Writing about the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides claimed that “it was the rise of Athens and the

fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” (Thucydides, 400 BC) In today’s

context, we can understand the Trap as when a rising power such as China threatens to displace

the ruling power - the United States, the resulting structural stress creates conditions where

otherwise manageable events can escalate and lead to war. (Allison, 2017, xiv) I argue that the

U.S. and China can avoid the Trap because (1) they are acutely aware of the possibility of war

and can thus prepare to avoid it (2) their differing value and political systems, while at odds, are

not irreconcilable, and (3) strong economic interdependence is a significant deterrence for both.

None of these factors, when independently considered can aid the United Stated and China in

avoiding war. They build on each other starting with the most important factor of awareness

leading to preparation to avoid war. While these reasons address the question of ‘can’ the U.S.

and China avoid the Trap and prevent war, ‘will’ they be able to? This depends heavily on their

ability to avoid falling prey to ‘flashpoints’ – small, possibly benign actions or events that can

quickly escalate into major war.

Section I of this essay covers definitions of crucial concepts and examines the main

reasons listed above of why the U.S. and China can avoid war through the lens and frameworks

provided by IR theory. Section II offers three case studies to examine the soundness of these

reasons.

Section I: Conceptual Framework

This section covers (i) definitions of crucial concepts, (ii) the possibility of war in the nuclear

age and in the current international order. We then examine the three main reasons war can be

avoided (iii) awareness of the possibility of war prevents ‘sleepwalking’ into one, (iv) the U.S.
and Chinas’ value and political systems are not irreconcilable, and lastly (v) economic

interdependence is a significant deterrence.

(i) Definitions

Graham Allison’s understanding of the Thucydides Trap warns us that the structural

stress created in a system where a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power can lead to

war. When we examine the trap and the possibility of the U.S. and China going to war in this

context, we need to be clear of a few definitions, particularly of war and international order. For

the purposes of this paper, war is defined as “armed conflict between two states” (Nolan, 2015,

1) and understood as a great power conflict with kinetic military action as put forward by Chris

Coker in The Improbable War. (2015) This definition is most appropriate for examining the U.S.

– China situation as quite simply, it is possible that it may occur. As conflict on a large-scale that

has the potential to draw in most of the world, with the extensive use of military action and

large-scale loss of life and resources will have serious consequences and its sheer possibility

makes it imperative to examine.

Secondly, for the purposes of this essay the International Order is defined as “the body of

rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations between the key players on the international

stage. Today, this body includes a nexus of global institutions, such as the United Nations, and

the World Trade Organization; bilateral and regional security organizations.” (RAND

Corporation, 2017) This is an important concept as the current international order was formed

under the leadership of the U.S. and represents their core values of democracy, free trade, human

rights etc. Even though China has thrived in the system it fundamentally differs from the U.S. on

some of these values. This undoubtedly creates the ‘structural stress’ Allison refers to.

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(ii) Possibility of war in the nuclear age in the current international order

With an understanding of war as great power conflict with military action in a west-led

international order, we need to stop and ask if such a conflict is even possible today when both

sides are nuclear powers. Do nuclear weapons fundamentally alter the ‘structural stress’ on the

international order? Waltz claims that nuclear weapons are a highly effective deterrent as they

put the very survival of states at risk. Before the existence of nuclear weapons, conventional

methods of warfare while resulting in significant destruction still made the costs of war bearable.

He cites the example of the Cuban Missile Crises. (Waltz, 1990, 734) Others such as Mueller

have suggested that great power conflict is essentially obsolescent in today’s world, and that “an

important and consequential change has taken place with respect to attitudes toward the

institution of war, one rather akin to the processes by which the once-accepted institutions of

slavery and dueling became extinct.” (Mueller, 2012, 6)

Have nuclear weapons, as suggested by Waltz, and changing attitudes towards war, as

suggested by Mueller, made great power conflict obsolescent? It does make sense to ask: Why

would two nuclear powers go to war given the dire consequences? Coker claims, “Because they

can.” (2015) This is unfortunately a simple but calamitous truth. Mearsheimer, indeed, has

warned us that China cannot rise peacefully, “if China continues to grow economically, it will

attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The

result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.” (2014) Coker

has also argued that the main reason great powers have gone to war has been “the need to set the

rules of international conduct.” (2015, x) We can safely say on the basis of these arguments that

great power conflict is indeed possible in today’s international order.

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(iii) Awareness of the possibility of war limits the probability of ‘sleepwalking’ into one

Mearsheimer argues that just at the U.S. pursued hegemony in the Western hemisphere,

China will do the same in Asia to reflect its new economic power. He warns that this process

cannot be peaceful as China’s neighbors and the U.S. will do everything in their power to

prevent this from happening. It follows that China will also attempt to set new rules for the

international order with a significantly larger seat at the table to reflect its position as a

superpower. All of the above is possible. However, both powers are acutely aware of these

circumstances and this creates a crucial advantage – they are armed with the knowledge of the

possibility of war and so can prepare themselves to avoid it. Xi Jinping himself has publicly

claimed “we must all strive to avoid falling into the Thucydides Trap.” (Shengkai, 2016) The

balance of power is indeed shifting, China is deeply embedded in the global economy and

international institutions, and it is a key driver of global economic growth. This has caused

significant stress on the U.S. led world order. The fact that both countries acknowledge these

circumstances rather than ignoring them publicly, while plotting privately, severely limits the

probability of sleepwalking into a war.

(iv) The values and political systems of the two powers are not irreconcilable

The second main reason both powers can avoid war is the fact that though the value and

political systems of both sides differ, they are not irreconcilable. Today’s international order is

essentially the brainchild of the United States. (Ikenberry, 2008. 24) The governing rules and

institutions of the international stage were almost indistinguishable from the U.S.’s own point of

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view or policy on most fronts. U.S. dominance and the Washington Consensus laid out the rules

of the road for the international political, economic and legal system that were rooted in key

values such as democracy, capitalism, free trade and human rights. It is within this U.S. led

system that China has flourished. But it is opposed to almost all the values laid out: it is not a

democracy, proports state-led development and economic policy, and is no champion of human

rights. China’s economic success and the fact that the U.S. unipolar moment will inevitably end

is irrefutable. (Ikenberry, 2008, 25) The question then becomes whether both powers can co-exist

peacefully and compromise enough to avoid war within this changing environment. Ikenberry

argues that today’s international system is “open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep

political foundations…and is hard to overturn and easy to join.” (2008, 24) Keeping in mind the

knowledge of the possibility of war, and thus preparing to avoid it means that both sides need to

come to the table with the intention to cooperate. Firstly, the U.S. must invest in making the

current international system even more resilient so that China becomes even more deeply

embedded. The U.S. must acknowledge the reality of its declining relative power and give China

a larger seat at the table but strive to keep the international order strong by investing more in

multilateralism and institutions. Secondly, China is not revolutionary (for now), it is a reformist

revisionist that “accepts some of the institutions of international society for a mixture of

calculated and instrumental reasons. But it resists and wants to reform… and possibly also wants

to change its status.” (Buzan, 2010, 18) If the U.S. continues to invest in the institutions of the

current order and is open to reasonable dialogue as discussed in Part (iii), a difference in value

and political systems can be accommodated and doesn’t have to lead to war.

(v) Economic interdependence as a deterrent if future expectations of trade are positive

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 The third and last major reason as to why war can be avoided between China and the U.S.

is the deep economic interdependence that exists both between the two powers, and with the rest

of the world. Total merchandise trade between the U.S. and China was $637 billion in 2017, with

a U.S. trade deficit from $337bn to $376 billion. (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) China

is heavily dependent on the U.S. as it is the largest consumer of its export led strategy. The U.S.

is still more advanced technologically and China is a considerable importer particularly in this

sector. Within the context of such an extensive web on interdependence, Dale Copeland provides

a helpful framework to examine whether it can successfully deter conflict between the two sides.

His framework is a combination of liberal and realist outlooks on interdependence, namely

interdependence ensures peace through trade and interdependence makes war likely as states

become more dependent for access to vital goods. He introduces a new variable: “a state’s

expectations of future trade” (2014, 324) If a state has positive expectations for future trade with

a country, it more likely to strive for peace. In this regard, he suggests that the U.S. must

maintain consistency in economic policy emphasizing its strong commitment to extensive trade

with China. (2014, 325)

It is important to note here, that economic interdependence as described above serving as

an effective deterrent to war is most effective when the first two major reasons for avoiding are

considered. Namely, both sides are aware of the possibility of war and thus can be prepared to

avoid it by collaborative dialogue, and the international order remains resilient enough to render

their value differences as reconcilable.

Section II: Cases

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 Allison examines sixteen cases through the course of history to understand how and why

the Trap can be avoided. In four of these cases, war does not occur. These can be chronologically

and thematically be classified as - Firstly, Portugal and Spain: two colonial powers sides agreed

to divvy up the world to avoid conflict. Secondly, U.S-UK: tacit agreement that led to a peaceful

transition of superpower status. Thirdly, U.S-Soviet Union: war was avoided through deterrence

and the Cold War. And lastly, UK & France – Germany: conflict was avoided through European

integration. While each of these cases provide helpful empirical evidence to draw from, the most

analogous case to the present is one that did lead to war: World War I. And it is from this case

we can learn the most. This section covers three cases studies: (i) In the first case we examine

World War I to underscore the importance of not sleepwalking into war. (ii) The second case of

the Cold War highlights that war can be avoided between two powers who have differing value

systems, and lastly (iii) The third case looks at Japanese - American relations during 1920-40s to

examine how interdependence and the future trade expectations of U.S. and China can be a

deterrent.

(i) World War I

Our first main reason as to why war between China and the U.S. can be avoided is that

they are both acutely aware of the possibility of war and both sides can thus prepare to avoid it.

This awareness itself is a crucial advantage as it prevents us sleepwalking into a war. Coker

draws our attention to the fact that one of the most significant similarities between World War I

and today is that “so many leading thinkers felt that a great power conflict was as improbable in

1914 as many do today.” (2015, 8) Angell, in The Great Illusion, highlighted that modern

finance and credit markets require peace to function effectively, and military conquest can no

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longer provide access to those forms of substantial wealth. (1909) He was quite clearly wrong.

There are some scholars today that echo the unlikeliness of war such as Pinker in The Better

Angels of Our Nature. (2102) However, we are moving in the direction of awareness, and more

and more leading thinkers are warning us of the possibility of war today including Mearsheimer

and Coker.

Additionally, Coker stresses that politicians on both sides took unnecessary risks as they

thought that war was improbable and did little to avert it. (2015, 9) Churchill was determined to

maintain British hegemony and protect its naval supremacy but preventing Germany from

building its naval forces would lead to such a devastating conflict that it was improbable. He

later claimed that, “For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the

strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent.” (Churchill, 207)

However, we’ve already recognized that Xi Jinping himself has warned that we must not fall into

the Thucydides Trap. This awareness gives us a significant leg up to avoid the mistakes made in

World War I and to not sleepwalk into a war. The U.S. and China have the luxury of truly

understanding that this is a very real possibility and thus have the time to prepare for avoiding it.

Thus, one of the main ways of not sleepwalking into a war is to acknowledge it and both

sides must actively pursue (among other things) “a constructive cultural dialogue about their

respective values while holding each other accountable for how they interpret them.” (Coker,

2015, 181) Military aspects such as avoiding a naval arms race, the militarization of space and

cyberwarfare need to be discussed openly. Kissinger has also stressed the need for partnership

diplomacy and military dialogue: “The combination of balance-of-power strategy with

partnership diplomacy will not be able to remove all adversarial aspects, but it can mitigate their

impact…A purely military definition of the balance will shade into confrontation. A purely

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psychological approach to partnership will raise fears of hegemony. Wise statesmanship must try

to find that balance. For outside it, disaster beckons.” (Kissinger, 2014)

Lastly, there are several differing analyses about the causes of the first World War.

However, there is general consensus around what set it off – The assassination of Archduke

Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28th June 1914 triggered a chain of events that resulted in a war

where each of the states involved were left worse off. This is a classic example of a flashpoint –

a seemingly unrelated or small event that can escalate very quickly. Allison has warned us that

these can be exacerbated due to the structural stress placed on a system with shifting power

dynamics. It is essential to learn this lesson as the potential for flashpoints is certainly high at this

point and it is only the awareness of their existence and the dangers of escalation that help the

U.S. and China to prepare for unforeseen eventualities.

(ii) U.S. and Soviet Union

Our second main reason is even though the value and political systems of both sides

differ, they are not irreconcilable and will not necessarily lead to war. The U.S. and the Soviet

Union were locked in an ideological conflict, an arms race and the hunger for supremacy. This is

possibly the best and most recent example of the fact that war can be avoided by two powers that

have differing values. Allison calls out, “Though often tense, the Cold War stands as one of

history’s greatest successes in escaping Thucydides’s Trap. By developing vehicles for

competition outside of armed conflict, the two powers peacefully managed the highest-stakes

great power competition in history.” (2017, 281)

Firstly, their value and political systems were drastically opposed with democracy and

communism at significant odds. Sentiments in the West can be summarized as Soviet

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communism was “as incompatible with democracy as was Nazism or Fascism because it rested

upon the willingness to apply force to gain the end.” (Forrestal, 1945, 57) Secondly, the Soviet

Union can be classified as a revolutionary revisionist as explained by Buzan, as it was “seeking

to overthrow both the status order and the form of international society.” (2010, 18) Historian

John Gaddis claimed that rather than maintaining the balance of power in Europe, the Soviet

Union was seeking to dominate it much like Hitler did. (2006, 15) Thirdly, the Soviet Union was

making advances technologically through the launch of Sputnik, militarily developing nuclear

weapons, and economically via industrial production.

The parallel with the current U.S. – China situation is the differing value systems

between the two powers, and economic, technological and military advancement on the part of

China similar to the Soviet Union. The factor that perhaps made the Cold War situation more

dangerous is the fact that the Soviet Union was revolutionary, while China is reformist and not

attempting to overthrow the current system. This works in the favor of both parties being able to

avoid war in the current system.

Most importantly, Allison highlights a ‘culture of cooperation’ that developed around

nuclear weapons through treaties and the Reagan-Gorbachev summits in the 1980s. This “not

only reduced the risk of a nuclear accident, but also built a baseline of trust.” (2017, 283) This

also underscores the importance of our first main argument of the acknowledgement of

possibility of war allowing both parties to prepare to avoid. If China and the U.S. create this

baseline of trust and engage in partnership diplomacy, war can be avoided.

(iii) Japan & the U.S. (1920s-1940s)

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 We use this case study to further underscore our third main reason of how war can be

avoided through the importance of economic interdependence in deterring war. Dale Copeland

who puts forth the framework we used in Section I to examine this concept, highlights the

importance of a state’s expectation of future trade. This case is particularly important as the U.S.

and China are currently engaged in a tense trade war. The situation and circumstances that lead

to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941were fueled by the future trade expectations of a declining

Japan. Thus, it is important to examine this case to understand the significance of economic

interdependence and trade expectations. Due to Japan’s limited natural resources, it was heavily

dependent on foreign powers for oil and raw materials. Following World War I, foreign powers

were equally interested in pursuing trade and this interdependence thrived through the 1920s.

However, Britain and America started implementing protectionist policies and introduced tariffs

and sanctions in 1930.

Japan saw its only option being expansion within Asia for access to resources, peacefully

or with force if necessary. Even though they were well aware that the United States and Britain

would not stand for this behavior, “Japanese leaders saw war, despite its high costs and risks, as

preferable to the certain destruction that would come if Japan met the new U.S. price for

reinstated trade. War had become the tragic lesser of two evils.” (Copeland, 2014, 334) With

declining access to basic goods, Japan’s economy was suffering, and they had no reason to

believe that America and Britain would change their minds on allowing the free flow of trade

again. This pessimistic expectation of future trade put Japan in a corner where it felt it had no

choice but to go to war.

This case points to factors that are dangerously analogous to the current U.S. – China

trade war. Growth in the U.S. goods trade deficit with China between 2001 and 2013 coincided

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with the loss of 3.2 million U.S. jobs, three-quarters of which were in manufacturing. (Economic

Policy Institute, December 2014) Trump has publicly called out China as being the main reason

for these job losses. Additionally, he has called them out for intellectual property theft, dumping,

and currency manipulation. China, on the other hand, depends on the U.S. for key technology

components and as the largest consumer market for its exports. Both sides have imposed severe

tariffs, and this has undoubtedly created concerns among economists about “the fabric of global

commerce. For decades, businesses have built global supply chains to drive down costs and

boost productivity. With greater barriers to trade, both the United States and China could suffer

as more goods in more industries are hit with tariffs.” (Rosen, 2018) Continuing this aggressive

and protectionist behavior has negative ramifications for the future of trade not only for the U.S.

and China, but also for the rest of the world in a highly interdependent global economy.

Conclusion & a Note of Flashpoints

The United States and China can avoid Thucydides’s Trap because (1) they are acutely

aware of the possibility of war and can thus prepare to avoid it. This awareness gives them strong

incentive to create a culture of cooperation when approaching tense situations. (2) Their differing

value and political systems, while at odds, are not irreconcilable. China has flourished in the

current West-led international order. Both sides can compromise to avoid escalation as the

alternative points to a strong probability of war. (3) Lastly, strong economic interdependence is a

significant deterrence for both if they want to enjoy a positive future for trade. The longer they

engage in a trade war, the more precarious the structural stress on the system will get.

None of these factors, when independently considered mean that the United States and

China can avoid war. They build on each other starting with the most important factor of

12
awareness leading to preparation to avoid war. This sets the intention and culture for the

relationship the two countries share. While these factors address the question of ‘can’ the U.S.

and China avoid war, ‘will’ they be able to? This depends heavily on their ability to avoid falling

prey to ‘flashpoints’.

Allison warns us that the dangers of these flashpoints are exacerbated due to the

structural stress created in a system of shifting power dynamics. There are certainly enough

tensions already that could escalate very quickly such as the trade war, industrial espionage,

views on Taiwan, the South China Sea, Tibet and the list goes on. In order to be well equipped to

address these tensions as they arise and prevent escalation, I close with Coker’s advice in The

Improbable War: “It is of vital importance that the possibility of conflict between the United

States and China continues to be discussed,” as this allows us to prepare for avoiding it and

incentivizes a culture of cooperation.

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Book Allison, G, 2017, Destined for War
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Storm
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Book Copeland, D, 2014, Economic Interdependence and War
Web Resource The Economist
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