G.R. No.

80116 June 30, 1989 assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent
judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-
vs. 52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding same court. 7
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON.
LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents. Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set
aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was
filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434.
The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to
REGALADO, J.: inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office
foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity for review. 9
suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her
jurisdictional question. arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, 52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1 of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order
the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner
and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their a plea of not guilty. 14
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying
Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law
said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
jurisdiction. 4 No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to against the petitioner. 16
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia
as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall
in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the accordingly issue.
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery,
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It
eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court
over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement
for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently
it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case. be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action
for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should action by the former against the latter.
be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce
the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so- has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of conclusion. 22
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian,
such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other,
is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced
except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have of defendant when the offense is said to have been
the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the committed, he had ceased to be such when the
filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion his status was not such as to entitle him to make
to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
or petition. offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well
as the state, in explaining the reason for this
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale that the unoffending spouse must be such when the
would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
exclusively within his power and option. is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality
the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21 Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and
and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting
exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his such stance, thus:
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such
capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. There can be no question as to the validity of that
We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so. States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential husband, in any State of the Union. ...
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a
complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
 It is true that owing to the nationality principle complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public SO ORDERED.
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v.
their national law. ... HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS C. VICTOR AND
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case Facts:
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25 On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino
citizen) and respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being German national, were married at Federal Republic of Germany. They
no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse Geiling.
at the time he filed suit.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought in Germany. The local court in Germany promulgated a decree of
this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouse.
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before
there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a a trial court in Manila.
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger
of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the
of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on complaint for adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they
speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of were still married.
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations
of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside
the cases filed against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings.
relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the
Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended
to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital Issue:
vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to
have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she Is the action tenable?
actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely,
it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be
Ruling:
filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed.
There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn written filed
leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time
the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is logical
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be
and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce. of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It
is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant
to commence the action be definitely established and, such status
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country, may be
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery,
is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code
although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
on the matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.
controversy herein.

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to
quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely
vs. left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent. had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in
the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she
DECISION left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While
she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was
2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out
1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
Family Code of the Philippines. misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had litigation expenses.
five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who
are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their
and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the
did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely
able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned openly used her American husband’s surname, Micklus.9
to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their
eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth
child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the
live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of
and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by
At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California,
left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent
to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4with the RTC on 05 June declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen initio, on the basis of the following findings –
since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she
admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a
five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
household. She could not have been extravagant since the family practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United
States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien
in another country. spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench,
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot
annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance. Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship
and thus becomes herself an alien.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,
marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital the marriage of the parties.16
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
firmly. 2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds –
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court
finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do
These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time
of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in
towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15 paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. 18

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that
RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-
of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of
2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent
reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
void, to wit – represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the
instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State,
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws
… and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
I
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38. Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the
Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND
A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for and clinical psychologists.
determining its existence.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
defined, thus – was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter employment in a job…
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
marriage is celebrated…21 the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by – outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party essential to marriage.
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 22 to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the text of the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by
this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
below – controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence,
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle the Philippines.
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract under Philippine law.
between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated
on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time
grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although
obligations of marriage. the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer,
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
under the said Article.27 until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article respondent Crasus.
36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a III
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28 marriages.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot- Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for
Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of
American family and her American surname, may indeed be the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –
obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If
the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under fabricated or suppressed.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this
Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does
have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints
explained. the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of
the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
marriage as the foundation of the family.32 constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
II
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
applicable to the case at bar. preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then
Philippines – his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to
the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support
or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.
who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office Sec. 19. Decision. –
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control
over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State. …

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the (2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by
nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 – appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)],
this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application (3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
counsel for the State: public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the …
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, Sec. 20. Appeal. –
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The …
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor (2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213] fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on
the adverse parties.
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
General to appear as counsel for the State…37 those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity
and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At
most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those
Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific
take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of answer to every individual problem.39
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent
provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below –
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and
… SET ASIDE.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the remains valid and subsisting.
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its
filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same SO ORDERED.
period.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L.

…
IYOY, respondent.
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
FACTS: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision
Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
25, 1997. Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws,
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After from respondent Crasus.
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L.
an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage
to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
litigation expenses. vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null
and void ab ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One DECISION
factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married another man and has
established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in QUISUMBING, J.:
an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country. The Court of Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce
decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
ISSUE: likewise remarry under Philippine law?

1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make
psychological incapacity. a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure
question of law.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
RULING: Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July
4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had
1st issue: declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. Using WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of
the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring
their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of IT IS SO ORDERED.3
the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
2nd issue: an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect
been naturalized as an American citizen. the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. marriage.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place,
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Brief Historical Background
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4 which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending
determination.6 Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable
to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
Constitution.7 except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
provides: alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
RULE 63 supplied)

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry,
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his U.S.A.
rights or duties, thereunder.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code,
... the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered
the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons 1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
judicial determination.8 foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a 2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here
and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.) capacitating the latter to remarry.

Legislative Intent In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
to the Filipino spouse.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity.
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization? However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence
duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens evidence.13
when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American
citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
and can thus remarry. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12 petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino No pronouncement as to costs.
citizen and a foreigner; and
SO ORDERED.
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
Republic vs. Orbecido
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
FACTS: Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain
issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on
May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed
Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and
as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30,
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial
son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No.
the Family Code. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1)
dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution
Family Code.
issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the
HELD: consolidation of both cases.

The Facts
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave
birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter,
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District
spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was
under Philippine law. duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008 couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the
legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship
over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
vs. Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents. during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
x-------------------------------------------x Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008 Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance
of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration
vs. of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent. however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to
withdraw the petition.

DECISION
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen;
VELASCO, JR., J.: that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that
she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
The Case
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before
the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria
Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition from conducting further proceedings in Civil
was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for SO ORDERED.23
their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also
prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution
moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite. dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002
on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari,
(DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another Ruling of the CA
marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints
against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury
complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated
Vicente with bigamy and concubinage. March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set
aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case.
The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18
denying Vicente's and the Order dated November 20, 2001
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows: entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to
state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in SO ORDERED.26
Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the
amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to on the basis of the following premises:
Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings
relative to the instant Petition. (1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining
SO ORDERED.19 whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying
said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of
action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment declaration of nullity of marriage.
invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual
trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a (2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her
mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been
preclude her from receiving legal support. dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she
personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was (3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187. Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered,
was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was
also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca
issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO. 22 On April 30, of her father.
2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads: (4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship,
having professed to have that nationality status and having made
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such
resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c)
Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on
court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and
later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96- Three legal premises need to be underscored at the
378) on March 14, 1996. outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines,
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship
citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute
denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce. divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized
in this jurisdiction.32
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in
under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979. G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to
dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions
of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time
The Issues the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on
February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on
the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of The Court's Ruling
the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending
final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA
decision submitting as follows: Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

I There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied
for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen
and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2)
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting
FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND may still be, a holder of an American passport.33
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A
QUO.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed,
asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly:
II (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the
birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.
RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration
III (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a
Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen.
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of
TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
CONCURRENT ACTS.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC
IV 9778:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN To Whom It May Concern:

RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
GRAVE ABUSE.30 BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome whose other particulars are as follows:
being determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No.
155635. Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of
Birth: March 5, 1953
 Sex: female Civil confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of
Status: married Color of Hair: brown Justice pursuant to Executive Order No.
292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and
marks on face: none any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant
to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as (Emphasis ours.)
per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the
1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213
signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine
October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of
2000. recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual
sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to
said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
travel purposes. Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau
Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995 certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or
confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the
D) EDGAR L. MENDOZA 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice
O. COMMISSIONER Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a
few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
cial Receipt No. 5939988
ed at Manila
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
d Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000 Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino
facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that
Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized
(2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment
affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity
October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988. (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because
she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date
have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996
Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no
to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1 st Indorsement by mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only
Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the
was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the
certificate in question must be spurious. Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to
expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the
petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of
Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of
Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first
III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required. dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate
No. RC 9778.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on
Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides: At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient
basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective
shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which
official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from
we will expound later.
its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
Validity of Divorce Decree Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and wit:
406/97 valid.
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public as follows:
documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before,
during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared: (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties between the parties and their successors in interest
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing clear mistake of law or fact.
at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge
court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as
x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing
him to subscribe all the acts concerning this As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured
case.37 (Emphasis ours.) the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel,
a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand,
the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and
laws of the United States of America, a country which allows Vicente.
divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on
December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a
February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary
issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition
Rebecca was valid. will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22,
1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42
of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the
sufficient. same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an
obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed;
denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language,
impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As
of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between
of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL
The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez: completing the legal requirements."43

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer
foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot,
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows: Marriage

Art. 26. x x x x Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court
that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly of a cause of action, thus:
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227) violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus: complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
capacitating him or her to remarry. of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the

time of the celebration of the marriage, but their One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45 thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage,
a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further
the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when
they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant
proceedings. must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more
and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement
provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their
family home, thus: The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of
Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The
records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any
which they acquired during their marriage rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982,
consists only of the real property and all the improvements reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before
and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would
Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly
168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate
of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the
M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x. 46 (Emphasis support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both
ours.) Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente
owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by child concerned shall have finished her education.
the divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree
No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve
agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to
1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support
divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-
said agreement."47 094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for
was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48 review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004
Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are CARPIO, J.:
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
The Case
SO ORDERED.
For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce
Bayot vs. CA child custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008 The Facts

FACTS: Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent

Rebecca Macapugay Bayot was an American citizen and born in Agoa, Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in
Guam, USA. She married Vicente Bayot at Greenhills, Mandaluyong Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21
on April 20, 1979. On November 27,1982, Rebecca gave birth to a September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from
daughter named Alix at San Francisco, California. However, as the the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois
marriage turned sour, Rebecca initiated a divorce on 1996 in court) a divorce decree against petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois
Dominican Republic. The latter ordered the dissolution of marriage court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to
and remarriage after competing the legal requirements. However, there respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the
must be a joint custody and guardianship to Alix, and the conjugal case for enforcement purposes.
property, particularly the real properties located only in Manila that
they acquired during their marriage be settled. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement4 ) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties
However, Rebecca stated under oath on May 28, 1996 that she is an chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes
American citizen and she is carrying a child not of Vicente. Rebecca arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the
again filed another petition in Manila on March 2001 for absolute Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
nullity of marriage on the ground of dissolution of partnership gain,
monthly support for their daughter and that Vicente is psychological In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of
incapacitated. Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement.
Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent
Vicente averred and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause and exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
action and filed a case of adultery and perjury against Rebecca.
Rebecca, on the contrary, charged Vicente with bigamy and Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others,
concubinage. lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
On the other note, Rebecca became a recognized Filipino citizen on
2000. The Ruling of the Trial Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce is valid? In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s
motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
HELD: held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit
1) No serious dispute that at the time of divorce to Vicente, Rebecca considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its
was an American citizen and still remains to be one. Evidences: a) she divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie
was born in USA and jus soli is followed in American territory in to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following
granting American citizenship; b) she was and may still be an the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the
American passport holder; c) in marriage certificate, birth certificate Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the
of Alix and divorce decree in Dominican Republic, it was declared that Civil Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
she is an American
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the
2) VALID. Rebecca was bound by the national laws of USA where divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce
divorce was valid. Their property relations were also properly decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
adjudicated through their Agreement on 1996. Foreign divorce can be case.
recognized in the Philippines provided that the divorce decree is fact
and valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The reckoning In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration,
point is the citizenship of parties at the time the divorce was obtained holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is
and not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
marriage.
Hence, this petition.
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner, the Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the
vs. Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent. child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is
independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
DECISION
The Issue The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being
contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement
cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because
custody of the parties’ child. the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live
together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes
sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and
The Ruling of the Court any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint
custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and
enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give
call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot
custody. contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal
custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk,
to Enforce Contracts drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have
sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.22
filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial
Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its
belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner text that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
went to the right court. the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." To limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned
agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under
grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers
Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole
"jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This ignores
suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a
divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."24
custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s
so-called "retained jurisdiction."
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated
parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect,
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of
custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the parents.25 However, these are objections which question the law’s
Agreement which is contrary to law. wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and
remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate,
the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms
agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting
of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to
the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.12 Otherwise,
inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second
the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
from the beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under
Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve
seven years of age, in case of disagreements.1avvphi1
as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child
custody stipulations.14
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of
Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002,
year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives
two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old
the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
(having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly,
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States
even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from
because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child
entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie,
custody for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second
respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no
Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x
ambit of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article
x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother
213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of
is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject
Stephanie.
only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then,
the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime
between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not
old contravenes Philippine law. because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked
Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The to serve the child’s best interest.31
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo 27 settled the WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The
divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce ruling.
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this
wise: SO ORDERED.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in Herald Black Dacasin, Petitioner,
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What versus
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Respondent.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15

FACTS:
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
1. On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
Philippines.
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
2. The following year respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
girl whom they named Stephanie.
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
3. In June of 1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
Court a divorce
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
decree against petitioner.
marriage.
4. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner
and
xxxx respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the 5. On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case Manila a contract
below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie.
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, 6. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he Court of Makati City. 7. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before sole custody over Stephanie.
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 8. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of
(Emphasis supplied) jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the
divorce decree.
ISSUES:
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal – Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case
complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the – Whether the agreement or contract is valid
foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he HELD:
no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints Case was dismissed dated March 1, 2005.
under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois
a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien Court’s
divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its
nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce. order awarding
sole custody of Stephanie to respondent. The divorce decree is binding
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this
Justify Remand jurisdiction. Agreement is void
The agreement is void for contravening Article 2035 paragraph 5 of
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to the Civil
its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.
settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 II. FACTS:
years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory 1. Petitioner sought reconsideration his new argument is that the
maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within divorce decree obtained by respondent is void.
coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings – the 2. The divorce is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
best interest of the child.30 As the question of custody is already before the
the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the Agreement, case.
initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift 3. In its order on June 23, 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration
and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage because petitioner is under the laws of his nationality, which is
of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial American. Hence, the petitioner filed alternative theories for the
arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court validity of the agreement:
render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine > The agreement noted the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms
of child custody from the
sole to joint trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition
> The agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
respondents but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
II. ISSUE requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
– Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of prayer to Gerbert’s.
petitioner’s suit
– Whether the trial curt can enforce the Agreement on joint custody In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition.
II. HELD The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
settle is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse
Stephanie’s custody. (Article 213 of the Family Code lost its coverage can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
over the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Stephanie. Stephanie was already almost 15 during this time thus, she Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
is entitled to
choose to whom she want to be)
Instead of dismissing the case, court chose to remand the case in order Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
to settle accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
Stephanie’s custody. Court decided to REVERSE the orders dated solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
March 1, 2005 and June 23, 2005. The case is REMANDED for except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
further proceedings consistent with its ruling. and 38.

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents. This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
DECISION III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
BRION, J.: obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional THE PETITION
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for
review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
petition).
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
later, on January 8, 2006.5 prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office Gerbert’s position.
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be divorce decree.
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
THE COURT’S RULING
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Code.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
between Filipino citizens.18 capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows: invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 jurisdiction
and 38.
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens –
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one thing; and
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
to be served.22 judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to subsequent title.
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence
to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the or clear mistake of law or fact.
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital national law.27
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The the civil registry:
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the (a) births;
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires (b) deaths;
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official (c) marriages;
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in (d) annulments of marriages;
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
(e) divorces;
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its (f) legitimations;
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the (g) adoptions;
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

(i) naturalization; and

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given
the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s
(Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the (j) changes of name.
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right xxxx
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in
persons:
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

(1) Birth and death register;

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice
of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will marriages.
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule
that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides. (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
what had been done. divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent
or his being married or not."35 Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can
be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of
the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is Two years after the divorce, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1 Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that

the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition
for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, Gerbert also filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn
in the civil registry. did not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the
petition.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the The RTC denied the petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must
be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
Court. contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of
a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry ISSUE:
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and RULING:

REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
Petitioner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Canadian citizenship married respondent Daisilyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding.
When he returned to the Philippines and discovered that his wife was
having an affair with another man, he filed a petition for divorce before
the Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada which granted As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to
the petition for divorce. avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e.,
to the Filipino spouse.” that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
capacitating him or her to remarry. with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our
rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made,
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision. judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010] MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
FACTS: MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left
for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he
returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already DECISION
romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing
of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually CARPIO, J.:
granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month
later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen The Case
in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went
to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce
decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court
the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question
until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March
series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized petition.
Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article The Facts
26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry
in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
petition. respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on
23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
ISSUE: parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants
aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
recognition of a foreign divorce decree? Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
HELD: brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared to nullify a bigamous marriage.
void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6 Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce
or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void
active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC): the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the
trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack
of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
xxxx cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the
"trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M.
of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x provision.

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
"gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides 11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is
marriage void, and not Fujiki. not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family
Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the
nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction
Philippine courts.12 of entry] x x x."27

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that
the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition
was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02- Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the
11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment
petition under the same provision. on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the
fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand,
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment
on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar The Issues
General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor
General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
Manifestation and Motion.31
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave citizen on the ground of bigamy.
v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained: (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or the Rules of Court.
she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage
was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the The Ruling of the Court
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the We grant the petition.
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule
the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
Constitution.34 declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 I.
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen. under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such
the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences authenticated by the seal of office.50
upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family
Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen
and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of
v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41 will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously of Court.
concluded litigation."59
II.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General,
foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
citizen. itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void or a particular fact."67
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it
were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
evidence. for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
jurisdiction of other states.62 civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. regime of the marriage.71
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
decree abroad.65 between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case,
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully union recognized by law.
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage
on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words,
that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer foreign court.
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.
The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine
is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the
civil registry. case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

III. The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to

address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino,
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse
"should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served."91
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition
of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouse cannot remarry.
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical FACTS:
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground
for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines.
349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy lost contact with each other.
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without
to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married
in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties,
or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish
who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are their relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign a family court in Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on the
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status ground of bigamy.
of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial
court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the file the petition.
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an ISSUE:
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign bigamy.
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes RULING:
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen.
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1 Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides for who may
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article
file such petition, to wit:
349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction
of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees
the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form
of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02- In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a
11-10-SC. personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Thus,
he has the legal personality to file the petition. PETITION GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 G.R. No. 215723
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN
accordance with this Decision. GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
SO ORDERED. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated
by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of
DECISION the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the
applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial
relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working
knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned
Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated November 28, treatises pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented
in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition for judicial and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry notice of foreignjudgments and law.23
pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.
Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a
The Facts Resolution25 dated November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and The Issue Before the Court
respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were
married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.4 Their union The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC
bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. 5 divorce.1âwphi1

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of The Court's Ruling
Japan, filed for divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi
Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the
Divorce Certificate7 and the same was duly recorded in the Official At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for
Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8 absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article
26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
Certificate of Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar of obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial The provision reads:
recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692. Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely, and 38.
"Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"13 and
"Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that
the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on
said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of the dissolution of the marriage.26
Japan 2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of
Japan's law on divorce.18 In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The RTC Ruling The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, foreign judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice Herrera explained that, as
ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that
and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 20 and under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband,
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or SO ORDERED.
defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Facts:
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and
jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were
to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.[4] Their union
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006,
must be proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.[5]
laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
Japan, filed for divorce[6] before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi
like any other fact.31
Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the
Divorce Certificate[7] and the same was duly recorded in the Official
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.[8]
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the
matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her
evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant Certificate of Marriage[9] on file with the Local Civil Registrar of
appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition[10] for
45 petition for review. judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The Code[11] before the RTC
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.[12] On the
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely,
binding subject to certain exceptions.32 In this regard, it is settled that "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"[13]
appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"[14] both issued by the
exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a
(CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 33 certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate"
issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a
above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under Certification[15] issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila
paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in
provides: the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and
their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil Code of
Japan 2009"[17] were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of
Japan's law on divorce.[18]
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional
Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's
Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce
Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce
final. decree and" the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce must be proven
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof
The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen
that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error irr the
were successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she
choice or mode of appeal.34
nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband,
particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan
dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul
involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant in Japan... adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the
that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings. applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial
It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified
administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations
secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid and divorce.
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after
all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and
the courts.35 considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and law.[23]
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in a
justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for Resolution[25] dated November 28, 2014
appropriate action including the reception of evidence
to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in Issues:
accordance with this Decision.
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC
erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
Ruling: Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for dispositive portion of the Decision states:
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article
26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino WHEREFORE, the instant appeal
spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in
The provision reads:... the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of
the marriage.[26] San Juan, Metro Manila.

This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
SO ORDERED.3
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The facts are undisputed.

Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo)
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.[30] Since our courts
filed a petition for cancellation of
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.[31] Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by
virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch
matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for
evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial
appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
45 petition for review. newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and
fact binding subject to certain exceptions.[32] In this regard, it is issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact with the jurisdictional requirements.
or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of
Appeals (CA) The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City
It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the
secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after a foreign judgment.
all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
the courts.[35]
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also
justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to alleged:
DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision. 2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage
April 24, 2018 Contract xxx;

G.R. No. 221029 3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent 4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and
her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact,
petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese
RESOLUTION
former husband;

peralta, J.:
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously
Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is
still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the
or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved
by aid entry of marriage; filed abroad by the latter.

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence,
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the this petition.
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
divorce decree; [and]
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4 or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave
for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were offered 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
and admitted were: hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its 2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance; Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012; it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese 4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
husband; the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court; alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code
of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly
thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987. 17 Aside from
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5 amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented
allegations of Manalo. and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of
merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil accordance with the laws in force in the where country where they
Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their 36, 37 and 38.
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing
marriages."6
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because
the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of
et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the
law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was
Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to
the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino use her maiden surname.
as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a We rule in the affirmative.
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was
that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under
the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a
even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25 spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, respectively.
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to
a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement,
obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their
Orbecido III:26 child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his
of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which
n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein is void, this Court said:
hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry. Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
injustice. x x x
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There,
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged
who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
citizen and a foreigner; and Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court
discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
him or her to remarry.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
remarry. he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, policy.
a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may
divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
[and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
794,799: Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. x x x34
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the
the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce
former marriage." must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the
assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31 observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change
as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by
the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle,
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33 Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution.
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy, We ruled: We beg to differ.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. departure."38
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
the marriage. legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v.
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the Although the Family Code was not enacted by the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to
rule that the spirit of the law control its letter. a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable
as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious
the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, foreigner.55
it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
operation on the latter's national law. obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse
. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written the other.
by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien
by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for divorce
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she
limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code"
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar,
it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these
to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
interest.47 petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality
is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free
speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of
travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must
give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that,
because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the
former to take precedence over the latter.52 First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever
was sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to
the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on
evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted
and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our
wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part
conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed
out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year
relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one
more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living
And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the
decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said: Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic
does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors
structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other submitted by the House Committee on Population
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.63 And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March
19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the absolute divorce are as follows:
State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on
divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in 1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the Code, modified or amended, as follows:
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical
about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner petitioner;
Bernas be recognized.
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
recognized.
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner,
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in
categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a inducement;
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my
intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social
institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic
now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to gambling of respondent;
discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the
meaning of prohibiting a divorce law? g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66 another person other than one's spouse during the marriage,
except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a
 child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or 4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which
when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape; have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner,
a common child or a child of a petitioner; and To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions
justifiable cause for more than one (1) year. that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence,
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more
thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
separation. or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a
Code restated as follows: state religion.76

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand
twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that
the consent of the parents guradian or personl having they are good for country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament,
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
husband and wife;
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
and wife; other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity
of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among
such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
husband and wife; to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the
ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
as husband and wife; among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not
eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and
the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-
appears to be incurable; and Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family
infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable. as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight
of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained
years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the
a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still
reconciliation is highly improbable;
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair
the time of the celebration of the marriage or later; has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these
are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
or transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
respondent, or vice-versa; be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-
in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
customs.82 the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases
not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present its spirit or intent.88
time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry
that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize
individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be
brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality. proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The
country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body
Luis85 quoted: or tribunal of foreign country.

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated: Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good seal of his office.92
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48
is obeyed. (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the
them." OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor
the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion,
xxxx fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
constant and perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence
in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
justice.86
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.96 2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the Japan valid here in the Philippines?
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
Ruling:
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if be taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED
IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law
on divorce. amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino

SO ORDERED deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no

longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the

Republic v. Manalo (Case Digest)
wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only

SEPTEMBER 16, 2018 ~ PINGTHINGLAW that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate

as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse
Republic v. Manalo
or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the
G.R. No. 221029
provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be
April 24, 2018
initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such

interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent

Facts:
of the law.
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino

Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due REPORT THIS AD

proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this

Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the

Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it

surname, Manalo. will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of

individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the of the equal protection clause. They said that the limitation provided

alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical

shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case

is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated

Issues: a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce

1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce

spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse? proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction

between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained

 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which denied petitioner
would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition
before it.
other.
The Facts

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji)
in Quezon City on December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter, they lived together
solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were not blessed
with a child. During their married life, they would constantly quarrel
right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he
was much older than Luzviminda.4 As such, she and Ryoji submitted
cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and
State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on
July 1, 2012.5 In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for
the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by
recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and
Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her
the foreign spouse.
former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry again. 7

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the
case for hearing. Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition except
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
the government, Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-
parte. After the presentation and absent any objection from the Public
Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part
of the testimony of the witnesses.8
types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
The RTC Ruling
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro,

which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In a Decision9 dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's
petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse
may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is
valid according to the national law of the alien – the same does not find
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who
procured the same. Invoking the nationality principle provided under
the Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose
divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she
herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;10 hence, this
Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. petition.

The Issue Before the Court

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly
further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant denied Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce
decree she procured with Ryoji.
Japanese law on divorce.
The Court's Ruling
G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018
The petition is partly meritorious.
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ
MORISONO, Petitioner, v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents. as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce,
and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with
DECISION Articles 1511 and 1712 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two
(2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws;
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC), through a petition for review the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case
on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.13 capacitating him or her to remarry.18 In the same case, the
Court also initially clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, only to cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of
is encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads: his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
Article 26. x x x citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by
naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly decree.19
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),20 the
shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Court En Banc extended the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen
who divorced his/her foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling
read:
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
is capacitated to remarry. x x x.
is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
We rule in the affirmative.
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care
and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must
x x x x
still be determined by our courts. The rationale for this rule is to avoid
the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it
his or her national law.14 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,15 the Court held:
should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the x x x x
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based
to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner
the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
alien spouse. there should be no departure."
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national purposes. x x x.
law.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
x x x x

According to Republic v. Orbecido III,17 the following elements must To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
concur in order for Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and. against
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the according to indigenous customs.
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving time. With the advancement of communication and information
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
are severed by operation of the latter's national law. more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
x x x x individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive
political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as of any good to the society where one is considered released from
varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More x.21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino
against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by
an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.
marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be
recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference
initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for
between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and
the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the
a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his
Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws,
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.22
both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of
are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based
initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However,
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the
the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for
other.
recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to
prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya
x x x x
City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on
divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
remand to the court a quo is warranted.
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
dated July 18, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend, among
Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed
to their development. To our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce
in this Decision.
these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.
SO ORDERED.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair
DECISION
has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these
are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent
but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the PERALTA, J.:
subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido
Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry
G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision dated in the event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino spouse who had
November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the acquired foreign citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence presented,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, petitioner explains that the reason why she was unable to present
granting petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan
Judgment. relative to divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan due to the
fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a
The antecedent facts are as follows: copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the
Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do
August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After not issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation
two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in certificates of Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the legal
said country dissolving their marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this constitutes
petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence.10
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte.
In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition We grant the petition.
and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective
under Philippine Laws.3 On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling
decision of the RTC. of Republic v. Manalo,11 the facts of which fall squarely on point with
the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino,
In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA was married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She,
revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its previous decision. however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which
According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites granted the same and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving
under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized
marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a in the Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in
foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said
capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry.
was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not The trial court, however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that
by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to
Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause.6 Philippines or in another country.

On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view
following arguments: and affirmed, instead, the ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that
the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding
I. wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the
application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage
GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to
CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must
HUSBAND. actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true
intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
II.
which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS]
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore,
IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT
should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign
ON THE SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE]
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.12
REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court
designated as Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the
Divorce, is the more practical and common type of divorce in Japan. divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she
She insists that it is to her great disadvantage if said divorce is not initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the
recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently,
avail of the benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by
Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby
abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have
consented to the divorce does not prevent the application of Article 26 capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
for said provision does not state that where the consent of the Filipino
spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no longer finds Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant
petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics
she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may Office, Civil Registry Division.4
recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and
again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not Ito. Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.13 This means that later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce
our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law Certificate5 that was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or reads as follows:
herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 2415 of Rule 132 of Cert. No. IB12-08573-12
the Rules of Court applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof, either by
(1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not DIVORCE
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate CERTIFICATE
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.17
MARLYN MONTON
Name:
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute NULLADA
the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible.
What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law
on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed Date of Birth: SEPTEMBER 03, 1968
to know by reason of their judicial function.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 Nationality: FILIPINO
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to
the relevant Japanese law on divorce. Name of Spouse: AKIRA ITO
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019 Date of Marriage: JULY 29, 1997

MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, PETITIONER, v. THE HON.

CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO
AND ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM ANY Date of Divorce: NOVEMBER 16, 2009
INTEREST, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis
of the Official Family Register issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku,
Tokyo, Japan on February 06, 2013. This certificate is issued for the
A. REYES, JR., J.: purpose of the process of Notification of Foreign Divorce in the
Republic of the Philippines.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, which seeks to assail the Decision1 dated Marlyn and Akira's acceptance of the notification of divorce by
January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of agreement was supported by an Acceptance Certificate6 that was
Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832, that denied the issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan, an English translation
recognition of a foreign divorce that was obtained by petitioner Marlyn of which forms part of the records.
Monton Nullada (Marlyn) with Japanese national Akira Ito (Akira).

As she sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines,

The Antecedents Marlyn filed with the RTC the petition that ended with the following
prayer:
The action arose from a Petition2 for registration and/or recognition of
foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that,
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:
the Family Code, by Marlyn in 2014 with the RTC of Manila. She
claimed that on July 29, 1997, she and Akira got married in
Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of 1. Recognizing the divorce obtained by [Marlyn and
Marriage3 that was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Akira], which was validly decreed in Japan thus
The document was registered with both the Office of the Local Civil dissolving their marriage, to be likewise valid and
effective in Philippine jurisdiction;
 2. Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of Marlyn also identified and submitted a Judicial
Manila to cancel the entry of marriage of [Marlyn Affidavit18 (Exliibits "N," and "N-1"), which was
and Akira] recorded in the Office of the Local adopted as her direct testimony.19 Mary Ann Chico, registration officer
Civil Registry of Manila; of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, also testified in court to present
original copies of the divorce and authentication certificates that were
3. Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of filed with local civil registry.20
Manila to register the Japan divorce decree of
[Marlyn and Akira] in the entry of marriage Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons
recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registry by publication. The Republic also did not offer any evidence to rebut
of Manila, and; the case of Marlyn.21

4. Declaring [Marlyn's] marriage to [Akira] as Ruling of the RTC

dissolved with a pronouncement that petitioner
[Marlyn] shall have the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. On January 21, 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the
petition. The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
Petitioner prays for other relief just and equitable under the premises.7
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED.
The RTC found the petition to be in due form and substance, and thus,
issued an Order of Hearing8 with order for publication. Copies of the Notify the parties/counsels/Trial Prosecutor and the Office of the
petition were also ordered served upon the Office of the Solicitor Solicitor General.
General (OSG) and Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. 9 On
February 12, 2015, the OSG entered its appearance for the Republic of SO ORDERED.22
the Philippines, and then deputized the City Prosecutor of Manila for
assistance in all the hearings of the case.10 Given proof of compliance
Under the third paragraph of Article 1723 of the New Civil Code is a
with the action's jurisdictional requirements, trial before the RTC
policy of non-recognition of divorce. For the trial court, the fact that
ensued.11
Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira
barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
During the trial, Marlyn testified mainly to identify the following Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse
pieces of documentary evidence that were submitted to support the to remarry after the alien spouse had validly obtained a
petition: divorce.24 While the intent of the law is to equalize Filipinos with their
foreigner spouses who are free to marry again after the divorce, the
Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of equity behind the law
(1) Report of Marriage12 (Exhibit "H") that was issued by the when he or she is an initiator or active participant in procuring the
Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Japan on the divorce.25
registration with the embassy of Akira and Marlyn's
marriage on July 29, 1997 in Japan; Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was
denied by the trial court via an Order dated April 26, 2016.26 This
prompted Marlyn to file the present petition for review on certiorari.

(2) Authentication Certificate of the Report of

Marriage13 (Exhibit "H-1"); The Present Petition

Marlyn seeks to justify her immediate recourse to the Court by

explaining that the present petition involves a pure question of law
(3) Divorce Certificate14 (Exhibit "J") issued by the Embassy of based on a lone issue, as follows: Whether or not Article 26, paragraph
Japan in the Philippines on the basis of the Official Family 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so as to apply only
Register issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not
Japan; where the divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses.27

The Court's Ruling

(4) Authentication Certificate of the Divorce The Court finds merit in the petition.
Certificate15 (Exhibit "J-1");
At the outset, the Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from
the decision of the RTC on the ground that the petition raises a pure
question of law on the proper application of Article 26 of the Family
(5) Acceptance Certificate16 (translated in English) (Exhibit
Code. "[D]irect recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
"L"); and
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised
or involved."28 In this case, the RTC's resolve to dismiss the petition
filed before it delved solely on its application of the statutory provision
to the facts undisputed before it. This question of law was directly
(6) Excerpts of the Japanese Civil Code17 (Exhibit "M"). resolved by the Court in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines
v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo,29 which was promulgated by the Court
subsequent to the filing of the present petition.
The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-
Family Code, which states: mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation
and 38. to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed
and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse xxxx
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Underscoring
ours) Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a
The facts in Manalo are similar to the circumstances in this case. A clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce decree between a Filipino and a Japanese national was divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
obtained by the spouses upon a case that was filed in Japan by Manalo, demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
the Filipino spouse. Initially, the recognition of the divorce decree in proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
the Philippines was rejected by the RTC where the petition for distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment was filed, as the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
trial court cited Article 15 of the New Civil Code and reasoned that as the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the
a rule, "the Philippine law 'does not afford Filipinos the right to file for lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know that meaning of the
a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
marriage in the Philippines or in another country x x x[.]"' On appeal est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
to the Court of Appeals (CA), however, the RTC decision was departure."
overturned. The appellate court held that Article 26 of the Family Code
should apply even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce. The decree xxxx
made the Japanese spouse no longer married to Manalo; he then had
the capacity to remarry. It would be unjust to still deem Manalo To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer married to her. The absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential. This spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
ruling of the CA was then affirmed by the Court in Manalo upon a country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
petition for review on certiorari that was filed by the Republic of the spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
Philippines. where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
factual milieu that attended in Manalo, the present case warrants a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
reversal of the RTC's decision that refused to recognize the divorce her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
in Japan solely on the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
the spouses. The Court finds no reason to deviate from its recent circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
disposition on the issue, as made in Manalo, thus: initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision the residual effect of the foreing divorce decree on Filipinos whose
[Art. 26], a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and national law. (Emphasis ours)
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. x x x. While opposition to the foregoing interpretation is commonly raised
on the basis of the nationality principle, such principle is not an
We rule in the affirmative. absolute and unbending rule. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code should be deemed an exception to the general rule.33
In the Manalo decision, the Court went on to cite jurisprudence
wherein the legal effects of a foreign divorce decree, albeit obtained Applying the foregoing to the present case, the assailed Decision of the
by a Filipino spouse, were acknowledged in our jurisdiction but limited RTC warrants the Court's reversal. The dismissal of Marlyn's petition
on the issues of child custody30 and property relations.31 In several based on the trial court's interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code
other jurisprudence,32 recognition of the effects of a foreign divorce is erroneous in light of the Court's disposition in Manalo. The fact that
was also implied from the Court's disposition of the cases. The specific the divorce was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Aldra was not
issue on the binding effect of a divorce decree obtained by a Filipino sufficient ground to reject the decree in this jurisdiction.
spouse on one's marital status was then expressly and directly tackled
by the Court. In determining whether a divorce decree obtained by a While Marlyn and Akira's divorce decree was not disputed by the
foreigner spouse should be recognized in the Philippines, it is OSG, a recognition of the divorce, however, could not extend as a
immaterial that the divorce is sought by the Filipino national. The matter of course. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the
Court reasoned: submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the
foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the
sufficiently proved. "Because our courts do not take judicial notice of United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a
proven x x x like any other fact."34 In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to
Echin,35 the Court reiterated the following rules on proof of foreign adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece
laws: and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior
to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy consent to the adoption.
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court which read: On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision
granting the petition. a petition for Review on Certiorari was filed
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court referred
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a trial court's decision.
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assigned a lone error on the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the part of the respondent court, thus —
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA
record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office. MABUNAY HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE
NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a PHILIPPINE LAW.
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt.
the original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of
under the seal of such court.36 the Philippines," is explicit.

Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :
include a photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely
stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy
of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300.37 This clearly does (1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to
not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan's the approval of the final accounts rendered upon
law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the termination of their guardianship relation;
the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the
RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of (2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime
Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court. involving moral turpitude;

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. (3) An alien, except:
The Decision dated January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832 (a) A former Filipino citizen
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the who seeks to adopt a relative
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to by consanguinity;
the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

(b) One who seeks to adopt

SO ORDERED. the legitimate child of his or
her Filipino spouse; or
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
(c) One who is married to a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Filipino citizen and seeks to
vs. adopt jointly with his or her
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES Filipino spouse a relative by
JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY consanguinity of the latter.
HUGHES, respondents.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
The Solicitor General for petitioner. may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided
Westremundo y. De Guzman for private respondents. by law.

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under

any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3) of the
aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph
VITUG, J.:
(3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption
Executive Order No. 209, expressing as follows: by the lower court, has theorized that James Anthony
should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, proceedings. This view of the appellate court cannot be sustained.
except in the following cases: Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate
paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that
necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by
illegitimate child; or the adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are
matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate parties.
child of the other.
We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint instance, that an adoption can bring not so much for the prospective
adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also
along together with Article 184. realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is
given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the
The old law on adoption, Presidential Decree No. 603 (The Child and adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been
Youth Welfare Code), exactly adopted that found in then Article 336 designed. When, however, the law is clear and no other choice is
of the Civil Code. Article 29, Section B, Chapter I, Title II, of the said given,1 we must obey its full mandate.
decree provided :
Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this opinion without having
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In to call the attention of the appropriate agencies concerned to the
such case, parental authority shall be exercised as urgency of addressing the issue on inter-country adoption, a matter that
if the child were their own by nature. evidently is likewise espoused by the Family Code (Article 184, last
paragraph, Family Code).

Observe that the law then in force used the word "may" under which
regime, a joint adoption by the spouses was apparently not made WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
obligatory. The provision was later amended, however by Executive respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon C.
Aquino. The new Article 29 expressed, thus — SO ORDERED.

Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
such case, parental authority shall be exercised as
if the child were their own by nature. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as
wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
shall not be allowed. Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A.
CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had
thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one The Solicitor General for petitioner.
of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of
the same nationality. R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185
thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses
except in only two instances —
PUNO, J.:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
legitimate child; or Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special
Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of
child of the other. law.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private
of parental authority, can aptly find governance. respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are
aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt
or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the There is no controversy as to the facts.
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by
the spouses in accordance with this Code.
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse
sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND EVELYN
Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE
weeks. LAW.

The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. We rule for petitioner.
Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He
married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private
States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon
and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old Joseph Alcala.
minor.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody
of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His
mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due (3) An alien, except:
to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
(a) A former Filipino citizen
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the who seeks to adopt a relative
Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the by consanguinity;
petition for adoption.
(b) One who seeks to adopt
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none the legitimate child of his or
of the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will her Filipino spouse; or
redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge
rendered a decision on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows: (c) One who is married to a
Filipino citizen and seeks to
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adopt jointly with his or her
adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and spouse a relative by
Evelyn A. Clouse and decrees that the said minor consanguinity of the latter.
be considered as their child by adoption. To this
effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and Aliens not included in the
duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. foregoing exceptions may
Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON adopt Filipino children in
ALCALA CLOUSE. accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may
The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed be provided by law.
upon his natural parents and vests parental
authority to the herein petitioners and makes him There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is
their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D. 603 not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the
as amended, the decree of adoption shall be exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is
effective as of the date when the petition was filed. not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United
In accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is
let this decree of adoption be recorded in the neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
corresponding government agency, particularly spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February
Leyte where the minor was born. The said office 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby directed to Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was
issue an amended certificate of live birth to the naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
minor adopted by the petitioners.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She
petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor
Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte. alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption
by the husband and wife. It reads:
SO ORDERED.2
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us except in the following cases:
for relief, contending:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
 (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
child of the other. of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.3 SO ORDERED.

The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree G.R. No. 94147 Republic v. Toledano, et. al. June 8, 1994
603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and Facts:
wife "may" jointly adopt.4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on
December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands
that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales by
alien.5 It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse, both aliens, seeking to
adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of
husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned Evelyn who has been under their care and custody for quite a time.
before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a Filipino, who
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.7 As the child to
thereafter became a naturalized citizen of the US in Guam. They are
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
between the spouses.8

In a distinctly similar case, we held: Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery
Alcala, a widow, due to poverty and inability to support and educate
her son.
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential
Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for
both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the
was an alien. The law was silent when both Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the
spouses were of the same nationality. petition for adoption.

The Family Code has resolved any possible

uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the
necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses petition for adoption and decreeing that said minor be considered as
except in only two instances — their child by adoption. To this effect, the Court gives the minor the
rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. Also, it
dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents and
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or vests parental authority to the spouses and makes him their legal heir.

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a Petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the lower court, contending that
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the it erred in granting the petition for adoption because spouses Clouse
Code, on the parental authority, can aptly find are not qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
governance.

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the filing of petition
or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the for adoption.
other, jointly parental authority shall be exercised
by the spouses in accordance with this Code.9
Issues:

Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its
interpretation. There is only room for application.10 1. Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the right or are
qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
2. Whether or not joint adoption by spouses is mandatory.
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption
and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective.11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the Ruling:
welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful
and happy life.12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest
of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209, otherwise known as “The
cases.13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and Family Code of the Philippines”, spouses Clouse are clearly barred
welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount from adopting Solomon.
consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of
the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly enumerates the
adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
who are aliens.

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their
consanguinity; natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990
spouse; or granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children
of the spouses Dye by adoption. 2 Respondent Regional Trial Court
disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly spouses being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal
implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind
adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child.3 The court
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability
be provided by law. and love and affection for the intended adoptees.

There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law,
under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to
Firstly, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born US citizen adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
. Secondly, Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the
legitimate child of his spouse. Lastly, when spouses Clouse jointly The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it.
filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino
citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is
US citizen.
proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states:

Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She
sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for xxx xxx xxx
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article
185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
(3) An alien, except:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the (a) A former Filipino citizen
following cases: who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity;
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(b) One who seeks to adopt
the legitimate child of his or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. her Filipino spouse; or

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a (c) One who is married to a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by
G.R. No. 95551 March 20, 1997 consanguinity of the latter.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
vs. may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity rules on inter-country adoption as may be
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial provided by law.
Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL
ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is
disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because
he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid
down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt
ROMERO, J.: a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives
by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed,
Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here
City 1 to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino
old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a adopt.
former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the Facts:
law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to
exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision 4 that husband The spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition
and wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R.
scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making it now Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, younger siblings of
mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force,
is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga.
Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized
the following cases: American.

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own Issue:

illegitimate child;

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate Whether or not the spouses Dye may legally adopt Maricel and Alvin
child of the other. Due

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and

Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's Held:
child but her brother and sister.

No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is

The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code. The law here does
situated alien husband with a former Filipino wife seeking to adopt the not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen
latter's nephews and niece in the case of Republic v. Court of seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
Appeals.5 Although the wife in said case was qualified to adopt under consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
Article 184, paragraph 3 (a), she being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt.
adopt a relative by consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her
husband under Article 185 because he was an alien ineligible to adopt
here in the Philippines. Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates
joint adoption by husband and wife under Article 185 of the Family
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which Code.
is the promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. 6 The law must also be applied with compassion, G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate
HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
children. 7 Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial
vs.
court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO
and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter
is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for
adoption.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City in Special ROMERO, J.:
Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the
minors Maricel R Due and Alvin R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The
answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first impression,
SO ORDERED. would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and
jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the
case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review
vs. on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter of
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners."
ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married
on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July
G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997
3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, attend to a family business, "leaving the children would
born on January 3, 1981. be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-
seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship parental rights" over the children for the following reasons:
was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of
her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family 1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed
friend of the Clavanos. her to enter into any contract without the written
consent of her husband;
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed
a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite 3 with the 2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an
then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu 4 which rendered illegal alien in the United States and had been
a decision5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses transferring from one place to another to avoid
providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed detection by Immigration authorities, and
and board." They further agreed:
3. Her husband had divorced her.
(c) That the children of the
parties shall be entitled to a Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately
monthly support of ONE returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging
THOUSAND PESOS that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano
(P1,000.00) effective from the were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances
date of the filing of the were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience,
complaint. This shall allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved
constitute a first lien on the children."
net proceeds of the house and
lot jointly owned by the
parties situated at Cinco Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to
Village, Mandaue City; reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had
transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their
children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional
(d) That the plaintiff shall be Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna
entitled to enter into any Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and,
contract or agreement with therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court
any person or persons, natural then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
or juridical without the petitioner.
written consent of the
husband; or any undertaking
or acts that ordinarily requires On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,
husband's consent as the issued a decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as
parties are by this agreement follows:
legally separated; 6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce for adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and
from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the
of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole petitioner-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and
of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7 approved. These children shall henceforth be
known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine
D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife shall:
and never remarried.
(1) Confer upon the adopted
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical children the same rights and
Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month 8 a portion of which duties as though they were in
was remitted to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another, fact the legitimate children of
deposited in the bank in the name of his children. the petitioners;

Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. (2) Dissolve the authority
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and vested in the parents by
sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB nature, of the children; and,
for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-
old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed (3) Vest the same authority in
an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal the petitioners.
obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of
the children; that because she would be going to the United States to
 Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, testimony of his
Philippines with a copy of this Decree of Adoption alleged
for registration purposes. paramour, mother of his two
sons and close friend of Anna
SO ORDERED. Marie, Wilma Soco, who said
that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife in the very
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons: house of the Cangs in Opao,
Mandaue City.
(1) The Cang children had,
since birth, developed "close (2) The alleged deposits of
filial ties with the Clavano around $10,000 that were of
family, especially their "comparatively recent dates"
maternal uncle," petitioner were "attempts at
Ronald Clavano. verisimilitude" as these were
joint deposits the authenticity
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara of which could not be
Clavano were childless and, verified.
with their printing press, real
estate business, export (3) Contrary to petitioner's
business and gasoline station claim, the possibility of his
and mini-mart in Rosemead, reconciliation with Anna
California, U.S.A., had Marie was "dim if not nil"
substantial assets and income. because it was petitioner who
"devised, engineered and
(3) The natural mother of the executed the divorce
children, Anna Marie, proceedings at the Nevada
nicknamed "Menchu," Washoe County court."
approved of the adoption
because of her heart ailment, (4) By his naturalization as a
near-fatal accident in 1981, U.S. citizen, petitioner "is
and the fact that she could not now an alien from the
provide them a secure and standpoint of Philippine laws"
happy future as she "travels a and therefore, how his "new
lot." attachments and loyalties
would sit with his (Filipino)
(4) The Clavanos could children is an open question."
provide the children moral
and spiritual direction as they Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC
would go to church together Social Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as
and had sent the children to follows:
Catholic schools.
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has
(5) The children themselves abandoned his children. And abandonment of a
manifested their desire to be child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by
adopted by the Clavanos — statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent
Keith had testified and to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P.
expressed the wish to be 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case,
adopted by the Clavanos adoption will be allowed not only without the
while the two younger ones consent of the parent, but even against his
were observed by the court to opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039,
have "snuggled" close to 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P.
Ronald even though their 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83
natural mother was around. Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170
Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Steams v.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St.
petitioner to rest on "a very shaky foundation" because of its findings Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439,
that: 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo,
173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep.
(1) Petitioner was "morally 17.) 9
unfit to be the father of his
children" on account of his Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court
being "an improvident father erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children
of his family" and an if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
"undisguised Lothario." This Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally
conclusion is based on the defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a)
he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never 1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985
abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not
present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by
law.
2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan
National Bank
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the child to be
adopted. It has been held however that the consent Virginia, U.S.A.
of the parent who has abandoned the child is not
necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos 3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19
vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question Security Pacific National
therefore is whether or not oppositor may be
considered as having abandoned the children. In Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
adoption cases, abandonment connotes any
conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental
duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, U.S.A.
or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations which parents owe their children The first and third accounts were opened however
(Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding in oppositor's name as trustee for Charmaine Cang
of the parent's presence, his care and the and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other
opportunity to display voluntary affection. The words, the accounts are operated and the amounts
issue of abandonment is amply covered by the withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot
discussion of the first error. be said that they belong to the minors. The second
is an "or" account, in the names of Herbert Cang
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the
remittances to the children and has in fact even Philippines, said account is operable only by
maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him
to provide support comes from two judicial alone.
pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707
CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children The bank accounts do not really serve what
P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence "the aim
divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal and purpose of providing for a better future and
Court which orders him to pay monthly support of security of his family."10
US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not
submitted any evidence to show compliance with
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals.
the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted
He emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not based on the
22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn
merits of the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to a
in the children's names totalling $2,126.98. The
compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and his
last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45).
wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was
His obligation to provide support commenced
borne out by the fact that prior to his departure to the United States,
under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that
the family lived with petitioner's parents. Moreover, he alone did not
as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made
instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the "joint
53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00.
complaint" for divorce.
No other remittances were shown to have been
made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date,
oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for
of the divorce decree. And since he was totally in his children was belied by the award to him of custody over the
default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate
inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really court's findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay
been performing his duties as a father, contrary to claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not
his protestations. take away the fact that he "is still a father to his children." As regards
his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he had always
denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened
case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family
three accounts in different banks, as follows —
friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7)
kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City.
Acct. No. Date Opened Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have
Balance Name of Bank been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for
adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and
———— —————— — went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for
——— —————— monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be
hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the children
much more than he could. 11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally established rule is that the statute in force at the time of
defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child court. 12 As such, when private respondents filed the petition for
and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code. adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988,
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code
written consent of the following to the adoption took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its
shall be necessary: retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As
amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for
(1) The person to be adopted, adoption now reads:
if fourteen years of age or,
over;
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to
the adoption shall be necessary:
(2) The natural parents of the
child or his legal guardian of
the Department of Social (1) The person to be adopted,
Welfare or any duly licensed if ten years of age or over;
child placement agency under
whose care the child may be; (2) The parents by nature of
the child, the legal guardian,
(3) The natural children, or the proper government
fourteen years and above, of instrumentality;
the adopting parents.
(Emphasis supplied) (3) The legitimate and
adopted children, ten years of
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued age or over, of the adopting
Executive Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 parent or parents;
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31
read: (4) The illegitimate children,
ten years of age or over, of the
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The adopting parents, if living
written consent of the following to the adoption with said parent and the
shall be necessary: latter's spouse, if any; and

(1) The person to be adopted, (5) The spouse, if any, of the

if fourteen years of age or person adopting or to be
over; adopted. (Emphasis supplied)

(2) The natural parents of the Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the
child or his legal guardian amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the
after receiving counselling adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
and appropriate social requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as
services from the Ministry of follows:
Social Services and
Development or from a duly Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be
licensed child-placement filed with the petition a written consent to the
agency; adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of
age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's
(3) The Ministry of Social spouse, if any, and by each of its known living
Services and Development or parents who is not insane or hopelessly
any duly licensed child- intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if
placement agency under the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
whose care and legal custody children's home, or benevolent society or person,
the child may be; by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such persons; but if the
child is illegitimate and has not been recognized,
(4) The natural children, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not
fourteen years and above, of be required. (Emphasis supplied)
the adopting parents.
(Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial
such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are
acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3)
alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based
Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
declared: conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
is deemed more important that the petition should findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
contain facts relating to the child and its parents, on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
which may give information to those interested, overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which,
than that it should be formally correct as a if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10)
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
complies with the adoption statute, alleging all
facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14 This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother different conclusion 21 on the issue of whether petitioner has so
was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged unnecessary.
the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural
father as follows: In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to
forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and
RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given her express publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never
Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written to resume or claim one's rights or interests. 22 In reference to
consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It
left his wife and children and had already divorced means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations
the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the of care and support which parents owe their children." 23
DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of
Washoe, State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not
which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
long after he abandoned his family to live in the all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
United States as an illegal immigrant. 15 Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by
jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to mail and catered to their whims.
the adoption of their minor children.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily evidence consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he his wife and children:
had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The
issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary 1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu
issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of (Anna Marie) addressed to "Dear Bert" on a C.
the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu
he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be stated therein that it had been "a long time since
considered on its merits. the last time you've heard from me excluding that
of the phone conversation we've had." She
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding discussed petitioner's intention to buy a motorbike
upon this Court. 17 This Court is not expected nor required to examine for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that
or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She said
parties. 18 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the that in the "last phone conversation" she had with
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts petitioner on the birthday of "Ma," she forgot to
if it that these do not conform to the evidence on record. 19 tell petitioner that Keith's voice had changed; he
had become a "bagito" or a teen-ager with many
"fans" who sent him Valentine's cards. She told
him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative
"almost dalaga" who could carry on a
conversation with her angkong and how pretty she
was in white dress when she won among the
candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had
prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however,
that she was worried because Charmaine was vain
and wont to extravagance as she loved clothes.
About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told
petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and
"quite spoiled" being the youngest of the children
in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was
his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She
admitted having said so much about the children-
because they might not have informed petitioner
of "some happenings and spices of life" about
themselves. She said that it was "just very exciting
to know how they've grown up and very pleasant, 4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on
too, that each of them have (sic) different stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear
characters." She ended the letter with the hope that Dad." Keith told his father that they tried to tell
petitioner was "at the best of health." After their mother "to stay for a little while, just a few
extending her regards "to all," she signed her name weeks after classes start(s)" on June 16. He
after the word "Love." This letter was mailed on informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder
July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose I and that, about the motorbike, he had told his
address was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West mother to write petitioner about it and "we'll see
Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D). what you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for
chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts,
rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for
2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green outing and perfume. He told petitioner that they
stationery with golden print of "a note from had been going to Labug with their mother picking
Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie them up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch
stated that "we" wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 or dinner. From her aerobics, his mother would go
and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock
petitioner "called up last time." She told him how in the evening. He wished his father "luck and the
Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so best of health" and that they prayed for him and
petitioner would know what he wanted to order. their other relatives. The letter was ended with
Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed "Love Keith."
that she missed petitioner's call because she also
wanted something that petitioner should buy.
Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine wanted a 5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith.
pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her He thanked his father for the Christmas card "with
walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of
informed petitioner that the kids were growing up Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner the
and so were their needs. She told petitioner to be amounts following his father's instructions and
"very fatherly" about the children's needs because promise to send money through the mail. He asked
those were expensive here. For herself, Anna his father to address his letter directly to him
Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and because he wanted to open his own letters. He
Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he informed petitioner of activities during the
would incur, she would "replace" these. As a Christmas season — that they enjoyed eating,
postscript, she told petitioner that Keith wanted a playing and giving surprises to their mother. He
size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider shoes." apprised him of his daily schedule and that their
mother had been closely supervising them,
instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up
3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small their pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton
piece of paper that reads: had become very smart while Charmaine, who
was also smart, was very demanding of their
Dear Herbert, mother. Because their mother was leaving for the
United States on February 5, they would be
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you missing her like they were missing petitioner. He
had a wonderful one. asked for his "things" and $200.00. He told
petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he
would make the sign of the cross even when they
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his
It's nice to be thought of at X'mas. Thanks again. insistence that Aquino was not dead because he
had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith,
Charmaine had become "very maldita"Swho was
not always satisfied with her dolls and things
i but
Joeton was full of surprises. He ended nthe letter
c
with "Love your son, Keith." The letter was mailed him to call them often like the father
on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D). of Ana Christie and to write them
when he would call so that they could wait for it.
6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She He informed petitioner that they had all grown
thanked petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain, bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner would be
pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and happy with the letter that had taken him so long to
$50.00. She reminded him of her birthday on write because he did not want to commit any
January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him perfume
informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added
her feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in that the latter should buy something for Mommy.
Lahug but classes would start on January 9
although Keith's classes had started on January 6. 11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My
They would feel sad again because Mommy would Wonderful Father" dated October 8, 1984 from
be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
writing them. She signed, "Love, Charmaine."
12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish
7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He For You" with the year '83 written on the upper
explained to petitioner that they had not been right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith,
remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him Charmaine and Joeton.
of their trip to Manila — they went to Malacañang,
Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign 13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner
Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three that he had written him even when their Mom "was
days and Baguio for one week. He informed him there" where she bought them clothes and shoes.
that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his
class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike,
would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he was he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost
glad they would be together in that school. He P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he would
asked for his "reward" from petitioner and so with go to an afternoon disco with friends but their
Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars"
and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner for excellence. Keith wanted a bow and arrow
that he was saving the money he had been sending Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire
them. He said he missed petitioner and wished him that petitioner would come and visit them
the best. He added that petitioner should call them someday.
on Sundays.
14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four
8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine pages bearing the date January 1986. Keith told his
but apparently written by the latter. She asked for father that they had received the package that the
money from petitioner to buy something for the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however,
school and "something else." She, promised not to fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton
spend so much and to save some. She said she who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for
loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said "hi!" grocery items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in
to petitioner. After ending the letter with "Love, behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a
Joeton and Charmaine," she asked for her prize for dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards
her grades as she got seventh place. that would make her look sexy. He intimated to
petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was
9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in
petitioner that he had been writing him; that he the grocery even though his mother had told him
would like to have some money but he would save not to be shy about it.
them; that he learned that petitioner had called
them up but he was not around; that he would be Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of
going to Manila but would be back home May 3; banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition
that his Mommy had just arrived Thursday for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his
afternoon, and that he would be the "official altar children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to
boy." He asked petitioner to write them soon. the children from 1985 to 1989.

10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite
money he sent. He told petitioner that he was surprising why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring
saving some in the bank and he was proud because not only evidence on financial support but also the emotional exchange
he was the only one in his group who saved in the of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts
bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his
and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were
by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants "withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below attached a
and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of high premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally
topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the
that he was a member of the basketball team and emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
that his mom would drive for his group. He asked
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child
aunt. However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by to the father, the Court said:
his testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as
revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates
Keith's testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more
adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a
mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had mother separated from her children and the
been used to. humiliation she suffered as a, result of her
character being made a key issue in court rather
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to than the feelings and future, the best interests and
the children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their welfare of her children. While the bonds between
young lives, the children were used to their presence. Such attachment a mother and her small child are special in nature,
had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling close to either parent, whether father or mother, is bound
private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody.
emotional detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater
uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when than that of the other parent. It is not so much the
they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent
spent for his hospital bills. but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot
be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial
measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding
Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children.
child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account
instead of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual
because the child opted to go with his mother. The Court said: needs of the child. 30 The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner
abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly
of affluence that private respondent promises if the affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had
child lives with him. It is enough, however, that so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The
support her children according to her means. letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained
the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The
children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of but also because he was a person they could share with their daily
whether to award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster activities, problems and triumphs.
mother, this Court said:
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to petitioner's "meager" financial support to ferret out other indications
come of having deprived mother and son of the on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission
beautiful associations and tender, imperishable of said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected
memories engendered by the relationship of parent to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound
and child. We should not take away from a mother them to their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears
the opportunity of bringing up her own child even out the fact that the welfare of the children was not exactly the
at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and "paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to consent to
lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able their adoption.
to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction
at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble,
to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the
should not forget that the relationship between a children in the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a
foster mother and a child is not natural but problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other
artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her
forgetful of what its foster parents had done for because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
him, said parents might yet count and appraise children. 31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that
(sic) all that they have done and spent for him and Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and came home
with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and twice or three times, 32 thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who
even rue the day they committed the blunder of actually left her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough
taking the child into their hearts and their home. that their father left their children when he went abroad, but when their
Not so with a real natural mother who never counts mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The
the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first
memories of her associations with her child, discussed the adoption of the children, they decided that the
however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's brother Jose. However,
blood count. . . . . because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the
task upon private respondents. 33
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n
ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant children. A businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano
commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its
respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight proper context and perspective. The Court's position,
stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences
could "take care of the children while their parents are beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. 46 The discretion
away," 35 thereby indicating the evanescence of his intention. He to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best
wanted to have the children's surname changed to Clavano for the interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights
reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be of the parents over the child. 47
difficult for them to get a visa if their surname were different from
his. 36 To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to spare the children In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the
the stigma of being products of a broken home. manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna
Marie which became the basis of the decree of legal separation.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent According to private respondents' counsel, 48 the authority given to
Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal
inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away separation was "all embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving her
from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on
was allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she was a victim of the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to
an almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties,
herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she shall include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of the
could still take care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private
ability to physically care for them was her employment at the respondents' apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for
Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles 38 — she could not have been doing away with petitioner's consent to the adoption.
employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the
Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of
apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an inveterate the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner
womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for
"never be at ease with the wife of their father." 39 adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a parent designated by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall
womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he take into account "all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic
in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent
family man, considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act spouse the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the
visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a premium on the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights
inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the
them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his
a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education,
petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional wisdom and health and religion. 50
common human experience show that a "bad" husband does not
necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not exactly an
upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority,
as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his
children when he took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the lower . . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law
court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after grants to parents for the purpose of the children's
learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case physical preservation and development, as well as
and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite his the cultivation of their intellect and the education
family once more in the United States. 44 of their hearts and senses. As regards parental
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
abide by the agreement with his wife on the support of the children. sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As such, he could minor."
not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to
refute petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from the Parental authority and responsibility are
sale of the conjugal home, 45 pursuant to their inalienable and may not be transferred or
manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case. renounced except in cases authorized by law. The
Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale right attached to parental authority, being purely
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
and sent his family money, no matter how "meager." institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of
a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption even in a document, what is given is merely
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the temporary custody and it does not constitute a
rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever renunciation of parental authority. Even if a
mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
 The father and mother, being the natural guardians the Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the
of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry,
entitled to keep them in their custody and Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the
company. 52 (Emphasis supplied) domestic adoption of Filipino children. 59

As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws,
completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award such as the following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that
award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement (a) To ensure that every child
of the spouses. remains under the care and
custody of his/her parent(s)
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to and be provided with love,
a compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation care, understanding and
case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be security towards the full and
deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the harmonious development of
law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal his/her personality. 60
separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody
over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was (b) In all matters relating to
not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration the care, custody and adoption
thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of a child, his/her interest
of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a shall be the paramount
contempt charge against them. 54 consideration in accordance
with the tenets set forth in the
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the United Nations (UN)
child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the Convention on the Rights of
legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is the Child. 61
whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental (c) To prevent the child from
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there unnecessary separation from
cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as his/her biological parent(s). 62
this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on
the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations
record. Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials
are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to
instant case are the following provisions:
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has
ruled in Tenchavez v. Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino
citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this States Parties shall respect the responsibilities,
jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a
American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained manner consistent with the evolving capacities of
a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect. the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the
exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the
present Convention. 63
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out
of established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v.
Court of Appeals, 57 a case involving the visitorial rights of an States Parties shall respect the right of the child
illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that: who is separated from one or both parents to
maintain personal relations and direct contact with
both parents on a regular basis, except if it is
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral contrary to the child's best interests. 64
and legal duty, to care for their children, see to
their upbringing and safeguard their best interest
and welfare. This authority and responsibility may A child whose parents reside in different States
not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis,
renounced by them. Even when the parents are save in exceptional circumstances personal
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, relations and direct contacts with both parents . .
the attachment and feeling for their offsprings . 65
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law not
the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the the parents . . . to provide direction to the child in
well being of the child. the exercise of his or her right in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil child. 66
Code, there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption
proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and
as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and care of the domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle
parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is
not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of Yes.
the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights
of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption,
other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained
extent possible. a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a
written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate
Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching or has not abandoned the child.
eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the
discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the
that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent
and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly
the time that the petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must intemperate."
be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father
who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned
them. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural
GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, children."
are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is
immediately executory.
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would
SO ORDERED. forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998 abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he
maintained regular communications with his wife and children through
FACTS: letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims.

Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her Categories: Adoption, G.R. No. 105308, Persons and Family
husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the Relations, Philippine Civil Code
petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United
States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna,
reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert. ART. 209.

The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 FACTS:
minor children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was
already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption,
holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married and
natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine,
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3,
Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated 1981.
the case to the Court.

Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu, upon learning of her husband’s
ISSUE: extramarital affairs Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos,
which the trial court approved. Petitioner sought a divorce from Anna
Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the which issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the
written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all
abandoned them. reasonable times and places to petitioner.

Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, the brother and
RULING: sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption
of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children and
that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a
family business, leaving the children would be a problem
Petitioner contest the adoption, alleging that, although were financially By resolution adopted on September 23, 1996, we
capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager accepted the appeal. We shall treat the appeal as one via
compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip certiorari from a decision of the regional trial court under Supreme
him of his parental authority over his beloved children. Court Circular 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, on pure questions of law.

The facts are undisputed and may be related as follows:

The petition was granted by the lower court which the Court of
Appeals affirmed stating Article 188 of the Family Code which
requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller,
adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified
has abandoned the child is not necessary petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.

The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988,
Herbert elevated the case to the Court on the ground that at 9:00 in the morning. At the hearing, with the attendance of an
assistant city fiscal of Angeles City, in representation of the Solicitor
General, respondents adduced evidence showing that:
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has abandoned his children and the
latter be legally adopted without his written consent. Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S.
Miller, 40 years of age, both American citizens,
are husband and wife, having been married on
RULING: June 21, 1982.

No, petitioner has not abandoned his children and the latter cannot be They were childless and "do not expect to have
legally adopted without his written consent. sibling out of their union on account of a medical
problem of the wife."

The act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which Claude A. Miller was a member of the United
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all States Air Force, as airman first class, assigned at
parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the Clark Air Base since January 26, 1985.
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe
their children The family maintains their residence at Don
Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City,
since 1985. 1
In this case, however, petitioner did not manifest any conduct that
would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and
abandonment. While petitioner was physically absent, he was not Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the
his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that custody of respondents since the first week of
petitioner maintained regular communications with his wife and August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the
children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered future of their son prompted the natural parents
to their whims. who have no visible means of livelihood to have
their child adopted by respondents. They executed
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the
G.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999 adoption by respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners The Department of Social Welfare and

vs. Development, through its Regional office at San
CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents. Fernando, Pampanga, recommended approval of
the petition on the basis of its evaluation that
respondents were morally, emotionally and
financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the
adoption would be to the minor's best interest and
PARDO, J welfare. 2

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition
appealed originally to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the for adoption, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, granting the petition
of respondent spouses to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. WHEREFORE, finding that petitioners possess all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
In its decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals for adoption, the instant petition is hereby
certified the case to the Supreme Court because the petition raised only Granted, and this Court decrees the minor
questions of law. MICHAEL MAGNO MADAYAG freed from all
obligation of obedience and support with respect
to natural parents and is hereby declared the child
 of the herein petitioners by adoption. The minor's No costs.
surname shall be changed from "MADAYAG" to
"MILLER", which is the surname of the herein SO ORDERED.
petitioners. 3
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to this Court. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family
Code, 4 effective on August 3, 1988 5 when the petition for adoption x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code 6 which allowed aliens to adopt.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P.
LIM,
The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to
adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which
could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying him. 7 DECISION

Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, CARPIO, J.:
1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt
a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of The Case
filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then
in force. "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim
does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term
(petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason
of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial
and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action,
court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed
or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society,
without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
deny." 8 "Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations
created after the right has vested. 9 The Facts

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The
attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P.
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to
attaching in the first instance. 10 the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date
of birth is 1 August 1983.4
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
effective of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under
Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
prevailing before the Family Code. 11 They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname
"Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28
November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those
couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002,
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
objective of the law. 12 adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, in SP. Proc. No. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
3562.1âwphi1.nêt evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his
consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in
of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned psychologically capable of caring for children, at least
child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a
DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11 position to support and care for his/her children in keeping
with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen
(16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
The Ruling of the Trial Court adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological
parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing parent;
the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
of the Family Code. that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three
(3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to
untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, enter his/her country as his/her adopted
such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply. residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights consanguinity or affinity; or
from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
Hence, the present petition. son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

Issue (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and

seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt. affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

The Court’s Ruling (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. following cases:
She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. son/daughter of the other; or
Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority. (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
We deny the petition. however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, other.
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
RA 8552 reads:
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt: joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12 SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct keeping with the means of the family.
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s)
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, succession shall govern.
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as
that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3)
proved during the trial. to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. support21 and successional rights.22
The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
Effects of Adoption education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them
the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
the age of majority. This is untenable. sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which
mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
the children.15 Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of
the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were
effects of adoption, thus: filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We
cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would
show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los
parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for
a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral
decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and mental and physical character and well-being.
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above
that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967
was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,
dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos vs.
City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil
against petitioner. Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.

SO ORDERED. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
SANCHEZ, J.:
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Refusal of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to record an Escritura
de Adopcion executed in Madrid, Spain, is now challenged before this
Court on appeal by registrant-adoptee from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila confirmatory of such refusal.
FACTS:
The disputed deed of adoption had its inception, thus: Prior to October
21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the Court of
First Instance of Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55
Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them years, a citizen of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid,
by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of Spain. On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the application
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding adoption
married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. document "con arreglo al articulo 177 del Codigo Civil." The adoption
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty document became necessary for the reason that under Article 177 of
given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. the Civil Code of Spain, "[a]probada definitivamente la adopcion por
In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and el Juez, se otorgara escritura, expresando en ella las condiciones con
Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and que se haya hecho, y se inscribira en el Registro Civil
already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. correspondiente." In compliance, on November 29, 1958, the notarial
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their document of adoption — which embodies the court order of adoption
consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. — whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted petitioner,
was executed before Notary Public Braulio Velasco Carrasquedo of
Madrid. In that document, Maria Gernier Garreau instituted petitioner,
amongst other conditions as here unica y universal heredera de todos
sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on
December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine
Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the
HELD: corresponding certificate of authentication.1

The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar, however,
refused to register that document upon the ground that under Philippine
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had
law, adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding. And since
already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3
the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not
instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
entitled to registration.
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use
of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental Failing in her move to reconsider, petitioner went to the Court of First
authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a Instance of Manila on mandamus.2 As adverted to earlier,
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. the mandamus petition did not prosper. The lower court in its decision
The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are of February 28, 1964, dismissed said petition.
certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The Petitioner's lone assignment of error reads: "The lower court erred in
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification declaring the 'escritura de adopcion' as authenticated by the Philippine
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental Vice Consul in Madrid, Spain, as not registrable in the Philippines."
1. Act 3753 of the Philippine Legislature, entitled "An Act to establish capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
a civil register," in Section 1 thereof, recites that a "civil register is Philippines even though living abroad."
established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered," amongst others, "(g) adoptions." It provides for local civil 4. Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign
registrars. Complementary thereto are Article 407 of our Civil Code adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created
which commands that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register;" and same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status
Article 408 of the same Code which, in language similar, directs that of adoption when created by its own law.4It is quite obvious then that
"[t]he following shall be entered in the civil register: . . . (8) adoptions; the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will
. . ." The law is clear. The compulsory tenor of the word "shall" leaves be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the
no alternative. It is a command. interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the
substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil
2. But the Solicitor General, hewing to the line drawn by the court Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption
below, argues that petitioner's case does not come within the purview "remains subject to local law."5
of Article 409 of the Civil Code, which states that:
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of
Art. 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, foreign adoptions. We hold that an adoption created under the law of a
naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in the foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil
preceding article it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the
which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has effects of such adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.6
been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy
of said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality Conformably to the foregoing, the lower court's decision of February
where the court is functioning. 28, 1964 dismissing the mandamus petition appealed from, is hereby
reversed; and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila is hereby directed to
and Section 11 of Act 3753, which reads: register the deed of adoption (Escritura de Adopcion) by Maria Garnier
Garreau in favor of petitioner Josefina de Dios Ramirez Marcaida.
Sec. 11. Duties of clerks of court to register certain
decisions. — In cases of legitimation, acknowledgment, No costs. So ordered.
adoption, naturalization, and change of given or family
name, or both, upon the decree of the court becoming final, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., M
it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the
decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and
if this has not been done, to have said decree recorded in the JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA vs.
office of the civil registrar of the municipality where the LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil
court is functioning. Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24006, November 25, 1967
It is at once apparent that the cited legal provisions refer to adoptions
effected in the Philippines. For, indeed, Article 409 of the Civil Code FACTS:
and Section 10 of the Registry Law speak of adoption which shall be Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started
registered in the municipality or city where the court issuing the before the CFI- Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years
adoption decree is functioning. But, the trial court concluded that what of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years,
is registrable is only adoption obtained through a judgment rendered a citizen of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. The
by a Philippine court. court granted the application for adoption and gave the necessary
judicial authority, once the judgment becomes final, to execute the
We are not persuaded to adopt the Government's theory. We are at a corresponding adoption document.
loss to understand how it could be concluded that the structure of the On November 29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which
law did not authorize registration of foreign adoptions. We perceive embodies the court order of adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier
that Article 409 and Section 10 aforesaid were incorporated into the Garreau formally adopted petitioner, was executed before Notary
statute books merely to give effect to our law3 which required judicial Public Braulio Velasco Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document,
proceedings for adoption. Limitation of registration of adoptions to Maria Gernier Garreau instituted petitioner, amongst other conditions
those granted by Philippine courts is a misconception which a broader as here unica y universal heredera de todos sus bienes, derechos y
view allows us now to correct. For, if registration is to be narrowed acciones, presentes y futuros.
down to local adoptions, it is the function of Congress, not of this In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion (deed of
Court, to spell out such limitation. We cannot carve out a prohibition adoption) was, on December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S.
where the law does not so state. Excessive rigidity serves no purpose. Martinez, Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who
And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil Code, the disputed document issued the corresponding certificate of authentication.
of adoption is registrable. The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. The Registrar refused to register it on the ground
3. No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State and that under Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial
adoptee, or any other person for that matter, would ensue from the proceeding. And since the notarial document of adoption is not a
adoption here involved. The validity thereof is not under attack. At any judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration. Petitioner went to
rate, whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and CFI- Manila on mandamus. The lower court dismissed said petition
adoptee and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article and decided that what is registrable is only adoption obtained through
15 of our Civil Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws a judgment rendered by a Philippine court.
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal Solicitor General argues that petitioner’s case does not come within
the purview of Article 409 of the Civil Code, which states that:
“In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald
orders mentioned in the preceding article it shall be the duty of the Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian and oppositor-
clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same appellee,
has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of vs.
said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, petitioner-
court is functioning”, and Section 11 of Act 3753, which reads: appellant.
“Duties of clerks of court to register certain decisions. — In cases of
legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, naturalization, and change of Stanley A. Clark for appellant.
given or family name, or both, upon the decree of the court becoming Tancredo M. Guray for appellee.
final, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the
decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this
has not been done, to have said decree recorded in the office of the REYES, J.B.L., J.:
civil registrar of the municipality where the court is functioning.:”
In Special Proceedings No. 163 of the Court of First Instance of La
Union, appellee Severo Viloria was, on October 27, 1948, appointed
ISSUE: guardian of the person and estate of the minor Roy Reginald Lelina,
WON the order of adoption issued by the CFI- Madrid can be beneficiary of arrears pay, insurance, and other benefits from the U.S
registered in the Philippines. Veterans Administration due to the death of his late father Constancio
Lelina, supposedly a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the war.
On March 31, 1950, the court authorized the guardian to withdraw
RULING: from the estate of his ward the sum of not to exceed P30 a month for
Yes. The cited provisions refer to adoptions effected in the the boy's support and other expenditures.
Philippines.Article 409 of the Civil Code and Section 10 of the
Registry Law speak of adoption which shall be registered in the
On March 20, 1952, the U. S. Veterans Administration filed a motion
municipality or city where the court issuing the adoption decree is
in the guardianship proceedings, alleging receipt of certain letters from
functioning.
its central office in Washington, D. C., to the effect that the minor's
We perceive that Article 409 and Section 10 aforesaid were
deceased father had not guerrilla or other service in the armed forces
incorporated into the statute books merely to give effect to our law
of the United States, and that consequently, his heir was not entitled to
which required judicial proceedings for adoption. Limitation of
the payment of gratuitous National Service Life Insurance, and prayed
registration of adoptions to those granted by Philippine courts is a
that the guardian be ordered to stop further payment of monthly
misconception which a broader view allows us now to correct. For, if
allowances to the minor. The court found the motion well-founded and
registration is to be narrowed down to local adoptions, it is the function
granted the same. A few years later, on February 15, 1955, the
of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out such limitation. We cannot
Administrator of Veterans Affairs again filed a motion in the same
carve out a prohibition where the law does not so state. Excessive
guardianship proceedings for a refund to the U.S. Veterans
rigidity serves no purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil
Administration of the sum of $2,879.68, the balance of gratuitous
Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable.
insurance benefits allegedly wrongfully paid to the minor Roy
No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State and adoptee,
Reginald Lelina, which was still on deposit with the Philippine
or any other person for that matter, would ensue from the adoption here
National Bank, San Fernando, La Union Branch. Upon opposition of
involved. The validity thereof is not under attack. At any rate, whatever
the guardian, who submitted evidence of the service record of the
may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and
minor's deceased father duly recognized by both the Philippine and
other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil
U.S. Armies, the motion for refund was denied. Then on April 27,
Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: “Laws relating to family
1955, the guardian moved to be allowed to withdraw P4,000 from the
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
minor's estate to meet the minor's needs. This motion was opposed by
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living
the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, arguing that the minors right to
abroad.”
National Service Life Insurance benefits is governed exclusively by
Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign
the S.S. Code Annotated, which provides (Tit. 38, section 808) that
adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created
decisions of the Administrator —
by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the
same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status
of adoption when created by its own law. It is quite obvious then that shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact
the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will and no other official of the United States, except a judge or
be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the judges of the Unite States courts, shall have jurisdiction to
interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the review any such decisions;
substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil
Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption In the same motion, the Administrator prayed for the setting aside of
“remains subject to local law.” the court's order denying the refund of the money in the hands of the
We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is minor's guardian, on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction".
entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the
Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such
Acting on the pending motions of the guardian and the Administrator,
adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.
the lower court held:
The lower court’s decision is hereby reversed; and the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila is hereby directed to register the deed of adoption
(Escritura de Adopcion) by Maria Garnier Garreau in favor of If the legal provisions alleged in the petition of the veterans
petitioner Josefina de Dios Ramirez Marcaida. Administration is correct, and should be taken into account,
this Court may not have the right to order the return of the
amount of $2,879.68 at present credited as funds of the
G.R. No. L-9620 June 28, 1957 minor, and deposited in the name of the said minor with the
Philippine National Bank. Precisely, the issue now pending
 in this guardianship proceeding is whether or not, the father alleged mistake was really committed; and the Philippine
of the minor deceased Constancio Lelina, has a valid military courts' determination of the question is as binding upon
service to justify the payment to him or to his heirs of the the Veterans' Administrator as upon any other litigant.
National Life Services Insurance benefits.
Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was
The minor Reginald Lelina through his guardian and his not properly filed in the guardianship proceedings, since the latter are
counsel claims that his father had rendered services as shown solely concerned with the ward's care a custody and the proper
by certain papers submitted in this case to support that claim. administration or management of his properties. Conflicts regarding
As a matter of fact, the said minor was granted and paid those ownership or title to the property in the hands of the guardian, in his
benefits as shown by the statements of accounts submitted capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate proceeding.
and duly approved by this court up to and including March
31, 1954, in the order of Judge Primitivo L. Gonzales dated The order of the court below, dated 22 June 1955, is hereby affirmed,
April 22, 1954. On that other hand the Attorneys of the with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Veterans Administration now claim that such payment was
an error because the deceased Constancio Lelina had no
recognized military services or was he a member of the Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista
Commonwealth Army in the service of the Armed Forces of Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Felix, JJ., concur.
the United States Government. This is, therefore, a matter
that should be determined in an appropriate action filed the
complete court. This being the case, until this issue is, finally
determined by the competent court in an appropriate action,
the balance of the amount now deposited in the name of the
minor through his guardian could not be disposed by this
Court one way or another. In this proceeding, the matter at
issue cannot be finally determined. Hence, this Court
believes and so holds, that in the meantime, the status quo
should be maintain with respect to funds now existing and
deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union
Branch in the name of the herein minor. (Rec. on Appeal, pp.
47-49)

and denied both the guardian's motion to withdraw from the minor's
deposits, and the Administrator's position for refund. The
Administrator of Veterans Affairs sought reconsideration of the above
order, which was denied; wherefore, it appealed to this Court.

We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The

provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the
decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when
made on claims properly submitted to him for resolution; but they are
not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting
as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions
against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance
with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including
the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where
the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and
submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has
not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of
the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive
on our courts. That in effect, would deprive our tribunals or judicial
discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the
veterans' Administrator.

In an analogous case, we have ruled:

By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the

Philippine Alien Property Administrator has submitted to its
jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting order.
He can not therefore now dispute this power. (Brownell vs.
Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz., 4772.)

From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to
the appellee guardian, for the ward's benefit, the latter became their
lawful possessor and he can not be deprived thereof on the sole
allegation of the Veterans' Administrator that the money was
erroneously paid. The burden lies upon him to satisfy the court that the