CIGRE, Cable Box Type Transformer
CIGRE, Cable Box Type Transformer
CIGRE, Cable Box Type Transformer
http : //www.cigre.org
A. PETERSEN
AP Consulting – Transformer Technology
Australia
SUMMARY
Whilst the risk of fire in transformers is relatively low, it is not negligible. Prevention of transformer
fires and implementation of strategies to prevent loss of life, minimise the loss of adjacent assets and
loss of supply is therefore an essential part of the management of transformer assets. The aims of this
paper is to address and quantify the risk of such fires and provide guidance on how the fire risk can be
managed cost effectively without escalating and causing loss of lives,
Key elements addressed in the paper include:
Risk assessment - Quantative and anecdotal data from number of countries is presented to establish
typical risk scenarios.
The major causes fires in transformers are discussed and ranked as to determine the most cost effective
methods of risk reduction to increase the reliability and availability of the supply.
Risk reduction - The question of which risk should be reduced first to get maximum reduction per
dollar spend on risk reduction is discussed and guidance on ranking of risk reduction options is
presented.
The design and layout of the substation can have a significant impact on the risk of adjacent plant
catching fire or the risk of the fire spreading and causing damages to buildings. Risk reduction options
applicable for different types of substation installations are presented.
Oil spills and potential for contamination of the environment is a foreseeable and preventable event.
Many countries now consider oil spill and other forms of contamination from transformer fires a
serious offence and have legislation prohibiting contamination of the environment by oil spills and
other chemical effluent, including chemicals used in fire fighting. Severe fines may be imposed if
accidental oil spills or fire fighting chemical are not contained within the site. The need for this to be
managed proactively and taken into consideration at the design of the substation is discussed.
Selection and procurement of plant and equipment can have a significant impact on the risk of
transformer fires, Selection of plant and equipment with lower fire risk is discussed.
KEYWORDS
Transformer fires, fire risk, oil spill, tank rupture, risk reduction strategies.
[email protected]
1 INTRODUCTION
A very high percentage of power transformers contain large quantities of mineral oil and whilst the
probability of an explosive failure is low it is not insignificant. If an explosive failure occurs in a
bushing, a cable box or within the oil filled transformer, then there is a high probability that it will
develop into a serious and at times disastrous oil fire causing loss of the transformer, possibly other assets
and possible loss of supply. The potential risk of oil spill and an oil fire is therefore a serious risk, which
must be considered by all owners of power transformers.
Cigre Study Committee A2 has recognised this risk and the seriousness of transformer fires and
established Working Group [WG] A2.33 to investigate and report on “Transformer Fire Safety Practices”.
This WG will complete its work and its technical brochure on Transformer Fire Safety Practices in late
2010.
The author of this paper is the convenor of WG A2.33 and the aim of this paper is to quantify the risk of
transformer fires, discuss typical fire scenarios and some of the measures which can be taken to mitigate
and reduces the risk and losses from transformer fires. The content of this paper draws on the
contributions made from other members of the WG A2.33 during discussions within WG A2.33.
However, the views and opinions expressed in this paper are the authors own and they may or may not be
shared and endorsed collectively by the group in its final report.
2 RISK ASSESSMENT
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The Canadian failure data [6] included 24 transformer fires, 46 % of these fires were caused by failure of
OIP bushings and the remaining 56 % of fires from failures from HV leads to bushing turrets or HV leads
to tank wall. A high percentage of these arcing failures caused rupture of bushing turret or breakage of
bolted flanges on bushing turrets (chimneys) and in a few cases rupture of tank spilling of oil and fire. A
high proportion of the bushing/bushing turret (chimney) failures occurred in transformers at the 735 kV
voltage level and were high arcing energy failures.
Ph 1. OIP bushing failure and oil spilling into Ph 2. OIP bushing failure causes fire in trans-
common cable trench causes fire in two 90 MVA former but fire contained by sound enclosure
transformers
The risk of fires being initiated by a failure of a Resin Impregnated Paper [RIP] bushing or a Synthetic
Resin Bonded Paper [SRBP] bushing is significantly less than for OIP bushings. The reason for this is
that these types of bushings do not have porcelain insulators on the oil side (the lower end) of the
bushing. A failure at the lower end of the bushing will therefore not cause breakage of porcelain and in
most cases does not cause damage to air side (upper part) of the bushing or result in oil spill unless the
arcing energy is very high.
A failure in the upper side of an RIP bushing will most likely cause fragmentation of the porcelain if the
bushing uses a porcelain insulator, but in most cases no fire as a high proportion of RIP bushings do not
contain any oil, or if it uses oil between the porcelain shell and the condensor body then in most cases
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only a very small fire. Oil free RIP bushings are common and available from most suppliers of RIP
bushing. The use of polymer insulators on the air side is also common. This eliminates the risk of
porcelain fragment being expelled in event of a bushing failure and also reduces the fire risk further as
Silicone rubber will not sustain a fire without significant heat input.
The author is not aware of any oil fires having been initiated by a failure in a RIP or SRBP bushing. This
is not a categorical statement that a fire could be not initiated by such bushings, but merely that the risk is
much less than for OIP bushings.
Ph. 3 Burnt out 240 MVA Ph. 4 Transformer fire caused by Ph 5 cable box after fire in
transformer after a 132kV cable 11kV cable termination failure ph.4. Cables & gland plate
termination failure blasted off by arcing fault
It is the author’s experience that very few air insulated cable boxes on transformers have arc venting
which could prevent damage to cable box, dislocation of the cables and breakage of bushings. Such
deficiency is not tolerated in metal clad air insulated switchgear, which always is designed with arc
venting. The arcing energy in an air insulated cable box can be very high, even at 11—33 kV.
These points need to be considered and taken into account at the design stage of the sub-station. Processes
methodologies [HAZOP, FMEA] have been developed for this purpose [4].
It often is useful to categorise substation into types of substation designs where specific standard
strategies can be applied for fire risk management. Viz.
Open air substations where land cost is low – in such installations space separation will often be the
most economic fire victim risk management strategy.
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Compact air insulated substations where land cost is higher. In such installations fire barriers in the
form of reinforced concrete panels/wall, sound/fire enclosures, or water spray “curtain” are common
forms of fire protection.
Underground or substation in city building. Such installation will normally have a very site specific,
fire prevention and fire contingency management strategies. Japan has well developed designs for
risk management in such installation, using a combination of large duct openings between the banks
of single phase transformers and up to the conservator and high strength tanks design – up to 2-5
bar with plastic deformation and up to 5 Bars withstand before tank rupture . This combination gives
the time for and provides large oil volume expansion and allows the oil to move rapidly into the
conservator in event of internal arcing , resulting in reduced rate of pressure rise and containment the
oil and arcing gases , for the time required for the protection to clear the fault without rupture of the
tank [9] [10].
For smaller power transformers dry type or transformers using high flame point fluids (low fire risk)
are possible options for reduction of transformer fire risk.
If the installation is in the basement of an occupied office building or people traffic area, then SF6
cooled transformers will be the safest option [11] [12] as such transformer can be made completely
free of fire risk.
Deluge or fogging water spray systems can be effective in protection of “fire victim” assets and are
often used on unit and generator step-up transformers at power stations where high capacity and
reliable water supply is readily available. It is important to recognise that water spray may also be
required to cool nearby building structures or other critical assets, and not just the fire origin.
Other types of installation – Installation which is more unique and does not lend itself to be categorised
must be considered on a case by case basis.
Standard precautions which apply to all installations and should be considered at the design stage include:
Access to key areas of the substation with any one transformer on fire. Multiple access points may
be necessary.
Radiated or wind borne heat should not be able to initiate fires in other substation assets.
Fire brigade access and availability of water/foam/other fire suppressants for fire fighting. Whilst
water is generally not effective in extinguishing transformer oil fires and foam not effective in
fighting oil fires with oil spilling over vertical surfaces, water can be very effective in cooling the
fire to reduce heat output and in preventing a fire spreading to adjacent assets.
Spilling oil outside the substation during a fire should not be considered an accident, but negligence
and failure to foresee and manage the risk. Regulating authorities in many countries now apply
heavy fines if oil spill occurs outside the substation boundaries. Oil containment systems are
therefore becoming a standard feature in substation installations. The systems should be sized to
ensure all oil from the largest transformer in the substation can be contained.
Most utilities have developed oil containment system to suit their specific requirements. The key
requirements of such systems are - that oil should be directed away from the fire zone rapidly so it is
not available to fuel the fire, and should not contaminate the environment. The oil containment
system must be fit for the climatic and other site specific conditions. Underground oil/water
separation tanks are becoming widely used in Australia. Such a systems can separate transformer oil
mixed with water to less than 10ppm of oil in the water at the outlet from the from oil separation
tank at max flow rate through tank [7]. A Canadian utility [8] uses a mat/membrane system suitable
for cold climate, which allows water to flow through, but will contain oil and prevent it from
contaminating the ground water.
Oil spilled from a fire source should not be able to travel along cable trenches or conduits and cause
the fire to spread to buildings or other plant items (refer Ph. 1) Use of cable segregation and fire
barriers should be used for this purpose.
There are many more issues to be considered in terms of good fire safety practices; however it is outside
the scope of this paper to address these in any further details.
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5 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES
Some of the key questions which should be considered by the transformer owner and other key
stakeholders when planning a substation are:
What fire risk is acceptable?
What fire risk reduction measures are available and at what cost?
“It is important to consider and rank risk reduction measures in terms of economic efficiency = risk
reduction /cost of risk reduction”.
For a fire to exist and propagate, it requires the three key elements of Heat, Fuel
and Oxygen. If any one of these is absent then the fire will not start, or if removed
after the fire has started, then the fire will extinguish. The single most effective risk
management strategy should therefore focus on keeping the oil within the confines
of the transformer tank, as this eliminates the risk of a fire and the cost of cleaning
up the oil spill. The small quantity of oxygen dissolved in the trans-former oil is not
available to initiate a fire.
The Following Listing of Risk Mitigation Measures is in Order of Economic Efficiency
Avoid OIP bushings and cable terminations housed in cable boxes as these accounts for more than
70 % of transformer fires in transformers below 300kV and approx. 50 % of transformers above 300
kV.
Use reliable and fast acting duplicate protection systems and high speed circuit breakers. The
reduction in fault clearing time is directly proportional to the reduction in arcing energy and thus the
most effective measure available to minimise the risk of tank rupture for a given tank design.
If cable connections are used then they should preferably be
terminated on a free standing structure a short distance away
from the transformer and the connection to the transformer made
to cover mounted bushing via a short bus bar with flexible
shunts, to ensure that a cable termination fault will not cause
breakage of transformer bushings and initiate an oil fire. The
photograph to the left is from same installation as the
transformer fire in Ph. 2. and whilst the purpose of separating
the cable terminations from the transformer was to minimise the
risk of a cable fault causing a transformer fire, it also ensured . Ph. 6 Cable
that the cable was not damaged by the transformer fire. terminations
If cables are terminated in an air insulated cable box, then the cable box should be designed with a
weakened section, which will vent excess pressure generated by an arcing fault to avoid damage to
bushings and consequential spill of oil and fire.
PRD’s with opening in the range of 100-150mm dia.,. should not be relied upon to prevent tank
rupture. They have insufficient capacity to prevent pressure rises within the tank for high energy
fault say > 2.5-3MJ. Tank flexibility together with pressure withstand capability is likely to be more
important than fitting of PRD’s when considering withstand capability against tank rupture during
arcing faults.
PRD’s cannot provide protection against tank rupture for high arcing energy faults. Resistance
against tank rupture for such faults can only be achieved if the transformer has been designed to
withstand high pressures and is provided with large openings into the conservator or other forms for
oil volume expansion [9] [10] [13].
It is still recommended to follow the convention of providing one or two PRD’s on transformers to
provide safety from over pressure damage during oil filling. They can also provide protection against
tank rupture with low energy faults and slow acting protection and for transformers with gas
cushions where pressure rises during arcing faults are much slower.
The MVA rating for which hermetically sealed gas cushion transformer design can be
accommodated has increases significantly in recent years [14]. Gas cushion transformers can provide
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very good tank rupture withstand capability against tank rupture during arcing faults, provided the
gas cushion is oxygen free, the tank is equipped with PRD and has good pressure withstand
capability with a suitable margin above the opening pressure of the PRD. The benefit of this type of
design is that a relative large amount of arcing gas will only produce a minor and relative slow
pressure increase in the tank as the gas cushion is compressible. The relative slow pressure increase
provides time for protection to interrupt the arcing current before the rupturing pressure is reached.
OLTC should be provided with oil surge trip relay and PRD. The PRD will not prevent OLTC vessel
from rupture with high arcing fault energy, but may do so with lower arcing energy levels which is often
the case for OLTC arcing faults, if the tapping winding is at the neutral end. The PRD may provide less
protection against barrier board/cylinder rupture than a rupture disc, but has the benefit of resealing
capability and thus prevent oil spilling and exclude oxygen from the OLTC vessel after the fault has been
cleared, which can be a significant reduction in fire risk.
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Acknowledgement:
The contribution of other members of WG A2.33 is acknowledged.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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[3] W. H. Bartley, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co.
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[7] A. Henrion et.al. : Design, maintenance and environment design, maintenance and environmental
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2000.
[8] E. Figueora, D.J Transformer Conference, Sydney, March 2008.
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oil filled transformers", paper 12-02, CIGRÉ 1988 Session, Paris.
[10] H. Murakami et.al: Tank design for low rupture risk - Japan practice, Australian Cigre APA2
Transformer Conference, Sydney, March 2008.
[11] T. Kobayashi et.al: Underground city substation, design and protection -Japanese practice’,
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[12] G. Ebb. Underground city substation design for fire safety, Australian Cigre APA2 Transformer
Conference, Sydney, March 2008.
[13] M. Foata: Power Transformer fire risk assessment, Australian Cigre APA2 Transformer
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[14] U. Rimmele: Transformer tank design practice, Australian Cigre APA2 Transformer Conference,
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