PICART vs.

SMITH [37 Phil 809]

FACTS
• Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php
31,100 as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by Smith.
The incident happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La
Union. • Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he had gotten half
way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12
miles per hour. • Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was
not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his course and made two more blasts. •
Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the right
side of the railing. • As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its
left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. • Smith noticed that the pony
was not frightened so he continued without diminution of speed. • When he learned that
there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other side, Smith drove his car to the
right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close proximity to
the horse that it became frightened and turned its belly across the bridge with its head
towards the railing. • The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange
of the car and the limb was broken. • The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with
some violence. • It showed that the free space where the pony stood between the
automobile and the railing was probably less than one half meters. • The horse died and
Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.

ISSUE
Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage done to Picart and his pony.

HELD
Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the amount of P200. The
sum is computed to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the
loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel. • In the nature of things, this
change in situation occurred while the automobile was still some distance away. From
this moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a
place for greater safety. • The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith,
and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop or seeing no other persons on
the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid
collision. There was an appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would
react that way. The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used the
same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence. The law in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias
of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. A prudent man, placed in the
position of Smith in the Court’s opinion would have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course.

FGU INSURANCE vs. CA, FILCAR & FORTUNE INSURANCE

FACTS:
On 21 April 1987, two Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, collided along EDSA, Mandaluyong City.
The car owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by
Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car was owned by respondent FILCAR Transport,
Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee. Upon approaching the
corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left
side of the car of Soriano. Said Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a
Philippine driver's license.

As a consequence, FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with

Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. After which, it sued Dahl-Jensen, FILCAR and
Fortune Insurance for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer
staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the
complaint. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
claim of subrogation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on
another ground, and not that of respondent FILCAR. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N Filcar and Fortune are liable for damages suffered by a third person?

HOLDING:
FILCAR and Fortune are not liable. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: " Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . "

To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.

SC agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the
second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault
or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, since the only cause of the
damage was due to his swerving to the right lane, in which FILCAR had no participation.

Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict provides:

"In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . .
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable ."
Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of
master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly,
petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-
delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.

Article 2180 par. 5 of NCC: “… employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.”

The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them
from causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is
hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the
case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business
was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum
juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of
the latter.

ANDAMO vs. IAC and Missionaries of Our Lady of La Sallete, Inc.

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an

artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and
stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 4, against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers
and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subsequently, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time
a civil case, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
before the same court.

Respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections
on the land. The trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or
suspend the civil action, issued an order dismissing the civil case for lack of jurisdiction,
as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.

In an appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated a decision affirming the

questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was
denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation can be held civilly liable for damages?

HOLDING
Reversed and Set aside.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of
the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by
his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
“Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.”

SO PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) [GR No. 120554]

FACTS
In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a
lease agreement with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The contracts were
initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they continued on a month to month
basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new
corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators.

So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, occupied the same stalls
under the business name, Trendsetter Marketing.

In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in
rent effective September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1,
1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing.
While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts
were not signed, the same were not rescinded.

In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the
same were going to be used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able to
secure lease agreements from DC Chuan.

Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between
Trendsetter and DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The CA, on
appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only.

ISSUE
WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract

HELD
Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of
others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the
case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its
favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right.

Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in
fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC
Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference.

The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering
that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest.
It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious
interferer. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the
part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages.

The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which
states that “ any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party”. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of
legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article
2208 of the Civil Code.

GAN vs. CA [G.R. No. L-44264, September 18, 1988, 165 SCRA 378]

FACTS
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o’clock, the accuse Hedy Gan was driving a
Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo Manila. While in front of house No. 694
along North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on
one side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other.
As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were
parked there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another
which tried to overtake and pass the one in front of it a head-on collision with the
oncoming vehicle, the defendants swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front
bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the
boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The
force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the
parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged
on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front portions, and the truck
sustained dents at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was
later identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a
result of which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner
during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor
were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to presecute the case as
evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of
eyewitness to sustain the charge.

The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The court instead ordered
the prosecution to present its evidence. After the prosecution had rested its case, the
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of the
offense charged. In an appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the charges. Still not
satisfied, petitioner went to the Supreme Court for the reversal of the judgment.

ISSUE
WON Gan is liable for quasi-delicts?

HOLDING
Under the rule that is known in the law as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence.”

Applying the above rule to the case at bar, the Court find the petitioner not guilty of the
crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide. The course of action suggested by
the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion
did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in
the least possible harm to herself and to others.

Due to lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with

respect to the relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming
overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to
reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the right without
stepping on her brakes.

The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very
existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the
very powerful instinct of self-preservation. We therefor rule that the “emergency rule”
enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently absolve
petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under
consideration. Petitioner is aquited.

CALALAS vs. CA [G.R 122039, May 31, 2000]

FACTS
At 10 a.m. of 23 August 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about
24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool
at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan,
Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at
the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was
doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the “distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin.” Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case
wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August
23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic
surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of 3 months and would have
to ambulate in crutches during said period.

On 9 October 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas before the
RTC of Dumaguete City (Branch 36), alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the
former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas,
on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment, against Salva as third-party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu
truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil
Case 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch
37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, and on 31 March 1991, the ruling of the lower court
was reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of
carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence
required under the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, with the
modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.

ISSUE
WON Calalas is held liable for the damage sustained by Sunga?

HOLDING
Sunga is not bound by the ruling in Civil Case 3490, which found the driver and the
owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict, as she was never a party to that case. Further,
the issues in Civil Case 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue in
Civil Case  3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict
for the damage caused to Calalas’ jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in the present
case is whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage. The principle of res
judicata, therefore, does not apply.

Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source
the negligence of the tortfeasor. On the other hand, breach of contract or culpa
contractual is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because
it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case
the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and
1755 of the Code. The provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Herein, it is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver.

Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil
Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or
injury to passengers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers,
from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety
of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756. “ On the other hand,
Article 1755 of the Civil Code provides that “ A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.” Article
1756 provides that “In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.”

AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO (GRN L-21438/September 28, 1966)

FACTS
Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes
on March 30, 1958. Air France issued a “first class” round trip ticket from Manila to
Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, passenger Carrascoso traveled in first class but at
Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the first class seat because a
white man had a better right to it. The purser wrote in his record book “First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and the captain refused
to intervene” which was written in French. Petitioner contends that damages must be
averred that there was fraud and bad faith in order that claim for damages should set in.

ISSUE
Whether or not passenger Carrascoso was entitled to damages.

HOLDING
Yes. Carrascoso was entitled to damages. Although true that there was no mention of
bad faith in the complaint, the inference of bad faith can be drawn from the facts and
circumstances therein. The petitioner violated its contract of transportation with the
aggravating circumstance committed by its manager when it went to the extent of
threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the
part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier.