1.

VERGARA VS COURT OF APPEALS

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any
An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of
of the Civil Code) was filed by private respondent negligence on his part.
against petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular
accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, 2. FGU INSURANCE VS CA
Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a
cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" At around 3 o’clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles,
the store-residence of the private respondent, causing both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along
damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City,
at P 53,024.22. figured in a traffic accident. The car bearing Plate No.
PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at
Petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone,
Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by
(and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven
to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane,
tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo left of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner
truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to
the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At
respondent) and that the said accident was an act of
that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess
God for which he cannot be held liable.' Petitioner also
a Philippine driver’s license.
filed a third party complaint against Travellers
Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging that said As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance
cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with
belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of
party defendant insurance company. subrogation,2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent
FILCAR As well as respondent Fortune Insurance delict
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
respondent. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
latter court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl
court, which ordered petitioner to pay, jointly and Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given
severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was
Corporation, to the private respondent. dropped from the complaint.

ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF FAULT OR ISSUE: Whether an action based on quasi-delict prosper
NEGLIGENT. against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its
insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving
HELD:
the rented vehicle.
Torts; Damages; Quasi-delict; Requisites of a quasi-
delict— These requisites of a quasi-delict are: (1) HELD:
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals
omission, of which defendant, or some person for affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on
whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of
connection of cause and effect between such Dahl- Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of
negligence and the damages. respondent FILCAR. In other words, petitioner failed to
establish its cause of action for sum of money based on
Same; Same; Negligence; Common Carriers; Defective quasi- delict.
brakes cannot be considered fortuitous in character.—
A mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
considered as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the which states: “Whoever by act or omission causes
defects were curable and the accident preventable. damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or 3. SINGSON VS BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict …” Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in
which judgment had been rendered sentencing him
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille
to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein.
or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the Said judgment became final and executory as only
fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A
established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI
the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was — in which the Singsons had a current account —
brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against the Bank were
swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was concerned.
driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the
negligence was solely attributable to Dahl- Jensen thus Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of
making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his the bank, upon reading the name of the Singson in the
personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants,
participation therein. without further reading the body and informing himself
that said garnishment was merely intended for the
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his
the persons made responsible thereunder, derived deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance
over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian
causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service and
respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were
because none of the circumstances mentioned therein dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote
obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI
FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only because his account therein had already been
the owner of the car leased to Dahl- Jensen. As such, garnished and that they are now constrained to close
there was no vinculum juris between them as employer his credit account with them.
and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not
former not being an employer of the latter. included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had
the same Code which provides: “In motor vehicle been inadvertently committed.
mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the ISSUE: Whether the existence of a contract between
use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the parties bars a plaintiff’s claim for damages based on
the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions torts?
of article 2180 are applicable.” Obviously, this provision
of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the HELD:
absence of master-driver relationship between Existence of a contract between the parties is not a bar
respondent FILCAR and Dahl- Jensen. Clearly, petitioner to the commission of a, tort by the one against the
has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on other.—It has been repeatedly held: that the existence
the basis of quasi- delict; logically, its claim against of a contract between the parties does not bar the
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. commission of a tort by the one against the other and
the consequent recovery damages therefor. Indeed,
this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
Carrascoso, L- 21438, Sept. 28, 1966, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, committed in the admission by the trial court of Exhibits
had been illegally ousted from his first-class A to F, but that since the plaintiff made the proper offer
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the to present its witnesses, the case should be remanded
tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover for a new trial.
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort
on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between The Penal Code authorizes the imposition of subsidiary
a passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin liability in default of the persons criminally liable.
and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be Article 20 of the Penal Code provides that this
a tort.” subsidiary liability shall "apply to masters, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
4. CITY OF MANILA VS MERALCO industry for felonies and misdemeanors committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
On June 8, 1925, in the City of Manila, there occurred a employees in the discharge of their duties." It is under
collision between a street car of the Manila Electric this provision that the City of Manila is attempting to
Company, of which Sixto Eustaquio was the motorman, collect damages from the Manila Electric Company. In
and a truck belonging to the City of Manila. As a result connection with the Penal Code, there must be taken
of the collision, the truck was damaged in the sum of into view certain provisions of the Civil Code. It is
P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio was prosecuted for the provided in article 1903 that the obligation imposed for
crime of damage to property and slight injuries through the damage to another caused by fault or negligence is
reckless imprudence. He was convicted by final enforcible against those persons for whom another is
judgment and was sentenced to pay a fine P900, to responsible. But it is added that "The liability imposed
indemnify the offended party, the City of Manila, in the by this article shall cease in case the persons subject
sum of P1,788.27, with subsidary imprisonment in case thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Not being able to good father of a family to prevent the damage." Art.
collect the indemnity from the accused, the City of 1902 provides "Civil obligations arising from crimes or
Manila began an action to obtained payment from the misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of
Manila Electric Company. An allegation of the the Penal Code."
complaint was "That the defendant Manila Electric
Company as master of the said agent and servant, Sixto While the Civil Code, in its article 1092, simply makes
Eustaquio, by virtue of its relation with the latter and by reference to the Penal Code, yet, it is beyond doubt that
express provisions of law, is subsidiarily liable to the by this reference it means those rules of a general
herein plaintiff for the sum of P1,788.27, representing nature which regulate the civil liability arising from the
the damages caused by its agent and servant, the said particular crimes or misdemeanors therein mentioned,
Sixto Eustaquio, in the discharge of his duties as and that, in connection therewith, they shall have the
motorman of the defendant's electric car." preferential application which this article recognizes in
favor of the Penal Code.
ISSUES: (1) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RELY ON
RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL CASE TO RENDER With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no
JUDGEMENT ON THE CIVIL CASE; (2) WHETHER escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal
MERALCO SHOULD BE ABSOLVED FROM LIABIITY. Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary
HELD: liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
The first error plainly has merit. As a general rule, a providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
record in a criminal action cannot be admitted in misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of
evidence in a civil action except by way of inducement the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious reason is misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
that the parties and the issues in a criminal action and Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or
a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that negligent act or ommision not punishable by law.
due process must be followed in the trial of all causes. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with
No man or entity may be condemmed without a day in Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code.
court. It is our ruling that prejudicial error was In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction
while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with
case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are
arises and not a case of civil negligence. Indeed, as required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as
pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling follows:
would premit the master to escape scot-free by allging
and proving that the master had exercised all diligence "SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is
in the selection and training of its servants to prevent hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly
the damage. That would be good defense to a strictly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this
civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.
or misdemeanor.
"SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this
Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the
5. UNITED STATES VS BARIAS Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by
authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a
Defendant was charged with a violation of paragraphs misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by
70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of
Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. After or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of
a demurrer to the complaint was overruled, it was the court: Provided, That violations of law may be punished
proved that, being the captain of the lighter Maude, he either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or
by that prescribed in this section, or by both."
was moving her and directing her movement, when
heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the
Under this statute, which was not referred to on the
hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other
argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty
external power.
in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming
within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in
Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:
the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was
‘ "No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft
engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was
shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without
navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in
being towed by steam or moved by other adequate
the city of Manila. This spot is near the mouth of the
power."
river, the docks whereof are used for the purpose of
taking on and discharging freight, and we entertain no
Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:
doubt that it was in a right sense a part of the harbor
"For the violation of any of the foregoing regulations,
the person offending shall be liable to a fine of not less
6. GAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of
the court."
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of
Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. Hedy Gan was
In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the
driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First, that it is
Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay
unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second,
Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a
that if the Acts of the Philippine Commission bear the
jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following
interpretation of authorizing the Collector to
the other about two to three meters from each other.
promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle,
illegal delegation of legislative power.
the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown
ISSUE: WHETHER DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF
Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the
MISDEMEANOR.
boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the
rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact
HELD:
caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the
By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29,
rear of the parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was
1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license
injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the
craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively
jeep suffered damages on its rear and front parts, and
the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of
its rear. The body of the old man who was later On October 5, 1995, at Maitum Highway, within
identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
(pronounced) dead on arrival. above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill,
taking advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu
ISSUE: WHETHER HEDY GAN IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME Elf, and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
OF HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds
from . . . behind in a sudden and unexpected manner
HELD: with the use of said vehicle . . . members of the
The test for determining whether or not a person is Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage Training Course (Scout Class 07-95), wearing black T-
results to the person or property of another is this: shirts and black short pants, performing an “Endurance
Run” of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City,
as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet,
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take more or less, from one trainee to another, thus forming
precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to
a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or less 50
do so constitutes negligence.
meters from the 1st man to the last man, unable to
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the
defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved
emergency rule. “Under that rule, one who suddenly finds his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without PNP joggers in spite of the continuous warning signals
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to made by six of the joggers who were at the rear
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection waving their hands at the accused for him to take the
may appear to have been a better method, unless the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his a distance of 100 meters away from the jogger’s rear
own negligence. portion, but which accused failed and refused to heed;
instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the joggers,
petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence thus forcing the rear guard[s] to throw themselves to
resulting in Homicide. [a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting,
bumping, or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of
presented by the prosecution with respect to the said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being
relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney aware that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield
and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake,
to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting
reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on
swerve her car to the right without stepping on her said 1st line,
brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the
prosecution on this point is the petitioner’s statement While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino,
to the police. died few days after the incident, while the following
eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously
7.PEOPLE VS DE LOS SANTOS wounded, the accused thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of Murder as
Glenn was charged with crimes of Multiple Murder, a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by
Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted reason of some cause other than said accused’s
Murder in an Information filed in RTC of Cagayan de spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able
Oro.
medical assistance rendered on the following victims The test for determining whether a person is negligent
which prevented their death. in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Could a prudent
After which said accused thereafter escaped from the man, in the position of the person to whom negligence
scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims afore- is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
enumerated helpless. Contrary to Article 248, in reasonable consequence of the course actually
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
Immediately after receiving the report, he and two against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
other policemen proceeded to the traffic scene to constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
broken particles of the hit-and-run vehicle remained on prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
the highway. They did not see any brake marks on the held to exist.
highway, which led him to conclude that the brakes of
the vehicle had not been applied. The policemen GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that
long. reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
ISSUE: WHETEHER GLENN IS GUILTY OF THE CHARGES damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
FILED AGAINST HIM. precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1)
HELD: his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other
in light of the number of persons killed and seriously circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an
It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence experienced driver, should have known to apply the
that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon
trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting
them with intent to kill. the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was
established that the road was slippery and slightly going
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was
conviction especially where the assailant is positively foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in
identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent
determining which of two conflicting theories of the man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his
incident is more likely to be true. Thus, in People v. brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean
Godinez this Court said that the existence of a motive entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence
on the part of the accused becomes decisive in that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction).
determining the probability or credibility of his version It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at
that the shooting was purely accidental. the time. And even if he was driving within the speed
limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care
A man must use common sense, and exercise due under the existing circumstances and conditions at the
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, time.
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such Considering that the incident was not a product of a
results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of
one would have performed except through culpable reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the
abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
exposed to all manner of danger and injury serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when
the single act constitutes two or more grave or less Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his
for committing the other, the penalty for the most own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied accident, while under the influence of liquor, without
in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in also sought to establish that it had exercised due care
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as “acts or in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
omissions punishable by law” committed either by driver.
means of deceit or (dolo) or fault (culpa) In Reodica v.
Court of Appeals We ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, Both the trial court and the appellate court had made
or negligent act results in two or more grave or less fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the manner in
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna
Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted, Street on the basis of which both courts drew the
in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, inference that there was negligence on the part of
of the complex crime of “homicide with serious physical Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this
injuries and damage to property through reckless negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and
imprudence,” and was sentenced to a single penalty of Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both courts
imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and
the trial court. Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the
accident was not the way in which the dump truck had
8. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS CARBONEL been parked but rather the reckless way in which
Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed
had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and into the dump truck.
General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna ISSUES:
Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) A. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" DIONISIO HAD A CURFEW PASS
and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some
2-½ meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned Private respondent Dionisio was not able to
by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead,
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right he offered the explanation that his family may have
hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a
hand side of a person facing in the same direction certification (dated two years after the accident)
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the
oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Campo
(not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of have authority to issue curfew passes for
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a
dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier valid curfew pass. The relevance of possession or
that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando non-possession curfew pass that night lies in the
U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of light it tends to shed on the other related issues:
his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether
carried out early the following morning, Dionisio he had indeed purposely put out his headlights
claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his before the accident, in order to avoid detection and
car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police
into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio station for travelling after the onset of curfew
suffered some physical injuries including some without a valid curfew pass.
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
B. WHETHER DIONISIO WAS DRIVING FAST OR motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.
SPEEDING JUST BEFORE THE COLLISION WITH THE There simply is not enough evidence to show how
DUMP TRUCK much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of
that upon his physical faculties or upon his
We think that an automobile speeding down a judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware
street and suddenly smashing into a stationary that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect
object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling different people differently.
event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than The improper parking of truck created an unreasonable
reflective, reactions from observers who happened risk for anyone driving on that street for which the truck
to be around at that time. The testimony of driver should be held responsible as the negligence of a
Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part car driver bumping that truck was no more than a
of the res gestae and should have been considered forseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck
by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should driver.—We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's
have been ascribed to such testimony, even though negligence far from being a "passive and static
it did not, as it could not, have purported to condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient
describe quantitatively the precise velocity at cause. The collision between the dump truck and the
which Dionisio was travelling just before impact private respondent's car would in all probability not
with the Phoenix dump truck. have occurred had the dump truck not been parked
askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.
C. WHETHER DIONISIO HAD PURPOSELY TURNED OFF The improper parking of the dump truck created an
HIS CAR’S HEADLIGHTS BEFORE CONTACT WITH unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
THE DUMP TRUCK OR WHETHER THOSE General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
HEADLIGHTS MALFUNCTIONED MOMENTS BEFORE risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our
COLLISION view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore
that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening
crossed the intersection but was non-committal as or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as
to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable
that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even
consequence of the risk created by the negligent
before he reached the intersection so as not to be
manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump
detected by the police in the police precinct which
he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed
away from the intersection. We believe that the a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others
petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk
than that offered by private respondent Dionisio— the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was
i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the not of an independent and overpowering nature as to
crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, the improper parking of the dump truck and the
although he succeeded in switching his lights on accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. We
again at "bright" split seconds before contact with hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
the dump truck. "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck
D. WHETHER DIONISIO WAS INTOXICATED AT THE
driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
TIME OF ACCIDENT.
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article
We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to
2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a
Same; Doctrine of "last clear chance" is a common-law the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in
theory adopted to mitigate the harshness of the the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that
"contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by
which in common-law countries plaintiff is barred from a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the
any recovery, unlike in our system of law where the Civil track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or
Code expressly states that it will merely reduce the upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking
his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the
amount to be recovered.—Petitioners also ask us to
knee.
apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking
the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private of the tie, which was the immediate occasion of the
respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is found by
avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that the trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the
Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" argument to have been the dislodging of the crosspiece
must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay
doctrine of the common law was imported into our raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent of the
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid
debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way in the sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at
into theCivil Code of the Philippines. The historical the time of the occurrence
function of that doctrine in the common law was to
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was
mitigate the harshness of another common law
necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing
doctrine or rule—that of contributory negligence. The either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles
common law rule of contributory negligence prevented transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to
any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect
even if the plaintiff s negligence was relatively minor as and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant
defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance to repair the weakened track, after notice of its
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who condition, that the judge below based his judgment.
had also been negligent provided that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS CONTRIBUTORY
failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what NEGLIGENCE BY THE PLAINTIFF
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine
HELD:
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar
were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both
it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the the officers of the company and three of the workmen
Philippines. testify that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by the side
9. RAKES VS ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO.
of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in
prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
the employment of the defendant, was at work
On this contradiction of proof we think that the
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff
contention to the extent of the general order being
claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
made known to the workmen.
defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so
acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate
that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or
causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction
sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or
must be between the accident and the injury, between
guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to
the event itself, without which there could have been The referee overruled the defenses, having found the
no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering five men to be employees who had died or were injured
into it, independent of it, but contributing under review in the course of employment. Consequently he
was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to required the employer to make compensation in the
replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for amounts specified in his award. However on appeal, the
damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner absolved Dr.
sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the Bulaong from all liability, because he found that the
plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not claimants had received, after the mishap, various
contribute, although it was an element of the damage amounts of money from the owner of the colliding bus,
which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of the Victory Liner Inc., each of them having executed a
place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of written release or waiver in favor of said Liner.
duty, the last would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would Claimants, the Commissioner declared, had elected to
have been responsible. Where he contributes to the hold the Liner responsible for the accident, and could
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, not thereafter turn around to recover their employer.
he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the He cited section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he Law, which for convenience is quoted:
may recover the amount that the defendant SEC. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, suffers an injury for which compensation is due under
less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
imprudence. shall be optional with such injured employee either to
claim compensation from his employer, under this Act,
10. ALBA VS BULAONG or sue such other person for damages in accordance
Petitioners Gregorio de la Cruz, Pedro C. Bulaong and with law; and in case compensation is claimed and
Pacifico Bulaong were employees of Dr. Horacio allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who
Bulaong in his business of threshing palay. Other paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the
employees were Engracio Alba (husband of petitioner same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right
Maria Paz S. Alba) and Vicente A. Sebastian (husband of of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided,
petitioner Elisea S. Sebastian). Early in the morning of That in case the employer recovers from such third
that day said five employees were, upon specific orders person damages in excess of those paid or allowed
of Dr. Bulaong, on their way to Barrio Baringan, under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the
Malolos, Bulacan, to thresh palay, riding on a tractor injured employee or any other person entitled thereto,
which was pulling a threshing machine. Suddenly a after deduction of at the expenses of the employer and
speeding bus of the Victory Liner Inc. collided with the the costs of the proceedings .The sum paid by the
thresher which in turn hit the tractor, and as a result employer for compensation to which the employee or
those on board were violently thrown out. Engracio his dependents are entitled of this Act, shall not be
Alba and Vicente Sebastian died; Gregorio de la Cruz, admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.
Pedro C. Bulaong and Pacifica Bulaong sustained
physical injuries. ISSUE: WHETHER DR. BULAONG WAS FREE FROM
LIABILITIES
Five separate claims were filed before the Workmen's
Compensation Commission against the employer Dr. HELD:
Bulaong. Three defenses were set up by him: (a) There is no question that the Liner was a "third party"
claimants were not his employees, but industrial within the meaning of section 6. There is also no
partners, (b) the injuries were not sustained in the question that petitioner have not sued the Liner for
course of employment and (c) the claims, if any, had damages. Wherefore they are not deemed to have
been extinguished by virtue of the monetary made the election specified in section 6. However, the
settlements which petitioners had concluded with the plain intent of the law is that they shall not receive
Victory Liner Inc. payment twice for the same injuries (from the third
party and from the employer). Hence if without suing
they receive full damages from the third party, they
should be deemed to have practically made the election Bulaong in the same juridical position, respectively, of
under the law, and should be prevented from holder, maker and indorser. The release with express
thereafter suing the employer. Full damages means, of reservation produced the implied reservation already
course what they would have demanded in a suit stated.
against the third party or what they would receive in a
compensation as complete settlement. Needless to say, It is therefore our view that the moneys received from
where the injured employee is offered, by the third Victory Liner Inc. did not necessarily have the effect of
party, compensation which he deems insufficient, he releasing Dr. Bulaong. Inasmuch as the five men were
may reject it and thereafter litigate with such third his employees, and they were injured by reason of and
party. Or choose instead to complain against his in the course of their employment, he must pay
employer. compensation to be fixed in accordance with law.
Bearing in mind, however, the law's intention not to
If the third party agrees to the reservation, such partial give double compensation, the amounts they have
payment may legally be made and accepted. We say received from the Victory Liner shall be deducted from
"if", because the reservation necessarily entails some the sums so determined.
disadvantage to the third party, inasmuch as pursuant
to legal principles when the employer subsequently In this connection we notice that the referee who has
pays, he may in turn recover from the third party (See investigated the matter has made some calculations of
sec. 6). The employer can not validly object to such monetary award. However they were not passed upon
reservation by the employee, because in effect the by the Commissioner.
settlement helps to reduce the amount he will
afterwards have to disgorge. 11. CALALAS VS CA
At 10 o’clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
As we see it, the five employees' acceptance of the respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
Victory Liner's offer of compensation, under the freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
circumstances disclosed by this record, especially the University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
written acknowledgments, showed they were not operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney
content with the amount received — they did not was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga
consider it sufficient — so they reserved their right to was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a
require additional compensation from their employer. wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
Hence their action against Dr. Bulaong is not barred by the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
section 6. He may in turn demand reimbursement from Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.
Victory Liner Inc. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
The implied reservation of Dr. Bulaong's right against so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned
Victory Liner Inc. is not unprecedented in the roam of by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jurisprudence. When a promissory note is dishonored jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained
for non-payment, the holder may recover its value a fracture of the “distal third of the left tibia-fibula with
either from the maker or from the indorser. If he sues severe necrosis of the underlying skin.” Closed
the indorser and recovers, the latter may in turn recoup reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and
from the maker. The statute expressly permits him to case wedging were done under sedation.
renounce his right against the maker and reserve his
right to recover from the indorser (Sec. 120 (e) On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for
Negotiable Instruments Law). When that happens, the damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
courts say the indorser's right to recover from the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
maker is also reserved. (Bootman's Sav. vs. Johnson, 24 the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Mo. App. 317; Tolentino Commercial Laws Vol. I (7th Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
Ed.)p. 361.1) against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

In the situation resulting after the collision, we could The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as
regard the five employees, the Victory Liner and Dr. thirdparty defendant and absolved Calalas of liability,
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption of
responsible for the accident Negligence; Upon the happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at
Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was once arises, and it becomes the duty of a
reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action common carrier to prove that he observed
was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, extraordinary diligence in the care of his
and that the common carrier failed to exercise the passengers.—In the case at bar, upon the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate happening of the accident, the presumption of
court dismissed the third party complaint against Salva negligence at once arose, and it became the
and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. duty of petitioner to prove that he observed
extraordinary diligence in the care of his
ISSUES: passengers. Now, did the driver of jeepney
A. WHETHER SALVA AND HIS DRIVER VERENA WERE carry Sunga “safely as far as human care and
LIABLE FOR QUASIDELICT FOR YJE DAMAGE foresight could provide, using the utmost
CAUSED TO PETITIONER’S JEEPNEY. diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances” as required by
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common militate against petitioner’s contention.
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they Same; Same; Fortuitous Event; Words and
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. Phrases; The taking of an “extension seat” is
1733 and1755 of the Code. This provision not an implied assumption of risk on the part of
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden the passenger; A caso fortuito is an event which
of proof. could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable; Requisites.—We find
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s
ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his contention that Sunga’s taking an “extension
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner’s seat” amounted to an implied assumption of
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision many victims of the tragedies in our seas
between the jeepney and the truck was the should not be compensated merely because
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of those passengers assumed a greater risk of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This
quasi delict, not in actions involving breach of is also true of petitioner’s contention that the
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
liability to a person where there is no relation parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito
between him and another party. In such a case, the is an event which could not be foreseen, or
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This
is a pre-existing contractual relation between the requires that the following requirements be
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the present: (a) the cause of the breach is
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to independent of the debtor’s will; (b) the event
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects is such as to render it impossible for the debtor
regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
diligence required of common carriers with regard (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the
to the safety of passengers as well as the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
presumption of negligence in cases of death or foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with
injury to passengers. its body protruding two meters into the
highway.
B. WHETHER PETITIONER IS LIABLE ON HIS
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE C. MORAL DAMAGES
 As a general rule, moral damages are not get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters.
breach of contract for it is not one of the items As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As toward his left, that being the proper side of the road
an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a that the horseman would move to the other side. The
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had
Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that
which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead
provided in Art.2220 of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
damages since there was no factual finding by the gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga’s quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
contention that petitioner’s admission in open court hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as
that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in
going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an such close proximity to the animal that it became
admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of frightened and turned its body across the bridge with
the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on
imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and
plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at thrown off with some violence.
fault for the accident.
ISSUE: whether or not the defendant in maneuvering
*12. PCIB VS CA his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
13. PICART VS SMITH repair the damage

The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this HELD:

action took place on December 12, 1912, on the we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to
that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of
gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the would not be done; and he must in a moment have
rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He things this change of situation occurred while the
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge automobile was yet some distance away; and from this
he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to moment it was not longer within the power of the
him that the man on horseback before him was not plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place
observing the rule of the road. of greater safety. The control of the situation had then
passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing
and heard the warning signals. However, being that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost
of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited
fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there accident being at a point near the intersection of said
was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question street and Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped
was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get at its appointed place for taking on and letting off
exited and jump under the conditions which here passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its
confronted him. When the defendant exposed the course at a moderate speed under the guidance of the
horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, motorman. The car had proceeded only a short
negligent in the eye of the law. distance, however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del
Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his
The question as to what would constitute the conduct approach being made from the left. The car was of the
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be kind having entrance and exist at either end, and the
always determined in the light of human experience movement of the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. at the front entrance of the car at the moment when
Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but the car was passing.
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men
govern their conduct by the circumstances which are ISSUES:
before them or known to them. They are not, and are a. WHETHER THE MOTORMAN WAS NEGLIGENT
not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence With respect to the legal aspects of the case we
they can be expected to take care only when there is may observe at the outset that there is no
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. obligation on the part of a street railway
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, company to stop its cars to let on intending
foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? passengers at other points than those
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to appointed for stoppage. In fact it would be
guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, impossible to operate a system of street cars if
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this a company engage in this business were
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be required to stop any and everywhere to take on
held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion people who were too indolent, or who imagine
for determining the existence of negligence in a given themselves to be in too great a hurry, to go to
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a the proper places for boarding the cars.
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would Nevertheless, although the motorman of this
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on,
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct it was his duty to do act that would have the
or guarding against its consequences. effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he
was attempting to board the car. The
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the premature acceleration of the car was, in our
present case we think that negligence is clearly opinion, a breach of this duty.
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized b. WHETHER MERALCO IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the The relation between a carrier of passengers
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that for hire and its patrons is of a contractual
course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on nature; and in failure on the part of the carrier
the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened to use due care in carrying its passengers safely
harm. is a breach of duty (culpa contructual) under
articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code.
14. DEL PRADO VS MERALCO Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of
The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged passengers owes to its patrons extends to
in operating street cars in the City for the conveyance persons boarding the cars as well as to those
of passengers; and on the morning of November 18, alighting therefrom. The case of Cangco vs.
1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as appellant's Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an
motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from instance of the violation of this duty with
east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the respect to a passenger who was getting off of a
 train. In that case the plaintiff stepped off of a “On August 4, 1964, plaintiff Engineering Construction,
moving train, while it was slowing down in a Inc., being a successful bidder, executed a contract in
station, and at the time when it was too dark Manila with the National Waterworks and Sewerage
for him to see clearly where he was putting his Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook to
feet. The employees of the company had furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and materials (not
carelessly left watermelons on the platform at furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed
the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the 2nd Ipo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and
result that his feet slipped and he fell under the Appurtenant Structures, and Appurtenant Features, at
car, where his right arm badly injured. This Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to complete said works
court held that the railroad company was liable within eight hundred (800) calendar days from the date
for breach positive duty (culpa contractual), the Contractor receives the formal notice to proceed.
and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the
amount of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the “The project involved two (2) major phases: the first
opinion in that case the distinction is clearly phase comprising the tunnel work covering a distance
drawn between a liability for negligence arising of seven (7) kilometers, passing through the mountain,
from breach of contructual duty and that from the Ipo river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where
arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code the Ipo Dam of the defendant National Power
(culpa aquiliana). Corporation is located, to Bicti; the other phase
The distiction between these two sorts of consisting of the outworks at both ends of the tunnel.
negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for
the reason that where liability arises from a “The record shows that on November 4, 1967, typhoon
mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a ‘Welming’ hit Central Luzon, passing through
breach of positive obligation, an employer, or defendant’s Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at
master, may exculpate himself, under the last Ipo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, by project area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to
providing that he had exercised due degligence the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the
to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is Angat Dam was rising perilously at the rate of sixty (60)
not available if the liability of the master arises centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water
from a breach of contrauctual duty (culpa from the dam, since the water level had reached the
contractual). In the case bfore us the company danger height of 212 meters above sea level, the
pleaded as a special defense that it had used all defendant corporation caused the opening of the
the deligence of a good father of a family to spillway gates.”
prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff;
and to establish this contention the company The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial
introduced testimony showing that due care court that the evidence preponderantly established the
had been used in training and instructing the fact that due to the negligent manner with which the
motorman in charge of this car in his art. But spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an
this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the
the liability involved was derived from a breach gates, and hit the installations and construction works
of obligation under article 1101 of the Civil of ECI at the Ipo site with terrific impact, as a result of
Code and related provisions. (Manila Railroad which the latter’s stockpile of materials and supplies,
Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica and Atlantic, camp facilities and permanent structures and
Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs. accessories were either washed away, lost or
Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., destroyed.
706, 710.)
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DESTRUCTION AND LOSS OF ECI’S
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES WERE DUE TO FORCE
*15. TAYLOR VS MERALCO MAJEURE WHICH EXEMPTS NPC FROM LIABLITY

16. NAPOCOR VS CA HELD:

NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano.
the proximate cause of the loss and damage even When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport
though the typhoon was an act of God.— It is clear from road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing
the appellate court’s decision that based on its findings against each other from the opposite direction. Tano
of fact and that of the trial court’s, petitioner NPC was stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing
undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made
gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust
“Welming” when it knew very well that it was safer to to settle, Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards
have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was the airport road. When he was about to reach the
also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by
at least four days before it actually struck. And even Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and
though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van.
call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained.
its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage. As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. ISSUE: WHETHER THE NEGLIGENCE OF MONTEROLA IS
Court of Appeals: Thus, if upon the happening of a THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or HELD:
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the Under the Land Transportation and Traffic
obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, the driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before
Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, is called
cannot escape liability. The principle embodied in the upon to first see that such movement can be made in
act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must safety, and whenever the operation of any other
be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature vehicle approaching may be affected by such
and human agencies are to be excluded from creating movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the
or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the driver of such other vehicles of the intention to make
effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found such movement (Sec. 44, R.A. 4136, as amended). This
to be in part the result of the participation of man, means that before a driver turns from a direct line, in
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or this case to the left, the driver must first see to it that
failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby there are no approaching vehicles and, if there are, to
humanized, as it was, and removed from the rules make the turn only if it can be made in safety, or at the
applicable to the acts of God. Thus, it has been held that very least give a signal that is plainly visible to the driver
when the negligence of a person concur s with an act of of such other vehicle. Tano did neither in this case, for
God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from he recklessly made a left turn even as visibility was still
liability by showing that the immediate cause of the very poor, and thus failed to see the approaching
damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability motorcycle and warn the latter of his intention to make
for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from a left turn. This is plain and simple negligence.
any previous negligence or misconduct by which the
loss or damage may have been occasioned. "Rogelio Monterola's motorcycle would not have hit
the cargo van had Tano, in operating it, not recklessly
17. LBC AIR CARGO VS CA turned left when visibility was still poor, and instead
The case arose from a vehicular collision which observed the directive of the Land Transportation Code
occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of 15 November that before doing so, he should first see to it that such
1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was movement can be made in safety, and that whenever
traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards any other vehicle approaching may be affected by such
Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road movement, should give a signal plainly visible to the
in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a driver of such other vehicle of the intention to make
cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by such movement.
defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the
opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On "That Rogelio Monterola was running fast despite poor
board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC
visibility as evidenced by the magnitude of the damage Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and
to the vehicles is no defense. His negligence would at Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173 SCRA
most be contributory (Article 2179, N.C.C.). Having 464). In the case at bench, the victim was traveling
negligently createdthe condition of danger, defendants along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be.
fail to see Fernando Yu's liability as Manager of LBC- The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable
Mangagoy Branch Office, there being no employer- time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to
employee relationship between him and Jaime Tano his left to the actual impact, that could have afforded
who is a driver of the LBC Air Cargo, Inc. It was held in the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc., et al. vs. Phil. American
Forwarders, Inc., 63 SCRA 231, that the term 'Manager' 18. CHINA AIRLINES VS CA
in Article 2180 is used in the sense of 'employer.' Hence,
no tortuous or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened Jose E. Pagsibigan, then vice-president and general
on Fernando Yu as branch manager of LBC Air Cargo, manager of Rentokil (Phils.) Inc., a local firm dealing in
Inc. insecticides, pesticides and related services
appurtenant thereto, purchased a plane ticket for a
"Considering, however, the contributory negligence of Manila-Taipei-Hongkong- Manila flight from the
Rogelio Monterola in driving at a fast clip despite the Transaire Travel Agency. The said agency, through its
fact that the road was dusty, we reduce the aggregate Cecille Baron, contacted the Manila Hotel branch of
amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled by defendant Philippine Air Lines which at that time was a
twenty per cent (Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. sales and ticketing agent of defendant China Air Lines.
Intermediate Appellate Court, Supra). On June 6, 1968, PAL, through its ticketing clerk
defendant Roberto Espiritu, cut and issued CAL Ticket
From every indication, the proximate cause of the No. 017991 for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong- Manila
accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite flight. According to the plane ticket, the plaintiff was
extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart from Manila
(towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first for Taipei on June 10, 1968 at 1720 hours (5:20 p.m.),
waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Exhibit A.
Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on
the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite Upon arriving at the airport, the plaintiff was informed
direction, that almost instantaneously caused the that the plane he was supposed to take for Taipei had
collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to left at 10:20 in the morning of that day. The PAL
attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have employees at the airport made appropriate
been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle. arrangements for the plaintiff to take PAL’s flight to
Taipei the following day, June 11, 1968. The plaintiff
Doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at took said flight and arrived in Taipei around noontime
times, as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered of the said date.
peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act “On July 8, 1968, the plaintiff, through counsel, made
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, formal demand on defendant PAL for moral damages in
or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or not less than P125,000.00 for what the plaintiff
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one allegedly suffered as a result of his failure to take the
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the flight as stated in his plane ticket. (Exhibit E) After a
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with series of negotiations among the plaintiff,
the consequences thereof (see Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil.
809). Stated differently, the rule would also mean that In his complaint, plaintiff prays for the recovery of
an antecedent negligence of a person does not P125,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 for and
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening as attorney’s fees. The moral damages allegedly arose
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought from the gross negligence of defendant Roberto
by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, Espiritu in stating on the plane ticket that the time of
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise departure was 1720 hours, instead of 1020 hours which
of due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. was the correct time of departure in the revised
summer schedule of CAL. Plaintiff claims that by reason
of his failure to take the plane, he suffered besmirched in proving that the fault lied with Espiritu, defendant
reputation, embarrassment, mental anguish, wounded CAL derives no solace nor gains an advantage. It may
feelings and sleepless nights, inasmuch as when he not claim exemption from liability by reason thereof.
went to the airport, he was accompanied by his Espiritu was an employee of PAL and whatever
business associates, close friends and relatives. He negligence was committed by him is attributable to
further averred that his trip to Taipei was for the PAL. It is an admitted fact that PAL is an authorized
purpose of conferring with a certain Peng Siong Lim, agent of CAL. In this relationship, the responsibility of
president of the Union Taiwan Chemical Corporation, defendant PAL for the tortious act of its agent or
scheduled at :00 a.m. on June 11, 1968. representative is inescapable

“Defendant Philippine Air Lines alleges in its answer When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
that the departure time indicated by Espiritu in the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
ticket was furnished and confirmed by the reservation that there was negligence on the part of the employer
office of defendant China Air Lines. It further avers that either in the selection of the employee or in the
CAL had not informed PAL’s Manila Hotel Branch of the supervision over him after such selection. The
revised schedule of its flight, nor provided it with presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
revised timetable; that when the travel agency sought showing on the part of the employer that it has
to purchase the ticket for the plaintiff on CAL CI Flight exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
No. 812 for June 10, 1968, Espiritu who was then the family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
ticketing clerk on duty, checked with the reservation
office of CAL on the availability of space, the date and Hence, to escape solidary liability for the quasi-delict
the time of said flight; that CAL’s Dory Chan informed committed by Espiritu, it is imperative that PAL must
Espiritu that the departure time of Flight No. 812 on adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
June 10, 1968 was at 5:20 in the afternoon of said date. care. PAL failed to overcome the presumption. As found
by respondent court, CAL had revised its schedule of
“Defendant China Air Lines, for its part, disclaims flights since April 1, 1968; that after the Civil
liability for the negligence and incompetence of the Aeronautics Board had approved the revised schedule
employees of PAL. It avers that it had revised its of flights, PAL was duly informed thereof and, in fact,
schedule since April 1, 1968, the same to be effective PAL’s Manila Hotel branch office had been issuing and
on April 20, 1968, and the said revised schedule was selling tickets based on the revised time schedule
adopted only after proper petition with and approval of before June 10, 1968.
the Civil Aeronautics Board of which all airlines,
including defendant PAL, were notified. The respondent court found that the mistake
committed by Espiritu was done in good faith. While
ISSUE: WHETHER CAL IS LIABLE TO PAGSIBAGAN. there is no evidence that he acted with malice, we can
not entirely condone his actuations. As an employee of
HELD: PAL, the nature of his functions requires him to observe
CAL had no share in the error committed by Espiritu in for the protection of the interests of another person
indicating the time of departure of Flight No. 812. PAL that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
had shown through the testimony of Carmen Ibazeta circumstances justly demand. He committed a clear
Gallaga, ticket representative of PAL at the Manila neglect of duty. Ergo, for his negligence, Espiritu is
Hotel Office, that they received circulars and timetables primarily liable to respondent Pagsibigan under Article
of airlines in the PAL main office. It further appears that 2176 of the Civil Code. For the failure of PAL to rebut
on two occasions, defendant PAL cut and issued tickets the legal presumption of negligence in the selection
for CAL based on the new schedule even before June and supervision of its employee, it is also primarily
10, 1968. As a matter of fact, the other entries of time liable under Article 2180 of the same code which
departures in the ticket issued to the plaintiff are in explicitly provides that employers shall be liable for the
accordance with the revised schedule, and that the only damages caused by their employees and household
error therein was with respect to the departure from helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
Manila on June 10, 1968.
even though the former are not engaged in any Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the
business or industry. time of the accident, nor did he know that his ,son was
going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when
Under the aforesaid provision, all that is required is that his son told him after the accident that he attended the
the employee, by his negligence, committed a quasi- parade upon instruction of his teacher.
delict which caused damage to another, and this
suffices to hold the employer primarily and solidarily ISSUE: Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held
responsible for the tortious act of the employee. PAL, civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante,
however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement of for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
the amount which it will a have to pay the offended Caperiña caused by the negligentact of minor Dante
party’s claim Capuno.

19. EXCONDE VS CAPUNO HELD:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and
double homicide through reckless imprudence for the 5, which provides:
death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March "ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next
31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal
(Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno damages caused by the minor children who live with
was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, them. Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he apprentices while they are under their custody.
committed the crime.
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante while they are under their custody", but this provision
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p, 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed.,
be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña, he is p. 557). Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the
Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-
time of the accident, the former was not under the curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of
control, supervision 'and custody of the latter. This Dr. José Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade
consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
the damages claimed in the complaint. From this while driving it, the accident occurred. In the
decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that
the case was certified to us on the ground that the school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
appeal only involves questions of law. liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not
then a student of an institution of arts and trades as
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts provided for by law.
Organization. He attended a parade in honor of Dr. José
Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's The civil liability which the law impose upon the father,
supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he any damages that may be caused by the minor children
took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep consequence of the parental authority they exercise
turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty
and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence. Delfin of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to to Vicente Trinidad on September 24,1980, after the
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the latter had paid all his monthly amortizations under the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation" financing lease agreement between FMLFC and
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way Trinidad.
by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is
if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a On FMLFC's motion, the lower court granted FMLFC's
good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article leave to file a third-party complaint against Trinidad
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This and admitted the third-party complaint filed therewith.
defendants failed to prove. Answering the third-party complaint, the Estate of
Vicente Trinidad admitted that the truck was operated
20. FIRST MALAYAN VS CA by the deceased during his lifetime. Nevertheless, it
On June 26, 1984, Crisostomo B. Vitug filed Civil Case raised the defense that the estate of Vicente Trinidad
No. 84-25186 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, was no longer existing because the same had long
Branch XLIII, against the defendant. First Malayan
Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC for short), to On August 25, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision
recover damages for physical injuries, loss of personal sentencing FMLFC to pay Vitug the sum of P 133,950
effects, and the wreck of his car as a result of a three- with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the
vehicle collision on December 14, 1983, involving his complaint until fully paid, plus the sum of P10,000 as
car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck registered in attorneys fees and costs.
the name of FMLFC and driven by one Crispin Sicat. The
evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop FMLFC appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals
at the intersection of New York Street and Epifanio which rendered a decision on November 27, 1989
delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Cubao, Quezon City, modifying the appealed judgment by ordering the
northward bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck third-party defendant-appellee (Estate of Vicente
bumped a Ford Granada car behind him with such force Trinidad) to indemnify the appellant, FMLFC, for
that the Ford car was thrown on top of Vitug's car whatever amount the atter may pay Vitug under the
crushing its roof. The cargo truck thereafter struck judgment. In all other respects, the trial court's decision
Vitug's car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode was affirmed
and setting the car ablaze.
ISSUE: WHETHER FMLFC IS LIABLE FOR THE MISHAP.
Stunned by the impact, Vitug was fortunately extricated
from his car by solicitous bystanders before the vehicle HELD:
exploded. However, two of his passengers were burned In the first place, the factual finding of the trial court
to death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000, was a total loss. and the Court of Appeals that the Isuzu vehicle which
When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug figured in the mishap was still registered in the name of
discovered that he had lost various personal articles FMLFC at the time of the accident, is not reviewable by
valued at P48,950, namely a necklace with a diamond this Court in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of
pendant, a GP watch, a pair of Christian Dior eyeglasses, Rules of Court.
a gold Cross pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also
suffered injuries producing recurring pains in his neck This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who
and back. Upon his physician's advice, he received the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the
further medical treatment in the United States which registered owner is the operator of the same with
cost him US$2,373.64 for his first trip, and US$5,596.64 respect to the public and third persons, and as such,
for the second. directly and primarily responsible for the consequences
of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
At the time of the accident on December 14, 1983, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver,
Isuzu cargo truck was registered in the name of the First the actual operator and employer being considered
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC). merely as his agent (MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation
However, FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10, citing Vargas vs.
was not the owner of the truck, neither the employer Langcay, 6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs. Aguino, 105 Phil. 949).
of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck
Were the registered owner allowed to evade delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the
responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A and B. Espiritu,
or owner is, it would be easy for him by collusion with however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas
others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. The signatures
transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who appearing in the way bill receipts Exhibits A and B of the
possesses no property with which to respond financially Alday Transportation admittedly not the signature of
for the dam age or injury done," (Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 any representative or employee of the Atlas Fertilizer
Phil. 103.) Corporation. Roberto Espiritu could not be found, and
plaintiff reported the loss to the Manila Police
"x x x The registered owner or operator of record is the Department. Roberto Espiritu was later arrested and
one liable for damages caused by a vehicle regardless booked for theft
of any alleged sale or lease made thereon." (MYC-Agro-
Industrial Corp. vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 11.) It was claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan from the Police
Department after he had been notified by his
In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle employees that the truck had been impounded by the
to be valid against third persons, it must be recorded in police; but as he could not produce at the time the
the Land Transportation Office. For, although valid registration papers, the police would not release the
between the parties, the sale cannot affect third truck to Gelisan. As a result of the impounding of the
persons who rely on the public registration of the truck according to Gelisan, x x x and that for the release
motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In of the truck he paid the premium of P300 to the surety
law, FMLFC was the owner and operator of the Isuzu company.
cargo truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by The defendant, Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the other
its operation due to the fault or negligence of the driver hand, disowned responsibility. He claimed that he had
thereof. no contractual relations with the plaintiff Benito Alday
as regards the hauling and/or delivery of the 400 bags
21. GELISAN VS ALDAY of fertilizer mentioned in the complaint; that the
alleged misappropriation or nondelivery by defendant
"Defendant Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight Roberto Espiritu of plaintiff's 400 bags of fertilizer, was
truck bearing plate No. TH-2377. On January 31, 1962, entirely beyond his (Gelisan's) control and knowledge,
defendant Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu and which fact became known to him, for the first time.
entered into a contract marked Exhibit 3-Gelisan under on 8 February 1962 when his freight truck, with plate
which Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan No. TH-2377, was impounded by the Manila Police
for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer Department, at the instance of the plaintiff; and that in
at an agreed price of P18.00 per trip within the limits of his written contract of hire with Roberto Espiritu, it was
the City of Manila provided the loads shall not exceed expressly provided that the latter will bear and pay all
200 sacks. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and losses and damages attending the carriage of goods to
pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the be hauled by said Roberto Espiritu.
goods to be hauled by him. The track was taken by a
driver of Roberto Espiritu on February 1,1962. Plaintiff ISSUE: (1). WHETHER GELISAN IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
Benito Alday, a trucking operator, and who owns about TO ALDAY FOR THE NON-DELIVERY OF FERTILIZER
15 freight trucks, had known the defendant Roberto
Espiritu since 1948 as a truck operator. Plaintiff had a The Court citing Montoya vs. Ignacio, thus:
contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer "There is merit in this contention. The law really
Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its requires the approval of the Public Service Commission
Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the in order that a franchise. or any privilege pertaining
gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the
with the driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of certificate issued to the grantee. The reason is obvious.
fertilizer. The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday and Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or
he instructed his checker Celso Henson to let Roberto lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service
Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of Commission so that the latter may take proper
200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was safeguards to protect the interest of the public x x x
there should be a public hearing, with notice to all
interested parties, in order that the Commission may
determine if there are good and reasonable grounds
justifying the transfer or lease of the property covered
by the franchise, or if the sale or lease is detrimental to
public interest. Such being the reason and philosophy
behind this requirement, it follows that if the property
covered by the franchise is transferred, or leased to
another without obtaining the requisite approval, the
transfer is not binding against the Public Service
Commission and in contemplation of law thegrantee
continues to be responsible under the franchise in
relation to the Commission and to the Public

(2) WHETHER GELISAN IS LIABLE FOR THE ACT

COMMITTED BY ESPIRITU
The Court has invariably held in several decisions that
the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation or that may be
caused to any of the passengers therein. The claim of
the petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease
contract executed by and between him and Roberto
Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third
persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that
the lease contract, adverted to, had not been approved
by the Public Service Commission. It Is settled in our
jurisprudence that if the property covered by a
franchise is transferred or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not
binding upon the public and third persons