Maria Katrina Z.

Rebagay
Torts & Damages
Chapter 2
Elements of Quasi-Delict
NEGLIGENCE
Negligence Defined (Art. 1173 NCC)

DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
1 Q: What are the different degrees of negligence? Define each.

2 Q: X was a regular employee of ABC Express. His job was to deliver and pick-up
packages. For this purpose, X was assigned the use of a motorcycle and informed
to take care of the same. Sometime last year, X parked his motorcycle directly in
from of the ABC office, switched off the engine and took the key with him. But,
he did not lock the steering wheel because he allegedly was primarily concerned
with the packages and huge sum of money that needed to be immediately
secured in the ABC office. He returned promptly within 3 to 5 minutes but the
motorcycle was gone. After investigation, X received a notice of termination and
was barred from reporting to work. X filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
payment of backwages and reinstatement with damages. The Labor Arbiter
found X’s dismissal to be lawful on the ground that he was grossly negligent. Is
the decision correct? (LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc vs. Mateo, G.R. No.
168215, June 9. 2009)

3 Q: X’s defective car was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner in a straight
highway when its right front wheel got detached, and the car bumped the
passenger jeepney driven by Y. Identify each degree of negligence attributable to
each driver. (Achevera vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 175172, September 29, 2009)
4 Q: X stopped his car in a railroad track for a while, then, proceeded accordingly. A
PNR train turned up and collided with the car. At the time of the mishap, there
was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the intersection to warn motorists of an
approaching train. No whistle blow from the train was likewise heard before it
finally bumped the car. After impact, the car was dragged about 10 meters
beyond the center of the crossing. Who is negligent, X or PNR? (PNR, et. al. vs.
CA, et. al., G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007)

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN NEGLIGENC

5 Q: What are the factors to consider for negligence to exist? (Pangonorom et al,
vs. People, G.R. No. 143380, April 11, 2005)
6 Q: While driving, X, a licensed driver, saw Y, a 7 year old child, playing with a ball
at the shoulder of the highway without anyone tending the latter. Since, Y was at
the shoulder of the highway, X maintained his speed at 80kph when suddenly Y
placed himself in front of X’s car. Y was hit by X’s car and suffered various
damages. Was X negligent? (US vs. Clemente, G.R. No. 8142, January 25, 1913)

7 Q: Is intoxication a clear indication that one is negligent? (Wright vs. Manila

Electric Co, G.R. No. 7760, October 1, 1914)

PROXIMATE CAUSE
8 Q: What is proximate cause? (McKee vs. IAC, G.R. No. 68102, July 16, 1992)
(Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corp, G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009)
9 Q: The passenger bus driven by X was cruising along its rightful lane when the
tricycle, driven by Y, coming from the opposite direction overtook another
vehicle and encroached the bus’ lane while approaching a blind curve resulting
to the death of all the tricycle’s passengers. X was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. Assuming X stepped on the
accelerator pedal because his lane was clear, is X guilty of criminal negligence?
(Vallacar Transit Inc. vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011)

10 Q: If there are multiple causes that result to an injury, would it be correct to say
that none of those causes can be considered as the proximate cause of the
injury? (Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. CA, et. al., G.R. Nos. 130068 & 130150,
October 1, 1998)

BURDEN OF PROOF
11 Q: Who has the burden of proving that the negligent
act of a person is the proximate cause of the quasidelict? (Cea vs. Villanueva,
G.R. No. L-5446,
March 10, 1911)

PRESUMPTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE
12 Q: Are there provisions in the Civil Code or those
found on jurisprudence wherein negligence is
presumed to have been committed? (Articles 2184,
2185, 2188, 2183, 1265, 1733 and 1756, of the
Civil Code)
13 Q: An Isuzu truck, driven by X, lost its brakes and
bumped a passenger bus, owned by Y, on its left
middle portion. Due to the impact, the bus fell on
its right side and caused the death of Dr. Dre, Z’s
wife. Z filed a complaint for breach of contract of
carriage against Y. Does the presumption of
negligence arise even if the bus was not at fault?
(Mariano, Jr vs Callejas, G.R. No. 166640, July
31, 2009)

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

(The thing speaks for itself – Black’s Dictiona
14 Q: Several houses were destroyed when the fire broke
out at Caltex station while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground
storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose
had been inserted.
Suit was filed against Caltex and the station
manager. Since, there is no proof of the origin and
cause of the fire, what evidentiary rule might be
applied such that the defendants can be presumed
negligent? (Layugan vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73998,
November 14, 1988)

15 Q: What are the requisites before resort to the

doctrine? (FGU Insurance Corp. vs G.P.
Sarmiento Trucking Corp et al, G.R. No. 141910,
August 6, 2002)
 Chapter 2
Elements of Quasi-Delict
NEGLIGENCE
Negligence is the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time, and place.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
1. Slight Negligence - Failure to exercise great or extraordinary care
2. Ordinary Negligence - Want of ordinary care and diligence or the absence of such care and
diligence an ordinary prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
3. Gross Negligence - Materially greater than ordinary negligence and consist of an entire absence of care or an
absence of even slight care or diligence

Yes. Gross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care. X undisputedly did not exercise even the
slightest degree of care when he left the motorcycle for three to five minutes without locking it. X failed to exercise
the requisite degree of diligence required of him under the circumstances. Although such negligence committed
was not habitual, X may be dismissed especially if the grossly negligent act resulted in substantial damage to the
company. The value of the motorcycle could not be considered a trivial amount and X was entrusted with a great
responsibility to take care of and protect said company property.

X is liable for Gross Negligence for his lack of care or even the slight care or diligence that is evident on his act of
driving a defective car twas wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner causing it to bump a passenger bus driven
by Y. Y , being a passenger jeepney driver is liable for slight negligence for failure to exercise great or extraordinary
care expected of a driver of a public utility vehicle .
 PNR was negligent when the collision took place. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code states that:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter. Evidence unveils that the train was running at
a fast speed because the train still dragged the car some distance away from the point of impact and that the
inadequate precautions taken by PNR to forewarn the public of the impending danger. Aside from not having any
crossing bar, no flagman or guard to man the intersection at all times was posted on the day of the incident. It is
the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order to
give notice to the public. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. The circumstances were beyond the
control of X. From the records of the case, it can be inferred that X exercised all the necessary precautions required
of him as to avoid injury to himself and to others. It is settled that every person or motorist crossing a railroad track
should use ordinary prudence and alertness to determine the proximity of a train before attempting to cross. "

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN NEGLIGENCE

1. Employment or occupation 2. Degree of intelligence 3. Physical condition; and 4. Other circumstances regarding
persons, time, and place
Yes. One of the factors to consider in determining negligence is the degree of intelligence or capacity of the person
endangered to care for him/herself. "It is the duty of any person who's driving a vehicle in the public thoroughfares
to reduce the same to control, ready to be stopped at any moment, when he sees a child below the years of
understanding in such place that it can, by any reasonable chance, place itself in a dangerous position with respect
to the vehicle. In such case the vehicle must be under such control that, if the child, by some sudden or
unexpected movement, places itself in the way of the vehicle, it can be stopped in time to avert injury. In the
instant case, X did not exercise the required due diligence in the given circumstances.

No. Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. As
a general rule, if one’s conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether
he is drunk or sober.

PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause has been defined as 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
No. To constitute a criminal negligence, it is not enough to estalish negligence. It is equally imperative that the fault
or negligence be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the victim. Based on the given facts, it is
crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Y and not
because X was running very fast. Even if X is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the collision if
not for the fact that Y has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving his tricycle which an ordinary
prudent driver would have done under the circumstances. Recklessness on the part of Y is evident when he tried
to overtake another vehicle. Y's overtaking of another vehice, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision which led to his own death.

No. In order to render a person liable, negligence need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them
was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer
is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proving that the negligent act is the proximate cause of the quasi delict is on the one alleging the
negligent act.

PRESUMPTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE
Yes.There is presumption of negligence in the following Civil Code provisions: a)Art.
2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
b)Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) c)Art. 2188.
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) d)Art. 2183. The possessor of an
animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
e)Art. 1265. Whenever the thing is lost in the possession of the debtor, it shall be
presumed that the loss was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to the
provisions of article 1165. This presumption does not apply in case of earthquake, flood, storm, or other natural
calamity.
f)Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745,
Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in Articles
1755 and 1756. g)Art.
1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
1755.
 No. Article 1756 of the Civil Code states that in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing
evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a
mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary
diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the
passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event. Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business
of a transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries
sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law
requires. In accord with the above provisions, the passenger bus, through its driver, and its registered owner, Y, has
the express obligation "to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances," and to observe
extraordinary diligence in the discharge of its duty. The death of the wife of the Z in the course of transporting her
to her destination gave rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome the presumption,
respondents have to show that they observed extraordinary diligence in the discharge of their duty, or that the
accident was caused by a fortuitous event. The totality of evidence shows that the death of Dr. Dre was caused by
the reckless negligence of the X driver of the Isuzu truck which lost its brakes and bumped the passenger bus,
owned and operated by Y.

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

(The thing speaks for itself – Black’s Dictionary)
The doctrine of doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" can be invoked when under the circumstances involed, direct
evidence is absent and not reasily available. Under this doctrine, the happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality
under exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.

Resort to the doctrine, may be allowed only when the following requisites are present: (a) the event is of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct
of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is
within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident
may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.
 Maria Katrina Z. Rebagay
Torts & Damages
Chapter 3
Nature of Liability
LIABILITY OF TORTFEASORS
1 Q: What is the responsibility of 2 or more persons who
are liable for quasi-delict? (Art. 2194, NCC)
2 Q: How about the sharing as between solidary debtors
to the damages caused to the injured creditor?
(Singapore Airlines Limited vs. CA et al, G.R. No.
107356, March 31, 1995)

4 Q: X, Y & Z are joint tortfeaseors. A, the injured party,

only sued X. By agreement, A agreed to accept the
proportionate share of X to the total damages caused to
the former. Can A sue Z for the remaining balance of the
damages?

5 Under American Jurisprudence, what are the 3 rules that have developed which
deal with the question of whether the release of one joint tortfeasors releases
other tortfeasors who are not parties to or named in the release? (Republic of
the Phil vs. Sandiganbayan et al, G.R. No. 92594, March 4, 1994)

DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY

6 Q: Is the obligation arising from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 demandable only
for one’s own acts or omissions? Q:
What is the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability or Imputed Negligence (Art. 2180,
NCC)

7 Q: X, an employee of Y, committed a negligent act

against Z. Can Z file a suit against Y only if X is
insolvent? (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March
23, 2004)

9 Can the mother be vicariously liable, if the father of the

child is still alive? (Libi et al vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70890,
September 18, 1992)

13 Can par. 5 be applied to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or
industry?
14 X, a manager of Jolibee, was sued for the negligent act of an employee. Will the
action against X prosper? (Martin vs. CA, 205 SCRA 591 [1992] & Metro Manila
Transit Corp vs. CA, 223 SCRA 521 [1993])

15 What are the elements of Er-Ee relationship?

(Investment Planning Corp of the Phils vs. SSS, 21 SCRA
924)
16 Can the employer-common carrier be presumed liable if
the fault or negligence of its employee-driver was never
established? (Vallacar Transit vs. Catubig, G.R. No.
175512, May 30, 2011)

17 Driver check the vital parts of the vehicle he is assigned

to before he leaves the compound like the oil, water,
brakes, gasoline, horn, etc. The driver had been driving
for him sometime in 1976 until the collision. Can this be
considered as an exercise of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his driver? (Heirs of
Reinoso, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 116121, July 18, 2011)

20
If the owner is inside the vehicle driven by a newly hired competent driver, is the
former liable for the negligent act of the driver? (Chapman vs. Underwood, G.R.
No. 9010, March 28, 1914)
22

Mayor Bong of Naga City is on board a pick-up truck driven by Tato, an employee
of the City of Naga. Said pick-up is registered to X, but it is in the possession of Y.
Tato borrowed the pick-up from Y to bring Bong to Pili Airport to catch his Manila
flight. The pick-up accidentally hits Bords, a minor, who suffered serious injuries
which lead to his death. Who are the tort-feasors solidarily liable? (Sps. Jayme vs.
Apostol, et. al., G.R. No. 163609, November 27, 2008)
24

At midnight, X, while driving his car, rammed into a pile of earth from a deep
excavation at Barlin St., which was then being repaired by the Naga City
Government, without any warning device. X filed a complaint for damages
against Naga City and Engr. Palo. Is the City of Naga vicariously liable for the
injuries suffered by X? (Quezon City Government, et. al. vs. Dacara, G.R. No.
150304, June 15, 2005)
26

X, a UNC teacher, is a defendant in an action for damages filed against him due to
tortious act of his student under his supervision when the complained incident
took place. X argued that he is not liable under Art. 2180 as said provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution (Exconde vs. Capuno, et. al., G.R. No. L10134, June 29, 1957). Is X
correct? (Amadora vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988)
 Chapter 3
Nature of Liability
LIABILITY OF TORTFEASORS
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.

DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY