Criminal Law Module Guide LA1010 - 2018 - VLE

Criminal law
William Wilson
This module guide was prepared for the University of London by:
uu William Wilson, Professor of Criminal Law, Queen Mary, University of London.
This is one of a series of module guides published by the University. We regret that
owing to pressure of work the author is unable to enter into any correspondence
relating to, or arising from, the guide.
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Criminal law page i
Contents
Module descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1 The lawyer’s method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 What does criminal law comprise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 The sources of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Study materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6 Online resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7 Preparing for the examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.8 Getting started . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 The building blocks of criminal liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 General principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 The three basic elements in crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Proving the elements of the offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Am I ready to move on? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Actus reus: conduct and circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 What does the actus reus consist of? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Actus reus: consequences and their causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1 Result crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 Accountability: basic guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Principles governing causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 Breaking the chain of causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5 Mens rea: criminal fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1 Objective fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2 Subjective fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3 Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.4 Recklessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.5 Negligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6 Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1 Temporal coincidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2 Correspondence principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.3 Transferred malice: a qualification to the correspondence principle . . . . . 54
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7 Criminal homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.1 Common elements in criminal homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.2 Murder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.3 Voluntary manslaughter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.4 Involuntary manslaughter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8 Rape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8.1 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.1 – rape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.2 Conduct elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.3 Absence of consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.4 The presumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.5 Procedure: relationship between s.1, s.75 and s.74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.6 Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
9 Non-fatal offences against the person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
9.1 Crimes of violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
9.2 Crimes against autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Am I ready to move on? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10 Defences 1: failure of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
10.1 The two types of defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
10.2 Involuntary conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
10.3 Insanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
10.4 Intoxication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
10.5 Crimes of basic intent and specific intent contrasted . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11 Defences 2: affirmative defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
11.1 Relationship between the defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
11.2 Public and private defence including self-defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
11.3 Meaning of ‘reasonable force’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
11.4 Scope of private defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
11.5 Duress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
11.6 Duress of circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
11.7 Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
12 Property offences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

12.1 Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
12.2 Burglary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
12.3 Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
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13 Criminal damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
13.1 Simple criminal damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
13.2 Aggravated criminal damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
14 Criminal attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

14.1 Retribution or prevention? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
14.2 Actus reus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
14.3 Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
14.4 Impossible attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
15 Participation in crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

15.1 Complicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
15.2 Elements of accessoryship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
15.3 Joint enterprise liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
15.4 Difference in offence or liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
15.5 Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
15.6 Relationship between accessorial liability and inchoate liability . . . . . . 206
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Notes
Criminal law page v
Module descriptor
GENERAL INFORMATION
Module title
Criminal law
Module code
LA1010
Module level
4
Contact email
The Undergraduate Laws Programme courses are run in collaboration with the
University of London. Enquiries may be made via the Student Advice Centre at: www.
enquiries.londoninternational.ac.uk
Credit value
30
Courses in which this module is offered

CertHE, LLB, EMFSS
Module prerequisite
None
Notional study time

300 hours
MODULE PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

Criminal law is one of the seven foundation modules required for a qualifying law
degree in England and Wales and is a core requirement of the University of London LLB
and CertHE Common Law programmes.
This module is concerned with the general principles of criminal liability, fatal and
non-fatal offences against the person and offences against property. Attempts to
commit offences, secondary liability and defences also form part of the curriculum.
MODULE AIM
This module introduces students to the aims and principles of criminal law and helps
them to explain and evaluate offences and defences, and the general principles
governing liability.
LEARNING OUTCOMES: KNOWLEDGE

Students completing this module are expected to have knowledge and understanding
of the main concepts and principles of criminal law. In particular they should be able
to:
1. Describe the legal principles governing liability for offences against the person and
property offences;
2. Describe the principles governing criminal defences;
3. Describe the legal principles governing liability for preliminary or inchoate

offences and liability as an accomplice;
page vi University of London
4. Explain the hierarchy of courts and the appeal process in criminal cases;
5. Explain the points of comparison and distinction between different offences within
the same family and different criminal defences.
LEARNING OUTCOMES: SKILLS

Students completing this module should be able to:
6. Interpret a set of facts in order to identify legal issues arising, providing reasoned
arguments and conclusions as to the criminal offences that may have been
committed and defences that may be available;
7. Identify strengths and weaknesses of areas of law in terms of underlying

considerations of morality, principle and policy;
8. Communicate in a clear and concise manner, using accurate legal terminology;
9. Conduct straightforward legal research tasks using legal databases and the internet
to locate primary and secondary sources relevant to criminal law.
BENCHMARK FOR LEARNING OUTCOMES

Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) benchmark statement for Law (2015).
MODULE SYLLABUS
a. General principles of criminal law.
b. Actus reus. Act requirements. Liability for omissions and situational ability.
c. Causation.
d. Mens rea. Intention recklessness and negligence.
e. Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea.
f. General defences 1. Insanity. Automatism. Intoxication.
g. General defences 2. Necessity. Duress. Self-defence. Consent.
h. Murder and voluntary manslaughter.
i. Involuntary manslaughter.
j. Non-fatal offences 1: Section 39 Criminal Justice Act 1988.
k. Non-fatal offences 2: Sections 18, 20, 47 OAPA 1861.
l. Rape.
m. Theft. Fraud. Burglary.
n. Criminal damage.
o. Secondary participation.
p. Inchoate offences. Assisting and encouraging crime and criminal attempts.
LEARNING AND TEACHING
Module guide
Module guides are the student’s primary learning resource. The module guide
covers the entire syllabus and provides students with the grounding to complete
the module successfully. It sets out the learning outcomes that must be achieved as
well as providing advice on how to study the module. It also includes the essential
reading and a series of self-test activities together with sample examination questions,
designed to enable students to test their understanding. The module guide is
supplemented each year with the pre-exam update, made available on the VLE.
Criminal law page vii
The Laws Virtual Learning Environment

The Laws VLE provides one centralised location where the following resources are
provided:
uu a module page with news and updates, provided by legal academics associated
with the Laws Programme;
uu a complete version of the module guides;
uu online audio presentations;
uu pre-exam updates;
uu past examination papers and reports;
uu discussion forums where students can debate and interact with other students;
uu computer marked assessments, multiple-choice questions with feedback are

available for some modules, allowing students to test their knowledge and
understanding of the key topics.
The Online Library

The Online Library provides access to:
uu the professional legal databases LexisLibrary and Westlaw;
uu cases and up-to-date statutes;
uu key academic law journals;
uu law reports;
uu links to important websites.
Core reading
Students should refer to the following core text. Specific reading references are
provided for this text in each chapter of the module guide:
¢¢ Wilson, W. Criminal law. (Harlow: Pearson, 2017) sixth edition [ISBN

9781292129051]. www.dawsonera.com/depp/athens?url=https://www.
dawsonera.com/abstract/9781292129075
ASSESSMENT
Learning is supported by means of a series of activities in the module guide, which
develop skills outcomes 6, 7, 9 and 10. Self-assessment questions also help students to
test their knowledge and understanding (outcomes 1–5). The formative activities also
prepare students to reach the module learning outcomes tested in the summative
assessment.
Summative assessment is through a three hour and fifteen minute unseen written
examination.
Permitted materials
Students are permitted to bring into the examination room the following specified
document:
¢¢ Core statutes on criminal law 2017–18 (Palgrave Macmillan).

page viii University of London
Notes
1 Introduction
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1 The lawyer’s method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 What does criminal law comprise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 The sources of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Study materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6 Online resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7 Preparing for the examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.8 Getting started . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

page 2 University of London
Introduction
This module guide is designed to help you to learn, understand, apply and evaluate
those aspects of the criminal law which form the syllabus of the University of London
Criminal law module. It is intended to be read in conjunction with your textbook and
has been designed to fit together with it. In each chapter of the module guide you will
be directed to parts of the textbook, the virtual learning environment (VLE) or cases to
be found in the Online Library, with a view to answering questions about the subject.
In this way your knowledge and understanding of the subject is enhanced. Reading
without thinking cannot achieve this.
Criminal law 1 Introduction page 3
1.1 The lawyer’s method

Students new to law often think that being a lawyer is all about knowing a lot of law
and ‘learning the cases’. Strangely this is not true. The most law you will ever know
will probably be around examination time when you have committed a lot of material
to memory. As you move from student to practising lawyer, much of this law will be
forgotten. But you will have an understanding of the basic principles of each of the
subjects you have studied, and you will have internalised the skills and competencies
which are so valuable to lawyers’ clients.
Proficiency in criminal law involves a number of different skills and competencies,

including:
uu a knowledge of the rules and principles governing criminal offences
uu an ability to use books, libraries and the internet to discover these rules
uu a basic understanding of the rules of evidence and procedure
uu an ability to identify the rule(s) applicable to a fact situation and to apply them
logically and coherently.
Attaining these latter competencies is necessary to discharge effectively the day-to-

day tasks of a criminal lawyer – whether student, solicitor, advocate or judge. However,
true mastery requires something further. It requires also a critical and evaluative
attitude. The criminal law in action is not just a matter of doctrine. The purpose
of criminal law doctrine is the delivery of criminal justice and criminal justice is a
contingent outcome in which rule, process and context all play their part.
Understanding criminal law requires, therefore, an appreciation of the day-to-day

workings of the criminal justice system. Moreover, it requires an understanding of
the resources of the criminal law to produce substantive justice. The criminal law is
not just a set of rules. It is underpinned by ethical and political principles designed
to ensure both justice to the individual and protection to the community the
individual inhabits. If the mechanical application of a given rule to a fact situation
acquits a dangerous or wicked person, or convicts someone neither dangerous nor
blameworthy according to ordinary standards, something has gone wrong. Students
should therefore be prepared to subject the rules to critical scrutiny. Lawyers do this
all the time, not least in court when their job is to fight their client’s cause. Sometimes,
they will be saying, in effect, ‘This is bad law and should not be followed’ or ‘This law
was not intended to cover this situation’, and so on.
Throughout this module guide we shall be posing the question ‘Do you agree with this
decision?’ Take these questions seriously! Here is an example.
In a leading case called Ireland, which we will be looking at in Chapter 9, a man made
a woman’s life a misery by making a succession of telephone calls, usually silent ones.
Eventually she had a breakdown, suffering clinical depression. Obviously this man
had done something very wrong but the criminal law has no authority to punish him
unless the thing he has done is a criminal offence (the principle of legality). Is it? What
offence had he committed? Ireland was charged and convicted of assault occasioning
actual bodily harm. This requires proof of an assault, which means acts causing the
victim to fear immediate personal violence. Did those calls cause the victim to fear
immediate violence? It requires proof of actual bodily harm. Is depression ‘bodily’
harm? The House of Lords upheld his conviction. If I were to ask you now ‘Do you agree
with this decision?’ you might say something like this. ‘Well the decision is right from
the point of morality – what he did was unforgiveable – but it is possibly not right
from the point of view of the principle of legality (that people should not be punished
unless their action is prohibited by the criminal law). He had not assaulted her. He had
frightened her but that is not the same thing. And he had not caused her actual bodily
harm. Depression is mental harm not bodily harm.’ This is the kind of critical thinking
which you should be deploying.
1.2 What does criminal law comprise?

Crimes are distinguished from other acts or omissions which may give rise to legal
proceedings by the prospect of punishment. It is this prospect which separates the
criminal law from the law of contract and tort and other aspects of the civil law. The
formal threshold at which the criminal law intervenes is when the conduct in question
has a sufficiently serious social impact to justify the state, rather than (in the case
of breach of contract or trespass) the individual affected, taking on the case of the
injured party.
The American Model Penal Code provides a good restatement of the proper purposes
of the criminal law, namely:
1. to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or

threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests
2. to subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that they are
disposed to commit crimes
3. to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal
4. to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to be an offence
5. to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offences.
Which of these propositions were contradicted in Ireland?
1.3 Procedure
The criminal law’s purposes are discharged by law enforcement and the machinery
of criminal justice generally. Law enforcement includes preventing crime, typically
by policing and also by bringing offenders to justice. The procedures vary according
to the nature of the offence committed. Criminal offences are classified according
to whether they are arrestable or non-arrestable. The former, which includes more
serious crimes, allows a suspect to be arrested without an arrest warrant.
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has the overall responsibility for bringing
proceedings. It is their job to assess the weight of evidence, and decide, in the light
of the evidence and the public interest, whether a prosecution should proceed.
Discretion, as much as the rules of criminal law, is influential. So, for example, the CPS
had the job of deciding whether to proceed in the case of Ireland. It would have been a
difficult decision to make.
It should be understood that, although official charging standards govern the exercise
of the CPS’s discretion over which offence to charge, there is no necessary connection
between the offence actually committed and that charged. Thus a person who has
committed robbery may be charged only with theft; a person who has committed a
wounding may be charged only with assault; a person who has committed murder
may be charged only with manslaughter. Undercharging carries a number of benefits.
First, it may have evidential advantages. It is easier to prove theft than robbery. Second,
it may encourage a guilty plea. Third, it may enable the case to be heard summarily
rather than on indictment. The advantage for the prosecution of summary trial is that it
is less costly and more efficient. It is also thought to increase the chances of conviction.
Offences are triable:
1. summarily – that is, before magistrates
2. on indictment – that is, in Crown Court before a judge and jury
3. either way – that is, either summarily or on indictment.
All defendants have a right to jury trial in respect of offences triable either way. In
practice, the vast majority of offences are heard by magistrates. Whether heard
summarily or on indictment, the conduct of the trial in each case is dictated to a
greater or lesser extent by the rules of evidence and procedure.
The formal accusation made against a defendant is in the form of an indictment or,
where the matter is tried summarily before magistrates, an information. This contains
a statement of the offence and particulars of the offence charged. Thus the indictment
in the case of Ireland would have been in the following form.
John Ireland is charged as follows:
Statement of Offence: assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Particulars: John Ireland, between the dates of September 1998 and May 2004, assaulted
Vicky Henderson, causing her actual bodily harm.
Judge and jury have separate roles in the conduct of the trial. The judge takes care of
the law. In Ireland, for example, counsel for defence queried whether causing someone
psychiatric injury was covered by the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily
harm. The trial judge ruled that it was. As a result, Ireland pleaded guilty and so the
jury were not called upon to give a verdict. When the judge gives such a ruling on a
matter of law it is always open to the defence to appeal the ruling. Appeals are made
from Crown Court to the Court of Appeal (and then the Supreme Court). This is what
the defence did in Ireland, unsuccessfully as it turned out.
The jury are the judges of fact. This means that it is for them ultimately to decide how
much weight to ascribe to the various pieces of evidence adduced by prosecution and
defence. They will not do this unsupervised. In the course of the trial, the judge will
ensure that no evidence is taken into account which is either irrelevant to the proof of
guilt of the defendant or, if relevant, less probative than prejudicial. After prosecution
and then defence have presented their cases, the judge will sum up and will review
the facts for the jury. The judge will then explain to the jury what the law is and the
facts they have to find to sustain a conviction. The judge will also tell the jury that the
burden of proof is at all times on the prosecution and that the standard of proof is
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. These instructions to the jury are known as jury directions.
If the judge makes a mistake in directing the jury this can be appealed on the ground
of misdirection.
1.4 The sources of criminal law

The criminal law is a creature of the common law, that is, judge made law. Some
of the most important crimes have their source in the common law. Murder and
manslaughter are obvious examples. However, the majority of criminal offences
are now statute based. Such offences may either have originated in statute or are
common law offences whose elements have been incorporated into statute, such
as theft and most crimes of violence. In the latter case, such statutes will not always
define the full common law offence. This will leave the common law with a significant
role still to fulfil. In Ireland, for example, the offence charged was a statutory offence
but the full scope of the offence is a matter of judicial decision.
European Law and the European Convention on Human Rights are other key sources of
criminal law. It is important in particular to understand the Convention and its impact.
Rarely a month goes past without some aspect of domestic law being challenged
for being inconsistent with the Convention. Prime examples in the criminal field
include Dudgeon v UK, in which the court held that a legislative provision criminalising
homosexual activity between consenting adults in private in Northern Ireland was
a breach of Article 8. And in A v UK the court ruled that a common law defence of
reasonable chastisement which had led to the acquittal of a man who had beaten
his step-child with a garden cane did not provide adequate protection for the latter’s
Article 3 rights. In both cases Parliament acted quickly to eradicate the inconsistency.
1.5 Study materials

The core textbook for this subject is:
¢¢ Wilson, W. Criminal law. (Harlow: Pearson, 2017) sixth edition

[ISBN 9781292129051]. www.dawsonera.com/depp/athens?url=https://www.
dawsonera.com/abstract/9781292129075
Throughout this guide, this textbook will be referred to as ‘Wilson’. Usually, section
references will be given to direct your reading. For example: ‘Wilson, Section 11.4.’
Please note that all references to Wilson in this module guide are to the sixth edition
(2017). You will find guidance as to which sections of the textbook you should read for
any particular topic. This textbook is essential for examination success. This module
guide has been specifically designed to dovetail with it, through the activities which
appear in each chapter, so that the extra pieces of information and understanding
which you will require to pass your examinations will be easily available. Reading
the module guide alone will not be enough. You will see why if you look at last year’s
Examiners’ report (available on the VLE)!
You are also advised to read a criminal law casebook of your choice. The following ties
in most closely with the textbook:
¢¢ Dine, J., J. Gobert and W. Wilson Cases and materials on criminal law. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780199541980].
There are a number of others on the market which are equally useful.
You are encouraged to read widely and you will find it useful to refer to other
textbooks on occasion. Here are some of the most useful for Criminal law.
¢¢ Ormerod, D. Smith and Hogan’s criminal law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015) 14th edition [ISBN 9780198702313].
¢¢ Horder, J. Ashworth’s principles of criminal law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2016) eighth edition [ISBN 9780198753070].
¢¢ Kyd, S, T. Elliott and M.A. Walters Clarkson and Keating: criminal law: texts and
materials. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2017) ninth edition [ISBN 9780414061521].
¢¢ Herring, J. Criminal law: text, cases and materials. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016) seventh edition [ISBN 9780198753049].
¢¢ Herring, J. Great debates in criminal law. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)

third edition [ISBN 9781137475916]. You will find this book both helpful and
enjoyable for that part of the module and examination which requires you to
analyse and evaluate areas of criminal doctrine.
Please ensure that you use the latest edition of any textbook or casebook you choose.
You will also need an up-to-date criminal law statute book. You will be able to take an
unannotated copy into the examination.
1.6 Online resources

In addition to the hard copy materials, there are numerous online resources to help
you with your studies. You can access these through the VLE. The Online Library
contains everything you would find in a well-stocked law library and you should use it
regularly, particularly for the purpose of reading key cases. Such reading gives valuable
understanding about how lawyers reason their way through to conclusions and often
contains little nuggets of information and understanding which you can deploy to
good purpose in your essays.
Criminal law has its own section of the VLE which contains lots of important materials,
including the complete module guide and feedback to activities, computer-marked
assessments, newsletters, recent developments, updates, links to the Online Library
and other useful websites, a discussion board, past examination papers and
Examiners’ reports.
There are also a full set of criminal law presentations on the VLE, including audio
lectures and accompanying slides. These presentations introduce you to each topic
covered on the syllabus and in the module guide and dovetail with both. A good way of
learning is, therefore, to listen to the lecture and then turn to the matching part of the
module guide. It can also usefully be referred to as a consolidation and revision aid.
1.7 Preparing for the examination

At the end of the module you will need to pass the examination in order to progress.
The module guide and its activities, the textbook and audio presentations have been
designed to ensure that you will have covered everything necessary for success, and
in sufficient detail. Please ensure you approach your studies systematically, chapter by
chapter, working through all the questions and activities, and making reference to the
textbook and other materials as you do so. The feedback to activities in this guide is
available on the VLE. Doing the activities properly is crucial. This enables you to develop
the legal skills which full time students get from the small group tutorial classes when
doing their law degree at the University. Reading and remembering is not enough. You
are being examined on your skills as a lawyer! At the end of each chapter, ensure you
have tackled all the ‘Am I ready to move on?’ questions which have been posed.
Advice and guidance on how to answer essay and problem questions appears at
intervals in the module guide. More information about the examination will be made
available on the VLE along with sample examination questions. You must ensure that
you are up to date with the format of the examination and any changes from previous
years which will be detailed on the VLE.
1.8 Getting started

If you are new to law, you may find the subject a bit daunting at first, particularly if you
come from a non-English jurisdiction. But, in time, you will find it is just like any other
academic subject. Criminal law is full of interesting cases and ideas and we hope that
as you read through the module guide and textbook you begin to find it enjoyable as
well as interesting. When you get to that stage you will know you are well on track for
success.
Good luck!
Notes
2 The building blocks of criminal liability
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 General principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 The three basic elements in crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Proving the elements of the offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Am I ready to move on? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Introduction
This chapter introduces you to some of the key terms and principles in criminal law.
Essential reading
¢¢ Wilson, Chapter 4 ‘Actus reus’, Sections 4.1 ‘Introduction’, 4.2 ‘Elements of
liability’ and 4.3 ‘Interrelationships of actus reus, mens rea and defences’.
Criminal law 2 The building blocks of criminal liability page 11
2.1 General principles

If you decide to bake a cake but have never done so before, you will probably wish
to consult a recipe. The recipe will contain ingredients general to all cakes. There are
three such elements, namely a shortening agent such as fat or oil, a raising agent such
as eggs or baking soda, and finally some form of farine such as flour. In addition, the
recipe will contain ingredients which are specific to the cake you wish to make. There
is an unlimited variety of such ingredients; for example a fruit cake contains dried fruit,
sugar, spices and molasses.
The constituents of every human-made product can be approached in this way. Thus
a residential house also contains three essential ingredients, namely foundations,
structure and a roof. Again, the specifics of the house may vary enormously. The
structure may be made of wood, bricks, concrete, metal, plastic or glass, while the roof
may be made of stone, pottery, wood or dried vegetation.
The criminal law, as a human-made product – like cakes and houses – also contains
these general elements or building blocks. The basic elements of a cake or house are
designed primarily to make the product fit for purpose, and the essential elements of
a crime are similarly designed. The purpose they are fitted for is to provide clear rules
of conduct and a secure and fair basis for punishment.
In criminal law these basic elements are prohibited conduct (the external element),
and an accompanying mental element (the internal element). Again, the specifics
of a crime may vary enormously. The prohibited conduct may consist of snatching
someone’s handbag, hacking into their computer, poisoning their dog or even killing
them. The mental element may be intention, recklessness, wilfulness or knowledge. As
a student of criminal law, your job when analysing a case is always to ask the following
questions in the following order.
uu Has the accused performed a prohibited act?
uu Was that act accompanied by a specified state of mind or mental element?
These elements can be reduced to an equation:
prohibited conduct + mental element = criminal liability

The Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is a traditionally used shorthand
for this equation. Its usual translation is ‘an act is not criminal in the absence of a guilty
mind’; or, more analytically, ‘criminal liability requires D to have done something
criminally wrong (actus reus) with an accompanying blameworthy state of mind (mens
rea)’.
When reading textbooks and cases you will find different words and phrases used to
describe the conduct and mental elements in crime. There is no magic in any of these
words or phrases, and so at the outset you may find this short glossary of synonyms
helpful.
uu The prohibited conduct element in crime is also known as the ‘external element’,
the actus reus or the ‘wrongdoing’ component.
uu The mental element is also known as the ‘internal element’, the mens rea, the
‘guilty mind’ or the ‘fault element’.
Use any of these as you see fit. I shall use all of them in this module guide but I shall
tend to use actus reus and mens rea most often.
The actus reus and mens rea of a crime is to be found embedded in its definition. So
assume you are asked to decide whether it is murder where A has killed B, his wife, by
poisoning her drink with cyanide in revenge for cheating on him with C. Your task is to
work out whether A has committed the actus reus of murder, and whether he did so
with the mens rea for murder.
In Section 4.2 of Wilson, murder is defined as ‘an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought’. We can then separate the actus reus from the mens rea. The actus reus
is the prohibited act; that is, ‘an unlawful killing’. The mens rea is the accompanying
mental element which renders that prohibited act punishable, which is ‘malice
aforethought’. At Section 4.2 you will also discover that ‘malice aforethought’ means
‘an intention to kill or cause serious injury’.
To analyse the problem you therefore ask the following questions.
uu Has A unlawfully killed a human being? Answer, yes.
uu Did he do so intending to kill or cause serious injury to B? Answer, also yes.
When we look deeper into the criminal law we will discover that there is in fact a third
element in criminal liability, namely the absence of any defence. The third question to
ask, therefore, is:
uu Does A have a defence for the killing? The answer to this question is no. Revenge is
not a defence and so A is guilty of murder.
You should always follow this method when analysing a problem, whichever crime you
are considering.
2.2 The three basic elements in crime
2.2.1 Actus reus

The actus reus of a crime is the package of behaviour which the law prohibits.
This package may prohibit simply acting in a particular way, as in the offence of
careless driving, or it may prohibit bringing about a particular result, as in murder or
manslaughter. It may also prohibit doing something, or bringing about something
in particular circumstances, such as, in the crime of rape, having intercourse with
another without their consent. This can be represented as follows:
The actus reus of a crime comprises conduct, with or without a designated result,
including the presence of any circumstances necessary for that conduct to be
criminalised.
2.2.2 Mens rea

Liability for serious crimes requires proof that the accused was blameworthy in doing
what they did. This is because it is a fundamental ethical principle underpinning
the criminal law that the state has moral authority to punish its citizens only if they
deserve it. This moral principle – that justice in punishment requires punishment to
be deserved – is known as the principle of retribution. This principle reflects how we
go about things in everyday life. In the home, for example, children who break vases,
ornaments or windows tend not to be punished if the breakage was accidental, since
punishment would be unfair. In the criminal law the blameworthy states of mind most
commonly used to justify punishment are:
uu intention
uu recklessness
uu dishonesty
uu knowledge
uu belief.
What you should notice about all these forms of mens rea is that they are states of
mind. In other words they reflect a conscious attitude of the accused to what they
are doing: put simply, they are aware of what they are doing. Having such an attitude
is what makes them deserving of punishment, since they are consciously defying a
standard of conduct binding on them. So a person who intentionally kills another,
recklessly damages their property, dishonestly takes their property or knowingly buys
and sells their stolen property is not only doing wrong: they also know they are doing
wrong but do it nevertheless. Hence they deserve to be condemned and punished.
Criminal law 2 The building blocks of criminal liability page 13
Note: This is not the only possible justification for punishment. Another is prevention.
Utilitarian theorists believe that punishment can never be deserved because it
involves harming people and ‘two wrongs do not make a right’. The utilitarian
justification for punishment is to reduce the incidence of anti-social and dangerous
conduct through punishment’s deterrent or preventive function. The contemporary
view, which favours retribution, is that for stigmatic crimes such as are dealt with
in this module guide, prevention is not a moral justification for punishment as
punishment for these crimes requires the defendant to be conscious of their
wrongdoing. One area where there is less unanimity is the law of criminal attempts
(see Chapter 14). Where prevention comes into its own is with respect to those
offences which have harm prevention rather than moral wrongdoing as their primary
focus.
Such offences often have a fault element which requires no conscious awareness of
doing wrong: careless driving and gross negligence manslaughter are examples of
these. Other crimes need no fault element at all. These are known as crimes of strict
liability: most driving offences are of this nature. Such offences are justified as being
not contrary to principle because they do not tend to involve social stigma or carry
imprisonment as a potential punishment.
2.2.3 Defences
The third element in criminal liability is that of criminal defences. Defences block
criminal liability although the elements of the offence (actus reus and mens rea) are
present. Some of the more common defences are self-defence, insanity, consent,
duress and necessity.
Defences involve one of two moral claims to avoid liability.
uu The first is that it would be unfair to punish the accused, although their act was
wrongful, because they were, in the words of H.L.A. Hart, deprived of ‘the capacity
or a fair opportunity to conform’ to the prohibition (Punishment and responsibility,
1968). Such defences, of which duress and insanity are examples, are known as
excuses.
uu The second is that although the definition of the offence is satisfied the act of the
accused was not wrongful because of special circumstances. Such defences are
known as justifications. An example is self-defence.
The fact that defences operate outside the boundaries of the offence definition has
one very significant consequence. If an element of the offence definition is not present
but the accused does not know this when they are acting, they still escape liability. For
example, if A has intercourse with B believing that she is not consenting when in fact
she is consenting, A is not guilty of rape, since one of the basic elements of the offence
(actus reus) is absent. This is not the case with defences. To rely on a defence there
must not only be a good reason for the accused acting as they do, but also the accused
must act for that reason.
Activity 2.1
Read Wilson, Section 4.3 ‘Interrelationships of actus reus, mens rea and defences’
and consider whether the court was right to convict Dadson of malicious wounding
and what problems the case provokes.
2.3 Proving the elements of the offence
2.3.1 Burden of proof

Suppose A shoots B dead in broad daylight with 100 witnesses to the killing. She is
charged with murder. A admits what she did but claims it was an accident. In other
words A is making a claim about her mens rea. She is saying that because the killing
was an accident this means that she did not intend to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm to B.
In Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 the House of Lords had to consider whether the
fact that the actus reus was satisfied meant that the burden was placed on A to prove
that the killing was an accident. The famous conclusion it reached was that the burden
of proof did not pass to A, and never would. People are assumed innocent until
proven guilty. This means that in respect of all the elements of all offences the burden
of proof is on the prosecution. So with respect to the actus reus the prosecution must
do the proving, and it must prove every bit of the actus reus. For example, the actus
reus of the crime of rape is having intercourse with a person without their consent.
This means that the prosecution must prove to the satisfaction of the jury both that
sexual intercourse between the two parties took place and that the intercourse was
non-consensual.
Again, with respect to the mens rea, the prosecution must do all the proving. For
example, in a case of theft of a wallet, the prosecution must prove that D took V’s
wallet intending never to return it; or in a case of handling stolen goods, that D knew
or believed the goods she was handling were stolen goods.
Finally, with respect to defences, again the prosecution must do the disproving. For
example, it must prove that D was not acting in self-defence or was not acting under
duress. Here, however, a slight qualification is needed. The prosecution does not bear
this burden with respect to defences unless the defence first adduces some credible
evidence that D may have been acting in self-defence or under duress. In other words,
the prosecution does not have to counter every defence the accused may possibly
raise, but only those which are worthy of being taken seriously. This evidential burden
on the defence is not heavy, however; it is simply designed to ensure precious court
time is not wasted proving the obvious.
2.3.2 Standard of proof

Consonant with the principle that a person is considered innocent until proven
guilty, the prosecution must prove each and every element of the offence ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’. This means that the jury or magistrates must not convict unless
the prosecution has made them sure that all the elements of the offence are present.
If, therefore, the jury is convinced that A took a handbag belonging to V (actus reus)
and that the taking was dishonest (mens rea) and think that it is probable, but without
being sure, that it was A’s intention to keep the handbag permanently (mens rea), it
must acquit of theft.
Am I ready to move on?

Are you ready to move on to the next chapter? You are if – without referring to the
module guide or Wilson – you can answer the following questions.
1. What are the three elements which make up criminal liability?
2. What does actus reus mean?
3. What does mens rea mean?
4. What are crimes called where the prosecution does not have to prove mens rea?
5. If D confesses to having committed a crime but claims he did so under duress, does
D have to prove the duress?
6. There are two types of defences. Explain what they are and give examples of each.
7. Dadson shot an escaped convict. It was at that time lawful to shoot an escaped
convict. Why then was he found guilty of unlawful wounding?
3 Actus reus: conduct and circumstances
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 What does the actus reus consist of? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Introduction
The criminal law has no business punishing us for our thoughts, only for our actions
or deeds. Even a criminal attempt requires the defendant to have acted upon their
decision to kill someone, injure them or steal their property. Until then, they are free
to plan the crime, obtain the poison and reconnoitre the place contemplated for the
commission of the crime. It is only when they put their plan into action that the
criminal law can get involved.
Criminal law 3 Actus reus: conduct and circumstances page 17
3.1 What does the actus reus consist of?

The actus reus in crime comprises:
uu conduct (always)
uu any circumstances necessary to render that conduct wrongful (if any are required)
uu result (if any is required).
In this chapter we will concentrate on the conduct and circumstances elements of

actus reus.
3.1.1 Conduct: the act requirement

The core element of criminal liability is some form of prohibited conduct. Usually this
prohibited conduct will involve a wrongful act. Identifying an act is therefore a key
task for the prosecution. Although there are exceptions, generally if the defendant has
not acted there can be no liability. This principle is known as the ‘act requirement’.
3.1.2 What is an act?

There are two components to acts. The first is a ‘bodily movement’ (American Model
Penal Code). The second is that the bodily movement be ‘voluntary’.
A bodily movement
The conduct element in murder consists of any act which causes the death of a human
being. There is no need for an act of violence; any act which causes death will do.
Poisoning the victim’s drink is an act. Cutting the brake cables of the victim’s car is an
act. In Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692 it was sufficient that the accused threatened and
chased his victim, who consequently died of a heart attack.
The corollary of this is that if A’s contribution to the occurrence of a criminal harm
can be described only as ‘doing nothing’ or ‘not lifting a finger’, she cannot be held
criminally accountable for that harm.
Illustration 3.1
Noor sees Parveen, a blind woman whom she does not like, about to step out into
a road, unaware that a lorry is approaching at great speed. Noor does nothing to
warn Parveen, who dies in the resulting crash.
Here there can be no criminal liability in respect of Noor. Parveen did not die as a
result of any bodily movement on the part of Noor. Doing nothing is not an act.
The bodily movement must be voluntary

The second component of the act requirement is that the bodily movement is
voluntary. In Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1961] 3 All ER 523 HL, Lord Denning
explained this as follows:
No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context…

means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a
spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious
of what he is doing, such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst
sleepwalking…
Illustration 3.2
Yasmin is waiting at the kerbside waiting to cross a busy road. Aisha trips over
a brick and stumbles into Yasmin, thus propelling her on to the road. Yasmin is
injured in the resulting collision with a car.
Aisha cannot be criminally liable because her act is involuntary. She was not in
control of the actions which led to Yasmin’s injury.
Where a defendant has no control over what they are doing they are said to be acting
in a state of automatism. Like insanity, its close cousin, automatism is a defence to
criminal liability: both will be looked at in detail in Chapter 10 of this module guide.
3.1.3 Am I able to identify the act component in an actus reus?

To decide whether D has committed the actus reus of a crime you need to:
uu find the definition of the crime
uu distil from that definition the actus reus
uu identify from that actus reus the act of the defendant which you are to rely on in
establishing that actus reus.
Activity 3.1
Let’s see if you can do this in relation to theft. Read Wilson, Section 14.2.A.1 ‘The
appropriation’, Sections (a) ‘Assuming rights of ownership’, (b) ‘Insubstantial
appropriations’ and (c) ‘The relevance of consent or authority’ and answer the
following questions.
a. What is the actus reus of theft?
b. What does the actus reus component of theft known as ‘appropriation’ in theft
mean?
c. If V lends D his book and a week later D decides to keep and sell the book, does D
need to sell the book to satisfy the act component of the actus reus?
Activity 3.2
Consider the following cases and answer the question below.
a. Aftab has an infectious respiratory disease. He kisses Miah. Miah catches Aftab’s
disease and suffers serious illness.
b. John has a heart attack while driving his car. He loses consciousness and crashes
into Margaret, injuring her.
c. Vikram pushes Chen. Chen falls onto Isobel who falls over and breaks her leg.
d. Peter is driving a car with Bella, his dog, in the back seat. Bella unexpectedly
jumps on to Peter’s lap, causing him to lose control of the car and go through a
red traffic light.
e. Imran, a practical joker, explodes a paper bag behind Adele’s back. Adele falls
over in fright, bangs her head and loses consciousness.
f. Suki, Afzal’s teacher, tells Afzal that he has failed his final year examinations. In
despair, Afzal commits suicide.
g. George overhears Hui tell Wen that he intends to kill Ming. George makes a note
of this but does not tell the police. The next day Hui kills Ming.
Consider in relation to each of the above cases whether, assuming the various
parties are charged with a criminal offence, the act requirement is satisfied. In each
case you will need to identify what the act is, if any, whose act it is and if the act is
voluntary. You are not being asked whether a criminal offence has been committed.
This depends upon other matters such as the presence of mens rea, causation and
defences. If you find the answers to any of these questions difficult, read Wilson,
Sections 4.1–4.4 again. Do not move on until you are satisfied with your answers
and your level of understanding. If you have a study partner, why not talk about the
questions with them?
3.1.4 Exceptions to the act requirement

There are three exceptions to the usual rule that criminal wrongdoing (actus reus)
requires an act. Certain crimes do not require any act at all. These include what are
termed situational crimes, crimes of possession and crimes of omission.
Situational crimes, crimes of possession and crimes of omission

Although the conduct element in crimes generally is an act, there are some
exceptions. Criminal liability is often based upon a failure to act as the law requires,
as in failing to wear a seatbelt, failing to tax one’s car, failing to submit a tax return or
failing to display a licence plate. Such offences are typically statutory strict liability
offences designed for regulatory rather than retributive purposes. They are known as
statutory crimes of omission.
Criminal liability may also on occasion be based upon being in possession of a

prohibited article; for example controlled drugs, extreme pornography, offensive
weapons or articles for use in terrorist offences. These again are statutory crimes and
are known as crimes of possession.
The final exception is what is termed ‘situational liability’. The prohibition for these
offences is not some form of act but, similar to the other two exceptions, simply being
in a prohibited situation. For example, it is a crime to be drunk in a public place, or to
be drunk in charge of a vehicle, or to be the owner of certain types of dogs (such as a
pit bull terrier) or to allow a dog to be dangerously out of control in a public place.
The problem posed by both possession offences and situational liability is that
criminal liability does not depend upon the defendant having chosen to be in
possession or be in the prohibited situation. In other words no wrongdoing is
required. The offence in the case of owning a pit bull terrier is constituted although
the dog was by way of an unsolicited gift and although the defendant believed the dog
to be of another breed. The offence in the case of the out-of-control dog is constituted
although the defendant performed no act and took reasonable steps to keep the dog
under control (see Elvin [1994] 1 WLR 1057). In relation to crimes of possession, a person
can be guilty of being in possession of a dangerous weapon when they believed
the article in their possession was, for example, a torch and not, as it subsequently
transpired, a taser (Deyemi [2008] 1 Cr App R 25).
Activity 3.3
Read Wilson, Section 4.5.A ‘Situational liability’ and B ‘Possession offences’ and
answer the following questions.
a. Why do commentators object to the decisions in Winzar (1983) and Larsonneur
(1933)? Do you agree that they were objectionable?
b. Is the decision in Robinson-Pierre consistent with Elvin? Is it a good decision?
Omissions and commissions

We have seen how a failure to act may serve as the actus reus of an offence where the
defendant is placed under a statutory duty to act as the statute requires. These are
known as crimes of omission. This is an exception to the act requirement in criminal
law. However, since the behaviour demanded by the statute is clearly specified and is
not onerous in its demands, it is not contrary to principle.
A more controversial exception to the act requirement concerns crimes of

commission. Can these be committed by omission? Crimes of commission are those
crimes whose definition includes an actus reus which satisfies the act requirement, but
whose result component can be caused by doing nothing. For example, the actus reus
of murder is ‘an unlawful killing’. Dictionaries define ‘kill’ as ‘an act of killing’, but also
define it simply as ‘causing death’. An act of killing involves some affirmative action
such as a stabbing, a shooting, a beating, a poisoning, a suffocating and so on. But it
is possible to ‘cause death’ by doing nothing. For example, it is a perfectly correct use
of language to say that a parent who gives her baby no food so that it dies causes the
death of the child – and indeed ‘kills’ the child. The controversy concerns how far this
principle should stretch. Only one person can pull a trigger, but every passerby who
sees a baby drowning in a puddle but does nothing to help can be said to ‘cause’ the
baby’s death. Are they all to be charged with murder? How do we ensure that only the
truly deserving suffer conviction and punishment?
Key requirements for criminal liability

To ensure the net of criminal responsibility is not spread too far, there are certain key
restrictions on criminal liability in cases of harm caused by omission.
1. The conduct element of the crime in question must be capable of commission by

omission.
2. The circumstances must be such as to create a legal duty to act.
3. The defendant’s failure to act must be in breach of that duty.
4. The defendant’s failure to act must be voluntary.
5. The harm must be caused by the omission.
1. The conduct element of the crime in question must be capable of commission

by omission
Most result crimes can be committed by omission. This includes theft, murder,
criminal damage, fraud and most forms of manslaughter. Some, however, cannot. The
definitions of some offences specify or imply that only acts are sufficient. Assault is
one. So in R v Dunn [2015] EWCA Crim 724 D was charged with indecent assault. What he
had done was to cause a 15-year-old girl to masturbate him. The Court of Appeal held
that the offence was not made out. Indecent assault requires there to be an assault. An
assault requires some form of act on D’s part. Here the act was the girl’s, not his. D had
committed an offence but not this one. This offence was causing a child to engage in
sexual activity (s.10 Sexual Offences Act 2003).
Activity 3.4
Read Wilson, Section 4.5.D.2 ‘Omissions: the common law approach’ and find and
note down for later reference some other crimes which cannot be committed by
omission.
2. The circumstances must be such as to create a legal duty to act

Assuming the offence is capable of being committed by omission a successful
prosecution can occur only if the defendant’s omission was in breach of a legal duty
to act. This is why parents may be guilty of homicide for failing to feed their children,
or for neglecting them. They are guilty because parents owe a statutory duty of care to
their children. The number of duty situations are limited. They can be found in Wilson,
Section 4.5.D.3 ‘Circumstances giving rise to a duty to act: duty situations’ and need to
be learned.
Activity 3.5
Read Wilson, Section 4.5.D.3 ‘Circumstances giving rise to a duty to act: duty
situations’ and consider which, if any, of the following cases place A under a duty
to act and, if a duty does exist, what is the source of that duty. When you have done
this, consider whether, on the basis of your answers, the range of duty situations is
either too narrow or too broad. Write down your conclusions and the reasons for
them.
a. A is a swimming pool attendant. He sees V, a swimmer, struggling out of her
depth in the pool.
b. A is the sister of V. She sees V struggling out of her depth in the pool.
c. A is the mother of V. She sees V struggling out of her depth in the pool.
d. A is the son of V. He sees V struggling out of her depth in the pool.
e. A is the owner of the swimming pool. She sees V struggling out of her depth in
the pool.
f. A is the mother of T (aged 10) who has invited V, his friend (also aged 10), to go
swimming with him at the local pool. A sees V struggling out of his depth in the
pool.
g. A and V are an unmarried couple who live together. A sees V struggling out of his
depth in the pool.
h. A, who is supervising her child at a swimming pool, drops an ice cream

accidentally at the poolside. V (a child) slips on the ice cream and falls into the
pool. A sees V struggling out of her depth in the pool.
In the absence of such a duty of intervention or rescue an omission, however

reprehensible, cannot form the basis of a criminal prosecution. In the famous example
of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen:
A sees B drowning and is able to save him by holding out his hand. A abstains from doing
so in order that B may be drowned, and B is drowned. A has committed no offence.
(A digest of the criminal law, 1887)
This makes it important to know whether the conduct of the accused is an act or an
omission because a person’s criminal liability depends upon it. For example, if in a
variation of the above example, A holds out his hand for B to grasp and then removes
his hand from B’s grip when realising B is his deadly enemy, is this a case of omission or
commission? If it is the latter then A is guilty of murder: if the former then it is nothing.
So much hangs on a simple question of definition. The usual definition of an act, as we

know, is ‘a bodily movement’. Since A has moved his body then, assuming death would
have been prevented by maintaining his grip, A seems to be guilty of murder. Simple in
theory, but not so simple in practice. To understand why you will need to read Wilson.
Activity 3.6
Read Wilson, Section 4.5.D.1 ‘Acts and omissions: what’s the difference?’ and answer
the following questions.
a. Why were the doctors in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) not guilty of murder
for switching off the machine keeping Anthony Bland alive?
b. Do you think this is the right decision?
c. If Anthony Bland’s parents had switched off the machine out of compassion for
his position would they have been guilty of murder?
3. The defendant’s failure to act must be in breach of that duty

D’s failure to act does not necessarily mean that D is in breach of duty. For example, in
cases where D has a duty of rescue but failed to rescue someone, D is not liable for a
failure to rescue if:
uu they did as much as could be expected in the circumstances
uu performance of the duty was impossible
uu the failure to act was justified.
Activity 3.7
Read Wilson, Section 4.5.D.4 ‘Circumstances governing the scope of the duty’ and
note down examples of how a person can or has avoided liability for omitting to act
on the basis of the above three situations. Retain these notes for future reference.
4. The defendant’s failure to act must be voluntary

If D’s failure to act was due to his being unconscious or being restrained, the failure is
involuntary and cannot form the subject matter of a criminal offence even though D
was under a duty of intervention.
5. The harm must be caused by the omission

The prosecution must be able to prove that the defendant’s breach of duty caused
the harm. In Morby (1882) 8 QBD 571 a parent failed to call for medical support for his
ailing child. The child subsequently died of smallpox. The parent was convicted of
manslaughter at first instance, but the Court for Crown Cases Reserved allowed the
appeal, since the prosecution could not prove that prompt medical attention would
have saved the child. Put another way, the prosecution could not prove that the
defendant’s failure to perform his duty had caused the infant’s death since the child
might have died anyway.
Activity 3.8
Can you remember what you have learned so far? Let’s see. Read Wilson, Section
4.5.D ‘Omissions and crimes of commission’ and then complete the following.
a. Name three crimes which cannot be committed by omission.
b. For result crimes, how does the criminal law ensure that liability for failing to
prevent a result does not criminalise too many people?
c. Under what circumstances is a person placed under a duty to act to prevent

harm?
d. Does a sibling owe a duty to other siblings?
e. Do offspring owe duties to parents?
f. Do live-in partners owe a duty to each other?
g. Do mountain climbers owe a duty to each other?
h. Assault is one of those few result crimes which cannot be committed by

omission. Why then was the defendant in Fagan v MPC (1969) (Wilson, Section
8.1.A ‘Temporal coincidence’) found guilty of assault when he refused to remove
his car which had been inadvertently parked on a policeman’s foot? It might be
helpful to read the case report in the Online Library.
i. Read Wilson, Section 4.5.D.3(d) ‘The duty to avert a dangerous situation caused
by the defendant’ and (e) ‘Miller and beyond’. How does the case of Evans (2009)
extend the principle in Miller (1983)?
j. What reason did the House of Lords give for deciding that if doctors turned off
Anthony Bland’s life support machine this would be an omission, not an act?
k. Consider the case of Morby (1882). Is it ever possible for the prosecution to
prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that V would not have died when he did if
D had sought prompt medical care? Does this put an undue burden on the
prosecution?
3.2 Circumstances
As was outlined in Chapter 2 of this module guide, the definition of certain crimes
requires proof that certain circumstances existed which convert what would otherwise
be an innocuous act into a criminal act. Obvious examples include rape and assault,
both of which can be committed only where the victim does not consent. Absence of
consent, for these crimes, is therefore a circumstance which can convert an ordinarily
quite lawful act (sexual intercourse or a simple touching) into the actus reus of a crime.
Activity 3.9
Look at the definitions of theft and a firearms offence and answer the questions
below.
‘(1) A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to

another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; and “thief”
and “steal” shall be construed accordingly.’ (s.1, Theft Act 1968)
‘(1) Subject to any exemption under this Act, it is an offence for a person –
(a) to have in his possession, or to purchase or acquire, a firearm to which this

section applies without holding a firearm certificate in force at the time, or
otherwise than as authorised by such a certificate.’ (s.1, Firearms Act 1968)
In each case state:

a. the prohibited conduct
b. the prohibited circumstances.
Sample examination question

One very good way of learning and understanding an area of law is to answer an
examination question. This will focus your reading, thus helping you to understand
and remember what you are reading. If you just read, this will not be so helpful.
Consider the arguments, both for and against, for expanding the range of duty
situations which ground liability for omissions. Should there be a general duty of
easy rescue?
Advice for answering the question

First analyse what the question requires of you. This question involves two parts.
The first part asks you to consider changes to the present law involving the possible
creation of new duty situations. The second asks you to consider whether we should
stop limiting liability for omissions to a small range of duty situations and create a
general duty to intervene whenever we are in a position to prevent harm.
Using Wilson, Section 4.5.D ‘Omissions and crimes of commission’ write a one-page
skeleton answer to this question which highlights at least three reasons why criminal
liability for omitting to prevent harm is thought a bad idea (or why the current range
of duty situations are sufficient) and three responses to those objections. Also suggest
at least three examples of duty situations which should or could be added to the
present list, together with arguments against. Finally consider the arguments, for and
against, for giving everybody a general responsibility to help others in peril.

In Chapter 4 of this module guide we shall look at the other ingredients of the actus
reus, namely consequences and causation. Are you ready to move on to the next
chapter? You are if – without referring to the module guide or Wilson – you can answer
1. What is the ‘act requirement’?
2. What are the three exceptions to the act requirement?
3. What are the conditions of liability for a crime of commission in respect of an

omission to act?
4. Under what circumstances will a duty to act arise?
5. What is the difference between an act and an omission? Why does it matter?
6. Why is criminal liability for omissions controversial?

Notes
4 Actus reus: consequences and their causes
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1 Result crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 Accountability: basic guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Principles governing causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 Breaking the chain of causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Introduction
Most of the crimes we examine in Criminal law require proof that D caused a
particular harm, for example injury or death to the victim or damage to their property.
So how do the prosecution go about proving that D (or rather D’s act) was the cause?
For example, if A threatens B with death if he does not punch C, and B does punch C,
is it A or B who causes C’s injury? Or if A stabs V and V is killed in a car crash on the way
to hospital is it A or the car crash which causes V’s death? The principles governing
causation are the subject of this chapter.
Essential reading
¢¢ Wilson, Chapter 5 ‘Causation’.
Criminal law 4 Actus reus: consequences and their causes page 27
4.1 Result crimes

The third element in actus reus concerns result crimes only. You will remember that
some crimes do not require proof of harm. These are known as conduct crimes.
They require proof only of some form of wrongful conduct. An example is dangerous
driving; a person can be convicted of dangerous driving if, for example, they drive too
fast or aggressively, ignore traffic lights or road signs, or overtake while driving round
a blind corner. A conviction does not require anybody to be hurt or for there to be an
accident.
Result crimes, however, require both wrongful conduct and harm. So the crime of
causing death by dangerous driving requires both dangerous driving and a death.
Crucially, however, the prosecution must also prove causation. In other words, it must
prove that the victim met their death as a result of the defendant driving dangerously.
For all result crimes, therefore, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
defendant’s conduct caused the prohibited result. In murder or manslaughter this
will be the death; in criminal damage it will be the damage done to the property; in
malicious wounding it will be the wound, and so on. In this chapter we consider what
the prosecution has to show if it is to discharge its burden of proving causation.
In the vast majority of cases this will be straightforward. For example, if A shoots B with
a gun and B dies, it should not be too difficult for the prosecution to show that A’s act
caused B’s death. Similarly, if A sets light to B’s house or stabs B, it should not be too
difficult for the prosecution to show that A’s act caused the criminal damage or the
wound, as the case may be.
The prosecution’s task becomes harder, however, when more than one event or act
contributes to the result. In such circumstances questions as to whether D’s act or
omission was the cause of the harm demand the application of legal principles. So
what are the principles governing causation in the criminal law? Before we investigate
further, consider the following cases in which such principles will need to be deployed.
Activity 4.1
Review the following cases. When you have done so answer the questions at the
end.
a. D, as a joke, places a wet bar of soap on the floor of V’s bathroom, hoping that
V will slip on the soap. V does slip on the soap, hits her head on the floor and is
knocked unconscious. Does D cause V’s injury?
b. As above except that V dies because her skull was unusually thin. Does D cause
V’s death?
c. D rapes V. So distressed is V that she commits suicide. Does D cause V’s death?
d. D rapes V. When V’s father finds out he kills V due to the dishonour caused to the
family by V’s loss of virginity. Does D cause V’s death?
e. D stabs V. An ambulance is called to take V to hospital. On the journey to hospital

the ambulance is involved in an accident which kills the driver, X, and V. Does D
cause V’s death?
f. D is the lifeguard on a beach. She sees V struggling in the water and dives in to
save him. Unfortunately D is not a good swimmer and is unable to rescue V in
time. Does D cause V’s death?
g. D stabs V. An ambulance is called to take V to hospital. The ambulance crew are

on their lunch break and refuse to come until it has ended. By the time they
arrive, V has died of blood loss. Does D cause V’s death?
h. D and V attend a party together. D gives V an ecstasy pill which V takes. Unknown
to both D and V the pill has unusual strength. V falls unconscious and dies almost
immediately. Does D cause V’s death?
In each of the above cases the defendant (D) may wish to claim that although
they did wrong they should not be held accountable for the harm that transpired
because it is too far removed from D’s initial act or omission. In which of the above
cases do you agree that D should not be held accountable and in which do you think
D should? Is there any pattern to your conclusions which could form the basis for
general principles of application?
4.2 Accountability: basic guidelines

A basic rule of thumb is that where a person‘s voluntary act initiates a causal sequence
which ends in harm, that person will normally be held accountable unless an act or
event later transpires which renders a finding of accountability inappropriate. If we
examine case (a) in Activity 4.1 above, this produces the following analysis.
uu D’s act is voluntary in the sense of being under the physical and mental control of D.
uu D’s act is the first link in a chain of events (chain of causation) which results in V’s
injury.
uu D is therefore accountable for that injury unless a later act or event occurs which
renders a finding of accountability inappropriate.
The later act or event is V slipping over and banging her head. Does this act or event
render it inappropriate to hold D to account for V’s injury? This is the big question.
We need to have a basis for saying either that D should be held accountable or that
D should not. It is this basis which, in an ideal criminal justice system, will form the
central principles governing accountability or causation in the criminal law. What
conclusion did you reach and what was your reasoning?
Assuming you concluded that D did cause V’s injury, here are some possible basic
principles which you might have adopted to explain your conclusion.
uu D is accountable for all the consequences of their wrongful act.
uu D is accountable for all the foreseeable consequences of their wrongful act.
uu D is accountable for all the foreseen consequences of their wrongful act.
Now consider the Draft Criminal Code Bill 1989, clause 17 of which is intended to be a
restatement of the common law position. Clause 17 reads:
1. …a person causes a result which is an element of an offence when –
a. he does an act which makes a more than negligible contribution to its occurrence;
or
b. he omits to do an act which might prevent its occurrence and which he is under a
duty to do according to the law relating to the offence.
2. A person does not cause a result where, after he does such an act or makes such an
omission, an act or event occurs –
a. which is the immediate and sufficient cause of the result;
b. which he did not foresee, and
c. which could not in the circumstances reasonably have been foreseen.
This is a clear and generally a pretty accurate restatement of the common law
position. It renders D accountable for V’s injury in case (a). D did an act (placed soap
on the floor) which made a more than merely negligible contribution to the result (V’s
loss of consciousness) and everything that happened after putting the soap on the
floor (V slipping over and banging her head) could ‘in the circumstances reasonably
have been foreseen’. So D is accountable for the result.
There are, however, certain aspects of causation doctrine which part company with
this restatement. For example, the courts will sometimes treat a later voluntary act
of a third party or the victim as breaking the chain of causation between act and
result if it was sufficient cause of the result, even if it was perfectly foreseeable or
indeed foreseen. Case (h) in Activity 4.1 is an example. In law, D is not the cause of V’s
death because although D began the chain and V’s taking the pill was foreseen and
foreseeable, V’s voluntary taking of the pill breaks the chain of causation. It is now V’s
act rather than D’s which causes V’s death.
Now we shall look more closely at the case law and the principles of causation which
derive from it.
4.3 Principles governing causation

As Clause 17 of the Draft Criminal Code Bill 1989 indicates, causation involves a two-part
inquiry. The first part concerns how causal sequences begin, while the second part
concerns how, once begun, a causal sequence may come to an end. In short, to be held
accountable for a consequence involves being both the factual cause and also the
legal cause of that consequence.
4.3.1 Factual cause

Hart and Honoré describe a factual cause as:
an event or act which ‘makes the difference’ between something happening and
something not happening.
(Causation and the law. (1959))
The common way of representing this is:
uu an act is the factual cause if the consequence would not have happened but for
that act
uu an omission is the factual cause if the consequence would not have happened but
for the defendant’s failure to act as they should have done.
Put another way, if the consequence would have happened just as it did irrespective
of the defendant’s act (White [1910] 2 KB 124) or omission (see Morby (1882), Chapter 3)
it is not caused by the defendant. So White was not accountable for the death of his
mother, whose drink he had poisoned, when she died of a heart attack before taking
the poison. Nor would White be accountable had his mother swallowed the poison
but died of a heart attack before the poison began to work. However, it would have
been different if, in the latter case, the heart attack was prompted by the initial effects
of the poison. In this latter case the but for principle operates because the heart attack
is not independent of the initial act of the defendant and so forms the final link in the
causal chain.
To be the factual cause of a criminal harm, D does not have to start the process leading
to the consequence; it is enough that D accelerates it. So in Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454 a
child was admitted to hospital with injuries suffered after his father had beaten him
severely. At the time of his hospitalisation the child was suffering from meningitis.
The child died of his injuries. Medical evidence was adduced to show that he would
have died of meningitis before long. D was charged and convicted of manslaughter.
He appealed on the ground that he was not a but for (factual) cause of V’s death since
the child would have soon died of meningitis anyway. The court said that it was not
necessary to show that D was the sole cause of death so long as his action accelerated
the time when death would otherwise occur.
Activity 4.2
This question of how much acceleration needs to be established is a particular
problem attached to cases of euthanasia. There have been a number of high-profile
cases in which doctors have been prosecuted for murder where they have ‘eased
the passing’ of a terminally ill patient. Examples are Adams [1957] Crim LR 365 and
Moor. For interesting commentaries see Arlidge, A. ‘The trial of Dr David Moor’
(2000) Crim LR 31, Smith, J.C. ‘A comment on Moor’s Case’ (2000) Crim LR 41 and
Goss, J. ‘A postscript to the trial of Dr David Moor’ (2000) Crim LR 568.
Now read Wilson, Section 5.5.B.1 ‘The general framework for imputing cause’ and
explain why Dr Adams was not thought to have caused the death of his patient and
what change in the facts of the case would have been necessary for the court to
have reached a contrary conclusion.
To be the factual cause of a criminal harm, the causal connection does not have to
be direct. In Mitchell [1983] 2 All ER 427 the accused punched a man who had accused
him of queue-jumping in a post office. The man fell on top of an 89-year-old woman,
which initially broke her leg and consequently caused her death from a pulmonary
embolism. The accused’s conviction for manslaughter was upheld on appeal. He was
a but for cause. In the words of the Draft Criminal Code, he did an act which made ‘a
more than negligible contribution’ to the consequence’s occurrence.
4.3.2 Legal cause

The factual cause of a consequence will also be the legal cause of that consequence,
unless the factual cause is too insubstantial or remote to render it inappropriate to
attribute the consequence to the act. In the words of the Draft Criminal Code a factual
cause will be too remote if, subsequent to it, another act or event occurs which also
contributed to the result which was not foreseen by the defendant, and could not in
the circumstances reasonably have been foreseen.
The most important thing to remember here is that the judgment made by the court
is not a scientific judgement, as it is with the factual cause. It is a moral judgement.
The court is being asked to consider whether it is appropriate to hold the defendant
to account for what has transpired. Sometimes a person can be the factual cause of
a criminal harm and yet it does not seem appropriate to hold them accountable. You
may well have reached this conclusion in relation to case (d) in Activity 4.1 above. If
anybody is to be held accountable for V’s death (as opposed to the rape) it is surely V’s
father, not D.
In this section we will consider when a factual cause of a consequence is too

insignificant to be treated as the legal cause, and when it is too remote.
Principles of application
To be the legal cause of a criminal harm, the consequence must be the consequence
not merely of the defendant’s act but of their wrongful act. So if A is charged with
causing B’s death by dangerous driving and A does kill B by running him over in her car,
while driving dangerously, this does not necessarily mean that A is guilty of causing
death by dangerous driving. The crime is causing death by dangerous driving not
causing death while driving dangerously.
Activity 4.3
Read Wilson, Section 5.5.B ‘Legal cause’ and answer the following questions.
a. Why was the defendant in Dalloway (1847) not guilty of manslaughter, although
he was driving his cart very dangerously when it ran over the child?
b. A points a gun at B and threatens to kill B. C sees this. C, in trying to disarm A,

causes the gun to fire and injure V, a bystander. Is C the legal cause of V’s harm?
To be a legal cause, the defendant’s contribution to the result must be substantial,

although it need not be the sole cause. Even if a result would not have occurred but for
D’s acts, it is appropriate to ask to what extent D’s acts significantly contributed to the
result. The criminal law ignores trivial causes. For example, in Adams (1957) a doctor
gave his terminally ill patient a dose of painkillers so strong that it killed the patient.
Devlin J ruled that if the dose were given for pain relief in accordance with the doctor’s
duty it would not be the doctor but the disease which was the real cause of death. The
doctor’s contribution could be ignored as negligible.
Compare Benge (1865) 4 F & F 504 in which D, a foreman platelayer on a railway, failed
to check the train timetable to ensure the men working for him were safe on the
line. A train killed one of the workmen. D claimed that he was not the legal cause
since the driver of the train could have prevented the deaths if he had kept a proper
lookout. It was held that D’s contribution was substantial enough to justify attributing
responsibility for the death to him; his contribution was too substantial to be ignored.
4.3.3 Problem cases

The court is most likely to be taxed in deciding whether D is the legal cause of a
consequence when something unusual happens following D’s unlawful act. In
McKechnie (1992) 94 Cr App R 51, for example, D beat up an elderly man, V, who suffered
very serious head injuries and remained unconscious for weeks. Doctors discovered
that V had a duodenal ulcer but decided that it would be too dangerous to operate
because he was still unconscious from his beating. V died as a result of the ulcer
bursting. D was convicted and appealed inter alia on the direction as to causation. The
Court of Appeal, upholding his conviction, ruled that D was still the cause of V’s death
since the doctors’ decision not to operate was due to the effects of the initial beating.
Two key points emerge from this case. The first, reflecting Benge, is that where more
than one cause operates, as it did here, the initial wrongful act of D is still the legal
cause if it is still a substantial and operative cause; in other words, if it is still strongly
influential on the outcome. The second is that a later causal contribution will not
prevent the initial cause being still operative unless it is independent of the initial
act. Here the doctors’ decision was not independent of the initial beating as it was
influenced by that beating. If the doctors had mistakenly given the victim poison
which caused the ulcer to rupture this would have been independent of the initial act,
and so D would not have been the legal cause of V’s death.
Sections 4.3.6–4.3.8 below present some other problem cases where the courts have
to choose whether the legal cause of a criminal harm is D’s wrongful act or some other
act or event.
4.3.4 Death precipitated by the victim’s vulnerable physical or mental

condition
Occasionally the victim’s death is triggered by a combination of the defendant’s
unlawful act and their own physical or mental vulnerability. For example, in
Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692 D chased the victim, D’s wife, and threatened her with
death. Unknown to him V had a weak heart and died of a heart attack. D remained
accountable for the death. This principle, which is known as the ‘Eggshell Skull Rule’
is of general application. Simply put, D’s causal responsibility for resultant harm is not
deflected if V has a condition (such as a skull as fragile as an eggshell), which renders
them especially likely to suffer injury or die.
Activity 4.4
Read Wilson, Section 5.6.A ‘Subsisting conditions’ and answer the following
questions.
a. Why was Blaue the cause of V’s death when V could have easily prevented it by
agreeing to a blood transfusion?
b. Eve asks Adam, her husband, to shoot her because she is terminally ill and
wishes to die. Adam does so out of compassion and respect for her wishes.
However, his shot fails to kill her but causes massive internal bleeding. Adam
then realises that he does not want to be responsible for Eve’s death so he takes
her to hospital. The hospital tells Eve that she needs a blood transfusion and
that she will die without it. Eve refuses, as she still wants to die – which she does.
Is Adam the legal cause of her death? Please note here that there is no right
answer. Questions about whether the factual cause of a criminal harm is also the
cause recognised by the law is a matter of moral and common-sense judgement
– so exercise yours!
4.3.5 Supervening acts of third parties

Acts of third parties can, on occasions, break the chain of causation linking a but for
cause to a consequence. However, these occasions are rare, as we shall now see.
Acts of third parties exacerbating the harm

If a third party contributes to the harmful result, this will not break the chain of
causation if D’s original act was still a substantial and operative cause of the harm. In
Smith [1959] 2 QB 35 the victim died of a stab wound to the lung, but not before he
had been dropped twice before reaching medical attention and had received artificial
respiration – which is not a good idea for someone with a punctured lung! Smith was
still the legal cause of V’s death. Although the intervening acts contributed to the
death, Smith’s acts were still a substantial cause of the harm and were still operative at
the time of death.
Hint: Consider what the autopsy report would have said to be the cause of death.
The following statement of principle given in Smith is a very useful summary of the
general legal position governing causation.
if at the time of death the original wound is still an operating cause and a substantial
cause, then the death [is] the result of the wound, albeit that some other cause is also
operating. Only if it can be said that the original wounding is merely the setting in which
another cause operates can it be said that the death does not result from the wound.
Putting it in another way, only if the second cause is so overwhelming as to make the
original wound merely part of the history can it be said that death does not flow from the
wound.
Activity 4.5
Memorise the statement of principle in Smith – it will be time well spent.
Activity 4.6
Read Wilson, Section 5.6 ‘Particular examples of causal sequences giving rise to
causation problems’ and answer the following question.
If the doctors had given the victim in Smith a huge overdose of painkillers by
mistake, which would have killed any patient irrespective of their condition, would
this prevent the initial wound from being the ‘substantial and operative cause’ of
V’s death?
Acts of third parties reacting to a danger caused by A’s act

It is natural that when a person acts in a dangerous fashion third parties may act
unpredictably by way of reaction. For this reason it will be rare that such a reaction will
break the chain of causation linking the defendant with the eventual consequence. For
an extreme example see Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279, in which D used his pregnant
girlfriend, V, as a human shield to prevent police officers arresting him. D had a
shotgun with him and shot towards the police. They returned fire and V was killed. He
appealed against conviction for manslaughter on the ground that the police, and not
he, had caused V’s death. The Court of Appeal disagreed. In reaching its decision it said:
if a reasonable act of self-defence against the act of the accused causes the death of a
third party…[it does not] relieve the accused from criminal responsibility for the death of
the third party.
Activity 4.7
Consider the case of Pagett and answer the following questions. Remember, there
are no right answers to these questions. They are simply some of the considerations
the court will have in mind in deciding whether to attribute cause to the defendant
when their causal contribution is not obvious.
a. Do you think the police’s reaction was reasonable? Do you think the real issue
should be whether the police response was ‘foreseeable’?
b. If D had simply waved the gun in the air and the police had opened fire, with the
same result, would D still be the cause of V’s death?
c. What principle would you adopt to support your answer to question (b) above?
Hint: In each case, ask yourself whether D’s act was a substantial and operative
cause of death; whether the police response was reasonable; whether the police
response was foreseeable; whether the police response was made more likely
by D’s action? In principle, a ‘yes’ to any one of these questions might support D’s
conviction. Which question(s) do you think the court should ask?
Medical interventions
We have already seen an example of poor medical treatment contributing to a
criminal harm (Smith). In Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844 D shot V in the abdomen. V was
taken to hospital where he was operated on. Almost immediately he started suffering
breathing difficulties and so a tracheotomy was performed. Six weeks later, V’s wounds
were nearly healed but his breathing was getting progressively worse and he died. The
doctors failed to recognise and respond to the cause of V’s problems, which was that
the tracheotomy had been negligently performed. The trial judge told the jury that
this bad medical treatment did not relieve D from responsibility. On the basis of this
direction the jury convicted. D appealed.
Activity 4.8
Read Wilson, Section 5.6.B.2 ‘Third party’s act contributing to the occurrence
or extent of injury’, Section (b) ‘Medical treatment’ and answer the following
questions.
a. What was the response of the Court of Appeal to the appeal in Cheshire? What
principle did the Court lay down in reaching its decision? This is another
principle that is worth committing to memory.
b. Cheshire was quite an extreme case of bad medical treatment yet D remained
liable. In what situations will bad medical treatment rid D’s criminal act of
‘causal potency’?
c. Consider the court’s decision in Jordan. Is it consistent with Cheshire? If not,

which do you prefer and why?
4.3.6 Supervening acts of the victim
Supervening acts of the victim exacerbating the harm

If, after they have been hurt by D, V does something which is unexpected and
prejudicial to their prospects of recovery, this will not break the chain of causation
if D’s act is still a substantial and operative cause. For example, in Holland (1841) 2
Mood & R 351, V, following a serious assault with an iron bar, refused to submit to the
amputation of a finger, recommended to prevent tetanus. D was held to be causally
responsible for V’s resultant death from tetanus. In Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411, D stabbed V,
causing serious blood loss. Doctors treating V told her she needed a blood transfusion
else she would die. V refused the transfusion for religious reasons and died of blood
loss. D argued that he was not the cause of V’s death: the cause was V’s refusal. The
Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating that the defendant must ‘take the
victim as he finds him’. D’s act was still a substantial and operative cause of death.
Remember the autopsy report!
Escape attempts
If V is injured attempting to escape from D’s unlawful attack, D will be causally
responsible so long as the defensive action was attributable to that attack. In Roberts
(1972) 56 Cr App R 95, V jumped out of a moving car in reaction to being sexually
assaulted by D in the car. The Court of Appeal ruled that D was the cause of V’s injuries
as D’s act began the causal chain and her reaction was reasonably foreseeable. The
Court also stated that the chain of causation would be broken only by the victim doing
something ‘daft’. In Williams and Davis [1992] 1 WLR 380, on similar facts except that
the result was the death of the escaping passenger, a slightly different test was used
– namely whether V’s response was within the range of responses which might be
expected from a victim ‘placed in the situation which he was’.
Activity 4.9
There are three different tests of causation used in Roberts and Williams and Davis.
Two are used in one case!
a. One says that the chain of causation is not broken unless V does something
which was not reasonably foreseeable.
b. Another says the chain of causation is not broken unless V does something ‘daft’.
c. The final test says that the chain of causation is not broken unless V’s response
was ‘not within the range of responses which might be expected from a victim
placed in his situation’.
Do all these tests mean the same thing or might the tests elicit different answers?
Think of some situations which might.
Suicide
If V commits suicide as a result of D having raped, maimed or physically abused them,
is D causally responsible for V’s death? The tests of causation in Activity 4.9 are not
terribly helpful here. Suicide is hardly a foreseeable response to a rape but if we ask
the question ‘is suicide “within the range of responses which might be expected
from” a rape victim?’ we would probably say yes. In Dhaliwal [2006] EWCA Crim 1139, a
case involving suicide following a long period of domestic abuse, the Court of Appeal
acknowledged that suicide could be triggered (and caused) by the most recent
unlawful attack. Specifically:
where a decision to commit suicide has been triggered by a physical assault which
represents the culmination of a course of abusive conduct, it would be possible…to argue
that that final assault played a significant part in causing the victim’s death.
Activity 4.10
Is the principle enunciated in Dhaliwal the same as rendered Blaue liable for his
victim’s unforeseen decision to refuse a blood transfusion?
4.4 Breaking the chain of causation

So far you will be forgiven for thinking that nothing can prevent the attribution of
legal cause to a person whose culpable act began a chain of causation which ended
with the victim’s death or other harm. However, in certain circumstances, the chain of
causation linking act and result can be broken. It can be broken by an act or an event
which, in the words of the Draft Criminal Code, was neither foreseen nor foreseeable
or, in certain circumstances, by the voluntary actions of the victim or third party –
whether foreseeable or not.
An act or event which breaks the chain of causation is known as a novus actus
interveniens, or a new act intervening. Now we will examine the special characteristics
of a novus actus interveniens, of which the case of Jordan (1956) is an example. In this
case the court ruled, rightly or wrongly, that the intervening causal contribution of
a third party was so powerful and independent of the initial wrongful act of the
defendant that that act was no longer fairly treated as the cause of death.
Activity 4.11
Read Wilson, Section 5.6.B.2 ‘Third party’s act contributing to the occurrence of
injury’.
What were the special features in Jordan which prompted the court to hold that the
chain of causation had been broken? What was the test used? If that same test had
been used in Cheshire would the outcome have been any different?
When will a subsequent act or event break the chain of causation? This depends upon
whether the intervening event is an act or a natural occurrence.
4.4.1 New acts intervening

An intervening act of a third party will break the chain of causation if it is:
uu voluntary
uu independent of the initial act, and
uu sufficient in itself to cause the harm suffered by the victim.
For example, in the American case of People v Elder (1894), D struck V and V collapsed
on the ground. Then a bystander, B, who was not part of any plan to hurt V, stepped up
and kicked V, killing him. D was not guilty of homicide. Although D was a factual cause
of the death, the independent and voluntary act of B broke the chain of causation. A
more modern example is the English case of Rafferty [2007] EWCA Crim 1846, which you
will find in Wilson, Section 5.6.B.3 ‘Intervening cause supersedes defendant’s act’.
The requirement that the act of the third party be independent of D’s act is best
illustrated by the cases of Pagett and Cheshire. The acts of the police officers in Pagett,
and the medics in Cheshire, did not involve new acts intervening because they were by
way of reaction to D’s wrongful act. They were not independent of it.
Activity 4.12
Read Wilson, Section 5.6.B.2 ‘Third party’s act contributing to the occurrence or
extent of injury’.
Under what circumstances might very bad medical treatment break the chain of
causation?
The chain of causation in cases of intervening voluntary and independent acts is
broken only if the intervening act was sufficient in itself to kill V. If V’s death occurred
only because V was already weakened by the initial attack the chain of causation will
not be broken, as D’s initial act will still be an operative and substantial cause.
As we have seen, unpredictable reactions of the victim to the defendant’s wrongdoing

do not generally break the chain of causation because they are not deemed to be
independent of the initial act which is still an operative cause: see Holland, Roberts and
Blaue, for example.
The most important cases of intervening acts of the victim breaking the chain of
causation involve drug supply. In a number of cases in the past 20 years, the supplier
of drugs to a person who has died following self-injection has been charged with
manslaughter. The main question for the court is whether the unlawful act of supply
causes the death. If we apply the usual rule of foreseeability (see Roberts and the Draft
Criminal Code) the supply is the legal cause of death. However, supplying drugs to
someone does not cause them to take the drugs. It is their choice. In other words, the
cause of death seems to be the voluntary act of the victim in self-injecting rather than
that of the supplier in supplying it to them.
For a number of years the courts could not decide which test to apply. In Finlay [2003]
EWCA Crim 3868 the Court of Appeal said that the supplier had caused the death
because it was foreseeable that the recipient would self-inject. The position now,
following Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38, is that the test is not whether the victim’s act
was foreseeable but whether it was voluntary. A free and informed choice to self-inject
the drug breaks the chain of causation. It would not be free and informed if the victim
lacked mental capacity or did not know of the strength of the drug.
We need to make one qualification to this. If the supplier witnesses the victim losing
consciousness and fails to do anything to remedy the situation, a different causal
inquiry may result in the supplier’s conviction for manslaughter. In such a case, the
supplier’s omission in breach of duty (see Evans in Chapter 3 of this module guide) will
be the new intervening cause of death.
4.4.2 Intervening events

An intervening event will break the chain of causation if it is:
uu abnormal
uu independent of D’s act (i.e. a complete coincidence), and
uu sufficient in itself to cause the death or other harm.
This would apply to case (e) in Activity 4.1 above, the ambulance case. It would
also apply if V died in hospital due to an earthquake or contracted a fatal illness
independent of their condition. For example, in Bush v Commonwealth (1880) V died of
scarlet fever contracted in hospital following D’s attack. D was held not to be the cause
of death.
However, an intervening event will not break the chain of causation if the risk of
it happening was created by or increased by D’s act. For example, if D leaves V
unconscious by the side of the road and V later stumbles on to the road and into the
path of a passing car (Corbett [1996] Crim LR 594), if D leaves V on the beach and the
tide comes in and drowns V, or if D leaves V in a cemetery and a wild animal attacks V
(The Harlot’s Case (1560)), D will remain causally accountable for the resulting harm,
death or serious injury, as the case may be.
Activity 4.13
Read Wilson, Section 5.6.B ‘Intervening acts and events’ and answer the following
questions.
a. Is there one test of causation or are there a number of different tests depending
upon the facts of the case?
b. Do you think Kennedy (No 2) is rightly decided?
c. Consider the Environment Agency v Empress Cars case. Is it consistent with

Kennedy? Do you agree with the decision?
d. Compare Rafferty with Maybin. Which decision do you prefer, and why?

1. State the general rule of thumb governing causation.
2. Give a verbatim account of the test for causation in either the Draft Criminal Code
or Smith.
3. Explain how chains of causation come to an end.
4. Explain the ‘Eggshell Skull Rule’ and give one example.
5. Explain why in Pagett, although it was police rather than D who shot V dead, it was
D who was the legal cause of her death.
6. Give three examples of cases in which the court’s conclusion was that, although
a later act or event had influence on the result, the initial wrongdoer was still
accountable.
7. Give three examples of cases in which the court’s conclusion was that, due to
the intervention of a later act or event, the initial wrongdoer was no longer
accountable.
8. Explain the meaning of ‘operative’ in the phrase ‘substantial and operative’.
9. Explain the meaning of ‘substantial’ in the phrase ‘substantial and operative’.

5 Mens rea: criminal fault
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1 Objective fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2 Subjective fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3 Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.4 Recklessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.5 Negligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Introduction
As we saw in Chapter 3 of this module guide, criminal guilt, at least for traditional core
crimes, requires both wrongdoing and fault. It is not a crime to kill someone; but it is a
crime to intentionally or recklessly kill someone.
Criminal fault is necessary to ensure that conviction and punishment are deserved. It
acts as the criminal law’s filtering mechanism to ensure that only the blameworthy are
punished. Criminal fault is of two types – objective fault and subjective fault.
Criminal law 5 Mens rea: criminal fault page 39
5.1 Objective fault

A person is objectively at fault if they are thought blameworthy, irrespective of their
state of mind at the time of acting. For example, if my son is playing football too
near to the house and breaks a window, I will be tempted to tell him off, even if the
breakage was not deliberate and he was oblivious to the likelihood of causing damage.
I will tell him that he is at fault because he failed to conform to the family Wilson’s
standards of carefulness. These are objective standards which do not vary with the
context and take no account of the intentions or beliefs of the wrongdoer. Negligence
or carelessness are two fault terms representing ‘objective fault’ and are the attributes
of a person who fails to conform to the standards of ordinary, reasonable people.
Examples of crimes of objective fault are careless driving, dangerous driving and gross
negligence manslaughter.
Many commentators feel that objective fault should have little or no place in criminal
law. This is because of the importance of desert in punishment. While we may
rightly criticise people who fail to live up to the standards of behaviour we expect
from ordinary, reasonable people, is it fair to punish them if they were doing their
incompetent best? In McCrone v Riding [1938] 1 All ER 157, for example, the court ruled
that it was no answer to a charge of careless driving that the driver was a learner driver
and was not able to drive as proficiently as those who had passed their test.
In his book Punishment and responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) H.L.A Hart,
while accepting that punishment is deserved for failing to conform to objective
standards of behaviour, nevertheless argued that punishment should be limited to
those who could have conformed had they put their mind to it.
What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the
normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and abstaining
from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities.
5.2 Subjective fault

Traditional core crimes are, with the exception of rape and gross negligence
manslaughter, crimes of subjective fault. Most of these crimes carry substantial
terms of imprisonment as maximum sentences. Citizens are protected against unfair
punishment by a general requirement that, when performing their act of wrongdoing,
they have an accompanying mental attitude to what they are doing. It is this mental
element which makes them blameworthy and so punishable. Put simply, desert in
punishment requires the defendant to consciously choose the wrong they are about
to perform. There is no such requirement in relation to objective fault. There the
defendant is at fault simply because they did something bad or stupid, not because
they consciously chose to do so.
These (subjective) mental attitudes are of diverse kinds.
uu For murder, the prosecution must prove an intention to kill or cause serious injury.
uu For theft, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew others would think
their actions were dishonest.
uu For criminal damage, the prosecution must prove that the damage was done
intentionally or recklessly (with foresight).
uu For handling stolen goods, the prosecution must prove that the handler knew or
believed that the goods were stolen.
In this chapter we will examine the meaning of two forms of subjective fault (mens rea)
– namely intention and recklessness – and the major form of objective fault – namely
negligence.
5.3 Intention
Intention lies at the heart of criminal liability, since a basic element in all core crimes
is that D intended to do the act which formed the substance of their wrongdoing. To
be guilty of murder by shooting, for example, the prosecution must prove both that D
intended to pull the trigger and that D intended to kill, or at least cause serious injury.
It is important from the outset to understand that intention is different from motive.
As a rule of thumb, the motive provides the actor’s reason for forming the intention.
Criminal liability, in theory, ignores motive.
Illustration 5.1
a. A shoots B, a police officer, through the heart in order to escape arrest.
b. A (B’s wife) gives B, who is suffering a painful terminal illness, a lethal dose of
poison so that B can die without further suffering.
In both of these cases A intends to kill B. The motive, good or bad, is ignored.
5.3.1 Basic and specific intent

Certain crimes can only be committed with intention as the fault element. These crimes
are known as crimes of specific intent. A crime of specific intent is a crime for which the
prosecution has to prove that D intended to bring about some state of affairs by doing
what they did. An example of a state of mind labelled as ‘specific intent’ is the fault element
of murder, which is the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The prosecution in a
murder case must always prove that D acted with one of these two states of mind.
Crimes which do not require the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended
to do anything other than perform the acts which they did perform are known as
crimes of basic intent. Criminal damage is a crime of basic intent. The prosecution
has to prove that D intended to light the match, throw the stone, fire the gun and so
on. But it does not have to prove that D intended to damage the relevant property by
that act. If D foresaw that what they were doing might have this consequence that is a
sufficiently blameworthy state of mind to support the conviction.
5.3.2 Murder and manslaughter: what does ‘intention’ mean?

Because murder is a crime of specific intent, we need to know precisely what
‘intention’ in this context means in order to ensure that those who commit murder
are successfully distinguished from those who commit manslaughter, where no such
intention has to be shown. In Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55 this proved a great challenge
to the House of Lords when considering whether Hyam was guilty of murder or
manslaughter. Hyam had dropped a petrol bomb through the letterbox of her
neighbour, Mrs Booth, late one night when Mrs Booth was asleep. She did so not to
kill or cause serious injury to Mrs Booth but to frighten her out of the neighbourhood,
since Hyam was in love with Mrs Booth’s husband and wanted him for herself. Two of
Mrs Booth’s children died in the fire. Hyam argued that she did not intend to kill or
cause serious injury to Mrs Booth or the children: her intention was to frighten Mrs
Booth. This argument was unsuccessful and Hyam was convicted. The House of Lords
upheld the conviction on the basis that since she acted in the knowledge that death or
serious injury was likely she must be taken to have intended those consequences.
Activity 5.1
Read Wilson, Section 6.6.A.1 ‘Intention and risk-taking’ and answer the following
questions.
a. How would you define intention?
b. Do you agree with Lord Diplock’s definition of ‘intention’ in Hyam?
c. Why do you think he defined intention in this way?
d. What problems are created by this definition?
e. Give an example of such a problem.

Subsequent to this case, first in Moloney [1985] AC 905 and then in Hancock and
Shankland [1986] AC 455, the House of Lords revisited the meaning of intention.
These are cases on murder but their conclusions hold good for all crimes of specific
intent. In both cases the House of Lords, overruling Hyam, stated that if it could be
shown that D foresaw a consequence as probable or highly probable and yet carried
on regardless, this did not mean that D, therefore, intended the consequence as a
matter of definition. However, proof that D acted with this foresight could be used as
evidence that the consequence was in fact intended. Indeed, in many cases, the only
evidence that D intended an outcome is the fact that it was so likely to result from D’s
act. The higher the degree of probability foreseen by the defendant, the more likely
it was that the consequence was intended. Indeed, if the evidence showed that D
foresaw the consequence as virtually certain, the inference that D intended it might be
‘irresistible’. In Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025, on facts similar to Hyam, Lord Lane CJ put it
this way:
Where a man realises that it is for all practical purposes inevitable that his actions will
result in death or serious harm, the inference may be irresistible that he intended that
result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen.
However, the jury must decide whether the consequence was intended by reference
to all the evidence, and not just the probability of the consequence occurring. Section
8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 states that the jury:
shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by
reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions.
It should instead make the decision about whether D did have such an intention or
foresight:
by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear
proper in the circumstances.
Some have taken the effect of Nedrick to mean that if a person acts in the knowledge
that a consequence is practically certain then they intend it as a matter of definition.
It does not. It means that they may intend it as a matter of evidence. This means that
the jury will normally find it difficult (because the evidence of intention is so strong)
to resist finding that D did intend the consequence, even though it may not have been
their primary purpose.
Illustration 5.2
D rapes V, a four-year-old infant. D then throws V into a fast-flowing river in order
to destroy any trace of his DNA. He knows that this will certainly, for all practical
purposes, result in V’s death, which it does.
D does not act for the purpose of killing but the jury will nevertheless find it
difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that he did not intend to kill V because he
knew that this was inevitable and yet did nothing to stop it. If D did not intend the
death of V then why did he do what he did? He intended, in other words, the whole
package.
This approach was adopted by the House of Lords in the case of Woollin [1999] 1 AC
82, in which Nedrick was approved. Woollin threw his infant son across the room in a
moment of fury, and the son’s skull fractured and he died. Woollin was charged with
murder. The prosecution accepted that Woollin did not act in order to kill or cause
serious injury, but nevertheless argued that he intended at least serious injury. Woollin
was convicted of murder. He appealed on the basis that the trial judge misdirected the
jury on the meaning of intention.
The House of Lords made two very important points in this case. The first point is that
in the vast majority of cases the jury should not be directed by the judge as to what
intention means since it is an everyday word. The jury should be directed simply that
it should find the defendant not guilty of murder unless it was sure he intended to kill
or, if not to kill, then to cause grievous bodily harm (the simple direction). However, it
must be explained to the jury that intention is not the same as motive.
The second point is that the jury should be given some guidance in those rare cases,
such as in Woollin and in Illustration 5.2 above, where, although the evidence does
not indicate a purpose to kill or cause grievous bodily harm it does indicate that the
defendant was aware that death or grievous bodily harm might well occur. This is what
the guidance in Woollin states. It is in the form of a model direction from which judges
should not deviate.
Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple direction is not
enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary
intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty
(barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that
the defendant appreciated that such was the case. The decision is one for the jury to be
reached upon a consideration of all the evidence.
This direction makes clear that the foresight of virtual certainty is not intention in itself
but only evidence from which the jury is entitled to infer intention, depending upon
the rest of the evidence (see Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192). For example,
in Illustration 5.2 above the jury would no doubt wish to find the death of V intended.
But it would be less inclined to find intention in Illustration 5.3 below, where D would
also foresee death as a virtual certainty.
Illustration 5.3
V is in hospital on a life support machine. Doctors have concluded that there is no
prospect of recovery. X is admitted to the hospital following a car accident. X will
die unless put on to a life support machine immediately, but there are none free. Y,
X’s surgeon, removes the life support machine from V and gives it to X. Y knows that
the inevitable result of this will be V’s death. Does Y intend to kill V?
The Woollin direction tells the jury that it is entitled to say ‘yes’ but should make its
decision on the basis of all the evidence. In other words, the jury is also entitled to say
‘no’ if the evidence as a whole supports that conclusion, which in this case it clearly does.
The Woollin direction is important for giving the jury some discretion (or elbow room)
not to find intention in cases where death occurs as a side effect of an action otherwise
quite acceptable, such as this. This is a surprising state of affairs because motive is not
supposed to be taken into account in deciding whether intention is present or not.
Activity 5.2
Read Wilson, Section 6.6.C ‘The meaning of intention in the criminal law’ and
a. What is the difference between intention and motive?
b. Why is motive not supposed to be relevant to a person’s culpability?
c. Have the courts always kept to this principle?
d. Why do you think that courts sometimes take motive into account when they
are not supposed to?
e. In the case of Steane (1947), on what ground could Steane have been acquitted
other than his lack of criminal intent?
The Woollin direction is most important for drawing a clear line between intention and
recklessness. Foresight of anything less than virtual certainty cannot be intention but
can only be recklessness.
A succinct restatement of the present state of the law as to the meaning of intention
and the guidance juries are to be given appears in a recent Law Commission Report:
(1) A person is taken to intend a result if he or she acts in order to bring it about.
(2) In cases where the judge believes that justice will not be done unless an expanded
understanding of intention is given, the jury should be directed as follows: an
intention to bring about a result may be found if it is shown that the defendant
thought that the result was a virtually certain consequence of his action.
(LC 304: Murder, manslaughter and infanticide (2006), para.3.27)

Intention as understood by clause (1) above is commonly known as direct intention.

R.A. Duff (Intention, agency and criminal liability. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)) has explained
direct intention as being the state of mind of someone who when acting would
consider his act a failure if the consequence did not result. Intention as understood by
clause (2) is commonly known as indirect or oblique intention. This definition and that
of the Law Commission should be learned and understood.
Activity 5.3
Read Wilson, Sections 6.6.A ‘Everyday usage and its relevance to criminal
responsibility’ and 6.6.C ‘The meaning of intention in the criminal law’. In each
of the following questions state whether Adam intentionally kills Eve and, if so,
whether the form of intention is direct or indirect.
a. Adam’s wife, Eve, is trapped in a car which is about to be engulfed by flames
after an accident. She pleads with Adam, who has escaped the wreckage, to kill
her before she is burnt to death. Adam does so by a gunshot through the heart.
b. Adam and Eve go climbing together in the mountains. While climbing a steep
cliff, for which they are roped together, Eve slips and starts to fall. The weight
of Eve’s body begins to drag Adam off the cliff. Adam therefore cuts the rope,
causing Eve to fall to her death.
c. Adam, an angry farmer, sees Eve trespassing on his field about a kilometre away.
He takes out his rifle and aims it at her. He knows he is unlikely to hit her since
the rifle has a range of only around a kilometre, it is not a very reliable rifle and
he is not a very accurate shot. Adam is so angry he takes aim and shoots anyway.
The shot hits Eve and she is killed.
5.4 Recklessness
The mental element known as recklessness has had an undistinguished history. On
numerous occasions it has been used by judges interchangeably with negligence or
gross negligence, especially in the field of manslaughter. In theory, these two fault
elements are very different: recklessness is a subjective fault element requiring proof
of ‘awareness’ or ‘thought’, whereas negligence is an objective fault element which
does not. The traditional meaning of recklessness is the deliberate running of an
unjustified risk of which D was aware.
5.4.1 Awareness of the risk is necessary

The first major authority for the requirement that D be conscious of the risk they
were running was Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396. In this case, D ripped a gas meter from
the wall of a house in order to steal from it. Gas escaped from the exposed pipes and
penetrated next door’s house, affecting the occupants. D was charged and convicted
of ‘unlawfully and maliciously administering a noxious thing so as to endanger life’
contrary to s.23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861). His conviction
was quashed on appeal, as the judge had misdirected the jury on the meaning of
‘malicious’, telling them it meant ‘wicked’. The Court of Appeal stated the correct
meaning was that propounded by Professor Kenny, who had said in his Outlines of the
criminal law (Cambridge University Press, 1911):
In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of
wickedness in general but as requiring either (1) An actual intention to do the particular
kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should
occur or not (i.e., the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be
done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). It is neither limited to nor does it indeed
require any ill will towards ‘the person injured’.
This definition was adopted in Briggs (Note) [1977] 1 WLR 605, a case on criminal
damage to a car caused by overenthusiastic wrenching of the door handle.
5.4.2 Being aware of a risk does not always require conscious thought
process
This definition is true for the few crimes of malice which still remain, of which the
most important is malicious wounding, an offence under s.20 OAPA 1861. Professor
Kenny talks of the defendant ‘foreseeing’ the risk of harm of damage. Perhaps a better
phrase is ‘being aware of’, since it is quite possible to be aware of things which might
happen without explicitly thinking about them (foreseeing them) at the time of
acting. An illustration is Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600 in which the defendant, after a bad day
at the office, slammed down the receiver on the cradle of a defective public telephone
in frustration, which broke the telephone. He was fined for the damage caused and
he appealed. The Court of Appeal upheld the fine saying that if D did not think about
the risk of damage before he slammed down the telephone then ‘he was, in effect,
deliberately closing his mind to the obvious – the obvious being that damage in these
circumstances was inevitable’.
The Court concluded (Lane LJ at p.604):
A man is reckless in the sense required when he carried [sic] out a deliberate act…closing
his mind to the obvious fact that there is some risk of damage resulting from that act but
nevertheless continuing in the performance of that act.
This statement applies to those who know what the risks are but ‘close their mind to
the obvious’.
But what about those, such as the young and those with learning difficulties, who
do not or would not know them in the first place? Are they reckless? In Stephenson
[1979] QB 695 the defendant was a vagrant who lit a fire to keep warm in a haystack.
The haystack was destroyed and he was charged and convicted of criminal damage.
However, D had a long history of schizophrenia and expert evidence at trial suggested
that he may not have had the same ability to foresee or appreciate risks as the
mentally normal person. The trial judge told the jury that it could convict if D closed
his mind to the obvious fact that the haystack could be destroyed. Then the judge said
‘all kinds of reasons which make a man close his mind to the obvious fact – among
them may be schizophrenia, that he is a schizophrenic’. The jury convicted and D
appealed.
Activity 5.4
Read Wilson, Section 6.7.A.1 ‘The subjectivist stance’.
a. What was the Court of Appeal’s response to Stephenson?
b. ‘Closing the mind’ to a risk is obviously a metaphor. But what does it actually
mean?
Apart from the ‘closing the mind’ type of recklessness, one further qualification
needs to be made with respect to the requirement that the prosecution must prove
conscious foresight. That is if the lack of awareness is due to voluntary intoxication. In
Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413, D was drunk when he climbed on railings at a nightclub
and fell on to the dance floor below, causing serious injuries to V who was dancing
there. He was charged with malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm, an offence
under s.20 OAPA 1861.
Directing the jury as to recklessness, the judge said:
…where there is no issue of intoxication the test requires that the defendant should be
aware of a risk and go on to take it, the risk being of injury.
He then directed the jury on recklessness in the context of voluntary intoxication, saying:
…if the defendant had been sober and in good mental shape would he have realised that
some injury…might result from his actions in what he was doing in the condition he was
in that night.
This was accepted as a correct statement of law by the Court of Appeal.

5.4.3 The risk taken must be unreasonable in the circumstances known to

the defendant
All of us take risks in our everyday lives. We run across roads, we climb trees. We play
cricket, rugby, football and other dangerous sports. We drive cars. Taking risks is part
of being a human being: it is not necessarily blameworthy behaviour. Risk-taking is
blameworthy, therefore, only if it is a risk that should not have been taken. A person
who drives their car at 90mph in a 60mph zone may well be driving recklessly if they
do so because they are late home for dinner. However, a jury may have other views if
the person drives so fast because their daughter’s appendix has burst, she is bleeding
to death and they are taking her to hospital. Lord Justice Lane in Stephenson explained
the position as:
A man is reckless when he carries out the deliberate act appreciating that there is a risk
that damage to property may result from his act. It is however not the taking of every
risk which could properly be classed as reckless. The risk must be one which it is in all the
circumstances unreasonable for him to take.
Activity 5.5
Read Wilson, Section 6.7.A ‘Recklessness in the criminal law’ and answer the
D returns to the car park where he has left his car to find that it is boxed in by cars
on either side. He knows that he will not be able to escape from his parking spot
without risking damage to one or other cars. He decides to take that risk. Despite
taking as much care as possible, the consequence is that he breaks the wing mirror
of one of the cars. Is he reckless for the purpose of criminal damage? Who decides,
judge or jury?
5.4.4 Objective form of recklessness

For a short period at the end of the last century, recklessness took on an objective
meaning. No longer was it necessary to prove that D foresaw the risk of harm
accompanying their action; it was enough that they should have foreseen it. This was
the consequence of the case of Caldwell [1982] AC 341.
In this case the defendant had set fire to a hotel while drunk and was charged with
reckless arson. He argued that he was so drunk he was unaware of his actions and
the likely consequences. This was the kind of argument which had succeeded in
Stephenson, except here the reason for D’s lack of awareness was drunkenness,
whereas in Stephenson it was his general mental capacity. D was convicted at first
instance on the basis of the trial judge directing the jury that his lack of awareness
could not be relied upon if it was due to self-induced intoxication (see Brady above).
The Court of Appeal agreed.
The House of Lords dismissed the subsequent appeal but gave a different reason,
namely that whether or not D was intoxicated, it was not in any event a negation of
fault that a person did not think that what they were doing was dangerous, when
reasonable people would have done so. Far from it; such a failure to think manifested
fault. Lord Diplock gave the following model direction for judges to give to juries in
explaining the notion of recklessness. A person is reckless for the purpose of criminal
damage if:
(1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed
or damaged and (2) when he does that act he either has not given any thought to the
possibility of there being such risk or has recognised that there was some risk involved
and has nonetheless gone on to do it.
The key thing about this direction is that it tells the jury that it can convict of a crime
of recklessness (such as criminal damage) although D gave no thought to the risk of
damage, so long as the risk was obvious; in other words, as long as the reasonable
person would have recognised the risk. This definition became the standard definition
for all crimes of recklessness, except for crimes of violence such as assault and
malicious wounding which, confusingly, continued to require actual awareness of the
dangers of causing harm on the part of the defendant (Spratt [1990] 1 WLR 1073).
Activity 5.6
Read Wilson, Section 6.7.A.2 ‘Caldwell recklessness’ and answer the following
questions.
a. What were the major problems posed by Lord Diplock’s new test of
recklessness?
b. Is the test simply a way of incorporating the ‘closed mind’ form of recklessness
into the definition while ridding it of its ambiguity?
In G and R [2003] UKHL 50, the House of Lords was faced with yet another case
involving an unforeseen conflagration. The defendants were young boys of 11 and 12
who were away from home without permission. They set up camp in the back yard of
a shop and in the early hours of the morning they lit a fire in a dustbin to keep warm.
The fire spread and the shop was gutted: the boys were charged with arson.
The House of Lords acknowledged that the Caldwell test of recklessness might
operate unfairly for 11 and 12-year-old boys if they were held to the same standard of
foresight as reasonable adults. An obvious risk for the latter would not necessarily be
obvious for the former. Their Lordships had three choices: to keep the law as it was;
to modify it so as to render the test of recklessness sensitive to the characteristics of
age, experience and mental capacity of the defendant; or to return the law to its pre-
Caldwell state. They chose the final option and overruled Caldwell.
Activity 5.7
Read Wilson, Section 6.7.A.3 ‘The retreat from Caldwell’ and answer the following
questions.
a. What reasons did the House of Lords give for overruling Caldwell?
b. Do you think that the House of Lords went too far in requiring the defendant to
be aware of the risk they are taking?
c. Is the ‘closed mind’ form of recklessness still recklessness or does the overruling
require actual foresight of the risk in all cases?
d. Do you agree with the decision in Booth v CPS?
e. A finds her car in the car park pinned by the car on either side. She can only enter
her car by opening her car door and squeezing inside. She considers whether
this creates a risk of denting the neighbouring car and concludes that so long
as she is particularly careful when entering the car any damage will be avoided.
She is wrong and the car is dented. Is she reckless for the purpose of the crime of
criminal damage?
f. Here is part of a past examination question.
uu D, who is thinking about other things, parks his car in a car park and, without
checking to see if any other car is in the vicinity, opens his car door. V’s car,
which is close by, suffers a serious dent.
uu Now consider whether D is reckless, in which case he is guilty of criminal

damage, or simply negligent, in which case he is guilty of nothing. Apply the
law to the facts of this case and make your decision. Remember, there are two
routes to concluding D is reckless: (1) D runs an (unreasonable) risk of which
he is aware; (2) D closes his mind to an (unreasonable) risk of which he would
ordinarily have been aware.
5.5 Negligence
It is important to be able to distinguish recklessness from negligence. As you know,
the formal distinction is that recklessness, which is a form of subjective fault, requires
awareness. Negligence, which is a form of objective fault, does not.
All cases of recklessness are automatically also cases of negligence. Recklessness is

negligence with added fault, namely ‘awareness’ of the risk being run. However, not
all cases of negligence are cases of recklessness because negligence does not require
proof of any awareness of the risk. The two fault elements start to fade into each other
when we consider ‘closed mind’ recklessness, because here the fault element can be
established without conscious awareness, so long as the risk was obvious. This can be
seen in question (f) in Activity 5.7 above. Clearly D was negligent but he may also have
been reckless if the jury concludes that the risk to the other car was so obvious that he
must have closed his mind to it.
Negligence covers a far wider field of fault than recklessness, however, since it
describes a person’s conduct rather than their state of mind. There are a lot of ways
a defendant’s conduct may be found wanting, other than by them creating a danger
consciously. The Law Commission’s definition of negligence makes this clear. It occurs
where a person ‘fails to exercise such care, skill or foresight as a reasonable man in his
situation would exercise’ (Law Commission Working Paper No. 31: Codification of the
criminal law, general principles, the mental element in crime (1970) www.bailii.org/ew/
other/EWLC/1970/c31.pdf).
Activity 5.8
Read Wilson, Section 6.9.B ‘Negligence in the criminal law’ and answer the
a. Apply the Law Commission’s definition to careless driving. Give examples of the
three ways a driver can drive negligently.
b. Which, if any, of these examples might lead the jury to conclude that the
defendant was also reckless?
c. Can a person who lacks the skill, capacity for care and foresight of reasonable
people escape liability for careless driving by relying on this lack?
d. Are those who possess special skills negligent if they fail to exercise those extra
skills or only if they fail to satisfy the standards of ordinary reasonable people?
Crimes of subjective fault are often graduated in terms of the degree of commitment
shown to the result. This is why murder is treated more seriously than reckless
manslaughter, because D’s commitment to the outcome is greater than where D kills
only recklessly. Negligence, as a form of objective fault, also forms part of a ladder of
gravity. There may be degrees of negligence. At the top end there is gross negligence
which is the fault element of gross negligence manslaughter. To be guilty of this
offence, the prosecution must prove far more than simply that D ‘failed to exercise
such care, skill or foresight as a reasonable man in his situation would exercise’. It
must show the failure which led to the victim’s death was of such a high degree that
nothing but a manslaughter conviction would address it.
For other crimes, such as dangerous driving, ‘extra’ negligence beyond that necessary
for careless driving is necessary. Careless driving becomes dangerous driving when a
driver falls ‘far below’ the expected standard, and when such a failure brings obvious
risks of danger (s.2A of the Road Traffic Act 1988).
Many other crimes have a negligence component. The most obvious example is rape
for which, until the passing of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, D would not be liable if
he honestly believed the victim to be consenting. The new fault element is negligence
(objective fault). D will escape liability for non-consensual intercourse only if his belief
that V consented was based on reasonable grounds.
A negligence component may also be included in an otherwise strict liability offence
by the incorporation of a no-negligence or ‘due-diligence’ defence. For example, by
s.28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, a person has a defence to the otherwise strict
liability crime of possessing controlled drugs if they can prove that they neither
believed nor suspected nor had reason to suspect that the substance or product in
question was a controlled drug. Notice here that there is a reversal of the usual burden
of proof. The defence rather than the prosecution has to do the proving. The apparent
justification for this is that the offence is one of strict liability and that therefore any
escape from liability must be ‘hard won’.

Compare and contrast intention, recklessness and negligence.
Write a skeleton answer, using either the module guide or Wilson or both, of no
more than one page which includes:
a. definitions of all three fault elements. Remember to highlight the two forms of
intention
b. three (bullet) points of comparison (similarity) and three points of distinction

between intention (both forms) and recklessness
c. two (bullet) points of comparison (similarity) and two points of distinction

between recklessness and negligence
d. one (bullet) point of comparison (similarity) and three points of distinction

between intention and negligence.

1. What is the difference between subjective and objective fault?
2. Is recklessness an example of subjective or objective fault?
3. Define:
a. direct intention
b. indirect intention.
4. State the difference between them.
5. True or false? A person does not intend a consequence unless they foresee it as
virtually certain.
6. Define recklessness. How does it differ from:
a. direct intention
b. indirect intention?
7. Define negligence. How does it differ from recklessness?
8. True or false? A person can be reckless but not negligent if they lack the experience
or capacity to appreciate the risk they are taking.
6 Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1 Temporal coincidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2 Correspondence principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.3 Transferred malice: a qualification to the correspondence principle . . . 54

Introduction
So far we have learned that criminal liability requires actus reus and mens rea. Actus
reus is the external element in the crime package; mens rea is the internal element
– that which the prosecution has to show was going on in the defendant’s mind. We
need to understand something further about these elements, namely that in relation
to any given crime, actus reus and mens rea should, in principle, coincide.
There are two facets to this premise. The first is that actus reus and mens rea should
coincide in point of time; that is, liability should depend upon proof that the
defendant had the relevant mental attitude at the moment of doing the acts which
form the actus reus of a criminal offence. This is known as temporal coincidence.
The second facet is that offence definitions should match any relevant conduct,
consequence or circumstance with an exactly matching mental state on the part
of the defendant. This is known as the correspondence principle. Without such
correspondence, it is thought, the defendant will be punished for the wrong harm.
Criminal law 6 Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea page 51
6.1 Temporal coincidence

Temporal coincidence is an easy concept to grasp, a less easy concept to apply. Here
are some examples falling on either side of the liability fence.
Illustration 6.1
D takes V’s wallet, intending to steal from it. A few seconds later he changes his
mind and puts the wallet back. Is he guilty of theft?
The commonsense answer is no. D momentarily had the mens rea for theft but
since he decided to put the wallet back there was no actus reus. This is not the legal
answer. To discover this we need to apply the lawyer’s method. This requires us to
consider the definition of theft. Here is a simplified version:
uu A person is guilty of theft if they take property belonging to another intending not
to return it.
This definition tells us that the offence is made out, since at the time D took
the property it was his intention not to return it. Actus reus and mens rea, thus,
coincided in point of time.
We have already come across a few cases where this principle was at issue. One is
Ahmad (1986) Crim LR 739, where the landlord was charged with harassing his tenant
with intent to make him give up occupation. The landlord was not guilty of this crime
because he had formed the intention only after he had committed the acts (removing
windows) relied upon as acts of harassment. See Wilson, Chapter 4.5.D.2 ‘Omissions:
the common law approach’.
Activity 6.1
Read Wilson, Section 8.1 ‘Introduction’ and answer the following question.
D is a contract killer, with a contract to kill V. He drives to V’s house with his gun. On
the way there D is involved in an accident when a pedestrian unexpectedly runs
out in front of his car. The pedestrian is killed. D gets out of his car to discover the
victim is V. D rubs his hands, pleased that he has been saved some effort. Is D guilty
of murder?
6.1.1 Avoiding the coincidence requirement

If act and mind do not coincide in time this is not always fatal to a successful
prosecution. This is because it may be possible to ignore the initial act and graft
liability on to a subsequent omission. This is what happened in Miller (1983) (see
Chapter 3, Activity 3.8 of this module guide). The act which caused the fire in this case
was unaccompanied by mens rea, since D was asleep at the time. Mens rea was formed
only after the act was complete, when D woke up and realised his bed was on fire.
This will normally mean that D would escape liability for criminal damage. The House
of Lords ruled, however, that the actus reus could be based upon D’s omission to put
out the fire, which omission was accompanied by mens rea (recklessness). Actus reus
and mens rea coincided, therefore, at the moment of D’s deciding not to put the fire
out because here the actus reus was D’s omission. The crime was constituted by his
reckless (mens rea) omission in breach of duty (actus reus).
Another way in which the coincidence requirement has been avoided is by reference
to the continuing act doctrine. In Fagan v MPC [1969] 1 QB 439 there appeared to be
a classic example of a case where the mens rea and actus reus did not coincide, since
mens rea was formed only after the harm-causing act had been performed. D had
innocently parked his car on a police officer’s foot, which he realised only after he
had turned the engine off. At that moment he decided not to remove the car. D was
convicted at first instance of assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty. He
argued that there had been no assault since the act of assault took place without mens
rea, and when he formed mens rea there was no accompanying act. It was central to
his argument that assault required an act and could not be committed by omission.
The Queen’s Bench Division agreed that assault required an act and could not be
committed by omission. Nevertheless, it affirmed the conviction.
Activity 6.2
a. Read Wilson, Section 8.1.A.1 ‘Qualifications to the requirement of temporal
coincidence’, Section (b) ‘Continuing acts’. How did the court justify affirming
the conviction when it agreed that assault could not be committed by omission?
b. Read the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Santana-Bermudez [2003] EWHC

2908 (Admin) and consider what the act was which constituted the assault in
this case. Or was the conduct of S a culpable omission under the Miller principle
(and so inconsistent with Fagan)?
6.1.2 The supposed corpse cases

The principles in Miller and Fagan constitute two qualifications to the rule that actus
reus and mens rea should coincide in point of time. But they are not exceptions: they
are ways of avoiding its application. The supposed corpse cases, however, are an
exception to the rule. These are cases where the defendant has attacked the victim
and, wrongly concluding the victim is dead, disposed of the body, which disposal is the
actual cause of death.
The first case in which this complex scenario surfaced, Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR
228, was a case involving a preconceived plan to kill the victim. Their plan was to lure
V to a hut in a deserted spot, beat him to death and then roll him over a cliff to fake
an accident. The plan nearly worked perfectly. The defendants lured V successfully to
the spot, beat him up and then, having concluded that V was dead, they rolled him
over the cliff. Actually he was not dead at the time. He died as a result of exposure
from being left at the foot of the cliff. The defendants were charged with murder.
They argued that the act which caused death (the disposal of the supposed corpse)
was unaccompanied by mens rea since at that time they thought death had already
occurred, and so actus reus and mens rea did not coincide. Not surprisingly the Privy
Council rejected this argument.
It appears to their Lordships impossible to divide up what was really one transaction in
this way. There is no doubt that the accused set out to do all these acts in order to achieve
their plan and as parts of their plan; and it is much too refined a ground of judgement to
say that, because they were under a misapprehension at one stage and thought that their
guilty purpose had been achieved before in fact it was achieved, therefore they are to
escape the penalties of the law. (Lord Reid)
In Church [1966] 1 QB 59, where there was no preconceived plan, a different

explanation was given which centred on the chain of causation. D panicked when,
having struck V, she fell down, apparently dead. D threw the supposed corpse in the
river, and V died of drowning. D was charged and convicted of manslaughter but
argued that actus reus and mens rea did not coincide. The Queen’s Bench Division
disagreed, recommending that homicide is the appropriate verdict if the appellant’s
‘behaviour from the moment he first struck her to the moment when he threw
her into the river’ could be regarded ‘as a series of acts designed to cause death or
grievous bodily harm’. If that was how the jury ‘regarded the accused’s behaviour, it
mattered not whether he believed her to be alive or dead when he threw her in the
river’ (Edmund-Davies J).
Put simply, D had the mens rea for manslaughter when he first struck V. V died
following a series of further acts on D’s part, none of which broke the chain of
causation.
This causation account was elaborated upon in Le Brun [1992] QB 61. The defendant
struck his wife in the course of an argument outside their front door. She fell down,
struck her head and lapsed into unconsciousness. She died as a result of injuries
sustained when D dragged her from the road into the house to avoid detection. In
response to the argument that mens rea and actus reus did not coincide, Lord Lane CJ
for the Court of Appeal said:
It would be possible to express the problem as one of causation. The original unlawful
blow to the chin was a causa sine qua non (but for cause) of the later actus reus. It was the
opening event in a series which was to culminate in death: the first link in the chain of
causation, to use another metaphor. It cannot be said that the actions of the appellant
in dragging the victim away with the intention of evading liability broke the chain which
linked the initial blow with the death. In short, in circumstances such as the present,
which is the only concern of this court, the act which causes death, and the necessary
mental state to constitute manslaughter, need not coincide in point of time.
Activity 6.3
Read Wilson, Sections 8.1.A ‘Temporal coincidence’ and 5.5.B.1 ‘The general
framework for imputing cause’ and answer the following question.
Lord Lane CJ says in Le Brun ‘It cannot be said that the actions of the appellant in
dragging the victim away with the intention of evading liability broke the chain
which linked the initial blow with the death’. If, as he also states, the ‘problem is
(only) one of causation’ why should it matter what the appellant’s intentions were
in dragging the victim away? What intentions would break the chain of causation
and why?
6.2 Correspondence principle

Simply put, the correspondence principle requires a corresponding mental element
for each aspect of the actus reus; that is, conduct, circumstance and consequence. The
principle derives from the broader ethical principle that conviction and punishment
be deserved. If a person can be punished for doing X without a mental element
corresponding to X, then the punishment is undeserved and unfair.
Illustration 6.2
A person is guilty of theft if they dishonestly appropriate property belonging to
another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. The actus
reus of theft is appropriating property belonging to another. The correspondence
principle, as a minimum, requires that:
a. A intends to appropriate the property. So if the property is secreted in her bag
without her knowing, the correspondence principle requires an acquittal.
b. A intends to appropriate property belonging to another. This requires her to

know or believe that the property she is appropriating belongs to someone
else. So if A takes an umbrella from a stand believing it is her own or has been
abandoned, the correspondence principle demands an acquittal.
Activity 6.4
If it is an offence for a person to have sexual intercourse with a person lacking
mental capacity, what (corresponding) mens rea does the correspondence principle
require?
The correspondence principle is an ethical or normative principle rather than a
descriptive principle. In practice, a good many crimes can be committed without a
perfect match between actus reus and mens rea. Indeed, the majority of crimes of
violence bear an actus reus without a corresponding mental attitude. Murder is a
prime example.
Activity 6.5
Read Wilson, Section 8.1.B.1 ‘Qualifications to the requirement of definitional
concurrence’, Section (b) ‘Definitional non-correspondence’ and answer the
a. Which important offences breach the correspondence principle?
b. How does Horder justify these breaches in his article ‘Transferred malice and the
remoteness of unexpected outcomes’ (2006) Crim LR 383?
c. A, intending to teach V a lesson, breaks V’s legs with a baseball bat. V,

attempting to get up, falls over and hits his head on the pavement, which kills
him. Should A be guilty of murder? Is she guilty?
6.3 Transferred malice: a qualification to the correspondence

principle
No breach of the correspondence principle occurs if the defendant commits the formal
actus reus of an offence with the relevant mens rea for that offence, but the subject
matter of that actus reus was other than that intended or foreseen by the defendant.
Illustration 6.3
D, intending to shoot B dead, misses B and kills C, an innocent bystander.
D is still guilty of murder. He has the mens rea for murder and he has committed the
actus reus of murder. He has also committed the offence of attempted murder in
relation to B (R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59). The criminal law permits the mens rea in
relation to B to be joined to the actus reus committed against C. This qualification is
known as the doctrine of transferred malice.
The effect of transferred malice … is that the intended victim and the actual victim are
treated as if they were one, so that what was intended to happen to the first person (but
did not happen) is added to what actually did happen to the second person (but was not
intended to happen), with the result that what was intended and what happened are
married to make a notionally intended and actually consummated crime. The cases are
treated as if the actual victim had been the intended victim from the start.
(Lord Mustill in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 at 262.)
The principle applies to all crimes of violence, not merely murder. So in Latimer (1886)
17 QBD 359 D swung a belt at X in a pub, which missed X and hit V, standing behind him.
D was found guilty of assault against V although he neither intended to hit V nor even
knew V was there. In each case the malice/intention D entertained with respect to the
intended victim transfers to the actus reus of the crime committed against the real
victim.
It applies even where the harm suffered by the unintended victim differs from that
which the attacker intended his victim to suffer. This was made clear in in R v Grant
[2014] EWCA Crim 143. D fired shots into a shop intending to kill X. The shots missed
and hit V1 and V2 who were bystanders. D was charged with attempted murder (on X)
and causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to s.19 of the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861. D argued that the transferred malice principle only applied where
the crime committed against the unintended victim was identical to that intended
against the intended victim. Here it was not. He argued that the fact he intended to kill
X meant that he did not have the intention to cause X GBH. As a result, there was no
‘malice’ to transfer. The court rejected this argument. If D had the intention to kill X he
must also have had the intention to do him serious injury by definition.
One qualification is in order. The principle applies only with respect to crimes of the
same family. In Pembliton (1874) D threw a stone at X in the course of a fight with X and
Y. It missed X and broke a window. D was indicted for criminal damage. The Court for
Crown Cases Reserved said that the intention to harm X (a crime against the person)
was not sufficient to support a conviction for causing criminal damage to V’s property
(a crime against property). Lord Blackburn said that D could be guilty of criminal
damage only if he intended or foresaw damage to the window. Since that had not
been argued by the prosecution the conviction was quashed.
Activity 6.6
Read Wilson, Section 8.1.B ‘Definitional concurrence’ and answer the following
questions.
a. A fires a gun at B, intending to kill him. The bullet misses B and rebounds off the
wall, injuring C. Can A be charged with wounding with intent?
b. A fires a gun at B, who is in a car. The bullet hits the car door and rebounds, killing
C’s dog who is on the pavement. Is A guilty of causing criminal damage to the dog?

1. State and explain the temporal coincidence rule.
2. Give two ways in which the temporal coincidence rule can be avoided.
3. Explain the legal position relating to the supposed corpse cases.
4. State and explain the correspondence principle.
5. Give two examples of how the correspondence principle is not always adhered to.
6. Explain the doctrine of transferred malice.
7. Explain why the doctrine of transferred malice is a qualification of the

correspondence principle.
Notes
7 Criminal homicide
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.1 Common elements in criminal homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.2 Murder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.3 Voluntary manslaughter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.4 Involuntary manslaughter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Introduction
Criminal homicide comprises two key forms: murder and involuntary manslaughter.
Both forms involve a similar actus reus, namely an unlawful killing of a human being.
They are distinguished by their respective mental elements.
uu Murder requires the killing to be accompanied by an intention to kill, or an

intention to cause grievous bodily harm. Manslaughter does not.
uu Manslaughter does require proof of fault but the nature of that fault varies
according to the type of manslaughter charged.
uu Reckless manslaughter requires foresight of death or serious injury.
uu Gross negligence manslaughter requires no foresight, but a very high degree of

negligence as to the risk of death.
uu Constructive manslaughter requires neither foresight nor negligence as to the

risk of death or serious injury. It requires simply the commission of a crime
likely to cause harm with the relevant mens rea for that crime.
Criminal homicide
Involuntary
Murder
manslaughter
Voluntary Reckless
manslaughter manslaughter
Gross negligence
Loss of self control
manslaughter
Diminished Constructive
responsibility manslaughter
Suicide pact
Figure 7.1
Criminal law 7 Criminal homicide page 59
Illustration 7.1
a. D launches a savage attack on V with fists and feet. V dies in hospital of his
injuries.
b. D, wishing to scare V from the neighbourhood, pours petrol through V’s

letterbox and sets it alight. V dies in the resulting fire.
c. D, angry with V, delivers a single punch to V’s chin. V falls over and hits his head
on the pavement. V dies of the injury due to a weakness in his skull.
d. D, an anaesthetist, gives V who is undergoing an operation a massive

overdose of anaesthetic having failed to notice a decimal point on the dosage
recommended in her anaesthetist’s handbook. V dies as a result.
e. D, aged 20, points a gun at V, her 10-year-old brother, in the course of a game
and pulls the trigger. D believes it to be the toy gun given to her brother for
Christmas. In fact it is the gun of her mother, who is a police officer, and the gun
is loaded. V dies of the wound.
Each of the above illustrations involves a killing of a human being. The first four involve
a criminal homicide since the killing is unlawful.
a. is murder since D has the fault element for murder.
b. is reckless manslaughter. Although lacking the intention to kill or cause grievous

bodily harm, there is evidence of foresight of either of these results. It is also
constructive manslaughter.
c. is constructive manslaughter. Although D neither intended nor foresaw death or

serious injury he did intend to cause injury to V which is sufficient mens rea.
d. is gross negligence manslaughter, which, depending on the jury’s view of the

matter, is charged when D kills V not in the course of an attack but in the course of
doing something so carelessly as to justify holding D to account for the death.
e. also involves homicide but it is not a criminal homicide, since D lacks criminal fault
and so the killing is not unlawful.
In this chapter we shall begin with an examination of the common elements in

murder and involuntary manslaughter, namely that there should be an unlawful killing
of a human being. We shall follow up by examining each individual offence in turn,
beginning with murder. Murder has three partial defences which, if successfully raised,
reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. We shall look at two of them, namely loss
of self-control and diminished responsibility. We shall then examine the three forms of
involuntary manslaughter.
7.1 Common elements in criminal homicide

The common elements in criminal homicide are the prime conduct elements,
constituted by ‘an unlawful killing of a human being’. These elements comprise a
killing, an unlawful killing and a human victim.
7.1.1 A killing
A killing in this context follows the general template for all criminal offences. It
requires an act or, in the case of murder and gross negligence manslaughter but not
constructive manslaughter, an omission in breach of duty.
Activity 7.1
Read Wilson, Section 13.3.A.2 ‘Unlawful killing’ and answer the following questions.
a. What are the three principal ingredients which make up a ‘killing’?
b. If V refuses consent to a life-saving operation must his surgeon still perform the
operation if she is to avoid a conviction for criminal homicide?
c. Under what circumstances will an omission to prevent someone from dying

amount to a ‘killing’? If you have forgotten, read Wilson, Section 4.5.D.3
‘Circumstances giving rise to a duty to act: duty situations’.
d. For the purpose of criminal homicide, when will D be considered to have caused
V’s death? If you have forgotten, read Wilson, Section 5.5 ‘Causation: the legal
position’.
7.1.2 An unlawful killing

A killing is lawful if it is accidental; that is, not blameworthy (see Illustration 7.1(e)). It is
also lawful if a valid defence operates, for example self defence.
Consent is not a defence to liability for criminal homicide by affirmative action: there
is no defence of euthanasia or of duelling. The most recent affirmation of this principle
occurred in Nicklinson (2014). Mr Nicklinson suffered from ‘locked-in-syndrome’,
following a stroke, which rendered every muscle in his body below his eyelids
paralysed. He sought a declaration that it would be lawful on grounds of necessity
for his doctors or his wife to terminate his life, since his condition rendered his life
intolerable. He claimed that a refusal would be in violation of his human rights and
his autonomy since, because of his total paralysis, he was being denied the rights
of all other people to take the steps necessary. His claim was rejected. The appeal
was rejected by the Supreme Court. The decision was later affirmed in the European
Court of Human Rights case Nicklinson v UK (Admissibility) (2478/15) (2015) 61 EHRR
SE7 on the ground that the matter was so morally contentious that only Parliament
could properly address it. It should be noted that no such caution characterised the
court decision in an equivalent challenge recently made in Canada (Carter v Canada
(Attorney-General) February 6 2015). The prohibition on physician assisted suicide
was declared contrary to human rights by the Supreme Court of Canada. In reaching
this conclusion the Court ruled that the corresponding prohibition in the Canadian
Criminal Code (241(b)) infringed s.7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
United Kingdom criminal law does respect a person’s autonomy to a certain degree,
however. If V refuses medical treatment which will save their life, or even the life of
another, doctors who accede to that refusal are not responsible for the resulting
death(s). Indeed the doctors will be acting unlawfully if they override V’s decision
and operate. So it was unlawful for a doctor to perform an emergency caesarean on
a woman without her consent, although it was necessary to save the life of both the
woman and her unborn child (St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26).
Activity 7.2
If respect for autonomy explains the court’s approach in the latter case, how can
the decision in Nicklinson be justified?
7.1.3 A human victim

The law of criminal homicide protects only living humans. It is not criminal homicide
to kill a foetus in the womb, although this may constitute the separate offence of
abortion or child destruction. A criminal homicide also cannot be charged if the acts
are directed against a person already dead. Therefore, two issues need considering:
first, when does life begin, and second, when does life end?
Activity 7.3
Read Wilson, Section 13.3.A.3 ‘In being’ and then answer the following questions.
a. What test do the courts apply in deciding whether the victim’s life had begun at
the time of the unlawful act in question?
b. If D performs an abortion on herself which causes the child to be born alive but
the child then dies because it is born prematurely, is a conviction for murder or
manslaughter possible?
c. Do you agree with their Lordships’ conclusion in the A-G’s Reference (No 3 of
1994) case that, as a matter of principle, the intention necessary to convict D
of murder could not be transferred from the mother to the foetus and then
back again to the living child? Why did the intention not transfer between the
mother and the child as soon as the child was born?
d. Would their Lordships’ conclusion have been different if the prosecution had
been able to prove that D had stabbed V for the purpose of killing the foetus
rather than hurting V?
e. What test do the courts apply in deciding whether the victim’s life had already
ended at the time of the unlawful act in question?
f. Under what circumstances will it not result in a conviction for criminal homicide
if D removes a patient from a life-support machine? You might find it helpful to
reread Wilson, Section 4.5.D.1 ‘Acts and omissions: what’s the difference?’ on
this question as well as the above reading.
7.2 Murder
We have examined the actus reus of murder, which is an unlawful killing of a human
being. All that is left to discuss, of the basic elements, is the mens rea.
7.2.1 Intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm

Traditionally this is described as malice aforethought. However, it is better to forget
this form of words, which was coined in an earlier, less definition-driven age. Neither
malice nor premeditation is required. A killing done intentionally in the heat of the
moment is just as much murder as one which has been planned and premeditated. An
intentional killing is murder if prompted by compassion as much as if it is prompted
by greed. So, in Inglis [2011] 1 WLR 1110, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for
murder of a mother whose son was suffering persistent vegetative state following
a car accident and whom she had deliberately injected with heroin as an act of
compassion.
The mens rea for murder is intention to kill (also known as express malice) or intention
to cause grievous bodily harm (also known as implied malice). The mental state
common to both these is intention.
7.2.2 What does intention mean?

We examined the meaning of intention in Chapter 5 of this module guide. It means,
in the context of murder, having death (or grievous bodily harm) as one’s objective
in acting as one did such that, if death (or grievous bodily harm) did not occur, one
would consider one’s action a failure (Duff, 1990).
Occasionally, the judge will direct the jury that it is entitled to find intention in the
absence of evidence of such ‘direct’ intention if, although it was not the actor’s aim
or objective to cause death (or grievous bodily harm), the jury considers that D knew
either of these outcomes was virtually or morally certain. This is known as ‘indirect’ or
oblique intention. As we have already covered in detail what intention means, in this
chapter you will see how it is used in practice.
Much of the criminal law is about getting the right instruction for the jury. Many of the
cases which you have encountered here and in Wilson, and will continue to encounter,
are cases where the judge got this instruction wrong – if only slightly – which opened
up the case to an appeal. I hope this makes you feel more comfortable about your own
knowledge and understanding!
7.2.3 Directing the jury on the mens rea for murder

In the vast majority of cases the judge must give the jury the standard direction, which
does not define intention except to say that intention is different from motive. So, on
the facts in Illustration 7.2, only a standard direction should be given.
Illustration 7.2
D, a gangster, stabs V through the abdomen in the course of a fight. V dies. D is
charged with murder. D denies an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.
He says he did it simply to hurt V.
The standard direction will be something like this:
Members of the jury, to find the defendant guilty of murder the question you must ask
yourself is: ‘Did D stab V with the intention of killing V?’ If you are not sure of the answer
to this question then ask yourselves: ‘Did D stab V with the intention of causing V serious
injury?’ If your answer to either of these questions is yes then you must find the accused
guilty of murder. If you are not sure that he had either of these intentions but are sure
that he did intend some harm then you may find him guilty of manslaughter.
Now assume the following facts.
Illustration 7.3
D, a gangster, throws V, a rival gangster, off the roof of a three-storey house and is
charged with murder. D claims that it was not his intention to kill or cause grievous
bodily harm to V: they were rivals and he did it to ‘teach him a lesson and to make
him fearful of challenging D’s supremacy’.
Here there is evidence that D may well have had something else in mind other than
death or grievous bodily harm when he threw V off the roof. The jury will, therefore,
need some guidance as to whether it is entitled to convict D of murder given the
likelihood that death or serious injury would result from such an act. Only where, as
here, the evidence strongly supports the possibility that D acted for a purpose other
than to kill (e.g. to frighten, to escape, to intimidate, to reduce pain suffered by the
other) must the special direction be given. For example:
Members of the jury, you have been told that it was not D’s intention in throwing V off
the roof to kill him or cause him serious injury but simply to teach him a lesson. You are
entitled to disbelieve this but if you think that this claim may be true I must direct you
that you may still find the necessary intention if you are convinced that, whatever else
D intended, he knew that one of these consequences would almost certainly occur. If
you think that, then I must also direct you that you are not entitled to find the necessary
intention, unless you feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty,
barring some unforeseen intervention, as a result of the defendant’s actions and that
the defendant appreciated that such was the case. In deciding whether the intention is
present, however, you must make your decision on the basis of all the evidence.
(based on Woollin [1999] AC 82, per Lord Steyn at 87)
Most juries would convict of murder on the basis of such a direction as they would no
doubt consider broken bones (grievous bodily harm) at the very least to be a virtual
certainty and be prepared to impute that knowledge to the defendant on the basis
that if they know it then he knew it.
There are two important things to be noted about this direction. The first is that the
direction does not instruct the jury that it is bound to find intention where there is
foresight of certainty, only that it is entitled to. The second is that the direction tells
the jury that it may not find the necessary intention unless the defendant foresaw the
death or grievous bodily harm as virtually certain. Foresight of high probability is not
enough. This would be sufficient only for manslaughter.
Now consider this example.
Illustration 7.4
D is caught in a blazing fire in the third-storey bedroom of her home with V, her
three-year-old son. D panics, believing that they are both doomed unless they jump
out the window. She pushes her son out of the window and then jumps herself. V
dies in the fall; D survives.
Again there is evidence that D had something else in mind other than causing death or
grievous bodily harm when she threw V out of the window. Again, therefore, the jury
will need some guidance as to whether it is entitled to convict D of murder given the
extreme likelihood that death or serious injury would result from such an act. Again
the Woollin direction must therefore be given:
Members of the jury, you have been told that it was not D’s intention in throwing V out
of the window to kill him or cause him serious injury. Far from it, it was to save him. If
you think that this claim may be true I must tell you that you may still find the necessary
intention if you are convinced that, whatever else D intended, she knew that one of
these consequences would occur. If you think that, then I must direct you that you are
not entitled to find the necessary intention, unless you feel sure that death or serious
bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result
of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.
In deciding whether the intention is present, however, you must make your decision on
the basis of all the evidence which requires you of course to consider the context within
which D threw her son out of the window.
A jury would probably not wish to convict of murder on the basis of such a direction
although it would no doubt still consider broken bones (grievous bodily harm) at the
very least to be a virtual certainty and be prepared to impute that knowledge to the
defendant on the basis that if they know it then she knew it.
The jury would be entitled not to convict because of two aspects of the direction. The
first, dealt with above, is that the direction does not instruct the jury that it is bound
to find intention where there is foresight of certainty, only that it is entitled to. The
second is that the direction tells the jury to reach its decision on the basis of all the
evidence. Taking into account D’s motive, this form of words sends a pretty clear
message to the jury that ‘foresight of certainty’ is not conclusive. With this message,
the jury’s natural humanity can be relied upon to reach the common-sense verdict of
not guilty.
Note that if D is not guilty of murder, the jury should not bring in a verdict of
manslaughter either, since, in effect, they are concluding that the killing was not
done recklessly (justified-risk taking), was not unlawful (no intention to harm/
no recklessness) and was not grossly negligent (reasonable conduct in the
circumstances).
Of course there are other means of avoiding a conviction for murder here, namely the
possibility of raising a defence of necessity, but the courts have set their face against
developing a general defence of necessity to cover such cases preferring to rely on the
jury’s good sense via the mens rea requirement.
Note: If D kills using a lethal weapon, poison or extreme violence, the standard
direction will almost invariably be the correct one and Woollin should not be used.
7.2.4 What has to be intended?

It is important to remember that the mens rea for murder is either an intention to kill
the victim or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm to the victim. This was made
clear in Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664 and confirmed in Cunningham [1982] AC 566, in which
the defendant repeatedly hit the victim over the head with a chair which caused his
death. The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder, arguing that Vickers
was wrongly decided and an intention to kill was necessary. This was rejected and
Vickers affirmed.
Activity 7.4
Read Wilson, Section 13.4.A.2 ‘The law post-1957’ and answer the following
questions.
a. How have the courts defined ‘grievous bodily harm’?
b. Is it a helpful definition?
c. Who decides whether the harm intended by D is properly described as ‘grievous’?
d. Does ‘grievous bodily harm’ require the harm intended to be potentially life
threatening?
7.2.5 Directing the jury: intentional violence

So how should the jury be directed in a case where, although D causes V’s death by an
act of intentional violence, the injury intended was not life threatening?
Consider the following example.
Illustration 7.5
D, a member of a criminal gang, decides to teach V, a member of a rival gang, a
lesson. D takes an iron bar, smashes both V’s kneecaps with it and leaves him in the
street. V crawls along the pavement and tumbles on to the road where he is killed
by a passing car.
In this case the prosecution has all it needs to gain a conviction for murder. It can
prove both actus reus and causation. It also has strong evidence of a direct intention to
cause V grievous bodily harm. It has no need to prove anything else. The trial judge will
direct the jury as follows.
Members of the jury, to find the defendant guilty of murder the question you must ask
yourself is: ‘Did D act with the intention of killing V?’ If you are not sure that he did, then
ask yourselves: ‘Did D act with the intention of causing V serious injury?’ If he did, this
is sufficient to convict. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove to you that the
injury D intended was life threatening. What it has to prove is that the injury is really
serious. It is up to you to decide whether smashing both kneecaps is really serious injury
for this purpose but I hardly need to advise you that the consequences of such an injury,
although not life threatening, are likely to be long lasting and severe.
7.2.6 Reforming murder

There is general dissatisfaction with the law relating to murder. The major problem
from which all others derive is the mandatory life sentence. This means that a cold-
blooded serial killer receives the same sentence as a caring spouse who performs
euthanasia on a terminally ill partner, and the same sentence as someone (as in
Illustration 7.5) who, intending only to cause serious injury, causes that person’s
death when others would have survived. Many commentators believe that the
intention to cause serious injury should not be sufficient for murder since it is a form
of constructive liability; that is, liability for the greater crime (murder) is constructed
out of the elements of a lesser crime (causing grievous bodily harm with intent). This
is a breach of the correspondence principle (see Chapter 6 of this module guide) and,
given the mandatory life sentence for murder, it is a gross breach. See, for example,
Lord Steyn’s speech in Powell and Daniels [1999] 1 AC 1.
Activity 7.5
The Law Commission has recommended that murder should be divided into two
degrees of gravity (Law Com 304: Murder, manslaughter and infanticide (2006)).
You will find discussion of this and other reform proposals in Wilson, Section 13.4.B
‘Conclusions: a rational mens rea for murder’, which you should now read. What
reforms are advocated here? Do you agree that murder should include certain
forms of reckless killing?
7.3 Voluntary manslaughter

Apart from the general defences, murder is served by three special (partial) defences
which, if successful, reduce a murder conviction to a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter. It is called voluntary manslaughter because the prosecution can prove
the killing was voluntary (in the sense of being intended or almost intended), but the
context provides a degree of mitigation which would render the mandatory sentence
unjust. We shall be covering here two of these partial defences, namely loss of self-
control (known as provocation until 2010) and diminished responsibility.
7.3.1 Provocation
Provocation still applies in relation to killings preceding 2009 and so will be dealt with
very briefly here. It is similar in structure to the defence which replaces it, loss of self-
control. Moreover, many of the principles underlying the defence are similar to those
underlying the new defence so it is useful to read this section carefully.
Provocation had a subjective and an objective element. The subjective element

was that the killing should result from a loss of self-control which was triggered by
provocative deeds or actions. Loss of self-control which has not been triggered by
another’s deeds or actions is not covered by the defence (Acott [1996] 4 All ER 443).
The requirement of loss of self-control excluded revenge, and other premeditated
killings, from the coverage of the defence (Ibrams (1982) 74 Cr App R 154). It was long
thought to mean that the defence could not be relied upon if there was a time lapse
between the last piece of provocation and the killing (Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932). In
Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 it was said that although provocation required a loss
of self-control it did not necessarily follow that it should be by way of immediate
reaction. In particular a woman subject to cumulative domestic abuse might lose her
self-control after a period of ‘slow burn’, simmering anger which erupts long after the
last provocative event. So long as the killing was by way of loss of self-control, and not
revenge or premeditation, the defence remained available.
The objective element was that the defendant’s conduct should be consistent with
that of reasonable people faced with a similar trigger. In deciding this question the
jury was to take into account any characteristics of the defendant which made the
acts or words of the provoker provocative, for example race, size, weight, colour, hair
colour, habits or sexuality, if this was the target of the provocation. The jury was not
to take into account any characteristic which may have reduced the defendant’s self-
control below that of reasonable people (e.g. intoxication, mental illness, excitable or
aggressive temperament).
7.3.2 Loss of self-control

The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 retains the overall structure of provocation, but
restricts its application considerably by limiting the kind of triggers upon which
the defendant can rely to ground their loss of self-control. Under the previous
law, defendants had successfully used the defence in many cases thought to be
undeserving, for example loss of self-control triggered by a crying infant, a nagging
partner or, most commonly, an unfaithful partner. This is no longer possible.
Section 54 of the act states the guiding principles of the new defence:
(1) Where a person (‘D’) kills or is a party to the killing of another (V) D is not to be
convicted of murder if –
(a) D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D’s
loss of self-control, the loss of self-control
(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and
(c) a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint
and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar
way to D.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of
control was sudden [our emphasis].
Like provocation, this contains a subjective hurdle involving two separate elements.
These are, first, that D must lose their self-control. Section 54(4) states explicitly that
the defence is not available if, in doing or being a party to the killing, the defendant
acted in a considered desire for revenge. It requires also that the loss of self-control be
triggered by something. But, consolidating Ahluwalia, the loss of self-control does not
have to be sudden. The jury should of course be made aware that, as a matter of pure
evidence, the longer the time lag between the trigger and the killing, the less likely
it is that the killing is attributable to D’s loss of self-control. Clearly, in most cases, the
longer the period between the trigger and the reaction, the weaker the evidence will
be that a loss of self-control did actually occur. In two recent cases, heard together, the
defence was held not available where the killings, although clearly influenced by the
consequences of the break-up of relationships, were premeditated and considered
rather than spontaneous (R v Dawes and Hatter [2013] EWCA Crim 322).
The new partial defence also contains an objective element. The loss of self-control
must be consistent with that of ordinary people of D’s sex and age, with a normal
degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D. In R v
Willcocks (2016) the question for the court on appeal was whether a personality or
mental disorder of the defendant was one of the circumstances the jury should
take into account in deciding whether the defendant’s reaction was to be expected.
The Court of Appeal said that the trial judge was right to refuse to allow this to be
taken into account since the only relevance of this disorder was that it reduced the
defendant’s powers of self-restraint. The circumstances which the jury are able to take
into account are circumstances which any ordinary person might encounter, e.g. race,
gender, sexual preference, appearance, past events and experience. If a person suffers
from a personality disorder which reduces their powers of self-restraint they should
plead diminished responsibility.
7.3.3 First qualifying trigger

The first qualifying trigger is fear of serious violence. A typical scenario covered by
this trigger is the person who, after a period of cumulative violence, snaps and kills
their tormentor (see Ahluwalia, above). Read together with s.54(1) and (4), the fear
must trigger a loss of self-control rather than, say, a desire to be avenged or a rational
decision to put an end to an ongoing source of torment. It would also cover cases
such as Clegg [1995] 1 AC 482 and Martin (Anthony) [2001] EWCA Crim 2245 (see Chapter
11) where the respective defendants killed wrongdoers in circumstances where there
was reason for fear but no good reason for what transpired to be an (over)reaction to
that fear. In both cases, the defendant’s claim would be something to the effect that,
‘In the heat and stress of the moment I was so fearful of the prospect of myself (or my
colleagues) being killed or seriously hurt that I just lost my cool’.
7.3.4 Second qualifying trigger

The second, and alternative, qualifying trigger poses two questions.
1. Is the loss of self-control attributable to things said or done which constitute

circumstances of an extremely grave character?
This provision is designed to filter out trivial triggers such as ‘nagging’, crying
babies and sexual jealousy because they do not constitute circumstances of an
‘extremely grave character’. Sexual infidelity is in fact explicitly excluded from the
range of qualifying triggers by s.55(6) (see below).
2. Did these extremely grave circumstances cause D to have a justifiable sense of

being seriously wronged?
There are two components of this question. First, the trigger must cause D to feel
seriously wronged. If D would have killed anyway, the trigger is inoperative (see
also discussion of s.55(6) below). Second, D must be justified in feeling that they
have been seriously wronged. It will normally follow from being the subject of an
extremely grave provocation that a person’s sense of being seriously wronged is
justifiable.
But not always. In Bowyer [2013] EWCA Crim 322 D, who was known to V, was
discovered burgling V’s flat. V, in his anger, made some extremely insulting
comments about D’s girlfriend whereupon D lost his self-control and killed V. The
Court of Appeal confirmed that the defence was not available since D’s status as a
burglar blew apart his claim that he was justified in losing his self-control.
Activity 7.6
Read Wilson, Section 13.5.A.2 ‘The elements of the defence’, Section (a) ‘The
subjective element’ and answer the following questions.
a. A calls B a paedophile. B loses self-control and kills A. Assuming this insult
constitutes circumstances of ‘an extremely grave character’, under what
circumstances, if any, would B’s sense of being seriously wronged not be
justifiable?
b. V imprisons X in order to prevent X from executing his plan to harm Y. X kills V

in indignant reaction to the loss of freedom. Is the defence of loss of self-control
available to X?
7.3.5 Other restrictions on the use of the qualifying triggers

Section 55(6) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 states:
In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger –
(a) D’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was caused by a
thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use
violence;
(b) a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not justifiable if D incited
the thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence...
7.3.6 Explanation
If D is at fault in causing V to use violence, for example D strikes the first blow, or says
or does something provocative (e.g. commits a sexual assault on V) which triggers a
violent or otherwise abusive reaction from V, D is not disabled from using V’s conduct
as a qualifying trigger (Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 740). However, if D does so in order to give
themself an excuse to kill V when V retaliates, then D is disabled. This was confirmed
in Bowyer [2013] EWCA Crim 322.
7.3.7 Sexual infidelity

Under the old law of provocation, one of the most common triggers, in line with the
defence’s heavily gendered nature, was sexual jealousy and possessiveness. The new
law seeks to remove gender bias from the defence by ensuring that emotions such as
sexual jealousy and unjustified anger are no longer qualifying triggers. Only justified
loss of self-control is covered.
To make sure no judge was under any illusions that sexual jealousy was a qualifying
trigger, s.55(6) explicitly excludes it. Now a person who kills because they witness or
hear about the sexual infidelity of their partner cannot use the defence. In Clinton,
Parker & Evans [2012] EWCA Crim 2, an important clarification was made by the Court of
Appeal. In effect Clinton interprets s.55(6) to mean that sexual infidelity which prompts
a loss of self-control due to sexual jealousy, possessiveness or family honour is not a
qualifying trigger. However, if the sexual infidelity provides the context within which
another trigger operates it must be considered.
In Clinton, D killed his wife having found out she was unfaithful. However, the loss of
self-control was not prompted by possessiveness or jealousy but by the fact that, when
asked to reconsider her wish to leave D, she abused him and made several extremely
wounding remarks – including that she had had enough of looking after their children
– and derided him for being too weak-minded to execute his desire to commit suicide.
Thus, taking the whole context into account including the infidelity, D was able to
claim that he was subject to things said or done which constituted circumstances
of an extremely grave character and caused him to have a justifiable sense of being
seriously wronged.
Since Clinton, other cases have occurred in which defendants have killed following
a discovery of sexual infidelity. These have not been presented as cases where the
killing was triggered by jealousy, but, as in Clinton, have been presented as cases
where infidelity was one of a number of events which cumulatively constituted
circumstances of an extremely grave character. In Dawes and Hatter [2013] EWCA Crim
322, the Court of Appeal, while approving the decision in Clinton, agreed with the
trial judge that the fact of the break-up of a relationship, of itself, will not normally
constitute circumstances of an extremely grave character and entitle the aggrieved
party to feel a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. As a result their convictions
were upheld. The following statement of the trial judge in Hatter explains the decision:
To suggest that the fact of a break-up of a relationship could amount to circumstances

of an extremely grave character or that it would entitle the aggrieved party to feel a
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged would be to ignore the normal meaning of
these words. It would also result in the defence of loss of control being left to the jury in
almost every case where one partner to a relationship kills the other, which was clearly not
Parliament’s intention.
There must, in other words, be something in addition to the usual heartache

and grievances accompanying the break-up of a relationship which renders the
circumstances sufficiently grave to warrant a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
Activity 7.7
Eve discovers her husband, Adam, having sex with Ruth, her daughter and his step-
daughter. Eve loses self-control and kills Adam. Is the defence of loss of self-control
excluded under s.55(6)?
Might a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in the circumstances of D, have reacted in the same or in a similar way
to D?
This compares with the old law of provocation in so far as it disqualifies the defendant
from relying on the defence if his reaction was more to do with his being unusually
intolerant or apt to lose control or being intoxicated (Asmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157)
and so less able to control himself. People are expected to keep to the same standards
of self-control as other ordinary people. If the individual has some condition or
characteristic which renders him less able to exercise self-control he would be better
advised to rely on the defence of diminished responsibility. The only matters which
might impact on this objective standard are age, presumably because the young are
more likely to be hot-headed, and sex, for less obvious reasons.
7.3.8 Evidence and procedure

The relative functions of judge and jury are described in s.54(5) and (6) of the Coroners
and Justice Act 2009.
(5) On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect
to the defence under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the defence is satisfied
unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue
with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the trial
judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might
apply.
As is usual in relation to defences, the burden of (dis)proof is on the prosecution. As
is also usual, this burden of proof does not kick in unless D adduces evidence capable
of leading the jury to conclude that the defence applies (s.54(5)). The judge decides
whether the evidence so adduced by the defendant is so capable (s.54(6)). The judge
would, therefore, disallow any evidence that the defendant lost their self-control due
to intoxication, sexual jealousy, their partner’s nagging, their baby crying and so on.
If, however, the defendant’s evidence was that their partner had threatened them or
the child with injury, or had been taking family money to support a lover or a business
venture, or had been accused of some disgraceful act, the judge should permit the jury
to consider this evidence to determine whether the defence should succeed. For an
example of a judge refusing to accept that the trigger was sufficiently grave, see Dawes
and Hatter.
7.3.9 Diminished responsibility

Diminished responsibility originated in s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957. As with
provocation, its purpose was to provide a sentencing discretion in cases of murder
where serious mitigation exists. This was particularly important since, at the time,
murder was a capital offence.
The defence was reconfigured by s.52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The major
changes made were to clarify the type of mental abnormality which may ground the
defence, and the mechanism for substantiating that abnormality. Beyond this, the
defence covers much the same ground and pre-2009 cases are likely to remain of
authority where consistent with the new provisions. It should be noted that unusually
– and contrary to the position with loss of self-control – the burden of proof is on
the defence. The standard of proof is on the civil standards; that is, on the balance of
probabilities.
Section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 amends s.2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957
as follows.
(1) A person (‘D’) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted of
murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which –
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in
subsection (1A), and
(c) provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the
killing.
(1A) Those things are –
(a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.
In Sections 7.3.10–13, we look at the elements of diminished responsibility.
7.3.10 Abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised

mental condition
An abnormality of mental functioning is not defined, but is traditionally regarded
as an objectively significant deviation from what would be regarded as normal by a
reasonable person. Obviously this is a rather vague test but is given focus by s.52(1A)
which refers to its effect on D’s ability:
(a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.
So a person who kills because their abnormality of mental functioning causes them to
misinterpret V’s words or actions, or causes them to interpret an innocent act as an
aggressive act, or causes them to see dangers where there are none, or overestimate
the danger they are facing, or because they killed at the prompting of ‘internal voices’,
or simply because their abnormality reduced their powers of self-control, comes
within the defence, so long as this results from a recognised mental condition.
7.3.11 Recognised mental condition

Under the old law, there was no requirement that the defendant’s mental abnormality
resulted from a recognised medical condition so long as it was caused by some
‘inherent’ condition. This created a degree of flexibility, which is either a good thing
or a bad thing depending upon your point of view. Some of this flexibility has been
removed. It is no longer possible, for example, for D to rely on the defence simply
because they suffered chronic jealousy, or their powers of resistance had been worn
down by the illness of a partner or child.
Recognised medical conditions can be found in authoritative classificatory lists,

including the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases and
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. It is likely that the following conditions, which grounded the old law, will
continue to be accepted as recognised mental conditions.
uu Arrested or retarded mental development.
uu Depression (Gittens [1984] QB 698).
uu Bipolar (Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2637).
uu Paranoid schizophrenia (Sutcliffe, The Times, 30 April 1981).
uu Brain damage.
uu Psychopathy (Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396).
uu Paranoid personality disorder (Martin (Anthony) [2001] EWCA Crim 2245).
uu Postnatal depression (Reynolds [1988] Crim LR 679).
The new law, therefore, will require the testimony of expert witnesses in any case
where the condition relied upon by the defendant is contested or ambiguous. The
case of Brennan [2014] EWCA Crim 2387, clarifies an important procedural issue in
relation to the defence. If medical evidence supporting a defence of diminished
responsibility is put before the court by a medical expert and the prosecution do
not contradict that evidence with evidence of their own medical expert, a charge of
murder should be withdrawn from the jury. So if the prosecution do not like the expert
evidence put before the court by the defence, they should appoint their own medical
expert to rebut it. Examples of contested conditions which were accepted as a basis
for the defence under the old law include battered women’s syndrome (Ahluwalia;
Hobson [1998] 1 Cr App R 31) and premenstrual syndrome (Smith (Sandie) [1982] Crim LR
531). Nevertheless, the decision is ultimately one for the judge. In Osborne [2010] EWCA
Crim 547, the Court of Appeal ruled that attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal against conviction on the basis of
diminished responsibility.
Activity 7.8
Read Wilson, Section 13.6.B ‘Statutory definition’ and D ‘Overlap with loss of self-
control’ and answer the following question.
Do the defences of loss of self-control and diminished responsibility adequately
address the problem of battered partners who kill their abuser such as Ahluwalia?
7.3.12 Alcohol and drugs

The old law distinguished between binge drinking and chronic alcoholism. This
separation is likely to be continued. Intoxication is not a ‘medical condition’ (Fenton
(1975) 61 Cr App R 261; it will not therefore ground the new defence. In Dowds [2012]
EWCA Crim 281, (2012) MHLO 18, the Court of Appeal concluded that voluntary acute
intoxication, whether from alcohol or another substance, is not capable of founding
diminished responsibility. However, the abnormality of mental functioning does
not have to be the sole cause of the killing so long as it ‘provides an explanation’ for
D’s participation in the killing. So a person who kills due to the combined effect of
intoxication and a recognised mental condition may still have a defence (Dietschmann
[2003] 1 All ER 897, disapproving Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470). In R v Kay [2017] EWCA Crim
647, the fact that the defendant, who suffered with schizophrenia, was unable to
provide evidence that it was his schizophrenia that provided the trigger for the
killing rather than the fact that he was acutely intoxicated at the time meant he was
unable to rely on the defence. In other words, just because a person is schizophrenic
does not mean that they can rely on the defence unless they can establish that the
schizophrenia, rather than another trigger such as intoxication, was the cause of the
psychotic episode.
One exception to this rule arises where the defendant is a chronic alcoholic. Under
the old law, chronic alcoholism could ground the defence as it was inherent to the
defendant (Wood [2009] 1 WLR 496; Stewart [2009] 1 WLR 2507). This is still the law,
since chronic alcoholism is a recognised medical condition and its effect, which is
well known, is to provoke irresistible cravings for alcohol and consequently a reduced
capacity for self-control and forming rational judgements. So Mr Kay could have relied
upon the defence if he had been able to establish that the psychotic episode arose
from a combination of schizophrenia and chronic alcoholism. Unfortunately for him,
he could not. He was just drunk.
Wood is a typical case of this nature, involving a homeless alcoholic who, heavily
intoxicated, killed an associate who had made a homosexual advance. The trial judge
gave the misleading impression to the jury that the defendant’s consumption of
alcohol had to be entirely involuntary to count as an internal pathology capable of
grounding the defence. The defendant’s appeal was allowed for misdirection. The
President of the Queen’s Bench rejected the trial judge’s proposition to the effect that
‘unless every drink consumed that day by the appellant was involuntary, his alcohol
dependency syndrome was to be disregarded’.
7.3.13 Which provides an explanation for the killing

The new provision requires that the abnormality must provide an explanation for the
defendant’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing. It must form
part of the story as to why this killing took place: the defendant’s reason was impaired,
they did not fully understand what they were doing, or their self-control was lacking,
and that is why – or one of the reasons why – they did what they did. A psychopath
is, therefore, unlikely to be able to use this defence, since they lack neither ordinary
powers of self-control nor normal cognitive abilities.
Section 52(1B) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 states that an explanation will be
provided if ‘it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out
that conduct’. Whether it does provide an explanation for the killing is a question
for the jury which, in cases involving multiple causes – for example depression and
intoxication (see Gittens) or chronic alcoholism and intoxication (see Wood) – could
prove a bit of a challenge.
7.3.14 Substantially impaired

The defence only operates if the mental abnormality substantially impaired D’s ability
to do one of the three things mentioned in s.52(1)(a). What does ‘substantially’ mean
in this context? In Golds (2014) the Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant’s mental
abnormality must have had a very significant effect on his ability to understand/
control himself, etc.
The Supreme Court has agreed with the Court of Appeal ruling in Golds (2014) EWCA
Crim 748 that, for the purpose of diminished responsibility ‘substantially impaired’
means ‘something whilst short of total impairment is nevertheless significant and
appreciable’ rather than a ‘more than trivial impairment’. Golds’ appeal was dismissed.
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0053-judgment.pdf

Are you ready to move on to the next part of this chapter? You are if – without
referring to the module guide or Wilson – you can answer the following questions.
1. Define murder.
2. Explain what a ‘living person’ is for the purpose of criminal homicide.
3. Explain the relevance of consent in cases of criminal homicide.
4. State the mens rea for murder.
5. Explain when the Woollin direction should be given to the jury and when it should
not.
6. Explain what grievous bodily harm means and who decides whether harm inflicted
is grievous bodily harm.
7. Explain the difference between provocation and loss of self-control.
8. State the elements of loss of self-control.
9. State and explain the two types of ‘qualifying trigger’.
10. Explain what the respective role of judge and jury is in deciding whether D is able
to rely on a defence.
11. State the elements of diminished responsibility.
12. State six recognised mental conditions which can ground the defence.
13. Explain what ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ means.
14. Explain how, if at all, intoxication is relevant in assessing whether someone is able
to rely on a defence.
7.4 Involuntary manslaughter

Involuntary manslaughter can be one of three types:
uu ‘foresight’ or ‘reckless’ manslaughter
uu ‘unlawful act’ or ‘constructive’ manslaughter
uu gross negligence manslaughter (causing death through lack of care).
One of your key tasks is to be clear about their respective areas of coverage. The three
forms overlap to a certain extent but also have their own specific application.
7.4.1 Overlap between forms of involuntary manslaughter

Hyam (Hyam [1975] AC 55) and Smith (Smith [1961] AC 290) both killed in the course
of doing something extremely dangerous. In the former case, Hyam threw a petrol
bomb through V’s letter box, while in the latter case, Smith drove his car extremely
dangerously in an attempt to dislodge a police officer trying to arrest him. Both
victims were killed. If these cases came to the courts today the defendants should
not be charged with murder, which requires intention to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm. They should, however, be charged with:
uu reckless manslaughter, if the prosecution could prove foresight of death or serious

injury
uu gross negligence manslaughter, if, irrespective of whether the prosecution could

prove foresight of death or serious injury, the jury considered their actions to be
grossly negligent as to the risk of death
uu constructive manslaughter, since both defendants killed in the course of doing

something illegal and dangerous.
The prosecution will tend to charge the form which is most easy to establish as
a matter of evidence. Here this is probably constructive manslaughter, but the
prosecution would still find it relatively easy to gain a conviction charging either of the
other two forms.
7.4.2 Distinctiveness
There are, however, killings where only one form should be charged. This
distinctiveness should be understood. Reckless manslaughter is rarely charged. Since
acting with foresight of death or serious injury will usually be a criminal offence,
almost all cases of reckless manslaughter will also be cases of constructive (unlawful
act) manslaughter. Reckless manslaughter comes into its own when the defendant
is charged with murder and the judge directs the jury that it can find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter if not convinced there was the necessary intention but if
convinced that the defendant foresaw death or serious injury as probable. Examples
of cases where this would be appropriate include Hyam (1975), Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr
App R 23 and Hancock and Shankland [1985] 3 WLR 1014. Since this explanation tells us
all we need to know about reckless manslaughter, no more will be said about it in this
chapter.
Constructive manslaughter is the correct charge when there is evidence that death
resulted from an unlawful and objectively dangerous act of D, but there is insufficient
evidence that D intended death or serious injury, or was grossly negligent as to the risk
of death.
Illustration 7.6
A hits B with a single punch to the jaw. B dies as a result of a hidden weakness in his
skull which implodes under the force.
This is constructive manslaughter; neither of the other two forms apply since A neither
foresaw death nor grievous bodily harm, and nor was he grossly negligent as to the
risk of death.
Gross negligence manslaughter is the correct charge where there is insufficient

evidence that D foresaw death or serious injury resulting from their conduct and there
is no unlawful and dangerous act upon which to graft liability. It is most appropriate,
therefore, for those who kill in the course of performing a lawful activity in a criminally
careless fashion, or who omit to do something they should have done. It covers,
for example, parents who neglect their children, train drivers who ignore signals,
electricians who forget to earth their circuits, builders who break building regulations,
surgeons who perform incompetent surgery on their patients, bus drivers who fall
asleep at the wheel and so on.
7.4.3 Constructive manslaughter

Constructive manslaughter is also known as unlawful act manslaughter. It is called
constructive manslaughter because liability does not derive, as it usually must, from
a combination of an actus reus and mens rea which match a consequence with an
equivalent mental state. Rather, liability for one crime is constructed out of the
elements of another. For example, one can be guilty of manslaughter if death results
from the commission of an assault, criminal damage, burglary, robbery or even theft.
The prosecution’s task is to prove:
uu the elements of the core offence (e.g. the assault)
uu the objective likelihood of resulting harm, and
uu a causal connection between the assault and the death.
This offence is, in the opinion of most commentators, unjust, since – as Illustration 7.6
shows – the criminal label may seriously misrepresent the nature of the defendant’s
wrongdoing.
7.4.4 Actus reus: constructive manslaughter
An act
To be guilty of constructive manslaughter the cause of death must be an act. This is
one of the few crimes which cannot be committed by omission. Omissions are not
sufficient even where there is a duty of care. So in Lowe [1973] QB 702 D was charged
with the constructive manslaughter of his child whom he had badly neglected. He was
convicted on the basis that he had caused his child’s death through the commission of
a criminal offence. That offence is wilful neglect of a child (s.1 of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1933). D’s conviction was quashed. The Court of Appeal ruled that an act
was of the essence for constructive manslaughter. This charge would have been proper
if the child had died as a result of injuries sustained through a beating. As no such acts
could be established, the case should have been charged as one of gross negligence
manslaughter. No doubt the prosecution chose to charge constructive manslaughter
because it was easier to establish the commission of the s.1 offence than it was to
establish gross negligence on D’s part. The Court of Appeal saw through this ruse!
An act which is criminally unlawful

This is an important point. It was first established in Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163
in which D killed a swimmer by throwing a wooden crate off a pier into the sea. D’s
conviction for constructive manslaughter was quashed since what he had done, if
wrongful, was not a criminal wrong. In deciding whether someone has committed
constructive manslaughter, therefore, the first question to ask is whether the death
resulted from the commission of a crime. This crime must, moreover, be identified by
the prosecution (Jennings [1990] Crim LR 588).
Activity 7.9
Read Wilson, Section 13.7.B.1 ‘The elements of constructive manslaughter’, Section
(b) ‘Dangerous act’ and 13.7.C ‘Manslaughter by breach of duty’ and answer the
a. Why was Slingsby not guilty of constructive manslaughter?
b. Lamb shot dead his friend. Why was he not guilty of constructive manslaughter?
Could he have been guilty of gross negligence manslaughter?
Larkin [1943] KB 174 and Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 are authorities for the proposition
that the prosecution must be able to prove all the elements of a criminal offence to
support a conviction for constructive manslaughter. But the prosecution’s task does
not stop there. If D has a defence to the core offence, for example consent or self-
defence, again no conviction for unlawful act manslaughter will arise. In Scarlett [1993]
4 All ER 629 D, a publican, ejected a drunk from a public house who then fell backwards
down the steps and died following a fractured skull. D’s conviction for constructive
manslaughter was quashed on the basis that he feared the drunk was about to attack
him and so his use of force was lawful self-defence.
7.4.5 Crimes of negligence: a qualification

Certain activities are lawful if done properly, but unlawful if done dangerously or
negligently. The most common example of these are driving offences. If D commits a
driving offence such as speeding or dangerous driving which results in V being killed,
is D automatically guilty of constructive manslaughter? This is an important question
because if the answer is yes it would threaten to put a lot of people, whose only fault
is negligence or absent-mindedness, behind bars. It would also take over the space
currently occupied by gross negligence manslaughter and render a conviction for
negligent killing easier; indeed, far too easy. In Andrews [1937] AC 576, the House of Lords
ruled that only acts which are inherently criminal can form the basis of a constructive
manslaughter charge. If they are criminal only because they are performed in a careless
or dangerous fashion then the prosecution must charge gross negligence manslaughter,
which will necessitate the prosecution proving not merely the carelessness or
dangerousness required by the core crime but also gross negligence as to death.
Activity 7.10
Lord Atkin said in Andrews: ‘There is an obvious difference in the law of
manslaughter between doing an unlawful act and doing a lawful act with a degree
of carelessness which the legislature makes criminal’.
In other words, you cannot charge constructive manslaughter if the only criminal
wrong committed by the defendant is speeding, dangerous driving or driving
without due care.
Now invent an examination question in which it would be right to charge
constructive manslaughter arising from a piece of dangerous driving. If you can do
this, you have gone a long way towards understanding constructive manslaughter.
Read Wilson, Section 13.7.B.1 ‘The elements of constructive manslaughter’ if you
have difficulty but try it yourself first!
7.4.6 The criminal act must be dangerous

‘Dangerous’ is a term of art here. It does not mean threatening to life or limb; it means
simply of a nature to cause harm. A punch then is dangerous because punches often
result in harm, albeit not serious harm. A punch was the core activity which resulted
in a manslaughter conviction in the leading case of Church [1966] 1 QB 59. In this case,
Edmund Davies LJ gave the following authoritative definition of what counts as a
dangerous act.
the act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise
must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom,
albeit not serious harm.
Activity 7.11
The principle in Church should be committed to memory. It is brief and very helpful.
The phrase ‘the other person’ in the Church quotation does not mean that the dangerous
act need be directed against the deceased specifically. It could be directed against a third
party, as happened in Mitchell [1983] 2 All ER 427 (the altercation in the Post Office queue
case, see Chapter 4), but it must be of a nature to cause harm to someone.
Two cases involving different outcomes from similar actions illustrate this meaning of
‘dangerous acts’. In Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150 D pointed a replica gun at V in the
course of a robbery. V had a history of heart conditions and died of a heart attack: D
was convicted of constructive manslaughter. On appeal his conviction was quashed
because the judge had not made clear to the jury that it could convict only if pointing
the gun was objectively dangerous. And it would be objectively dangerous only if it
was known that V had a heart condition – this had not been established.
In Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684, D committed burglary on a house occupied by V, an

87-year-old man who suffered from a heart condition. The encounter between D and V
resulted in V being disturbed and upset, and a little later he suffered a heart attack and
died. D was convicted of manslaughter. Although his appeal was successful on other
grounds, the Court of Appeal made clear, on the basis of the Church definition, that D’s
encounter with V was objectively dangerous, as soon as it became clear that V was old
and frail. Continuing with the burglary after this realisation would therefore satisfy the
dangerous act requirement.
7.4.7 The dangerous act must cause death

Establishing causation is not generally a problem for the prosecution, as was seen
in Chapter 4. It will normally follow from the fact that but for D’s act the death
would not have occurred, although this is not always the case. D’s act must be the
substantial and operating cause, which it will not be if, independently of D’s action,
another cause intervenes which rids D’s initial act of all causal potency. (For a good
example, see the discussion of Rafferty in Wilson, Section 5.6.B.3 ‘Intervening cause
supersedes defendant’s act’.) A particular causal sequence in which this routinely
happens involves the supply of dangerous drugs. Supplying drugs is a criminal act and
it is dangerous in the Church sense. However, if V self injects and this causes V’s death,
D (who supplied the drugs) is not guilty of manslaughter. V’s free and informed act
breaks the chain of causation (Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38).
If, however, D does the injecting then D will be liable for constructive manslaughter if
this results in V’s death. Here, however, it is not the act of supply which will form the
basis of the charge, but the administration of the drug (an offence under s.23 OAPA
1861). D will remain liable because no subsequent act or event intervenes, following
this administration, to break the chain of causation (Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110).
7.4.8 Mens rea

As has been explained, constructive liability involves the defendant being held liable
for crime A on the basis of their liability for committing crime B. If, therefore, D is being
charged with constructive manslaughter (crime A) on the basis of having committed
an assault (crime B), all the prosecution has to establish is that V’s death was caused
as a result of the assault (crime B). Setting aside proof of causation, which is a given,
its first task is to prove the actus reus of assault (e.g. a punch). Its second task is to
prove the mens rea for assault, that is intending or foreseeing (recklessness) unlawful
physical contact with V.
Activity 7.12
Read Wilson, Section 13.7.B.1 (b) ‘Dangerous act’ and answer the following questions.
a. Read the discussion of DPP v Newbury and Jones (1977). Is it necessary for the
prosecution to prove that the defendants foresaw harm resulting from their
criminal action?
b. What was the relevance of the defendants’ age in this case?
c. Do you think the defendants’ age should have been taken into account in
deciding whether they were guilty of the crime?
d. What exactly was the crime which formed the substance of the charge and
subsequent conviction for constructive manslaughter?
e. Read R v F [2015] EWCA Crim 351. Does this case add anything new to the law as
propounded in DPP v Newbury and Jones?
f. What was the important point of law proposed by the Court of Appeal in
Jennings (1990)?
g. Under what circumstances, if any, can a person be guilty of constructive

manslaughter for having caused V to commit suicide?
7.4.9 Reform proposals

The Law Commission recommended the abolition of the rule in Newbury and Jones,
which permits liability in the absence of foresight of harm. Under its proposals,
manslaughter will encompass ‘killing through a criminal act intended to cause some
injury, or in the awareness that the act posed a serious risk of causing some injury’.
These proposals were considered by the Court of Appeal in R v F (see above).
7.4.10 Gross negligence manslaughter (manslaughter by breach of duty)

People whose gross carelessness results in death may be charged with gross
negligence manslaughter, the essence of which is a breach of a legal duty to be careful.
Such duties do not exist in a vacuum. As we have seen in Chapter 3, for example, where
death is caused by an omission such a duty exists only where it has been voluntarily
assumed, or where there is a contract, special relationship and so on. So a lifeguard
may be guilty of gross negligence manslaughter for failing to save a child drowning in
their swimming pool, but not an expert swimmer who is in attendance and witnesses
the whole affair.
Whether a duty exists in cases of affirmative action causing death is a matter of law
to be decided by the trial judge. In the civil law of negligence, such duties tend to arise
by virtue of the duty holder being in a position where their actions are likely to cause
harm to another. The criminal law follows this pattern to a large extent, but the fact that
a duty is not recognised in the civil law does not mean that it will not be recognised in
the criminal setting. In Wacker [2002] EWCA Crim 1944 a lorry driver transported illegal
immigrants in an airless container which led to the deaths of most of them. He was
held properly convicted of manslaughter for his failure in this regard. Although in the
civil law such a duty would probably not have arisen due to the immigrants’ complicity
in an illegal enterprise, no such stricture applied in the criminal law where deeper
considerations of public policy applied. A similar result was seen in Willoughby [2004]
EWCA Crim 3365 where D and V torched D’s building for the purpose of committing an
insurance fraud, during which V died. Again, although no duty of care would have arisen
in the civil law, a duty did arise in the criminal law and D was guilty of manslaughter.
The modern law of gross negligence manslaughter derives from the leading case of
Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, in which an anaesthetist was charged with manslaughter
for failing to supervise properly a patient who was given a general anaesthetic in
the course of an eye operation: the patient died when, unnoticed by the defendant,
his oxygen supply was cut off. The House of Lords made a number of important
statements of principle in the course of this case. In particular, it deprecated the trial
judge’s use of the term recklessness to describe the fault element and said that trial
judges should direct the jury in terms of gross negligence only in cases where a lack of
care is alleged to be the cause of death.
It stated that the elements of this form of manslaughter were threefold. The
prosecution must show:
uu D owed a duty of care
uu D was in gross violation of this duty
uu death occurred as a result of this breach of duty.
7.4.11 Duty of care

As explained above, it is a matter of law for the judge to decide whether the defendant
owed a duty of care to the victim. The jury’s function is to decide whether the duty was
broken and if the death was caused by the breach. This principle was affirmed in Evans
[2009] EWCA Crim 650 in which the Court of Appeal introduced a new duty situation
in cases of manslaughter by omission – namely one arising where the defendant is
responsible for contributing to circumstances of extreme danger for the victim. This
was an extension of the principle in Miller in which the House of Lords had limited
this duty to cases where the dangerous situation was caused by the defendant (see
Chapter 3). Now it is enough that they simply contributed to the danger. In the words
of Lord Judge CJ:
When a person has created or contributed to the creation of a state of affairs which he
knows, or ought reasonably to know, has become life threatening, a consequent duty on
him to act by taking reasonable steps to save the other’s life will normally arise.
Activity 7.13
Read Wilson, Section 13.7.C ‘Manslaughter by breach of duty’ and Section 4.5.D.3
‘Circumstances giving rise to a duty to act: duty situations’ and find authorities for,
and illustrations, of the duty of care in the following contexts.
a. Trades (e.g. building, plumbing, electricity).
b. Driving a car (motor manslaughter) or crossing a road.
c. Caring roles (e.g. parents).
d. Carers.
e. Professionals (e.g. doctors, nurses, dentists).
f. Contractual roles.
g. Other non-specific activities.

7.4.12 Breach of duty

How negligent does a person have to be to breach their duty of care? Very! In Adomako
the standard of care was described as follows.
[Responsibility] will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the
defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred...
[The jury must consider] whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct
of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in their judgment to a
criminal act or omission.
(Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 per Lord Mackay)
Note here that liability for gross negligence manslaughter requires there to be a
risk of death. There is no liability if the risk is simply of harm/serious harm (compare
constructive manslaughter).
Moreover, the risk of death has to be apparent at the time of the breach of duty. This
is an important qualification and was made clear in R v Rose [2017] EWCA Crim 1168. An
optometrist failed to conduct a full examination of the deceased’s eyes during a sight
test. If the optometrist had done so, she would have discovered that the deceased had
a life-threatening condition and would have sent her for urgent specialist attention. Her
conviction for gross negligence manslaughter was quashed. The Court of Appeal agreed
that her failure to conduct a full examination was very negligent. However, the fact that
a proper examination might have revealed a serious life-threatening problem did not
mean that there was a ‘serious and obvious risk of death’ if such an examination was not
carried out. This was, after all, a simple routine eye test. It might have been different if
the patient had presented with symptoms that themselves had either pointed to the risk
of a potentially life-threatening condition or provided a sign that alerted a competent
optometrist to that risk.
It has been argued that the offence of gross negligence manslaughter breaches
Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights which proscribes retrospective
criminalisation. This is because the line between mere negligence and gross negligence
is not precisely drawn. Whether a person’s conduct amounts to gross negligence,
therefore, cannot be assessed in advance but only by a jury deciding ex post facto. This
argument was rejected in Amit Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375.
Activity 7.14
a. Read Wilson, Chapter 13 ‘Homicide’ and identify, make notes on and commit to
memory all the Law Commission’s major reform proposals concerning murder
and manslaughter. Do you agree with them?
b. Invent for yourself an examination problem which involves a person committing

each of the three forms of manslaughter which could not be charged as one of
the other forms (you will find reckless manslaughter the most difficult). Below is
an example in relation to constructive manslaughter.
Constructive manslaughter: A hits B with a single punch to the jaw. B dies as a

result of a hidden weakness in his skull which implodes under the force. What
crime has A committed?
Now invent your own.

1. Identify the elements of reckless manslaughter.
2. Identify the elements of constructive manslaughter.
3. In relation to constructive manslaughter, explain what the mens rea is, and if it is
necessary that D foresaw harm – and if so what kind of harm – to V by what D was
doing.
4. Identify the elements of gross negligence manslaughter.
5. Explain what the relevant function of judge and jury is in relation to gross
negligence manslaughter.
6. Answer the question as to what D must be grossly negligent of.
7. Explain the difference in coverage between the various forms of manslaughter.
8. Explain their points of overlap.
9. Outline the major Law Commission proposals for reforming criminal homicide.
Notes
8 Rape
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8.1 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.1 – rape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.2 Conduct elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.3 Absence of consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.4 The presumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.5 Procedure: relationship between s.1, s.75 and s.74 . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.6 Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Introduction
The law of rape is contained in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003). This Act
reordered and restructured all sexual offences, whose rationale and structure
reflected their piecemeal development through the common law, the Sexual Offences
provide coherent and clear sex offences which protect individuals, especially the more
vulnerable, from abuse and exploitation, enable abusers to be appropriately punished,
and be fair and non-discriminatory in accordance with the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998.
Act 1956 and the later amendments thereto. The overall philosophy is to
Part 1 of the SOA 2003 enacts the newly-constituted structure of sexual offences
that includes rape, assault by penetration, sexual assault and causing a person to
engage in sexual activity without consent. It deals with the issue of consent and, in
particular, seeks to simplify the process of establishing absence of consent by the use
of presumptions. It also covers child sex offences including those taking place within a
family context. Part 2 is largely a re-enactment of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 containing
measures for the protection of the public. In this chapter we will be examining just
one sexual offence, namely rape.
Criminal law 8 Rape page 83
8.1 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.1 – rape

(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (b) with
his penis,
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the

circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
(3) Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment,
to imprisonment for life.
8.2 Conduct elements

The actus reus of rape involves the non-consensual penetration of the mouth, anus or
vagina of a man or a woman by a man’s penis. Penetration by the penis is key to the
actus reus of rape. Penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth with the tongue or finger
or with objects such as broom handles, bottles or dildos is not rape. It is the separate
offence of (sexual) assault by penetration (SOA 2003, s.2).
By SOA 2003 s.79(2), ‘Penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal.’ This
enshrines the pre-SOA 2003 decision in Kaitamaki [1985] AC 147 that a man who
continues to have intercourse after consent is withdrawn commits the actus reus of
rape. Rape is an offence which can only be committed by a man, but, since the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, it can be committed on either a man or a woman.
Any non-consensual penetrative vaginal, oral and anal sex constitutes rape. Ejaculation
is not necessary (R (on the application of F) v DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin)). By s.79(3),
‘vagina’ includes surgically constructed vaginas following gender reassignment surgery.
Rape has, since 1992, been possible between man and wife. Before this, the consent of
the wife was presumed unless the marriage had terminated. Henceforth, the consent
of the wife must be forthcoming and all the provisions of the SOA 2003 apply to
determine whether it is.
8.3 Absence of consent

In most cases of rape the main problem for the prosecution is proving absence of
consent. The problem has been described as linked with the ‘infinite circumstances
of human behaviour, usually taking place in private without independent evidence,
and the consequent difficulties of proving this very serious offence’ (Bree [2007] per
Hallett J at [36]). The fact that the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt and
the difficulty, in the absence of clear evidence of violence or threats thereof, of proving
lack of consent, historically created substantial problems for the victims of rape. These
problems were compounded by inflexible and insensitive rules of procedure and
evidence by which the victim, as the prime prosecution witness, was routinely forced
to defend themself against allegations of promiscuity and loose morality. This led to
the charge that the criminal justice system did not take rape seriously, and tended to
prioritise the rights of the accused over those of the victim.
The SOA 2003 has sought to address that charge and to ease the burden of the
prosecution by having a number of conclusive presumptions (s.76) and a number of
evidential presumptions (s.75). The effect of these is that, where these apply, there will
rarely be any need for the victim to be cross-examined on the question of consent; it
will be presumed absent. If neither s.75 nor s.76 applies the prosecution are required to
prove absence of consent in the usual way. The prosecution will, therefore, be anxious
to establish that a presumption does apply if possible since it will ease its burden
considerably. As a student you should follow the same route. First consider whether a
presumption applies and only if it does not consider whether s.74 is satisfied.
8.4 The presumptions

The SOA 2003 Imposes two types of presumptions:
uu Conclusive presumptions, s.76. These cannot be rebutted.
uu Evidential presumptions, s.75. These can be rebutted by raising evidence that,

notwithstanding the circumstance relied upon, the victim nevertheless did
consent.
8.4.1 Conclusive presumptions

By s.76 it is conclusively presumed both that V did not consent and D did not
reasonably believe V to consent in the following circumstances:
(2)...(a) the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the

nature or purpose of the relevant act;
(b) the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant
act by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant.
The job of the prosecution, therefore, is to try to establish beyond reasonable doubt
either of these two circumstances. If it succeeds the case is won without having to
establish anything else.
Section 76(2)(a)
A pre-SOA 2003 example of the first presumption is Williams [1923] 1 KB 340. D, a singing
teacher, told V, his pupil that it was necessary to perform an act in order to improve
her singing. She agreed, not knowing or understanding that the act she was engaging
in was sexual intercourse. It was held that her consent was vitiated by fraud as to the
nature and quality of the act. What V was consenting to and what she thought she
was consenting to were completely different in their nature. Compare Linekar [1995]
QB 250, where it was held not to be a deception as to the nature and quality of the
act for a person to trick a prostitute into having intercourse without payment. What
she agreed to is what she got. It is possible that this case might be decided differently
under the SOA 2003 since V could plausibly argue that although she consented to the
nature of the act, she did not consent to its purpose. The purpose for her after all was
financial not sexual. However, in Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 the Court of Appeal
stated that where this presumption is raised it should be the subject of ‘stringent
scrutiny’ since, if accepted, it is conclusive on the question of guilt.
Section 76(2)(b)
Before the SOA 2003, a man who induced a person to have sexual intercourse with
him by impersonating their partner committed rape. So it was rape when the
defendant, the twin brother of V’s boyfriend, had intercourse with V by pretending
to be the brother: Elbekkay [1994] EWCA Crim 1. The SOA 2003 extends the old rules on
impersonation in that consent is vitiated not only when it is the complainant’s partner
or spouse who is impersonated but also when it is any person ‘known personally to
the defendant’. No doubt there will be some interesting cases arising out of social
networking friendships concerned with establishing exactly what ‘known personally
to the defendant’ means.
Section 76: questions of procedure

The procedure, where there is an issue that consent may be vitiated by one of the
circumstances in s.76, is that the prosecution will seek to establish the existence of
that circumstance. If that fails, the prosecution will then seek to negate consent by
relying on s.74. This is what occurred in Jheeta (2007). D began a sexual relationship
with C. Whenever C tried to end her relationship with D, he sent her text messages
from different ‘police officers’ telling her it was her duty to sleep with him, otherwise
she would receive a fine. D was arrested and admitted sexual intercourse had taken
place while the complainant was not truly consenting. He was convicted of rape.
It was held that C had not been deceived as to the nature or purpose of the sexual
intercourse, but was deceived as to the situation in which she had found herself.
Section 76(2)(a) had no application in the instant case, therefore. The prosecution,
therefore, had to prove absence of consent by reference to s.74, which it succeeded in
doing. The effect of the deception was that the complainant had not exercised a free
choice as to whether to have intercourse or not.
8.4.2 The evidential presumptions

By s.75, where one of six different circumstances occur, it is a rebuttable evidential
presumption that the complainant did not consent to the relevant act, and that the
defendant did not believe that the complainant consented to the relevant act.
The key difference between these presumptions and the presumptions in s.76 is that
the evidential presumptions can be rebutted by the raising of relevant evidence. This
will generally not be easy but it is possible.
(2) The circumstances are that—
(a) any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began,
using violence against the complainant or causing the complainant to fear that
immediate violence would be used against him;
(b) any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began,
causing the complainant to fear that violence was being used, or that immediate
violence would be used, against another person;
(c) the complainant was, and the defendant was not, unlawfully detained at the time
of the relevant act;
(d) the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious at the time of the relevant
act;
(e) because of the complainant’s physical disability, the complainant would not
have been able at the time of the relevant act to communicate to the defendant
whether the complainant consented;
(f) any person had administered to or caused to be taken by the complainant,

without the complainant’s consent, a substance which, having regard to when it
was administered or taken, was capable of causing or enabling the complainant to
be stupefied or overpowered at the time of the relevant act.
All these situations concern circumstances where it is unlikely, without being

impossible, that V consented and D had reasonable grounds for believing that. If you
think about it, it would be quite a rare circumstance for someone to have intercourse
with a sleeping person who actually consents to the act. Rare but not impossible. The
example often given is that of a couple who have got into the habit of having sex at
night when the woman is asleep.
The procedure to be followed is that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the circumstance existed (e.g. that V was asleep when D had intercourse
with V). V is then presumed not to have consented and D is presumed to have
known that. Another example of an evidential presumption is where D used force
or threat of force before or at the time of the relevant act. Again, upon proof of this,
the prosecution will win its case without having to specifically prove absence of
consent unless D is able to offer plausible evidence in rebuttal (e.g. by raising plausible
evidence that sleeping sex was a regular consensual occurrence or, in the violence
case, by raising plausible evidence that both parties were fetishists and were role
playing with consent). If D does this successfully the prosecution are back to square
one and must prove absence of consent by reference to the statutory definition which
appears in s.74. If D does not, he is convicted.
Section 75(2)(f) typically covers cases where D secretly introduces a ‘date rape’ drug
such as rohypnol into V’s drink or ‘spikes’ V’s soft drink with alcohol. Section 75(2)(f)
does not require that V is stupefied or overpowered by the substance only that the
substance was capable of producing this effect. If the prosecution can prove that
this substance was administered or caused to be taken it is presumed that V did not
consent to intercourse and that D had no reasonable grounds for believing that she
did. Again, however, the defendant can rebut the presumption by raising plausible
evidence that notwithstanding D’s subterfuge V did consent to the act of intercourse
(see illustration below). If he is successful the prosecution must prove absence of
consent by reference to s.74.
8.4.3 Section 74 – the statutory definition of consent

Prior to 2003 the very concept of consent was fragile. This led to huge problems in
establishing its absence. In Olugboja [1982] QB 320 the victim’s case was simple: ‘I didn’t
consent, although I did not struggle. I was terrified and could do nothing to resist.’ The
defendant’s case was equally simple: ‘I did not threaten or use force on her. She
consented’. The Court of Appeal was forced to duck the issue by relying on the ‘good
sense of the jury’. Dunn LJ said that:
the dividing line ... between real consent on the one hand and mere submission on the
other may not be easy to draw. Where it is to be drawn in a given case is for the jury
to decide, applying their combined good sense, experience and knowledge of human
nature and modern behaviour to all the relevant facts of that case.
Section 74 does little to improve the situation. It defines consent, but in a very loose
way, stating that ‘a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and
capacity to make that choice’. The concerns are that ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ are:
ideas which raise philosophical issues of such complexity as to be ill suited to the needs
of criminal justice – clearly those words do not refer to total freedom of choice, so all the
questions about how much liberty of action satisfies the ‘definition’ remain at large.
(Temkin, J. and A. Ashworth ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, sexual assaults and
the problems of consent’ (2004) Crim LR 328–46, 336.)
In Doyle [2010] EWCA Crim 119, a case involving the rape of the defendant’s ex-partner,
the defence noted the Judicial Studies Board Specimen Direction, no. 53, which
embodied the direction given by Pill J in the trial of Mohammed Zafar:
A female partner may not particularly want sexual intercourse on a particular occasion,
but because it is her husband or her partner who is asking for it, she will consent to
sexual intercourse. The fact that such consent is given reluctantly or out of a sense of
duty to her partner is still consent.
Although the SOA 2003 provides a statutory definition of consent, its indeterminacy
has led to the Olugboja model continuing to be heavily influential in terms of jury
directions in cases where consent is an issue. In Kirk [2008] EWCA Crim 434 the Court
of Appeal upheld the conviction of a defendant who had made sexual intercourse the
condition of a gift of money needed by the young homeless victim to buy food. In so
doing it approved the distinction drawn by the trial judge between consent and ‘mere
submission’, without clarifying it, which formed the basis of the decision in Olugboja.
In R v Ali and Ashraf [2015] EWCA Crim 1279 the Court of Appeal ruled that in the case
of a vulnerable, immature complainant, who had been groomed by the defendants,
the mere fact that from the evidence presented the latter appeared to consent to
intercourse did not necessarily mean the jury were bound to accept that this apparent
consent was freely chosen.
The case of Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804 illustrates another of the circumstances
rendering proof of consent problematic, namely intoxication. The fact of intoxication
may affect both a person’s capacity to consent and their freedom of choice. It may also
disinhibit, which is perfectly consistent with consent. The defendant was a 25-year-old
man of excellent previous character. After a very heavy evening drinking together,
he had sexual intercourse with a young woman aged 19 years. He was charged and
convicted of rape. The victim stated in evidence that having lost consciousness she
awoke to find the defendant engaging in sex with her. The prosecution case was that
although the complainant was not so drunk as to lack the capacity to consent, she
did not in fact consent to intercourse. She knew that she did not want to have sexual
intercourse, and so far as she could, made that clear. The trial judge failed to put this
case clearly to the jury and so the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. How should
the case have been put? The position appears to be as follows.
If the alcohol renders the victim unconscious or prevents the victim from knowing
what is happening, then the victim does not consent due to lack of capacity. If the
effect of the alcohol prevents the victim from communicating their lack of consent,
they do not consent due to lack of free choice. Questions of proof will be paramount.
If the effect of the alcohol is to cause the victim to engage in sexual activity, which they
would not have done if sober, they still do consent. In this latter case, as was stated
controversially in Dougal (2005), ‘a drunken consent is still consent’.
In Kamki (2013) the Court of Appeal approved the following direction of the trial judge
in another case involving sexual activity while intoxicated raising questions of consent.
The full quotation is given here as it is very helpful.
A woman can have the capacity to make a choice to engage in sexual activity, even
when she has had a lot to drink obviously. Alcohol can make people less inhibited than
they are when they are sober and obviously everyone is free, we are all free to decide
how much to drink and whether to have sex or not. However, if through drink a woman
has temporarily lost her capacity to choose whether to have sexual intercourse or to
engage in sexual activity of another sort, she would then not be consenting. Clearly as I
have said, a person who is unconscious through the consumption of alcohol cannot give
consent, and it may well be there is before that complete loss of consciousness, a state of
incapacity to consent which can be reached.
So there are of course, and this is common sense again, various stages of consciousness,
are there not, from being wide awake to having a dim awareness of reality. In a state of
dim and drunken awareness, a person may not be in a condition to make choices, so
you will need to consider the evidence carefully in this case as to what was M’s state of
consciousness or unconsciousness at the time of penetration, and decide firstly was
she in a condition in which she was capable of making a choice one way or the other. If
you are sure that she was not, then she was obviously not consenting. If you conclude,
however, that she was or may have been able to make a choice, you must decide whether
she was or may have been consenting to sexual intercourse in relation to count one,
penetration of her vagina in relation to count three and the touching of her breast in
relation to count two.
Does a person who agrees to sexual activity as a result of a deception, not falling
within s.75 or 76, ‘agree by choice’? This depends, of course, on whether consent
means informed consent. If A has intercourse with B concealing from her that he is
HIV positive, does he commit the actus reus of rape, given that consent would not
have been granted had B known of his condition? The presumptions do not apply – A
does not deceive B as to the nature or purpose of the act. Guilt depends therefore on
whether consent is vitiated. In B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945 the Court of Appeal ruled that
it was not vitiated for the purpose of the offence of rape but it was for the purpose of
s.20. The transmitter of the disease would therefore be guilty under s.20.
Two important recent decisions also centre on the phrase ‘agree by choice’. In Assange
[2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) a woman who had intercourse with a man on condition
he wear a condom was held not to have consented to the intercourse when he failed
to wear one. In R (on the application of F) v DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin) a similar
decision was reached when the condition was that the man should wear a condom
or otherwise not ejaculate. These are controversial decisions as in both cases the
victim consented to the intercourse. There was no sexual ‘violation’. Arguably a better
outcome would have been for the defendant to have been charged with common
assault since the contact the victim consented to (safe sex) was not the contact she
received (see B above).
8.5 Procedure: relationship between s.1, s.75 and s.74
Illustration 8.1
D spikes V’s drink with alcohol for the purpose of disinhibiting V. V then has
intercourse with D, as D planned. V then discovers the deception and calls the
police. D is prosecuted for rape.
The prosecution must normally prove
a. that V did not consent, and
b. that D did not reasonably believe that V did consent.
In this case, however, the s.75(2)(f) presumption may apply. The procedure will be that
if the prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt that D, or someone else, had
spiked V’s drink/food with an intoxicant and that the amount was capable of or sufficient
to stupefy V or permit her to be overpowered, then D will be convicted, unless he can
rebut the presumption. He can do this by raising plausible evidence that, although V was
under the influence, she nevertheless consented, and/or that he reasonably believed V to
be consenting. D will attempt to discharge this evidential burden, typically, by claiming
that V said or did certain things which implied willingness. If this evidence is plausible,
particularly if the alleged words or deeds of V were witnessed by another person, the
burden of proof shifts back onto the prosecution to prove absence of consent (and
absence of reasonable belief) in the ordinary way, that is, by reference to s.74. If this
is what happens the prosecution will try to convince the jury that a person who has
intercourse with another, having been involuntarily intoxicated, does not consent in the
sense of having a ‘free choice’, however willing they may have appeared to be. Equally,
any belief that D had that V’s choice was free would be unreasonable given that he knew
and indeed possibly relied on the fact that V had been drugged/intoxicated. The trial
judge is entitled to withdraw the question as to whether D’s belief was reasonable if
there was insufficient evidence (Ciccarelli [2011] EWCA Crim 2665).
Activity 8.1
Read Wilson, Sections 12.7.A.1 ‘Relevance of fraud or force – presumptions’, 12.7.A.2
‘Fraud – conclusive presumptions’ and 12.7.A.3 ‘Evidential presumptions’, and
With particular reference to the presumptions in the SOA 2003, is there rape in the
following situations?
a. Donald and Vera have sexual intercourse. Donald had promised Vera money for
doing so, but left without paying.
b. Donald tricks Wendy into having sexual intercourse with him by pretending to
be George Clouseau, a famous film actor.
c. Donald is Beyonce’s facebook friend. They have been friends for several months.
They have sent each other photographs. Frank, Donald’s twin brother, finds
out about their relationship and, pretending to be Donald, arranges to meet
Beyonce in a pub. Later that evening he invites her to his apartment where, still
pretending to be Donald, he proposes intercourse which she agrees to.
d. Donald, who is happily married to Xenia, comes home to find her asleep and
starts having sexual intercourse with her. She wakes up and tells him to stop.
e. In a bar, Donald buys Yvonne an alcoholic cocktail rather than the non-alcoholic
drink she asked for. Yvonne does not notice the difference and, not being used
to alcohol, becomes drunk. Donald drives Yvonne back to her flat where they
have sexual intercourse.
f. Donald meets Violet in a singles bar. He invites her back to his apartment,
where, after having a few drinks, he takes out a pair of hand cuffs. He says to
Violet, ‘We are going to have sex now and I am going to put these on you’. He
does so and they have sex.
8.6 Mens rea

At common law the prosecution were required to prove that the defendant lacked
an honest belief that the victim was consenting. The defendant could escape liability
even if his honest belief was not based upon reasonable grounds: DPP v Morgan
[1976] AC 182. This created serious problems for victims in court. Under the SOA 2003
s.1(1)(c), the mens rea requirement has changed. Honest belief in consent is not
enough. The defendant’s belief that the victim consents must be reasonable. When
s.75 or 76 applies such a belief will be presumed, conclusively or evidentially, absent.
Otherwise, whether a belief in consent is reasonable is a matter for the jury. However,
the trial judge may withdraw the issue from the jury if there is insufficient evidence.
In Ciccarelli, the accused had sexually assaulted the complainant while she slept. The
s.75 presumption applied that she did not consent as she was unconscious and this
presumption was not rebutted. The accused’s defence rested on the fact that while he
knew the complainant was asleep, he believed she would have consented because of
a sexual advance made by her to him earlier on the evening in question. The trial judge
in that case addressed s.75 and ruled that whether or not the accused believed the
victim was consenting, there was insufficient evidence that the accused’s belief was
reasonable. The judge said that she would direct the jury accordingly. As a result of this
ruling, the accused changed his plea to guilty. He appealed against conviction on the
ground that the judge’s ruling was wrong and that the jury should have been allowed
to consider whether his belief was reasonable. In dismissing the appeal the Lord Chief
Justice said that the appellant’s reasonable belief in the complainant’s consent,
either when she was asleep or in any other of the situations identified in section 75(2) (in
what we describe as a position of disadvantage) will be considered by the jury provided
that there is evidence which is sufficient to raise that issue.
He agreed with the trial judge that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable
person could possibly come to the conclusion that the victim would consent. The
parties hardly knew each other and had never had any form of sexual contact.
Reasonableness has to be assessed, according to s.1(2) of the SOA 2003,

having regard to all the circumstances including any steps [the defendant] has taken to
ascertain whether [the person] consents.
Whether a defendant’s belief is reasonable or not is assessed objectively. It matters

not that the defendant thought his belief was reasonable, if it was not. In B [2013]
EWCA Crim 3 the defendant obliged his partner to have intercourse with him, having
a delusion that he was a healer with special powers and that this would prevent his
partner taking an improper interest in other men. The Court concluded that delusional
beliefs such as he undoubtedly had would not in law render reasonable a belief that
his partner was consenting when in fact she was not. A delusional belief in consent is,
by definition, an unreasonable one.

You are if – without referring to the module guide or Wilson – you can answer the
1. Define the offence of rape.
2. State whether penetration of a woman’s vagina with a man’s tongue is rape.
3. State whether a man can be guilty of raping another man.
4. State whether a woman can be guilty of rape.
5. State whether it is rape if a man has intercourse with a transsexual who has a
surgically-created vagina.
6. Define consent.
7. Explain the meaning and significance of the conclusive presumptions.
8. Explain the meaning and significance of the evidential presumptions.
9. State the circumstances which create the conclusive presumptions.
10. State the circumstances which create the evidential presumptions.
11. Explain and illustrate the court procedure in cases where a conclusive presumption
is relied upon.
12. Explain and illustrate the court procedure in cases where an evidential
presumption is relied upon.
13. Explain the fault element for rape and the relevance, if any, of the presumptions to
that fault element.
9 Non-fatal offences against the person
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
9.1 Crimes of violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
9.2 Crimes against autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99

Introduction
Non-fatal offences against the person take two forms. The first and most obvious
form, which we will start with, involves crimes of violence. The criminal wrongdoing
for such crimes is the causing of physical harm to another. Proof of physical harm
is, therefore, an essential ingredient of these offences and, equally importantly, the
offences may be committed irrespective of the victim’s consent. The State takes the
view that causing people physical harm is inherently wrong and, with some obvious
exceptions such as surgery, the consent of the victim does not make it right.
The second form involves crimes against autonomy. The criminal wrongdoing for
such crimes is the undesired interference with the victim’s autonomy or freedom of
action. The essence of these crimes is that the victim does not consent to the contact,
rather than any harm which may have resulted. So, for example, if A (an adult) kisses
B (another adult), this will be an offence only if B does not consent to the kiss. If A (an
adult) punches B (another adult) in the course of an informal fight, breaking B’s nose,
this will be an offence even though B does consent to the punch.
Criminal law 9 Non-fatal offences against the person page 93
9.1 Crimes of violence

The crimes of violence dealt with in this module guide are those appearing in the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA). These offences form a ladder of relative
seriousness starting from, at the bottom of the ladder, assault occasioning bodily harm
(s.47), to malicious wounding (s.20), up to wounding with intent to cause grievous
bodily harm (GBH) (s.18). We shall deal with these in descending order of gravity,
starting with the most serious.
9.1.1 Wounding with intent

By s.18 of the OAPA it is an offence to:
unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily
harm to any person, with intent to do some grievous bodily harm to any person, or with
intent to resist or prevent (arrest)...
The major difference between this offence and that of s.20 OAPA lies in the mens
rea. Section 18 is a crime of specific intent whereas s.20 can be committed either
intentionally or recklessly.
Actus reus: s.18

It is important to understand that there are two different conduct elements in s.18.
The first is a wounding; the second is causing grievous bodily harm. These are by no
means synonymous. It is possible to wound someone without them suffering grievous
bodily harm. And it is possible to inflict grievous bodily harm on someone without
wounding them.
Illustration 9.1
a. D, wanting to seriously hurt V, takes a carving knife and thrusts it towards V’s
abdomen. V sidesteps and the knife catches him on the arm, causing significant
bleeding.
b. D smashes V over the head with an iron bar. This causes a fracture to V’s skull.
Both these cases support a conviction under s.18 since both are done with the
intention to cause GBH. In the first case there is a wounding without grievous bodily
harm, while in the second case there is a causing of grievous bodily harm but no
wounding.
Wounding
A wound requires more than a scratch or a graze, even though blood may show. It
requires a penetration of both layers of skin – namely the dermis and epidermis.
Internal ruptures do not count as a wound, nor does bruising, despite the blood loss
(McLoughlin (1838) 173 ER 651). In Eisenhower [1984] QB 331, D shot V with an air gun and
the pellet hit V near the eye, resulting in a bruise below the eyebrow and a bloodshot
eye. D was charged under s.20, whose actus reus is similar to that of s.18. The injury
satisfied neither form of the actus reus of s.20: it was insufficiently serious to count as
grievous and nor did it count as a wound, because a wound is a break in the continuity
of the skin. In short, an internal rupturing of the blood vessels, as here, is not a wound.
This should have been charged as a s.47 offence.
Note that there is one exception to the rule that internal ruptures do not count as a
wound; this is where the internal membrane ruptured takes the form of skin, as in the
lining of the mouth and the urethra (Waltham (1849) 3 Cox 442).
9.1.2 Grievous bodily harm

DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 defined grievous bodily harm as ‘really serious bodily harm
or injury’. I think you will agree that this is not a particularly helpful elaboration. No
more helpful is Janjua [1999] 1 Cr App R 91, in which the Court of Appeal ruled that
‘serious harm’ is a good enough paraphrase of grievous bodily harm to be given to the
jury. Whether an injury counts as ‘really serious’ or ‘serious’ is a question of fact for
the jury. In Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846, the Court of Appeal said that, in deciding
whether harm was serious or not, the jury should take into account the age and
state of physical fitness of the victim, as well as the extent and nature of the injury.
In practice, the jury’s task is made easier by the filtering mechanism of the Crown
Prosecution Service charging standards. These offer guidance to the prosecution as to
what kind of injuries count as grievous for the purpose of deciding which offence to
charge. Serious wounds count as grievous bodily harm; so does breaking an arm or leg,
savage beatings, knocking someone unconscious for more than a brief period, injuries
involving permanent disfigurement or long-term treatment and those involving
serious loss of blood or requiring surgery. Grievous bodily harm also includes sexually
transmitted diseases such as HIV (Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103) and serious psychiatric
injury (Burstow [1997] 1 Cr App R 144).
Causing grievous bodily harm

We have dealt with the concept of cause before. Again, to remember what it is to
cause harm means you may need to revisit Chapter 4 of this module guide. Harm
can be caused by an act, or an omission in breach of duty (e.g. Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR
37, Instan [1893] 1 QB 450, Evans [2009] EWCA Crim 2243). The reference in s.18 to ‘any
means whatsoever’ does not add anything to the normal rules of causation.
Activity 9.1
Return to Chapter 4 of this module guide and remind yourself of the principles
governing causation. In particular, you must remember how not all ‘but for’ causes
of a harm are the legal causes. Then answer the following question.
Jaz and Deepak attack Ali when he calls them names at a football match. Jaz hits
the first blow which causes Ali to fall down. Jaz then loses interest and returns to
watching the game. Meanwhile Deepak kicks Ali several times, causing him to suffer
a ruptured spleen. Has Ali’s (serious) injury been caused by both Jaz and Deepak or
only by Deepak?
Mens rea: s.18

Section 18 is a crime of ulterior intent. What makes it so serious is that, accompanying
the wounding or the causing of grievous bodily harm, is an intention matching or
exceeding the simple causing of the injury, that is to cause GBH or resist or prevent an
arrest.
Activity 9.2
Read Wilson, Section 11.2.A.2 ‘Mens rea’, Section (b) ‘Maliciously’ and then answer
the following question.
Is D guilty of the s.18 offence in the following two illustrations?
a. P, a police officer, is chasing D for the purpose of arresting her. While crossing
a road, P grabs hold of D. D pushes P away, causing P to fall over. He is hit and
seriously injured by a passing car.
b. As above, except that D does not push P, who trips over before being hit by the
car.
Intending grievous bodily harm

Whether the conduct element relied upon is a wound or GBH the prosecution must
also prove that the defendant intended to cause the victim GBH, or, if that cannot be
proved, the alternative intention of resisting or preventing an arrest. In other words, if
D wounds V but not seriously the prosecution will fail on a s.18 charge unless they can
prove that it was D’s intention to cause a serious wound, that is a wound amounting
to GBH. In the case of D causing V GBH in some other way, the prosecution must prove
that this level of injury was intended. The jury should not normally be given a Woollin
direction, but should simply be asked to consider whether, on the basis of all the
evidence, D not only intended to do what they did but specifically intended to cause
V really serious injury, etc. (see Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741, Purcell (1986) 83 Cr App R 45).
A jury which is not convinced that D had the necessary intention to cause grievous
bodily harm can bring in the alternative verdict under s.20 (malicious infliction of GBH)
(Mandair [1994] 2 All ER 715). In Banton [2007] EWCA Crim 1847, the trial judge refused to
allow the jury this option on a charge of s.18, when D had smashed a bottle in V’s face.
He told the jury that this could only mean one thing, namely that D intended grievous
bodily harm. Do you agree?
Activity 9.3
Read Wilson, Section 6.6.B ‘Intention in the criminal law: intention, purpose and
motive’ and 6.6.C ‘The meaning of intention in the criminal law’. Then create an
examination-style question in which a Woollin direction would be necessary in a
case of causing GBH with intent.
9.1.3 Malicious wounding

Malicious wounding is on the next rung down in the hierarchy of gravity. Under s.20 of
the OAPA, an offence is committed where D:
unlawfully and maliciously wound[s] or inflict[s] any grievous bodily harm, upon
any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument.
Actus reus: s.20

It is again important to understand that there are two alternative conduct elements
in s.20. The first is a wounding; the second is an infliction of grievous bodily harm (see
the discussion on s.18 above).
Illustration 9.2
a. D, wanting to hurt V, stabs him in the leg with a small screwdriver. The
screwdriver punctures V’s leg and causes significant bleeding.
b. D, wanting to daze V so as to make his escape, hits him over the head with a
baseball bat. This causes a fracture to V’s skull.
Both these cases support a conviction under s.20. In the first case there is a wounding
without grievous bodily harm, whereas in the second there is an infliction of grievous
bodily harm but no wounding. In practice, trivial wounds such as Illustration 9.2(a)
tend to be charged under s.47 in the absence of an intention to cause serious injury.
The way this offence has been fashioned, therefore, encompasses an enormous
potential range of degrees of injury, from a trivial wound to a life-endangering beating.
Both are subject to the same maximum punishment of five years.
Grievous bodily harm

For the meaning of ‘grievous bodily harm’, see Section 9.1.2 above.
The cases referred to above in relation to the transmission of sexually transmitted

diseases (Dica) and serious psychiatric injury (Burstow) were, in fact, decided in the
context of the s.20 offence. Indeed, it will be rare for the prosecution to be able to
prove the intent necessary in such cases to sustain a charge under s.18. In Dica, the
Court of Appeal ruled that a sexually transmitted disease with serious effects, for
example HIV, counts as grievous bodily harm. In Burstow, the House of Lords ruled
that GBH includes serious psychiatric injury such as acute clinical depression. Expert
medical evidence will be necessary, therefore, to determine this; mere emotions such
as panic, shock or distress do not count as bodily harm for the purpose of s.47 or s.20
(see Mandair and Chan Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689).
Grievous bodily harm must be ‘inflicted’

Until recently ‘inflict’ was thought to be narrower than ‘cause’ (the actus reus
element in s.18). ‘Inflicting grievous bodily harm’ conjures up the vision of some
form of application of force which delivers the harm, just as a knife or gun delivers a
wound. This is supported by the presence in s.20 of the words ‘either with or without
any weapon or instrument’, which implies some form of harm-delivering blow or
application of force. This was the view taken in Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 where it was
held that a husband who gave gonorrhoea to his wife during consensual intercourse
was not guilty under s.20; he had caused GBH but not inflicted it. He had not inflicted
GBH because he had not assaulted her, and he had not assaulted her because she
consented to the intercourse. Clarence also stood for the proposition that for s.20
there should be at the very least some form of direct contact between perpetrator and
victim which delivered the harm to the victim.
In Wilson [1984] AC 242 the requirement of an assault to establish an infliction was

dispensed with. It also dispensed with the requirement that there should be some
form of direct contact between the parties. It was enough that the harm was sustained
as a result of the victim receiving a physical blow/contact of some kind. Wilson held
that an infliction could occur in one of two ways. Either:
uu by way of an assault (e.g. some form of direct attack), or
uu ‘by doing something, intentionally, which, though it is not itself a direct application
of force to the body of the victim, it does directly result in force being directly
applied violently to the body of the victim so that he suffers grievous bodily harm.’
Illustration 9.3
D digs a pit for V to fall in as a joke. V does fall in the pit and breaks his leg.
Until Wilson, this was not a s.20 offence because Clarence required all inflictions
to involve some form of assault. Digging a pit is not an assault and so was not an
‘infliction’ of harm. Following Wilson, however, it became an infliction because D did
something intentionally (they dug the pit) which, though not itself a direct application
of force to V’s body, does directly result in force being applied violently to V’s body (by
falling into the pit), so that V suffers grievous bodily harm (a broken leg).
This made sense of a number of decisions prior to 1984 which seemed wrongly
decided. In Halliday [1886–90] All ER Rep 1028, the Court for Crown Cases Reserved held
that D could be guilty of s.20 even though he had not committed a technical assault on
V who, fearing a future assault, had jumped out of an upstairs window and broken his
leg. The broken leg was inflicted on V in the sense that it had come about as a result of
the force applied to V’s leg, when V hit the ground.
In Burstow, Clarence was disapproved. In this case, D had stalked his victim over a long
period of time: he had made silent telephone calls, sent hate mail, followed her around
and stolen clothing from her washing line. V suffered serious clinical depression as
a result. The House of Lords held that serious depression counted as grievous bodily
harm, just as depression counted as actual bodily harm. Such harm could be inflicted
in the absence of the application of force. It is not that kind of harm. It was said that
there was no meaningful difference between inflicting harm and causing harm. If
this is the case then if Clarence were decided today, the husband would be guilty
under s.20. In Dica this was confirmed. D had intercourse with V without informing
her that he was HIV positive. V contracted the virus. It was held that a serious sexually
transmitted disease counted as serious bodily injury and that D had inflicted it. There
was no requirement that the harm be delivered by any unlawful force as Clarence had
supposed. To inflict harm means simply to cause it, which D had done.
One distinction between ‘cause’ and ‘inflict’ may, however, remain. Cause is possibly
slightly wider in that one can cause someone serious harm by omission, say by
omitting to put out a fire that one has accidentally started, which results in injury
to the victim (see Miller). It is not yet clear whether one can inflict serious harm by
omission. In Burstow it was said that it is simply a matter of correct linguistic usage.
If so, it is arguable that, although it is certainly correct linguistic usage to say that D
‘caused’ V serious injury by failing to put the fire out, it is not so obviously correct
usage to say that D ‘wounded’ or ‘inflicted serious harm’ on V (her son) by failing to
stop V from injuring himself on a barbed wire fence. The words ‘wound’ and ‘inflict’, in
other words, seem to imply the need for some form of action.
Mens rea: s.20

The mens rea for s.20 OAPA is malice; that is, intention or subjective recklessness. In
Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421, the Court of Appeal ruled that it was necessary to prove that D
intended or foresaw harm befalling V but it was not necessary to intend or foresee the
degree of harm actually sustained. In Parmenter [1991] 2 WLR 408 the House of Lords
approved Mowatt, concluding that the prosecution need prove only that D intended
or foresaw the risk of some physical harm resulting from his shaking of his child for a
conviction under s.20. It was not necessary to show that D intended or foresaw that
the child would suffer serious injury. For this reason D, in Illustration 9.3, has the mens
rea for the s.20 offence as well as having committed the actus reus. D has the mens rea
because they would foresee some harm befalling V by falling into the pit. D does not
have to foresee the broken leg.
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

Section 47 OAPA makes it an offence to commit an assault occasioning actual bodily
harm. To support a conviction for s.47 the prosecution must therefore establish:
uu a common assault
uu actual bodily harm
uu a causal connection (occasioning) between the assault and the harm.
Common assault
The elements of common assault will be dealt with later. For our purposes, all that
is necessary to understand is that an assault comprises two alternative forms of
wrongdoing. The first is an unconsummated threat of unlawful force to another
person. Glanville Williams (Textbook of criminal law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015)
fourth edition)) has termed this a ‘psychic’ assault. The second is the actual application
of unlawful force to the body of another. This is known as a battery, assault by beating
or ‘physical’ assault. The prosecution can establish the s.47 offence, therefore, if it can
prove actual bodily harm was caused as a result of either D threatening an unlawful
contact or actually making such contact.
Illustration 9.4
a. A punches B (battery), breaking B’s nose (causing actual bodily harm).
b. A, intending to throw beer at V, accidentally lets go of the glass (causing), which

hits (battery) and cuts C (actual bodily harm) (Savage [1992] 1 AC 699).
c. A makes an unwelcome advance to V, a passenger in the back of B’s car (assault).

V, in fear, jumps out of the car, breaking her leg (causing actual bodily harm)
(Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95).
Actual bodily harm

Actual bodily harm was defined rather loosely by Swift J in Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 as:
any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the [victim]. Such
hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must...be more than merely transient and
trifling.
The jury is the arbiter of fact as to whether the ‘hurt’ suffered by V is ‘actual bodily
harm’. Any injury which is not trivial is theoretically ‘bodily harm’. In practice, s.47
is unlikely to be charged unless the degree of injury is fairly substantial. Assaults
causing minor scratches and bruises tend to be charged as common assault. Actual
bodily harm does not, however, require injury to living tissue. The Divisional Court has
included the cutting of a woman’s ponytail as actual bodily harm, although the hair is
technically ‘dead tissue’ (DPP v Smith [2006] EWHC 94 (Admin)).
Activity 9.4
Read Wilson, Chapter 11.2.C ‘Aggravated assaults’ and complete the following
activity.
List examples of actual bodily harm to be found in the Crown Prosecution Service
charging standards. These standards do not have the force of law but they are
influential in practice. You can use them to guide your own choice of which crimes
to charge in problem answers.
Actual bodily harm has been defined to include psychiatric injury. In Chan Fook [1994]
1 WLR 689, the Court of Appeal ruled that this did not include simply shock, pain or
panic; a recognised psychiatric illness is necessary. In Ireland and Burstow, two women
who suffered panic disorder (chronic panic attacks) and depressive illness as a result of
being persistently stalked by the defendants were ruled to have suffered ‘bodily’ harm
for the purposes of both s.47 and s.20. Ireland (see below) is authority for two separate
propositions.
uu A telephone call, even a silent telephone call, can constitute a common assault.
uu If psychiatric injury is suffered as a result the assault can be charged as assault

occasioning actual bodily harm.
As we have already seen, if the psychiatric injury suffered is severe, the assault can be
charged, under s.20, as the malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm. See Burstow,
above.
9.1.4 Causal connection

Section 47 refers to assault ‘occasioning’ actual bodily harm. ‘Occasioning’ simply
means ‘causing’. To secure a conviction for s.47, as opposed to common assault,
therefore, the prosecution must prove an unbroken causal chain linking the victim’s
injury with the defendant’s assault (or battery). The test for causation requires simply
that the victim’s actions were a factual and legal cause of the common assault. The
factual cause will be the legal cause if it substantially contributed to the resulting
harm and if there was no novus actus interveniens (see Chapter 4).
So in Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95, D touched V on the knee. Fearing a sexual attack, V
jumped out of the car. Was D guilty of a common assault only or of the s.47 offence? D
argued that he should not be guilty of the aggravated offence, only the common
assault because he did not cause the victim’s injury; she did by jumping out of the car.
Since her reaction was not abnormal, the causal chain linking assault and physical
harm remained intact. Roberts was approved in Savage [1992] 1 AC 699, in which D
threw a pint of beer in V’s face. The glass slipped and cut V. The House of Lords held
that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove actual foresight of harm for D to
be guilty under s.47:
The verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm may be returned upon proof of an
assault together with proof of the fact that actual bodily harm was occasioned by the
assault.
Mens rea: s.47

The mens rea for s.47 requires, therefore, only an intention to cause apprehension
of violence or an intention to apply (unlawful) force to the victim (or foresight of
either). It is not necessary to prove D intended or foresaw the injury. So in Roberts it
was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that D foresaw any injury, as long as he
intended to touch V or foresaw her apprehension. Proving culpability requires proof
of foresight: proving cause does not. Again, in Savage, where V was injured by a beer
glass, the offence was made out upon proof that D intended to throw beer at V. It was
not necessary to show further any foresight that the beer glass might slip from her
grasp and cause the resulting cut.
Activity 9.5
Read Wilson, Sections 11.2 ‘Offences protecting physical integrity’ and 11.3 ‘Offences
protecting personal autonomy’ and answer the following questions.
a. Adam and Eve are partners. One day Eve starts tickling Adam. He asks her to stop
but she refuses and so Adam jumps over the sofa and falls awkwardly, breaking
his ankle. Has Eve committed assault occasioning actual bodily harm?
b. Eve is an asthmatic. Adam, who knows this, steals her inhaler. He then
telephones her to tell her what he has done. Eve asks for its return but Adam
refuses, although he foresees that this might cause her to have a panic attack
which in turn would precipitate an asthma attack. This is indeed what happens
and Eve is rushed to hospital. In attempting to remedy her condition an
overdose of a palliative drug is given which sends Eve into a coma. She regains
consciousness a few days later with no ill effects. What offence(s), if any, has
Adam committed?
Hint: In question (b), Adam cannot be guilty under s.47. Do you know why? If you do,
and you understand what he may be guilty of, you are a long way down the road to
a good understanding of this area.
Activity 9.6
Read Wilson, Section 11.2 ‘Offences protecting physical integrity’ and answer the
a. Identify two similarities and two differences between s.18 and s.20.
b. Identify two similarities and two differences between s.20 and s.47.
9.2 Crimes against autonomy

Autonomy means freedom to control one’s own life, body and actions. The most
common criminal interferences with autonomy include common assault, false
imprisonment and rape. In this chapter we shall examine only common assault.
Common assault comprises two separate offences: assault and battery. The difference
between the two is simple. Battery involves an unconsented-to application of force;
assault involves the unconsummated threat thereof. Punching someone is a battery;
making as if to do so is an assault. Usually both offences will be committed at the same
time, for example by A threatening to hit B before they deliver the blow. It is possible,
however, for the offences to be committed singly, for example by threatening to hit
someone without consummating the threat or by hitting someone from behind.
Failure to charge the right offence will result in the case being thrown out (R (Kracher)
v Leicester Magistrates’ Court (2013)).
Assault and battery are offences in their own right as well as being ingredients in other
offences, such as assault occasioning actual bodily harm and assault with intent to rob.
They were originally common law offences but have been made statutory offences by
s.39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The principles governing the offences are still to
be found in case law. This includes both the criminal law and the law of tort (trespass
to the person). They are triable only summarily with a maximum sentence of six
months’ imprisonment.
Don’t allow yourself to be confused over terminology. The phrase ‘common assault’
refers to both assault and battery. So to say ‘A assaulted B’ can mean either that A hit B
or that A threatened to hit B. However, it is always best to identify the type of common
assault you are dealing with for purposes of clarity. You may wish to follow the lead
of Glanville Williams (Textbook of criminal law) who distinguishes the two forms by
referring to battery as ‘physical assault’ and assault as ‘psychic’ assault.
9.2.1 Assault
The first form of common assault is assault, properly so called, or – as Williams calls it
– ‘psychic’ assault. It requires no physical contact with the person of the victim. It was
defined in Venna [1975] 3 All ER 788 as:
A person is guilty of assault if he intentionally or recklessly leads someone to
apprehend the application to his body of immediate unlawful force.
Actus reus: assault
Causing apprehension
The actus reus of assault is acting so as to lead another to apprehend an immediate
unlawful contact. To apprehend means simply to ‘expect’. It does not specifically
require ‘fear’ although fear will normally be present. In Savage and Parmenter, the
House of Lords, approving Venna, underlined the fact that the offence was constituted
by the fact of V apprehending the application to his body of immediate unlawful force.
Activity 9.7
Read Wilson, Section 11.3.A.1 ‘Assault’ and answer the following questions.
a. A points a gun at B and threatens to shoot B. B, but not A, knows the gun is not
loaded. Is there an assault?
b. A points a gun at B and threatens to shoot B. A, but not B, knows the gun is not
loaded. Is there an assault?
Immediacy
The requirement of immediacy was once central to the offence; in short, some form
of physical confrontation was necessary. For this reason it was not an assault if D
threatened V with future harm (Halliday), or threatened V from afar, or otherwise was
unable to put their threat into immediate execution. So in Thomas v NUM [1986]
Ch 20, a civil case, it was not an assault when picketing mineworkers made threatening
gestures to strike-breaking colleagues who were being brought to the colliery in
vehicles under police escort, as there was no immediate prospect of converting the
threat into action. It would have been different if the picketing miners had thrown
stones or produced guns.
In recent years, this requirement of immediacy has been gradually attenuated, largely
on the ground that the wrongdoing component of an assault is the effect the threat
has on the victim rather than the reasonableness of the victim’s fear. Fear, after all,
often produces irrational thoughts. So in Smith v Chief Constable of Woking (1983) 76 Cr
App R 234, D, late one night, peered through the curtains of V’s apartment. This
frightened V considerably and she called the police. D argued that he was not guilty of
an assault as he had done nothing which would put V in fear of immediate personal
violence. This argument was rejected on the basis that D’s action was likely to instil
fear of potential violence, even though objectively his position outside the apartment
made this physically impossible. Kerr LJ said:
What else, other than some form of immediate violence, could [V] have been terrified
about?...When one is in a state of terror one is very often unable to analyse precisely what
one is frightened of as likely to happen next. When I say that, I am speaking of a situation
such as the present, where the person who causes one to be terrified is immediately
adjacent, albeit on the other side of a window…It was clearly a situation where the basis
of the fear which was instilled in her was that she did not know what the defendant
was going to do next, but that, whatever he might be going to do next, and sufficiently
immediately for the purposes of the offence, was something of a violent nature.
This kind of behaviour is now a separate statutory offence under the Protection from
Harassment Act 1997. But the effect of the case may well have been to change the
application of the law in cases such as Thomas v NUM. The leading authority on the
matter is Ireland [1998] AC 147. In this case D made a number of phone calls to V: some
included threats, others were silent. The House of Lords concluded, consistently with
Smith v Woking, that the ingredients of assault were present, whether or not words
were used, so long as the jury was convinced that D’s phone calls led V to expect
immediate personal violence and this did not require a face-to-face confrontation
between D and V. Another important consequence of this case is to rid the law of any
doubt that assault could not be committed by words alone. It can. Indeed, even a silent
telephone call is an assault if it leads V to apprehend immediate personal violence.
The effect of this House of Lords’ decision is to relax the immediacy requirement
quite considerably. In Constanza [1997] 2 Cr App R 492, the Court of Appeal held that
even sending threatening letters could form the subject matter of an assault. On the
question of immediacy, it sufficed that D’s actions provoked a fear of violence at some
time not excluding the immediate future. For ‘immediate’ we must now, in other
words, read ‘imminent’.
Activity 9.8
Read question (b) in Activity 9.5 again. If you did not understand before why Adam
was not guilty of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, do you now? The answer is
that Adam did not provoke a fear of violence in Eve and so did not commit (psychic)
assault. Clearly there was no battery either.
Unlawful force
The force or threat of force must be unlawful, so no offence is committed if D is acting
in self-defence, or if the show of force was done to effect a lawful arrest (s.3(1) of the
Criminal Law Act 1967 (CLA 1967)) or the approach is consented to. So in Cousins [1982]
2 All ER 115, it was said that a threat to kill was capable of being a lawful exercise of
self-defence in discouraging a threatened attack and so would not be an assault. So
also, if A encourages B (a circus knife thrower) to throw a knife at him, which he does,
no assault is committed due to A’s consent, even though A apprehends the possibility
of being struck.
Mens rea: assault

The mens rea for common assault of this kind is intention or common law recklessness;
that is, foresight that V will apprehend the application of unlawful force. In Spratt
[1990] 1 WLR 1073, D fired an air pistol through the window of his flat for no particular
reason. Two pellets hit a girl playing in the forecourt, whom D had not known was
there. D was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47 OAPA). The
Court of Appeal quashed his conviction. To be guilty of assault occasioning actual
bodily harm the prosecution had to prove both the bodily harm and an assault that
had caused it. It could prove the former but not the latter, since to be guilty of an
assault it had to be proven that D intended to hit the girl (battery) or cause her to fear
being hit (assault), or foresight of either these two alternatives. It could do this only if
D had known the girl was there.
9.2.2 Battery or assault by beating

Battery can be defined as:
any act by which D, intentionally or recklessly, inflicts (non consensual) unlawful force
upon P.
Actus reus: Battery
Force
As has been explained, the wrongdoing in common assault, including battery,
otherwise known as ‘assault by beating’, is not physical harm but unwanted
interference with the person of the victim. In battery this takes the form of someone
applying force to the victim, or – putting it another way – making physical contact with
them. So examples of battery include restraining a person (Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1
WLR 1172), digging them in the ribs, spitting on them (Commonwealth v Cohen 55 Mass
App Ct 358 (2002)), cutting their hair (DPP v Smith (2006)), even, it appears, cutting
(Day (1845) 1 Cox CC 207) or feeling a person’s clothes while on their person.
The physical contact does not have to be painful or hurtful but it does have to involve
force. So it is not battery to drug, poison or gas someone: such interferences should be
charged as an offence under s.23 OAPA.
A battery requires an act. In other words it may not be committed by omission. So a

tree surgeon who, without fault, allows a tree branch to fall, pinning a passerby to the
ground, does not commit battery by failing to remove the branch. One qualification
to this rule is the continuing act doctrine. This refers to cases where the defendant’s
failure to act can be construed as continuing an earlier act. In Fagan v MPC [1968] 3 All
ER 442, it was an assault for a driver to fail to remove his car from a policeman’s foot,
having first parked it there without fault. The court ruled that this was not an omission
but a continuation of the initial act of parking. Put another way, F was not ‘omitting’
to remove the car from the foot. He was ‘keeping’ the car on the foot just as he would
have been doing if, having stepped on the policeman’s foot by mistake, he then
refused to step off again. The requirement that there be an act was reaffirmed in Dunn
(2015) which was considered in Chapter 3 of this module guide.
Activity 9.9
If F had only learned about the plight of the policeman having left the car, would his
refusal to remove the car still be a continuation of the initial act of parking the car?
Would the tree surgeon, considered above, be guilty of battery on this basis?’
Is direct contact necessary?

It is not necessary for there to be direct contact between D and V. In the old case of
Scott v Shepherd (1773) 95 ER 1124, D was found guilty of battery when he had thrown
a lit firework into a crowded marketplace. The firework exploded in V’s face, but only
after it had passed through several hands before it arrived there. The court ruled that
this did not affect D’s liability. More generally, however, it should not avail D so long as
V was injured by D applying force. Again, it was an infliction of grievous bodily harm
for a practical joker to shout ‘Fire!’ at a theatre production, resulting in serious injuries
to members of the audience trapped in the resulting crush (Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54).
So also in Mitchell [1983] 2 All ER 427, D assaulted V by pushing T roughly, who then fell
on top of V. However, it should not be a battery if A digs a pit for B to fall in, as B’s fall
is not the result of A applying any force. The case of DPP v K (A Minor) (1990) 91 Cr App
R 23 runs counter to this conclusion. K, a schoolboy, loaded a hand dryer in the school
lavatories with acid. The next user, V, was injured when it discharged on to him. The
Queen’s Bench Division was satisfied that this was a battery. But what force did K apply
directly or indirectly to V? Presumably the force of the acid hitting his person.
Activity 9.10
Read Wilson, Section 11.3.A.2 ‘Battery’ and answer the following question.
What was the act of assault relied upon in DPP v Santana-Bermudez (2003)? What
problem does the case create?
Unlawful force
The force or threat of force must be unlawful; so, as with assault, no offence is
committed if D is acting in self-defence, or the contact is consented to (Slingsby [1995]
Crim LR 570) or if the show of force was done to effect a lawful arrest (s.3(1) CLA 1967).
So in Kenlin v Gardiner [1966] 3 All ER 931, police officers were suspicious of the activities
of two boys and took hold of them to prevent them running away. They struggled
and punched the officers. The boys appealed against their convictions for assault at
the Magistrates’ Court. The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court held that, since the boys
were not arrested, the taking hold of them was an assault by the officers. The boys
were allowed to use reasonable force in self-defence against an assault, and their
convictions were quashed.
Compare this case with Donnelly v Jackman [1970] 1 All ER 987, 134 JP 352 where, on
similar facts, the officer tapped D on the shoulder with the intention of stopping him.
D then punched the officer. On appeal against conviction, the Divisional Court upheld
D’s conviction. Tapping D on the shoulder was a trivial interference with his autonomy
and did not take the officer outside the exercise of his duty. This case shows that not
every unconsented-to contact is a battery. Unconsented-to contacts issuing from the

ordinary rough and tumble of everyday life do not count as batteries so long as the
force used was not excessive (Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172). This will include such
contacts as taps on the shoulder to attract another’s attention, slaps on the back in
greeting, jostling, knocking and bumping in queues, on trains and while running for
the bus.
However, contrary to some earlier authorities, there is no requirement that the

touching be hostile. If V makes clear that they refuse a particular kind of contact, D will
commit battery if they ignore the refusal, however well intentioned. A surgeon who
discovers cancer in the womb of an anaesthetised woman on whom he is a performing
a dilation and curettage acts unlawfully if, without gaining the woman’s consent, he
performs a hysterectomy.
Mens rea: Battery

The mens rea for battery, as with assault, is intention and recklessness as to the
unlawful contact. It is not intention or recklessness as to any resulting harm. It is for
this reason that in Slingsby (1995) D was not guilty of manslaughter, because, although
he may have foreseen some injury to his partner, he did not have the mens rea for
battery. The actus reus of battery is the application of unconsented-to force: the mens
rea is the intention to apply (or foresight regarding) unconsented-to force.
9.2.3 Charging common assault

We have seen that actual physical harm is not of the essence of battery. However,
most cases of battery will inevitably result in some physical harm. The question for
the prosecuting authorities is, therefore, whether to charge such a case as common
assault or the aggravated version, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47
OAPA). The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has published charging standards for
the guidance of prosecutors. These state that batteries causing minor bruises and
cuts, abrasions, swellings, broken nose, loss or breaking of teeth and black eyes are
appropriately charged as common assaults. More serious injuries, such as also appear
in the charging standards, are chargeable under s.47 and s.20 OAPA. The charging
standards do not have the force of law but do help to explain why cases are charged as
they are.
9.2.4 Consent and offences against the person

We have already seen that absence of the victim’s consent is one of the elements of
common assault. This means that if D is charged with battery and the prosecution
proves that D intentionally punched V in the stomach, and nothing more, the defence
can make a submission of ‘no case to answer’. This is because an essential element in
the offence of common assault has been left unproven, namely that the force applied
to V’s body was not consented to.
This explains the decision in Slingsby, in which D was charged with manslaughter when
his partner died of septicaemia following consensual, although extremely vigorous,
sexual activity. The validity of the conviction depended upon whether the sexual
activity involved an unlawful battery. The prosecution argued that it was because it
was extremely rough and had caused the victim harm. This argument was rejected on
the basis that the activity was consensual. Since there was no battery, there could be
no liability for constructive (unlawful act) manslaughter.
Different principles apply where D causes harm deliberately. The deliberate causing
of physical injury is considered inherently unlawful and, being inherently unlawful,
victim’s consent cannot make it lawful (Donovan (1931)). Before exploring this aspect of
consent, let us examine the actual concept of consent.
What is consent?
This is not an easy question to answer since there is vast range of responses possible
between, at one end of the consent spectrum ‘Oh yes, please!’ and the other ‘Not
over my dead body!’ Clearly, if V submits to physical contact only due to force or the
threat of force, this is not consent. However, the use of force or threat of force is not
the only way consent can be vitiated. For example, threats of financial or social harm
or other non-violent threats might also invalidate consent. In Olugboja [1982] QB 320,
a rape case, the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between reluctant acquiescence
(consent) and mere submission (not consent).
Whether consent is present or not is a question of fact for the jury on the basis of its
own common sense and experience of life. In Kirk [2008] EWCA Crim 434, the Court
of Appeal upheld a conviction for rape of a destitute and hungry girl who submitted
to intercourse so as to be able to buy food. This was decided under the definition of
consent provided by s.74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, but the basic principles
should be comparable. This was interpreted as a case of submission rather than
reluctant acquiescence.
Consent may be express or implied. Obvious examples of implied consent occur in

cases of everyday physical contact between people who know each other. Punching a
friend in jest will usually be treated as impliedly consented to. As we shall see below,
participants in sports are also deemed to consent to the ordinary ‘rough and tumble’
involved in the relevant sport, even where such rough and tumble falls outside the
rules of the game.
Consent must be effective

Apparent consent can be rendered ineffective in a number of ways. In particular, the
consent of those who do not understand exactly what they are consenting to – for
example the young or those who lack mental capacity – may be ineffective. For this
reason a tattooist was guilty of common assault for tattooing youths of 12 and 13,
consent notwithstanding (Burrell v Harmer [1967] Crim LR 169).
More generally, certain types of fraud may vitiate consent. Consent is not vitiated
simply because a person would not have agreed to the contact had they known all the
relevant facts. It is vitiated only if the nature of the fraud prevented the victim from
understanding what they were consenting to.
Since 2003, the position on consent in relation to sexual assaults, including rape,
is regulated by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It enacts that two deceptions vitiate
consent, namely deception as to identity and deception as to the nature and purpose
of the act. The pre-2003 Act law is still authoritative in relation to non-sexual assaults
which is essentially similar. In Bolduc v Bird [1967] SCR 677, D asked V’s consent to
conduct a medical examination on her in the presence of his ‘medical student’, who
in fact was not his medical student but a friend. It was held that her consent was not
vitiated and there was no assault. A similar decision was reached in Richardson [1999]
QB 444, in which V submitted to dental treatment by a dentist who had been struck
off. It was held that V’s consent was not vitiated by the fact that her choice was not
fully informed. In both cases the deception was as to the quality of the contact rather
than its nature, and to status rather than identity.
Activity 9.11
If Richardson had never been a qualified dentist, but was a charlatan, would this
have vitiated V’s consent?
A slightly different conclusion was reached in Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328, in which
the defendant induced women to submit to breast examinations by misrepresenting
his medical qualifications. The Court of Appeal held that such mistakes could vitiate
consent since the victims were consenting to one thing (medical examination) and
were getting another (indecent assault).
Judges are increasingly requiring consent to be fully informed for it to be operative.

This is certainly the case in relation to the transmission of sexually transmitted
diseases. In Dica (2004) and Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706, the Court of Appeal ruled
that consent to the act of intercourse is vitiated for the purpose of common assault,
s.47 and s.20 OAPA, if – unknown to V but known to D – D is suffering from a sexually
transmitted disease. Please note that consent to the act of intercourse for the purpose
of the crime of rape is not vitiated in this case, since the act of intercourse was what
the victims consented to and was what took place.
Consent and violence

The final limitation on consent must now be elaborated upon. This is that, although
(absence of) consent is an essential element in common assault, it is not an essential
element in crimes of violence such as s.47, s.20 and s.18 OAPA. This means, in effect,
that the victim’s consent is not normally a defence to a crime of violence. So consent is
a defence to a kiss, a tap, a tickle or a slap, but it is not a defence to a private physical
fight to settle an argument (as occurred in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715).
In this case Lord Lane CJ said:
It is not in the public interest that people should try to cause, or should cause, each other
actual bodily harm for no good reason. Minor struggles are another matter.
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal approved the case of Donovan [1934] 2 KB
498. The appellant was charged with indecent and common assault upon a girl whom
he had beaten with a cane, with her consent, for his own sexual gratification.
Explaining his decision, Swift J said at 507:
If an act is unlawful in the sense of being in itself a criminal act, it is plain that it cannot
be rendered lawful because the person to whose detriment it is done consents to it. No
person can license another to commit a crime...As a general rule, although it is a rule
to which there are well established exceptions, it is an unlawful act to beat another
person with such a degree of violence that the infliction of bodily harm is a probable
consequence, and when such an act is proved, consent is immaterial.
Illustration 9.5
a. Alan has an informal boxing match with his friend, Brenda. In the course of the
match Alan and Brenda land several blows to the body. These do not result in
any significant harm.
b. Stephen and Richard have an informal boxing match. In the course of the match
Stephen and Richard land several blows to the body and the face. Stephen
suffers a broken nose and cuts and bruises as a result.
In the first case, if Alan and/or Brenda were prosecuted for common assault, they
would have an absolute defence, namely consent.
In the second case, if Richard were prosecuted for assault occasioning actually bodily
harm, he would have no defence. Consent is not a defence to informal fighting causing
actual bodily harm.
Note that if Richard were charged, as he could be, only with common assault he would
have a defence as per the first case since common assault, unlike assault occasioning
actually bodily harm, requires proof that V did not consent.
Let us examine more closely the claim that consent is ineffective where physical
injury has been sustained. It is more accurate to say that, in the case of deliberately
inflicted harm, consent will be ineffective unless the activity from which the harm
derives is privileged as being in the public interest. In the case where the harm is not
deliberately inflicted, consent will usually be effective because of the presumption
that people should be free to take risks of physical harm.
Deliberate infliction of harm

A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) is authority, in effect, for the proposition that where injury
is inflicted deliberately it cannot be consented to, unless the context within which the
injury is inflicted is specially privileged on public interest grounds. Causing injury for
sexual gratification is not deemed to be in the public interest. In Brown [1994] 1 AC 212,
a case involving a consensual homosexual orgy in which quite serious injuries involving
the genitals were deliberately inflicted, Lord Templeman for the House of Lords put it:
In my view the line properly falls to be drawn between assault at common law and
the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm created by s.47 of the 1861
Act, with the result that consent of the victim is no answer to anyone charged with
the latter offence or with a contravention of s.20 unless the circumstances fall
within one of the well-known exceptions such as organised sporting contests and
games, parental chastisement or reasonable surgery.
In Emmett, The Times, 15 October 1999, consent was similarly not available where
a heterosexual couple engaged in consensual sado-masochistic activities of a
particularly dangerous nature designed to enhance sexual pleasure, including the
burning of the woman’s chest with lighter fuel and partial suffocation.
No decision has yet been made on the legality of sado-masochistic activity involving
a low level of violence, for example biting and scratching. In principle, Brown and
Emmett notwithstanding, this should be treated as lawful. Although such activities
cannot be presented as being in the public interest, it can certainly be argued that
it would be contrary to the public interest to proscribe them, if only on grounds of
privacy and the principle of minimal criminalisation (see R v Wilson, below). Biting and
scratching is a not uncommon incident of sexual relations even among those who
would disapprove of the practice of sado-masochism. As we have already seen, victim’s
consent does render vigorous sex lawful even if it is of a nature to cause physical injury.
Activity 9.12
Read Wilson, Sections 2.2.B.2 ‘Liberal objections to the enforcement of morality’ and
2.2.B.3 ‘Is there a meaningful difference between legislating to enforce morality and
legislating to prevent harm?’ On the basis of the arguments presented there do you
agree with their Lordships’ decision in Brown?
Exceptions
Surgery, tattooing and body alteration

Other exceptions to the rule that deliberately inflicted harm cannot be consented to
include, as Lord Templeman remarks, ‘reasonable surgery’. The implication behind the
use of the word ‘reasonable’ is not clear, but probably does not require the surgery
to be clinically necessary but, rather, reasonable according to the ethical standards
informing surgery at the relevant time. Sex change operations and cosmetic surgery
are therefore capable of being consented to, subject always to the requirement
that the consent is informed. In the case of minors, the consent of both parents is
necessary for non-clinically necessary procedures such as circumcision (Re J (Prohibited
steps order: circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 571.
Tattooing, ear piercing and other forms of body piercing and body alteration may also
be consented to if reasonable (Brown). In Wilson [1997] QB 47, the Court of Appeal ruled
that it was not unlawful for a man to brand his partner on the buttocks with a hot
knife when it was consensual and done for purposes of adornment rather than simply
to cause injury. The Court said that the criminal law should be slow to interfere with
what people do in private. This does not affect the decisions in Brown and Emmett. The
rather fragile distinction to be drawn between these cases and Wilson is that in the
latter the consensual hurt suffered by V was incidental rather than the point of the
exercise. The Court drew an analogy between this case and a case of tattooing, which
is also lawful where consented to.
Boxing, wrestling and martial arts

Boxing is a genuine exception to the rule that consent is ineffective in the case of
deliberately inflicted injuries. It attracts a special privilege in that even acts intended
to cause serious injury can be consented to. This is a peculiar exception, given that
informal fighting attracts no such privilege and that the only positive public interest
benefit discernible is the enjoyment spectators receive in watching the spectacle –
hardly a ‘good reason’, one would suppose, for permitting it. It certainly sits ill with
the position with respect to consensual sado-masochism where the participants
themselves experience the enjoyment.
Wrestling and martial arts are probably not an exception because these sports, unlike
boxing, do not have the intentional infliction of injury as the point of the activity.
Consent to incidental injuries is probably effective for the same reason as other
contact sports, as will now be discussed.
Non-deliberate infliction of harm
Games and sports

The other privileged activities referred to by Lord Templeman include lawful sports
and games. Consent is effective in relation to this category for a different reason than
that for boxing – namely that the taking of risks and engaging in dangerous pursuits
is normal human activity and should be criminalised only if the risk-taking is contrary
to public policy. Injuries inflicted in the course of contact sports such as football and
rugby will therefore be prima facie lawful unless deliberately inflicted, in which case
consent, even were it to be present, is ineffective.
This is the conclusion to be drawn from Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246 where the Court
of Appeal said that resort to the criminal courts in cases of sporting injury should be
exceptional. Most sports have their own codes of discipline which can properly be
deployed in the face of dangerous play. An instinctive error, reaction or misjudgement
in the heat of a game was not to be treated any differently. However, intentionally
caused injuries give no immunity:
In making a judgment as to whether conduct is criminal or not, it has to be borne in mind
that, in highly competitive sports, conduct outside the rules can be expected to occur in
the heat of the moment, and even if the conduct justifies not only being penalised but
also a warning or even a sending off, it still may not reach the threshold level required
for it to be criminal. That level is an objective one and does not depend upon the views
of individual players. The type of the sport, the level at which it is played, the nature of
the act, the degree of force used, the extent of the risk of injury, the state of mind of the
defendant are all likely to be relevant in determining whether the defendant’s actions go
beyond the threshold.
(Per Lord Woolf CJ at [15])
In principle, the same reasoning applies to wrestling and martial arts. Although
potentially dangerous, participants are deemed to validly consent to injuries sustained
as a result of contacts, whether or not they are explicitly covered by the rules of the
sport, so long as they are of a nature to be expected of the sport as it is played at the
relevant level.
Horseplay
The decision in the A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) case must be distinguished from
cases of rough and undisciplined horseplay. The essence of the former was that the
blows landed by the accused were intended to cause injury. Play fighting and other
expressions of high spirits which result in physical injury are not so treated and
consent may therefore be a defence. In Jones (1986) 83 Cr App R 375, D (a schoolboy)
and others, to celebrate V’s birthday subjected V to the ‘bumps’ (a procedure involving
throwing the subject into the air and allowing them to drop on the ground). This
caused V to suffer a broken arm and a ruptured spleen. D’s appeal against a conviction
under s.47 was allowed. Given the context there was evidence of either express or
implied consent to the ‘bumps’ procedure. In any event even if consent were absent
such that the actus reus was established, the defendants’ belief that V was a willing
participant meant that they lacked the mens rea for the crime charged.
Sexual relations
Consent, express or implied, is effective in relation to harms committed during
sexual activity, so long as these are not deliberately inflicted for their own sake (see
Brown, above). In Slingsby (1995), D inserted his hand into V’s vagina and rectum
with her consent. A ring which he was wearing caused internal cuts, and V later died
of septicaemia. In the subsequent trial for manslaughter, D was held not to have
committed an assault and so could not be liable for manslaughter.
In cases involving the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, informed consent

will be effective to prevent liability under s.47 or s.20. Authority for this is Konzani
(2005), in which the Court of Appeal made clear that so long as the transmittee of
the disease knew of the disease at the time of intercourse, she consented both to the
intercourse and to the risk of transmission of the disease.
Activity 9.13
Read Wilson, Section 11.4.A.3 ‘What can be consented to?’ and answer the following
questions.
a. Is it possible to reconcile the decision in Slingsby with that in Emmett and Brown?
b. Is it possible to reconcile the decision in Konzani with that in Emmett and Brown?
c. Read the case of Aitken (1992). Do you think this case was rightly decided?
d. The Law Commission published a consultation paper entitled Consent and

Offences against the Person in 1994. In it the suggestion is made that individuals
should have the right to consent to any non-serious injury. Do you agree with
this?
e. Do you think consent should be a defence to harm caused while boxing, where
the purpose of the competition is to cause harm, possibly life-threatening harm,
to the other?
f. Can the exception in the case of boxing be reconciled with the absence of an
exception in the case of sado-masochistic sexual relations between consenting
adults? If not, should they both be criminal or neither?

1. State the s.18 OAPA offence.
4. Explain what actual bodily harm means and comprises.
5. Explain what grievous bodily harm means and comprises.
6. Explain the points of difference and the points of overlap between s.18, s.20 and
s.47 OAPA.
7. Explain what the mens rea is for s.47 OAPA.
8. Explain what the mens rea is for s.20 OAPA.
9. Define common assault (both forms), ensuring you are word perfect.
10. Explain the difference between assault and battery and how one can be committed
without the other.
11. Explain what the immediacy requirement in (psychic) assault means in practice.
12. Explain when consent can be vitiated by fraud.
13. Explain the legal position governing consent in respect of common assault.
14. Explain the legal position governing consent with regard to crimes of violence.
10 Defences 1: failure of proof
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
10.1 The two types of defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
10.2 Involuntary conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
10.3 Insanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
10.4 Intoxication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
10.5 Crimes of basic intent and specific intent contrasted . . . . . . . . . . 121

Introduction
So far we have discovered that the prosecution bears the burden of proving that
all the elements of the offence are present. It also bears the burden of disproving
any defence for which D adduces evidence in support. In Chapters 11 and 12 we shall
examine the core general defences. These are of two types.
Defences
Failure of proof Affirmative defences
Automatism Duress
Insanity Necessity
Intoxication Self-defence
Consent
Mistake
Figure 10.1
Criminal law 10 Defences 1: failure of proof page 111
10.1 The two types of defences

There are two categories of defences – affirmative defences and failure of proof
defences. The former defence blocks criminal liability although D has performed the
actus reus of the offence with mens rea. The essence of such defences is that D is not
denying that the elements of the offence are present. Rather D is seeking to excuse
or justify what would otherwise be punishable conduct on the basis of the particular
circumstances which led them to do what they did. For example, D may wish to
adduce evidence that they shot V under coercion by a third party, or that they were
acting in self-defence to prevent V shooting them or another person, or that they
had lost their self control, having come upon V committing rape upon a child. Such
defences are known as affirmative defences or defences of confession and avoidance,
and we shall examine these in Chapter 11.
The type of defences we shall be dealing with in this chapter, failure of proof defences,
do not act outside the elements of the offence; rather they provide the evidential basis
for a claim that one of these elements is lacking.
Illustration 10.1
D, witnessed by a crowd of onlookers, aims his gun at V and shoots him dead.
To gain a conviction for murder, the prosecution bears the burden of proving:
uu that D’s act caused V’s death
uu that D’s shooting of the gun was actuated by an intention to kill V or cause him
serious injury.
As you may appreciate, this should not be too difficult, given that there are:
uu witnesses who saw D aim the gun and pull the trigger
uu witnesses who saw V fall down immediately after the gun was fired
uu doctors who will confirm that V’s death was caused by the blood loss occasioned
by the bullet entering V’s body.
Indeed in a case like this, D’s counsel will no doubt recommend that D plead guilty
because the chances of an acquittal are next to nothing.
Occasionally, however, D may be able to deflect a finding that all the elements of
offence are present despite the most compelling of physical evidence. For example, in
this case D might adduce evidence suggesting that, although it might have appeared
to the witnesses that he intended to kill V, in fact he did not. For instance, D might
adduce evidence that he was intoxicated and that he thought V was a scarecrow,
or that he was insane and thought V was the devil, or that he was sleepwalking and
that he was quite unaware of what he was doing. If these claims may have been true,
D is entitled to be acquitted since they amount to a plausible claim that one of the
elements of the offence is missing (mens rea).
There are a number of defences whose function is to regulate the conditions under
which a defendant is permitted to adduce evidence of this nature. The defences in
question are known as failure of proof defences. They include intoxication, mistake,
automatism and insanity. The scope of these defences is strictly controlled in order to
ensure that a finding of accountability is not too easily deflected.
For both types of defences it is not enough for D simply to claim that they were
sleepwalking or acting under duress to require the prosecution to prove otherwise.
This would be too much of a burden on the prosecution. In order to ensure that D’s
claim is worthy of being taken seriously by the jury, D is required to adduce some
evidence strong enough to introduce some reasonable doubt into a juror’s mind as
to whether the prosecution’s case is as strong as it makes out. This might include, in
connection with the claims raised by D in Illustration 10.1 above, medical evidence
– for example a doctor’s report that D was a serial sleepwalker. Or evidence from a
witness that V had been seen lying drunk in a ditch an hour before the shooting. Or, in
the case of an affirmative defence, evidence from a witness that V was a man known to
exact compliance through violence and had been witnessed talking to D prior to the
shooting.
In this chapter we will cover three failure of proof defences, namely involuntary
conduct, insanity and intoxication.
10.2 Involuntary conduct

Involuntary conduct is the prime example of a failure of proof defence, since it can be
used to negate either actus reus or mens rea. This may be of considerable importance
to the defence since it may be used to escape liability, even for strict liability crimes
which do not require mens rea. The essence of the defence is that the criminal conduct
complained of was not done by D: rather, it happened to them. In Hill v Baxter [1958] 1
QB 277 the defendant was charged with dangerous driving, having blacked out at the
wheel. Although D’s defence was disallowed by the Court of Appeal, it accepted, in the
following famous statement of principle, that voluntariness of action was central to
criminal responsibility even for strict liability offences.
there may be cases where the circumstances are such that the accused could not really
be said to be driving at all. Suppose he had a stroke or an epileptic fit, both instances of
what may properly be called acts of God; he might well be in the driver’s seat even with
his hands on the wheel, but in such a state of unconsciousness that he could not be said
to be driving. A blow from a stone or an attack by a swarm of bees I think introduces some
conception akin to novus actus interveniens.
You will understand from the above statement that the defence may take one of two
forms.
uu A loss of physical control over one’s conduct.
uu A loss of mental control due to a trigger such as a stroke or epileptic fit.
The criminal law has traditionally called both instances ‘automatism’. In the words of
Lord Denning in Bratty v A-G of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386:
No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context – some
people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ‘automatism’ – means an act which is done by the
muscles without any control by the mind...
Activity 10.1
Learn Lord Denning’s statement by heart: it is a good summary of the law.
In this chapter we shall deal with the two forms of automatism separately, since
certain biological or mental conditions which trigger involuntary behaviour may lead
to distinct case outcomes.
10.2.1 Physical involuntariness

We have come across the concept of involuntary action already in the context of
causation (see Chapter 4). You will remember that a person’s conduct is causally
effective only when it is voluntary. It is for this reason that in Mitchell (1983) it was
Mitchell who was deemed to be the cause of the elderly woman’s death rather than
the man whom Mitchell caused to fall on top of her. In Hill v Baxter (1958) above, an
attack by a swarm of bees or blow on the head was said to be comparable.
Similar principles occur where something goes wrong with a car. For example, in
Burns v Bidder [1967] 2 QB 227 a driver was charged with the offence of failing to
accord precedence to a pedestrian on a crossing. His defence was that his action was
involuntary as he had suffered brake failure. The court held that if this had happened
without any fault on the part of the driver – for example because the defect was not
the result of poor maintenance – then he was entitled to an acquittal. Even a strict
liability offence, which this was, requires voluntary action to constitute the actus reus.
10.2.2 Automatism
The other form of involuntary behaviour, also known as automatism, occurs where the
accused is effectively unconscious while committing the offence. Again, successful
raising of this defence means that the accused is entitled to an absolute acquittal.
There are, however, dangers attached to raising this defence; namely that the judge
may treat the mental condition relied upon to support the defence as involving a
‘disease of the mind’. This is dangerous because it may trigger the special verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Although the verdict is an acquittal, it is not an
unqualified acquittal since it affords the judge a number of powers of disposal,
including mandatory hospitalisation.
So in Bratty the defendant killed a young woman by strangling her with her own
stockings. D pleaded automatism relying on evidence that he suffered from psychomotor
epilepsy at the time of the offence, and had blacked out and knew nothing of what he
had done. Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge was correct in
his ruling that D’s mental condition was due to disease of the mind and could only be
presented to the court as insanity. Although receiving the special verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, D was committed indefinitely to a secure mental hospital. From his
point of view, at least, a conviction might have been preferable.
In Quick [1973] QB 910, D was a psychiatric nurse working in a mental hospital. He was
a diabetic. On the day in question he had taken insulin, had also taken alcohol and
had eaten little food. For a diabetic this is a dangerous regime because it will induce
hypoglycaemia, a deficiency of blood sugar which can impair consciousness and
cause aggressive outbursts. And so it transpired. In this condition D attacked a patient,
causing him injury, and was charged with assault.
In his defence D claimed that he lacked mens rea due to being in an automatic state
brought on by hypoglycaemia. The judge refused to allow this defence to go to the
jury, ruling that it was one of insanity. D changed his plea to guilty. He appealed on the
ground that the judge was wrong to refuse to allow his condition to be presented as
automatism as opposed to insanity. The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal on the
basis that his hypoglycaemia was a condition that had been triggered by the taking of
insulin, and so not a mental condition caused by a disease of the mind, but – like blows
on the head or an attack by a swarm of bees – was caused by an external factor which
deprives the actor temporarily of control over his actions. Lawton LJ explained it as:
…a malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the

body of some external factor such as violence, drugs (including anaesthetics), alcohol or
hypnotic influences.
Activity 10.2
Read Wilson, Section 9.8.C ‘Conditions of automatism’ and answer the following
questions.
a. Why did Quick change his plea to guilty?
b. Make a note all of the examples of conditions which have been successfully used
to support a defence of automatism.
c. Why was the defendant in T (1990) able to use her condition to support her
claim of automatism but not the defendant in Rabey (1978)?
d. Search the term ‘confusional arousal’ on the internet. Can you think of an
example of how experiencing this condition might cause someone to perform a
prohibited act?
Success rates in using automatism as a defence are relatively poor. There are three
reasons for this.
uu Automatism can be used for all crimes, even crimes of strict liability where the
prosecution does not need to prove fault on the part of the defendant. Driving
offences are prime examples. As we know, the policy behind such offences is that
it would be counterproductive to require proof of fault. If society wants to stop
bad driving, the best way is to make it known that whatever the excuse bad driving
will be punished. In deference to this policy, the courts have shown a marked
reluctance to allow no-fault liability to be undermined by a claim of automatism.
uu The defence cannot be relied upon if the defendant was at fault in inducing the
condition.
uu The courts insist upon medical evidence to support the claim and, as can be seen
from Bratty and Quick, even then the danger is that the defence will be construed
as involving a disease of the mind. Underpinning such decisions is a judicial
reluctance to allow an unqualified acquittal to those whose mental condition may
reoccur, particularly if violence was involved.
These three reasons will now be explored.
10.2.3 Strict liability offences

We have seen that automatism can be used even for strict liability offences. This is
because automatism is not simply a denial of mens rea; it is also a denial of actus reus.
In Burns v Bidder, the accused escaped liability on the basis that he was not ‘driving’ his
car, not on the basis that he was not at fault in driving it badly.
The courts have kept strictly to this idea that automatism can only operate to negate
voluntary action not fault in strict liability offences. In Neal v Reynolds [1966] Crim LR
394, D was charged with failing to accord precedence to a pedestrian on a crossing.
Like the defendant in Burns v Bidder, D’s defence was that this was involuntary; he
could not avoid failing to give precedence to the pedestrian because that same
pedestrian had dashed out without warning and without giving him the chance to
stop. The court refused the defence on the basis that D, despite the action of the
pedestrian, was fully in control of his vehicle and so was not acting involuntarily.
Comparable decisions were reached in Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321 and A-G’s
Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91, in both of which cases the defendant was charged
with driving dangerously when their mind was not fully conscious due to matters
outside their control – hypoglycaemia in the former, a trance-like state induced
by the defendant’s concentrated attention to the lines separating the motorway
carriageways in the latter. Their defences of automatism failed on the ground that it
was available only where there was a complete loss of conscious control.
10.2.4 Prior fault

The defendant in Quick was a touch fortunate in having his conviction quashed. If the
trial judge had directed the jury as he ought, D would probably have been properly
convicted at first instance. What the judge should have told the jury was that it should
acquit if it thought D may not have been aware of what he was doing due to his
hypoglycaemia unless he was at fault in getting himself into that condition. The jury
may well have concluded that D was at fault, since a diabetic would usually know that
after taking insulin it was important not to drink alcohol on an empty stomach. Lawton
LJ made this clear when hearing the appeal: ‘A self induced incapacity will not excuse...
nor will one which could reasonably have been foreseen’.
In Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760, on similar facts, the Court of Appeal ruled that what was
important was not what ‘could reasonably have been foreseen’ but what was
foreseen by the accused. Only if the accused foresaw that his failure to eat and drink
properly might cause him to become ‘aggressive, unpredictable and uncontrolled
with the result that he may cause injury to others’ would a conviction be proper.
These were not cases of self-induced automatism but preventable automatism. Cases
of self-induced automatism are treated slightly differently. Where the defendant’s
automatism is the result of voluntary intoxication with drink or drugs, they are
disabled from using it as a defence for all crimes except crimes of specific intent; that
is, crimes where the prosecution has to show that the accused specifically intended
the consequences of their act. For all other crimes voluntary intoxication is treated as
a basis in itself for a conviction.
In Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152 the defendant went on an ‘acid trip’ (took the hallucinogenic
drug, LSD) with his girlfriend. He awoke some time later to find her dead of suffocation;
he had stuffed a sheet in her mouth while hallucinating that she was a snake. He was
charged with manslaughter. D’s defence of automatism was rejected on the basis
that his condition was self-induced. If he had been charged with murder, which
requires proof of a specific intent to kill or cause serious injury, he could have used
the evidence of his acid trip to negate his mens rea. No such relief was available for
manslaughter, however.
The rule that self-induced automatism is not a defence applies only where the
defendant’s intoxication was voluntary. If in Lipman the LSD tablet had been
introduced into D’s food without him knowing, or if his hallucination was caused by
drugs taken under medical prescription, the intoxication would be involuntary and he
would have been able to rely on it. In Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64, the Court of Appeal added
a further qualification, comparable with the decision in Bailey, that the voluntary
consumption of a drug (here Valium) not known to result in unpredictable and
aggressive behaviour could be relied upon in support of the defendant’s claim (on a
charge of arson) that he lacked awareness of what he was doing.
Both Bailey and Hardie are authorities for the broader proposition that, for crimes of
mens rea, only those who are at fault in permitting themselves to lapse into aggressive
and unpredictable behaviour are denied the defence. For crimes of negligence,
automatism will not be a defence if the condition could have been prevented by the
taking of reasonable care. In Kay v Butterworth (1945) 61 TLR 452, for example, it was
affirmed that falling asleep at the wheel, or brake failure due to not servicing a car
properly, is no defence to careless or dangerous driving. This is consistent with the
point that taking a sedative would be no answer to a charge of dangerous or reckless
driving. Indeed, if it resulted in the defendant falling asleep at the wheel, it would
provide the prosecution with all the evidence it needed to secure the conviction!
10.2.5 Insanity (insane automatism)

As we have seen, automatism can be the result of loss of physical control or loss of
mental control over one’s actions. In the latter case, the defendant is relying upon a
mental condition which rendered them unaware of what they were doing. By raising
such evidence before the court, the defendant is, of course, putting their sanity at
issue. In a number of cases a plea of automatism has been rejected by the court and
construed as one of insanity. It is therefore important to be able to distinguish insanity
(or insane automatism) from simple automatism. In the next section we will examine
insanity in detail.
10.3 Insanity
The defence of insanity is unusual in a number of ways. First, if successfully raised it
will not result in an unqualified acquittal, but rather a special verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity. Upon such verdict, the court has a wide-ranging dispositive
discretion which includes hospital order, guardianship, absolute discharge and
supervision (Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991). Before 1991
the only power available was mandatory indefinite committal to a mental hospital
at the Home Secretary’s discretion (Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s.5 and
Schedule 1; see R.D. Mackay Mental condition defences in the criminal law. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995) pp.106–08). As a result, the defence was understandably
unpopular with defendants who might otherwise have wished to avail themselves
of it (R.D. Mackay ‘Fact and fiction about the insanity defence’ [1990] Crim LR 247).
The case law contains a number of instances of defendants relying upon non-insane
automatism, who changed their plea to guilty upon the trial judge ruling that their
defence was properly one of insanity (see, for example, Hennessy below). Even a ‘life’
sentence for murder may be preferable to an indefinite committal – which might
really mean life (although as Mackay’s research shows (1990, pp.254–55), judges did
not always implement the mandatory hospital order. Although the defence has not
gained significantly in popularity since the change in the law, it seems likely to do
so, given the wide-ranging discretion now available (R. Mackay and G. Kearns ‘The
continued underuse of unfitness to plead and the insanity defence’ [1994] Crim LR 576;
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity used in only five cases in 1992).
A second unusual characteristic is that, unlike other defences, it may be raised by either
defence or prosecution (although in Price [1963] 2 QB 1, Lawton J appeared to dissent from
this view). The prosecution may raise it when the defendant puts his sanity at issue, for
example by pleading diminished responsibility (Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964,
s.6) or non-insane automatism (Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 411–12
per Lord Denning; Dickie [1984] 3 All ER 173 at 180 per Watkin LJ). When this occurs the
standard of proof is the criminal standard (beyond reasonable doubt: Podola [1959] 3 All
ER 418; Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557; see also though Bratty at 411–12 per Lord Denning).
When raised by the defence, the burden of proof is with the defendant rather than, as
is usual, the prosecution. A right of appeal exists against a special verdict even though
technically the defendant has been found not guilty (Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act
1964, s.2). See the fascinating account of the interplay of substantive and procedural
aspects of the insanity defence in A. Loughnan ‘Manifest madness: towards a new
understanding of the insanity defence’ (2007) MLR 379.
10.3.1 The M’Naghten rules

The legal notion of insanity is captured and defined in a statement of principle
which derives from a famous case in 1843 when Daniel M’Naghten, in an attempt to
assassinate the prime minister, instead succeeded in killing his private secretary.
M’Naghten was found not guilty by reason of insanity on the grounds that he
was suffering an insane delusion that the prime minister and his constituents
were conspiring against him at the time of his act. So incensed were the public at
M’Naghten’s acquittal that the House of Lords asked a panel of judges to establish
rules governing the defence of insanity. These rules are known as the M’Naghten rules.
On the precise issue in the case, namely insane delusions, their Lordships concluded
that an insane delusion would act as a defence only if, assuming the delusion was true,
it would have entitled the defendant to do as he did. In R v Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725
the defendant attacked police officers under the insane delusion that they were evil
spirits attacking him. His defence of self-defence was rejected by the Court of Appeal.
The correct defence was that of insanity. Assuming his delusion to be true he would
have been justified in using force to defend himself. So also, if M’Naghten’s insane
delusion was that Sir Robert Peel was about to kill him, the defence would have stood,
since killing in self-defence is permitted. On the facts, however, M’Naghten’s insane
delusion was insufficient; that someone is conspiring against you does not excuse or
justify killing the conspirator. The body of the M’Naghten rules is as follows.
[E]very man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be

responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved…and…to establish a defence on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as not to know that what he
was doing was wrong.
Activity 10.3
Learn the M’Naghten rules by heart: they represent the law and must therefore be
known.
It will be apparent that there is a considerable overlap between insanity and automatism.
A defendant who suffers from a defect of reason which renders them unaware of what
they are doing can be in either a state of sane or insane automatism. The difference
between them lies in the cause of that disorder. With insanity, the defect of reason results
from a disease of the mind. So what exactly is a disease of the mind?
10.3.2 Disease of the mind

The notion of a disease of the mind owes nothing to the current state of knowledge
regarding mental illness: it is a matter of legal rather than medical definition. The
current legal position is that many who would not be considered to have a disease of
the mind by any ordinary measure are so treated by the criminal law.
The ruling test for a disease of the mind is that of Devlin J in the case of Kemp [1957] 1
QB 399. The defendant attacked his wife with a hammer, causing her grievous bodily
harm. The medical evidence showed that D suffered from arterial-sclerosis, a condition
which restricts the flow of blood to the brain, and this caused a temporary lapse of
consciousness. D sought to raise the defence of automatism. Devlin J rejected this
defence, ruling that it was one of insanity.
…The condition of the brain is irrelevant and so is the question of whether the condition
of the mind is curable or incurable, transitory or permanent... Hardening of the arteries
is a disease which is…capable of affecting the mind in such a way as to cause a defect,
temporarily or permanently, of its reasoning, understanding and so on, and so is in my
judgment a disease of the mind...within the meaning of the rules.
The deceptively simple result of this test is that defects of reason are treated as
insanity if triggered by an internal condition, but as (simple) automatism if triggered
by an external cause.
Activity 10.4
Read Wilson, Section 9.9.A.3 ‘Disease of the mind’ and make a note of the three
different tests of ‘disease of the mind’.
a. Do you prefer the Devlin test or one of the other two?
b. Why have the courts ignored medical definitions in deciding the meaning of a
disease of the mind?
c. Learn the Devlin test by heart: it is the current law governing the meaning and
scope of disease of the mind.
Although a simple test, the Devlin test is by no means a convincing one. Consider
for example, the medical condition of diabetes. Diabetes can produce defects of
reason involving loss of conscious awareness in two separate ways. It can produce
hypoglycaemia (low blood sugar) where the person takes insulin but does not
compensate its effects with an appropriate dietary regime. It can also produce
hyperglycaemia (excess blood sugar) where the person fails to take their insulin as
instructed. Both conditions can result in the kind of mental confusion, unconscious
action and/or aggression which can trigger criminal activity.
As we have seen (Quick), if D suffers hypoglycaemia (without fault on their part)

induced by the taking of insulin (external trigger), the condition is treated as one of
simple automatism and they receive an unqualified acquittal (Bingham [1991] Crim LR
433, in which a conviction for theft was quashed). If, however, D suffers hyperglycaemia
as a result of not taking insulin (internal cause), the condition is treated as one
of insanity (insane automatism) (Hennessy (1989) 89 Cr App R 10). In short: similar
condition, totally different outcome.
On the basis of this internal/external test, acts of violence committed while

sleepwalking (Burgess (1991) 93 Cr App R 41; Lowe (2005)); while suffering an epileptic
seizure (Sullivan [1984] AC 156) or while suffering clinical depression (Rabey (1980) DLR
193) have all been designated the result of conditions of insanity rather than of simple
automatism. In the case of sleepwalking, this is particularly ironic given that this was
traditionally proposed as the classic example of automatism (see Bratty quotation in
Section 3.1.2 of this module guide). This is no longer the case, at least if (as it usually
will) it stems from an internal susceptibility.
Activity 10.5
Read Wilson, Section 9.9.A.3 ‘Disease of the mind’ and note down as many
difficulties associated with the ‘internal/external cause’ test of insanity/automatism
as you can find. Concentrate particularly on the discussions relating to diabetes and
sleepwalking. When you have done this, consider whether Hennessy would have
been in a stronger position to claim automatism if he had forgotten or failed to take
his insulin due to:
a. the sudden death of his child
b. a fire at his home
c. an unlawful attack on his person
d. theft of the insulin.
10.3.3 Second limb of the M’Naghten rules

The M’Naghten rules also permit the insanity defence for those who know what they are
doing but do not ‘know that it is wrong’. This has subsequently been construed to mean
‘legally’ wrong, so is not available to a person who believes that they have God’s consent
to commit the relevant crime or whose disordered mental state convinces them that the
criminal law is overridden by the demands of morality. So in Windle [1952] 2 QB 826, D, a
husband who killed his suicidal wife at her request believing, in his mentally disordered
state, that it was right to do so, was unable to raise the defence. When he was arrested, D
had said to the police, ‘I suppose they will hang me for this’. In saying this, D signalled his
understanding that what he was doing was legally wrong. That was unfortunate enough.
More unfortunately, however, at that time murder was a capital offence.
10.4 Intoxication
Intoxication, like other failure of proof defences, is not a defence in itself. Indeed, it is
more like an anti-defence. If a person kills another, inflamed by drink, or drives a car
dangerously due to the influence of alcohol, this exacerbates rather than excuses or
mitigates the wrong. Intoxication operates, like automatism, to provide an evidential
basis for a claim of no mens rea. Consider again the case of Lipman above. Without
the evidence of D having taken LSD, the jury would have had no reason to believe his
action was not deliberately undertaken and so, in the absence of such evidence, would
no doubt have convicted him of murder. People do not tend to stuff sheets into the
mouths of others unless they want to kill them; and the jury would know this. As it
was, the evidence was forthcoming and so it could convict only of manslaughter. So
something, at least, went right for Lipman!
It is easy to forget this aspect of the so-called defence of intoxication, namely that it
is of evidential value only and that its value is not by way of excusing D’s wrongdoing
but rather to substantiate D’s claim that they lacked the mens rea (i.e. the intention,
knowledge or foresight) of the crime charged. It is for this reason that intoxication
– even involuntary intoxication – is not a defence to crimes of negligence or strict
liability unless it can be presented as one of automatism. So in Blakely and Sutton
[1991] RTR 405, D spiked B’s soft drink with alcohol at a party. B, unaware of this, drove
home and was stopped by police on the way and breathalysed. B was properly found
guilty of driving with excess alcohol. The fact that he was unaware of his condition is
no answer to a strict liability crime which does not require proof of fault.
Activity 10.6
Read Wilson, Sections 9.8.A ‘Automatism and crimes of mens rea’, B ‘Automatism,
negligence and strict liability’ and C ‘Conditions of automatism’ again.
How might a person be able to avoid liability for a strict liability crime or crime of
negligence by pleading involuntary intoxication?
Hint: Think of a strict liability driving offence and a possible neurological outcome
of involuntary intoxication which prevents that offence from taking place.
For crimes of mens rea, if D has the mens rea for the crime charged they will remain guilty
even though they would not have committed the offence if sober. This important point
of law was confirmed in Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355. D committed a sexual assault on V, an
underage boy, under the influence of drugs which had been given to him secretly by
X. (X’s plan was to photograph the event and use it to blackmail D.) D was charged and
convicted of indecent assault. He appealed on the ground that it was an excuse that his
intoxication was involuntary and that he would not have committed the offence if sober.
The House of Lords, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal who had surprisingly
ruled in his favour, said that D was properly convicted since the effect of the alcohol
was to disinhibit D rather than to prevent him from forming the mens rea for the
assault. Although D would not have committed the assault if sober, he knew exactly
what he was doing and intended to do it. There was no excuse known to the criminal
law that D was unwittingly induced to commit an offence he would not have
committed otherwise, by the deceitful stratagem of another.
So the first question which must always be asked in a question involving an

intoxicated offender is:
‘Was the effect of the intoxication to prevent D from forming mens rea or simply to
remove D’s inhibitions or otherwise inflame D’s anger or desires?’
Only in the former case will it avail D to adduce evidence of intoxication.
Activity 10.7
a. Do you agree with the decision in Kingston? If you do, consider the next question.
b. Adam, a placid man, does not drink alcohol. Cain is a practical joker. He secretly
adds vodka to Adam’s orange juice at a party to see what Adam is like when
drunk. Adam, who is unused to alcohol, feels strange and starts to act in a silly
fashion. Cain taunts him for being drunk. Adam is indignant, loses his temper
and punches Cain. Is Adam guilty of assaulting Cain? Should he be?
10.4.1 Restrictions on the use of evidence of intoxication

We have discovered that adducing evidence of intoxication is of use only if the
crime charged requires proof of mens rea and the effect of the intoxication is to
deprive the defendant of mens rea. If it does not, the defence will, if anything, be
counterproductive, providing the prosecution with clear evidence of motivation.
An important qualification to this rule must be added; namely that if the intoxication
is voluntary it cannot be used, even for this purpose, with respect to a substantial
class of crimes of mens rea. These crimes are known as crimes of basic intent. A crime
of basic intent, it will be remembered, refers to those crimes of mens rea where the
definition of the offence requires no proof that D had any special or specific intent in
doing what they did beyond performing the actions which form the actus reus of the
crime (see Chapter 4). For example, the crime of arson requires proof that D intended
to light the match used to start the fire. It does not require proof that D specifically
intended to damage or destroy property by fire. D’s foresight that this consequence
might result from their action is enough.
By contrast, murder requires the defendant not merely to intend to do the act which
results in the victim’s death, but also intend the consequence thereof – death or
serious injury, as the case may be. This subtle distinction was first drawn in DPP v Beard
[1920] AC 479. While drunk, D raped a young girl, who died of suffocation as a result of
him putting his hand over her mouth to prevent her screaming. D’s conviction for
murder was quashed and a verdict of manslaughter substituted. Lord Birkenhead
explained the legal position as follows.
Under the law of England as it prevailed until early in the nineteenth century voluntary
drunkenness was never an excuse for criminal misconduct; and indeed the classic
authorities broadly assert that voluntary drunkenness must be considered rather an
aggravation than a defence. This view was in terms based upon the principle that a man
who by his own voluntary act debauches and destroys his will power shall be no better
situated in regard to criminal acts than a sober man…[However] where a specific intent
is an essential element in the offence, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering
the accused incapable of forming such an intent should be taken into consideration in
order to determine whether he had in fact formed the intent necessary to constitute the
particular crime. If he was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent required
he could not be convicted of a crime which was committed only if the intent was proved...
In a charge of murder based upon intention to kill or to do grievous bodily harm, if the
jury are satisfied that the accused was, by reason of his drunken condition, incapable
of forming the intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm...he cannot be convicted of
murder. But nevertheless unlawful homicide has been committed by the accused, and
consequently he is guilty of unlawful homicide without malice aforethought, and that is
manslaughter.
Voluntary intoxication, therefore, can support the defendant’s claim that they lacked
mens rea for a specific intent crime, such as murder. It cannot be so used for crimes of
basic intent such as manslaughter, as Lipman later confirmed, where it is no part of the
prosecution’s case to show that the defendant had anything specifically in mind when
acting as they did.
10.4.2 ‘Dutch courage’ crimes

One small qualification needs to be added to the principle that voluntary intoxication
may be used to negate the mens rea for a crime of specific intent. This is that if the
defendant becomes intoxicated in order to gain the courage to commit a specific
intent crime, they will not be able to rely on that intoxication. Authority for this
proposition is A-G of Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349. In this case D decided
to kill his wife. Before killing her, and to give himself the courage to do so, he drank a
bottle of whiskey. The House of Lords, affirming D’s conviction for murder, held that so
long as he harboured the intention to kill his wife prior to becoming intoxicated, this
was enough. It was not necessary to prove that D had the necessary intention at the
time of the actual killing.
Activity 10.8
Go to Chapter 6 of this module guide. Insert Gallagher into the text at an
appropriate place to give another exception, along with the supposed corpse cases,
to the rule that mens rea and actus reus must coincide in point of time.
10.4.3 Voluntary and involuntary intoxication distinguished

To summarise: intoxication can result from either drink or drugs. Involuntary
intoxication can be used to negate the intention, foresight, knowledge or belief of all
crimes which have this mental element. Voluntary intoxication cannot be used to
negate the mens rea of all such crimes: it can be used only in respect of crimes of
specific intent. The leading case of Majewski [1977] AC 443 characterises voluntary
intoxication as:
the intoxication of a person by an intoxicant which he takes otherwise than properly for a
medicinal purpose (and according to medical instruction), knowing that it is or may be an
intoxicant.
Activity 10.9
Learn the Majewski test by heart: it tells you most of what you need to know about
the difference between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. The bit it does not
tell you is dealt with below in relation to Hardie.
Involuntary intoxication may therefore result from:
uu an intoxicant taken under medical supervision
uu an intoxicant secretly administered to A without their knowledge (e.g. Kingston)
uu an intoxicant voluntarily taken by A, who mistakes its properties. An example is

where A takes what they think is a painkiller when in fact it is an intoxicant.
A further qualification was introduced in Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64, in which D, having
been jilted by G, his girlfriend, was advised by G to take some of her Valium to calm
himself down. D later set fire to a wardrobe in G’s flat. Giving evidence, D claimed that
he did not remember starting the fire due to his intoxicated state but conceded that
he must have started it as he was alone in the room at the time. Although the Valium
was taken wittingly by D, the Court of Appeal quashed his conviction. In effect, the case
was treated as one involving involuntary rather than voluntary intoxication, as there
was no suggestion that the taking of Valium was a reckless course of conduct.
Activity 10.10
Read Wilson, Section 9.11.A ‘Intoxication: its effect on criminal liability’ and answer
the following question.
If Hardie, instead of setting fire to the wardrobe, had left the house and, driving
home, had fallen asleep at the wheel, would this have been a case of voluntary or
involuntary intoxication?
10.5 Crimes of basic intent and specific intent contrasted

There is no consistently applied test to separate crimes of basic and specific intent.
However, the usual test used, which is consistent with the explanation given above
at Section 10.4.1, is that a crime of basic intent is one which does not require the
defendant to have intended the consequences of his action. It can be committed by
recklessness. Accordingly, in Majewski it was no defence to a charge of assaulting a
police officer in the execution of his duty, that D was oblivious to what he was doing
when he attacked the officer in a public house due to the effects of drink and drugs.
Assault is a crime of basic intent because it can be committed by recklessness. A
crime of specific intent, by contrast, is a crime which requires the defendant to have
a consequence in mind when acting. Murder is a crime of specific intent because the
prosecution must prove D acted with the intention of killing, or causing grievous
bodily harm. It cannot be committed by recklessness.
Activity 10.11
Read Wilson, Section 9.11.C.2 ‘The rationale for restricting the exculpatory scope of
voluntary intoxication’ and answer the following questions.
a. What is the rationale for not allowing evidence of intoxication to be used to
negate mens rea in crimes of basic intent such as assault? Do you agree with it?
b. Which crimes are crimes of specific intent?
c. Which crimes are crimes of basic intent?
d. Most crimes of specific intent have a basic intent crime of lesser gravity which
can still be charged in cases of voluntary intoxication. What are the basic intent
counterparts of murder, and s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861?
e. Give an example of a specific intent crime which has no basic intent counterpart.
10.5.1 Intoxicated mistakes as to a defence

Most criminal defences remain available to the defendant even if they are mistaken
as to the facts. So, for example, a person who honestly believes they are about to be
attacked may lawfully use reasonable force to defend themselves although the belief
was entirely without foundation.
This does not apply where the mistake is induced by voluntary intoxication. In O’Grady
[1987] QB 995, D killed his friend, V, with whom he had been drinking throughout the
day believing, on waking up from sleep, that V was attacking him. The Court of Appeal
ruled that, where a mistake either as to the need to use force in self-defence or the
degree of force necessary to defend oneself is made due to voluntary intoxication, self-
defence cannot be relied upon. D’s conviction for manslaughter was upheld, and the
following statement of principle was forthcoming.
We have come to the conclusion that where the jury are satisfied that the defendant
was mistaken in his belief that any force or the force which he in fact used was necessary
to defend himself and are further satisfied that the mistake was caused by voluntarily
induced intoxication, the defence must fail. We do not consider that any distinction
should be drawn on this aspect of the matter between offences involving what is
called specific intent, such as murder, and offences of so called basic intent, such as
manslaughter.
In O’Connor [1991] Crim LR 135, on similar facts, the Court of Appeal adopted this
approach, holding that where a defendant, because of self-induced intoxication,
formed a mistaken belief that the use of force was necessary to defend himself, a plea
of self-defence failed even in relation to the specific intent crime of murder. Evidence
of self-induced intoxication could be used to negate the mens rea for the crime but not
to support the defence of self-defence.
Illustration 10.2
Adam goes to sleep very intoxicated. He wakes up, still drunk, to see Eve standing
over him with what appears to be a knife in her hand. It is in fact a cigarette. Adam
throws a knife at Eve which kills her.
If Adam relies on self-defence, he cannot use his intoxication to substantiate his
claim that he believed he was being attacked with a knife and so was defending
himself. The jury will be told to ignore Adam’s intoxication and consider only
whether he would have made the mistake if sober.
If, however, Adam claims that he only intended to frighten Eve away, he can use his
intoxication to explain why, although he threw a knife at her, he had no lethal intent.
Activity 10.12
Now read Wilson, Section 9.11.D ‘Intoxicated mistakes’ and answer the following
question.
Does it make sense that intoxicated beliefs may be taken into account for the
purpose of (negating) mens rea but not for the purpose of raising a defence?
The defence of duress, similarly, cannot be relied upon if D, because of intoxication,
mistakenly believes they are being coerced into committing a crime (Graham [1982]
1 WLR 294).
In one situation, and inconsistently with O’Connor, an intoxicated belief can be relied
upon to support a defence. This is in relation to s.5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act
1971 which enacts that it is a lawful excuse to a charge of criminal damage that the
defendant believed they would have the consent of the owner. In Jaggard v Dickinson
[1980] 3 All ER 716 D, stranded with no money after a night’s drinking, went round
to a friend’s house and, having failed to rouse her, broke into the house believing
she would have her friend’s consent. Unfortunately she chose the wrong house. The
Queen’s Bench Division accepted D’s defence of lawful excuse. Section 5(2)(a) required
only that the belief in consent was honestly entertained. There was no requirement
that the belief be reasonable. This case was considered to be of doubtful authority
in Magee v Crown Prosecution Service [2014] EWHC 4089 (Admin). A was charged with
failing to stop after an accident on a road, as required by s.170(1) and (2) of the Road
Traffic Act 1988. D’s defence was that he did not realise that he had had an accident.
The Divisional court ruled that this did not afford a defence where, as here, D’s lack of
awareness was the result of his self-induced intoxication. The offence charged was not
a crime of specific intent and so DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 applied.
Activity 10.13
Read Wilson, Section 9.11.E ‘Conclusion’ and consider whether the present law
relating to intoxication is acceptable and whether the Law Commission proposals
for reform would improve the situation.
We discussed earlier the need to have a template for answering problem questions
and gave some examples. Here is an example of a past examination question, testing
understanding of intoxication, and the method to be adopted in answering it.

Alison, Bertha, Charles and Desmond meet in a pub for a reunion. Alison does not
drink alcohol but Bertha puts vodka in her lemonade for a joke, without Alison
noticing. Later Bertha suggests to Alison that Alison should drop her glass on the
floor to see if it will bounce. Alison does so and the glass breaks. Bertha, who has
been drinking beer all evening, later rides off on the landlord’s bicycle. When
stopped by John, a police officer, Bertha says that she thought the bicycle had been
abandoned. When John tries to arrest her, Bertha aims a punch at him which misses
and hits Phoebe, a bystander. What offences have been committed and by whom?
Advice on answering the question

There are a number of possible offences committed here. In each case begin with the
offence to be charged.
Alison: method
Identify harm/crime = criminal damage
1. Define the crime and identify the elements.
2. Then consider what elements are at issue.
3. Here there is only one issue. Has Alison mens rea? Her problem is that if we don’t
take into account her drunken state, the jury will inevitably conclude that she
has, because everybody knows glasses don’t bounce: they break. If we do take
intoxication into account, she has a chance. How can Alison use the evidence to
support her claim of lack of mens rea? By claiming that, due to her intoxicated
state, ‘I honestly did not think the glass would break’.
4. State the governing rules. If the intoxication is involuntary, Alison can use it. If it is
voluntary she cannot, if criminal damage is a basic intent crime.
5. Discuss whether criminal damage is a crime of specific or basic intent.
6. Discuss whether Alison’s is a case of voluntary or involuntary intoxication.
7. Conclude.
Bertha: method
Identify harm/crime = punch = assault
1. Define the crime and identify the elements.
2. Then consider what elements are at issue.
3. Again, the issue is whether Bertha lacks mens rea.
4. Only if she does lack mens rea can Bertha use evidence of intoxication to support
her claim.
5. State the relevant rules. If the intoxication is voluntary it can be raised in evidence
to negate mens rea for a crime of specific intent but not for a crime of basic intent.
6. Discuss whether it is a crime of specific or basic intent.
7. Discuss whether it is voluntary or involuntary intoxication.
8. Conclude. Bertha will not be able to rely on intoxication with regard to the punch since
i. she has the mens rea for assault, and
ii. even if she lacked the mens rea for assault, the intoxication is voluntary and
assault is a basic intent crime.
Identify harm/crime = theft
1. Use same method as above.
2. Conclude. Bertha will be able to rely on her voluntary intoxication on the theft charge
as she does not have the mens rea for theft and theft is a specific intent crime.

1. State what automatism and insanity have in common.
2. State how they differ.
3. State the test which differentiates insanity and automatism.
4. Decide whether the following conditions or events affecting mens rea are examples
of insanity or automatism.
a. Post traumatic stress syndrome.
b. Heart attack.
c. Sleepwalking.
d. Depression.
e. Brain tumour.
f. Diabetic hypoglycaemia.
g. Diabetic hyperglycaemia.
h. Carbon monoxide poisoning.
i. Anaesthetic.
j. Hypnosis.
5. Explain the relevance of intoxication to proof of mens rea and to the defence of
automatism.
6. Explain the difference between basic and specific intent crimes.
7. Explain what the relevance of ‘involuntary intoxication’ is to criminal liability.
8. Explain why theft is an example of a specific intent crime.

11 Defences 2: affirmative defences
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
11.1 Relationship between the defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
11.2 Public and private defence including self-defence . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
11.3 Meaning of ‘reasonable force’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
11.4 Scope of private defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
11.5 Duress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
11.6 Duress of circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
11.7 Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Introduction
By contrast with failure of proof defences, affirmative defences operate outside
the elements of the offence. The moral core of these defences is that the particular
context within which the defendant was acting rendered their action permissible or
excusable, although contrary to a criminal prohibition. In essence they adduce to the
claim that the defendant reacted reasonably, or as reasonably as could be expected
in the situation in which they were placed, either to allay the unjust threat of harm
or otherwise to promote the common good. The defences we shall cover in this
chapter are duress, duress of circumstances, necessity and self-defence. It is how these
defences are distinguished which can cause difficulty.
Criminal law 11 Defences 2: affirmative defences page 127
11.1 Relationship between the defences

It is easy to mix up the various affirmative defences as they all generally involve the
claim that the defendant’s action was necessary to avoid harm befalling them or
someone else. It is important not to confuse them, however, not least because their
scope is different. Duress, for example, is not a defence to murder but self-defence is.
A brief outline of the usual coverage of these defences follows to show their essential
points of difference.
Consider the following hypothetical case.
Illustration 11.1
D threatens V with death unless V helps him to beat up X.
a. If V succumbs to D’s threat and does beat up X he may raise the defence of
duress. Obedience to the criminal law does not demand a disproportionate
personal sacrifice. Note the action taken by V is a wrong committed against an
innocent person, which is excused as a concession to human frailty.
b. If V resists the threat and attacks D, he may raise the defence of self-defence. The
law permits people to protect themselves from those who would harm them.
Note the action taken is not a wrong but a justified act of self-defence against
the wrongdoer.
c. If V escapes the threat by driving off at high speed the wrong way down a one-
way street, he may raise the defence of duress of circumstances to a charge of
dangerous driving. Again, the law does not demand a disproportionate personal
sacrifice. Note the action taken is a wrong but this time it involves no victim. This
wrong is excused.
d. If V pushes X to the ground to prevent D delivering the first punch on X he may

raise the defence of necessity. The criminal law accepts the moral imperative
that people, faced with a crisis demanding immediate action, may embrace the
lesser of two evils, even if that evil is non-conformity to the law. Note the action
taken is not a wrong but a justified act designed to advance X’s good and the
common good.
In short, in response to the same threat, four different possible responses are
available which may act as a defence to the charge levelled against V. These
defences will now be looked at in turn.
11.2 Public and private defence including self-defence

The criminal law permits the use of reasonable force for the purpose of public or
private defence. Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides the basic template for
both public and private defence. Section 3(1) reads:
(1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention
of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected
offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.
Private defence, which is a subset of public defence, similarly permits the use of
reasonable force in self-defence, defence of another or defence of property. To
constitute defensive force, D must be acting defensively (i.e. not in retaliation or
revenge) and the force used must be directed against a person posing an unjust
threat. Therefore, it is not available as a defence to a person resisting a lawful arrest
since the arrest is not unjust. It is also not available to justify force used against a
person, such as D in Illustration 11.1 (a) or the sacrificed twin in Re A (conjoined twins)
[2001] Fam 147, as neither is posing an unjust threat to the other. The correct defence
in the first case is duress. The correct defence in Re A is one of necessity.
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 has put some of the key common law
principles on a statutory footing to ensure clarity and consistency of approach. They
include a restatement of the rule that whether or not the use of force is lawful depends
not on whether it was in fact necessary, but whether the defendant honestly believed
it to be necessary. They include, also, guidelines on matters to be taken into account
in deciding whether the degree of force used was reasonable. These consolidate the
principles enunciated in Beckford [1988] AC 130. In this case, the Privy Council stated, on
an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica, that the test for self-defence was that
a person might use such force as was reasonable in the circumstances as the person
honestly believed them to be, in the defence of himself and another.
This principle was enshrined in s.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
(CJIA) as amended by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (s.43), which applies to all cases
involving the use of force in public or private defence. It provides that:
(3) The question whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances
is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be.
Further:
(4) If D claims to have held a particular belief as regards the existence of any
circumstances –
(a) the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether
D genuinely held it; but
(b) if it is determined that D did genuinely hold it, D is entitled to rely on it for the
purposes of subsection (3), whether or not –
(i) it was mistaken, or
(ii) (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one to have made.
(5) But subsection (4)(b) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief attributable to
intoxication that was voluntarily induced.
Therefore, in a case such as Beckford, in which the defendant claimed that he used a
gun because he believed he was being shot at, the jury must be asked: first, whether
D might have honestly believed that he was being shot at; and second, whether, on
this assumption, D’s use of the gun was proportionate to the perceived threat. The jury
should also be directed that if D’s belief that he was under attack was unreasonable this
would be irrelevant as a matter of law but very relevant as a matter of evidence. The
more preposterous D’s supposed belief, the less likely it is that he actually held it. There
is one qualification to the ‘circumstances as D believed them to be’ principle. If as in Oye
(2013) he is suffering from an insane delusion that he is being attacked and uses force to
resist that attack, D’s defence is one of insanity, not self-defence. See Section 10.3.1.
11.3 Meaning of ‘reasonable force’

Subsection 76(6) of the CJIA affirmed the common law position that the degree of
force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances
as D believed them to be if it was disproportionate in those circumstances. Subsection
76(6) has now been amended to provide some extra protection to householders
who overreact in the terror of discovering a burglar. For householders encountering
an intruder, the question is not whether the degree of force is disproportionate but
whether it is grossly disproportionate.
The common law provides that what is disproportionate is a question of degree. This
means that the degree of force deemed reasonable varies according to the nature
and degree of the threat. In A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983) [1984] 2 WLR 465, it was held
that a shopkeeper who armed himself with petrol bombs to protect his property from
rioters was not acting disproportionately. However, a person protecting his property
from burglars (Martin (Anthony) [2001] EWCA Crim 2245) or performing an arrest (Clegg
[1995] 1 AC 482, see below) will no doubt be acting disproportionately if he shoots to
kill, but proportionately if he shoots to pre-empt a murderous attack on himself or
another (Beckford). The case law contains the following guidance as to how to assess
the reasonableness of the defender’s response.
11.3.1 Use of force must be necessary

The use of force will not be reasonable if it is not immediately necessary (on the facts
as D believed them to be). If, therefore, there are other defence options available, for
example locking a door to prevent the intrusion of a burglar, the use of force may not
be reasonable.
11.3.2 No duty of retreat

In Field [1972] Crim LR 435, D was told that V was coming round to attack him. D remained
where he was and, in repelling V’s attack, killed him. The prosecution case was that D’s
use of force was unreasonable since he had the opportunity to retreat and seek police
protection. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and allowed the defence.
11.3.3 Provoking an attack

A person is not disqualified from using reasonable force to defend themselves although
they were originally at fault in provoking the attack. In Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim
3377, D mounted a revenge attack on V. V himself went on the attack, along with some
friends. D then sought to defend himself and killed V. The Court of Appeal stated that
the fact that D provoked the attack did not exclude his use of the defence. The defence
was available so long as V’s retaliation was of a nature to justify the use of force in self-
defence and if the violence used was not disproportionate to the perceived threat.
11.3.4 Pre-emptive strike

A person can make a pre-emptive strike so long as they honestly believe an attack
to be imminent. This was made clear in the case of A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983),
considered above. It was said that the manufacture and storage of firebombs as a
protective measure could negate liability for an offence amounting, in effect, to the
possession of an explosive substance for an unlawful purpose. In Beckford (1988) Lord
Griffith made the following statement of principle.
A man about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to strike the first blow
or fire the first shot; circumstances may justify a pre-emptive strike.
11.3.5 Reasonable force decided objectively

Whether the degree of force used is reasonable is decided objectively rather than
from the defender’s point of view. In deciding whether reasonable force was used,
what matters is not whether D believed the amount of force used was reasonable, but
whether it was reasonable. In deciding whether it was reasonable, the court must take
into account the fact that D was acting under conditions of extreme stress, and so the
jury must accept that under such conditions reasonable people may make errors of
judgement (Owino (1996)). As Lord Morris said in Palmer v R [1971] AC 814: ’Detached
reflection cannot be expected in the face of an uplifted knife’.
Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 enshrines this approach.
Section 76(6) provides that:
(6) The degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in
the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was disproportionate in those
circumstances.
In deciding whether it was disproportionate, s.76(7) says:
the following considerations are to be taken into account (so far as relevant in the
circumstances of the case) –
(a) that a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able to weigh to a nicety the
exact measure of any necessary action; and
(b) that evidence of a person’s having only done what the person honestly and
instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong
evidence that only reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose.
Notice, however, that the defender’s honest and instinctive belief is only evidential. It
cannot override the requirement that the degree of force used must be proportionate
to the threat. In R v Clegg, a private soldier serving with the Parachute Regiment in
West Belfast fired four shots into an oncoming car at a road block. The final shot killed
a passenger in the back seat. D’s defence was that he had fired because he had thought
that a colleague’s life was in danger. In relation to the first three shots the judge had
accepted that D may have fired in self-defence or in defence of his colleague. However,
the fourth shot had been fired at the car after it had passed. It could no longer,
therefore, ground the defence of self-defence since the danger had passed. Any use of
force thus became automatically unreasonable whatever D’s degree of stress.
Again, in R v Martin, D shot dead a burglar because he overestimated the danger to which
he was subject. He may have done so due to a psychiatric disorder. The Court of Appeal,
upholding D’s conviction, restated the rule that the question as to how much force is
lawful is a question of law and is an objective question. D’s honest assessment of the
degree of force necessary was not decisive. It could not be objectively reasonable to
shoot a burglar in the absence of any evidence of physical threat, however scared he was.
A similar result occurred in Yaman [2012] EWCA Crim 1075. The Court held that, even if
it was assumed that in attacking a court-appointed locksmith with a hammer, D had
mistakenly ‘done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary’ to resist
a supposed burglary on the family shop, the jury must still inevitably have concluded
that the force he used was excessive. The trial judge’s failure to refer to s.76(7) when
directing the jury was not therefore fatal to D’s conviction for wounding under s.18 of
the OAPA 1861.
Both Yaman and Martin illustrate the kind of problems likely to arise when
householders are unexpectedly confronted with an intruder. In 2013, the Government
made another attempt to ensure that public perceptions of the scope of the defence
corresponded with the legal underpinnings. This time, however, the change is one of
substance rather than language. Section 43 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 adds a
new subs.(5A) to s.76 of the CJIA. The effect of subs.(5A) is to apply a lower standard of
reasonableness of reaction to the householder (e.g. Tony Martin), than for the defence
generally (e.g. Private Clegg), to give householders ‘greater latitude in terrifying or
extreme situations where they may not be thinking clearly about the precise level
of force that is necessary to deal with the threat faced.’ (Ministry of Justice circular).
Subsection 5A provides:
In a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been
reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was grossly disproportionate
in those circumstances.
The effect of subs.(5A) is that, if householders act honestly and instinctively to protect
themselves or their family from intruders using force that was reasonable in the
circumstances as they saw them, they will not necessarily be guilty of an offence even
if the level of force turns out to have been disproportionate in those circumstances. In
R (Collins) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 (Admin) Collins was tackled
by a householder while intruding in his house. The householder put him in a headlock
which caused serious injury from which Collins was not expected to recover. The
question for the court was whether subs.(5A) had the effect of rendering any use of
force other than grossly disproportionate force, reasonable force. The Queen’s Bench
Divisional Court ruled that, while grossly disproportionate force cannot be reasonable
and so is unlawful, it does not follow that, if the force used is disproportionate without
being grossly disproportionate, it is therefore necessarily reasonable. In R v Ray
[2017] EWCA Crim 1391 the Court of Appeal approved this approach. In their view, the
amendment had simply, in householder cases, ‘slightly refined the common law so
that a degree of force used that is disproportionate may nevertheless be reasonable
so long as it is not grossly disproportionate’. Whether, despite being disproportionate,
it is reasonable or not is a matter for the jury, taking into account the context and all
the circumstances. The most important of those matters is, of course, the state of
mind induced in the householder by the intrusion, the time of the intrusion and the
manner of its execution. Presumably, other things such as whether the householder
has suffered a similar intrusion in the past will also be taken into account.
By subs.(8B) the definition of a householder covers people who live in dwellings

and also buildings which serve a dual purpose as a place of residence and a place
of work (for example, a shopkeeper and their family who live above the shop). In
these circumstances, the ‘householders’ can rely on the more generous defence
regardless of which part of the building they were in when they were confronted
by an intruder. The effect of Collins is that, in a householder case, if the force used is
grossly disproportionate it is also by definition unreasonable. If, however, the jury
find it to be disproportionate but not grossly, it must then decide whether, although
disproportionate, it was nevertheless not unreasonable taking into account matters
such as the extreme fear often experienced by householders confronted by a stranger
in their own home.
Activity 11.1
Read Wilson, Section 13.5.A.2 ‘The elements of the defence’ and answer the
a. How might Clegg now expect to be able to avoid a conviction for murder?
b. Does the new test put too much power in the hands of the householder?
11.4 Scope of private defence

As we have seen, self-defence is available to all crimes involving the use of force,
including physical force and pre-emptive force. It is even a defence to murder. Some
concern has been voiced in this regard in relation to the actions of law enforcement
agencies, such as the police. The ‘honest belief’ requirement in the need to use
force has on occasions led to dubious acquittals of police officers who shoot to kill,
without taking sufficient steps to determine whether the circumstances truly demand
defensive action. This seems to be contrary to Article 2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights which guarantees the right to life and permits fatal violence for
defensive purposes only if it is ‘absolutely necessary’. If D shoots V, believing V to be
taking out a gun from his pocket when in fact it is his identification papers, the killing
is hardly ‘absolutely necessary’, but the ‘honest belief’ requirement nevertheless
acquits D.
Public and private defence is not available to crimes not involving the use of force,
for example simple driving offences and most cases of criminal damage, theft or
fraud. D must therefore bring his case within another defence to avoid liability. So
public defence would not be available for a person, who, as a means of bringing a
fugitive to justice (public defence), paints the latter’s name and address on a police
station wall, since graffiti does not constitute force. It would be different if A broke
a window so as to be able to defend V, who was being attacked on the other side.
Here force – breaking a window involves force – is being used for defensive purposes.
Likewise a person who, in order to escape a threatened attack, drives the wrong way
down a one-way street or otherwise drives dangerously cannot rely on self-defence
but would need to bring her defence within the more restricted scope of duress of
circumstances. It should be remembered that even driving offences may be brought
within the scope of private defence if they involve the use of force. So in R v Riddell
[2017] EWCA Crim 413 the defendant, having been pursued in her car by another driver
and brought to a stop, sought to escape a threatened attack by nudging the pursuer
aside with her car. On a charge of dangerous driving, the trial judge did not put the
defence of self-defence to the jury. Instead, he directed them in relation to the defence
of duress of circumstances whose elements were less favourable to the defence. The
jury convicted. The defendant’s appeal was successful. What she had done in response
to the perceived threat – using her car to nudge the pursuer out of the way – involved
the use of force and so the defence was applicable.
Activity 11.2
a. Read R v Riddell (above) as well as the module guide, Chapter 11 and Wilson,
Sections 11.A.4 and 11.A.5. Identify how duress of circumstances is a more
challenging defence to raise successfully than self-defence.
b. Read the module guide, Chapter 11 and Wilson, Section 11.A.4. Discover or invent
an example of how a person might raise the defence of self-defence to a charge
of criminal damage.
11.5 Duress
11.5.1 General matters

Duress is a rather unusual defence in that it involves the claim that it may be excusable
to follow the commands of a wrongdoer rather than the state, and that it may be
excusable to victimise an innocent person to save one’s own skin. Therefore the
defence is hedged around with restrictions. Reasonableness of reaction is of the
essence for this defence since it is one of the criminal law’s few concessions to human
frailty. An account of the defence was expressed by Murnaghan J in A-G v Whelan [1934]
IR 518 (Irish CCA) as:
...threats of immediate death or serious personal violence so great as to overbear the

ordinary powers of human resistance should be accepted as a justification for acts which
would otherwise be criminal.
There are two forms of duress: duress by threats and duress of circumstances. In
duress by threats, D is coerced into committing an unlawful act by the threats of a
wrongdoer. In duress of circumstances, D is compelled to commit an unlawful act to
avoid a threat of harm posed by external circumstances.
Illustration 11.2
a. X puts a gun to the head of D, a taxi driver, and says ‘Get me to the airport in five
minutes or I kill you’. D exceeds the speed limit in acceding to this demand.
b. D notices that the driver in the car behind him has lost consciousness. At any
moment, the out-of-control car will crash into D’s car at high speed. D goes
through a red traffic light in order to avoid the crash.
In the first case, D may rely on the defence of duress by threats. In the second case, D’s
defence is one of duress of circumstances.
The basic principles governing duress were expounded in Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294.
These have been subsequently approved by the House of Lords in Howe [1987] AC 417
and held applicable also to duress of circumstances in Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652. In
Graham the defendant lived in a ménage à trois with W, his wife, and K, his homosexual
lover. One night, after D and K had been drinking heavily, K put a lighting flex round
W’s neck and then commanded D to pull at the other end. D did so and his wife was
strangled. Both D and K were charged with murder. D pleaded not guilty, claiming that
his action was coerced by his fear of K. Although the judge allowed the defence to go
to the jury, it convicted D of murder. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. Lord
Lane CJ proposed the following model direction as guidance to the jury.
Was the accused, or may he have been, impelled to act as he did because as a result of
what he reasonably believed to be the situation he feared that otherwise death or serious
injury would result; second, if so, would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the
characteristics of the accused, have responded to the situation by acting as the accused
did?
Activity 11.3
The above quotation encapsulates the basic principle governing both forms of
duress. Commit it to memory.
Why is illustration 11.2(b) not a case of self-defence?
11.5.2 Duress by threats

These principles have suffered significant elaboration more recently by the House of
Lords in the case of Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. In this case, in which the defendant pleaded
duress by threats by X, a violent man with whom he had a criminal association,
in answer to his trial for aggravated burglary, Lord Bingham placed the following
restrictions upon its application as a defence. It seems likely that these principles, with
the possible exception of 2, apply equally to duress of circumstances.
1. The threat or danger must be of death or serious injury.
2. The threat must be directed against the defendant, his or her immediate family or
someone close to the defendant.
3. The relevant tests are in general objective, with reference to the reasonableness of
the defendant’s perceptions and conduct.
4. The defence is available only where the criminal conduct which it is sought to
excuse has been directly caused by the threats relied upon.
5. There must have been no evasive action the defendant could reasonably have been
expected to take.
6. The defendant must not voluntarily have laid themself open to the duress relied
upon.
7. Duress may be a defence to any crime except some forms of treason, murder and
attempted murder.
Activity 11.4
Commit the seven restrictions on the defence of duress outlined in Hasan to memory.
1. The threat or danger must be of death or serious injury

The essence of this defence is that the defendant’s actions were morally involuntary,
and only threats of death or serious injury remove the element of free choice. So
in Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220, the Court of Appeal ruled that the threat of
exposing D’s homosexuality was not enough to raise the defence. Again, the Court of
Appeal in Quayle [2005] EWCA Crim 1415 ruled that duress of circumstances was not an
answer to a charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 for a defendant who claimed
he had consumed cannabis to combat severe neurological pain following a leg
amputation. Severe pain does not amount to serious injury.
One extremely significant qualification to this restriction was made in A (RJ) [2012]
EWCA Crim 434 where it was stated obiter that a credible threat of rape could ground
the defence of duress or duress of circumstances.
Activity 11.5
Read Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717. Can false imprisonment or the threat of false
imprisonment ground the defence of duress?
2. The threat must be directed against the defendant, his or her immediate
family or someone for whom the defendant reasonably regards himself as being
responsible
Duress is not limited to cases where the defendant is the subject of the threats. It also
applies where his or her partner (Hurley v Murray [1967] VR 526), spouse or family is the
subject (Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173). Until Hasan there was no strong authority for the
proposition that the availability was limited to those with a close personal connection
to the defendant. In Shayler [2001] EWCA Crim 1977, the defendant, a member of the
security services, in passing documents to journalists breached the Official Secrets Act
which, it was alleged, he had done in order to safeguard members of the public. At a
preliminary hearing the judge ruled that the defence of duress of circumstances was
not available to Shayler. His appeal was dismissed on the ground that he was unable
to pinpoint with any degree of precision what the threats to security might involve or
who was at risk. Lord Woolf limited the application of the defence to cases where:
a defendant commits an otherwise criminal act to avoid an imminent peril of danger to

life or serious injury to himself or towards somebody for whom he reasonably regards
himself as being responsible.
Lord Woolf included among that class not merely members of the defendant’s close
circle but also cases where:
he is placed in a position where he is required to make a choice whether to take or not

to take the action which it is said will avoid them being injured. Thus if the threat is to
explode a bomb in a building if the defendant does not accede to what is demanded
the defendant owes responsibility to those who would be in the building if the bomb
exploded.
It is clear that this class of subjects is far wider than that proposed by Lord Bingham in
Hasan, and – for the reasons given by Lord Woolf – rightly so. An emergency is no less
an emergency for the fact that the individuals threatened are not known personally to
the defendant.
Activity 11.6
A tells B on the day of the trial that if he does not perjure himself C, A’s gang
member, has been given instruction to select and kill an unidentified child.
Assuming B commits perjury, what problem will the defence have in raising the
defence of duress? What argument would you make to advance the defence’s case?
3. The relevant tests are in general objective, with reference to the reasonableness
of the defendant’s perception and conduct
Hasan confirms Lord Lane CJ’s statement in Graham that if D acts under a mistaken belief
that he, or someone for whom he is responsible, has been threatened with death or
serious injury, the mistake will not avail him unless it is reasonable. Compare self-defence
on this point. The decision in Shayler, for example, could equally have been decided on
the ground that there was no plausible case appearing in the leaked documents that
members of the public were at imminent risk of death or serious injury. D may have
believed they were but the belief was not held on reasonable grounds.
In A (RJ) [2012] EWCA Crim 434, the defendant was convicted of the offence of
perverting the course of justice when she falsely retracted allegations of rape against
her husband. She did so, apparently, in the belief that she would suffer serious injury
by her husband if she did not. This fear was real but not based on reasonable grounds
since no threat of violence had been made to her when she made the false retractions
on which her prosecution was founded.
The criminal law does not give carte blanche to a person threatened with death or
serious injury to commit any crime demanded of them. Indeed, as we shall see, duress
is never a defence to murder or attempted murder, however powerful the threats.
But, more generally, a reasonable balance must be struck between the threat posed
to the defendant and the crime they must commit to avoid the threat. Although D is
faced with a threat of death or grievous bodily harm, it may still be necessary for them
to do their legal duty. Although there is authority for the proposition that duress of
circumstances may be an answer to a charge of hijacking an aircraft (Abdul Hussain
[1999] Crim LR 570), it might be that the jury concludes that participating in this crime
is not objectively reasonable, however serious the threats.
As Graham provides, moreover, reasonable standards of courage are required. In

deciding whether the defendant did display the standards of fortitude of reasonable
people, it will not avail D to claim that they were a congenital coward. So in Hegarty
[1994] Crim LR 353, the defendant pleaded duress to a charge of robbery and
possession of a firearm. He claimed that he had been threatened with violence against
his family if he refused. The court refused to allow medical evidence that D was
‘emotionally unstable’ and in a ‘grossly elevated neurotic state’ to vary the standards
of fortitude to be expected of him. And in Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372, the defendant’s very
low level of intelligence was similarly ignored on the basis that reasonable courage
can be expected of everyone, including those with severe learning difficulties.
However, some characteristics of the defendant which may affect the levels of
fortitude to be expected of reasonable people may be taken into account, so long as
they are consistent with a coherent notion of a reasonable person. The legal position is
summed up in the following statement of principle of Stuart Smith LJ in Bowen.
The mere fact that the defendant is more pliable, vulnerable, timid or susceptible to
threats than a normal person is not a characteristic with which it is legitimate to invest
the reasonable/ordinary person for the purpose of considering the objective test… The
defendant may be in a category of persons whom the jury may think less able to resist
pressure than people not within that category. Obvious examples are age, where a young
person may well not be so robust as a mature one; possibly sex, though many women
would doubtless consider they had as much moral courage to resist pressure as men;
pregnancy, where there is added fear for the unborn child; serious physical disability,
which may inhibit self protection…
One further qualification needs to be made with respect to this rather rigorous
restriction; namely that where a reasonable person has been reduced, through trauma
such as cumulative domestic violence or rape (Sewell [2004] EWCA Crim 2322), to a
condition of ‘learned helplessness’ and so unable to resist the threats of their abuser,
this should be taken into account. Society cannot expect reasonable people to be
steadfast in the face of unremitting physical and mental abuse.
Activity 11.7
a. Is Hegarty (1994) reconcilable with the case of Emery (1993), discussed in Wilson,
Section 10.4.C ‘A part subjective and part objective test’?
b. Can you think of any offences for which it might reasonably be concluded that
taking part in the offence, even under threat of death, would not be reasonable?
4. The defence is available only where the criminal conduct which it is sought to
excuse has been directly caused by the threats relied upon
It is not enough that the defendant was threatened with death or serious injury
for non-compliance with the threat; they must execute or participate in the crime
because of the threat. If D would have committed the crime anyway, the defence
is unavailable. In Valderrama [1985] Crim LR 220, for example, the defendant was
threatened both with exposure as a homosexual and threats to himself and his family
if he did not smuggle cocaine. The Court of Appeal said that if D had committed the
offence solely because of the threat to expose him as a homosexual, then he would
not be able to rely on duress, even though he had also been threatened with death.
However, if he had committed the offence at least in part due to the latter threat the
defence would be available.
5. There must have been no evasive action the defendant could reasonably have
been expected to take
Consistent with the requirement that D’s participation in the offence must be an
objectively reasonable means of allaying a threat of death or serious injury, the
defence is not available if it could have been avoided, whether by escaping the coercer
or seeking police protection. So in Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841, D was convicted of the theft of
his employer’s lorry. The Court of Appeal held that duress was not available where the
defendant had been left alone outside his employer’s yard, which he was due to rob,
and therefore was well able to raise the alarm and escape the threat.
In Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, the Court of Appeal was not so exacting. The
defendants were teenage girls who were prosecution witnesses in the trial of
certain gang members. The gang threatened to ‘cut them up’ if they did not perjure
themselves in court. They pleaded duress. The trial judge refused to allow the defence
since the threat could hardly have been carried out immediately in open court.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, agreeing that seeking police
protection was not always reasonably to be expected.
In Hasan the House of Lords has now abandoned this relaxed approach to the
requirement of urgency in duress. Lord Bingham, disapproving Hudson and Taylor,
insisted that the defence was not available unless D reasonably apprehended
immediate or almost immediate death or serious injury for failure to comply. If this
were not the case, D would be expected to take evasive action.
Activity 11.8
Read Wilson, Section 10.4.D ‘Immediacy of the threat’ and answer the following
question.
How is the abandonment of the approach in Hudson and Taylor reconcilable with
the principle in (3) above that the court should bear in mind matters such as
age, sex and physical health in deciding whether D could reasonably have been
expected to resist the threat?
6. The defendant must not voluntarily have laid themself open to the duress relied
upon
Intoxication
Once again, this requirement is a qualification of the general requirement of
reasonableness which hedges round the defence. There are two aspects to this
qualification. First, as Graham provides, loss of moral fortitude due to the effects of
voluntary intoxication cannot be relied upon. The jury should be told to disregard
any evidence of the defendant’s intoxicated state when assessing whether they acted
under duress. The reasonable person is sober and steadfast, not drunk and out of
control. This does not prevent the defendant from raising evidence of intoxication to
negate mens rea. Defence counsel did not present such an argument in Graham.
Activity 11.9
Read Wilson, Section 9.11.D ‘Intoxicated mistakes’ and answer the following
question.
Would the position be any different if the intoxication was involuntary?
Voluntary subjection to the risk of coercion

The defence is also denied to those who voluntarily place themselves at risk of
coercion. This is another example of the doctrine of prior fault. In Sharpe [1987] QB
853, the defendant joined a criminal gang. He later participated in a robbery on a Post
Office, in which a sub-postmaster was killed. D’s defence to manslaughter was duress:
he claimed that he had undertaken the robbery only because he had a gun to his head.
The defence was rejected upon the basis that D voluntarily joined the gang, knowing
that coercion might later be brought to bear to commit an offence. In Hasan [2005]
UKHL 22, the House of Lords stated that the defendant is disqualified from relying on
the defence not only where they actually foresee that violence may be used to exact
compliance, but also where they should reasonably know that it may be.
The rule applies equally where the defendant voluntarily runs the risk of coercion
outside the scope of a criminal organisation. In Heath [2000] Crim LR 109, a drug user
who was coerced into supplying a class B drug by his own supplier who he had not paid
was denied the defence on the basis that he should have known the risks of mixing
with drug dealers. A similar decision was reached in Mullally [2012] EWCA Crim 687.
7. Duress may be a defence to any crime except some forms of treason, murder
and attempted murder
Until fairly recently, duress could be raised in answer to a charge of murder but only
where the defendant was an accessory to, rather than perpetrator of, the murder.
This was the outcome of DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653 in which the
defendant, as driver, had participated in the murder of a police officer by the IRA. D’s
defence was duress, claiming the coercer would have shot him if he did not comply.
The trial judge disallowed the defence and the Court of Appeal dismissed D’s appeal.
The House of Lords, underlining the rationale of the defence as a concession to human
frailty, allowed the appeal. Lord Morris, explaining the decision, said:
any rational system of law should take fully into account the standards of honest and
reasonable men. By those standards it is fair that actions and reactions may be tested. If
then someone is really threatened with death or serious injury unless he does what he is
told to do is the law to pay no heed to the miserable, agonising plight of such a person?
For the law to understand not only how the timid but also the stalwart may in a moment
of crisis behave is not to make the law weak but to make it just. In the calm of the court-
room measures of fortitude or of heroic behaviour are surely not to be demanded when
they could not in moments for decision reasonably have been expected even of
the resolute and the well disposed.
In posing the case where someone is ‘really’ threatened I use the word ‘really’ in order to
emphasise that duress must never be allowed to be the easy answer of those who can
devise no other explanation of their conduct nor of those who readily could have avoided
the dominance of threats nor of those who allow themselves to be at the disposal and
under the sway of some gangster-tyrant…The law would be censorious and inhumane
which did not recognise the appalling plight of a person who perhaps suddenly finds his
life in jeopardy unless he submits and obeys.
In Howe [1987] AC 417, two appellants, H and B, were coerced by X into torturing
and murdering a young man. The House of Lords dismissed their appeals against
conviction and, overruling Lynch, said that it could be used neither by the principal
nor the accessory. Lord Hailsham LC, ignoring the ‘human frailty’ basis of the defence,
made it an issue rather of moral reasonableness. A reasonable person does not kill
another to save their own skin, a principle which had earlier been used in the necessity
case of Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273.
[In the case] where the choice is between the threat of death or… serious injury and
deliberately taking an innocent life… a reasonable man might reflect that one innocent
human life is at least as valuable as his own or that of his loved one. In such a case a man
cannot claim that he is choosing the lesser of two evils. Instead he is embracing the
cognate but morally disreputable principle that the end justifies the means.
In Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412, the restriction was extended to attempted murder. In this case,
D was coerced by his father into helping him to kill his mother. The Court of Appeal ruled
that the defence of duress was not available. It has been recently decided, however, that
duress is an answer to conspiracy to murder (Ness [2011] EWCA Crim 3105).
Activity 11.10
Read Wilson, Section 10.4.F ‘Scope of the defence’ and answer the following
questions.
a. Which approach do you prefer, Howe or Lynch?
b. The House of Lords refused to allow the defence to either principal or accessory.
Is this fair?
c. Is it cogent to distinguish between the relative contributions of principal and

accessory? If so, you might be interested in knowing that in Howe the coercer
did not execute the killing and so he was the accessory.
d. Can you think of a situation where it would definitely be unfair to disallow the
defence to an accessory?
e. If D intentionally commits grievous bodily harm to V under coercion D is entitled

to raise the defence. If V happens to die due to poor medical treatment, D will
be charged with murder and so will not be able to raise the defence. Is this
coherent?
f. If not, should duress be withdrawn from s.18 of the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861?
11.6 Duress of circumstances

In 1986 the defence of duress was allowed in a number of cases involving dangerous
driving and other driving offences, although the crime to be committed was not
nominated by the wrongdoer; it was nominated by the driver himself as a means of
escaping the wrongdoer’s threat of death or serious injury. In Willer (1986) 83 Cr App
R 225, duress was allowed as an answer to a charge of reckless driving when D drove
through a pedestrian precinct to escape from a gang threatening violence to him and
his passengers. This was not, in itself, a substantial departure from precedent. After all,
there is little difference between A saying to V ‘drive through this pedestrian precinct
or else I shoot you’ and A threatening to shoot V, in response to which A drives off
through a pedestrian precinct. If the one excuse is available, the other should be too.
A similar decision was reached in Conway [1989] QB 290, except that here D mistakenly
believed he was being attacked by a gang when in fact they were plain clothes
police officers trying to make an arrest on his passenger. You will remember that the
defence remains available even if D is mistaken as to the facts, so long as the mistake is
reasonable.
Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 was the first case in which it was explicitly recognised that
duress of circumstances was a separate form of the defence in which it was not
necessary to show that the defendant acted so as to escape the threats of a person
bent on killing or causing serious injury to them or a companion. Here, D drove his
stepson, who had overslept, to work although he was a disqualified driver. D had
been told by his wife that if he did not do so the stepson would lose his job and she
would commit suicide. The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge was wrong in not
allowing the defence of duress of circumstances to be put to the jury.
In Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607, the defence was made available for the first time
to a case not involving a driving offence. D was charged and convicted of being in
possession of a loaded machine gun. D claimed that he had taken possession of it to
prevent the owner shooting to kill and was intending to take it to the police the next
day. In S and L [2009] EWCA Crim 85, duress of circumstances was ruled available to a
charge of employing unlicensed security guards as a means of addressing the risk of
terrorist attack on their premises which abutted a public highway.
Note: Pommel, Martin and S and L, to a greater extent than Conway and Willer, involved
subtle changes to the conceptual DNA of the defence of duress. The defendant is not
merely saying ‘I broke the law to escape D causing me or someone else serious injury’
but rather ‘I did it because it was the lesser of two evils. If I had not broken the law a
worse evil would have occurred’. In other words, it transcends the usual rationale for
duress which is that it acts as a concession to human frailty. It takes on the trappings
of a partial justification rather than a mere excuse and begins to transmute into a
defence of necessity.
11.7 Necessity
The potential scope of necessity was described in the Canadian case of Perka v Queen
(1984) 13 DLR (4th) as:
Necessity covers all cases where non-compliance with the law is excused by an emergency
or justified by the pursuit of some greater good.
11.7.1 Necessity as an excuse

The recognition of the defence of duress of circumstances was in effect a recognition of
a general defence of necessity, a defence which had long been resisted by the criminal
courts. In fact, there is little in present case law to suggest that duress of circumstances
will develop to embrace the same coverage as duress by threats. As we know, duress by
threats is an answer even to crimes of violence where an innocent is victimised. Duress
of circumstances, by contrast, has usually been applied in so-called victimless crimes.
Indeed, the leading case on necessity (Dudley and Stephens (1884)) explicitly rejected
any defence of necessity which would permit ‘the killing of an innocent to save one’s
own skin’. As a result, two shipwrecked sailors, who killed and ate the cabin boy after
days adrift in an open boat, had no answer to a charge of murder.
It was this case and this principle which led Lord Hailsham in Howe to disallow the
defence of duress by threats in cases of murder. Until Willer and Conway the courts,
using Dudley and Stephens as authority, consistently refused to allow this ‘lesser of two
evils’ defence. There were two reasons given for this. The first, as illustrated by Dudley
and Stephens itself, was that it would introduce the potential for individual rights to
be overridden by collective interests. If those defendants had a defence, would it not
also afford a defence to doctors and others who effected forced blood transfusions or
organ transplants if this accorded with the balance of evils?
The second reason is that such a defence would subvert the rule of law since it could,
in effect, allow individuals to ignore their legal duty in the pursuit of some supposedly
greater good. On balance it might be considered better to allow the State to sort out
problems needing solution rather than leaving it to individual choice. So in Buckoke
v GLC [1971] Ch 655, the Court of Appeal held that it was no answer to a charge of
jumping a red traffic light that the driver was in a fire engine answering an emergency.
And in Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734, it was no answer to trespass that the
trespassers were homeless and the building unoccupied. In this case, Lord Denning
gave a classic illustration of a ‘floodgates’ argument in the context of the threat to the
rule of law posed by a potential defence of necessity.
…if hunger were once allowed to be an excuse for stealing, it would open a way through
which all kinds of disorder and lawlessness would pass…If homelessness were once
admitted as a defence to trespass, no one’s house could be safe. Necessity would open a
door which no man could shut. It would not only be those in extreme need who would
enter. There would be others who would imagine that they were in need, or would invent
a need, so as to gain entry.
The real significance of the acceptance of the defence of duress of circumstances

must be considered in the light of this statement, since it provides an answer to Lord
Denning’s concerns. The defence is limited to cases of emergency when something has
to be done immediately to prevent harm and there is no opportunity to seek guidance
or state protection. And it is limited to cases where the harm threatened is of death or
serious injury. The defendant, in other words, is not simply choosing a breach of the
law as the lesser of two evils: rather, the nature of the emergency gives him no choice.
The scoping statement provided in Perka is only partly covered by duress of

circumstances, since the latter does not legitimate action taken in defiance of a
criminal prohibition simply because it would be the lesser of two evils. Applied to a
case such as Buckoke v GLC, a defence is now available if the fire engine jumped the red
traffic lights in the reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent loss of life, but it
would remain unlawful to do so simply to facilitate the putting out of the fire and thus
reduce the extent of fire damage and the resources necessary to effect this.
11.7.2 Necessity as a justification

The justificatory form of necessity outlined in Perka has now been accepted by the
courts in one restricted context, namely medical intervention. There is a good reason
for this – that if the case is not an emergency, doctors generally have the ability to
secure legal authority for their action by an application to the High Court.
The first case of this nature was Re F [1990] 2 AC 1. Doctors in a mental hospital sought
a declaration that it would be lawful for them to perform a sterilisation operation
on a mentally incompetent (female) patient who had formed a sexual relationship
with a fellow patient. The House of Lords concluded that it was in her overall ‘best
interests’ for the operation to proceed on a balance of all her interests, including her
interest in remaining free from the physical and psychological effects of pregnancy,
abortion or childbirth on the one hand, and her interest in having procreative capacity
and remaining free from surgical interference on the other. Lord Goff, for the House
of Lords, underlined its justificatory nature by stating that it was not of the essence
that there be some emergency requiring immediate action, although in many cases
this would be present. Operations and other interventions may be justified even if
performed for other than clinical reasons. He said:
these might include such humdrum matters as routine medical or dental treatment, even
simple care such as dressing and undressing and putting to bed.
The availability of the defence does not, however, depend upon authority being
sought. In Bournewood [1999] 1 AC 458, the defence was allowed ex post facto to justify
the detention of a patient suffering a mental disorder and whose condition posed a
potential threat to himself and others.
These cases were not exceptional on the facts, since they involved mentally
incompetent patients whose wellbeing depended upon the availability of such a
defence. In other words, their human rights were supposedly being advanced, rather
than trampled on, by the defence. The defence does not, however, justify doctors
acting contrary to a competent patient’s express wishes, for example performing a
life-saving caesarean section (St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 All ER 673) or
leg amputation (Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819) on a patient who refuses consent.
In Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2001] Fam 147, the defence of necessity was used to justify
an operation to separate conjoined twins who shared a heart. The necessity for the
operation was that without it, both twins would quickly die. The problem, however,
was that the inevitable consequence of the operation would be the immediate
death of the twin lacking a heart and that was hardly in her best interests! Would
the proposed operation be lawful in the light of this? Doctrine holds that intentional
acts calculated to produce certain death is murder, and duress of circumstances is no
defence to murder. If necessity was to operate as a defence here, therefore, it would
have to be, like self-defence, in its justificatory form. Brooke LJ (at 1052) explicitly
adopted the justificatory lesser of two evils basis for the defence in the following
statement of principle. The defence would be limited to cases where:
uu the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil
uu no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be

achieved, and
uu the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.
Activity 11.11
See Wilson, Section 10.6.D ‘Necessity/duress of circumstances and murder’ for a
full discussion of the scope of justificatory necessity in cases of intentional killing.
Looking more closely at Re A (Conjoined Twins). It could be suggested that central to
the decision was the fact that the killing was a side effect of an otherwise entirely
proper action rather than a means to an end. It would not justify, for example,
killing a terminally ill patient to provide organs for others who would die without
them. Looked at in this way, it is possible that the defence of necessity may well be
applicable outside the medical arena to cases where the only way to prevent loss of
life is to take action which, incidentally, causes others to die.
What defence, if any, can be relied upon in the following examples?
a. D is crossing a road. He sees in front of him that the central reservation is full
of people waiting to cross to the other side. A lorry is bearing down on him. If
he does not push into the people on the reservation he will be hit and possibly
killed. He notices that there are also lorries on the other carriageway, equally
dangerous to anyone who steps out from the central reservation. He knows that
if he pushes his way on to the central reservation someone will be pushed off to
their certain death or serious injury. He does so and V is killed as a result.
b. D is caught on the staircase of a sinking ship, and the woman in front of him is
frozen with fear and cannot move. D knows that if he does not move her he will
be drowned and that he can only do so by throwing her down the staircase to
her certain death by drowning. He does so and she drowns.
c. A jet fighter from the Royal Air Force shoots down a passenger plane, which has
been hijacked by terrorists, just as it is about to be flown into a 30-storey office
block. All of the passengers and crew are killed.

You are ready to move on to the next chapter? You are if – without referring to the
1. State the rules governing self-defence.
2. State the rules governing duress and duress of circumstances.
3. State the rule governing necessity.
4. Give three similarities and three differences between duress and necessity.
5. Give three similarities and three differences between duress and self-defence.
6. Give three similarities and three differences between self-defence and necessity.
Notes
12 Property offences
Contents
12.1 Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
12.2 Burglary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
12.3 Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Notes
Criminal law 12 Property offences page 145
12.1 Theft
The law relating to property offences was codified in 1968 in the form of the Theft
Act, which aimed to simplify, consolidate and reform the previous ragbag of property
offences. It was only partially successful. While the law of theft, burglary, robbery and
handling remains largely as enacted, the law relating to fraud was found not fit for
purpose and was replaced first in the Theft Act 1978, and then again in the Fraud Act
2006.
Theft, and the elements thereof, are defined in ss.1–6 of the Theft Act 1968 although, as
will be seen, the Act does not purport to give a comprehensive definition of the
various conduct and mental elements. Theft is defined in s.1 as:
A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another

with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it.
Following the usual criminal template, therefore, the actus reus of theft is the
appropriation of property belonging to another; and the mens rea is dishonesty as
to the appropriation together with an intention permanently to deprive the owner
of the property. Each of these elements will be examined in turn, beginning with the
actus reus which comprises three elements – all of which the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt.
uu There must be property.
uu The property must be appropriated by the defendant.
uu The property appropriated must belong to another at the time of the

appropriation of it.
12.1.1 Actus reus: theft
Property
There is a comprehensive definition of property in s.4 of the Theft Act 1968. Subsection
4(1) gives us a general statement to the effect that property:
includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and
other intangible property.
Subsection 4(2) then qualifies subsection (1) by severely restricting the scope of
stealable land (real property). The reason for this is simple. It is not generally possible
to appropriate a parcel of land since land cannot disappear as watches and handbags
can. If your neighbour appropriates one metre of your garden for their garden, your
remedy is in civil trespass, not criminal theft.
Real property means land and interests in land, such as a tenancy. Personal property
means material objects which can (as a rule) be bought and sold; for example
furniture, clocks, pictures, food, books, clothes and so on. Things in action are not
material objects but are things of value which can be liquidated into money and
enforced in the courts. A debt is a good example.
Activity 12.1
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.A.2 ‘Property: general definition’, Section (b) ‘Things in
action and other intangible property’ and answer the following question.
A takes B’s cheque for £100 given to B by C as payment for a bicycle. A pays the
cheque into her bank account, causing a transfer of funds from C’s account to A’s
account. What has A stolen?
Subsection 4(2)(a) states the general rule that land and interests in land cannot be
stolen and its exceptions.
(2) A person cannot steal land, or things forming part of land and severed from it by him
or by his directions, except in the following cases, that it to say –
(a) when he is a trustee or personal representative, or is authorised by power of attorney,

or as liquidator of a company, or otherwise, to sell or dispose of land belonging to
another, and he appropriates the land or anything forming part of it by dealing with it
in breach of the confidence reposed in him…
This exception is intended to cover cases such as that of an executor of a will who,
instead of transferring the land to the intended beneficiary, sells it for their own
purposes.
Subsections 4(2)(b)and (c) make a further qualification to deal with the case of people
who steal things from off the land which formed part of the land at the time of the
appropriation. So, a person can steal land if:
(b) when he is not in possession of the land [he] appropriates anything forming part of the
land by severing it or causing it to be severed, or after it has been severed; or
(c) when, being in possession of the land under a tenancy, he appropriates the whole or
part of any fixture or structure let to be used with the land.
Subsection 4(2)(b) deals with the case of trespassers who, for example, steal turf or
topsoil, garden trees or shrubs, garden fixtures such as fountains or stone terraces, or
parts of the house such as lead from the roof or a fireplace or staircase.
Subsection 4(2)(c) deals with the case of tenants, who cannot steal turf or topsoil,
garden trees or shrubs, but can steal fixtures such as fountains and stone terraces.
Subsections 4(3) and (4) deal with another exception. Again, the property concerned is
not land itself but is a thing forming part of the land.
(3) A person who picks mushrooms growing wild on any land, or who picks flowers, fruit
or foliage from a plant [including shrubs or trees] growing wild on any land, does
not (although not in possession of the land) steal what he picks, unless he does it for
reward or for sale or other commercial purpose.
(4) Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, shall be regarded as property; but a person cannot
steal a wild creature not tamed nor ordinarily kept in captivity, or the carcase of any
such creature, unless either it has been reduced into possession by or on behalf of
another person and possession of it has not since been lost or abandoned…
A person who picks flowers from a flowerbed or greenhouse, or apples from a garden
tree commits the actus reus of theft, since apples and flowers are property. Subsection
4(3) applies to their ‘wild’ counterparts. It affirms that wild flowers, or fruit or foliage
from wild trees or plants on other people’s land, do not count as property capable
of being stolen unless it is done for some kind of commercial purpose. A person who
picks wild blackberries or apples, plants or mushrooms and sells them to a restaurant
or shop, or processes them for onward trade, is covered by s.4 and commits theft,
assuming all the other elements (e.g. dishonesty) of theft are present.
12.1.2 Identifying the property

A key task in deciding whether theft of property has occurred is to identify the
property. Misidentifying the property means the charge will fail, even though a theft
has been committed.
Activity 12.2
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.A.2 ‘Property: general definition’, Section (b) ‘Things in
action and other intangible property’ and state what, if anything, has been stolen in
a. A draws forged cheques owned by B for the sum of £1,000 on B’s bank account
and pays them into his account, causing a transfer of funds (a variation of what
happened in Chan Man-Sin v A-G for Hong Kong [1988] 1 WLR 196).
b. A eats a meal in a restaurant, although he has no money, and leaves without

paying the bill, which is £20.
Bodies and body parts

One cannot steal bodies or body parts because bodies are not personal property. In
Sharpe (1857) 169 ER 959, D dug up a corpse and sold it to a surgeon for dissection. D
was charged with and convicted of theft, but his conviction was quashed. As it was said
in this case, ‘a body wants no owner’. The same rule applies to body parts.
Illustration 12.1
A cuts a lock of B’s hair because B is a pop star and she wants a keepsake.
A has not committed theft of the hair. This is an offence against the person (battery),
not against property. A similar conclusion follows if the hair is on the floor of
the hairdressers, except here there is no criminal offence at all. There are some
qualifications to this to cover cases such as mummies and corpses for dissection which
take on the properties of property rather than being simply a corpse. Authority for
this is Kelly [1999] QB 621, in which a Royal College of Surgeons’ technician gave body
parts to D, who was an artist. These included human heads, arms, legs and torsos. D
made casts of the body parts which were exhibited in an art gallery. Both D and the
technician were convicted of theft, but in their appeal they contended the body parts
did not constitute property. The appeal was dismissed. A corpse, or part of a corpse,
is capable of being property within s.4 of the Theft Act 1968 if it has acquired different
attributes by virtue of the application of skill, such as dissection or preservation
techniques, for exhibition or teaching purposes.
Using the same reasoning, in Welsh [1974] RTR 478, a driver was guilty of theft for
removing his own urine specimen from a police station. He did this to avoid a
conviction for driving with excess alcohol.
Activity 12.3
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.A.2 ‘Property: general definition’, Section (a) ‘Human body
parts’ and answer the following question.
A, a hairdresser, collects his client’s hair with which to make cushions. He keeps the
hair in a refuse bag pending stuffing the cushions. B, a rival cushion stuffer, takes
the hair, having put it in her own bag. What, if anything, has B stolen?
12.1.3 Appropriation
Prior to the Theft Act 1968 the essence of theft, or larceny as it was known, was the
taking and carrying away of personal property. (One of the key differences between
larceny and theft introduced by the Theft Act is that there is no longer any need for a
taking and carrying away of the property. It is not needed but is sufficient.)
Appropriation is defined by s.3(1) of the Theft Act 1968 as:
Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and

this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it,
any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner.
This statement emphasises that it is not necessary to physically take property to

appropriate it. Indeed, as the provision makes clear, one can even appropriate
property which is lawfully in one’s possession. A person who finds property, or borrows
it, is not committing theft. However, if they subsequently assume rights of ownership
over the property – for example by selling it, lending it to someone else, or deciding
to keep it – this amounts to an appropriation of the property. Section 3(2) of the Theft
Act 1968 provides a limited defence in relation to a bona fide purchaser. A purchaser of
goods who decides to keep them when they discover the goods are stolen is not guilty
of theft.
The assumption of any right of ownership, however trivial, suffices for an

appropriation. In Pitham and Hehl (1977) 65 Cr App R 45, the defendant invited two
people into his friend’s house while his friend was in prison, and offered to sell
them his friend’s furniture. The Court of Appeal held that this offer constituted an
appropriation as it was an assumption of one of the rights of ownership, namely the
right to sell.
Activity 12.4
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.A ‘Actus reus’. List as many rights of ownership as you
can think of and consider how each of these rights could be appropriated. Then
consider the following questions.
a. What rights of ownership did the defendant in Morris (1983) appropriate?
How did he do so?
b. If A takes the key of a car so that he can steal the car later, has he
appropriated only the key or also the car?
Consent and appropriation

Is it a necessary ingredient in an appropriation that the act be unauthorised? In
Lawrence [1972] AC 626 the House of Lords said no. An Italian student took a lift in a
taxi. At the end of the trip, as he did not speak good English, he held out his wallet for
the taxi driver to take the right fare. The taxi driver took far more than the correct fare
and was charged and convicted of theft of the money. He appealed on the basis that
the trial judge should have told the jury that there could be no appropriation if the
owner consented. The House of Lords upheld the conviction, stating that the statutory
definition of appropriation did not include the words ‘without the owner’s consent’.
So even if the student had truly consented to the taking of the money it had still been
appropriated by the taxi driver.
The House of Lords came to a different conclusion in Morris [1984] AC 320. The
defendant had swapped price tags on a tin of beans in a supermarket in order to
purchase the beans at a lower price. He was arrested by a store detective before
reaching the checkout and charged with theft of the can. Upholding the conviction,
the House of Lords concluded that it was of the essence of an appropriation that the
act be by way of ‘adverse interference or usurpation of the owner’s rights’. Contrary to
Lawrence (where taking the money from the wallet was an appropriation despite the
owner’s authority), their Lordships concluded that taking the goods off the shelf was
not an appropriation because self-service shops authorise this act. It was only when
the price labels were swapped that an appropriation occurred, because this was not
authorised and was adverse to the owner’s right. Similar decisions were reached in
Meech [1974] QB 549 and a number of other cases including Fritschy [1985] Crim LR 745.
Fritschy (F) was a dealer in gold coins (krugerrands) for a Dutch company. F was
asked by V to collect a consignment of such coins from England for onward delivery
to H’s bank in Switzerland. F took them to Switzerland but did not deliver them to
H’s bank, instead keeping them for his own purposes. The question for the court
(which does not concern us) was where the appropriation had taken place. On the
authority of Lawrence it had taken place in England. The Court of Appeal, preferring
the House of Lords decision in Morris to that in Lawrence, decided that it had taken
place in Switzerland. There had been no appropriation in England because D had taken
possession of the krugerrands with H’s consent and, until he had deviated from V’s
instructions and authority (in Switzerland), had not appropriated V’s property.
The conflict of approach between Lawrence and Morris was finally resolved in Gomez
[1993] AC 442. D, the assistant manager of a shop, agreed with his accomplice, R (a
customer), to help him acquire goods in exchange for two stolen cheques. Knowing
that the cheques were stolen, D deceived the shop manager into authorising the sale
of the goods to the customer in exchange for the cheques. D was charged with theft
contrary to s.1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 and was convicted at first instance. He appealed,
submitting that the goods had been sold under a contract between the customer
and the shop, and that there could be no appropriation of property belonging to
another where the act relied upon was a contract of sale passing ownership to the
customer. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) agreed and allowed D’s appeal
against conviction. On appeal by the Crown, the House of Lords held that the fact that
the act was authorised in no way prevented it from being an appropriation. It was not
of the essence of an appropriation that it constituted some form of challenge to, or
interference with, the owner’s rights.
Activity 12.5
Note that in Gomez it was D, not R, who was charged with theft. What had D done to
appropriate the property?
In Gomez, the transfer was defective because the shop manager’s consent was
obtained by fraud and so the transfer of ownership could be undone. Does the person
who induces the transfer also appropriate property where there has been no fraud
and where the transferee receives an absolute title to the property?
This was the question the House of Lords had to answer in Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241. In this
case D had befriended V, a naive and gullible man, and encouraged him to make her
gifts of money from his bank account. She was convicted of theft, although there was
no evidence of duress or deception, or that V had parted with the money otherwise
than by gift. The defence case was that the recipient of a valid gift could not be guilty
of theft. Either there is a valid transfer of title or there is an appropriation. There
cannot be both. Lord Steyn said that whether or not V had gifted the money, D, by
acquiring title, had appropriated it. The acquisition of title, on this view, is simply
the clearest possible case of ‘assuming rights of ownership’. This was a surprising
decision because the transfer was treated as valid by the civil law – V could not claim
the money back in the civil courts as it was a perfect gift – but it was an invalid transfer
by the criminal law. D was guilty of stealing the money, assuming her obtaining of the
money was thought to be dishonest. The same principle applies to other transactions
involving the transfer of ownership such as contracts for sale (Gomez).
Activity 12.6
The House of Lords made it clear that most people who received property by way of
gift would not be guilty of theft. Liability in such a case will depend upon whether D
was dishonest in receiving the gift. Most receivers of gifts are not – thank goodness!
Now read Wilson, Section 14.2.B.2 ‘Dishonesty’ and decide whether Mrs Hinks was
dishonest in receiving her gift and how the court approached the question of
dishonesty. Once you have done that you might wish to read the dissenting opinion
of Lord Hobhouse who, however immoral you think Mrs Hinks was, is surely right in
concluding that she was not. You will find Hinks in the Online Library.
Belonging to another
A person cannot be guilty of theft if the property they appropriate does not belong to
another person. But a person can be guilty of theft if they appropriate property that
belongs to them! How can this be? The answer to this question is to be found in s.5 of
the Theft Act 1968 which defines the term ‘belonging to another’. Section 5(1) states
that property belongs to ‘any person having possession or control of it, or having in it
any proprietary right or interest’.
The consequence of this rather puzzling subsection is that a person can commit theft
of their own property so long as it also belongs to someone else for the purpose of
s.5. To understand this section properly let us assume that the property is a racehorse,
which is owned by a Mr Southwell. For the purpose of the Theft Act 1968 the racehorse
belongs to:
uu Mr Southwell
uu Mrs Goodwood, part owner
uu Ms Lingfield, the owner of the stables where the racehorse is stabled
uu Mr Aintree, the jockey, when he takes the horse for a gallop (during the gallop)
uu Mr Doncaster, the blacksmith, to whom the horse is delivered for a few hours to be
shod (during those hours)
uu Mrs Wincanton, the owner’s friend, to whom he lends the horse to compete in a
race (during the loan period)
uu The Happy Valley Finance Company, who lends Mr Southwell £50,000, using the
horse as security.
If any of these people appropriate the racehorse from any one of the others, they
have appropriated ‘property belonging to another’. The racehorse belongs to Mr
Southwell, Mrs Goodwood and the Happy Valley Finance Company since each has
‘proprietary rights or interests in the horse’. It belongs to the other parties by virtue of
their possession or control during the time they are in possession or have control. This
does not of course mean that they are necessarily guilty of theft because of the need
to establish all the elements of the offence, in particular, of course, dishonesty. If Mr
Southwell took back the horse from Mrs Wincanton without formally terminating the
bailment he would have appropriated property belonging to another, but he would
not usually be guilty of theft since his taking would not be dishonest and, moreover,
Mrs Wincanton would have no right as against him to retain the horse and so he could
terminate the bailment perfectly legitimately simply by taking the horse. In Meredith
[1973] Crim LR 253, the defendant took his own car from a police car park where it had
been impounded. He was indicted for theft. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit
on the ground that the police, although having the possession and control of the car
for the purpose of s.5(1), had no right to retain the car as against him.
Activity 12.7
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.A.3 ‘“Belonging to another”: who does property belong
to?’ and compare Meredith with Turner [1971] 1 WLR 901 CA, which is a good
illustration of how a true owner can steal from a mere possessor. Why was Meredith
acquitted and Turner convicted? Are they both right? Make sure you make notes of
both cases and your conclusions.
Abandoned property
If property is abandoned it may belong to no one, in which case it cannot be stolen.
However, even abandoned property may belong to someone else, for example the
owner of the land or vessel in which the property is found.
In Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142, D was a trespasser on land owned by a golf

club who collected golf balls lost and abandoned by their owners. He was charged
with theft. D argued that, having been abandoned, the balls belonged to no one: the
King’s Bench Divisional Court disagreed. Although the balls no longer belonged to
their previous owners they did belong to the club. Since D was a trespasser, the golf
club had the right to exclude him from the course and, therefore, from the balls. To
that extent the club had control of the balls and so they belonged to the club for the
purpose of s.5. Note that this means that other golfers would not be committing theft
of balls which they found on the course. These balls, having been abandoned, would
belong to no one as against them. It is for this reason also that I am not guilty of theft
when, every Saturday, I collect a dozen or so golf balls from my garden which some
unfortunate golfer has hit there from the golf course abutting my property. The golf
balls belong to me. I do not own them but, for the purposes of s.5, I am the only person
who cannot steal them.
Williams v Phillips (1957) 41 Cr App R 5 is a comparable case. A householder put

refuse out for collection by the local authority refuse workers. It was held by the
Divisional Court that such refuse remained property belonging to the householder
until collected, whereupon property passed to the local authority. So refuse workers
helping themselves to such property could be convicted of theft, on the basis that
the property had always belonged to someone (see also Woodman [1974] QB 754 and
Hancock [1990] Crim LR 125).
Activity 12.8
See Wilson, Section 14.2.A.3(b) ‘Theft by owners’. If A, a householder, hires a building
skip into which to throw her doors and windows, which she is replacing, does B
appropriate ‘property belonging to another’ if he takes them? In order to answer
this question you must consider whether there is any difference between this case
and that of Williams v Phillips.
The property must belong to another at the time of appropriation

In Chodorek v Poland [2017] ACD 244 (82) QBD the Administrative Court confirmed
that a person who uses a debit card at an ATM to withdraw cash commits theft
if he has no overdraft facility and knows he does not have the funds to cover the
amount withdrawn. All the elements of the offence are present, namely a dishonest
appropriation of property belonging to another with the intention of permanently
depriving the other of it. The property appropriated in this case is money (i.e. personal
property), not a thing in action. And, at the time of the appropriation, the money
belonged to the issuing bank and not to him as he was not in credit.
Corcoran v Whent [1977] Crim LR 52 is a perfect, if rare, example of how a theft

conviction was not possible because the property appropriated no longer belonged to
another person at the time of appropriation. D ate food in a restaurant with a friend.
When he left the restaurant, his friend told him that the meal had not been paid for. D
did not go back to pay for the meal although his intentions on entering the restaurant
were perfectly honest. He was later arrested, charged and convicted of theft. D’s
conviction was quashed on the ground that although all the elements of theft were
present, they did not coincide. At the time the appropriation (eating) of the property
(food) belonging to another (restaurant) occurred he had no mens rea for theft. At the
time the mens rea was formed he did not appropriate property belonging to another
for three simple reasons: (i) one cannot assume rights of ownership over the contents
of one’s stomach, (ii) the food was no longer food (property) it was mush in his
stomach and (iii) it belonged to no one, not even him!
Subsection 5(3) of the Theft Act 1968

This is a deceptively difficult subsection designed to cover the case of someone who
has passed ownership and possession in property to someone else for a particular
purpose and that purpose is disregarded. Is the transferee guilty of theft? The
subsection reads:
Where a person receives property from or on account of another, and is under an

obligation to the other to retain and deal with that property or its proceeds in a particular
way, the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the other.
This subsection has the effect that if A gives property (e.g. money) to B to do
something specific with it (e.g. pay a bill, deliver to charity), B commits theft if they do
something else with it even if B has become the sole legal owner of the property.
The major problem arises in deciding whether an obligation has arisen to deal with the
transferred property in a particular way. By ‘obligation’ is meant legal obligation. Easy
cases involve money which is explicitly earmarked by the transferor for a particular
purpose.
Illustration 12.2
Chen is collecting for the charity, Prisoner’s Aid, outside a train station. Nico puts
£5 into Chen’s collection box. Chen later takes out the £5 and buys a spicy chicken
burger with it.
As far as the civil law and s.5(1) are concerned, the £5 belongs only to Chen. It no
longer belongs to Nico, nor does it yet belong to the charity. Section 5(3) deems
the money still to belong to the donor, although technically they have transferred
possession and all rights and ownership over the money to the donee. This is because
charity collectors owe an obligation to the donors to hand over their donations to
the relevant charity. So Chen is guilty of theft. This is exactly what happened and was
decided in Wain [1995] 2 Cr App R 660.
In Davidge v Bunnett [1984] Crim LR 297, the defendant shared a flat with others who
gave her cheques to pay their joint gas bill. It was understood that D would have to pay
the cheques into her own bank account before doing so. In fact, D spent the proceeds
on Christmas presents. The Divisional Court held that s.5(3) applied, that D was under
a legal obligation to use the proceeds to pay the bill and therefore they were property
belonging to another by virtue of s.5(3).
Compare this case with DPP v Huskinson (1988) 152 JP 582, where it was held not to be
theft to use housing benefit for purposes other than paying the recipient’s rent. The
point of the relevant legislation was to impose a duty upon the social services to pay
benefit to the recipient. It was not the point of the legislation to impose an obligation
on the recipient to apply it directly for that purpose. In short, the housing benefit was
his own to deal with as he saw fit.
Activity 12.9
to?’, Section (c) ‘Special cases of belonging’ and answer the following questions,
making sure you take notes.
a. Why was the travel agent in Hall (1972) not guilty of theft? Did he not have an
obligation to secure flights for the depositors?
b. Who decides whether D has an obligation to deal with the property in a

particular way and what is taken into account in deciding this?

Subsection 5(4) was designed to address problems such as occurred in Moynes v
Cooper [1956] 1 QB 439, in which an employer paid an employee’s salary twice into the
employee’s bank account by mistake and the employee spent it. Under the civil law,
the funds in the account (thing in action) belong to the account holder. Subsection
5(4) confirms that the property mistakenly transferred or otherwise received belongs
also to the transferor for the purpose of the law of theft, so that if the transferee treats
the property as their own they will be guilty of theft. It reads as:
Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make
restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof,
then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as
against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to
make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of
the property or proceeds.
It has been made clear in a number of cases that reliance on s.5(4) is not strictly necessary
to denote the relevant property as belonging to another. In Shadrokh-Cigari [1988] Crim
LR 465, a bank account was wrongly credited with approximately £286,000 rather than
the £286 owing. D took and spent the money. He was convicted of theft of the money on
the basis that it remained property belonging to another, namely the issuing bank.
Activity 12.10
to?’, Section (c) ‘Special cases of belonging’ and explain the basis upon which
the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal in Shadrokh-Cigari. Is s.5(4) completely
redundant following this case?
12.1.4 Mens rea: theft
Dishonesty
The dishonesty requirement reflects the general principle that criminalisation is
inappropriate if the defendant has not acted in a socially unacceptable or immoral
fashion (see Section 1.2 of this module guide). Whether or not an appropriation of a
person’s property is socially acceptable or not depends to a certain extent on why it
was done. If the property was a gun, for example, and it was done to prevent the owner
killing with it, it might be considered morally incoherent to convict the appropriator of
theft. This would mean that the defendant would be expected to prioritise a property
interest above a personal interest. Why would they? Why should they?
Dishonesty is not defined in the Theft Act 1968. However, s.2 of the Act tells us
what dishonesty is not. Section 2(1) states that certain beliefs of the defendant are
inconsistent with having a dishonest state of mind. These are:
a. a belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or
of a third person; or
b. a belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the
appropriation and the circumstances of it; or
c. a belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by
taking reasonable steps.
The gun example above is a possible illustration of where s.2(1)(a) might apply. So also
is the case where D takes a sum of money from V believing they have the right to it
because V owes them that same sum (compare Robinson (1977) Crim LR 173). So also is
Hinks, although the court at first instance obviously thought otherwise. An example of
s.2(1)(b) is where D takes V’s milk from the refrigerator of their jointly occupied flat for
a cup of tea, having used all their own milk. An example of s.2(1)(c) is where D finds a
sum of money in a public area which, because of its relatively small size, they conclude
will never be reported to the police. The key point here is not that D does have this
right (s.2(1)(a)), or does have V’s consent (s.2(1)(b)), or that the property cannot be
returned to the owner by taking reasonable steps (s.2(1)(c)), but that D has this belief.
The jury will decide this by reference to all the evidence.
It was once thought that if D did not have one of the beliefs in s.2 then they were
automatically dishonest as a matter of law. This view was rejected in a number of cases
in the early years following the passing of the Act. The reason for this was explained by
Lawton LJ in Feely [1973] 1 QB 530. He said that immorality was of the essence of stealing
and the mere fact that a person takes property when he knows he has no right or the
owner would not consent does not render the taking immoral.
The facts of the case help us understand this point. D was a cashier in a betting office
who, contrary to his firm’s instructions, took some money out of the till on a Friday,
intending to repay it on the Monday. He left a note to this effect in the till. D was
charged with theft. The trial judge held that D’s actions were clearly dishonest.
Section 2 did not apply and his intention to replace the money was irrelevant. The
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Lawton LJ said that whether or not a person is
dishonest was not a matter for the judge but was a question of fact which should have
been left to the jury. He said:
Jurors, when deciding whether an appropriation was dishonest can be reasonably
expected to, and should, apply the current standards of ordinary decent people. In
their own lives they have to decide what is and what is not dishonest. We can see no
reason why, when in a jury box, they should require the help of a judge to tell them what
amounts to dishonesty.
A different direction for dishonesty – which is slightly more beneficial to the defence –
was laid down in Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, a case on fraud, which carries the same dishonesty
requirement. The defendant was a consultant at a hospital. He falsely claimed fees in
respect of an operation that he had not carried out. D claimed that he thought he was
not dishonest since he was owed the same amount of money for consultation fees. The
judge directed the jury members, in accordance with Feely, that they must simply apply
their own standards as ordinary decent people. D was convicted and his appeal was
dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Lane CJ stated that the jury must consider if the
conduct of the accused was dishonest according to the ‘ordinary standards of reasonable
and honest people’ (if not, then the prosecution fails). If it is dishonest according to those
standards then the jury must consider whether the accused ‘must have realised that
what he was doing was by those standards dishonest’.
The significant aspect of this direction is that it permits an acquittal in cases where the
defendant is dishonest according to prevailing social standards but does not realise
this. Critics describe the test as a Robin Hood defence.
Activity 12.11
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.B.2 and answer the following question.
Why is the Ghosh test described as a Robin Hood defence?
Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67

The Ghosh test was abandoned by the Supreme Court in a case decided under the
Gambling Act 2005. The question for the Court was whether Mr Ivey, a professional
gambler, was acting dishonestly, that he was cheating, in gambling with cards, which
although provided by the casino, he was able to identify by virtue of a defective pattern
on the cards’ reverse side. He argued that he was not dishonest because, whatever
the general public might feel about the honesty of his actions, as a professional
gambler he considered what he did to be simply good gambling and assumed the
public would think likewise. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. In so doing,
it found that the second limb was defective in that it introduced an unnecessary and
problematic subjective element into the assessment of dishonesty. Whether someone
is dishonest or not does not vary with the defendant’s own assessment of what counts
as dishonesty but is decided according to objective standards of ordinary, reasonable
people. In future, only the first question is to be considered, that is whether, according
to the standards of reasonable and honest people, what was done was dishonest. This
returns the law to the position in Feely [1973] 1 All ER 341 and will become the standard
test for dishonesty in theft, fraud and other offences in which dishonesty is an element.
The procedure in relation to directing the jury on dishonesty is first of all to ask it to
consider whether s.2 is applicable. If it is, that is an end to the matter and D is acquitted.
If it is not, the jury must then consider whether the defendant is dishonest according to
the Ivey/Feely test, that is according to the standards of ordinary people as represented
by the jury.
Activity 12.12
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.B.2.
Do you think the current mechanism for deciding whether a person is dishonest is
sufficiently clear and certain to pass muster?
Activity 12.13
Read Wilson, Chapter 14.2.B.2 ‘Dishonesty’, Section (b) ‘What dishonesty is’ and
answer the following question.
A takes a bruised apple from a market stall and gives it to a homeless person sitting
on the floor nearby. What direction should the judge give the jury on dishonesty?
Activity 12.14
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.B.2 ‘Dishonesty’, Section (c) ‘Reforming dishonesty’ and
outline the proposals for reforming theft and dishonesty tabled by Professors
Smith, Glazebrook, Tur and Elliot.
Intention permanently to deprive

A defendant commits theft only if it is their intention for the victim never to recover
the property. If D intends only to borrow property this cannot be theft, however
dishonest the taking is. The key point here is that this is a mens rea rather than an
actus reus element. Theft does not require the victim to be permanently deprived
of their property. It simply requires D to have this intention at the precise moment
they appropriate the property. Intention includes conditional intention; that is, the
intention of someone who appropriates property – say a holdall – conditionally on
the contents proving sufficiently valuable to take permanently. To gain a conviction,
however, it is necessary for the prosecution to draft the charge so as not to refer to
any specific property (compare Easom [1971] 2 QB 315), for example by charging D with
theft of ‘articles unknown, the contents of a holdall belonging to X’ (see also A-G’s
Reference (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979) [1979] 3 All ER 143).
In the case of fungibles such as money, food, drink and so on, this intention exists
even if D intends to return an identical sum, amount of food, drink and so on. This
was made clear in Velumyl [1989] Crim LR 299, in which D had taken money from his
employer’s safe and claimed that he intended to pay it back after the weekend. The
Court of Appeal held that D had not intended to return the exact coins and notes, and
that therefore he was properly convicted of theft on proof of dishonesty. (Note: in

such cases it would be far better for D to contend that he was not dishonest, given his
intention to replace the money with an equivalent fund.)
Subsections 6(1) and 6(2) of the Theft Act 1968 provide two special circumstances
beyond its normal meaning where the intention to take something temporarily counts
as an intention permanently to deprive the owner of the property.

A person is to be treated as having an intention to permanently deprive the owner of
his property if his intention is to:
treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing
or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a
period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal.
This provision refers to cases where the appropriation amounts to an outright

disposal but the defendant nevertheless shows no particular commitment to
depriving V of the property permanently (Coffey [1987] Crim LR 498). An obvious
example is where D appropriates V’s property, for example his dog or his painting,
intending to ransom the property back to V upon payment of a sum of money. Another
example is where D intends to exhaust the value of the property before returning
it. So if D ‘borrows’ V’s ticket for the Manchester United game against Manchester
City intending to return it after the game, D has – by virtue of s.6(1) – the intention to
permanently deprive V of her property because D is treating the ticket as his own to
dispose of regardless of the other’s rights.
In Marshall, Coombes & Eren [1998] 2 Cr App R 282, the Court of Appeal ruled that selling
on a used but unexpired tube ticket counts, by virtue of s.6(1), as involving an intention
permanently to deprive London Underground of the ticket – even though the ticket
will eventually find its way back to London Underground – since the seller is treating
the thing as their own to dispose of (through sale) regardless of the other’s rights. In
DPP v Lavender [1994] Crim LR 297, the defendant removed some doors from a council
property that was due for demolition and then installed the doors in his girlfriend’s
flat which was also owned by the council. D was charged with theft of the doors. It
was held that he did have the intention to permanently deprive under s.6(1) as, by
installing the doors at another’s house, D was treating the doors as if they were his
own to dispose of regardless of the owner’s rights.
This provision has generally been interpreted rather restrictively. It does not cover,
for example, the case of a person who ‘borrows’, without the owner’s consent, a
very valuable piece of jewellery, intending to return it at the end of their year-long
holiday. The courts have insisted that the defendant’s intention must be to exhaust the
property’s usefulness, or sell or otherwise get rid of it – for example by leaving it in a
remote or private location (Lavender). In Lloyd [1985] QB 829, D worked as a projectionist
at a cinema who allowed B to take the films to make pirate copies and then return
them. The Court of Appeal quashed D and B’s convictions on the ground that they
lacked the intention permanently to deprive the owner of the films, not having
sought to dispose of the films, and that s.6(1) did not cover the case of borrowing for a
dishonest purpose, however damaging to the owner’s rights this may be.
Activity 12.15
Read Wilson, Section 14.2.B.1 ‘Intention to deprive the owner permanently of his
property’ and answer the following question.
Jack Bilko, a golf professional, discovers that he has forgotten his golf balls when
he arrives at the first tee of the Masters Tournament at Augusta. While his playing
partner, Duke Lonard, is not looking, Jack takes a box of balls from Duke’s golf
bag which he uses throughout the course of the round. At the end of the match
he replaces all the balls in Duke’s bag. At the beginning of the next round Duke
discovers the box of balls and, concluding their condition is not good enough to
play with, opens another box of balls. If Jack were prosecuted for theft, would the
prosecution be able to rely on s.6(1)?

By subs.6(2), A is deemed to have the intention to permanently deprive B of B’s
property if A parts with property in A’s possession or control under a condition,
which A may not be able to perform. This is intended to cover the kind of case where
someone who has property belonging to someone else in their possession or control
pawns that property to another.

4. Explain the circumstances when body parts amount to property capable of being
stolen.
5. Explain what a thing in action is and how it can be stolen.
6. Explain when land or things forming part of land can be stolen.
7. Explain what an appropriation means.
8. Explain the legal position regarding consented-to appropriations.
9. Give your own example of how someone could be guilty of theft by receiving an
outright gift or making a purchase.
10. Explain what ‘belonging to another’ means.
11. Explain why s.5(3) of the Theft Act 1968 is necessary to the law of theft.
12. Explain the circumstances in which a person can be guilty of theft although it cannot
be proved that they intended permanently to deprive the owner of the property.
13. Explain the procedure for proving dishonesty in the light of both s.2 of the Theft Act
1968 and Ivey.
14. What are the main objections to the current tests for dishonesty?
12.2 Burglary
Section 9 of the Theft Act 1968 creates two separate offences of burglary: an inchoate
crime of ulterior intent where there is no need to prove the commission of the
substantive offence (s.9(1)(a)); and a complete crime where proof of the commission
of an offence is of the essence (s.9(1)(b)). Section 9(1) provides:
A person is guilty of burglary if –
(a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit
any such offence as is mentioned in subsection (2) below; or
(b) having entered any building or part of it as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal
anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person
therein any grievous bodily harm.
Since both s.9(1)(a) and s.9(1)(b) have ‘entry of a building as a trespasser’ as common
features for burglary these will be dealt with first before we cover the specifics of the
two offences.
12.2.1 Common features

In order to be guilty of burglary, D must enter a building or part of a building as a
trespasser. The following questions must be asked, therefore, in connection with both
forms of the offence.
uu Was there an entry? If yes,
uu did the person entering enter as a trespasser? If yes,
uu was the entry to a building or part of a building?

What counts as entry?

To enter premises, entry of the whole person is not necessary; however, the entry
must be ‘effective’. This does not necessarily mean that the entry has to be capable
of enabling the commission of an offence, but this helps. It is a question of fact for
the jury. In Brown [1985] Crim LR 212, it was confirmed that, contrary to the earlier
authority of Collins [1973] QB 100, the entry need not be substantial. So D’s conviction
for burglary was upheld on the basis of him having smashed the window of a shop and
having leant in, feet still on the pavement, to take goods from inside the window. In
Ryan [1996] Crim LR 320, on comparable facts the conviction was upheld although D,
who had become stuck in the window, had not managed to penetrate sufficiently far
into the premises to steal anything.
Did the person entering enter as a trespasser?

Entry will be as a trespasser if the entry is made without the consent, express or
implied, of the occupier, and without statutory authority. The question of whether the
defendant had entered as a trespasser was of key concern in Collins. The defendant,
intending to rape V, climbed naked up a ladder and perched on her windowsill. V
mistook him in the dark for her boyfriend and welcomed him in. It was not clear how
far into the room D was when he received his invitation, but the jury found that his
entry was sufficient for a conviction. However, the court made clear that if he was still
on the windowsill when invited in, he would not have entered as a trespasser and so
could not be guilty of burglary.
Since Collins it has also been decided that those who enter premises in excess
of authority are trespassers on those premises. This covers those who may have
permission to be in the property but exceed the permission by doing something
which they were not invited to do. So in Jones and Smith [1976] 1 WLR 672 it was
burglary for a son to enter his parent’s house intending to steal a TV. Although he had
general authority to enter the premises, that authority was vitiated by entering in
excess of the presumed terms of his parent’s consent.
Activity 12.16
Read Wilson, Section 16.4.B ‘Entry as a trespasser’ and answer the following
questions.
a. Raffles enters Wizzo supermarket intending to buy a razor. As he has little
money he decides, before entering, that if the razor costs more than the £3 in his
pocket, he will steal the razor. Has Raffles committed burglary?
b. In the light of Jones and Smith would Collins now be deemed to have entered
as a trespasser, assuming the invitation to enter was issued prior to his having
entered the bedroom?
Was the entry to a building or part of a building?

A building is not defined in the Theft Act 1968, although s.9(4) states that it includes
‘a vehicle or vessel constructed or adapted for human habitation’ – for example
houseboats, canal barges and caravans. A consensus holds that a building must be
some form of structure with a degree of permanence capable of being entered. This
would cover barns, churches, shops, warehouses and even portable cabins such as
freezer containers, and outbuildings – but probably not tents (B and S v Leathley [1979]
Crim LR 314).
A person who enters a building lawfully may become a trespasser in relation to a

part of that building where they have no licence to go. Parts of buildings include
living rooms, service rooms, bathrooms and roofs. In the case of Walkington [1979] 1
WLR 1169, it was held that a person lawfully visiting a department store was guilty of
burglary when she went behind a shop counter to steal from the till. This area, being
clearly defined, was ‘part of a building’ and she, having no authority to be there,
entered as a trespasser.
12.2.2 Mens rea: burglary

For both offences of burglary, the defendant must know they are a trespasser or be
reckless as to whether they are trespassing at the time of entry. They must also have
the relevant mens rea for the crime they commit or intend to commit, for example,
dishonesty and the intention to permanently deprive in the case of theft.
Activity 12.17
Did Collins have the mens rea for burglary upon entering the room?
Specific offences
(i) Section 9(1)(a) burglary

The s.9(1)(a) offence requires intention to commit one of the ulterior offences. It will
be charged when there is evidence that D had entered with the relevant intent, but
had not yet consummated the proposed crime. In everyday language, a person can be
a burglar without actually stealing anything or causing any harm. The most common
ulterior intent is the intent to steal. Following Jones and Smith, this has the surprising
consequence that a person who enters a shop intending to steal from it commits
burglary immediately upon entering the shop, because by having this intent they
enter in excess of authority and therefore enter as a trespasser.
It is important to remember that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove entry
with intent to steal, although of course this will usually be the case. A person who
enters with intent to commit any of the offences specified commits burglary. By s.9(2)
these are offences of:
uu stealing anything in the building or part of the building in question, or
uu inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm, or
uu doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein.
It is not burglary, therefore, to enter premises as a trespasser with intent to commit

fraud, rape or cause actual bodily harm.
(ii) Section 9(1)(b) burglary

The s.9(1)(b) offence does not require proof of an ulterior intent at the time of
entering as a trespasser. It is charged only where there is evidence that the substantive
offence has been committed. Since the offence has been committed, proof of the
ulterior intent upon entering as a trespasser is unnecessary. This form of burglary is
more restricted in its coverage than s.9(1)(a). It is committed where, having entered as
a trespasser, the entrant:
uu steals or attempts to steal, or
uu inflicts or attempts to inflict grievous bodily harm.
It does not cover, therefore, the case of a person who enters premises as a trespasser
and then causes criminal damage to the premises or inflicts bodily harm less than
grievous bodily harm. In such a case the prosecution must charge the substantive
offence. For the s.9(1)(b) offence the prosecution must prove not only the entry as
trespasser but also all of the elements of the ulterior offence.
Activity 12.18
Read Wilson, Section 16.5 ‘Modes of committing burglary’ and then answer the
a. A enters a private office at her local bank, without authority, to recover the
handbag she had mistakenly left there earlier in the day. Are either forms of
burglary committed?
b. A enters her flatmate’s room to borrow, without permission, her evening dress.
Are either forms of burglary committed?
c. Do you think s.9(1)(b) burglary should include cases where D commits criminal
damage or a non-serious offence against the person? Why do you think these
crimes are not included?
(iii) Aggravated burglary under s.10 of the Theft Act 1968

Under s.10(1):
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he commits any burglary and at the time
has with him any firearm or imitation firearm, any weapon of offence, or any explosive;
and for this purpose –
(a) ‘firearm’ includes an airgun or air pistol, and ‘imitation firearm’ means anything
which has the appearance of being a firearm, whether capable of being discharged
or not; and
(b) ‘weapon of offence’ means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury
to or incapacitating a person, or intended by the person having it with him for
such use; and
(c) ‘explosive’ means any article manufactured for the purpose of producing a practical
effect by explosion, or intended by the person having it with him for that purpose.
The relevant time for possessing the weapon depends on whether it is a s.9(1)(a)
offence or a s.9(1)(b) offence. If (a) then possession must be at time of entry; if (b)
possession must be at the time the ulterior offence is committed. In O’Leary (1986) 82
Cr App R 341, D entered a house without a weapon. Once inside he took a knife from
the kitchen and took it upstairs to effect the burglary. D’s conviction was upheld on
appeal. It was held that since the offence was charged under s.9(1)(b), there was no
requirement that he had the knife at the time of entry.

1. Explain the difference between s.9(1)(a) and s.9(1)(b) burglary.
2. Explain the considerations the prosecution must take into account in deciding
which to charge.
3. List the substantive offences around which both forms of burglary are constituted.
4. Explain what ‘entry as a trespasser’ involves.
5. Explain when, if ever, a person can be guilty of burglary although they have the
occupier’s consent to entering the building.
6. Explain what ‘building’ and ‘part of a building’ mean for the purpose of burglary.
7. For the purpose of aggravated burglary how does the form of the burglary impact
on the question of when the burglar is in possession of a weapon?
12.3 Fraud
The Fraud Act 2006 abolishes all the deception offences in the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978.
These included obtaining property by deception, obtaining services by deception and
evading a debt by deception. The main reason for the change was that the previous
offences had a high degree of overlap, were unduly technical, and did not cover
some important forms of fraudulent wrongdoing. For example, communicating false
information by computer as a ‘phishing’ ploy designed to defraud the recipient could
not ground a deception offence, because all deception offences required D to have
made a false representation which was believed and acted on by a specific person.
This causal effect had to be proved by the prosecution. So, also, a car seller who made
false representations to a purchaser who subsequently bought the car would not be
guilty of fraud unless the prosecution could prove beyond reasonable doubt that, but
for these representations, the purchase would not have been made. This clearly makes
the prosecution’s job difficult, and probably too difficult.
The Fraud Act 2006 replaces the deception offence with one basic fraud offence which
can be committed in three ways. These are by:
uu false representation
uu failure to disclose information
uu abuse of position.
The main change renders the wrongdoing the intentions of the wrongdoer rather than
the reactions of the victim. David Ormerod (Smith and Hogan’s criminal law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015)) complains that, in effect, the new offence criminalises
‘lying’. It is intended to capture wrongdoing such as that of computer ‘phishers’, who
make their money out of duping the one in a million people who happen to believe
them, which was not possible under the old law. The problem is that it also in theory
captures many less heinous forms of behaviour which are part and parcel of everyday
commercial life. Sellers are expected to tempt us with ‘white lies’, are they not? The
maximum sentence for fraud is 10 years’ imprisonment.
12.3.1 Section 2: fraud by false representation

The essence of this form of fraud is some form of deception. Section 2 of the Fraud Act
2006 reads as follows:
(1) A person is in breach of this section if he –
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and
(b) intends, by making the representation –
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
(2) A representation is false if –
(a) it is untrue or misleading, and
(b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.
(3) ‘Representation’ means any representation as to fact or law, including a representation

as to the state of mind of –
(a) the person making the representation, or
(b) any other person.
(4) A representation may be express or implied.
(5) For the purposes of this section a representation may be regarded as made if it (or
anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system or device designed to
receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention).
Elements of the offence

The actus reus requires proof that D made a false representation. The mens rea requires
proof that D:
uu knew the representation was or might be false, and
uu acted intending to make a gain or cause a loss, and
uu acted dishonestly.
Actus reus: fraud

The conduct element in fraud by false representation is simple. It requires proof that
D made a representation and that representation was false. There is no need to prove
that V acted to their detriment in reliance on the representation. Indeed, there is no
need for it to be communicated to V so long as it is made. So the phisher commits the

offence as soon as they type out their false statement: the prosecution does not have
to wait until the email is transmitted.
Meaning of representation
Representation is not defined in the Fraud Act 2006 except to say:
(3) ‘Representation’ means any representation as to fact or law, including a representation

as to the state of mind of –
(a) the person making the representation, or
(b) any other person.
(4) A representation may be express or implied.
The simplest meaning of representation is ‘stating something’, ‘pretending

something’, ‘professing something’ or ‘creating an impression’. So a seller who tells a
buyer that the car he is selling is in good condition makes a ‘representation’ that it is in
good condition. Similarly, a buyer who tells the seller that her credit is good makes a
‘representation’ that her credit is good. A representation can be made without words.
It can be made by conduct; for example, painting over rust damage on a car, thus
giving the impression it is in better condition than it is. It can also be implied.
Illustration 12.3
Assume A wishes to buy a car on credit and wishes to influence the decision to
advance her credit. The following words or actions will be express representations.
a. My credit is good (representation of fact).
b. I bank with Coutts and Co (a bank used largely by the rich and powerful) (one
express and one implied representation of fact – the implied representation is
creating an impression that she is rich and powerful).
c. I have just won £1 million on the lottery (representation of fact – she is creating
an impression that she is rich).
d. I will pay you back next week (representation as to state of mind – she is
creating an impression that she intends to pay the money back).
Activity 12.19
Read Wilson, Section 15.1.C.1. ‘Fraud by false representation’, Section (a) ‘Actus reus’.
Look at the following scenarios and state what representations are being made and
identify which, if any, are false.
a. A, a poor man, hires a Rolls Royce for the day.
b. A, a car dealer, turns back the odometer reading on a car prior to selling it.
c. A pays for chips in a casino with a cheque, having lost the bank’s authority to use
it.
Note, for exam purposes the most important abilities you should be able to display in
the context of fraud are:
a. being able to identify the representation that you think is the basis of the fraud
charge, and
b. being able to explain why in relation to that representation it is false.
It will usually help to ask yourself ‘What false impression or statement is D making for
the purpose of defrauding V?’
Can one make a representation by saying or doing nothing?

As a general rule, the answer is no since making a representation means to state
something or do something.
Illustration 12.4
A sells B a car, the odometer of which he knows carries a false reading.
A cannot be guilty of fraud as he has made no false representation as to the mileage.
It would be different if, upon being asked, A confirmed the reading or said that it
was genuine (express representation of fact) or that he believed it to be genuine
(express representation as to his state of mind).
Activity 12.20
Read Wilson, Section 15.1.C.1. ‘Fraud by false representation’, Section (a) ‘Actus reus’
and answer the following questions.
a. A is selling her car. It is in bad condition. To ensure that B, a potential buyer, does
not realise this, she tells B she will only show him the car at 9pm. B inspects the
car and does not spot the defects. Is A guilty of fraud?
b. Would it make any difference to the answer to the above question if A had said,
untruthfully, ‘You will have to come at 9pm as I do not get back from work until
then’?
In two situations silence may constitute a false representation. In both cases the
silence creates a false impression.
Where there exists a duty of disclosure (also covered by s.3)
Illustration 12.5
Adam performs a surgical operation on Eve at Green Wing Hospital. He does not tell
the hospital that Eve is a private patient and, as a result, the hospital, assuming Eve
is a national health service (free) patient, does not invoice him for the cost of the
operation (Firth (1990) 91 Cr App R 217).
By not telling the hospital, when he is under a duty of disclosure, Adam is creating
a false impression that Eve is a national health service (NHS) patient rather than the
private patient she actually is. Because of his duty of disclosure, the hospital is entitled
to assume that all patients operated on are NHS patients unless Adam tells them
otherwise.
Where the circumstances giving rise to a representation change so that the

original representation no longer accurately describes the true state of affairs
Illustration 12.6
a. Adam tells Eve truthfully that the odometer reading on the car he is selling is
accurate. Prior to concluding the sale he discovers that the odometer has, in
fact, been tampered with. He does not communicate this to Eve.
b. Adam truthfully tells his local authority that Eve, his mother, is bedridden and
so in need of a downstairs bathroom. On the strength of this representation the
local authority agrees to install a new bathroom. Before starting the work Eve
dies. Adam fails to tell the local authority of her death (the facts of Rai [2000]
1 Cr App R 242).
In both cases, Adam’s silence is impliedly telling the other party that nothing relevant
to their agreement has changed since the first representation was made. Put another
way, in both cases the statement that Adam has made which was once true is now
false. The change in circumstances has made it so.
Representations and machines

Under the old law of the Theft Acts, it was also not possible to make representation to
a machine: the essence of the deception offences was the tricking of a human mind.
The Fraud Act 2006 s.2(5) now makes it possible to commit fraud via a machine, since a
representation is regarded as having been made:
if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system or device designed to
receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention).
This would include putting false information on an online tax or insurance form, or
computer ‘phishing’ as in the case of those who place viral sob stories on the internet
which are intended to cause naive recipients to transfer money to the phisher. In this
latter case the representation is made as soon as the representation is typed on to the
phisher’s machine, thus relieving the prosecution from having to prove that anyone
read it.
A person who puts a foreign coin in a slot machine, such as a car park ticket machine
or chocolate machine, also commits fraud, whether or not the ruse is successful,
not because of subs.2(5) but because by putting the coin in they are making a
representation in the usual way. ‘This is a £1 coin’, ‘this is a $2 coin’, as the case may
be. Under the old law this was not a fraud because it required a human mind to be
deceived. As has been explained the fraud is now complete upon the making of a false
representation. It does not have to be effective or even communicated.
Activity 12.21
Read Wilson, Section 15.1.C.1. ‘Fraud by false representation’, Section (a) ‘Actus reus’
and answer the following question.
Adam, intending to sell his car, puts an advertisement on the windscreen while it
is in his garage. It says that the car has been driven by one careful female owner. In
fact it has been driven by him. Has Adam committed the actus reus of fraud at this
stage?
The representation must be false

By subs.2(2) of the Fraud Act 2006, a representation is false if (a) it is untrue or
misleading, and (b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or
misleading. This is a very inclusive definition. It includes the situation of someone who
believes what they say to be true but knows it might not be true or knows it might
be misleading. The coverage of the act is so wide it covers the kind of cases of (sharp)
practice in which most tradespersons have traditionally engaged to make a living. It
criminalises ‘mere puffs’. If Heineken describes its lager as ‘probably the best lager in
the world’, is it acting fraudulently when all purchasers understand that the claim is
not to be taken too seriously and do not buy their lager on the strength of it?
Activity 12.22
Read Wilson, Section 15.1.C.1 ‘Fraud by false representation’, Section (a) ‘Actus reus’
and answer the following questions.
a. Adam owns a BMW in which he has driven 111,000 miles since he bought it a
year ago. The odometer, having ‘gone round the clock’, shows 11,000 miles. It is
worth £15,000 as it stands, but £30,000 if the mileage truly was 11,000. He puts a
notice on his car windscreen in the following terms: ‘BMW for sale. One year old.
One careful owner. £30,000’. Has Adam made a false representation? If so, what
is it?
b. Claire is an art dealer. She describes a painting in the sales particulars as an

‘early Constable’. The painting, as she knows, is painted not by John Constable,
but by his son, John Charles Constable, a lesser artist. Has Claire made a false
representation? If so, what is it?
c. Jane is an art dealer. She describes a painting in the sales particulars as an

‘early Rembrandt’. She believes it to be a Rembrandt, and indeed bought it as
such, but knows that in the case of this particular painter precise attribution is
difficult due to the number of workshop versions of Rembrandt’s work on the
market. In fact it is not a Rembrandt. Has Jane made a false representation? If so,
what is it?
Note: Remember what was said earlier about the importance of being able to
identify the representation and what is false about it. If you are having difficulty
with any of these three cases you need to revisit the textbook.
Mens rea: fraud

The core mens rea element for fraud contrary to ss.2, 3 and 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 is
the defendant’s intention by making the representation, to make a gain for themself
or another, or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. Intention
in this context, in line with its meaning in theft and unlike its meaning elsewhere,
means purpose or knowledge of virtual certainty. In theft, such knowledge is intention
as a matter of law, rather than as a matter of evidence (see Section 5.3.2 ‘Murder and
manslaughter: what does “intention” mean?’). If D knows that their representation will
cause loss to V or expose V to the risk of loss, D intends that consequence. Gain and
loss are defined by s.5(2) and (3) of the act:
(2) ‘Gain’ and ‘loss’ –
(a) extend only to gain or loss in money or other property;
(b) include any such gain or loss whether temporary or permanent;
and ‘property’ means any property whether real or personal (including things in action
and other intangible property).
(3) Gain’ includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well as a gain by getting what one
does not have.
Activity 12.23
Read Wilson, Section 15.1.C.1 ‘Fraud by false representation’, Section (b) ‘Mens rea’
and decide, giving reasons, whether the following representations are capable of
resulting in a conviction of fraud.
a. Adam promises to marry Eve in order to encourage her to agree to sexual
intercourse.
b. Adam tells people in a queue for a concert that he has a bad back in order to gain
a better place in the queue.
c. Eve misrepresents her golf handicap in order to be permitted to join a top club.
Note: The gain or loss can be temporary or permanent, so making a misrepresentation

to induce a loan of a car or money, or to gain time to pay a debt would be covered. In
this latter example, fraud is constituted since ‘gain’ includes a gain by keeping what
one has, as well as a gain by getting what one does not have. ‘Loss’ includes a loss by
not getting what one might get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has.
There are four possible cases of this mens rea requirement.
1. The intention to make a gain for oneself by false representation (this will be the
most usual case).
2. The intention to make a gain for someone else, for example giving a false reference
to secure someone a job or a loan.
3. The intention to cause a loss to another. Usually this will go hand-in-hand with an
intention to make a gain, either for oneself or for another, but it will include cases
where the representor’s purpose is purely destructive. Here is an example.
Illustration 12.7
Janice, a committed vegetarian, places an advertisement in the Daily Globe
newspaper, implying that the hotdogs of HotdiggetyDog hotdog manufacturers
actually contain dog meat. The representation, which is false, is made in an attempt
to damage sales of HotdiggetyDog meat products.
This is fraud, because of Janice’s intention to cause financial damage to
HotdiggetyDog.
4. The intention not to cause a loss to the representee but to expose them to the risk
of loss (this is more unusual).
Illustration 12.8
a. A, a mortgage broker, puts false earnings particulars on clients’ mortgage forms
to induce the lender to lend to her clients.
b. B, an investment banker, speculates, without his bank’s authority, a huge

amount of his bank’s money on a short-term trade in a weak currency, which he
hopes will make a huge return the next day – thus advancing his reputation in
the company.
A is guilty of fraud. Her liability turns on the fact that although she does not intend
to cause the lender any loss, she does intend to expose the lender to the risk of loss,
namely the risk that the borrowers may default (Allsop (1977) 64 Cr App R 29). B is also
guilty of fraud for the same reason. The risk here is that daily currency fluctuations
mean that any overambitious currency trading could lose the investing company
millions of pounds. Indeed the effect of one such ‘rogue trader’ was to bankrupt
Britain’s oldest investment bank, Barings, with a trading loss of $1.5 billion.
Dishonesty
The final mens rea element is dishonesty. Dishonesty, in this context, is Ivey dishonesty.
There is no equivalent to s.2 of the Theft Act 1968 in the Fraud Act 2006. This means
that a person who makes a false representation in order to gain what they believe they
are in law entitled to is not automatically to be acquitted: it will be a matter for the
jury. This was made clear in the pre-2006 Act case of Woolven (1983) 77 Cr App R 231 and
one must assume the position is unaltered.
12.3.2 Fraud by failing to disclose information

This provision is probably unnecessary since a failure to disclose information which
one has a duty to disclose counts as a representation for the purpose of s.2 of the Fraud
Act 2006. Section 3 was included in order to simplify the proof of guilt. Section 3 allows
a conviction simply upon proof of the duty to disclose and the failure to do so with the
relevant intent. The important aspect of s.3 is the requirement that the defendant be
under a legal duty of disclosure: a moral duty is not enough. The concept of ‘legal duty’
is explained in the Law Commission’s Report on Fraud, which said:
Such a duty may derive from statute (such as the provisions governing company
prospectuses), from the fact that the transaction in question is one of the utmost good
faith (such as a contract of insurance), from the express or implied terms of a contract,
from the custom of a particular trade or market, or from the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between the parties (such as that of agent and principal).
So an art dealer would not commit the offence if they bought a painting at a car boot
sale knowing that the painting was worth a thousand times the asking price, as they
have only a moral duty of disclosure.
Mens rea: failing to disclose information

The mens rea for s.3 of the Fraud Act is as for s.2. There is no requirement that the
defendant be aware that they are under a legal duty of disclosure, although evidence
of lack of awareness will, no doubt, influence the jury’s assessment of dishonesty.
Section 3 states:
A person is in breach of this section if he –
(a) dishonestly fails to disclose to another person information which he is under a legal
duty to disclose, and
(b) intends, by failing to disclose the information—
The mens rea for s.4 is as for s.2. There is no requirement that the defendant be aware that
they are under a duty to safeguard the other’s financial interests, although evidence of
lack of awareness will, no doubt, influence the jury’s assessment of dishonesty.
Fraud by abuse of position
(1) A person is in breach of this section if he –
(a) occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the
financial interests of another person,
(b) dishonestly abuses that position, and
(c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position –
(2) A person may be regarded as having abused his position even though his conduct
consisted of an omission rather than an act.
The Law Commission described the type of relationships intended to be covered by
fraud by abuse of position as follows:
The necessary relationship will be present between trustee and beneficiary, director and
company, professional person and client, agent and principal, employee and employer,
or between partners. It may arise otherwise, for example within a family, or in the context
of voluntary work, or in any context where the parties are not at arm’s length. In nearly all
cases where it arises, it will be recognised by the civil law as importing fiduciary duties,
and any relationship that is so recognised will suffice. We see no reason, however, why the
existence of such duties should be essential. (para.7.3)
Whether a person occupies a position in which they are expected to safeguard the
interests of another is a question of law for the judge. Usually this will be because the
relationship, as in the case of trustee/beneficiary, contains, or is constituted by, explicit
duties of acting in the other’s interests or not acting against those interests. It may,
however, simply be understood as where A permits B to use her apartment while she
is holiday. It goes without saying that B would abuse his licence if he were to use A’s
apartment to deal in drugs or sell weapons from.
Note: Students, when answering problem questions, often ignore s.2 and go straight
to s.3. This is bad practice and illustrates the importance of identifying the (false)
representation. You should generally only use s.3 as a default option, that is, where,
having concluded that s.2 is or is not available and why, you go on to consider
the alternative possibility of liability under s.3. All of the examples given in the
illustrations and activities in this section are, first and foremost, cases of fraud by
false representation (s.2). Consider, for example, Activities 12.12–12.20. A student who
fails to analyse each of these activities by reference to s.2, and who simply talks about
whether Adam, Clare and Jane are under a duty of disclosure and so liable under s.3 for
not making disclosure, misses the whole point of these questions and would not do
very well! So, what answer did you give to in relation to Adam and his BMW?
12.3.3 Obtaining services dishonestly

Section 11 of the Fraud Act 2006 replaces s.2 of the Theft Act 1978. It covers any case
where services, for which payment would be expected, are obtained as a result of
dishonest conduct. By s.11:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he obtains services for himself or
another –
(a) by a dishonest act, and
(b) in breach of subsection (2).

The new offence differs from the old one by constituting the conduct element as any
form of dishonest conduct rather than the deception required by s.2.
Actus reus: obtaining services dishonestly

Under the previous law it was an offence only where there was a deception. Now any
dishonest act will be covered. The difference in coverage can be seen in the following
example.
Illustration 12.9
D parks her car in a pay-and-display car park. She does not pay for a ticket, hoping
that she will return before a ticket inspector arrives.
Under the Theft Act 1978 this would not be an offence under s.2 as no false
representation has been made. It is, however, an offence under s.11 because D has
obtained a service and her conduct is dishonest.
Illustration 12.10
Other cases of obtaining services dishonestly include the following.
a. Entering a cinema without paying.
b. Having a haircut without paying.
c. Obtaining chargeable data or software (e.g. music downloads) over the internet
without paying.
d. Ordering a meal in a restaurant knowing you have no means to pay (also fraud
by false representation).
e. Attaching a decoder to a TV to access chargeable satellite services without paying.
f. Using the services of a members’ club without paying and/or without being a
member.
Section 11 also differs from ss.2, 3 and 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 in the actus reus
requirement that the service be actually obtained. In this respect it is similar to the
offence it replaced. However, where the relevant services are obtained as a result
of a false representation, rather than by some other form of dishonest act, it will be
possible to proceed under either section.
Illustration 12.11
a. Adam parks his car in a pay and display car park. Eve, who is about to leave
the car park, gives Adam her unexpired ticket. Adam places the ticket on his
windscreen.
Adam is guilty under s.11. He is also guilty of fraud by false representation. By putting
the ticket on his windscreen he is impliedly representing that he has paid for it. The
gain he makes is keeping the fee due.
b. Mary untruthfully tells the sales assistant in a cinema that she is underage so as
to be allowed in at a lower price.
Since Mary is not a minor, she is guilty of fraud by false representation. The gain
she intends to make is the money she is enabled to keep in her pocket by her false
representation as to her age. She is also guilty of obtaining services dishonestly.
What conduct does ‘obtaining services’ cover?

Subsection 11(2) clarifies what is mean by ‘obtaining services’. As with the previous
offence, it refers to a narrower range of conduct than you might think.
(2) A person obtains services in breach of this subsection if –
(a) they are made available on the basis that payment has been, is being or will be
made for or in respect of them,
(b) he obtains them without any payment having been made for or in respect of them
or without payment having been made in full, and
(c) when he obtains them, he knows –
(i) that they are being made available on the basis described in paragraph (a), or
(ii) that they might be,
but intends that payment will not be made, or will not be made in full.
Subsection 11(2) makes it clear that only services made available on the basis that
payment has been, is being or will be made for or in respect of them are covered.
Activity 12.24
How good are your statutory interpretation skills? Read s.11(2) and consider
whether the following situations are examples of obtaining services dishonestly.
a. D, in order to avoid paying a charge at his local swimming pool, sneaks into a
school’s pool, use of which is restricted to school pupils on a non fee-paying
basis. Is this an offence under the Fraud Act 2006?
b. Adam and Eve pretend to be Muslims in order to get their child into a fee-paying
school, restricted to pupils of that religion. They are, in fact, Christians.
c. D, in order to avoid paying a full charge at her local swimming pool, pretends to
be a pensioner.
d. D, in order to see an adult film, tells the assistant that he is 18 when he is only 16.
Are you happy with your answers? Now look at Wilson, Section 15.2 ‘Obtaining
services dishonestly’ to see if you were right.
Mens rea: obtaining services dishonestly

The offence requires Ivey dishonesty, knowledge that payment is required or might be,
and an intention not to pay for the service or not to pay in full. Section 2 of the Theft
Act 1968 does not apply.
12.3.4 Making off without payment

Section 3 of the Theft Act 1978, which is still in force, provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, a person who, knowing that payment on the spot
for any goods supplied or service done is required or expected from him, dishonestly
makes off without having paid as required or expected and with intent to avoid
payment of the amount due shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) For purposes of this section ‘payment on the spot’ includes payment at the time of
collecting goods on which work has been done or in respect of which service has been
provided.
(3) Subsection (1) above shall not apply where the supply of the goods or the doing of the
service is contrary to law, or where the service done is such that payment is not legally
enforceable.
This offence is designed to enable a prosecution where, although the defendant has
acted dishonestly, it may be difficult to prove or prevent fraud or theft. It is easier to
prove that a driver has dishonestly made off without paying for their petrol than to
prove that they had an intention not to pay when first filling up the car – which would
ground a charge of theft or fraud.
Activity 12.25
At examination time you should be wary of putting undue emphasis on this offence
in cases where theft, fraud or obtaining services dishonestly are also present. This
offence is best thought of as an offence of last resort, for use where proving another
offence may be difficult. For example, read Wilson, Section 15.2.A ‘Actus reus’ and
While out shopping, Yuri sees a shirt priced £50. He swaps the price tag for one
marked £30 and pays the lower price. Yuri buys a DVD and pays for it with a £10
note. The shop assistant mistakenly gives him change for a £20 note. Yuri realises
this once he is outside the shop but keeps the money. What offences, if any, have
been committed?
In this question most of the marks would be awarded for discussion of theft and
fraud in relation to the swapping of the price tags. Can you see why it is a case of
both fraud and theft? Read Wilson, Sections 14.2.A ‘Actus reus’ and 15.1.C ‘Fraud’.
In relation to the mistake question your discussion should again concentrate on
theft. Only then consider whether there is a making off (see Wilson, Sections 15.3.A.1
‘Making off’ and 15.3.A.3 ‘Without having paid as required or expected’). Has Yuri
made off without paying as required or expected in the light of the mistake made?
Actus reus: making off without payment

A person can be liable only if they have made off from the spot where payment was
due. Liability turns therefore on where that spot is and whether D has departed from
it. In McDavitt [1981] Crim LR 843, D, following an argument about his bill, made for the
restaurant door having refused to pay for his meal. He was stopped and the police were
called. D admitted having intended to leave without paying. A submission of no case to
answer was accepted on a charge of making off without payment. The Court of Appeal
ruled that ‘making off’ means making off from the spot where payment is required or
expected. In this case the spot was the restaurant. The jury should have been directed
that it could not convict of this offence but it was open to them to convict of an attempt.
Compare Moberly v Alsop [1992] COD 190, in which D travelled on a train without paying
for a ticket. She was apprehended, having gone through the ticket barrier, and charged
with making off without paying. She argued that she had not made off without paying
because the spot for paying was the ticket office and she had not made off from there.
Indeed, she had never been there! This argument was rejected.
Activity 12.26
Why was the argument in Moberly v Alsop rejected? When you have thought about
the answer, read Wilson, Section 15.3.A.1 ‘Making off’, Section (a) ‘From the spot
where payment is due or expected’ to see if your reasoning was correct.
A person commits the offence only if, when making off, payment on the spot is
required or expected. If, therefore, the expectation is that D will be ‘billed’ for the
goods or services they are not guilty, even if it was their intention when making off
that they would not pay. So also D will not commit the offence if there has been a
breach of contract or if the contract was otherwise unenforceable.
Making off takes no particular form. A person can make off by stealth, or brazenly without
any form of dissimulation. A question does, however, surround the status of permitted
departures, as when a customer dupes a creditor into allowing them to depart by
pretending to have left their wallet at home. Is this a making off? In Vincent [2001] EWCA
Crim 295, the Court of Appeal concluded that it was not, since the effect of the deception
is to pre-empt any expectation that payment would be made on the spot. Fraud could
have been charged, but only if it could be proved that D had at some stage decided not
to pay before receiving any goods or services. Under these circumstances D would in this
case, by staying on in the hotel, have been impliedly representing that he intended to
pay for the goods or services when he did not (DPP v Ray [1974] AC 370).
Activity 12.27
Read Wilson, Section 15.3.A ‘Actus reus’ for a discussion of this problem.
Mens rea: making off without payment

The mens rea for s.3 of the Fraud Act 2006 is dishonesty and an intention to avoid
payment of the amount due. Significantly, s.3 does not state that the intention must
be to make permanent default. The commonsense view is this should not be the
case because having to prove D intended to make permanent default will make the
prosecution’s burden of proof rather difficult. It is easy to claim that one intended
to pay later and difficult to disprove this beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless in
Allen [1985] AC 1029, the House of Lords held that the offence was constituted only
upon proof of an intention permanently to avoid paying the amount due. So a hotel
customer who checked out without paying did not commit the offence if he was
temporarily financially embarrassed and intended to pay later.
Activity 12.28
In Lawrence [1972] AC 626, the House of Lords refused to read the words ‘without the
transferor’s consent’ into the definition of appropriation for the purpose of theft,
saying if Parliament had wanted this it would have said so. In the case of Allen, the
House of Lords did read into the words of the provision the word ‘permanently’
after ‘intention’. In so doing it has rendered the offence ‘toothless’. Is this a case of
double standards and do you agree with the decision in Allen?

1. State the essential elements of fraud by false representation.
2. Explain what a representation is.
3. Give examples of an express representation of fact, of law and of a state of mind.
4. Give three examples of an implied representation.
5. State, illustrate and explain the circumstances in which a person can be making a
representation by staying silent.
6. State, illustrate and explain what ‘false’ means for the purpose of the Fraud Act
2006.
7. State, illustrate and explain the circumstances in which a representation can be

false although the representor believes it to be true.
8. State and explain the mens rea for fraud by representation.
9. Explain when it is proper to charge fraud by abuse of position rather than by false
representation.
10. State the essential elements of obtaining services dishonestly.
11. State, explain and illustrate what is meant by ‘services’ for the purpose of this
offence.
12. Explain and illustrate the situations in which a person can be liable for both fraud
and obtaining services dishonestly.
13. Explain and illustrate the situations in which a person can be liable for obtaining
services dishonestly but not fraud.
14. Explain and illustrate the situations in which making off without payment – but no
other property offences – can be charged.
15. Explain what ‘making off’ comprises for the purpose of s.3 of the Theft Act 1978.
16. State, explain and illustrate the requirement that the defendant makes off from the
‘spot where payment is due’.
17. Explain the relevance of a person purchasing goods on credit for their potential
liability under s.3 of the Theft Act 1978.
18. Explain the mens rea for making off without payment.
13 Criminal damage
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
13.1 Simple criminal damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
13.2 Aggravated criminal damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Introduction
The Criminal Damage Act 1971 was designed to simplify the law and to ensure
consistency with other property offences (principally theft). It contains a basic offence
of damaging property and an aggravated offence where the damage to property is
foreseen or intended to endanger life.
Criminal law 13 Criminal damage page 173
13.1 Simple criminal damage

Section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 states:
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to
another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether
any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.
The maximum punishment for a violation of s.1(1) following a trial on indictment is 10

years’ imprisonment (s.4(2)). Where the offence is committed by fire it will be charged
as arson with a potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
13.1.1 Actus reus: simple criminal damage

As with theft there are three elements of the actus reus.
uu There must be property.
uu That property must belong to another.
uu D must damage that property.
13.1.2 Property
Property is defined in a similar way to property for the purpose of theft. However, it
does not include things in action or intangible property as these are immaterial and so
cannot suffer damage. Another significant difference is that there are no restrictions
regarding land or buildings. Indeed the most common subject of criminal damage, as
in arson, will be land and buildings.
Section 10 states:
(1) in this Act ‘property’ means property of a tangible nature, whether real or personal,
including money and:
(a) including wild creatures which have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captivity,
and any other wild creatures or their carcasses if, but only if, they have been
reduced into possession which has not been lost or abandoned or are in the
course of being reduced into possession; but
(b) not including mushrooms growing wild on any land or flowers, fruit or foliage of a
plant growing wild on any land.
For the purposes of this subsection ‘mushroom’ includes any fungus and ‘plant’
includes any shrub or tree.
Criminal damage therefore includes damage to land, including cultivated plants and
domesticated animals. It includes damage to things on the land, whether or not they
form part of the land. It also includes damage to personal property such as cars, vases,
carpets, food, drink, paper, clothes and so on.
13.1.3 Destroys or damages property

‘Destroys’ adds nothing to ‘damages’ and so here we will consider what counts
as damage. Any alteration to the physical nature of the property may amount to
damage, depending on the circumstances, the nature of the property and the
nature of the alteration. Whether property has been damaged is a question of fact
for the magistrates or jury. The case of Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48 involved
dismantling a scaffold barrier across the road. D was acquitted of criminal damage
to the bar component of the barrier. The court made the point that a scratch on the
bar of the barrier would not be damage as it could not have impaired its value or
usefulness, as scaffolding components get scratched in the normal course of events.
This case shows that whether or not damage has occurred can be determined only by
considering the object and the nature of the change wrought to it. If D had scratched
a piece of furniture instead of a scaffold bar, the jury would no doubt have considered
the damage element satisfied. Again, if he had been charged with damage to the
barrier as a whole, by dismantling it, he might have been convicted.
Activity 13.1
a. Read Wilson, Chapter 17 ‘Criminal damage’. Note down as many different
examples of criminal damage as you can find for future reference.
b. Why, in Henderson and Battley (1984), was depositing 30 lorry loads of rubble on
a building site criminal damage?
c. Do you agree with the view in Smith and Hogan (2015) that wheel clamping
should count as criminal damage, contrary to the decision in Drake v DPP (1994)?
13.1.4 Property belonging to another

By s.10(2) property for the purposes of the act belongs to any person:
(a) having the custody or control of it;
(b) having in it any proprietary right or interest (not being an equitable interest arising
only from an agreement to transfer or grant an interest); or
(c) having a charge on it.
Section 10 goes on to state that
(3) Where property is subject to a trust, the persons to whom it belongs shall be so
treated as including any person having a right to enforce the trust.
(4) Property of a corporation sole shall be treated as belonging to the corporation

notwithstanding a vacancy in the corporation.
This provision bears comparison with the position with theft. The offence is
committed only if the property damaged belongs to someone else. So the owner of
property can commit criminal damage of that property if it also belongs to someone
else in the sense provided by s.10. This would cover part owners of real or personal
property, tenants or occupiers of land, and those in possession or control of real or
personal property. So if, on the facts of Turner [1971] 1 WLR 901, D had damaged his car
rather than taken it, he would have committed the actus reus of criminal damage.
Likewise if a landlord damages the house let to their tenant, or vice versa, the actus
reus is satisfied.
The key thing to notice here is that it is not (simple) criminal damage to damage one’s
own property, so long as it does not also belong to another in one of these senses.
In Denton [1982] 1 All ER 65, D set fire to T’s property at T’s request, to perpetrate
an insurance fraud. He was convicted at first instance but his conviction was later
quashed. The insurance company had no proprietary interest in the property damaged
and T was the sole owner, so could not be liable. As Lord Lane CJ said in this case: ‘It
is not an offence for a man to set light to his own property’. And if T was not liable, D
could not be either because of the presence of T’s consent (see s.5(2)).
13.1.5 Mens rea: simple criminal damage

The defendant must intend to damage property belonging to another or be reckless in
respect of causing such damage. Intention carries its general meaning. The meaning of
recklessness for the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act was for many years a matter
of controversy until the House of Lords’ decision in G [2003] UKHL 50 which returned
recklessness to its previous (subjective) meaning. These states of mind were explained
and discussed in Chapter 5 of this module guide, and reference should be made to them.
Note: Remember that intention includes having damage as one’s objective or

foreseeing it as virtually certain. D is reckless if they recognised the risk of damage to
property and nevertheless went on to take that risk unreasonably. Recklessness does
not always require conscious awareness of the risk at the time of acting. It includes the
case of someone who closes their mind to the risk (Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600, Booth v CPS
[2006] EWHC 192 (Admin)).
It should be understood that legal principle requires mens rea to extend to every single
aspect of the actus reus. This means that the prosecution must prove not merely that
D intended damage to property (or recklessness) but more specifically that they also
intended (or were reckless) to damage property belonging to another. It is an answer
to the charge, therefore, that D believed they were damaging their own property. In
Smith [1974] QB 354, a tenant was found not guilty of damaging wiring in the apartment
he was renting. He had installed it himself and this had led him to believe it belonged
to him not the lessor.
13.1.6 Lawful excuse

Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 refers to damaging property without lawful
excuse. Apart from the general defences, which will always be available, s.5 provides
for two offence-specific defences. These are belief in the owner’s consent and belief
that it is necessary to protect one’s own property.
Subsection s.5(2) states:
A person charged with an offence to which this section applies shall, whether or not he
would be treated for the purposes of this Act as having a lawful excuse apart from this
subsection, be treated for those purposes as having a lawful excuse–
(a) if at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed
that the person or persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the
destruction of or damage to the property in question had so consented, or would
have so consented to it if he or they had known of the destruction of or damage
and its circumstances; or
(b) if he destroyed or damaged...the property in question...in order to protect

property belonging to himself or another or a right or interest in property which
was or which he believed to be vested in himself or another, and at the time of the
act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed –
(i) that the property, right or interest was in immediate need of protection; and
(ii) that the means of protection adopted or proposed to be adopted were or

would be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.
Section 5 is the Criminal Damage Act equivalent of s.2 of the Theft Act 1968.
With respect to both of these lawful excuses it is enough that the belief was honestly
held. There is no requirement that the belief be reasonable.
13.1.7 Belief in the consent of the person or persons believed to be

entitled to consent
Normally speaking, the person believed to be entitled to consent will be the owner,
but not necessarily. It may include the owner’s agent or manager or any other person
D thinks has the power of consent.
Note: The person believed to be entitled to consent does not include God: an
ingenious argument put forward by the defendant clergyman in Blake v DPP [1993]
Crim LR 586 as a defence to a charge of damaging property by graffiti!
Section 5(2)(a) provided the defendant with his excuse in Denton (see above). It also
provided the defendant with her excuse in Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527. D, after
an evening’s drinking, found that she had been locked out of her home. She broke
into a house which, in her drunken state, she thought belonged to a friend who would
consent. In fact she was mistaken; it was the house next door. The magistrates held
that she could not rely upon s.5(2)(a) since her belief in consent was brought about by
self-induced intoxication (see Chapter 10). The Divisional Court quashed the conviction
relying on s.5(3) which states: ‘For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether
a belief is justified or not if it is honestly held’.
Mustill J said that:
the court is required by s.5(3) to focus on the existence of the belief, not its intellectual
soundness; and a belief can be just as much honestly held if it is induced by intoxication,
as if it stems from stupidity, forgetfulness or inattention.
13.1.8 Damaging property in order to protect a person’s own property or

an interest therein
The simplest case of s.5(2)(b) is where D damages property in order to protect their
own property (e.g. shoots a dog worrying their sheep or sets fire to a haystack to
prevent a fire on neighbouring land spreading to their house). The defence extends
beyond property to property interests. So knocking down a wall blocking a right of
way was held to be a lawful excuse in Chamberlain v Lindon [1998] 1 WLR 1252.
Section 5(2)(b) has been held to apply only where the damage done is for the direct and
immediate purpose of protecting property. So in Hunt (1978) 66 Cr App R 105, D argued
that he set fire to a bed in an old people’s home to draw attention to the non-working
fire alarm. The Court of Appeal ruled that this was not a lawful excuse. D’s action was
taken not to protect the old people’s home from damage but to act as a warning. In
short, the act must be for the direct purpose of protecting property from harm.
13.2 Aggravated criminal damage

Section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 states:
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, whether
belonging to himself or another –
(a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any
property would be destroyed or damaged ; and
(b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being
reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered;
shall be guilty of an offence.
Simple criminal damage is a property crime. Aggravated criminal damage, however,

is a hybrid offence against property and against the person. Its core application is
cases of dangerous arson. The kind of case covered by the aggravated offence is A-G’s
Reference (No 50 of 2005) [2005] EWCA Crim 2041, in which the defendant used petrol to
set fire to his room in hostel, in the hope that he would be rehoused. The hostel was
destroyed. The aggravated offence was committed – D had committed arson and he
was reckless as to whether life would be endangered by that arson.
Although dangerous arson is the usual fact scenario, the offence extends to all
cases where, by damaging property, other people’s lives are put at risk. Because it is
designed to protect people from harm, this offence can be committed irrespective of
whether the property damaged belongs to another.
13.2.1 Elements of the offence

uu There must be intentional or reckless damage to property.
uu The property does not have to belong to another person.
uu The person must intend to endanger life by that damage, or be reckless as to

whether life would be endangered by that damage.
The requirement that the risk to life must derive from the damage done to the
property needs to be understood, so it is particularly important to do Activity 13.2.
Activity 13.2
Read Wilson, Section 17.3 ‘Criminal damage endangering life’. Which of the
following are not forms of aggravated criminal damage and why? Make sure you
take notes recording your answer. It is an important point.
a. Cutting the brake cable in a car.
b. Exploding dynamite during office hours in a bank vault in order to gain access to
a safe.
c. Demolishing a high wall on a public street, or felling a tree, without taking

precautions to safeguard passers by.
d. Ripping out copper electrified cables on a railway line, leaving live wires
exposed.
e. Throwing a stone through a car windscreen intending to hit V, the driver.
f. Shooting a hole in the tyre of a car while it is being driven by V.

Simple criminal damage

1. State the differences and similarities between the meaning of property in the
context of criminal damage and theft.
2. State and explain when a person can be guilty of damaging their own property.
3. Explain and illustrate what ‘damage’ means for the purpose of the Criminal Damage
Act 1971.
4. State and explain the mens rea for criminal damage.
5. State, explain and illustrate the ‘lawful excuses’ under s.5 of the Criminal Damage
Act 1971.
6. Explain why a person who cuts through a neighbour’s fence in order to rescue
the neighbour’s dog from drowning in their pond has a lawful excuse to criminal
damage on the fence.
7. Explain why a similar person who throws his neighbour’s dog into the pond in
order to demonstrate to the neighbour how dangerous the pond is to the dog
does not have a lawful excuse to committing criminal damage on the dog.
Aggravated criminal damage

1. State and explain the elements of aggravated criminal damage.
2. Give three examples of how the offence can be committed other than by arson.
3. State the doctrinal distinctions between simple and aggravated criminal damage.
4. Explain why it is not necessary in relation to aggravated criminal damage for the
property damaged to belong to another.
5. Explain why, in Steer (1987) (Wilson 17.3.B ‘Mens rea’), a person who shot a gun
through a closed window of a room hoping to endanger the life of the people in
the room was not guilty of aggravated criminal damage.
Notes
14 Criminal attempts
Contents
14.1 Retribution or prevention? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
14.2 Actus reus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
14.3 Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
14.4 Impossible attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Notes
Criminal law 14 Criminal attempts page 181
14.1 Retribution or prevention?

The difference between the person who tries to commit a crime and fails and their
counterpart who is successful may be nothing more than a gun which misfires, poor
aim or a victim who ducks. From a penological perspective, both offenders may be
equally dangerous and equally in need of rehabilitation and restraint.
Therein lies one rationale for the law of criminal attempts. However, there is a problem
with this rationale in that criminal law generally is premised on the defendant having
done something manifestly wrong which demands retributive punishment. If the
rationale behind the law of criminal attempts is to prevent people who intend to
commit an offence from committing it, then it may justify a law of criminal attempts
which allows the intervention of law enforcement agencies well before the defendant
has done anything manifestly wrong. What is the law of attempts for – retribution or
prevention? (See Chapter 2 of this module guide and Wilson, Chapter 3 ‘Punishment’.)
This confusion at the heart of criminal attempts has created some destabilising
doctrine. Consider, for example, the case of Geddes (1996) 160 JP 697. D was found in
a boy’s lavatory in a school, armed with knife, rope and masking tape. He did this in
furtherance of an intention to falsely imprison a boy with a view to committing a
sexual assault. The question was whether this could amount to an attempt to falsely
imprison the boy. The judge ruled that it could and it was for the jury to decide
whether it did. The jury was in no doubt – D was convicted. The Court of Appeal,
however, quashed the conviction. To count as an attempt at false imprisonment, D had
to do more than prepare for it. He had to have done things which formed part of the
execution of the offence.
The difference between the approaches of the trial judge and the Court of Appeal is
simple. The trial judge was treating the law of criminal attempts as a way of preventing
dangerous and blameworthy people from committing offences. The Court of Appeal
was treating the law of criminal attempts as a means of punishing people who got
so near to the commission of a substantive crime as to be worthy of punishment for
its inherent wrongfulness, rather than for what it heralded. The former approach
is forward-looking and preventive; the latter is backward-looking and retributive
(see Chapter 2 of this module guide). Some jurisdictions, for example the United
States, follow the former approach. Some, such as England and Wales and most other
common law jurisdictions, follow the latter approach, albeit with some degree of
equivocation.
Prior to the Criminal Attempts Act 1861, the law was that there should be proximity
between the offence intended and the acts done by the accused in furtherance of
the commission of that offence. The need for proximity was first advanced in the case
of Eagleton (1855) 169 ER 826, in which the defendant was given the job of delivering
bread to the poor for which he was paid by the guardians of a parish. D claimed
the money but delivered loaves which were underweight and was charged with
attempting to obtain money by false pretences. Parke B gave the following statement
of principle which became the standard test for attempts.
Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be considered as
attempts to commit it; but acts immediately connected with it are...
Since the defendant in Eagleton had committed the last act needed on his part to
commit the offence, his act was clearly proximate (immediately connected) to it and
so he was guilty. Unfortunately, this led on occasions to judges insisting that an attempt
always required defendants to have performed the last act needed on their part for the
crime to be committed; in other words for them to have completed their attempt.
Activity 14.1
Read and takes notes on the discussion of the cases of Robinson and Comer v
Bloomfield in Wilson, Section 18.4.D ‘When does the attempt begin?The common
law tests’. Do you agree with the court’s decision in these two cases that the
defendants had not committed an attempt? What was their reason for reaching this
decision?
Generally, however, the courts did not require defendants to have performed the
last act necessary on their part to complete the attempt. So in White [1910] 2 KB 124 it
was said that a defendant could be guilty of attempting to kill his mother by poison
although the modus operandi was to poison by cumulative effect and the defendant
had administered only small amounts at the time he was convicted. A number of
different tests were essayed: for example, in Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 Lord Diplock
referred to the fact that the defendant had ‘crossed the Rubicon’; that is, he had
gone so far towards achieving his criminal objective that there was no turning back,
although there were still acts needed to be done.
Attempting to commit a crime was made a statutory offence by the Criminal Attempts
Act 1981. A major objective of the Act was to pinpoint with greater precision than
hitherto the quality of conduct which amounts to an attempt. The basic definition is
contained in s.1:
(1) If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act
which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty
of attempting to commit the offence.
14.2 Actus reus

In England and Wales, the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 is representative of the general
common law approach, which is to seek a midway point between acts of preparation
and acts of perpetration to constitute the attempt. Proximity to the completed
offence is still required but, in order to ensure a practical marriage of prevention
and retribution, the test for proximity is couched in terms which avoid specifying
the degree of proximity required. This is done by requiring an act which is ‘more
than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence’. Ireland, Canada, Victoria,
Singapore and Australian Capital Territory all use a similar formula. The emphasis in
each case is upon what remains to be done. Is the person in the process of executing
the offence or simply preparing for it?
Activity 14.2
Read Wilson, Section 18.5.A.1 ‘The act interpreted’ and answer the following
questions.
a. Did D in Geddes go beyond mere preparation? The Court of Appeal said not but
many critics of the case thought he had. What do you think?
b. Adam wants to kill his wife. Knowing that she has a potentially fatal heart
condition that is susceptible to fat and salt, he makes sure that every meal he
cooks for her is heavily laden with both fat and salt. Is Adam guilty of attempted
murder?
c. Did the defendant in Dagnall attempt to rape his victim? Why do you think he
was convicted when the defendant in Geddes was not? Are they both right?
14.2.1 When is an act ‘more than merely preparatory’?

The ‘more than merely preparatory’ test is still a proximity based test. The judge
decides whether the defendant’s acts are capable of being more than preparatory. If
they are so capable the jury then decides whether they are in fact. Judges have been
instructed to ignore pre-Criminal Attempts Act 1981 tests – such as the Rubicon test
– in favour of a test which distinguishes between when the defendant is ‘on the job’,
that is in the process of executing the offence, and when they are merely preparing
for this. In Gullefer [1990] 1 WLR 1063, D, in the course of a greyhound race, realised the
dog that he had put money on was not going to win, so he climbed on to the track in
an attempt to stop the race, hoping that this would enable him to recover his stake.
The stewards decided not to stop the race. It was held that D’s acts were too remote
from the offence he was charged with attempting (theft of the stake money). The
Court of Appeal held that at the time D was arrested he could not be in the process of
committing theft as the race had not been called off, so there would be no evidence of
him doing acts of execution fit to put to the jury. Lord Lane CJ said that the actus reus of
attempt is satisfied:
when the merely preparatory acts come to an end and the defendant embarks upon the
crime proper. When that is will depend of course upon the facts in any particular case.
It would have been different if the race had been called off, since then D was in a
position to execute the offence.
This test was also adopted in Campbell (1991) 93 Cr App R 350, where D was charged
with attempted robbery of a Post Office. He had reconnoitred the place, bought a
disguise and imitation firearm and had armed himself with a threatening note he was
intending to give to a cashier. D was arrested before he entered the Post Office. The
Court of Appeal, quashing his conviction, held that these were acts of preparation. He
had not embarked upon the crime proper.
Activity 14.3
This accounts also for the decision in Geddes. The Court of Appeal concluded that
what D had done was to make preparation for what he had in mind to carry out
later. As you will probably agree, these decisions may be logical but they are hardly
practical. Just how far does the would-be child molester or robber have to go before
they commit the attempt?
A case falling on the other side of the line is Jones (1990) 91 Cr App R 351. In this case,
D, who was jealous of V, got into V’s car while it was stationary and handed over a
letter. While V read it, D took a loaded sawn-off shotgun from his bag, pointed it at V
at a range of some 10 to 12 inches and said, ‘You are not going to like this’ or similar
words. V grabbed the end of the gun and pushed it sideways and upwards. There was a
struggle, during which V managed to throw the gun out of the window. D’s conviction
for attempted murder was upheld. The Court of Appeal rejected the contention that
he had not performed the last act necessary to commit the offence – he still had
to take off the safety catch, aim the gun and pull the trigger – and so had not gone
beyond the preparatory stage. In the Court’s view:
once he had got into [the] car, taken out the loaded gun and pointed it at the victim with
the intention of killing him, there was sufficient evidence for the consideration of the jury
on a charge of attempted murder.
Clearly the legal position continues to be uncertain and, because of the outcry arising
on the basis of cases such as Geddes, the Law Commission was charged with making
proposals for reform. Initially it considered the idea that a back-up inchoate offence of
preparing for crime might be used to mop up cases like Geddes, Campbell and Gullefer.
Disappointingly, in response to criticism of these proposals, it ended up making no
major recommendations for reform.
Activity 14.4
Do you think the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 succeeded in bringing greater
precision to the definition of a criminal attempt? Could you think of a better
definition than that appearing in s.1?
The following definition of a criminal attempt might be appropriate and would
at least discourage judges from reaching decisions such as that in Geddes. To
constitute an attempt:
A must have done an act which was directly connected with its commission and which
was the last act the actor contemplated as necessary to commit the intended offence, or
was a more remote act which, without being an act of mere preparation, formed part of a
sequence of connected acts designed for the execution of the offence.
This could be supplemented by a list of statutory illustrations covering the most

problematic cases.
Try applying this to the cases covered in Wilson, Section 18.5.A ‘Actus reus’ Does it
help?
14.3 Mens rea

Section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 specifies that attempt is a crime of specific
intent. A must intend to commit the substantive criminal offence. This means that
the mens rea of attempted murder is not the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm but the intention (specifically) to kill. This was made clear in Whybrow (1951) 35
Cr App R 141, in which D built an electric device to give an electric shock to his wife
when she took a bath. Parker J directed the jury that if it was satisfied that in doing so
D intended to kill his wife or do her grievous bodily harm, then he would be guilty of
attempted murder. The Court of Appeal ruled that this was a misdirection but upheld
the conviction as there had been no miscarriage of justice.
Activity 14.5
Why do you think the Court of Appeal considered that there had been no
miscarriage of justice in Whybrow?
As it is a crime of specific intent, this also means that recklessness is not enough. This
is so even if the substantive offence can be committed by recklessness. So in Mohan
[1976] QB 1, D was driving his car and responded to a police officer’s signal to stop. D
slowed down but then accelerated towards the police officer, who moved out of the
way, and D drove off. D was charged with attempting to cause bodily harm by wanton
driving at a police constable. The jury was directed that the prosecution had to prove
that D realised that such wanton driving would be likely to cause bodily harm. The
Court of Appeal quashed D’s conviction, ruling that a conviction for an attempt to
cause bodily harm by dangerous driving requires proof that D intended to cause harm
by dangerous driving. It was not sufficient to prove that D did not care whether he hit
the police officer when attempting to escape, nor that he knew it was likely.
Similarly, in O’Toole [1987] Crim LR 759 it was held that to be guilty of attempted arson
requires proof that D intended to cause damage by fire. A reckless use of combustibles
is not enough, even though this would be enough to convict of the substantive offence
of arson.
14.3.1 Circumstances
One qualification is in order. Consider crimes which require proof not only that a
particular result has occurred but also that certain circumstances exist. An example is
rape. The result which must be proved is sexual intercourse: the circumstance which
must be proved is absence of victim’s consent. The corresponding mens rea for rape is
an intention to have intercourse and knowledge that V is not consenting or absence of
reasonable grounds for believing that V is consenting. What is the corresponding mens
rea for attempted rape?
There are two possibilities. The first is that, in addition to an intention to have
intercourse, D also has to intend (i.e. know for a fact) that V is not consenting. In other
words, it would have to be D’s intention to have intercourse with a non-consenting
person (a very small minority of cases, one would hazard). This would acquit of
attempted rape any person who tried to have intercourse with a person and simply
did not care whether the person was consenting or not (the vast majority). In Khan
[1990] 1 WLR 813 it was held, at a time when recklessness as to consent was the
minimum mens rea requirement, that recklessness as to the circumstances was also
enough for attempted rape; that is, it was sufficient that D tried to have intercourse
with V, not caring one way or the other whether she was consenting or not.
The Khan approach to attempts has been expanded to other crimes. For example, in
A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1992) [1994] 2 All ER 121, on a charge of attempted aggravated
arson contrary to s.1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, it was held that it was
sufficient for the prosecution to establish a specific intent to cause damage by fire
and that D was reckless as to whether life would thereby be endangered. It was not
necessary to prove that D intended that the lives of others would be endangered by
the damage.
In 2014 the Court of Appeal adopted a rather different approach. In R v Pace it was held
that a scrap metal dealer who bought metal suspecting it to be stolen could not be
liable for attempting to commit the offence of concealing, disguising or converting
criminal property (lead) contrary to s.327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA).
The lead in their possession was not stolen and the fact that they suspected it was,
which was sufficient for the substantive offence, was insufficient for the attempt. This
is an astonishing decision which is clearly at odds with the decision in Khan and the
reason for it.
Activity 14.6
Read Wilson, Section 18.5.B.2 ‘Attempts and recklessness as to circumstances’ and
a. Since Khan was decided, the mens rea for rape has changed. It is not necessary
to show that D knew V was not consenting or did not care one way or the other.
D can be guilty of rape although he honestly believes V to be consenting if that
belief is not reasonable. What is the corresponding mens rea for attempted
rape? Is it still recklessness (D does not care one way or the other), or is it
enough that D has no reasonable grounds for believing V to consent?
b. Do you approve of the way that Khan was adopted in the A-G’s Reference (No 3 of
1992) case?
14.4 Impossible attempts

At common law, the courts got themselves into a mess with respect to what was
termed ‘impossible attempts’. A person could be guilty of an attempt if what they did
was factually incapable of producing the substantive offence (e.g. a pickpocket dipped
their hand into an empty pocket intending to steal from it) or if the means adopted
for the task were inadequate (e.g. someone tries to blow up a safe with a firework).
However, a person could not be guilty of an attempt if what they were doing was
legally incapable of producing a criminal offence.
Illustration 14.1
a. D shoots V, an already dead man, believing him to be alive.
b. D takes talcum powder through customs believing it to be heroin.
c. D buys a gold ring believing it to be stolen. It is not.
In each case, D intends to commit an offence and takes more than merely preparatory
steps towards achieving it; yet until 1981, D was guilty of nothing. Lord Hailsham in
Haughton and Smith [1975] AC 476 put it as follows.
Steps on the way to the commission of what would be a crime, if the acts were completed,
may amount to attempts to commit that crime, to which, unless interrupted, they would
have led; but steps on the way to the doing of something, which is thereafter done and
which is no crime, cannot be regarded as attempts to commit a crime. Equally, steps on
the way to do something which is thereafter not completed, but which if done would not
constitute a crime, cannot be indicted as attempts to commit that crime.
Section 1(2) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 reverses that rule. It provides that:
A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence to which this section applies
even though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.
Section 1(3) states further that in any case where:
(a) apart from this subsection a person’s intention would not be regarded as having
amounted to an intent to commit an offence; but
(b) if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would be so
regarded,
then, for the purposes of subsection (1) above, he shall be regarded as having had an
intent to commit that offence.
This convoluted provision means simply that, in deciding whether what the person
was doing was attempting to commit a crime, we should ignore whether the crime
would have resulted if the facts were as they actually were and consider rather
whether it would have resulted if the facts had been as they supposed.
In Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560, four years after the passing of the 1981 Act, the
House of Lords, incredibly, refused to accept that s.1(3) was intended to abolish the
rule that a person could not be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if (as in (b)
and (c) of Illustration 14.1 above), the steps he was taking could not have resulted in
the commission of an offence. As a result, D’s conviction for attempted handling was
quashed when the goods which D handled, and which he thought were stolen, were
not in fact stolen.
Eventually the House of Lords saw reason in Shivpuri [1987] AC 1. The defendant was
paid to act as a drugs courier. He was required to collect a package containing drugs
and to distribute its contents according to instructions which would be given to him.
On collecting the package D was arrested by police officers, and he confessed to them
that he believed its contents to be either heroin or cannabis. An analysis revealed the
contents of the package not to be drugs, but a harmless vegetable substance. D was
convicted for attempting to be knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring a
controlled drug, namely heroin. His appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. Lord
Bridge, who was in the Court which decided Anderton v Ryan, was handed the short
straw of confessing the Court’s error in the earlier case. He said, with admirable clarity,
making it even more astonishing that the mistake was made first time round:
the first question to be asked is whether the appellant intended to commit the offences…
The answer was plainly yes, he did. Next, did he… do an act which was more than merely
preparatory to the commission of the offence? [The acts were] clearly more than
preparatory to the commission of the intended offence… This… analysis leads me to the
provisional conclusion that the appellant was rightly convicted…
Activity 14.7
Read Wilson, Section 18.5.D ‘Impossibility’ and answer the following question.
Adam is a believer in voodoo. He believes that he can kill people by making a wax
model of them and sticking a pin in the model where the heart should be. He makes
such an image of Eve and sticks a pin in, intending to kill her. Is Adam guilty of
attempted murder? Should he be?

1. State the two rationales for criminal attempts.
2. State and explain the proximity approach to criminal attempts.
3. Explain why it has proved difficult to settle on a clear and effective rule governing
criminal attempts.
4. State the current test for deciding whether a person has performed an act which is
‘more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence’.
5. State and explain the mens rea for criminal attempts.
6. State and explain the mens rea for attempted murder.
7. Explain the legal position surrounding the mens rea for crimes, such as rape or
criminal damage, where proof of a circumstance is necessary in addition to a
consequence.
8. State and explain the rules governing ‘impossible attempts’.

15 Participation in crime
Contents
15.1 Complicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
15.2 Elements of accessoryship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
15.3 Joint enterprise liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
15.4 Difference in offence or liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
15.5 Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
15.6 Relationship between accessorial liability and inchoate liability . . . . 207

Notes
Criminal law 15 Participation in crime page 189
15.1 Complicity
Often more than one person is involved in the commission of a criminal offence.
The person who is the most immediate cause of the actus reus is known as the
principal. If two persons are involved, for example in stabbing a victim, they both
may be principals. If a person procures an innocent third party, say a child below the
age of criminal responsibility, to commit the actus reus of an offence, the principal
is the procurer. The principal is said to have committed the crime by using ‘an
innocent agent’. Everyone else who is involved in the commission of the offence
and is criminally liable is referred to as an accessory, also known as an accomplice,
or secondary party. Complicity itself is also known as secondary party liability,
accomplice liability or, simply, accessoryship. These words can be used interchangebly.
The legal position regarding complicity is set out in the Accessories and Abettors Act
1861. Section 8 states:
Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence…
shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender.
The effect of this is that an accessory to an offence is guilty of the substantive offence,
rather than – in the case of conspiracy, for example – an inchoate offence.
Prosecutors will generally specify whether a person is being charged as principal or

accessory, but this is not strictly necessary since the secondary party is being indicted for
the substantive offence rather than their participation in it (Swindall and Osborne (1846)
2 Cox CC 141). This has the advantage for the prosecution of allowing a case to proceed
even where it is not clear which of two or more parties was the principal and which
was the accessory. For example, in Giannetto [1996] Crim LR 722, W had been murdered
but there was insufficient evidence to show whether the killing was done by G, W’s
husband, or by a hitman who G had procured to do the killing. The Court of Appeal said
that this lack of evidence was not fatal to the conviction since, one way or another, G had
committed murder – either by killing W himself or by encouraging another to do so.
Activity 15.1
Read Wilson, Section 19.2.E ‘Trial procedure’. Compare this with the position where
the prosecution can prove that one of two has committed a murder. For example,
in the case of Lane and Lane (1986) where it was clear that one of them had killed
their child but not which one. Why were they both acquitted? Consider now Smith v
Mellors and Soar. Do you agree with the decision? What principle of criminal justice
does this case illustrate?
One last point needs to be made. Although the accessory is tried, indicted and
punished in the same way as the principal offender, what the prosecution needs
to establish to gain a conviction differs alarmingly. This is because the elements of
liability of accessoryship are quite distinct from those of the substantive offence.
For example, to be guilty of murder as principal, the prosecution must prove that
the principal, in furtherance of an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm
to V, performed an act which caused V’s death. By contrast, to be guilty of murder
as secondary party, the prosecution must prove only that A, in furtherance of an
intention to assist or encourage P to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to V, provided
such acts or encouragement. It does not have to prove that A intended the death of or
grievous bodily harm to V. It does not even have to show that A’s acts of assistance or
encouragement caused P to kill V or even influenced P’s actions.
Illustration 15.1
P wants to kill V. He orders A, under pain of death, to drive him to V’s house and wait
for him and then drive him away again. A does this, foreseeing that P might kill or
cause grievous bodily harm to V but hoping that he will not (a variation on the facts
of DPP v Lynch (1975)). P kills V.
A is guilty, along with P, of murder although he has no mens rea for murder and his
acts do not cause V’s death. He is guilty because he intends (indirectly) to help P (by
driving the getaway car) commit what will be, if it takes place, the crime of murder
(killing with intent).
15.2 Elements of accessoryship
15.2.1 Actus reus
P must have committed an offence

The theory underlying accessoryship is that A’s liability does not derive from what A
has done but what P has done. This is why a gunsmith is guilty of murder simply by
supplying a gun to P which they know will be used to commit murder. A’s liability
derives from the fact that they have lent support to P in the commission of the offence
of murder. In theory, then, if P does not commit an offence, A cannot be complicit in
it. This does not require P to be convicted or even for his identity to be known – P may
have fled the country – so long as there is evidence that P, or someone, committed the
relevant crime and A aided and abetted that crime. There is one statutory exception
to this rule that a person cannot be an accessory to something which is not a crime,
namely complicity in suicide under s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961.
Proving that a crime has been committed will usually involve the prosecution
proving all the elements of that crime. So in Thornton v Mitchell [1940] 1 All ER 339,
a bus conductor was helping his driver to reverse. His instructions were hopelessly
inadequate and the driver collided with a pedestrian, causing the pedestrian’s death.
The driver was convicted at first instance of driving without due care and attention
and the conductor was convicted for aiding and abetting the offence. On appeal the
driver’s conviction was quashed because it was quite reasonable for him to rely on the
conductor’s guidance in reversing a bus. The conductor’s conviction was also therefore
quashed, since there was no crime for the conductor to aid. This principle applies even
where A is charged with procuring, rather than simply aiding and abetting, the offence
(Loukes [1996] 1 Cr App R 444).
A person can remain liable as an accessory, however, where the actus reus of the
offence is committed, even though the principal is acquitted because they lack mens
rea, or have a defence. To understand how, complete the activity below.
Activity 15.2
Read Wilson, Section 19.5.A ‘Conviction of secondary party where perpetrator is not
liable’ and answer the following questions.
a. If A’s liability as an accessory derives from the fact that P has committed an
offence, why then was the procurer in Cogan and Leak (1976) and Bourne (1952)
guilty of the offence?
b. What was the particular theoretical problem attached to convicting the

husband of rape in Cogan and Leak?
c. Do you think that the decisions in both cases were more driven by a desire to
punish an appalling case of wrongdoing than respect for legal principle?
Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the offence

The conduct elements for accessoryship are aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring
an offence. In theory each of these terms describes distinct behaviours: ‘aid’ means to
help or assist, ‘abet’ involves instigation or encouragement, ‘counsel’ implies advising
or urging. However, these words have no particular magic and can usually be reduced
to two: encouraging or assisting (the commission of an offence).
Procedural matters
In practice the indictment will read, whatever the nature of A’s participation, ‘A
aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of’ murder, theft, criminal
damage, burglary and so on. Only in the case of ‘procure’ may it sometimes be
necessary to specify the precise nature of the participation. This is because one can
procure someone to commit an offence although there was no common enterprise,
as where A, without P’s knowledge, adulterates P’s drink which causes P to be over
the prescribed alcohol limit when driving a car. This will not be ‘aiding and abetting or
counselling’ the offence but it will be ‘procuring it’ (A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975]
QB 773). To procure means ‘to produce by endeavour’.
As with all other conduct elements, aid, abet, counsel and procure usually require
some form of act. It is not aiding or abetting rape for a soldier to watch silently while
the principal, another soldier, is committing the offence (Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402).
This is because watching silently offers no encouragement or assistance. If P did in
fact gain encouragement from the silent witness, say because it led P to think that A
approved P’s actions, the act requirement would be satisfied. In Coney (1882) 8 QBD
534, for example, the mere presence of spectators at an illegal prize fight was thought
to be prima facie evidence upon which the jury might find encouragement and so
convict as accessories. It was not necessary to show that any individual charged had
joined in the applause. A spectator would be liable in that situation, however, only if
they were aware that their attendance was acting as an encouragement to P. Without
this awareness, they would lack mens rea.
Activity 15.3
Read Wilson, Section 19.3.A.1 ‘Level of participation’, Section (c) ‘Complicity by
omission and inactivity’ and answer the following questions.
a. Under what circumstances does a duty to control another’s conduct arise so that
failure constitutes complicity in that other’s wrongdoing?
b. On the basis of Du Cros v Lambourne (1907), is a householder, who knows that her
guests intend to drive home, under a duty to ensure they do not drink alcohol in
excess of permitted limits?
Communication and causation

If the basis upon which A is charged is an act of encouragement, this has to be
communicated to the principal. If, therefore, P does not hear or read the words
of encouragement, A cannot be charged as an accessory on the basis of that act
alone. However, there need be no direct causal connection between the words of
encouragement and the commission of the offence. So in Calhaem [1985] QB 808,
a woman who hired a hitman to kill another woman had her conviction upheld on
appeal, although there was evidence that the hitman may have killed on his own
account rather than because of the woman’s encouragement.
In the case of assistance, however, there need be no communication. So a person who

acts as a lookout while others commit an offence, or puts a gun in another’s pocket
‘just in case’, is guilty of assisting although none of the principals knew of their action
(State v Tally (1894) 102 Ala 25). Again, no direct causal connection with the commission
of the substantive offence need be established. Nor, indeed, need the words of
encouragement or the assistance be substantial. Saying ‘Oh, goody’ in response to
a proposal to kill is sufficient encouragement (Giannetto (1996)). Supplying a pair of
gloves to help prevent fingerprint identification is sufficient assistance.
Activity 15.4
Read Wilson, Section 19.3.A.1 ‘Level of participation’, Section (b) ‘Is a causal link
between the accessory’s contribution and the substantive crime necessary?’ and
a. A procures P, a hitman, to kill C. On the way to C’s house, P is involved in a car
accident which results in P’s car being badly damaged. P gets out of the car to
remonstrate with the driver and, after an argument with him, kills him. By a
coincidence, the driver is C. Is A complicit in the murder?
Read Wilson, Sections 8.1 ‘Introduction’, 19.3.A.1 ‘Level of participation’, Section (b)
‘Is a causal link between the accessory’s contribution and the substantive crime
necessary?’ and 19.5.A ‘Conviction of secondary party where perpetrator is not
liable’ and answer the following question. This time it involves consideration of
different parts of the course.
b. A procures P, a hitman, to kill C. On the way to C’s house, P is involved in a car

accident which kills the driver of the other car. By a coincidence, the driver is C.
i. Is P guilty of murder?
ii. If P is not guilty of murder, is A nevertheless liable as an accessory to murder?
15.2.2 Mens rea

The mental element of accessoryship was described by Devlin J in NCB v Gamble [1959]
1 QB 11 as follows:
aiding and abetting is a crime that requires proof of mens rea, that is to say, of intention to
aid [or encourage] as well as of knowledge of the circumstances.
This means that A’s acts of assistance or encouragement should be given with a view
to encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence, and the aider or encourager
should know the nature of the offence to be committed. This basic explanation is
deceptively simple (remember it!) and so we need to consider it more closely.
Intention to assist or encourage

You might have hoped that by this time in your studies we would not have to look
again at the meaning of intention. Unfortunately, complicity is probably the most
significant area where its meaning has been considered. This is because, in our
everyday lives, we all do acts which we know will assist or encourage others to commit
offences. Authors may write crime novels with plots or information which may help
or encourage readers to commit copycat crimes, such as murder, as was alleged of
Anthony Burgess’s A clockwork orange. A magazine article may explain in meticulous
detail how fraudsters can bypass the chip and pin system in using a stolen credit card.
TV journalists may broadcast footage of prison or urban riots, which encourage others
to do likewise. Shopkeepers or internet providers may sell weapons which may later
be used to cause harm, or clothes or equipment otherwise useful in the commission
of an offence. Others may offer alcoholic drinks to dinner guests whose only means
of getting home is by driving a car, or give money to a beggar, thus encouraging them
to persist in begging (not in itself an indictable offence but which is often associated
with fraudulent practices), or to a prostitute thus encouraging her pimp to continue
illegally exploiting her. Are these activities forms of criminal complicity?
This is a complex question. By intention, is it enough for the prosecution to show

that A knew that their acts would (or even might) assist or encourage P to commit
an offence? Or does it have to show that A acted in order to encourage or assist its
commission? In NCB v Gamble, Devlin agreed with the first approach:
If one man deliberately sells to another a gun to be used for murdering a third, he may be
indifferent whether the third man lives or dies and interested only in the cash profit to be
made out of the sale, but he can still be an aider and abetter.
This statement was approved and clarified in JF Alford Transport Ltd [1997] Crim LR
745. Lorry drivers pleaded guilty to misrepresenting their mileage on a tachograph
record. The appellants, their employers, were convicted of aiding and abetting those
offences. On appeal it was argued, inter alia, that the trial judge wrongly directed
the jury that the passive acquiescence of the employers in the offence committed
by their drivers was sufficient to amount to aiding and abetting the offence. This
argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. The trial judge was correct. What
mattered was knowledge of the principal offence, coupled with the ability to control
the action of the offender and the deliberate decision to refrain from doing so. The
Court of Appeal said that proof of these things entitled the jury, in the absence of any
alternative explanation, to infer that ‘the company had been positively encouraging
what was going on’. In other words on the issue of what could amount to positive
encouragement the prosecution approach was correct. Thus if the management’s
reason for turning a blind eye was to keep the drivers happy rather than to encourage
the production of false tachograph records that would afford no defence.
The appeal was allowed, however, on the basis that there was insufficient evidence
that the employers knew what was going on.
The importance of this restatement of the mens rea requirement in complicity is twofold.
First, it indicates the importance that A knows, rather than simply suspects, that their
conduct will assist or encourage the commission of an offence. Second, the restatement
is consistent with the principle laid down in Moloney, and upheld in Woollin, that acting in
the knowledge that a particular consequence will follow from one’s act is evidence that
the consequence was intended but not intention as a matter of law. As the statement
itself says, it entitles the jury, ‘in the absence of any alternative explanation, to infer…’
This gives the jury some discretion not to infer an intention to assist or encourage from
knowledge where there is ‘an alternative explanation’.
A prime example of where an alternative explanation was available is Gillick [1986]

AC 112 in which the House of Lords made clear that a doctor who gave contraceptive
advice to an underage girl was not to be taken to have intended to assist or encourage
the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse by virtue only of knowing that it would
for certain have this effect. The alternative explanation here is that the doctor was
simply performing his medical duty of preventing an unwanted pregnancy.
Activity 15.5
Revisit the examples given at the beginning of this section of people doing acts
which they know will assist or encourage others to commit offences but without
wanting to. What would prevent their liability as an accomplice if it could be
proved that someone benefited from the acts when committing a crime?
Knowledge of the circumstances

Clearly a person cannot be held responsible for assisting or encouraging the
commission of an offence unless they know that what they are doing will have this
effect. In Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544, it was put as follows:
Before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence, he
must at least know the essential matters which constitute that offence.
There are three facets to this principle.
uu A is not responsible unless they know that P’s intentions are criminal and the
circumstances which would make it so.
uu A is not responsible if P commits a crime other than the crime to which support is
lent.
uu A is not responsible, although they know their acts will assist or encourage P to
commit some kind of crime, unless they have a good idea of what crime P intends
to commit.
Illustration 15.2
A, a garage mechanic, believing B to be the rightful owner of C’s car, gives B the keys
to the car. B takes the keys and steals the car.
A is not liable as an accessory to theft. Although he intends to assist B to take the car,
he does not intend to assist B to steal the car. This requires A to know that B is not the
owner and that he intends to dishonestly misappropriate the car.
Activity 15.6
Read Wilson, Section 19.4.B ‘Knowledge of circumstances’ and answer the following
questions. Be sure to record your answers and the reasons for them for later use.
a. P is committing a bank robbery. He points his gun at V, a bank teller. A, a bank
customer, sees B, another customer, just about to tackle P. In his excitement A
shouts, ‘Go on, get him!’ P thinks A is encouraging him to kill V, which he does. Is
A liable as an accessory to murder?
b. A encourages B to have intercourse with V. Neither A nor B know that V is under

age. What is the criminal liability of A and B?
c. A, a gunsmith, sells a revolver type handgun to P, a suspicious-looking character.

He suspects that, although P has a licence for the gun, the licence may be forged
and that the gun may be used for a wrongful purpose, including murder. P does
use the gun for this purpose. Is A liable as an accomplice to murder?
d. P asks A, a gunsmith, for a replica gun which looks ‘as authentic as possible’.
A believes the gun is to be used to hold up a bank but he sells it to P anyway.
In fact, P modifies the gun so that it is capable of firing bullets. P kills V, a bank
teller, with it. Is A liable as an accomplice to murder?
e. A, who does not like V, tells P, her friend, that V deserves a good beating and asks
him to effect it. P goes round to V’s house and shoots him dead. Is A complicit in
the murder?
How much detail need the accessory know?

Johnson v Youden says that the accessory needs to know the ‘essential elements of the
offence’: in other words, the essential things which will make the principal’s conduct a
criminal offence. In Illustration 15.2, this will require A to know:
uu that the car belongs to someone other than B. He does not need to know precisely
who it belongs to
uu that B intends not to return it – A would not be an accomplice to theft if he

believed that B was taking the car for a temporary period
uu that B’s taking is dishonest – A would not be an accomplice to theft if he believed

that the car had been abandoned and the owner could not be found.
Activity 15.7
Sometimes the secondary party may not know the precise crime to be committed
but knows that some crime is intended. Is this lack of precise knowledge always
fatal to a criminal charge? Read Wilson, Section 19.4.B ‘Knowledge of circumstances’
for an answer to this important question. What principle derives from Bainbridge
[1960] 1 QB 129? Learn this principle (by heart if possible). Using the same section of
Wilson, now answer the following question.
P, a criminal, asks A, his sister, to drive him to a particular destination. A asks P what
he is going to do. P says ‘It’s better you don’t know’. A drives P there and then drives
off. P kills V. Is A an accessory to murder?
In practice, however, few assisters or encouragers have ‘no idea’ what the intended
offence is to be. As a result, doctrine has further developed to diminish the
significance of the ‘I had no idea’ defence. After Bainbridge another development
occurred in DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140, in which A was told
by a member of the Ulster Defence Army (an illegal terrorist organisation) to guide a
car to a public house. Driving his own car, A led another car containing three or four
men to the public house and then went home. One of the men threw a bomb into the
public house, but the attack failed due to action taken by the son of the public house
licensee. A was charged with doing an act with intent to cause an explosion by a bomb,
contrary to s.3(a) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, and with possession of a bomb,
contrary to s.3(b) of that Act. A was convicted of both offences as an accomplice. He
appealed, contending that since he did not know what form the attack would take, or
of the presence of the bomb in the other car, he could not properly be convicted of
aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes of which he was ignorant. The Court
of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland dismissed his appeal. A then appealed to the
House of Lords.
Activity 15.8
Read Wilson, Section 19.4.B ‘Knowledge of circumstances’. What was the outcome
of the appeal in Maxwell? Find the principle the House of Lords formulated in
reaching its decision and learn it. Together with Bainbridge, it covers most of what
you need to know and understand about the liability of accessories where they are
unsure of the crime the principal intends to commit.
The effect of these two cases (Maxwell and Bainbridge) is to significantly reduce the
power of the secondary party to claim that they should not be held accountable
because they did not know the essential elements of the offence to be committed.
What are we left with? Here is a summary.
Summary
uu If A does not know P intends to commit a crime, A cannot be liable as an accessory
although they give assistance and/or encouragement to P in the acts which
constitute that crime.
uu If A believes that P intends to commit crime X but in fact P commits crime Y, A is not
complicit in crime Y (questions (d) and (e), Activity 15.6).
uu If A does acts which lend assistance or encouragement to P who commits a crime,

but without knowing or intending that their acts offer that support, A cannot be
liable as an accessory to P’s crime (question (b), Activity 15.6).
uu If A gives advice or assistance to someone, suspecting that the advice or assistance

may be used to commit a crime but not knowing for sure, they cannot be guilty as
an accessory (question (c), Activity 15.6).
uu If A gives advice or assistance knowing that P intends to commit a crime but has no
idea what the crime is or what type of crime it is, A cannot be guilty as an accessory.
uu If A gives advice or assistance, knowing a crime is to be committed, not knowing

the precise details but knowing the type of crime it is, A is liable as an accessory
(Bainbridge).
uu If A gives advice or assistance, knowing a crime is to be committed, not knowing

the precise details nor the type of crime it is, but contemplating its commission
because it is on their mental ‘list’ of possible crimes to be committed, A is liable as
an accessory (Maxwell).
Liability of accessories for unforeseen consequences

We have considered the case of a supplier, A, who supplies P with an article useful in
the commission of an offence but P deliberately commits another offence. Here, A is
not complicit in that offence (question (d), Activity 15.6). The principle is the same if
A’s participation was by way of encouragement. The question arises, however, as to A’s
liability if the deviation is not deliberate. The basic principle of derivative liability is
that A is liable to the extent that P is liable. A, like P, bears the risk of the consequences
turning out other than was expected, so long as P did not deliberately deviate
substantially from the terms upon which help or encouragement was given.
Illustration 15.3
A procures P to kill C by poison. P mistakenly administers the poison to V, not C. V is
poisoned and dies.
P is guilty of the murder of V. A is complicit since A encouraged the poisoning, knowing
that it was P’s intention to commit murder, and V’s death arose from the execution of
that intention. A’s derivative liability means that both A and P take responsibility under
the doctrine of transferred malice.
Illustration 15.4
A procures P to poison C. P gives a poisoned apple to C to eat. Later C, not knowing
what it contains, gives the apple (in P’s absence) to V, who eats it and dies.
P is guilty of the murder of V by virtue of the doctrine of transferred malice. A will be
complicit since, again, A encouraged the poisoning, knowing that it was P’s intention
to commit murder, and V’s death arose from the execution of that intention. A’s
derivative liability means that both A and P take responsibility under the doctrine of
transferred malice.
Illustration 15.5
A encourages P to ‘give V a good beating’. P does give V a good beating and V dies.
P is guilty of either murder or manslaughter depending upon his mens rea. Accordingly,
A is guilty as an accessory as her liability derives from that of P. A will be guilty of
murder if she gave P encouragement knowing that P’s intention was to commit
grievous bodily harm (one of the essential elements of the offence of murder).
Otherwise A will be guilty of manslaughter.
Illustration 15.6
A procures P to kill C by poisoning. P, having no poison, kills C by shooting him with
a gun.
This is a deliberate variation, but not a substantial one, since the ‘essential elements
of offence’ – intentionally killing C – are known to A.
Complicated? To adopt the words of a song title – ‘You ain’t seen nothing yet’. In the
following section, we shall examine joint enterprise liability, an area of law which, in
my view and in the view of many others, is shamefully and unnecessarily complex.
Do not let this put you off: I warn you simply to ensure that, if you do find it a bit
confusing, you do not think it is your fault! Even judges find the area enormously
challenging. The good news is that the basic principle is easy to understand: it is the
application of that principle which has proved the challenge. In order to make things
as simple to understand as possible, I shall give you a lot of illustrations.
15.3 Joint enterprise liability

As I hope you will now understand, there are two main ways of participating in crime.
The first form involves the secondary party giving help or encouragement to a principal,
but not being an active participant in the commission of the offence. The second form,
as where a gang is formed to commit a particular crime, involves the secondary party
having an active role to play in the commission of the offence and sharing a common
purpose with the principal to commit that offence. This second form of participation in
crime is known as joint enterprise. Most of the confusion as to the potential scope of the
secondary party’s liability has arisen in this form of participation.
15.3.1 Basic outline of joint enterprise liability

In the normal course of events, where a criminal gang share a common purpose to
commit crime A and crime A is committed by one or more members of the gang, all
members of the gang are liable, either as principals or as accessories. This has been
explained above. An illustration follows.
Illustration 15.7
A and P are engaged in a joint enterprise to burgle C’s house. P breaks a window to
gain entrance.
Both A and P, in addition to being joint principals to the crime of burglary, are guilty
of criminal damage, P as principal, A as accessory since the damage to the window
arose out of the execution of the joint enterprise. A’s liability does not require this
to have been expressly agreed upon or even thought about.
Moreover, even the best-laid plans can go wrong. This might involve unexpected
events occurring and, due to the extreme pressure such enterprises excite, the
individuals involved will sometimes commit another offence in the heat of the
moment.
Illustration 15.8
A criminal gang, comprising A, B, C, D, E, F and G, decides to rob a bank. Each
member of the gang is allocated a specific role. It is A’s job to terrorise the bank
tellers; B’s and C’s jobs to monitor the customers; D’s job to act as a lookout; and E’s
job to drive the getaway car. Finally it is F’s and G’s jobs to take and load the money.
All of these people are members of the joint enterprise.
Suppose E drives the getaway car so fast in escaping the scene of the crime that a
pedestrian is killed. A, B, C, D, F, and G will be liable as accessories to the offence of
causing death by dangerous driving in addition to the robbery. Although this offence is
not part of the common purpose, the other parties are complicit because this offence
arose from the execution of the common purpose. They are liable because E is liable.
Suppose, however, A decides to shoot a bank teller, what is the liability of B, C, D, E, F

and G? Are they complicit in the murder as well as the robbery or is their liability only
limited to the robbery (the common purpose)? This is different from the previous
case because the killing does not form the common purpose, does not arise from
its execution and is deliberate and intentional. The basic principle, which is easy to
understand and that you must remember, is that the other parties will not be a party
to the murder unless it was agreed, expressly or impliedly, that this should happen or
should happen if the necessity arose.
Liability under these circumstances is known as ‘joint enterprise’ liability, since liability
for crime Y arises from a common purpose to commit crime X. D2’s liability is justified
on the ground that, by continuing with the common venture agreeing that D1 might
commit crime B in the course of it, they are regarded as having also lent their support
to this offence.
Elaboration
Joint enterprise doctrine has developed to address these kind of eventualities. The
basic principle governing joint enterprise liability is now understood to be the same
as in accessoryship generally; namely that, because the accessory’s liability derives
from that of the principal, any crime that P commits A also commits, so long as A
intentionally assisted or encouraged its commission. This is particularly pertinent in
cases of joint enterprise. One of the tasks of the jury, therefore, is to decide whether
A did intentionally assist or encourage P to perform the criminal acts in question.
This will require it to take inferences from the conduct of the parties and the other
circumstances to determine whether A’s participation implicitly or explicitly assisted
or encouraged P to do what he did. This is why in Illustration 15.8 the other parties are
complicit in E’s offence of causing death by dangerous driving.
In Baldessare (1930) 144 LT 185, D1 took a car for a joyride without permission. He
invited D2 to join him. The joyride ended in the death of a pedestrian, as a result of
D1 driving without proper lights and at an excessive speed. D1 was held liable for
manslaughter. Was D2 liable as well? The Court of Criminal Appeal said yes. It held,
dismissing the appeal, that the jury was entitled to take the inference from all these
facts that what D2 intentionally encouraged was not simply taking a ride in a stolen car
but joyriding, that is, thrill-seeking through dangerous driving. This was what D2 had
signed up to by entering and then staying in the car after D1 had started his dangerous
driving. D2 was a willing rather than a reluctant participant.
Activity 15.9
Read Wilson, Section 19.4.C ‘Liability for unintended consequences’ and explain why
the Court of Appeal arrives at a different conclusion in the case of Willett (2010).
A classic statement governing this area of liability was made in Anderson and Morris
[1966] 2 QB 110. Anderson and V had a fight because V had hurt Anderson’s wife.
Anderson told Morris, a friend, what had happened so they both went to find V. When
they found V another fight ensued. Anderson punched V in the presence of Morris,
although Morris himself did not take part. Anderson then stabbed V, causing his death.
Morris denied knowing that Anderson had a knife.
In his summing-up, the trial judge told the jury that it could convict Morris of
manslaughter even though he had no idea that Anderson had armed himself with a
knife. The Court of Appeal held that this was a misdirection in respect of Morris and
quashed his conviction for manslaughter. The correct direction would have
distinguished between what the joint enterprise was (beating up V) and what it
became (stabbing V to death). Morris could not be liable for that if he did not
contemplate the use of a knife (you cannot help or encourage what you do not know
about). If V had died as a result of a blow from a fist or foot, such blows would have
been contemplated and so would have properly resulted in a conviction for
manslaughter. Mr Geoffrey Lane QC, who later became the Lord Chief Justice, explained
the principle as:
Where two persons embark on a joint enterprise, each is liable for the acts done in
pursuance of that joint enterprise, that includes liability for unusual consequences if they
arise from the execution of the agreed joint enterprise but...if one of the adventurers goes
beyond what has been tacitly agreed as part of the common enterprise, his co-adventurer
is not liable for the consequences of that unauthorised act...It is for the jury to decide
whether what was done was part of the joint enterprise, or went beyond it.
The above principle governing liability for joint enterprise covers three separate cases.
uu Liability for unforeseen consequences of executing the joint enterprise.
uu Liability for accidental deviations in the execution of the joint enterprise.
uu Liability for deliberate deviations in the execution of the joint enterprise.
15.3.2 Liability for the unforeseen consequences of executing the joint

enterprise
The first case covered by the above principle is where an unexpected consequence
arises from the execution of the joint enterprise. Here the position is exactly as for
accessoryship generally (see Illustration 15.5 above). For example, if – in a variation of
Anderson and Morris – V died as a result of blows landed by Anderson in furtherance of
a joint plan to cause actual bodily harm to V, Anderson is guilty of manslaughter and so
is Morris, as accessory. His liability derives from that of Anderson, as principal.
Further, if the joint enterprise or common purpose is to cause V grievous bodily

harm then Anderson will be guilty of murder and Morris will be guilty of murder, as
accessory. Once again, his liability derives from that of Anderson. A similar result would
follow if A and P agreed to commit arson on a building and, unknown to both of them,
someone was in the building and was killed. If P did the ‘torching’, he would be liable
for manslaughter and A would also be liable for manslaughter, as accessory.
15.3.3 Liability for accidental deviations in the course of executing the

joint enterprise
Closely related to the above case is where P accidentally deviates in the execution of
the joint enterprise. Here again the position is generally the same as for accessoryship
(see Illustrations 15.3 and 15.4 above).
Illustration 15.9
A and P are engaged in a joint enterprise to kill C by shooting. P pulls the trigger,
misses C and hits V, killing him.
P is guilty of murder, by the transferred malice principle. A is complicit by virtue of
the same principle since the killing arose from the execution of the joint enterprise.
15.3.4 Deliberate deviations in the execution of the joint enterprise

It is with respect to deliberate variations that doctrine in the field of complicity has
been subjected to strain. There are both evidential and moral reasons for this. As a
matter of evidence, if P commits a crime other than the crime at the core of the joint
enterprise, it is easy for A to claim that this was not what they signed up for, and
difficult for the prosecution to disprove. The moral reasons are that active
participation in potentially dangerous criminal ventures with others is a reason in
itself to hold participants accountable when the dangers materialise. The courts have
therefore struggled to ensure that the derivative liability of the accomplice stays in
line with the retributive ethics underlying criminal conviction and punishment. This is
particularly the case where the principal commits murder. As Lord Steyn in R v Powell;
English (1997), put it:
Experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises only too often escalate into
commission of greater offences. In order to deal with this important social problem, the
accessory principle is needed and cannot be abolished or relaxed.
15.3.5 Doctrinal strain revealed

Until 2016 the basis of liability for those involved in a joint enterprise differed
significantly from that of accessoryship generally. In the specific context of murder,
for example, to be guilty as an accessory to murder, the prosecution had to show that
the secondary party intended to assist or encourage the principal to commit murder,
i.e. to kill with the intention to kill or cause serious injury. So, in an example given in
the case of NCB v Gamble, a person who supplies a gun to another who then uses it to
commit murder will only be guilty of murder as accessory if they intended, by that act
of supply, to assist or encourage the commission of murder. This ‘intention’ does not
require them to desire that this offence be committed. It is enough that they know for
certain that he will do so. This standard basis for liability did not apply in cases of joint
enterprise, that is, in cases where, unlike our gun supplier, the parties involved were
part of a gang bent on committing an offence. In cases of joint enterprise, for example
a burglary, or a punch up at a football match, all parties to the joint enterprise were
not only guilty of burglary (or assault) but also any other crime committed by any
of them which they contemplated one of their number might commit. It was not
necessary for them to desire this or know it for certain.
Illustration 15.10
A, B and C decide that B and C will commit the burglary and A will dispose of the
proceeds. In the course of that burglary C kills V, a householder, with a gun or knife
supplied by D and which A and B knew he was carrying. A and B will be complicit in
the murder simply upon proof that they contemplated that C might kill someone in
the course of the burglary with the mens rea for murder. The fact that A and B knew
that C was carrying the gun would be strong evidence of this contemplation. D,
however, would only be liable if (s)he knew for certain that this was C’s intention as
(s)he, unlike A and B, is not a party to the joint enterprise.
The rules governing accessorial liability for deliberate deviations in cases of joint
enterprise were thus as follows:
uu P and A must have embarked upon the commission of an agreed crime (crime X).
uu At the time of or during the commission of this offence A must contemplate that P,
in addition to or in substitution for crime X, might commit a further crime (crime
Y).
uu Notwithstanding this contemplation, A must have continued to give support and

encouragement to P in the commission of crime X.
uu The crime actually committed did not differ substantially in nature or execution
from that contemplated.
The leading case in the area was, until 2016, R v Powell; Daniels [1999] 1 AC 1, [1997] 4 All
ER, which confirmed the approach adopted by the Privy Council in the earlier case of
Chan Wing Siu (1985). Three men, including the two appellants, Powell and Daniels,
went to purchase drugs from a drug dealer (the joint enterprise), but having gone to
his house for that purpose, the drug dealer was shot dead when he came to the door.
The Crown was unable to prove which of the three men fired the gun that killed the
drug dealer. The defence argued that this meant that all three must be acquitted since
two of them did not pull the trigger. The Crown argued, (developing the successful
argument in Giannetto discussed in 15.1 above), that this lack of proof was not fatal to
the conviction of all three for murder. Whoever it was that fired the gun was guilty of
murder as principal, and the other two must also be guilty as accessories because they
knew that the third man was armed with a gun and contemplated that he might use it
to kill or cause really serious injury to the drug dealer. Powell and Daniels were
convicted of murder and their appeals were rejected by the Court of Appeal. The
question certified for the opinion of the House of Lords was:
Is it sufficient to found a conviction for murder for a secondary party to a killing to have
realised that the primary party might kill with intent to do so (or with intent to do GBH) or
must the secondary party have held such intention himself?
The House of Lords answered yes to the certified question, dismissing the appeal.
The fact that whoever did not kill V knew that the other was carrying a gun was
evidence that its murderous use was contemplated and that was sufficient to hold the
secondary party liable for the murder. Their Lordships rejected the argument that it
was unfair that a principal to murder could only be liable upon proof of an intention
to kill or cause serious injury whereas a secondary party, who was subject to the same
mandatory penalty, was guilty upon proof only of foresight (that P might kill with the
mens rea for murder). There was one small mitigation of the harshness of this rule,
namely where, although A contemplated that P might kill with the mens rea for murder
without intending this to occur, P’s action in doing the killing was fundamentally
different from the actions contemplated that P would use. So, in English, decided at
the same time as Powell and Daniels, the joint enterprise was to attack V with wooden
posts. P went further and stabbed V to death with a knife, which A had not known
about. At first instance, the judge ruled that this lack of knowledge of the knife was not
material because A contemplated that P might kill with the mens rea for murder (here
the intention to cause grievous bodily harm by hitting V with the wooden stakes). The
House of Lords quashed the conviction. Given that the joint enterprise was not to kill V
but to attack him, A could not be held to have intentionally assisted or encouraged P to
do something so fundamentally different from the planned attack. Whether the mode
of killing was ‘fundamentally different or not’ was stated to be a matter for the jury in
which the prime consideration was, as it was in English, the relative degree of lethality
of the weapon contemplated and the weapon actually used. In effect, P’s deviation
from the joint enterprise by using a weapon unknown to A would exculpate A only if
the weapon used was more lethal than the means agreed or contemplated. So A would
be complicit for the use of a knife when A contemplated only that P might be carrying
a gun or vice versa. But A would not be complicit if P produces a gun or a knife when A
contemplated only that P might produce a baseball bat or a snooker cue (Uddin (1999)).
In Mendez (2010) it was confirmed that the fundamental difference rule does not apply
where A and P share a common purpose to kill. Where there is a common purpose to
kill it does not matter at all how P does the killing. For example, if A and P agree to kill
V by suffocating him with a pillow and P kills V with a gun, A is liable as an accessory
to murder. Since the common purpose is to kill, it does not matter that P kills in a
fundamentally different way than that agreed.
The contemplation rule suffered a great degree of criticism. Consider the following
case.
Illustration 15.11
A, B C, D and P a group of football supporters, decide to have a fight with a gang
of rival supporters. P loses his cool, takes out a knife and intentionally stabs V to
death.
P is guilty of murder upon proof that he intended, at least, to commit GBH. A, B, C, and
D were also guilty of murder simply upon proof that they knew one of their number
was carrying a knife, gun or other lethal weapon and might use it. This state of affairs
poses a number of problems. First, they are liable although they did not intend to
assist or encourage the murder, which is the fault element usually required to convict
an accessory. Secondly, although the killer has to be shown to have intended death
or grievous bodily harm, they, as accessories to murder, are liable simply upon proof
of foresight of the possibility that one of their number might commit murder. The
problem with this is that a conviction for murder in such circumstances misrepresents
the nature of the secondary parties’ wrongdoing. Criminal justice requires something
more than the acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty. It also
requires the correct label to be assigned to the defendant’s wrongdoing and for the
sentence to be a fair reflection of the defendant’s culpability.
Neither of these requirements is satisfied here. Where a person signs up to

a criminal venture believing it might (not would) result in a co-adventurer
committing murder, the correct label is manslaughter since the co-adventurer is
signing up to doing something dangerous not to something lethal. As for the sentence,
it is patently unfair, given that murder carries a mandatory life sentence, for a person
to receive a life sentence when their degree of fault and wrongdoing is so far removed
from that of the killer. Sadly, it is all too common for youths to participate in fights
alongside someone they know to be carrying a dangerous weapon.
Activity 15.10
Read Wilson, W. and D. Ormerod, ‘Simply harsh to fairly simple: joint enterprise
reform’ Crim LR 2015, 1, 3–27 which expands upon these criticisms, giving
suggestions for reform.
In 2016 in R v Jogee [2016] 2 WLR 681 the Supreme Court agreed with these criticisms.
It ruled that in cases of joint enterprise in murder the contemplation basis for
liability established in Chan Wing Siu (1985) and approved in Powell (1999) was a
wrong turning. It was insufficient that the secondary party contemplated that the
principal might commit murder. Rather it had to be shown, as in accessoryship
generally, that the secondary party intended to assist or encourage that murder.
Rather, it had to be shown, as in accessoryship generally, that the secondary
party intended to assist or encourage that murder. Contemplation is not the
fault element in accessoryship. Intention is. However, if the secondary party
can be shown to have contemplated the commission of murder and carried on
regardless, this could of course be used by the prosecution as evidence that
it was indeed intended or intended if the occasion arose. Jogee was retried at
Leicester Crown Court. His conviction was quashed and replaced by a conviction
for manslaughter. The jury found that there was insufficient evidence that the
defendant intended to encourage the principal to kill or cause serious injury. There
was, however, sufficient evidence that he intended to encourage a lesser harm. In
such circumstances a conviction for manslaughter is proper. The main thrust of the
Supreme Court’s decision is to be found in paragraphs 89–90 summarised in the
following press statement:
The court holds, in a unanimous judgment, that the law must be set back on the correct
footing which stood before Chan Wing-Siu. The mental element for secondary liability is
intention to assist or encourage the crime. Sometimes the encouragement or assistance is
given to a specific crime, and sometimes to a range of crimes, one of which is committed;
either will suffice. Sometimes the encouragement or assistance involves an agreement
between the parties, but in other cases it takes the form of more or less spontaneous
joining in a criminal enterprise; again, either will suffice. Intention to assist is not the
same as desiring the crime to be committed. On the contrary, the intention to assist may
sometimes be conditional, in the sense that the secondary party hopes that the further
crime will not be necessary, but if he nevertheless gives his intentional assistance on the
basis that it may be committed if the necessity for it arises, he will be guilty. In many cases,
the intention to assist will be co-terminous with the intention (perhaps conditional)
that crime B be committed, but there may be some where it exists without that latter
intention. It will remain relevant to enquire in most cases whether the principal and
secondary party shared a common criminal purpose, for often this will demonstrate
the secondary party’s intention to assist. The error was to treat foresight of crime B as
automatic authorisation of it, whereas the correct rule is that foresight is simply evidence
(albeit sometimes strong evidence) of intent to assist or encourage. It is a question for the
jury in every case whether the intention to assist or encourage is shown.
A number of points need to be made to clarify this summary. First, the reference to
conditional intent. A person who, hoping that crime A, say burglary, does not lead
to crime B, say murder, nevertheless accepts that the commission of murder by the
principal may become necessary to achieve the criminal purpose and intentionally
encourages or assists the commission of burglary on that basis also (conditionally)
intends to assist P to commit murder.
It should be noted that Jogee has not gone down well in other common law
jurisdictions. In Miller v The Queen; Smith v The Queen; Presley v DPP for the State of
South Australia, 334 ALR 1 Jogee was not followed by the High Court of Australia,
approving the law as articulated in Chan Wing Siu and Powell. A similar rejection of
Jogee was made by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, approving the reasoning in
Miller (HKSAR v Chan Kam Shing [2016] HKCFA 87).
Illustration 15.12
P and A agree to commit a burglary. P takes a gun. A asks him not to take it. P tells A
that he is going to take it and will not use it unless it is their only means of escape.
A reluctantly takes part in the burglary, hoping the gun will not be necessary. When
the householder unexpectedly returns, P kills the householder.
P is guilty of murder. A, under the new approach, is also guilty of murder as secondary
party, not because he simply contemplates that P mighty commit murder but because
by his actions he shows his intention to assist and encourage the murder, conditional
upon it being necessary.
Secondly, by implication, Jogee requires liability to be based on A’s assent and/or

authorisation of murder by the principal. A’s conditional intention to assist or
encourage P to commit murder constitutes their common purpose just as much as the
core crime. Again, whether such assent or authorisation exists will be a matter for the
jury taking into account all the evidence. Often, of course, the most important
evidence in this respect will be evidence that A contemplated or foresaw P’s
commission of crime B, for example because he knew P was carrying a lethal weapon
and was prepared to use it. As Lords Hughes and Toulson for the Court put it at para 94:
If the jury is satisfied that there was an agreed common purpose to commit crime A, and
if it is satisfied also that D2 must have foreseen that, in the course of committing crime
A, D1 might well commit crime B, it may in appropriate cases be justified in drawing
the conclusion that D2 had the necessary conditional intent that crime B should be
committed, if the occasion arose; or in other words that it was within the scope of the plan
to which D2 gave his assent and intentional support. But that will be a question of fact for
the jury in all the circumstances.
The third point in need of clarification is the idea that an intention to assist P to
commit murder (crime B) is coterminous in most cases with an intention that P
commits that crime. In other words, it would not be a mistake for a judge, in directing
the jury in a case where P committed murder by shooting a bank teller in the course
of a bank robbery in which A was a participant, to tell the jury that they may convict
A also of murder as a secondary party if convinced that A intended P to shoot a bank
teller if the necessity arose. This is, no doubt, an easier concept for the jury to grasp
than a direction which tells them to convict if convinced that A intended to assist or
encourage P to shoot a bank teller if the necessity arose.
Instead of simply ordering Jogee’s acquittal, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial. The
case for the prosecution was that the principal, Mohammed Hirsi, had fatally stabbed
a police officer after an altercation and Jogee had encouraged the attack by ‘egging
him on’. The jury found Jogee not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. As the
trial judge explained, this meant that the jury found that Jogee did not intend Hirsi
to kill or cause serious injury to the police officer but did intend him to launch the
attack and cause him some injury, albeit not serious injury. His life term was replaced
by a sentence of 12 years. This verdict and the reasons for it is likely to set the basic
template for cases such as this when, as violent confrontations involving multiple
parties are wont to, the argument escalates into murderous violence.
Since the Supreme Court decision, a number of appeals have been lodged by
prisoners previously convicted of murder on the basis of the Chan Wing Siu/Powell
joint enterprise principle and serving a life term. Significantly these have to date
been unsuccessful. The latest, R v Johnson and Others and other cases (2016), explains
the reason for this. An appeal based on a post-conviction change in the law will only
be successful if that conviction was ‘unsafe’ (s.2 Criminal Appeal Act 1968). It would
not be unsafe if, for example, on the proven facts the jury would be unlikely to have
reached a different verdict had the original trial judge directed it in accordance
with the changed law. Given, as explained above, that Jogee replaces a rule of law
(contemplation is culpability) with a rule of evidence (contemplation is evidence of
intention/culpability) it is not surprising that the Court of Appeal were not inclined to
quash the convictions. The average juror will not take much convincing that a person
who robs a bank with a person whom he knows is carrying a lethal weapon and may
use it, actually intended it to be used if the occasion arose. This does not mean of
course that the law has not changed. It means rather that it will be less easy for the
prosecution to gain a conviction on the basis of foresight.
The true effect of Jogee has then yet to be worked out. It would have been more
satisfactory if the Supreme Court had made clear how exactly the jury could infer
intention from contemplation. Ideally, this will follow the approach considered above
in relation to Moloney and Woollin (see 7.2.3. above).
As applied to Illustration 15.10, the jury might be given a direction something like this if
Woollin is to be applied, as it should be applied, to cases of joint enterprise:
members of the jury, for A and B to be guilty of murder as accessories you must be sure
that they intended C to kill V or intended C to cause V serious injury or to do so if it became
necessary. If you think that they knew C was likely to use the gun in these circumstances
and yet carried on regardless then this might mean that they approved this possible
outcome and so intended it. But you will have to be sure that this was indeed their
intention. Contemplation alone is not enough, but obviously, the greater level of risk the
defendant foresaw, the more likely it is that he actually intended it to happen. On the other
hand, you have been told that they knew C had the gun but had made it clear that they did
not approve its potential use. If you think that this may have been the case then you must
acquit of murder as accessories unless you feel sure that, whatever they may have desired,
they still knew it was virtually certain that V would use the gun in this way if it became
necessary. If you are not sure that they had this knowledge or intention but you are sure
that they contemplated the possibility that this gun might be put to murderous use then
you should bring in a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder.
Activity 15.11
Read Ormerod, D. and K. Laird ‘Jogee: not the end of a legal saga but the start of
one?’ 2016 Crim LR 539.
On the basis of this article, is the change of approach to joint enterprise liability
more apparent than real?
15.3.6 The strange case of Gnango

Strangely, it seems there can be a joint enterprise even where there exists no degree
of cooperation between the parties and even where they are antagonists. This strange
state of affairs is the result of the recent Supreme Court decision of Gnango [2012] 2
WLR 17. A and P engaged in a gunfight in public, each intending to kill or cause serious
injury to the other. P accidentally shot and killed a passerby. The Supreme Court
decided (Lord Kerr dissenting) that both A and P were guilty of murder. This is a very
strange decision. Before reading on, think why.
In this case, clearly P was guilty of murder on the transferred malice principle. A will
also be guilty of murder if the prosecution can show that he was party to a joint
enterprise to commit murder. There are a number of ways of arguing this. One is to
claim that they were both principals in a joint enterprise to commit murder on each
other...
The second possible basis for joint enterprise liability, similar to the murder variation
in Illustration 15.7, is that they were participating in a joint enterprise to commit some
other crime (Crime X) contemplating that murder (crime Y) might be committed by
the other when they shot at each other. Crime X in this alternative is the crime of affray
which is committed when people use violence in a public place. This includes shooting
guns. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument also. Although both committed the
offence of affray they were not part of a joint venture to commit an affray since they
were acting independently of each other. If A and B decide independently to buy an
ice cream from a vendor it would be strange indeed to describe them as being part
of a joint enterprise/having a common purpose to buy an ice cream. The Supreme
Court, by a majority, accepted the first argument, namely that there was a joint
enterprise to commit murder, and were not discomfited by the prospect of a person
being convicted of aiding and abetting his own attempted murder! Needless to say,
the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in Gnango has not met with universal
approval.
15.4 Difference in offence or liability
15.4.1 Conviction of accessory for a different offence than that of the

principal
In principle, it by no means follows that if A and P agree to commit crime X and P
commits a greater offence than crime X, for which A is not complicit, A should be liable
for the lesser offence (here manslaughter). In Gamble, the court held that the deviation
was so substantial that there was no basis upon which to hold that A had aided or
abetted any offence of P’s. This was so although A and P both agreed to commit an
act of violence (kneecapping V), where P had deliberately varied the plan and slit V’s
throat. Whether Gamble survives Jogee is not clear. But it seems probable that the
effect of Jogee is to render A guilty of manslaughter in this and all cases where the jury
are convinced A contemplated, without intending it, that P might commit violence,
whether lethal or not. As the Supreme Court said ‘[The decision does not] affect the
law that a person who joins in a crime which any reasonable person would realise
involves a risk of harm, and death results, is guilty at least of manslaughter.’
15.4.2 Mismatch of liability

In some cases, there is a possibility of a mismatch between the liability of the principal
and that of the accessory. As has been explained, to be guilty as an accessory, a crime
must have been committed. If P does not go on to commit the crime encouraged or
assisted, the party cannot be guilty as an accessory but can be guilty of the inchoate
crime of assisting or encouraging the commission of an offence under the Serious
Crimes Act 2007. An exception is where P commits the actus reus of the crime but is
acquitted for lack of mens rea or because of the presence of a defence. In such a case,
if A has the mens rea that P lacks, or lacks the defence which P has, A’s conviction may
survive the acquittal of P (see Cogan and Leak and Bourne above). In principle, it should
also be possible to convict A of the offence where P, by reason of lack of mens rea or
availability of a defence, is guilty of a lesser offence so long as the actus reus of the
greater offence is committed.
Activity 15.12
Read Wilson, Section 19.5.B ‘Level of liability’ and then answer the following
questions.
a. A procures P to kill C. P, not wanting to kill C but wanting to demonstrate his
loyalty to A, shoots at C without aiming. C suffers a minor wound. Assuming P is
charged here with either s.20 (for the wound) or s.47 (for the actual bodily harm)
under OAPA 1861 can/should A be guilty as an accessory to attempted murder?
b. A, wishing to procure C’s death, tells P that C has raped his (P’s) child. P loses his
self-control and kills C. If P were charged with murder of C he would likely be
able to avail himself of the partial defence of loss of self-control. Is/should A be
liable for murder for having procured this intentional killing?
15.4.3 Accessories as victims

As a general rule, a person cannot be convicted as an accomplice to an offence created
for their protection. So in Tyrell (1894), a girl who incited a man to have sex with
her when she was under age, was not guilty of aiding and abetting unlawful sexual
intercourse since she could not, as the victim which this prohibition was designed to
protect, commit this offence against herself.
Note: On the basis of Gnango (2012), it seems that murder is not an offence created for
the victim’s protection, since it was no answer to A’s conviction as an accessory that
the act he supposedly encouraged was his own murder. This is another strange aspect
of Gnango!
15.5 Withdrawal
Once having signed up to assisting or encouraging the commission of a criminal
offence, it is nevertheless possible for A to withdraw their assistance and/or
encouragement and thus escape liability as an accessory to that offence. A may remain
liable for any inchoate offence, such as conspiracy, which they may have committed.
The main question surrounding withdrawal is how it is done. Is it enough for the
accessory to refrain from any further involvement in the criminal enterprise, or
should they have to report the principal to the police or otherwise frustrate the
accomplishment of the crime? The legal position is that the mode of withdrawal
varies according to the circumstances of the case, taking into account the nature and
extent of A’s involvement, the nature of the offence, and the degree to which the joint
enterprise has advanced.
15.5.1 Nature and extent of A’s involvement

In cases where A’s involvement is spontaneous rather than considered, it seems that
all A needs to do to withdraw is simply to walk away. It is not necessary for withdrawal
to be communicated to the principal. So said the Court of Appeal in Mitchell [1999]
Crim LR 496. In this case A, B and C started a fight with a waiter outside an Indian
restaurant, kicking and punching him repeatedly. A, B and C then walked away only
for C to return and hit the victim again several times with a stick. V died and A, B and
C were charged with murder. A and B claimed they had withdrawn from the joint
enterprise. The trial judge directed the jury that withdrawal required communication
rather than simply walking away and the jury convicted. A and B’s appeals were
allowed. Communication was not required in cases of spontaneous rather than pre-
planned violence.
In Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005, by contrast, it was held that simply not turning up to
participate in a planned murder was not enough to withdraw and so A remained
complicit. It was said in this case: ‘if participation is confined to advice or
encouragement [he] must at least communicate his change of mind to the other’. The
Court of Appeal left it open as to whether, in view of the seriousness of the offence,
more should have been done, such as informing the victim or the police.
Communication means either a verbal countermand of the former encouragement

or assistance, or otherwise making it clear that there has been a change of mind. So
in Grundy [1977] Crim LR 543, A gave details of the layout of a flat to P, who intended
to burgle it. Two weeks before the planned burglary, A sought to dissuade P from
committing it. It was held that this was sufficient to amount to a withdrawal.
In cases where A incites or procures the offence, it is arguable that A should do

more to countermand the initial incitement or procurement. So in Illustration 15.12
below, it is not merely the nature of the offence that lends support to a more robust
withdrawal being necessary but also the fact that A, by procuring an offence which
would not have otherwise taken place, has a degree of causal responsibility for its
commission which other aiders and abetters do not have.
15.5.2 Nature of the offence

It is plausible that the more serious the offence to which advice, assistance or
encouragement is given the more A must do to countermand this participation.
Illustration 15.13
A procures P to kill C for a fee. A later changes her mind and tells P not to proceed.
P insists on going through with it to earn his fee. A does nothing to stop P except
trying to dissuade him and insisting he will not get paid. P kills C.
There is a strong argument here that A should remain complicit, given the nature of
the offence procured. One might argue that the police or, at the very least, the victim
should be alerted.
15.5.3 In cases of joint enterprise, how far the enterprise has advanced
If the crime is already well underway, then a party will normally need to do more
than merely communicate withdrawal for it to be effective. What more needs to be
done depends, again, on the circumstances of the case. What is clear is that a party
to a joint enterprise to murder cannot withdraw by saying, just as the principal is
about to pull the trigger, ‘Don’t do it. I’ve changed my mind.’ This was the conclusion
reached in the leading case of Becerra and Cooper (1976) 62 Cr App R 212 in which B, G
and C took part in a burglary. In the course of the burglary C gave B a knife. They were
discovered by the tenant, at which point C said ‘Come on, let’s go’, climbed out of a
window (followed by G) and ran away. The court concluded that by giving B the knife,
C was taken to contemplate the use of the knife to kill or cause grievous bodily harm
and so would be complicit in murder. The question for the court was whether such
complicity could be avoided by C having withdrawn from the joint enterprise.
The Court of Appeal, upholding C’s conviction, said not. Roskill LJ said that if C wanted
to withdraw at that stage, he would have to do so by doing something ‘vastly different
and vastly more effective than merely to say “Come on, let’s go” and go out through
the window’. What these steps were Roskill LJ did not explain, but the implication was
that little short of physical intervention would have been enough, given the nature of
C’s involvement (he gave B the knife) and the degree to which the joint enterprise had
advanced (the risk of a killing had crystallised and was imminent).
15.6 Relationship between accessorial liability and inchoate

liability
You do not need to know in detail the provisions of Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act
2007, but it might be helpful to understand the relationship between liability as an
accessory and liability under this Act’s provisions. Essentially, the Serious Crime Act
covers those cases of encouragement and assistance where the principal does not
go on to commit the offence. Strictly speaking, the prosecution can charge under the
Serious Crime Act in substitution for complicity, even where the offence does take
place, but for our purposes, this should be understood as providing ‘back-up offences’
to criminalise the activities of those who willingly give help or assistance to potential
criminals. The Serious Crime Act 2007 creates three (inchoate) offences.
1. Cases where A intentionally encourages or assists the commission of an offence,

as where A procures B to kill his wife, C (see Calhaem). If B does not commit the
offence, A will be guilty under s.44 of the Act. This form of conduct used to be
known as incitement.
2. Cases where A encourages or assists P to commit an offence, believing that

the offence will be committed and that their acts will encourage or assist that
offence, but not giving the encouragement or assistance with that intention. This
is designed to cover cases where (as in Grundy), A supplies articles or information
useful in the commission of crime. A provides the articles or advice not because
they intend to be helpful or be encouraging, but because they have their own
reason for doing this, for example making money.
3. Cases where, like in Maxwell or Bainbridge, A encourages or assists the commission

of an offence, of which they do not know the precise details, knowing only that it is
one of a number of possible offences that the other intends to commit.

Have you understood this chapter? You have if – without referring to the module
guide or Wilson – you can answer the following questions.
1. Explain what derivative liability means and what effect it has on complicity doctrine.
2. Reduce the words ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’ to two words.
3. Explain and illustrate when it would be proper to use the word ‘procure’ rather
than aid, abet or counsel.
4. Explain the legal effect of being convicted as an accessory.
5. State whether an accessory’s liability depends upon causation.
6. State the circumstances when a person can be guilty as an accessory while the
principal is guilty of nothing.
7. If A and B set out to kill C by shooting, which they do, but it is impossible for the
prosecution to prove which of them fired the gun, are they both guilty of murder
or neither?
8. Explain when, if ever, a person can be guilty as an accomplice by doing nothing.
9. State the mens rea for accessoryship.
10. How detailed does A’s knowledge have to be of P’s criminal intentions for A to be
complicit in P’s crime?
11. If A strongly suspects, without knowing, that P intends to commit a crime and that
A’s acts would be of assistance in the commission of that crime, can they be guilty
as an accessory?
12. Which of the following represents a correct statement of law in cases not involving
joint enterprise?
a. To be guilty as an accessory to the murder of V, A must intend P to kill or cause

grievous bodily harm to V.
b. To be guilty as an accessory to the murder of V, A must intend to assist or

encourage P to kill V.
c. To be guilty as an accessory to the murder of V, A must intend to assist P to

intentionally kill V.
d. To be guilty as an accessory to the murder of V, A must intend to assist P to

intentionally kill V or kill V with the intention of causing V grievous bodily harm.
5. Explain and illustrate the meaning of a joint enterprise.
6. State the principles governing an accessory’s liability for the unforeseen acts or
consequences of their principal in cases of joint enterprise.
7. Under what circumstances, if any, can a party to a joint enterprise escape liability
for murder although they contemplated that their principal might kill with the
intention (kill/grievous bodily harm) necessary for murder?
8. If A and P agree to kill V by means of an attack with fists and feet and P kills V with a
gun, A cannot be liable because this is a fundamentally different way of killing than
that envisaged by the joint enterprise. True or false?
9. What is A liable for if, although the joint enterprise is to harm V, P deliberately
varies the joint enterprise to deliberately kill V?
10. What are the principles governing withdrawal from complicity?

Notes
Criminal law page 209
Notes
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Criminal law

uu William Wilson, Professor of Criminal Law, Queen Mary, University of London.

Published by: University of London

© University of London 2018

2 The building blocks of criminal liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3 Actus reus: conduct and circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4 Actus reus: consequences and their causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5 Mens rea: criminal fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

6 Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

9 Non-fatal offences against the person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

10 Defences 1: failure of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

11 Defences 2: affirmative defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

12 Property offences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

13 Criminal damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

14 Criminal attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

15 Participation in crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Courses in which this module is offered

Notional study time

MODULE PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

LEARNING OUTCOMES: KNOWLEDGE

2. Describe the principles governing criminal defences;

3. Describe the legal principles governing liability for preliminary or inchoate

LEARNING OUTCOMES: SKILLS

7. Identify strengths and weaknesses of areas of law in terms of underlying

8. Communicate in a clear and concise manner, using accurate legal terminology;

BENCHMARK FOR LEARNING OUTCOMES

d. Mens rea. Intention recklessness and negligence.

e. Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea.

f. General defences 1. Insanity. Automatism. Intoxication.

g. General defences 2. Necessity. Duress. Self-defence. Consent.

h. Murder and voluntary manslaughter.

j. Non-fatal offences 1: Section 39 Criminal Justice Act 1988.

k. Non-fatal offences 2: Sections 18, 20, 47 OAPA 1861.

m. Theft. Fraud. Burglary.

p. Inchoate offences. Assisting and encouraging crime and criminal attempts.

LEARNING AND TEACHING

The Laws Virtual Learning Environment

uu a complete version of the module guides;

uu online audio presentations;

uu past examination papers and reports;

uu computer marked assessments, multiple-choice questions with feedback are

The Online Library

uu the professional legal databases LexisLibrary and Westlaw;

uu cases and up-to-date statutes;

uu key academic law journals;

uu links to important websites.

¢¢ Wilson, W. Criminal law. (Harlow: Pearson, 2017) sixth edition [ISBN

¢¢ Core statutes on criminal law 2017–18 (Palgrave Macmillan).

1.1 The lawyer’s method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.2 What does criminal law comprise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1.4 The sources of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.5 Study materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.6 Online resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.7 Preparing for the examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.8 Getting started . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.1 The lawyer’s method

Proficiency in criminal law involves a number of different skills and competencies,

uu a knowledge of the rules and principles governing criminal offences

uu a basic understanding of the rules of evidence and procedure