WESCO FINANCIAL CORPORATION

LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS

To Our Shareholders:
Consolidated net “operating” income (i.e., before realized investment gains shown in
the table below) for the calendar year 2009 decreased to $54,073,000 ($7.59 per share) from
$77,562,000 ($10.89 per share) in the previous year.
Consolidated net income decreased to $54,073,000 ($7.59 per share) from $82,116,000
($11.53 per share) in 2008. The 2008 figure included realized after-tax investment gains of
$4,554,000 ($.64 per share). No investment gains or losses were realized in 2009.
Wesco has four major subsidiaries: (1) Wesco-Financial Insurance Company (“Wes-
FIC”), headquartered in Omaha and engaged principally in the reinsurance business, (2) The
Kansas Bankers Surety Company (“Kansas Bankers”), owned by Wes-FIC and specializing in
insurance products tailored to Midwestern community banks, (3) CORT Business Services
Corporation (“CORT”), headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia and engaged principally in the
furniture rental business, and (4) Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. (“Precision Steel”), head-
quartered in Chicago and engaged in the steel warehousing and specialty metal products
businesses.
Consolidated net income for the two years just ended breaks down as follows (in
thousands except for per-share amounts)(1):
Year Ended
December 31, 2009 December 31, 2008
Per Per
Wesco Wesco
(2)
Amount Share Amount Share(2)
Wesco-Financial and Kansas Bankers insurance
businesses —
Underwriting gain (loss) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. .. . $ 7,222 $1.01 $ (2,942) $ (.42)
Investment income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. .. . 55,781 7.83 64,274 9.03
CORT furniture rental business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. .. . (1,359) (.19) 15,744 2.21
Precision Steel businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. .. . (648) (.09) 842 .12
All other “normal” net operating earnings (loss)(3) .. .. . .. .. . (6,923) (.97) (356) (.05)
54,073 7.59 77,562 10.89
Realized investment gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 4,554 .64
Wesco consolidated net income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $54,073 $7.59 $82,116 $11.53

(1) All figures are net of income taxes.

(2) Per-share data are based on 7,119,807 shares outstanding. Wesco has no dilutive capital stock equivalents.
(3) Includes income from ownership of the Wesco headquarters office building, primarily leased to outside tenants, and interest and
dividend income from cash equivalents and marketable securities owned outside the insurance subsidiaries, less interest and other
corporate expenses, and, in 2009, a $6.2 million (after taxes) writedown of real estate held for sale.

This supplementary breakdown of earnings differs somewhat from that used in audited
financial statements which follow standard accounting convention. The foregoing supple-
mentary breakdown is furnished because it is considered useful to shareholders. The total
consolidated net income shown above is, of course, identical to the total in our audited
financial statements.
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Insurance Businesses
Consolidated operating earnings from insurance businesses represent the combination
of the results of their insurance underwriting (premiums earned, less insurance losses, loss
adjustment expenses and underwriting expenses) with their investment income. Following is
a summary of these figures as they pertain to all insurance operations (in 000s).
Year Ended December 31,
2009 2008

Premiums written . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $339,191 $316,472

Premiums earned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $323,221 $237,964
Underwriting gain (loss) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 11,111 $ (4,527)
Dividend and interest income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67,049 84,920
Income before income taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78,160 80,393
Income taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,157 19,061
Total operating income — insurance businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 63,003 $ 61,332

Following is a breakdown of premiums written (in 000s):

Wes-FIC reinsurance —
Swiss Re contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $294,142 $265,248
Aviation pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,085 33,374
Kansas Bankers primary insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,964 17,850
Premiums written . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $339,191 $316,472

Following is a breakdown of premiums earned (in 000s):

Wes-FIC reinsurance —
Swiss Re contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $276,681 $183,166
Aviation pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,463 34,418
Kansas Bankers primary insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,077 20,380
Premiums earned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $323,221 $237,964

Following is a breakdown of after-tax results (in 000s):

Underwriting gain (loss) —
Wes-FIC reinsurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 10,379 $ (1,405)
Kansas Bankers primary insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3,157) (1,537)
Underwriting gain (loss) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,222 (2,942)
Net investment income. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,781 64,274
Total operating income — insurance businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 63,003 $ 61,332

As shown above, operating income includes significant net investment income, repre-
senting dividends and interest earned from marketable securities. However, operating
income excludes after-tax investment gains of $4.6 million realized in 2008. The discussion
below will concentrate on insurance underwriting, not on the results from investments.
Wes-FIC engages in the reinsurance business. At the beginning of 2008, it entered into a
retrocession agreement with National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), an insurance subsid-
iary of Berkshire Hathaway, Wesco’s 80%-owning parent. Under the contract, Wes-FIC has
assumed 10% of NICO’s 20% quota-share reinsurance of Swiss Reinsurance Company and its
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principal property-casualty affiliates (“Swiss Re”). Under this agreement, which was enthu-
siastically approved by Wesco’s Board of Directors, Wes-FIC assumed 2% of essentially all
Swiss Re property-casualty risks incepting over the five-year period which began on January 1,
2008, on the same terms as NICO’s agreement with Swiss Re. Wes-FIC’s share of written and
earned premiums under the contract were $294.1 million and $276.7 million for 2009 and
$265.2 million and $183.2 million for 2008, representing very significant increases in Wes-
FIC’s reinsurance activities. It is important to keep in mind that premiums assumed under the
contract in each of the next three years could vary significantly depending on market
conditions and opportunities.
For several years, through yearend 2007, Wes-FIC’s principal reinsurance activity con-
sisted only of its participation in several pools managed by a subsidiary of General Rein-
surance Corporation (“Gen Re”), another insurance subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway. The
arrangement became effective in 2001 and has covered domestic hull, liability and workers’
compensation exposures relating to the aviation industry. For the past three years, Wes-FIC
has reinsured 16.67% of the hull and liability pools and 5% of the workers’ compensation
pool. Since mid-2009 Wes-FIC has also been reinsuring 25% of an international hull and
liability pool. Another subsidiary of Gen Re provides a portion of the upper-level reinsurance
protection to these aviation risk pools on terms that could result in the Berkshire subsidiary
having a different interest from that of Wes-FIC under certain conditions, e.g., in settling a
large loss. Premium volume under these pools has approximated $35 million annually.
It is the nature of even the finest property-casualty insurance businesses that in keeping
their accounts they must estimate and deduct all future costs and losses from premiums
already earned. Uncertainties inherent in this undertaking make financial statements more
mere “best honest guesses” than is typically the case with accounts of non-insurance-writing
corporations. And the reinsurance portion of the property-casualty insurance business,
because it contains one or more extra links in the loss-reporting chain, usually creates more
accounting uncertainty than the non-reinsurance portion. Wesco shareholders should
remain aware of the inherent imperfections of Wes-FIC’s financial reporting, based as it is
on forecasts of outcomes over many future years.
Wes-FIC’s underwriting results have typically fluctuated from year to year, but have been
satisfactory. When stated as a percentage, the sum of insurance losses, loss adjustment
expenses and underwriting expenses, divided by premiums, gives the combined ratio. Wes-
FIC’s combined ratios from reinsurance activities were 94.9% for 2009, 101.0% for 2008 and
93.9% for 2007, much better than average for insurers. We try to create some underwriting
gain as results are averaged out over many years. We expect this to become increasingly
difficult.
Float is the term for money we hold temporarily. Its major components are unpaid losses
and unearned premiums, less premiums and reinsurance receivable, and deferred policy
acquisition costs. As long as our insurance underwriting results are break-even or better, float
costs us nothing. The new Swiss Re venture with NICO has significantly increased Wes-FIC’s
float, from $76 million at the end of 2007, to $264 million at yearend 2009, thus providing
additional opportunities for investment. We hope to see our float continue to increase, but we
make no predictions.
Kansas Bankers was purchased by Wes-FIC in 1996 for approximately $80 million in
cash. Its tangible net worth now exceeds its acquisition price, and it has been a very
satisfactory acquisition, reflecting the sound management of President Don Towle and his
team.
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 Kansas Bankers was chartered in 1909 to underwrite deposit insurance for Kansas banks.
Its offices are in Topeka, Kansas. Over the years its service has continued to adapt to the
changing needs of the banking industry. Today its customer base, consisting mostly of small-
and medium-sized community banks, is spread throughout 29 mainly Midwestern states.
Kansas Bankers offers policies for crime insurance, check kiting fraud indemnification,
Internet banking catastrophe theft insurance, Internet banking privacy liability insurance,
directors and officers liability, bank employment practices, and bank insurance agents
professional errors and omissions indemnity.
Last year we reported that events in the banking industry, including a number of bank
failures, caused us to become less confident in the long-term profitability of Kansas Bankers’
long-established line of deposit guarantee bonds. These bonds insure specific customer bank
deposits above Federal insurance limits. After sustaining a loss of $4.7 million, after taxes,
from a bank failure in the latter half of 2008, Kansas Bankers discontinued writing deposit
guarantee bonds, and in September 2008 it began to exit this line of insurance as rapidly as
feasible. The aggregate face amount of outstanding deposit guarantee bonds has been
reduced, from $9.7 billion, insuring 1,671 institutions at September 30, 2008, to $33 million,
insuring 10 institutions, currently. We believe that none of the banks whose deposits are
currently insured are facing significant risk of failure.
This decrease in exposure to loss, of course, has caused a sharp decline in Kansas
Bankers’ insurance volume, inasmuch as premiums from guarantee bonds not only approx-
imated half of Kansas Bankers’ written premiums for 2008, but also represented the entirety of
the business it had conducted in almost half of the states in which it was licensed to write
insurance in 2008. The insurance business is highly competitive, with lengthy periods during
which competitors offer coverages at prices we do not consider adequate. Kansas Bankers is
now licensed to sell insurance in 29 states, down from 39 states one year earlier, with plans
soon to withdraw from 4 more. We expect that Kansas Bankers will ultimately expand its
premium volume, at prices deemed satisfactory.
When Wesco purchased Kansas Bankers, it had been ceding almost half of its premium
volume to reinsurers. In 2009 it reinsured only about 1%. And, because it has also restruc-
tured the layers of losses reinsured, it is now better protected from the downside risk of large
losses. Effective in 2006, insurance subsidiaries of Berkshire Hathaway became KBS’s sole
reinsurers. Previously, an unaffiliated reinsurer was also involved. The increased volume of
business retained comes, of course, with increased irregularity in the income stream. Kansas
Bankers’ combined ratios were 140.2% for 2009, 111.6% for 2008 and 55.1% for 2007.
Kansas Bankers’ business activities require a base of operations supported by significant fixed
operating costs which do not lend themselves to downsizing in proportion to the recent
decline in premium volume. We continue to expect volatile but favorable long-term results
from the now much smaller business remaining in Kansas Bankers.

CORT Business Services Corporation (“CORT”)

In February 2000, Wesco purchased CORT Business Services Corporation (“CORT”) for
$386 million in cash.
CORT is a very long-established company that is the country’s leader in rentals of high-
quality furniture that lessees have no intention of buying. In the trade, people call CORT’s
activity “rent-to-rent” to distinguish it from “lease-to-purchase” businesses that are, in
essence, installment sellers of furniture.
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 However, just as Enterprise, as a rent-to-rent auto lessor in short-term arrangements,
must be skilled in selling used cars, CORT must be and is skilled in selling used furniture.
CORT’s revenues totaled $380 million for calendar 2009, versus $410 million for
calendar 2008. Of these amounts, furniture rental revenues were $312 million and $340 mil-
lion, furniture sales revenues were $61 million and $62 million, and rental relocation
revenues were $7 million and $8 million. CORT operated at an after-tax loss of $1.4 million
for 2009 versus after-tax profits of $15.7 million for 2008 and $20.3 million for 2007.
Headwinds from the “Great Recession” that began in 2008 have caused the shift from
moderate profit to the small loss that occurred last year.
CORT has made several “tuck-in” acquisitions since its purchase by Wesco; most
recently, the residential furniture rental division of Aaron Rents, Inc., purchased late in
2008. Earlier in 2008, CORT expanded its operations internationally, through the purchase of
Roomservice Group, a small regional provider of rental furniture and relocation services in
the United Kingdom, now doing business as CORT Business Services UK Ltd. Factoring out
the effects of those acquisitions, CORT’s core revenues fell by almost 20% in 2009, reflecting
the hammering caused by the severe economic recession. So far, CORT’s business has been
melting away faster than CORT can fix it.
Shortly after its acquisition by Wesco, CORT started up a nation-wide apartment locator
service, originally intended mainly to supplement CORT’s furniture rental business by
providing apartment locator and ancillary services to relocating individuals. Paul Arnold,
long CORT’s able CEO, and his management team, have devoted much effort in recent years,
expanding CORT’s rental relocation services, and redirecting them toward the needs of
businesses and government agencies who require a skilled and able partner to provide
comprehensive and seamless relocation services for the temporary relocation of employees
worldwide. These efforts had not yet gained traction when recession hit. CORT is now
focusing its efforts more on cost containment than on expansion of services.
Under Wesco’s ownership, CORT has continuously undertaken to improve its compet-
itive position. With several websites, principally, www.cort.com and www.apartment-
search.com, professionals in more than 80 domestic metropolitan markets, affiliates
servicing more than 50 countries, almost twenty-one thousand apartment communities
referring their tenants to CORT, many ancillary services, and its entrée to the business
community as a Berkshire Hathaway company, CORT is better positioned than previously to
benefit from an economic turnaround if it occurs in due course. Near term, we expect more of
the difficult business conditions of the recent past, but we do not expect another operating
loss at CORT in 2010. Instead, we expect disappointing profits.
More details with respect to CORTare contained throughout this annual report, to which
your careful attention is directed.

Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. (“Precision Steel”)

The businesses of Wesco’s Precision Steel subsidiary, headquartered in the outskirts of
Chicago at Franklin Park, Illinois, were pounded by the “Great Recession,” exacerbating a
long-term reduction in demand resulting from movement of manufacturing outside the
United States. Revenues were $38.4 million for 2009 versus $60.9 million for 2008. Sales
volume for 2009, in terms of pounds sold, declined by one-third and represented less than
half the annual volume that Precision Steel had sold thirty years earlier, when it was acquired
by Wesco.
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 Precision Steel operated at an after-tax loss of $0.6 million in 2009 versus an after-tax
profit of $0.8 million in 2008. These figures reflect after-tax LIFO inventory accounting
adjustments increasing after-tax income by $1.5 million for 2009 and decreasing after-tax
income by $0.7 million for 2008. Had it not been for the LIFO accounting adjustments,
Precision Steel would have reported an after-tax operating loss of $2.1 million for 2009 versus
after-tax operating income of $1.5 million for 2008. Moreover, the $2.1 million pre-LIFO-effect
loss last year would have been about $0.5 million greater without after-tax profits from a couple
of Precision Steel’s small businesses that are different from conventional steel warehousing.
We do not consider Precision Steel’s recent operating results to be a satisfactory
investment outcome, particularly when one compares its recent performance with its
after-tax operating earnings which averaged $2.3 million for the years 1998 through
2000. And, because of the ongoing recession, more difficulty for Precision Steel will surely
lie ahead.
Apart from the recessionary-caused weakness, the general and ongoing decline in
Precision Steel’s physical volume is a serious reverse, not likely to disappear in some “bounce
back” effect once the economy recovers.
Terry Piper, who became Precision Steel’s President and Chief Executive Officer in 1999,
has done an outstanding job in leading Precision Steel through very difficult years. But he has
no magic wand with which to compensate for competitive losses among his best customers or
from the weak economic conditions. He is redoubling his efforts to pare costs, which must be
his response to conditions faced.

Tag Ends from Savings and Loan Days

All that now remains outside Wes-FIC but within Wesco as a consequence of Wesco’s
former involvement with Mutual Savings, Wesco’s long-held savings and loan subsidiary, is a
small real estate subsidiary, MS Property Company, that holds tag ends of appreciated real
estate assets consisting mainly of the nine-story commercial office building in downtown
Pasadena, where Wesco is headquartered. Adjacent to that building is a multi-story luxury
condominium building which MS Property Company has recently built and is in process of
marketing. For more information, if you want a very-high-end condominium, simply phone
Chris Greco (626-585-6700). MS Property Company’s results of operations, immaterial
versus Wesco’s present size, are included in the breakdown of earnings on page 1 within
“other operating earnings.”

Other Operating Earnings (Loss)

Other operating earnings (loss), net of interest paid and general corporate expenses,
amounted to ($6.9 million) in 2009 and ($0.4 million) in 2008. The 2009 figure includes a
$6.2 million after-tax writedown of the book carrying value of a condominium building that
was completed in the worst condominium market in decades. Other components of the other
operating loss in 2009 were (1) rents ($4.1 million gross) principally from Wesco’s Pasadena
office property (leased almost entirely to outsiders, including Citibank as the ground floor
tenant), and (2) interest and dividends from cash equivalents and marketable securities held
outside the insurance subsidiaries, less (3) general corporate expenses plus expenses involv-
ing tag-end real estate and real estate held for sale.
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Consolidated Balance Sheet and Related Discussion
Wesco has unusual balance sheet strength, concentrated in security holdings of its
insurance subsidiaries. These holdings, in turn, are concentrated in a few securities. Details
can be found in Note 2 to the accompanying financial statements.
Wesco carries its investments at fair value. As a result, unrealized appreciation or
depreciation, after income tax effect, is included as a component of shareholders’ equity and
net worth per share.
Affected substantially by changes in market value of securities owned, Wesco’s yearend net
worth per share has varied only slightly during recent tumultuous years. Figures are as follows:
2006 $337
2007 356
2008 334
2009 358
These results are not impressive. Moreover, if net worth per share had been computed at
its low point in the recent stock market panic, stability implied by the foregoing figures would
have been considerably lessened.
We repeat our standard warning. Business and human quality in place at Wesco
continues to be not nearly as good, all factors considered, as that in place at Berkshire
Hathaway. Wesco is not an equally-good-but-smaller version of Berkshire Hathaway, better
because its small size makes growth easier. Instead, each dollar of book value at Wesco
continues plainly to provide much less intrinsic value than a similar dollar of book value at
Berkshire Hathaway. Moreover, the quality disparity in book value’s intrinsic merits has, in
recent years, continued to widen in favor of Berkshire Hathaway.
The Board of Directors recently increased Wesco’s regular dividend from 391⁄2 cents per
share to 41 cents per share, payable March 4, 2010, to shareholders of record as of the close of
business on February 4, 2010. Shareholders can thank Director Elizabeth Peters for the
recommendation that Wesco increase its next and future dividends to ensure that share-
holders are paid in even pennies.
This annual report contains Form 10-K, a report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and includes detailed information about Wesco and its subsidiaries, as well as
audited financial statements bearing extensive footnotes. As usual, your careful attention is
sought with respect to these items.
Shareholders can access much Wesco information, including printed annual reports,
earnings releases, SEC filings, and the websites of Wesco’s subsidiaries and parent, Berkshire
Hathaway, from Wesco’s website: www.wescofinancial.com.

Charles T. Munger
Chairman of the Board
and President

Dated: February 26, 2010

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