VOL.

202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the
mandate which they have received from their constituents.
779
Same; Same; Term of office distinguished from tenure.—In theorizing that
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr. the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member
G.R. No. 96859. October 15, 1991.* of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As
succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General: "The term of office
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
Speaker, House of Representatives, and (HON QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds
JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO, Secretary, House of representatives, the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the
respondents. power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not
exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of
Administrative Law; Election Law; Petitioner's assumption that the
office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12)."
questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water.—
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned Same; Same; Same; Fact that the ground cited in Section 67, Article lX of BP
Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening
_______________
the tenure of office of members of Congress does not preclude its
application to present members of Congress.—That the ground cited in
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution
* EN BANC. itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress,
does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2
780
of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
780 conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr. not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that
the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the
statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.
discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out Same; Same; Forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the
their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office.—In
public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that
781
should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Dissenting Opinion

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991

781 Constitutional Law; Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to

the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers.—It is a
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr. fundamental principle in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by
Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of
above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure
automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of for disciplining constitutional officers other than those provided in the
candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are Constitution. This is as true for the President and the members of this Court
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and as it is for members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. removal found in the Constitution are not mere disciplinary measures. They
are intended
Same; Same; Same; As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for
another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the 782
elective position being presently held, it is not necessary as petitioner
opines, that the other position be actually held.—As the mere act of filing
the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the 782
permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not
necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is Dimaporo us. Mitra, Jr.
different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881,
which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and independent
par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution. discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court should insure
that what the Constitution provides must be followed.
Constitutional Law; Statute; To justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution not a doubtful and PETITION to review the decision of the Speaker and Secretary of the House
argumentative implication.—The basic principle which underlies the entire of Representatives.
field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be
created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, petitioner.
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does DAVIDE, JR., J.:
not suffice.
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991
Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional
783
elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter
performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.
thereto.
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the certificate of candidacy. The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for Phrases as by the very act itself—by the mere act. And therefore, by the
17 February 1990. very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives;
and, therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives
excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of carried in the future Rolls of the House. x x x"
Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated
Code.1 As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:2 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention
"to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of
"The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission
on Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of Congress."3 The record does not indicate what action was taken on this
communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain
the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the
regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief was
subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not include the name of
the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the
Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: 'Any elective official Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of
whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff
is holding in a was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other
_______________ persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his
duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and
qualified congressman from his district.

1 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did
2 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 24. not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of
783
B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress. Tribunal in an election contest; and,

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office."
members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which
the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions
Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators,
Members in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a
ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the intention of
_______________ the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
as among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be
shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the
3 Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 30. present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional
Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and
784 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in

784
excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted
without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr. "administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his
term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the
of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article
courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that
VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for
a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at 785
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other
hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991
"a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
785
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.
corporations or subsidiaries;
he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior; holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or ______________
employment.

In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the
4 Rollo, 8 and 14.
House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of
the following issues raised in this petition:4 786
A.

786
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION?
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.
B.
laws. They further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a
mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial
powers.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY,
'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF "Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other
HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?" than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
On the other hand, respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy."
contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the
present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No.
said Section 67 falls within the term Voluntary renunciation" of office 666,5 which reads:
enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the
"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other
ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not
than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered
affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There
resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members
candidacy."
of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime
which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office. Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this
wise:6
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an
act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is "Sec. 27. Candidate holding office.—Any elective provincial, municipal or city
presumed to be aware of existing official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding,
shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his The 1978 Election Code8 provided a different rule, thus:
certificate of candidacy."
"Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices.—Governors, mayors, members
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials of various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate
as follows:7 of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office."

"Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office.—Any elective provincial, sub- It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature
provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to be
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their
considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and Vice-
of his certificate of candidacy. President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:9
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office
commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation "MR. PALMARES:
takes place after such day. His failure to take his

_______________
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the
provision seems to be different—I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.

5 22 June 1941. Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a
6 Emphasis supplied. permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
7 Emphasis supplied. from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

787 May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing
or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just
adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be
the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991
MR. PEREZ (L.):
787

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I
oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right to
the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause _______________
or causes beyond his control."
8 P.D. No. 1296. for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned
not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but
9 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 8 October 1985. Underscoring primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on
supplied. accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution.
788 It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1—'Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.'

788 Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of

public officers? This only means that all elective public officials should honor
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus, under our
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr. Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the Batasan shall serve for the term
of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay
don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people must be given the officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of the
right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he
wants to run for another office. However, because of the practice in the past _______________
where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume
the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials
were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already 10 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985. Underscoring
obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run supplied.
for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate,
they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to 789
remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's
latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course, x x x"
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman
Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:10 789

"MR. GARCIA (M.M.): Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself
out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to
constitutional grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who
rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he
was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to
service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him. and
therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than 790
anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of elective SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
public officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of
his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself which I said under the Dimaporo us. Mitra, Jr.
1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.
bility of Public Officers" is more emphatic11 in stating:
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run.
"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy,
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
that means that he does not want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
an office other than the one he was elected to? The mere fact therefore of
justice, and lead modest lives."
filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or
relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory
if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern
service. that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from
term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office
Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision
and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail
not only of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local officials should
in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is
serve the entire 6-year term for which we were elected, but because of this
consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve
new chapter on the accountability of public officers not only to the
the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they
community which voted him to office, but primarily because under this
have received from their constituents.
commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers
must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of
that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with
candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than the one to "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:12
which they were elected, should be considered ipso facto resigned from
their office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy." 'The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an
It cannot be gainsaid that the-same constitutional basis for Section 67, officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the
Section 1 of Article XI on "Accounta- term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration
of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12)."
790
_______________
 Lansing,14 the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which
shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither
11 Compared to the provision in the 1973 Constitution which reads: does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds.15 Events so
"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant16 not as a
efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people." penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it
not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his
12 Memorandum for Respondents, 9. tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in the
Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such
791
absurdity.

The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a
constitutional measure is presumed
791
_______________
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby

files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have 13 Italics supplied.
voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his
14 46 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104.
successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
15 McKittrick vs. Wilson, 350 M 486, 166 SW2d 499, 143 ALR 465.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of 16 People ex rel. Fleming vs. Shorb, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.
office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, 792
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the 792
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.13 Such Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found
in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may to be created.17 This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of
be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee
doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does please enlighten us exactly what Voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin
not suffice.18 to abandonment?

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the MR. DAVIDE:
same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only those things
expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of
what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the
"legislature.19 The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a restriction by merely resigning at any given time
constitutional command.20 This maxim expresses a rule of construction and
serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not _______________
otherwise manifest.21

Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7,

17 16 Am Jur. 2d, p. 63.
Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation
envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the 18 People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90; Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30;
Constitutional Commissioners:22 Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6.
"MR. MAAMBONG: 19 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 SE 421.

20 State vs. Driscoll, 54 P. 2d 571, 576, 101 Mont. 348.

Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 21 Garrison vs. City of Shreveport, 154 So. 622, 624, 179 La. 605.
Voluntary renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in
Section 6. 22 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 591, 19

MR. DAVIDE: 793

Yes. VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991

MR. MAAMBONG: 793

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

OR the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit
general than abandonment and resignation? an office which he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office
must be clear, must be definite
MR. DAVIDE:
MR. ROÑO:

It is more general, more embracing."

Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a disagree with the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am
certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act saying that the filing of the certificate of candidacy is an overt act of such
of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is intention. It's not just an intention: it's already there"
evident from this exchange between the Members of Parliament Arturo
Tolentino and Jose Roño:23 In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals,24 a case involving Section 27 July to 6
August 1986.
"MR. ROÑO:
_______________

My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person . . . my, shall we
say, basis is that in one case the person is intending to run for an office 23 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985, Underscoring
which is different from his own, and therefore it should be considered, at supplied.
least from the legal significance, an intention to relinquish his office.
24 L-23258, 1 July 1967, 20 SCRA 620, 625.
MR. TOLENTINO:
794

Yes.
794
MR. ROÑO:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is
of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that
otherwise.
"forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
MR. TOLENTINO: certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing
are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and 26 Section 8, Rule III, Rules of the House of Representatives.
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.
Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro 795
vs. Gatuslao:25

"x x x The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991
the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not
make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and 795
unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.
filing of the certificate of candidacy. x x x' "
his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao,
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office
respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal
produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position
effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to
being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other
do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of
position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI
an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having judicially been declared unconstitutional.27 Officers of the government from
been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the it.28
House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public
Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of
trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the
Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions
holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may
attached to his office.26 As administrative officers, both the Speaker and
impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to
dictate on his office.29
remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor
of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed
SO ORDERED.
_______________
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
25 98 Phil. 94,196. Fernan, (C.J.), No part—related to one of the parties.
 Melencio-Herrera, J., On Leave. certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition
where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental
Gutierrez, Jr., J., Please see dissent concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations
Padilla, J., I join Mr. Justice Gutierrez in his dissent. which are cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or
arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
Bidin, J., I join in the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
It is a fundamental principle in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Dissenting Opinion by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal
of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different
procedure for disciplining constitutional officers other than those provided
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the in the Constitution. This is as true for the President and the members of this
Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Court as it is for members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for
removal found in the Constitution are not mere disciplinary measures. They
_______________ are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and
independent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court
should insure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.
27 Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818.
The Constitution provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be
28 Burton vs. U.S., 202 U.S. 344. shortened:

29 42 Am Jur 926. "A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
796 government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI,
Section 13);

B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec.

796
16[3]);
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr. election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);

Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an invalid D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI. Sec. 7, par. 2)." (See Petition, p.
statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly 8)
elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.
797
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain
his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically palatable, and salutary to
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being
considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-
797 constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr. prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials, It
has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the present 798
Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:

"Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other 798
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." (Petition, p. 8)
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during
mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The
non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently comatose on Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude
their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for
a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify in
the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a
recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It
other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by
the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign has to be in the constitution.
country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of
crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against one's public office? In other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary
running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the
while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Constitution?
Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the
proper case and controversy. My point is—Congress cannot by statute or From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P.
disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy
members. Only the Constitution can do it. by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his
seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by the
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881—namely, Section 2 of Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications
Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary"
1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code—does not help the refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional
respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner. requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be
deduced from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of
our constitutional history, running for a local government position was not And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due
considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in process of law, both substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary,
the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before capricious, and ultra vires, 'administrative act' of the respondents." (Reply to
some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the Comment, p. 5)
respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the
in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we
should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds for
dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional
'Voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted
by the respondents. Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted to
serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on
be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the
representation. elections for regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail
to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could
As aptly stated by the petitioner: be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
"We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is For the foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives,
but more important, we are dealing with the political Petition dismissed.

799 ——o0o——

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 © Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Dimaporo vs.
Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA 779, G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
799

GSIS vs. Civil Service Commission

right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to
representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere
'administrative act' of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of

representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.