The petition for quo warrranto seeks the ouster of Professor Maria Lourdes Sereno for being disqualified

from appointment to the Supreme Court. In response to the anticipated issue of whether or not
impeachment is the only means to remove a member of the Supreme Court, the petition states:

The petition for quo warranto against Respondent should be differentiated from the impeachment
proceedings against her at the House of Representatives. The writ of quo warranto is being sought to
question the validity of her appointment; in turn, the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. Stated differently, the
petitioner is seeking her ouster from her office because she did not prove her integrity as an applicant for
the position. The complainant in the impeachment proceedings wants her removed as the sitting Chief
Justice for impeachable offenses. (Page 11, par. 31).

The petition seeks to distinguish between acts performed before the appointment (quo warranto)
and acts performed after appointment (impeachment). There is no such distinction, however, in
the text of the Constitution, which reads:

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Note that there is no time frame for the prohibited acts as basis for impeachment. So one may be
impeached for said acts (treason, bribery and betrayal of public trust) even if the acts were
committed prior to appointment.

If impeachment were to be limited to acts committed “while in office”, the Constitution would have so
stated, like Section 248 of the Administrative Code of the 50s, which used the phrase “misconduct in
office” (Arsenio Lacson v. Mariano Roque, Executive Secretary G.R. No. L-6225 - January 10, 1953).
That phrase was also used in Section 60 of Batas Pambansa 337 (Francisco Lecaroz v. Hon. Jaime
Ferrer G.R. No. 77918 -July 27, 1987).

Is there precedent for this interpretation? Yes. The case of Federal Judge Thomas Porteus, Jr. who was
impeached for making false statements about his past to obtain the office of United States District
Court Judge. Article IV of the Articles of Impeachment states:

In 1994, in connection with his nomination to be a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., knowingly made material false statements about his past
to both the United States Senate and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to obtain the office of
United States District Court Judge.

Judge Porteus was impeached by a unanimous vote of 423 by the House, and removed by a vote of 90-6
by the Senate of the United States of America.

The petition also implies a distinction because this petition was filed “to question the validity of her
appointment”, while impeachment is for the purpose of removing an impeachable officer for acts
committed “while in office”. But what is the purpose of quo warranto proceedings?“The authorities are
agreed that quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise andto oustthe holder from
its enjoyment….(Flaviano Lota v. CA G.R. No. L-14803 -June 30, 1961.

The term oust means “to put out; to eject; to remove or deprive.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2 nd Ed.)So the
purpose of this petition is thesame;to remove an occupant from office. But this occupant, as the
Constitution states, is removable by impeachment.
It may be argued, as was written by Fr. Ranhilo Aquino, that the Constitution did not state that
impeachment is the only means to remove impeachable officers. The reverend scholar fails to remember
that the specific prevails over the general. The provisions on impeachment specify the power of Congress
to remove specific officers. The provisions on quo warranto, however, confer a general power over all
officials. The Constitutional provision, therefore, must prevail, not only because it is specific, but because
the Rules of Court, are subordinate to the highest law of the land.

The Supreme Court,has in fact, declared that impeachment is the only means to remove impeachable
officers, when it held:

The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court [Sandiganbayan] with jurisdiction
over "public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations."
There are exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by
impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption."

Thus, the above provision proscribes [prohibits] removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional
officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by
impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear mandate of
the fundamental law. (A.M. No. 88-4-5433 - pril 15, 1988).

The above case was interpreting the 1973 Constitution, which did not employ the term “only”, in stating
that: “The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall be removed from office….”

The petition points to the Rules of Court on the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, for the basis for the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court over one of its own members, when it states:

Although the afore cited rules pertain tothe President and Vice President, said rules maybe applied by
analogy. The Court recognizes the availability of quo warranto against an impeachable officer. Hence,
Respondent cannot claim that as Chief Justice, she can only be removed by impeachment under Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution. (Page 11, par. 34).

That argument is below the dignity, of even a law student. It is elementary that jurisdiction is conferred by
law (Maricris Dolot v. Hon. Ramon Paje G.R. No. 199199 - August 27, 2013). There is no country where
jurisdiction is conferred “by analogy”. In the case of the presidential elections, the Constitution created the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, and conferred on it, power over “all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President,” The Constitution also granted the
Supreme Court, as Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the power to “promulgate its rules for the purpose”.
(Article VII, Section 4).

The power to promulgate rules are only “for the purpose” of deciding “all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President,” The Constitution does not confer on the
Supreme Court the power to remove one of its own members. The purpose stated by the Constitution, is
fatal to the argument of power by analogy.

The Rules cited by the Petition also declares what the PET’s implied powers are, as follows:
Rule 7. Express and implied powers. - The Tribunal shall exercise all powers expressly vested in it by the
Constitution or by law, and such other powers as may be inherent, necessary or incidental thereto for the
accomplishment of its purposes and functions. (R6)

Note that in the title of Rule 7, the Supreme Court declares that it has Express and implied powers. Then
in the text of Rule 7, it states it is has “such other powers as may be inherent, necessary or incidental
thereto for the accomplishment of its purposes and functions”, mirroring the purposes stated in the
Constitution. So the implied powers stated in the title of Rule 7 are the inherent powers for the purpose of
deciding ““all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President,” That does not include the function of determining the validity of the appointment one of its
members.

It is also axiomatic that what is expressed prevails over what is implied. The express declaration by the
Constitution, and the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, negate any inference of “power by
analogy”.

More damning to the argument of “powers by analogy” is the enumeration of the inherent (implied)
powers under Rule 8:

Rule 8. Inherent powers. - The Tribunal shall have the following inherent powers:

(a) Preserve and enforce in proceedings before it or before any of its Divisions or officials acting under its
authority;

(b) Administer or cause to be administered oaths in any contest before it, and in any order matter where it
may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;

(c) Compel the attendance of witnesses and production of evidence in any contest before it.

(d) Compel obedience to its decisions, resolutions, orders and processes;

(e) Control its processes and amend its decisions, resolutions or orders to make them conformable to law
and justice;

(f) Authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and used instead of the
original copy thereof, and to restore and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings; and

(g) Promulgate its own rules of procedure and amend or revise the same (R7)

There is nothing there regarding the determination of the validity of the appointment of one of its own
members. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.. What is enumerated excludes that which is not
enumerated.

Finally, the issue of appointments is a political question, left to the political branches of government. By
political question here, we do not mean political in the street sense of “namumulitika”, signifying
partisanship. By political question is meant the wisdom of making a choice – choosing between one
candidate over the other (President and Congress – Commission on Appointments); choosing between
going to war or not (Congress); or choosing between withdrawing from a treaty or not (President only).

The appointment of members of the Supreme Court is a political question, and that choice is left to the
discretion of a political branch (Office of the President). Were the Supreme Court to invalidate the
appointment, it would be supplanting its judgment for that of the President; a power it has no authority to
wield. A political decision must be exercised by a political branch. It is for that reason that the framers of
the Constitution conferred the power to determine whether the President made a wise choice or not, on
another political branch (Congress).

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.(Luego v. Civil Service
Commission; G.R. NO. L-69137 - August 5, 1986)

Another reason for the lack of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court over this petition, is the fact that the
Supreme Court has no power to try (determine) facts. It may rule on findings of fact of trial courts,
amending, modifying orreversing them, in an appeal. But it has no power to make findings of fact in the
first instance. The question of whether an appointee is qualified or not, is a factual question. In other quo
warranto cases, the proceedings are commenced at tribunals with fact-finding power; either trial courts, or
the COMELEC. In the case of impeachable officers, the Constitution confers the fact-finding power on the
Senate.

The Supreme Court may only review the proceedings, when legal questions are concerned, such as the
question of the legality of the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Senate (Enrile as President Officer) in
the impeachment case of Renato Corona. The Supreme Court issued a TRO on the order of Senator
Enrile.

The petition strains to confer on itself, a Constitutional issue by citing Funa v. VillarBut Funaruled on the
Constitutional issue of what constitutes a “reappointment”. It was not an issue of qualifications of the
appointee. The Supreme Court held:

A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
…….

The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission
on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL ……

The petition next cites the case of Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. That case ruled on the Constitutional
issue of whether or not the promotion to Chairman of a sitting COA commissioner, is a “reappointment”,
which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Neither of the above cases questioned the qualifications of the appointee. Here, there is no Constitutional
issue being presented. The substantive basis of the petition questions the qualifications of the appointee.

Professor Sereno taught full-time, and it is difficult to find a retired RTC judge who remembers her
appearance in court. As a professor, she did not display the intellectual heft of Justice Serafin Cuevas,
Justice Vicente Mendoza,or Professor Haydee Yorac. I believe, therefore,that there were candidates
better qualified than her. But thatbelief must yield to myfealty tothe Constitution; even if the incidental
beneficiary is a minimally qualified appointee.

The Republic has survived Ferdinand Marcos, Gloria Arroyo, and Benigno Aquino III; all Presidents, with
almost limitless power. I am certain that it can survive the term of an unqualified Chief Justice, especially
because the Court, en banc, can effectively check her actions. But the Republic cannot survive the
erosion of Constitutional boundaries. This shortcut will yield greater mischief than the good that irregular
removal seeks to achieve. One can only point to the mischief wrought by the removal of Joseph Estrada,
for the then, seeming good of ascension by Gloria Arroyo. That disaster was also occasioned by a Court
with good intentions, but with no fealty to the Constitution.

For the above reasons, it is respectfully prayed that the petition for quo warranto be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.

But in a statement issued on Saturday, Albay Rep. Edcel Lagman said that “[a]ny quo warranto petition
questioning the authority or basis for Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno to hold the position of chief
magistrate is doomed to fail.”

“Section 11 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed
within one (1) year after the cause of action arose, which in this case was when the appointment of
Sereno was made and/or the time she assumed office as Supreme Court Chief Justice,” Lagman said.

In the same statement, he said that Sereno’s “appointment is valid and legal.”

Sereno was appointed as chief justice on August 24, 2012 and she assumed office the next day.

“The prescription of the period reads: ‘Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose,’” Lagman said.

“The quo warranto ruse is an admission that an impeachment trial will not prosper in the Senate,” he
added.

Psych exam

Sereno’s appointment cannot also be declared invalid based on the results of her psychiatric examination
when she applied for the top judicial post, Senate Minority Leader Franklin Drilon said on Saturday.

Drilon said there were only three requirements for a person to be qualified for the Supreme Court post,
and a high psychiatric exam score is not one of them.

To qualify as a magistrate, a person only needs to be a natural born Filipino, at least 45 years old and a
law practitioner.

“In my view, the additional ground that they have been saying is not a violation of public trust, Drilon
added.

The Senate minority leader was reacting to the earlier statement of House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez
who said Sereno’s appointment to the High Tribunal could be deemed “invalid” because of her psychiatric
evaluation.

Alvarez based his statement on the evaluation of a clinical psychologist who believed Sereno was
unsuitable for the chief justice post.

The psychologist, Geraldine Tria, gave the testimony on Tuesday after a four-hour-long closed-door
session conducted by the House justice panel that is hearing the impeachment complaint filed by against
Sereno.
Sereno, based on the article published by The Manila Times, got a score of 4 out of 5, with 5 being the
lowest, in her psychiatric examination when she applied for chief justice..

Even the quo warranto case being pushed by the Vanguard of the Philippine Constitution would not
prosper, according Drilon.

He said it would be better for Sereno to face impeachment proceedings as provided by law.

“There is already a complaint and it is being heard in the House of Representatives and if they believe
that there is enough basis, then they could transmit it to the Senate,” Drilon pointed out.