property without taking any evidence and with absolutely nothing
before it to justify such a decree except the petition and the answer thereto of
Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor. The latter consists of the
following statement:

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GUARDIANSHIP

That we have read the petition signed by Teodoro R. Yangco in which

he prays the appointment of a guardian for the said Luis R. Yangco; that
according to our information and belief the facts stated in said petition
are true, and we do not oppose the petition made by the said Teodoro
R. Yangco.
Wherefore, we pray the court to decide the matter presented by the
petition as justice requires.
No evidence of any kind was taken in the case so far as appears of record, and
the court, in making the order of prodigality and decreeing the appointment of a
guardian, had no more knowledge of the alleged spendthrift's incompetency to
manage his affairs that he had before the petition was presented.
It would be a strange condition of affairs indeed if a citizen and resident of the
Philippine Islands could be declared to be an incompetent and his property
taken from his management and control by the naked allegation of one stranger
admitted by the naked concession of another stranger. If Teodoro R. Yangco
can allege the incompetency of Luis R. Yangco and that incompetency be
admitted by Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor, and such allegation
and admission be sufficient of themselves to declare the person concerned
incompetent and deprive him of his right to manage and control his property,
then surely property in the Philippine Islands is held by very precarious tenure.
Section 560 provides that the court shall appoint a guardian of his person and
estate only "after a full hearing and examination upon such petition" and where
"it appears to the court or Judge" from such full hearing and examination "that
the person in question is incapable of taking care of himself and managing his
property."
It is not a full hearing and examination to have A allege that B is an incompetent
and to have C come in and admit the allegation. The court, before it can make
the decree as provided for in the law, must have before it competent evidence
demonstrating the facts necessary to sustain the decree, and that evidence
must be clear and definite. The law is not satisfied unless the court has before it
facts which will justify the decree. In proper cases, of course, the admissions
made by way of answer or otherwise by the party alleged to be a spendthrift
may be taken into consideration by the court in the determination of the question
involved and, under certain circumstances, will doubtless be sufficient to sustain
a decree of incompetency; but even such admissions should be received with
caution, for in cases of this character the foundation of the petition is, in a way,
the incompetency of the person against whom the petition is directed and the
court should accept his admissions with considerable hesitation. If there is doubt
the court should, in spite of his admissions, proceed with the hearing of the case

and require the production of evidence substantiate the allegation of

incompetency. Except by his own consent, it is legally impossible to declare a
and incompetent and deprive him of his property without clear and positive
evidence upon which the declaration and the deprivation are based.
We should not be understood as holding, even in this class of cases, that a
decision of a court which has not sufficient evidence to sustain it is void. A
judgment with any evidence to sustain it is valid judgment and not subject to
attack as void. It may be appealed from and, if founded on insufficient evidence,
reversed, but it is not void. Our remarks relative to the lack of evidence to
sustain the decree in this case are founded upon the fact that there is a lack of
any evidence whatsoever to sustain the decree; and we have said in the case of
Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil. Rep., 598), "a verdict or decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked."
It is the judgment of the court that the proceeding to declare that the petitioner
for the writ is an incompetent and all orders, judgments, and decrees made and
entered in said proceedings are null and void, as having been done, had, made
and entered by the Court of First Instance without jurisdiction, and the same are
hereby so declared.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.

42

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-4898

March 19, 1909

SALVADOR GUERRERO, guardian of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria

del Carmen Sanchez Muoz, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEOPOLDO TERAN, defendant-appellant.
J. Rodriguez Serra for appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 18th day of March, 1908, the plaintiff commenced an action against the
defendant to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. This amount was claimed
by the plaintiff from the defendant upon the theory that the defendant had been
the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 1st day of
September, 1901, until the 22d day of October, 1906. The plaintiff made a part
of his complaint the following items of indebtedness:
Difference, account of the property "Bonga"
........................................................ P10.55 Difference, account of the
property "Basag" ......................................................... 218.75
Difference, small accounts "Bonga" and "Basag"
................................................ 8.80 Difference, account estate of A.
Sanchez .............................................................. 150.00 Difference,
account heirs of J. M. Ceballos ............................................................
224.81 Difference, account hemp of "La Trinidad"
........................................................... 82.87 Difference, account
workmen at "La Trinidad" ..................................................... 80.70
Difference, account lates of Ligao
.......................................................................... 2.00 Small accounts of
"Bonga" and "Basag" .............................................................. 3,676.84
Cost 1 lamp and 1 barometer
.................................................................................... 33.50 Workmen at
"La Trinidad" .......................................................................................
5,709.90 Excess of salaries paid account general expenses at "La
Trinidad"................... 670.00 Account of cockpit
.................................................................................................... 34.15
Account "late Caualog"
........................................................................................... 220.10
Account Jesus Teran
................................................................................................ 235.92
Account Antonio Moreda
....................................................................................... 1,029.83

Total
..........................................................................................................
12,388.72
In answer to the said complaint, the defendant admitted certain allegations and
denied others. The defendant admitted that he owed the plaintiff P188.39 but
claimed that the plaintiff owed him the sum of P482.14, and that the plaintiff,
therefore, still owed to the defendant the difference between P188.39 and
P482.14, or the sum of P239.75, for which latter amount the defendant prayed
for judgment, with interest and cots against the plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court
found that the evidence that the defendant, as administrator of the estate of
Antonio Sanchez Muoz, or that part of the said estate belonging to the plaintiff,
owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46, with interest at 6 per cent until the same
amount should be fully paid. From this decision of the lower court the defendant
appealed and made the following assignment of error:
1. The court erred in holding that the defendant, from September 17,
1901, to October 6, 1906, managed and administered the estate of
Sanchez Muoz as a judicial administrator and executor.
2. The court erred in holding that the defendant was responsible to the
plaintiffs for the loans made to different persons for different accounts,
and for credits against the persons mentioned in the complaint.
3. The court erred in declaring in the judgment that the difference in the
weight of the scales was illegal.
4. And the court erred in sentencing the defendant to pay the costs
specified in the judgment.
With reference to the first above assignment of error, from the record brought to
this court the following facts appear:
First. That the defendant Leopoldo Teran was, on the 17th day of September,
1901, appointed as administrator of said estate. The record also discloses that
the defendant entered into a bond in the sum of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the
faithful performance of his duties as such representative of the estate of Antonio
Sanchez Muoz.
Second. The record further discloses that upon the 18th day of March, 1902, the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay appointed Maria Muoz y
Gomez as guardian for the said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez

43

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Muoz, and that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez gave the required bond for the
faithful performance of her duties as such guardian.
Third. While there are some indications in the record that the defendant
continued to act as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of the
said Maria Muoz y Gomez, up to and including the 6th day of October, 1906,
yet the fact exists and must be accepted as true that the said Maria Muoz y
Gomez was the actual representative of the said Maria Manuela and Maria del
Carmen Sanchez Muoz in the administration of their interests in the estate of
the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz, from and after the 18th day of March, 1902,
until the 6th day of October, 1906, and therefore the said Maria Muoz y
Gomez, as such guardian and administratrix of the estate of the said minors,
must be held responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the
period while she (Maria Muoz y Gomez) was the actual guardian of said
minors.
Fourth. On the 6th day of October, 1906, the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Albay, for the reason that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez was not a
resident of the Philippine Islands at the time for her appointment (the 18th day of
March, 1902) removed her as such guardian and appointed as guardian of said
minors Felix Samson, and required from said Samson, as provisional guardian,
a bond in the sum of P2,000. On the 18th day of October, 1906, the said
Samson duly executed the bond as required.
From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of the said Maria Muoz y
Gomez her lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, which appeal was
subsequently withdrawn. The order therefore revoking the appointment of the
said Maria Muoz y Gomez became final. The mere fact, however, that she had
been removed as said guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from
liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. It
must be clear, therefore, that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez is responsible to
the said minors for administration of their interests in the estate of the said
Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on
the 18th day of March, 1902, up to the time of her removal on the 6th day of
October, 1906. If during this time she allowed other persons to handle the
property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the
responsibility must fall upon her. Unquestionably, she may have an action
against the persons to whom she entrusted the direct management of said
estate for any loss which they may have negligently and corruptly occasioned
her. Therefore, if any loss occurred to the plaintiff between the 18th day of
March, 1902, and the 6th day of October, 1906, they have a right of action only
against the said Maria Muoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under the
law the administratrix of the property of their estate.

In the claim presented by the plaintiff against the defendant no dates are given
showing the time of the particular loss and losses occasioned by the defendant.
As was said above, the defendant was liable for losses only during the time that
he was acting as the legal representative of the said minors in the management
of their estate, from the 17th day of September, 1901, up to the time that he was
superseded by the said Maria Muoz y Gomez, on the 18th day of March, 1902.
There is no proof showing that any of the losses constituting the amount which
the plaintiff claims occurred within this period. However, the defendant
acknowledged that of the amount claimed by the plaintiff, he owes to them the
sum of P188.39.
There is no claim of any loss or that the estate has not been properly managed
since the appointment of the said Felix Samson on the 6th day of October, 1906.
From a consideration of all of the evidence brought to this court, we reach the
following conclusions:
First. That the defendant, Leopoldo Teran, was the duly appointed and
recognized representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen
Sanchez Muoz in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said
Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 17th day of September, 1901, until the 18th
day of March, 1902.
Second. That the said Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was the duly appointed
representative of the said minors in the administration of their interests in the
estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 18th day of March, 1902,
until the 6th day of October, 1906.
Third. That the Leopoldo Teran was responsible to the plaintiff (the said minors)
for the fruits and profits resulting from their interests in the estate of the said
Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the said 17th day of September, 1901, to the 18th
day of March, 1902.
Fourth. That the said Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was responsible to the
plaintiff (the said minors) for the fruits and profits resulting from the management
of the estate of the said Don Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 18th day of
March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906.
The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by the plaintiff were
due as a result of the management of the said estate during the time while the
said defendant was administering their interests therein, except the sum of
P188.39, admitted to be due by the defendant, we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that the only amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action is
the said amount of P188.39.

44

GUARDIANSHIP

Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory
that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine
Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact
that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged
with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of
the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not
consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are
not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of error for the
reason that there is no evidence in the record indicating any liability on the part
of the defendant other than his admission above indicated.
For the reason above stated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed,
without any special finding as to costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Willard, J., concurs in the result.

45

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-23976

March 30, 1970

EXALTACION ZAFRA-SARTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JULIAN LUA, FRANCISCO UNABIA and
FELISA UNABIA, respondents.
Burgos and Sarte for petitioner.
Ramon C. Aquino and Leandro Sevilla and Enrico R. Castro for respondents
Julian Lua, et al.
FERNANDO, J.:
This is a petition for a review of a decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 31, 1964, setting aside in a certiorari proceeding an order of the Court
of Juvenile & Domestic Relations of Manila, thus precluding the guardian
designated therein, Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte, petitioner before us, from assuming
her functions as such during the pendency of an appeal against her
appointment. The issue raised is therefore whether in attaching to such an order
the quality of immediate enforceability, there was a grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Court answered in the affirmative. We are of a different mind. On
the facts as found by it, which we are not at liberty to change, and in the light of
an applicable doctrine, it would follow that such appointment as guardian being
given effect forthwith is not offensive to what the law requires. Respondent Court
cannot be sustained. We find for petitioner.
The background facts as set forth in the appealed decision follow: "From the
record of this case we gather that on November 3, 1961, respondent Exaltacion
Zafra-Sarte petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
appointment of a legal guardian over the person and property of Remigia Zafra,
whom said respondent herein alleged to be an incompetent person, afflicted with
mental disorder and other ailments which rendered her incapable to take care of
herself and to manage her property. In her verified petition, Exaltacion prayed
for her appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia,
claiming that she is a niece of the latter, being a daughter of her (Remigia's)
sister. Said petition was, however, opposed by Julian Lua, who claimed that he
and Remigia Zafra have lived together as common-law husband and wife for
more than 30 years, and by Francisco Unabia, who claimed that he is a halfbrother of the alleged incompetent. The oppositors prayed that either of them be
1
appointed legal guardian of Remigia, should she be found incompetent."
What happened next was narrated thus in such decision: "At the conclusion of
the trial, which forthwith followed after the issues had been joined, respondent

Judge found Remigia to be really mentally deranged and for this reason
appointed Exaltacion as legal guardian of the former's person and property in an
order dated April 8, 1964 .... Copy of this order was served on the oppositors,
who are now herein petitioners, on April 16, 1964. On April 22, 1964, Julian Lua
and Francisco Unabia submitted their motion for reconsideration of that order of
the respondent Judge, but on the same date, while such motion was still
unresolved and before the period for appeal had expired, said respondent
directed the issuance of the corresponding letters of guardianship, and as a
matter of fact such letters were issued, after Exaltacion had submitted the
required bond of P1,000.00 and had taken her oath of office as legal guardian of
the person and property of Remigia Zafra. And on May 2, 1964, herein
petitioners were notified of the order of respondent Judge dated April 29, 1964,
denying their action for reconsideration as oppositors in the guardianship
proceedings. They then filed their notice of appeal and deposited their appeal
bond of P120.00 in cash, and on May 13, 1964, they also filed their Record on
Appeal. On June 11, 1964, respondent Judge approved the record on appeal of
the oppositors in that proceeding and directed the Clerk to elevate that case to
2
this Court for review."
Thereafter, on April 27, 1964, before such motion for reconsideration was
resolved, petitioner filed an urgent motion to enable her as such guardian to
bring the ward to the hospital before the Court of Juvenile & Domestic Relations.
As stated in the decision: "On May 15, 1964 respondent Judge favorably acted
upon this motion, the opposition thereto of herein petitioners notwithstanding,
and ordered them to transfer and surrender the person of the incompetent to
Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte .... Incidentally, this last order of respondent Judge was
issued after the oppositors in that guardianship proceeding had filed their notice
of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. On May 19, 1964, herein
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of the court dated May
15, 1964, praying that the status quo as to the custody of Remigia Zafra, who is
under the charge of Felisa Unabia, be maintained during the pendency of their
appeal. This motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge on
3
June 11, 1964."
On the allegation that now respondents Julian Lua, the common-law husband
and her half-brother, Francisco Unabia as well as her half-sister, respondent
Felisa Urnabia, had no other speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to prevent the immediate execution of the order by the Court of
Juvenile & Domestic Relations, a special civil action for certiorari was filed by
them with respondent Court of Appeals. They were able to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of the aforesaid order
complained of. As noted in the brief for petitioner: "Upon the facts above-stated,
the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the order issued by the trial court on
May 15, 1964, in Special Proceeding No. 03773, and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued on July 14, 1964 was ordered stayed until such time the Court

46

GUARDIANSHIP

of Appeals shall have the opportunity to review the merits of the aforesaid order
appointing Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte (herein petitioner) as legal guardian of the
4
person and property of Remigia Zafra."
After a motion for the reconsideration of the above decision of October 31, 1964
was denied, the present petition for review was filed before us. As noted at the
outset, we reverse respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner would impress on us that the issue as to the power of respondent
Court to suspend the effectivity of an order appointing a guardian in the event of
5
an appeal therefrom was decided in Mercader v. Wislizenus. To maintain such
an assertion, she quoted an excerpt from our opinion in that case thus: "The
order declaring the incompetency and appointing a guardian was good, until
reversed or set aside, and authorized the guardian, in spite of the appeal, to do
whatever was necessary under the direction of the Court, to protect the property
of the incompetent." The above citation does impart more than a semblance of
plausibility to her contention. It does support her stand.
It is to be admitted that the excerpt on which petitioner would pin her hopes
resulted from the realization of this Court that if it were not thus there was the
fear, not without basis, that the property of the person adjudged incompetent
could be frittered away during the pendency of such appeal or converted to the
use of designing persons. The above consideration does not detract from the
general principle announced that such appointment of a guardian should be
considered good until reversed or set aside on appeal. No such weighty and
persuasive reason that would call for a different ruling may be discussed from
the facts as found by the Court of Appeals. The above statement from the
opinion of Justice Moreland is thus impressed with a force sufficient to give more
than legal color to what was ordered by the Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations of Manila. For it to yield deference to such a pronouncement by this
Court cannot certainly earn the stigma of a grave abuse of discretion.
Why did respondent Court view the matter otherwise? It relied on two California
6
decisions, one promulgated in 1911, Coburn v. Hynes, and another in 1917,
7
O'Donnel v. Sixth Judicial District. They speak to the effect that upon the filing
of in appeal, the guardian appointed was automatically precluded from
exercising her functions. As correctly noted in the brief for petitioner the holding
of each of the above cases to that effect is predicated on relevant statutory
provisions of the State of California. As a matter of fact, such a doctrine goes
8
back to an 1892 pronouncement of the California Supreme Court. Respondent
Court should have displayed less receptivity to the persuasive force of the above
doctrine. It might have been otherwise if there were no Mercader ruling. As it is,
respondent Court was not justified in setting aside the order sought to be
assailed in a certiorari proceeding made in reliance on a decision of this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of October 21, 1964

is reversed with costs against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makatintal, J., took no part.

47

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. L-45963

October 12, 1939

CARLOS PARDO DE TAVERA and CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA

MANZANO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EL HOGAR FILIPINO, INC., defendant-appellee.
TAVERA-LUNA, INC., defendant-appellant;
VICENTE MADRIGAL, defendant-appellee.
Carlos P. de Tavera and E. Voltaire Garcia for plaintiffs and appellants.
Pedro Sabido and Jose Avancea for defendant and appellant.
Camus and Zavalla for appellee El Hogar Filipino.
Vicente Madrigal in his own behalf.
MORAN, J.:
On January 17, 1931, defendant corporation, Tavera-Luna Inc., for the purpose
of constructing the Crystal Arcade building on its premises at Escolta, Manila. To
secure this loan, the corporation executed a first mortgage on said premises and
on the building proposed to be erected thereon. On February 11, 1932, TaveraLuna, Inc., secured from El Hogar Filipino an additional loan of P300,000 with
the same security executed for the original loan. The Tavera-Luna, Inc.,
thereafter, defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations on the loan:
whereupon, El Hogar Filipino foreclosed the mortgage proceeded with the extrajudicial sale of the Crystal Arcade building, at which it was the highest bidder for
P1,363,555.36. One day before the expiration of the period of redemption,
Carlos Pardo de Tavera and Carmen Pardo de Tavera Manzano, in their
capacity as stockholders of the Tavera-Luna, Inc., and El Hogar Filipino, Inc., to
annul the two secured loans as well as extra-judicial sale made in favor of the
latter. Vicente Madrigal was included as party defendant because of his having
signed the second contract of loans aforementioned. From the judgment
dismissing the complaint and cross-complaint, plaintiffs and cross-complainant
took the present appeal.
The most important question raised by appellant is whether or not the two
secured loans are null and void. It is contended that they are, on the ground that
the Crystal Arcade building, given as security form the loans, is a public building.
This contention is predicated upon section 171 of the Corporation Law which
reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any building and loan association to make any
loan after the date when this Act, as amended, shall become effective
upon property that is able for use only as a manufacturing plant, theater,
public hall, church, convent, school, club, hotel, garage, or other public

building. To facilitate the investment of the idle funds of a building and

loan association, however, the Bank Commissioner, with the approval of
the Secretary of Finance, may, in special instances. waive the
provisions of this paragraph.
We find it unnecessary to determine, in the instant case, whether the Crystal
Arcade is or is not a public building, for, even if it is, the loan are valid. It may be
said, in passing the evidence is sufficient to show that the Secretary of Finance
and the Bank Commissioner had knowledge of the loans and of the security
given therefor, and that they have impliedly approved the same. On the other
hand, under the legal provision above quoted, a loan given on a property which
may be considered as a public building, is not, in itself, null and void. It is
unlawful to make loans on that kind of security, but the law does not declare the
loan, once made, to be null and void. The unlawful taking of the security may
constitute a misuser of the powers conferred upon the corporation by its charter,
for which it may be made to answer in an action for ouster or dissolution; but
certainly the stockholders and depositors of the corporation should not be
punished with a loss of the money loaned nor the borrower be rewarded with it.
As held by the Supreme Court of the United States, in a similar case:
The statute does not declare such a security void. If congress so meant,
it would have been easy to say so; and it is hardly to be believed that
this would not have been done, instead of leaving the question to be
settled by the uncertain result of litigation and judicial decision . . ..
We cannot believe it was meant that stockholders, and perhaps
depositors and other creditors, should be punished and the borrower
rewarded, by giving success to this defense whenever the offensive fact
shall occur. The impending danger of a judgment of ouster and
dissolution was, we think, the check, and none other contemplated by
congress.
That has been always the punishment prescribed for the wanton
violation of a charter, and it may be made to follow whenever the proper
public authority shall see fit to invoke its application. . . . (Union Nat.
Bank of St. Louis vs. Matthews, 98 U.S., 621; 25 L. ed., 188.) In the
same case it has been likewise held that:
Where it is a simple question of authority to contract, arising either on a
question of regularity of organization or of power conferred by the
charter, a party who has had the benefit of the agreement cannot he
permitted, in an action founded upon it, to question its validity.
Fletcher on this matter says:

48

GUARDIANSHIP

There is a direct conflict in the decisions as to the effect of a charter or

statutory prohibition against discounting or lending money on certain
securities. If the statute expressly declares that securities taken in
violation of the prohibition shall be void, such securities cannot be
enforced. Some courts have gone further and have held that the mere
fact of prohibition renders them unenforceable; but this construction is
not supported by the weight of authority. The better opinion is that
where the charter of a corporation or some other statute prohibits it from
lending money on certain kinds of security, but does not declare that
prohibited securities taken by it shall be void, they are not void, and may
be enforced by it. The taking of such security is a misuser of the powers
conferred upon the corporation by its charter, for which the state may
enforce a forfeiture, but the misuser cannot be set up by the borrower to
prevent the corporation from enforcing the security. In case of a state
statute prohibiting savings banks from lending their funds on the security
of names alone, it has been held that a savings bank may enforce
payment of a promissory note taken for money loaned in violation of the
statute. (Vol. 7, Fletcher Cyc. Corp., sec. 3616, pp. 744, 745.)
It is contended that the contracts in question are not of mortgage, but of
antichresis. The distinction, however, is immaterial, for even if the contracts are
of antichresis, the extra-judicial foreclosure of the security is valid. Stipulations in
a contract of antichresis for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the security may be
allowed in the same manner as they are allowed in contracts of mortgage and of
pledge. (El Hogar Filipino vs. Paredes, 45 Phil., 178; Peterson vs. Azada, 8
Phil., 432, 437.)lwphi1.nt
Appellants contend that El Hogar Filipino has been given the possession and
administration of the Crystal Arcade building, so that it may apply the rentals
thereof to the payment of interest and the capital owed by Tavera-Luna, Inc.,
and that due to the negligence of El Hogar Filipino, no rental sufficient to cover
the monthly amortizations on the debt had been realized therefrom. The alleged
negligence is made to consist in the failure of El Hogar Filipino to advertise the
rooms of the Crystal Arcade building for rent and to employ agents to solicit and
attract tenants. But the evidence presented to this effect has been sufficiently
contradicted by the evidence adduced by the defendant-appellant. Besides, it
appears that El Hogar Filipino appointed Jose V. Ramirez as its representative
in the management and administration of the Crystal Arcade building, and the
appointment was made in agreement with Tavera-Luna, Inc. The ability of
Ramirez to do the work entrusted to him is not disputed. As a matter of fact,
Ramirez, during his management of the building, was a stockholder and director
of the Tavera-Luna, Inc., and was serving that corporation as its secretary and
treasurer. Under all these circumstances, we see no reason to disturb the
findings of the lower court.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

49

GUARDIANSHIP

G.R. No. 45623

June 30, 1938

JESUS CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,

vs.
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, and RAMON
CRISOSTOMO, respondents.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Magno S. Gatmaitan for respondent Crisostomo.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from a decision of the second division of
the Court of Appeals, promulgated on June 19, 1937, which dismissed a petition
for certiorari and set aside a writ of preliminary injunction which had been
issued, with the costs to the then petitioner. In special proceedings No. 3632 of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, entitled "Guardianship of the Incompetent
Petrona Crisostomo", instituted sometime in 1928, the court, on April 21, 1933,
appointed the herein petitioner guardian of the person and property of the
incompetent. On February 29, 1936, while the incompetent was already
released from the National Psychopathic Hospital of Mandaluyon, Province of
Rizal, where she had been confined, the petitioner, such guardian, filed a
verified petition asking that the court which took cognizance of the guardianship
case declare that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties, that she
was able to take care of her person and to administer her property, cancel the
bond filed by the guardian, and order the termination and filing away of the
record. The petition was supported and accompanied by a verified statement of
the incompetent, who stated under oath that she was then 65 years of age, that
she was in good health, that she had recovered her mental faculties and that
she was already able to take care of herself and to administer her property. This
sworn statement was stamped by the ward with her thumbmark and made under
oath on February 15, 1936, before the notary public Victoriano Matienzo. The
Petition was likewise supported and accompanied by two medical certificates of
Doctors Alfredo L. Guerrero and Ramon Syquia, dated February 15, 1936, who
stated that Petrona Crisostomo was under their medical treatment and that she
had recovered her mental faculties. On the same date, February 29, 1936, the
court which took cognizance of the guardianship case was apprized of the
petition and it favorably acted thereon, issuing the order which states: "It having
been shown by a verified motion of the guardian and by two medical certificates
of well-known doctors that the incompetent Petrona Crisostomo has recovered
the full use of her mental faculties and that she is now in a position to take care
of her person and administer her own property, and this court having approved
the accounts submitted by the said guardian including his administration until
February 14 of the current year, the court declares the said Petrona Crisostomo

able to take care of her person and to administer her own property, wherefore, it
orders the terminator of this guardianship, the cancellation of the bond of the
guardian and the final filing away of this case. So ordered. Malolos, Bulacan,
February 29, 1936. (Sgd.) SOTERO RODAS, Judge."
After the lapse of about nine months from the issuance of the order of February
29, 1936, that is, on November 9 of the same year, the respondent Ramon
Crisostomo, brother of the incompetent, filed a motion in the guardianship
proceedings and in the same court which had taken cognizance of said special
proceedings, asking that the restoration order of February 29, 1936 be set aside,
that the case be reopened, and that a new guardian of the person and property
of Petrona Crisostomo be appointed, alleging as grounds that the aforesaid
order is null and void because entered without notice to the nearest relatives of
the incompetent and without hearing and that the latter had not yet recovered
her mentality. The petition objected to this petition on the ground that the order
sought to be annulled had already become final and that the court had already
lost jurisdiction to reverse or annul the same, but on December 15, 1936, the
respondent judge issued an order annulling that of February 29 of the same
year. The said judge having denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner, the latter sued out a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which
petition was denied, with the costs.
1. It is beyond question that the judge who took cognizance of and
granted the petition to restore capacity had full jurisdiction, conferred by
sections 559, 562 and 575, Chapter XXVII, of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The procedure followed by virtue of a petition for restoration
of competency is neither new nor independent; it is a continuation of the
original guardianship proceedings (32 C. J., sec. 326, p. 674; Ayers vs.
Mussetter, 46 Ill., 472; Matter of Osborn, 74 App. Div., 113; 77 N. Y. S.,
423; 11 N. Y. Ann. Cas., 211). If the court had jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian of the person and property of the incompetent, it is obvious
that it had like jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grant the petition for
restoration which was filed.
2. The principal question involved in the case has reference to the
validity of the order of restoration to capacity of February 29, 1936. The
court declared it null and illegal for lack of notice and for failure to hold
the hearing mentioned in section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
entertained the opinion that the respondent Ramon Crisostomo should
have been notified, being one of the nearest relatives of the
incapacitated, and that the want of this notice divested the jurisdiction of
the judge to issue the aforesaid order. The second division of the Court
of Appeals maintained this view. Counsel for the appellant contends that
the applicable section is 575 of the same Code and that even applying
section 562, the notice and the hearing were unnecessary under the

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circumstances of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals in that

section 575 is not squarely applicable because its provisions are
general in character and that the case should be governed by section
562 because its provisions are special in character and the question at
issue directly comes under the said provisions. Section 562 is of the
following tenor:
SEC. 562. Restoration of competency. Any person who has
been declared insane or incompetent, or the guardian, or any
relative of such person within the third degree or any friend,
may apply, by petition, to the Court of First Instance of the
province in which the appointment of guardians is made, and
have the fact of his restoration to capacity judicially determined.
The petition shall be verified by oath, and shall state that such
person is then sane and competent. Upon receiving the petition,
the court must appoint a day for hearing before the court, and
shall cause notice of the trial to be given to the guardian of the
person so declared insane or incompetent and to the ward. On
the trial, the guardian, or relatives of the person so declared
insane or incompetent, and in the discretion of the court any
other person, may contest the right to the relief demanded.
Witnesses may be required to appear and testify, and may be
called and examined by the court on its own motion. If it be
found that the person be of sound mind, and capable of taking
care of himself and property, his restoration to capacity shall be
adjudged and the guardianship of such person, if such person
be not a minor, shall cease.
In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an
incompetent may issue a valid order restoring him to capacity it is
necessary, under this section, (1) that a verified petition be presented by
the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the
third degree, or any friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that
the incompetent has recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity,
as the case may be; and (3) that upon receiving the petition the court
should set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and the
incompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of the
incompetent, and, in the discretion of the court, any other person may
oppose the remedy sought. The section does not require notice of the
hearing to any other person except the guardian and the incompetent. In
the case under study it happened that the verified petition was signed by
the guardian himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn
statement of the incompetent. In the petition it was stated that the
incompetent had recovered her mental faculties and this allegation was
corroborated by her in her sworn statement when she stated that she

had already recovered her mental faculties. In these circumstances the

only logical conclusion is that the requisites of section 562 have at least
been substantially complied with and that the notice and the hearing
were unnecessary and superfluous. It is true that under the section the
respondent Ramon Crisostomo could have appeared at the hearing and
opposed the petition, but this right given to him by law is not absolute in
the sense that he is also entitled to a personal notice. His situation is
like that of a person who, not being a defendant in an ordinary action
and not having been notified of the complaint, learns of the existence of
the suit and discovers that he has a direct interest in the subject matter
of the litigation; there is no question that he would be entitled to take
part therein as intervener, but he cannot successfully ask for the
annulment of the judgment to be rendered on the ground that he had a
right to be cited or notified and to be present at the trial because it
happened that he had an interest in the case.
Section 562, like the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
should be liberally interpreted pursuant to the provision of section 2
thereof in order to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining
speedy justice. If, as it seems, the intention of the respondent Ramon
Crisostomo is to annul the donation which the incompetent made of her
property in favor of the petitioner, the courts are open for him to bring an
action for that purpose.1vvphl.nt
3. The order issued by the respondent judge on December 15, 1936,
annulling that of February 29 of the same year is, in our opinion, null
and void because the court was without jurisdiction to enter the same
after the accounts of the guardian had been approved, his bond
cancelled and the record of the guardianship proceedings deemed
closed and filed away definitely. When the respondent Ramon
Crisostomo filed his motion asking the annulment of the order of
February 29, 1936, the latter had already become final and binding upon
the parties. The guardianship case was no longer before the court
because the accounts of the guardian had been definitely approved, his
bond had been cancelled, he had been relieved of his charge, and the
incompetent had recovered her capacity before the law.
4. Another of the reasons taken into account in denying the writ of
certiorari filed by the herein petitioner is that the order of December 15,
1936, was appealable and the petitioner could have perfected an appeal
therefrom if he so desired. It is fact, however, that the petitioner did not
appeal from the order and the appeal does not now lie because the
period therefor provided by law has long expired. The remedy by
certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an appeal
does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having been lost

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with or without the appellant's negligence, the court has no jurisdiction

to issue the order or decision which is the subject matter of the remedy.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is reversed and the order of
December 15, 1936 entered by the respondent judge is set aside, with costs of
this instance to the other respondent Ramon Crisostomo. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ.,
concur.

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G.R. No. L-17066

December 28, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE

BENGSON, Incompetent. CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, guardian-appellant, ADMINISTRATION OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, oppositor-appellant.
Pedro O. Arciaga for petitioner-appellee.
C.E. Medina and R.B. de los Reyes for guardian-appellant.
Cesar Pablite for oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de
Bengson became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits which amounted
to P10,738 as of July 1, 1957, and to a monthly death compensation for the rest
of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Upon
inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans
Administration filed Special Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of
La Union, where in due course, an order was entered on August 8, 1957,
adjudging Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and appointing the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her estate comprising the monies
due from the said Veterans Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued
in favor of the Philippine National Bank.
On March 5, 1960, alleging that she had regained her competence, her ward, by
counsel, filed a petition asking for an order terminating the guardianship, and for
delivery to her of the residuary estate. Attached to this petition was a medical
certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and possessed full
knowledge of her environmental surroundings. This was opposed by the
Veterans Administration on the ground that by reason of her advanced age (78),
physical and mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. On March 30, 1960, the son of the
ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the
personal guardian of the incompetent; that if appointed guardian of her estate as
well, he will comply with all the provisions of the Rules of Court, will not ask any
remuneration for his services, and will file a nominal bond. He prayed to be
appointed guardian of the ward's estate in place of the Philippine National Bank,
and for the balance of her estate to be withdrawn or transferred from the
Philippine National Bank's main office to its branch at San Fernando, La Union,
in his account as guardian. On the same date, the lower court ordered Francisco
Bengson to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate to substitute the

Philippine National Bank, upon filing a P1,000 bond with proper sureties; the
Philippine National Bank to transfer to its branch office at San Fernando, La
Union, whatever funds it has belonging to the ward, upon Francisco Bengson's
filing the required bond and taking his oath. As reasons for the removal of the
Philippine National Bank and the appointment of Bengson, the lower court
observed that the ward was living with Francisco Bengson in the latter's capacity
as personal guardian; that the appointment of Bengson in place of the Philippine
National Bank would save the compensation being paid that Bank; and that the
transfer to the Philippine National Bank branch at San Fernando, La Union
would be more convenient to all concerned for the proper administration of the
estate. The required bond was thereafter filed and letters of guardianship issued
to Francisco Bengson. A motion to reconsider was denied by the order of May
11, 1960, which, however, raised of the amount of the bond to P13,000, based
on a finding that the cash balance of the estate then amounted to P11,464.34
plus the monthly income estimated at P134, or P1,608 per annum. Hence, this
joint appeal by the Philippine National Bank and the Veterans Administration..
We find this appeal meritorious. The grounds for which a guardian may be
removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules.
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging
his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the
estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to render an account or
make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian,
remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the
person found to be lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied).
Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian
cannot be legally removed from office except for the causes therein mentioned
(Alemany vs. Moreno, 5 Phil. 172; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
II, 1957 Ed. p. 515). This is also the American law (39 C.J.S., p. 657).
Accordingly, conflict of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya, 74 Phil. 254; Gabriel vs.
Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25) has been held sufficient ground for removal, premised on the
logic that antagonistic interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust.
To the extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person is
insuitable or incapable of discharging his trust, that much it can be said that
removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be exercised within the law,
and when the latter has laid down the grounds for removal of a guardian,
discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those
grounds.lawphil.net
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that
there was any legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National
Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's manifestation
nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that the Philippine

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National Bank had become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable
therefor, or that it had committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds
for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all throughout, the
Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. The it has
received commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it,
especially since the Bank's commission averages no more than P100.00 a year
and is offset by interest on the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would
probably have to disburse in bond premiums. Neither is it sufficient to base
removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the
interests of the ward and more convenient for the administration of the estate. A
guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent reasons (39 C.J.S.
65); otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.
As to the alleged inconvenience of the guardian of the incompetent's person
having to come to Manila to obtain money for the ward's sustenance, the same
can be obviated by merely requiring the appellant Bank to keep part of the
moneys in the San Fernando (La Union) branch, without altering the
guardianship.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from dated March 30, 1960 and May 11,
1960 are reversed, costs against the appellee Francisco Bengson.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.

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