D671 / E681

SYLLABUS
TLO1. RECOGNIZE THE MORALITY OF AN ACT
1. GENERAL ETHICS
1.1. HUMAN ACTS
explain the human act in itself
explain the voluntariness of human acts
explain the modifiers of human acts
a) DEFINITION OF THE HUMAN ACT
b) CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS
i. The Adequate Cause of Human Acts.
(A) Elicited Acts: (a) Wish (b) Intention (c) Consent (d) Election (e) Use (f) Fruition
(B) Commanded Acts: (a) Internal (b) External (c) Mixed
ii. The Relation of Human Acts to Reason: (a) Good (b) Evil (c) Indifferent,
c) CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT
i. Knowledge ii. Freedom iii. Voluntariness.
THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HUMAN ACTS
a) KINDS OR DEGREES OF VOLUNTARINESS
i. Perfect and Imperfect ii. Simple and Conditional iii. Direct and Indirect iv. Positive and Negative
v. Actual, Virtual, Habitual, and Interpretative.
b) INDIRECT VOLUNTARINESS
i. When is the agent (doer, actor, performer) responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly
willed? ii. When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, which has two effects, one good, one
evil?
THE MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACTS
a) IGNORANCE
i. IGNORANCE IN ITS OBJECT: (a) Ignorance of Law (b) Ignorance of Fact (c) Ignorance of Penalty
ii. IGNORANCE IN ITS SUBJECT: (a) Vincible Ignorance (b) Invincible Ignorance
iii. IGNORANCE IN ITS RESULTS (a) Antecedent Ignorance (b) Concomitant (c) Consequent Ignorance
FIRST to FOURTH PRINCIPLES (on ignorance
b) CONCUPISCENCE: antecedent; consequent
FIRST to THIRD PRINCIPLES (concupiscence)
c) FEAR
PRINCIPLE (fear)
d) VIOLENCE
PRINCIPLE (violence)
e) HABIT
PRINCIPLE (habit)
1.2. THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS
explain ends in general
explain the ultimate end of human acts
a) DEFINITION OF END
b) CLASSIFICATION OF ENDS
i. The end of act, and the end of the agent ii. Proximate and remote ends iii. Intermediate and
ultimate ends
THE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS
a) THE OBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS
b) THE SUBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS
i. Kinds of Happiness: natural; natural happiness; supernatural ii. The Nature of Man’s Desire for
Happiness iii. The Manner in which Happiness is to be Possessed

1.3. THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS

 explain law as a norm of human act
explain conscience as a norm of human act
LAW
a) DEFINITION OF LAW
i. an ordinance ii. an ordinance of reason iii. Promulgated iv. promulgated for the common good:
territorial; personal v. promulgated in a society vi. promulgated by one who has charge of a
society
b) CLASSIFICATION OF LAWS
i. According to their immediate author ii. According to their duration: temporal; eternal iii.
According to the manner of their promulgation: natural law; positive laws: physical laws iv.
According as they prescribe an act or forbid it: affirmative; negative v. According to the effect of
their violation: moral; mixed
c) IMPORTANT CLASSES OF LAWS
i. The Eternal Law; ii. The Natural Law; iii. Human Positive Law.
Divine Positive Law belongs to Theology and not to Ethics.
CONSCIENCE
a) DEFINITION OF CONSCIENCE: i. judgment of reason ii. practical judgment iii. judgment upon an
individual act: Before action, After action,
b) STATES OF CONSCIENCE: i. invincibly erroneous or inculpably erroneous, culpably erroneous ii. certain
conscience, doubtful or dubious conscience: speculative doubt, practical doubt; probable
conscience, probable opinion
c) FORMING ONE’S CONSCIENCE: absolute certitude; moral certitude
1.4. THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS
explain morality and its norms
differentiate the determinants of morality
MORALITY AND ITS NORMS
a) DESCRIPTION OF MORALITY
b) THE NORM OF MORALITY
remotely and ultimately (but primarily), the Eternal Law (Divine Reason)
proximately (but secondarily) it is conscience (human reason)
c) DEFINITION OF MORALITY
d) DIVISION OF MORALITY
i. Material and Formal ii. Intrinsic and Extrinsic
THE DETERMINANTS OF MORALITY
a) THE OBJECT
intrinsic: objectively good; objectively evil: i. Custom ii. Human legislation iii. The arbitrary
decision of God’s will
b) THE END OF THE AGENT
principles
c) THE CIRCUMSTANCES
Who, what, where, with what ally,
in what condition, when and why?
1.5. THE PROPERTIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS
explain the properties of human acts
describe the consequences of human acts
THE PROPERTIES OF HUMAN ACTS
a) THE IMPUTABILITY OF HUMAN ACTS b) THE MERIT AND DEMERIT OF HUMAN ACTS
THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS
a) VIRTUES: i. Prudence ii. Justice iii. Fortitude iv. Temperance
b) VICES: by defect; by excess
(END OF GENERAL ETHICS)
  CO2. GIVE JUSTIFICATION TO A DECIDED ACTION TAKEN TO BE MORALLY GOOD OR BAD

2. SPECIAL ETHICS
2.1. INDIVIDUAL ETHICS 9HRS
2.1.1. RIGHTS AND DUTIES 135
explain individual ethics in rights and duties
2.1.2. MAN’S PERSONAL OFFICE 170
explain the duties of man towards his soul and his body

2.2. SOCIAL ETHICS

2.2.1. FAMILY 226 9HRS
explain the morality in society, marriage and in the rights and duties of parents
2.2.2. NATION 9HRS
explain the nature, origin, and ends of states 255
explain the rights and duties of man workers and as professionals 264
2.2.3. GLOBAL COMMUNITY 285
explain the rights and duties of nations, one towards another by international law in peace
and in war
(END OF SPECIAL ETHICS)
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F-076 MARITIME ACADEMY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC - KAMAYA POINT
Issue 0 Rev. 1
June 01, 2015 DEPARTMENT OF ACADEMICS
Associated Marine Officers’ and Seamen’s Union of the Philippines – PTGWO-ITF
Kamaya Pt., Brgy. Alas-asin, Mariveles, Bataan

ASSESSMENT PLAN

COURSE: HUM 2: Ethics A.Y: 2019 – 2020

INSTRUCTOR SAJOR EB SEMESTER: First

FACULTY-IN-
WEE
COURSE OUTCOME TOPIC (HRS) DATE CHARGE FOR
K NO.
COA
1-9 CO1. recognize the 1. GENERAL ETHICS (27) Week 6 SAJOR, EB
morality of an act. 1.1. HUMAN ACTS 2019.09.09-
1.2. THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 13
1.3. THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS
1.4. THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

(IN MIDTERM)
1.5. THE PROPERTIES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS
Week 9
Midterm Examination 2019.09.30-
10.04
10-18CO2. give 2. SPECIAL ETHICS (27) Week 15 SAJOR, EB
justification to a 2.1. INDIVIDUAL ETHICS 2019.11.25-
decided action 2.1.1. RIGHTS AND DUTIES 29
taken to be morally 2.1.2. MAN’S PERSONAL OFFICE
good or bad. 2.2. SOCIAL ETHICS
2.2.1. FAMILY
2.2.2. NATION
2.2.3. GLOBAL COMMUNITY
Week 18
Final Examination 2019.12.09-
13

PREPARED BY: NOTED BY:

SAJOR, EB ANALIZABETH R. PUNONGBAYAN

COURSE INSTRUCTOR GROUP LEADER
Date: 2019.08.01 Date:
 MIDTERM EXAM
TOTAL NO.
NO. OF COGNITIVE LEVELS OF ITEMS
TOPIC % WEIGHT PER TOPIC
HOURS
R U AP AN E C
1. GENERAL ETHICS 27 100.00% 4 1 5
1.1. Human Acts
1.2. The Ends of Human
Acts
1.3. The Norms of Human
Acts
1.4. The Morality of
Human Acts
1.5. The Properties and
Consequences of
Human Acts

FINAL TERM EXAM

TOTAL NO.
NO. OF COGNITIVE LEVELS OF ITEMS
TOPIC % WEIGHT PER TOPIC
HOURS
R U AP AN E C
2. SPECIAL ETHICS 27 100.00% 13 1 14
2.1. Individual Ethics
2.1.1. Rights and Duties
2.1.2. Man’s Personal
Office
2.2. Social Ethics
.2.1. Family
2.2.2. Nation
2.2.3. Global Community
 INTRODUCTION

1. DEFINITION
ETHICS is the practical science of the morality of human conduct.
a) Ethics is a science. It is a relatively complete and systematically arranged body of
connected data together with the causes or reason by which these data are known to be true.
Ethics squares with this definition, for it is a complete and systematically arranged body of data
which relate to the morality of human conduct; and it presents the reasons which show these
data to be true. Ethics is therefore a science.
b) Ethics is a practical science. If the data of a science directly imply rules or directions
for thought or action, the science is called practical. If the data of a science enrich the mind
without directly implying rules or directions, the science is called speculative. A speculative
science presents truths that are to be known; a practical science presents truths that are to be
acted upon. A speculative science enlarges our knowledge and enhances our cultural
equipment; a practical science gives us knowledge with definite guidance. Now the science of
Ethics presents data which directly imply and indicate directions for human conduct. Ethics is
therefore a practical science.
c) Ethics is a science of human conduct. By human act we mean only such human
activity as is deliberate and free. A deliberate and free act, an act performed with advertence
and motive, an act determined (i.e., chosen and given existence) by the free will, is called a
human act. Acts performed by human beings without advertence, or without the exercise of
free choice, are called acts of man, but they are not human acts in the technical sense of that
expression which is here employed. Ethics treats of human acts; human acts make human
conduct: Ethics is therefore a science of human conduct.
d) Ethics is the science of the morality of human conduct. Human conduct is free,
knowing, deliberate human activity. Such activity is either in agreement or disagreement with
the dictates of reason. Now the relation (agreement or disagreement) of human activity with
the dictates of reason is called morality. Ethics studies human activity to determine what it
must be to stand in harmony with the dictates of reason. Hence, Ethics deals with the morality
of human conduct.
e) The name Ethics is derived from the Greek word ethos, which means “a characteristic
way of acting.” Now the characteristic mark of human conduct is found in the free and
deliberate use of the will: in a word, this characteristic is found in human acts. Thus we perceive
that the name Ethics is suitably employed to designate the science of human acts, of human
conduct. – The Latin word mos (stem: mor-) is the equivalent of the Greek ethos. Hence we
understand why Ethics is sometimes called Moral Science or Moral Philosophy.

2. OBJECT
Every science has a Material Object and a Formal Object.
The Material Object is the subject-matter of the science: the thing, or things, with which
the science deals. The Material Object of Ethics is human acts, that is to say, human conduct.
The Formal Object of a science is the special way, aim, or point of view that the science
employs in studying or dealing with its Material Object. Now Ethics studies human acts (its
Material Object) to discover what these must be in order to agree with the dictates of reason.
Hence the special aim and point of view of Ethics is the right morality, or rectitude, of human
acts. We assert, then, that the Formal Object of Ethics is the rectitude of human acts.

3. IMPORTANCE
Ethics employs the marvelous faculty of human reason upon the supremely important
question of what an upright life is and must be. It is therefore a noble and important science.
Ethics furnishes the norm by which relations among men (juridical, political,
professional, social) are regulated. It shows what such relations must be, and indicates the
reasons that require them to be so. Thus, Ethics is fundamental to the sciences of Law,
Medicine, Political Economy, Sociology, etc. It is, in consequence of this fact, a very important
science.
Faulty ethical theories, as well as the lack of definite ethical principles, have been and
are still the cause of great disorders in the political and social world. This fact is apparent in
such things as Bolshevism, Nihilism, Socialism, Birth Control, Eugenics, Companionate
Marriage. Sound Ethics supplies the scientific knowledge which evidences the unworthiness
and unreason of such things. Ethics is therefore a science deserving a careful study.

4. DIVISION
Ethics has two major parts, viz., General Ethics and Special Ethics.
General Ethics presents truths about human acts, and from these truths deduces the
general principles of morality.
Special Ethics is applied Ethics. It applies the principles of General Ethics in different
departments of human activity, individual and social.
 PART I
GENERAL ETHICS

The following sentence should be memorized, for it explains the sequence of this entire
Part:
Human acts, directed to their last end by law applied by conscience, are moral acts,
and as such are imputable to the agent, and beget in him habits of action.
Outline:
Chapter 1 defines human acts and classifies them. It analyzes human
acts to discover their constituent elements, and considers the things
Human acts,
that may modify them or make them less human. The Chapter is
called “Human Acts.”
Chapter 2 discusses the ends of human activity. It defines and
classifies ends in general. It determines the last end of human acts,
directed to their last
and shows that this exists as an objective thing towards which man
end
tends, and that it is attainable. The Chapter is entitled “The Ends of
Human Acts.”
Chapter 3 discusses the existence and character of the rules of action
by which human acts are directed to their last end, viz., Law and
by law applied by
Conscience. In particular, The Eternal Law, The Natural Law, and
conscience,
Positive Law are studied. The Chapter is entitled “The Norms of
Human Acts.”
Chapter 4 deals with morality. It explains the intrinsic good or evil or
human acts, and the extrinsic factors that influence or determine the
morality of such acts. Certain false doctrines in the matter of
are moral acts
objective morality are refuted. Subjective morality (i. e., the relation
of human acts to the individual conscience) is studied. The Chapter is
entitled, “The Morality of Human Acts.”
Chapter 5 discusses the properties of human acts, viz., imputability,
are imputable to the
merit, demerit. It also studies the consequences of human acts, viz.,
agent and beget
the habits called Virtues and Vices. The Chapter is entitled “The
habits.
Properties and Consequences of Human Acts.”
 CHAPTER I
HUMAN ACTS
ARTICLE 1.
THE HUMAN ACT IN ITSELF

a) DEFINITION OF THE HUMAN ACT

A human act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate free will of man.
In a wide sense, the term human act means any sort of activity, internal or external,
bodily or spiritual, performed by a human being. Ethics, however, employs the term in a stricter
sense, and calls human only those acts that are proper to man as man. Now man is an animal,
and he has many activities in common with brutes. Thus, man feels, hears, sees, employs the
senses of taste and smell, is influenced by bodily tendencies or appetites. But man is more than
animal; he is rational, that is to say, he has understanding and fee will. Hence it is only the act
that proceeds from the knowing and free willing human being that has the full character of a
human act. Such an act alone is proper to man as man. And therefore Ethics understands by
human acts only those acts that proceed from a deliberate (i.e., advertent, knowing) and freely
willing human being.
Man’s animal acts of sensation (i. e., use of the senses) and appetition (i. e., bodily
tendencies), as well as acts that man performs indeliberately or without advertence and the
exercise of free choice, are called acts of man. Thus, such acts as are effected in sleep, in
delirium, in the state of unconsciousness; acts performed in infancy; acts due to infirmity of
mind or the weakness of senility – all these are acts of man, but they are not human acts.
It is to be noticed that acts which are in themselves acts of man may sometimes become
human acts by the advertence and consent of the human agent (and by agent is meant the one
who does or performs an act).
Ethics is not concerned with acts of man, but only with human acts. Human acts are
moral acts. For human acts man is responsible, and they are imputed to him as worthy of praise
or blame, or reward or punishment. Human acts tend to repeat themselves and to form habits.
Habits coalesce into what we call a man’s character. Thus we find verified the dictum of Ethics:
“A man is what his human acts make him.”

b) CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS

i. The Adequate Cause of Human Acts. – While all human acts have their source in
man’s free rational nature, there are some acts that begin and are perfected in the will itself, and
the rest begin in the will and are perfected by other faculties under control of the will.
Thus, some human acts find their adequate cause in the will alone (always remembering
that we speak of the will of advertent, knowing man, i. e., of the deliberate will); and these are
called elicited acts.
Other human acts do not find their adequate cause in the simple will-act, but are
perfected by the action of mental or bodily powers under the control of the will, or, so to speak,
under orders from the will; and these acts are called commanded acts.

Under the head of “Adequate Cause” we therefore consider:

(A) Elicited Acts
(B) Commanded Acts

(A) Elicited Acts are the following:

(a) Wish: the simple love of anything; the first tendency of the will towards a thing,
whether this thing be realizable or not. Every human act begins with the wish to act.
(b) Intention: the purposive tendency of the will towards a thing regarded as realizable,
whether the thing is actually done or not.
Intention is distinguished as actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative intention.
(c) Consent: the acceptance by the will of the manes necessary to carry out intention.
Consent is a further intention of doing what is necessary to realize the first or main intention.
 (d) Election: the selection by the will of the precise means to be employed (consented
to) in carrying out an intention.
(e) Use: the employment by the will of powers (of body, mind, or both) to carry out its
intention by the means elected.
True, the movement itself is a commanded act, but the commanding, the putting to
employment of bodily action, is the elicited will-act of use.

(f) Fruition: the enjoyment of a thing willed and done; the will’s act of satisfaction in
intention fulfilled.

Of the elicited acts listed, three appertain to the objective thing willed, and three to the
means of accomplishing it. Suppose the thing willed is a trip to Europe. Then:

I wish ……………………………………..
I intend ………………………….
I enjoy when accomplished ……

I consent …………………………..
I elect ………………………………………
I use my faculties ……………….

(B) Commanded Acts are:

(a) Internal: acts done by internal mental powers under command of the will.
(b) External: acts effected by bodily powers under command of the will.
(c) Mixed: acts that involve the employment of bodily powers and mental powers.
Of course, all human acts are internal inasmuch as all originate in the will which elicits
or commands them. Again, all external acts are mixed inasmuch as the outer activity which
perfects them is but the expression and fulfillment of the interior act of will. But, for sake of
simplicity, we call those human acts external which are perfected or completed by the exterior
powers of body; and we’ll call mixed only those acts which involve the use of bodily powers as
well as internal powers distinct from the will.

ii. The Relation of Human Acts to Reason. – Human acts are either in agreement or in
disagreement with the dictates of reason, and this relation (agreement or disagreement) with
reason constitutes their morality. On the score of their morality, or relation to reason, human
acts are:
(a) Good, when they are in harmony with the dictates of right reason;
(b) Evil, when they are in opposition to these dictates;
(c) Indifferent, when they stand in no positive relation to the dictates of reason.
Indifferent human acts exist in theory, but not as a matter of practical experience. A human act
that is indifferent in itself becomes good or evil according to the circumstances which affect its
performance, especially the end in view (or motive or purpose) of the agent.

c) CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT

In order that an act be human, it must possess three essential qualities: it must be
knowing, free, and voluntary.
i. Knowledge
A human act proceeds from the deliberate will; it requires deliberation. Now
“deliberation” does not mean quiet, slow, painstaking action. It means merely advertence, or
knowledge in intellect of what one is about and what this means. An act may be done in the
twinkling of an eye, and still be deliberate.
For the purposes of Ethics, then, deliberation means knowledge. A human act is by
definition a deliberate act; that is, it is a knowing act. No human act is possible without
knowledge.
 The will cannot act in the dark, for the will is a “blind” faculty in itself. It cannot choose
unless it “see” to choose, and the light, the power to see, is afforded by intellectual knowledge.
ii. Freedom.
A human act is an act determined (elicited or commanded) by the will and by nothing
else. It is an act, therefore, that is under control of the will, an act that the will can do or leave
undone. Such an act is called a free act. Thus, every human act must be free. In other words,
freedom is an essential element of the human act.
iii. Voluntariness.
The Latin word for will is voluntas, and from this word we derive the English terms,
voluntary and voluntariness. To say, therefore, that a human act must be voluntary, or must have
voluntariness, is simply to say that it must be a will -act. This we already know by the very
definition of the human act. Voluntariness is the formal essential quality of the human act, and
for it to be present, there must ordinarily be both knowledge and freedom in the agent. Hence,
the term voluntary act is synonymous with human act.
 ARTICLE 2.
THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HUMAN ACTS

a) KINDS OR DEGREES OF VOLUNTARINESS

i. Perfect and Imperfect.
Perfect voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent (i. e., the doer,
performer, actor) fully knows and fully intends the act. Imperfect voluntariness is present
when there is some defect in the agent’s knowledge, intention, or in both.
ii. Simple and Conditional.
Simple voluntariness is present in a human act performed, whether the agent likes or
dislikes doing it. Conditional voluntariness is present in the agent’s wish to do something
other than that which he is actually doing, but doing with repugnance or dislike.
iii. Direct and Indirect.
Direct voluntariness is present in a human act willed in itself. Indirect voluntariness
is present in that human act which is the foreseen result (or a result that could and should have
been foreseen) of another act directly willed.
A human act that is directly willed is called voluntary in se (i. e., in itself), while a human
act that is indirectly willed is called voluntary in causa (i. e., in its cause).
iv. Positive and Negative.
Positive voluntariness is present in a human act of doing, performing. Negative
voluntariness is present in a human act of omitting, refraining from doing.
v. Actual, Virtual, Habitual, and Interpretative.
Actual voluntariness (or actual intention) is present in a human act willed here and
now.
Virtual voluntariness (or virtual intention) is present in a human act done as a result of
(of in virtue of) a formerly elicited actual intention, even if that intention be here and now
forgotten.
Habitual voluntariness (or habitual intention) is present in a human act done in
harmony with, but not as a result of, a formerly elicited and unrevoked actual intention.
Interpretative voluntariness (or interpretative intention) is that voluntariness which,
in the judgment of prudence and common sense, would be actually present if opportunity or
ability for it were given.

b) INDIRECT VOLUNTARINESS
Indirect voluntariness, or voluntariness in cause, is present in that human act which is
an effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed.
We have seen that human acts are acts under the free control of the will. It is clear that,
since the will controls such acts, the will is responsible for them. In other words, human acts are
imputable (as worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment) to their author.
Two supremely important ethical questions present themselves in the matters of
indirect voluntariness and imputability.

i. The First Question: When is an agent (doer, actor, performer) responsible for the evil
effect of a cause directly willed?
The agent is responsible for such an effect when three conditions are fulfilled, viz.:
(1) The agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way.
(2) The agent must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect.
(3) The agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the evil effect.

ii. The Second Question: When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, which has two
effects, one good, one evil?
One may perform such an act when three conditions are fulfilled, viz.,
(1) The evil effect must not precede the good effect.
(2) There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect.
 (3) The intention of the agent must be honest, that is, the agent must directly intend the
good effect and merely permit the evil effect as a regrettable incident or “side issue.” To explain
these conditions in detail:
(1) The evil effect must not precede the good effect.
If the evil effect comes ahead of the good effect, then it is a means of achieving the good
effect, and is directly willed as such a means. Now it is a fundamental principle of Ethics – a
clear dictate of sound reason – that evil may never be willed directly, whether it be a means or
an end to be achieved. We cannot do evil that good may come of it. The end does not justify the
means. There is no good, however great, that can justify the direct willing of evil, however
slight. If a lie – even a “harmless” lie – will save a life –even an innocent life – that lie may not be
told. Notice well that the principle here discussed requires that the evil effect do not precede the
good effect; we do not say that the good effect must precede the evil, but that the good effect
must either precede the evil or occur simultaneously with it.
(2) There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect.
If this condition be not fulfilled, there is no adequate reason for the act at all, and the act
is prohibited in view of its evil effects. The sufficiency of the reason must be determined by the
nature, circumstance, and importance of the act in question, and by the proportion this reason
bears to the gravity of the evil effects.
(3) The intention of the agent must be honest.
If the agent really wills the evil effect, there is no possibility of the act being permissible.
Direct willing of evil is always against reason, and hence against the principles of Ethics. But,
unless the agent directly wills the good effect, he is really willing the evil effect – else he has no
adequate motive for performing the act at all.
 ARTICLE 3.
THE MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACTS

By the modifiers of human acts we mean the things that may affect human acts in the
essential qualities of knowledge, freedom, voluntariness, and so make them less perfectly
human. Such modifiers lessen the moral character of the human act, and consequently diminish
the responsibility of the agent.
There are five modifiers of human acts that call for detailed study, viz., ignorance,
concupiscence, fear, violence, habit.
a) IGNORANCE
Ignorance is the absence of knowledge – and, for our purpose here, it may be defined as
the absence of intellectual knowledge in man. Ignorance is thus a negation of knowledge; it is a
negative thing. But when it is absence of knowledge that ought to be present, the ignorance is
not merely negative, but privative.
Ignorance has, indeed, a positive aspect when it consists not merely in the absence of
knowledge, but in the presence of what is falsely supposed to be knowledge. Thus, if I see a
stranger in the street, and realize that I do not know him, my ignorance of his identity is merely
negative. But if I am misled by poor eyesight or by a resemblance in the stranger, and judge him
to be a well-known acquaintance, my state of mind is positive towards him: I have what I judge
to be positive knowledge of his identity. Such positive ignorance is called mistake or error.
We are to consider ignorance in its effect upon human acts.
i. in its object, i. e., in the thing of which a person may be ignorant;
ii. in its subject, i. e., in the person in whom ignorance exists;
iii. in its result, i. e., with reference to the acts that are performed in ignorance.
i. IGNORANCE IN ITS OBJECT.
The thing of which a person may be ignorant is a matter of law, fact, or penalty.
(a) Ignorance of Law is the ignorance of the existence of a duty, rule, or regulation.
(b) Ignorance of Fact is ignorance of the nature or circumstances of an act as forbidden.
Thus, ignorance of fact is lack of knowledge that what one is actually doing comes under
the prohibition of a known law.
(c) Ignorance of Penalty is lack of knowledge of the precise sanction (i. e., an
inducement sufficient to make reasonable men obey the law) affixed to the law.
ii. IGNORANCE IN ITS SUBJECT.
In the person in whom it exists, ignorance (of law, fact, or penalty) is either vincible or
invincible.
(a) Vincible Ignorance (i. e., conquerable ignorance; ignorance that can and should be
supplanted by knowledge) is ignorance that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence.
Such ignorance is, therefore, due to lack of proper diligence on the part of the ignorant person,
and is his fault. Vincible ignorance is, in consequence, culpable ignorance.
There are degrees of vincible ignorance:
If it be the result of total, or nearly total, lack of effort to dispel it, it is called crass (or
supine) ignorance.
If some effort worthy the name, but not persevering and wholehearted effort, be
unsuccessfully employed to dispel it, the ignorance is simply vincible.
If positive effort is made to retain it, the ignorance is called affected.
(b) Invincible Ignorance is ignorance that ordinary and proper diligence cannot dispel.
This sort of ignorance is attributable to one of two causes, viz.: either the person in whom the
ignorance exists has no realization whatever of his lack of knowledge, or the person who
realizes his ignorance finds ineffective his effort to dispel it. Hence, invincible ignorance is
never the fault of the person, in whom it exists, and it is rightly called inculpable ignorance.
Invincible ignorance has two degrees, viz.:
if no human effort can dispel it, it is physically invincible.
If such effort as good and prudent men would expend to dispel it – taking into account
the character and importance of the matter about which ignorance exists – is found to be
ineffective, the ignorance is called morally invincible.[1] [1] The word morally has no direct
relation in the present use of morality, but to characteristic action of men. Thus, ignorance is
morally invincible when such effort as would be truly characteristic of good and prudent men
in the circumstance, is found powerless to dispel it. In common language, ignorance is morally
invincible when it would be extremely difficult to dispel it.
iii. IGNORANCE IN ITS RESULTS.
Here we consider ignorance (of fact, law, penalty) with reference to acts performed
while ignorance exists.
(a) Antecedent Ignorance is that which precedes all consent of the will.
(b) Concomitant Ignorance is that ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an act
that would have been performed even if the ignorance did not exist.
(c) Consequent Ignorance is that which follows upon an act of the will. The will may
directly affect it, or supinely neglect to dispel it. Thus, consequent ignorance does not differ
from vincible ignorance.
The ethical principles which emerge from our study of ignorance as a modifier of human
acts are the following:

FIRST PRINCIPLE (on ignorance):

Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act.
Voluntariness, as we have seen, depends upon knowledge and freedom. Freedom, in its
turn, depends upon knowledge of the field of free choice. Ultimately, the, voluntariness depends
upon knowledge, and is impossible without it. Now, invincible ignorance is an inevitable
absence of knowledge. Therefore, an act, insofar as it proceeds from invincible ignorance, lacks
voluntariness, is not a human act, and is not imputable to the agent. –

SECOND PRINCIPLE (on ignorance)

Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
Vincible ignorance is not an inevitable lack of knowledge. On the contrary, it supposes
knowledge in the agent of his own lack of knowledge and of his duty of dispelling ignorance.
Hence, the agent has knowledge which bears indirectly upon the act which he performs in
ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect voluntariness, and is a human act
imputable to the agent. –

THIRD PRINCIPLE (on ignorance)

Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.
While vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act, it lessens
voluntariness, makes the act less human, and diminishes the responsibility of the agent. The
agent knows that he is in ignorance, and ought to dispel it, but, nonetheless, he lacks direct and
perfect knowledge of the act itself which is done in ignorance. Hence, his act, while possessing
voluntariness, does not possess direct and perfect voluntariness. Voluntariness is, therefore,
impaired or lessened.

FOURTH PRINCIPLE (on ignorance)

Affect ignorance in one way lessens and in another way increases voluntariness.
Affected ignorance is that vincible ignorance which is directly willed and positively
fostered. Yet, in spite of the bad will which it implies, it is still a lack of knowledge, direct and
perfect, and, insofar, it lessens the voluntariness of the act that proceeds from it. On the other
hand, affected ignorance, being deliberately fostered to serve as an excuse for sin against a law,
shows the strength of the will’s determination to persist in such sins. It is thus said to increase
the voluntariness of an act, or, more accurately, to indicate an increased voluntariness in the act
that comes from it.

b) CONCUPISCENCE
Concupiscence means those bodily appetites or tendencies which are called the passions,
and which are enumerated as follows: love, hatred; joy, grief; desire, aversion or horror; hope,
despair; courage or daring, fear; and anger.
We treat here of the passions in general. The passions are called antecedent when they
spring into action unstimulated by any act of the will; that is, when they arise antecedently to
the will-act.
They are called consequent when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs them up or fosters
them.
Antecedent concupiscence is an act of man, and not a human act. It is therefore a non-
voluntary act, and the agent is not responsible for it. Consequent concupiscence, however, is the
fault of the agent, for it is willed, either directly or indirectly, that is, either in itself or in cause.
The agent is, in consequence, responsible for it.
But what of the acts that come from concupiscence? We state the ethical principles in the
matter:

FIRST PRINCIPLE (concupiscence)

Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act.
Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act that comes from it.
Voluntariness depends upon knowledge and freedom. Antecedent concupiscence disturbs the
mind and thwarts, more or less completely, the calm judgment of the mind upon the moral
qualities of an act; hence, it impairs the knowledge necessary for perfect voluntariness. Again,
antecedent concupiscence is a strong and sudden urge to action, and thus, it lessens the full and
prompt control which the will must exercise in every perfectly voluntary act; hence, it impairs
freedom. Therefore, on the score of both knowledge and freedom, antecedent concupiscence
lessens the voluntariness of an act, and, in consequence, diminishes the responsibility of the
agent.

SECOND PRINCIPLE (concupiscence)

Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by antecedent concupiscence, they are
not destroyed; and the agent’s responsibility, while diminished, is not cancelled. A man may sin,
and sin gravely, even though strongly influenced by antecedent passion. Still, his sin is less
grave than it would be if committed dispassionately and, so to speak, “in cold blood.”

THIRD PRINCIPLE (concupiscence)

Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act.
Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or indirectly. Hence, the acts that proceed
from it have their proper voluntariness, direct or indirect.

c) FEAR
Fear is one of the passions, and is included under the general denotation of the term
concupiscence, but it is usual to give it special mention in Ethics, because it is a very common
passion, and we should know in detail its relation to the morality of acts, and because it has a
characteristic distinctive among the passion, viz., that it usually (when it is the cause of an act)
induces the will to do what it would not do otherwise. We may, however, present the ethical
doctrine on the subject of fear in very short space.
Fear is the shrinking back of the mind from danger. More accurately, it is the agitation of
mind (ranging from slight disturbance to actual panic) brought about by the apprehension of
impending evil.
Actions may proceed from fear as their cause, or may be done with fear as an
accompanying circumstance.

PRINCIPLE (fear)
An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also
conditionally involuntary.
 The principle speaks of an act performed from a motive of fear, an act proceeding from
fear, not an act performed with or in fear. A person may have full and unconditioned
voluntariness in that which is performed with fear,
An act performed from fear, however, great, is simply voluntary. If fear is so great as to
make the agent momentarily insane, the act done from fear is not voluntary at all, for it is an
act of man and not a human act. But as long as the agent has the use of reason, his acts
performed from fear are simply voluntary. For the agent effectively chooses to perform such an
act rather than undergo that of which he is afraid: he chooses the act as a lesser evil, and
effectively chooses it. But the act is also regularly involuntary inasmuch as the agent would not
perform it in other circumstance; were it not for the presence of an evil feared, the act would
not be performed.
The practical conclusion is this: Fear does not excuse an evil act which springs from it.
Fear does present a difficulty, but human acts are not necessarily easy acts. Still, the influence of
fear makes an act less perfectly human in character, although never to such an extent that the
agent is enabled to act humanly and still escape responsibility for his act.
The positive (“statute”) law of Church and State usually provides that an act done from
grave fear, unjustly suffered, and excited directly in order to force the agent to perform an act
that is against his will, is an invalid act or one that may be invalidated. Even though such an act
is simply voluntary, it would not be for the common good to allow an act extorted by fear to
stand as valid and binding.

d) VIOLENCE
Violence or coercion is external force applied by a free cause (i. e., by a cause with free
will; by man) for the purpose of compelling a person to perform an act which is against his will.
Violence cannot reach the will directly. It may force bodily action, but the will is not
controlled by the action, and since this command to make the bodily members offer due
resistance to violence, it concurs, insofar as such resistance is lacking, in the act done under
violence.

PRINCIPLE (violence)
Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused by violence, to which due
resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent.

e) HABIT
By habit Ethics understand operative habit, which is a lasting readiness and facility, born
of frequently repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner.

PRINCIPLE (habit)
Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at least in cause,
as long as the habit is allowed to endure.

Habit does not destroy voluntariness. The agent is fully responsible for human acts done
from what is called force of habit. Even if such acts be in themselves acts of man, the habit itself,
so long as it is not disowned, and a positive and enduring effort made to overcome it, is willed
as a human act, and its effects are voluntary in cause, and hence are human acts.
 CHAPTER II
THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS
ARTICLE 1. END IN GENERAL

a) DEFINITION OF END
An end is both a termination and a goal. In other words, and end is that which
completes or finishes a thing, and it is that for which the thing is finished.
Every activity tends toward an end; and thus every activity is a tendency. Every tendency
may be called an appetite, or more properly, appetency.
When appetency exists without any sort of knowledge – as in plants and lifeless things –
it is called natural appetency, in a special limited, and technical sense of the term “natural.”
When appetency comes of knowledge, it is of two kinds, just as knowledge itself is of
two kinds. Appetency which is stirred into action by sensation (i. e., by knowledge acquired by
the senses) is called sense appetency or sensual appetite.
Appetency which is stirred into action by intellectual knowledge is called the will or
rational appetency. We have already learned in our study of Human Acts that the will springs
into action only when intellectual knowledge presents something desirable, satisfactory, or
simply good, to be achieved by action. Every will-act, that is, every human act, is the expression
of rational appetency or will: it is an act directed to an end known as desirable, that is to say, as
good to attain.
In Ethics we speak of the ends of human acts. Here, then, the end is that which is
apprehended as good, as desirable, and which attracts the human agent to the performance of
the act. It is the agent’s motive and reason for acting. It causes the agent to act and, insofar, the
end is the final cause of a human act – a cause called final, from the Latin word finis, which
means end. The agent is the efficient cause of his acts, for it is he that effects or performs them;
but he would not effect them were he not attracted by the end or final cause. No human act can
exist, therefore, without a final cause, that is to say, without an end apprehended by the agent
as desirable or good enough to attract the agent to action and to serve as his motive in the act.
The end or final cause of human acts must be apprehended as good. Evil cannot be
willed as such or for its own sake. Evil is done only when it assumes the aspect of good, as
something that will bring satisfaction or will lead to it.
Notice that it is a greater good that the sin is chosen. Of course, the agent’s judgment in
the matter is not sound; his sin will not lead to ultimate happiness or satisfaction, but inasmuch
as it is a judgment of the sin as good, it explains what is meant by the statement that evil is not
chosen as such, nor for its own sake, but only when it assumes the aspect of good. In our sense,
good is that which answers tendency or desire.
To define end: An end is a termination and goal of activity. In a human act the end is the
final cause, viz., that on account of which, or to attain which, the act is performed, and which is,
in consequence, apprehended as a good sufficiently desirable to motivate the agent in
performing the act.

b) CLASSIFICATION OF ENDS
Here we distinguish:
i. The end of act, and the end of the agent;
ii. Proximate and remote ends;
iii. Intermediate and ultimate ends.
i. The end of the act is the end toward which the act of its own nature tends. Thus, the
act of giving food and shelter to destitute persons tends of its nature toward the relief of
distress, and we say that the relief of distress in the end of act. –
The end of agent is the end which the agent intends to achieve by his act.
When we speak of the end in Ethics, we usually mean the end of the agent.
ii. The proximate end is the end intended as the immediate outcome of an act.
The remote end is that which the agent wishes to achieve later on, and toward the
attainment of which he employs the present act as a means.
 Thus, a politician who gives money to the poor, wishes his good deed to be recorded in
the newspapers: his proximate end is favorable publicity. However, he does not desire publicity
for its own sake, but for the votes it will gain him in the coming election; and he wishes for
votes as a means to office. Thus, while publicity is his proximate end, votes and election to office
are remote ends.
iii. An end, whether proximate or remote, is willed either for its own sake or as a means
to an end more remote. If it is willed for its own sake, it is a last or ultimate end, and if it is
willed as a means to a further end, it is an intermediate end.
To illustrate:
A man gives money to the poor. He gives the money to gain favorable notice in the
newspapers (proximate and intermediate end); he wills publicity as a means to votes (remote
and ultimate end). This example shows us a chain or series of ends; and, since the ultimate end
of the series is not the general or unconditioned end of the man’s whole life and all its human
acts, but ultimate only in relation to the present series of ends, the ultimate end of the series is
called an end relatively ultimate. There must also be an end which is unconditionally and
unlimitedly the ultimate end of all human acts; and this we call the absolutely ultimate end. It
is the ultimate end which gives meaning to the intermediate ends that least to it. The
intermediate ends are subordinate to the ultimate end, just as the steps of a stairway are
subordinated to the top step. And as a man who wishes to reach the top of a stairway must take
many intermediate steps before reaching the top, but would not take any of them except to
reach the top, so in a series of ends, the agent must attain intermediate ends before achieving
the ultimate end, but he would not try to attain any of them except on account of the ultimate
end. Thus, we repeat, the ultimate end of a series of ends gives meaning and motive to the
whole series.
An ultimate end is both objective and subjective. The objective ultimate end is that
thing, that object, which, in last analysis, motivates a human act. The subjective last end
is the possession of the objective end and the satisfaction or happiness that is
apprehended as belonging to that possession.
 ARTICLE 2. THE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS

The ultimate end of human acts is that which, in the last analysis, serves as a
sufficient reason and motive for the acts. This end, considered as an objective thing toward
the attainment of which the acts are directed, is the objective ultimate end of human acts. The
possession of this objective end and the happiness which the agent seeks in that possession, is
the subjective ultimate end of human acts.
We have seen that a human act is always done on account of an end, and an ultimate end.
We now assert that all human acts are performed for a single absolute ultimate end.

a) THE OBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS

A human act is a deliberate and knowing act; it is an act performed by the knowing
agent who wills to perform it. And why does he will to perform it? Because he has a motive, a
reason, a final cause sufficiently attractive to induce him to perform it. And this reason, motive,
or final cause amounts to this: it appears good to the agent to perform the act and attain its
end. Even when the human act is difficult or undesirable in itself, it becomes desirable in view
of a further end to which it is directed as a means.
The driving power back of human acts viewed all together – or, more accurately, the
power of attraction that calls human acts into being – is not only the good, or the greater good,
but the greatest good, the absolutely illimitable, all-inclusive, and all-perfect good. This the
summum bonum, which, considered in itself, we call the absolutely ultimate objective end of
human acts. It will not be difficult to prove this assertion.
Man seeks happiness. Whether he seeks it in riches, in pleasures, in power, in
prominence, in honors attained, or even in license and sin, the fact remains that what he is
seeking is that which will please him, that which will satisfy his wants and desires, that, in one
word, which will make him happy. This quest which he finds it utterly impossible to free
himself. Man is free in his choice of objects in which he hopes to find happiness, and we call this
the freedom of the will, or freedom of choice; but man is not free to seek unhappiness for its own
sake. Even the “cantankerous” individual who does mean things in a mean way, and hurts
himself in doing them, and, so to speak, cuts off his nose to spite his face, is nevertheless doing
what he wants to do, and in the achieving of that want he apprehends some satisfaction;
otherwise, there could be no conceivable motive for the acts, and motive there must be, for the
acts exists.
Now, there is an object towards which the whole tendency of human action is ever
directed; an object that will satisfy all tendency, fill up all capacity for desire, leave nothing
further that can be the end of human acts. And this we call the absolutely ultimate objective
end of human acts. This end as that object, the possession of which will give perfect
happiness to man by completely filling up his capacity for desire, and leaving nothing
unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to tend as towards an
end.
This absolutely ultimate objective end must be one, must be a single object.
Consider:
This end is so perfect a good that nothing beyond it can be desired. Therefore, it must be
the infinite good. Nothing finite could meet the requirements of such an end. The greatest
happiness thinkable, short of the possession of the infinite good, is imperfect and fleeting. The
largest fortune might still be large; the serenest peace of life must quickly give place to care or
be lost in death; the highest honors man may achieve leave other honors still unwon. And over
all human achievements, over the bliss of abounding health and the rapture of the presence of
loved ones, over fame attained and glory worthily won, over ambition fulfilled and high hope
realized – over all that is finite hangs a cloud, a menace, a threat that is certainly to be fulfilled:
all must pass – and soon! Hence, all finite good is imperfect, if only that it will not last always,
but is imperfect also in scope, in extent. A finite thing is, by its very definition, a thing with
limits. Can any limited thing satisfy in fullest measure of perfection the unlimited desires of
man? No, for these pass all bounds; there is no line that can be drawn to mark the limit of the
possibility of desire. Only the infinite good can be the absolutely ultimate objective end of
human acts. And there can be but one infinite object. For the infinite object contains all possible
perfection, and there is, so to speak, no perfection left over for another object to possess. Hence,
we rightly maintain that the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts is one.
Now, the infinite good is God. Ethics must leave to the philosophical science of Theodicy
(i. e., Natural Theology) the proof of the existence of the one God, infinitely perfect, creator,
conserver, and ruler of the universe, the efficient and final cause of all. Ethics assumes the
existence and attributes of God as proved. We assert that the infinite good is God; that God is
the only object, the possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling
up his capacity for desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any
possibility, continue to tend as towards an end.
But, you object, there is such a thing as sin, and such a thing as sinful desire. Does the
sinner tend in his human act of sin toward God? Is sinful desire to find perfect fulfillment in the
possession of the All-Perfect? Of course, the sinner does not tend towards God, nor is sinful
desire as such satisfied with possession of the All-Perfect – to say so would be foulest
blasphemy. Yet the sinner, in his human act of sin, does not exhibit a tendency away from what
is apprehended as good; on the contrary, the very sin is a tendency toward that which is,
through perversion of reason, adjudged as good, as satisfying. The sinner knows that his act is
evil; but passion invites, immediate satisfaction is promised, the fleeting pleasure of his act is
ready at hand; the true good is not perceived as ready, prompt, present; it is farther off; it
presents certain difficulties, not only in the matter of waiting longer for its satisfaction, but also
in the effort required to put down the present allurement which draws to sin. And so the matter
is put to the judgment of the agent; and, judging freely that the present satisfaction outweighs
the remote real satisfaction, he sins. Of course the judgment is perverse; but the point here is
that the sinner does not tend away from the good – and the ultimate good –as such, but wrongly
judges that the present object is good. And he is responsible for this judgment, and so sin is no
mere mistake. Remember that the tendency of the human agent is towards the good, and the
infinite good, in general; but the agent may make perverse judgments about what is good in
particular.
Psychology clears up this matter in its thesis that “Man is capable of objectively
indifferent judgments,” i. e., man can view what is really evil under the aspect of good, and can
view what is truly good under the aspect of evil. Thus sin which is foul promises a present
pleasure, and insofar may be judged as good; while virtue inasmuch as it is difficult to acquire,
may be adjudged as evil.
To sum up:
The objective ultimate end of human acts is that which really in itself is the crowning
and perfect fulfillment of rational desire; it is the limitless good; it is God. Towards good in
general all human action, even sinful human action, tends. But action is sinful by reason of
man’s abuse of free will; and sinful action is possible because man may freely focus his
attention upon the desirability of that which satisfies minor or inordinate appetites, to the
exclusion of that which is supremely desirable and infinitely good in itself.

b) THE SUBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS

We have learned that the subjective end of an act consists in the possession of the
objective end. the name subjective is given to this end to indicate its possession by a subject,
that is, by the person who has it or strives to have it.
The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered in itself or objectively, is the
limitless good. The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered with reference to the
person who strive to possess it (that is, considered with reference to its subject), is the perfect
happiness which consist in the possession of the limitless good. In a word, the absolutely
ultimate subjective end of human acts is happiness.
In considering the objective end of human acts we found it necessary to speak much of
happiness. We saw that man acts for happiness in acting for the limitless good which is the
objective ultimate end of human action. Here we are to consider happiness more directly, and
to discuss the kinds of happiness, the nature of desire for happiness, and the manner in which
happiness is to be possessed. But first we must face an obvious difficulty.
The difficulty is this: man, acting in a human manner, is seldom conscious of the fact
that he is acting for happiness. The upright man acts virtuously, the sinner acts viciously, the
ordinary man lives his ordinary life, without thinking directly of happiness as an end to be
attained. How is it possible then to say that man always acts for happiness? We must recall our
distinction, made in an earlier chapter, between an actual and a virtual intention. An actual
intention is an intention elicited here and now with direct consciousness of that which is
intended. Happiness is seldom the object of such an intention; a man seldom, if ever, says to
himself: “In this action I intend to achieve happiness.” But a man always acts for happiness, at
least by a virtual intention. A virtual intention is an intention which exists in an act performed
in virtue of a formerly elicited actual intention. We have seen that man always tends towards
the good in general; and his connatural bent of will for the good involves a virtual intention for
that good. As the possession of good means happiness, we conclude that man acts for
happiness by a virtual intention does not exist by reason of an actual intention formerly
elicited. It does, if we consider that an actual intention may be implicit as well as explicit. A man
who shoots at a rabbit does not, in order to have actual intention, require a moment’s pause in
which to elicit the will-act of actual intention; he may not be aware of his intention as an
intention; he simply does what he wants to do; he simply raises his gun and fires; but we say,
and rightly, that his actual intention is implied in his action. Similarly, we declare that a man, in
his more serious and deliberate action of life, makes up his mind to do what he adverts to as
best, and here, at least implicitly, we an actual intention to act for good (objective end) and for
the possession of the good (subjective end, i. e., happiness). Then, in the less thoughtful acts of
life, the virtue of this implicit actual intention endures, and a man’s acts are, in consequence,
performed for happiness.
Consider: i. Kinds of Happiness; ii. The Nature of Man’s Desire for Happiness; iii. The
Manner in which Happiness is to be Possessed.
i. Kinds of Happiness
Happiness is natural when it comes of man’s possession of that which he finds
achievable by his unaided natural powers, or which is not beyond the reach of his nature. Thus,
a man’s happiness in the possession of sound health is natural happiness. Happiness is
supernatural when it consists in the possession of that which is of a value surpassing all that
natural powers can achieve unaided. Thus, man’s happiness in possessing the grace of God is
supernatural. Now, man tends toward the limitless good, and since this in infinite, - and hence
beyond man’s finite powers, - man tends toward something which is beyond the reach of
unaided nature. Man tends towards supernatural, eternal happiness. The appetite of man’s very
nature is for the supernatural. Still, this tendency and appetite for the supernatural is only
indicated in Ethics. As a purely rational science, independent of divine revelation, Ethics cannot
investigate the matter of supernatural happiness, nor describe the manner in which it is to be
attained. But this science can and does show that man’s tendency is to the limitless good, the
infinite good, and we know that natural powers can achieve only limited things. Yet, to confine
our study within its proper limits, we must consider the limitless good, and happiness in its
possession only insofar as this is achievable by natural powers, that is, by the perfect natural life,
by a life which fully agrees with the dictates of right reason.
ii. The Nature of Man’s Desire for Happiness
Man’s desire for limitless good, and consequently for perfect happiness, is not illusory; it
is not a deceitful and vain desire. It is a desire capable of fulfillment; it is realizable. We may,
with St. Thomas, reason to this conclusion in the following manner: Nature does nothing in
vain. Now, nature has implanted in man the desire for perfect happiness. Therefore, this desire
is not vain; in other words, this desire is realizable. – Again, Ethics may prove the same truth by
assuming as demonstrated the facts which are scientifically evidenced in the science of
Theodicy. Theodicy proves that there is one God, the Creator, who is all-wise, and all-good. But
neither an all-wise Creator could not implant in His rational creature a fine and worthy desire
that cannot be realized; else the all-wise God would be the author of a futility nor could the
all-good God mock man by causing him inevitably to desire the unattainable. Hence, we
conclude that man’s desire for perfect happiness in not illusory, but is realizable in very fact. We
cannot assert that each man will actually attain to perfect happiness; we only declare the
scientific truth that each man may attain that happiness. Certainly, this perfect happiness in not
attainable in this world here and now; then – since its attainment has been shown possible – it
must be attainable in another world hereafter.
iii. The Manner in which Happiness is to be Possessed
Man’s absolutely ultimate subjective end is the act of perfect happiness. Powers or
faculties are that by which action is accomplished; the act is the crowning fact, the perfection of
the faculty. Now, how is the act of happiness to be exercised? Man has the following faculties:
the senses, intellect, will. The senses are not man’s highest faculties, but serve the intellect
during bodily life. All knowledge begins somehow in sensation (i. e., in the act of the senses) for
man in bodily life; but sensation is not, in itself, essential to intellectual knowledge as such.
Obviously, perfect happiness, as an act, is the act of man’s highest and best faculties. Hence, the
essential act of happiness (which, of course, will eventually and in proper measure include the
satisfaction of the senses) is not an act of sensation. Nor is it an act of will: for the will either
tends towards an end )and then the end is not yet attained) or, by fruition, delights in the end
(and then the end already attained). The act of attainment, the act of happiness, is, in
consequence, neither a sense-act nor a will-act. It remains that it must be an act of intellect. But
here again, we must consider a twofold act of intellect: the intellect either knows a thing to do
(practical intellect) and this must be knowledge that leads to an end to be achieved; or the
intellect knows a thing to hold in contemplation (speculative intellect). This latter act is the
crowing perfection of man’s highest faculty of knowledge. We assert, then that the ultimate act
of perfect happiness is an act of the speculative intellect, it is an act of contemplation of the
limitless good; and this act of the intellect will be accompanied by the delight of the will, and by
the perfect satisfaction of the senses according to their proper place, order, and capacity.
 CHAPTER III
THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS

Let us view man as a traveler standing at a point where many roads converge. The
traveler wishes to reach the City of Limitless Good. This city is the goal toward which the
traveler tends by a connatural and inevitable bent of his will. Now, the tendency of the traveler
will remain the same, even if he should choose a wrong road. In other words, man, the traveler,
will choose a road for the purpose of reaching the City of Limitless Good, even if, as a fact, the
chooses road leads away from his goal. It is obvious, then, that the reveler needs guidance; he
needs direction, lest perverse and mistaken judgment thwart his purpose and render
impossible the attainment of his goal. In a word, the traveler needs a map. More: he requires
ability to read the map, and to interpret it rightly where the road seems to fork or by ways open
invitingly. Now, the map, the guiding direction, is supplied to man, the traveler, by law; and the
application of law in individual acts – the reading and interpreting of the map at particular
curves and corners – is achieved by conscience. Human acts are directed to their true end by
law, and law is applied by conscience. Hence, law and conscience are the directives or norms of
human acts.

ARTICLE1.
LAW

a) DEFINITION OF LAW
St. Thomas defines law as an ordinance of reason, promulgated for the common
good by one who has charge of a society.
i. A law is an ordinance, i. e., an active and authoritative ordering or directing of human
acts in reference to an end to be attained by them.
ii. A law is an ordinance of reason, and not an arbitrary or whimsical decree of the
legislator’s will. A law does come from the will of the lawgiver, but from his reasonable will, that
is, from his will illumined by understanding of an end necessary or useful to be attained,
toward which the law serves as a proper direction. Hence, law must be reasonable, and this
means that it must be just, honest (not contravening a higher law), possible of fulfillment (not
exacting undue or extraordinary effort on the part of those bound by it), useful, and in some
degree permanent (not a fleeting or whimsical decree). To be reasonable, to be a true law, a law
must have all the qualities here enumerated. Besides it must be promulgated, that is, made
known to those who are bound by it. Hence, the essential qualities of a true law are these: it
must be just, honest, possible, useful, relatively permanent, and promulgated.
iii. A law is promulgated, i. e., made known to those bound by it, and these are called
subjects. This is a requirement of law as reasonable, as already explained. By promulgation a
law is put in application as an authoritative ordinance.
iv. A law is promulgated for the common good. This is the purpose of law. In this point a
law is distinguished from a precept, which is an ordinance issued by public or private authority
for the particular or private good of one or several persons. A law also differs from a precept in
the fact that a law is territorial and applies to subjects only while they are in a certain place;
while a precept is personal and binds its subjects wherever they may be. A law is always
enacted by public authority, while a precept may be issued by either public or private
authority.
Finally, a law endures in force until it is repealed by the authority that enacted it, even
though the actual persons who framed it be dead or removed from office; but a precept ceases
to bind with the preceptor’s death or removal from office.
A law, then, is for the common or public good. This is the purpose of law. Law is not
meant to impose hardship or needless restriction upon its subjects, but to promote their good,
and hence to protect and promote true liberty among them. When a law is truly a law, that is to
say, when it has all the requisite qualities of law, and is just, honest, possible, useful, relatively
permanent, and duly promulgated – then it inevitably acts as a liberating agency and not as an
enslaving one. True law tends to make men good, and tends to liberate them from the perverse
and mistaken judgments that would lead them astray in the quest for their ultimate end. The
man who accepts the direction of true law is the man who is free to attain his goal, just as the
man who accepts direction when seeking the road to a city he wishes to reach is the man who is
really free to go to that city. He who refuses direction – although he refuses, as he thinks, in the
name of freedom – is enslaved by his own liability to error. The purpose of law, therefore, is to
protect and promote true freedom among members of a society in common, by insuring the
unhampered and unthwarted exercises of free acts which will carry man forward to his proper
end.
v. A law is promulgated in a society. This is evident from the fact that law is for the
common good, and hence supposes a commonality of community of subjects; and a community
is a society. Law in the fullest sense can exist only in a perfect society, for such a society alone
has the full and perfect right to legislate (i. e., full jurisdiction) for all subjects. Now, the supreme
and perfect society in the natural order is called the State (i. e., a body of people politically
united under one government), and the supreme and perfect society in the supernatural order
is the true Church. In the fullest sense, therefore, human laws can come only from Church or
State.
vi. A law is promulgated by one who has charge of a society. By “one” is meant a
person, whether this be a single human being (physical person) or a body of men united to form
the governing power (moral person). Here we have indicated the author of law, i. e., the
lawgiver or legislator. A legislator has jurisdiction, which mean, literally, “the saying of what is
right.” One who has the just authority of “saying what is right” in a community is empowered to
enact and promulgate true laws. Almighty God is the Supreme Lawgiver, and properly
constituted human legislation has its power and authority, directly or indirectly, from God. –
The author of law enacts laws as ordinances of reason, and hence he must have a direct care
and concern about their observance. To insure observance the author of the law establishes
sanctions for law, i. e., inducements (rewards and punishments) sufficiently strong to lead
reasonable men to follow the prescriptions of the law.

b) CLASSIFICATION OF LAWS
i. According to their immediate author, laws are distinguished as divine laws, which
come directly from God (such as the Ten Commandments), and human laws, which are the
enactments of Church or State. Human laws enacted by the Church are called ecclesiastical laws,
while human laws enacted by the State are called civil laws.
ii. According to their duration, laws are temporal or eternal. The Eternal Law is
God’s plan and providence for the universe. We shall speak of this law in detail in the next
section of this Article. All human laws are in themselves temporal, although some of them give
expression to requirements of the Eternal Law.
iii. According to the manner of their promulgation, laws are distinguished as the
natural law and positive laws. The natural law, in widest sense, is that which directs
creatures to their end in accordance with their nature, and, so understood, it coincides with the
Eternal Law. Usually, however, the laws that govern irrational creatures in their being and
activities are called physical laws, while the moral law which is apprehended by sound and
matured human reason is called the natural law. In this restricted sense we shall understand
the term, the natural law; and we shall define it as the Eternal Law as apprehended by human
reason. Positive laws are laws enacted by positive act of a legislator, and these fall under the
classification already made as divine and human. Thus, the Ten Commandments are divine
positive laws, and the laws of the Church and State are human positive laws.
iv. According as they prescribe an act or forbid it, laws are affirmative or negative.
Negative laws are also called prohibitory laws. Affirmative laws bind always, but not at every
moment. Negative laws of the natural order bind always and at every moment. Thus, the law
“Thou shalt not kill,” remains continuously in force, and must be obeyed at every moment
without exception and in all circumstances.
v. According to the effect of their violation, laws are distinguished as moral (violation
of which renders the violator liable to an established penalty, but does not infect him with sin),
and mixed (violation of which involves both fault and penalty).

c) IMPORTANT CLASSES OF LAWS

Here we are to consider: i. The Eternal Law; ii. The Natural Law; iii. Human Positive Law.
The discussion of Divine Positive Law belongs to Theology and not to Ethics.
i. The Eternal Law is God’s eternal plan and providence for the universe. God, decreeing
from eternity to create the world for an end (which is Himself), eternally plans and directs all
things toward that end. Thus there is from eternity a “plan of Divine Wisdom as director of all
acts and movements” – and this is The Eternal Law. St. Augustine defines the Eternal Law as the
Divine Reason and Will commanding that the natural order of things be preserved and forbidding
that it be disturbed. The Eternal Law extends to all acts and movements in the universe. Thus,
bodies obey the tendencies of their nature and follow the laws of cohesion, gravity, inertia, etc;
plants grow; animals follow the guidance of instinct; the earth turns upon its axis; the heavenly
spheres swing through their mighty orbits; all in accordance with the Eternal Law, powerless to
reject its influence or to disobey. Of all bodily creation, man alone may refuse the direction of
the Eternal Law in matters of free choice. For the Eternal Law applies to all creatures and directs
them in a manner consonant with their nature; and man’s nature, in its rational part, is free. As
a bodily being man acts in accordance with physical laws; so he does also in those animal and
vegetal functions which are proper to his nature but not under the control of his will. But in
matters that lie under man’s free control – in a word, in human acts – man may be perverse and
disobedient, refusing the direction of the Eternal Law as know to him by his reason. Thus, the
Eternal Law governs all things except human acts by necessity, that is, allowing the things
governed no choice in the matter; the same Eternal Law directs human acts by suasion.
ii. The Natural Law is the Eternal Law as known to man by his reason. It is, in some
sense, man’s participation in the Eternal Law. Man knows naturally, by the light of his
understanding, that there are some things evil in themselves, and some things which are
necessarily good. Thus, man knows that lies and murder are evil; and he knows that
truthfulness and respect for life and property are good. In a word, man inevitably recognizes an
order in things. That which is in line with this order is good, and that which is out of line with it
is evil. But man has more than an unconditioned knowledge of things as good and evil: he has
the knowledge of good as a thing to be done, and of evil as a thing to be avoided. For man’s
reason shows him the natural order as a thing to be conserved and not disturbed. Hence, by his
rational nature, man is aware of a general law: “Conserve the natural order,” or, in other words,
“Do good and avoid evil.” This is the fundamental expression of the natural law.
Now, the natural order of things is the order established by the Eternal Law. Hence, the
natural law, which commands the conserving of the natural order, is a law unchanging and
unchangeable. Even in its subjective aspect (i. e., viewed from the standpoint of its subjects),
the natural law presents itself to our understanding as unchangeable, for it is a direction to
guide men to their proper ultimate end, and all men at all times and in all circumstances have
the same nature and the same ultimate end; therefore, the direction toward that end must be
constant and unchanging.
No man of sound and mature reason can be invincibly ignorant of the natural law in its
general principles and obvious applications: that is, every sane adult must know that good is to
be done and evil avoided, and must recognize the obviously good things as good and evident
evils as evil. However, the exact nature of certain duties, and the manner in which certain duties
are to be performed, is sometimes derived from the natural law by an involved process of
reasoning; such duties are remote derivations of the natural law; it is therefore possible that
untaught or savage men may be ignorant of them, and invincibly ignorant. – The natural law has
its proper sanction. To deny this fact would be to deny the wisdom of the lawgiver; for surely
the legislator who frames a law wants the law fulfilled, else it is an absurdity; and a sanction
fitted to the nature of the law and of its subjects is the one means of giving the law force. The
author of the natural law is God, the All-Wise. Hence, a priori, we conclude that the natural law
has its sanction. This sanction consists in the peace and happiness consequent upon the
observance of the natural law, and in the remorse and unhappiness which follow its violation.
Though the sanction of the natural law is necessarily imperfect in this life, it is perfect in the life
to come, and consists primarily in the final achievement or loss of man’s ultimate end – God, the
Summum Bonum, and endless happiness.
iii. Human Positive Law is law enacted by Church or State. When such a law is truly law
– that is to say, when it is just, honest, possible, useful, and duly promulgated – it derives its
binding force from the natural law, and so ultimately from the Eternal Law, from God. We may
define a human positive law as an ordinance of reason, derived from the natural law, or
making a concrete and determinate application of the natural law, promulgated for the
common good by a human agency in charge of a society. That such a law derives from the
natural law is easy to see, for the natural law requires the observance of the natural order; and
the obviously requisite order for life in society is the observance, by all members of society, of
just laws. Hence, the natural order itself requires the observance of laws. But what of unjust
laws? What of laws that contravene laws of a higher order? What of civil laws that conflict with
ecclesiastical laws? Where there is injustice, there is no law: justice is an essential quality of
true law. Again, laws which contravene other laws of a higher order are not honest; and honesty
is an essential quality of true law, and without it the so-called law is no law at all. Finally, where
laws of Church and State clash, there is injustice on the one side or the other; and, in case of
dispute, presumption favors the higher, the supernatural law, when it is truly law, binds the
conscience of its subjects, for it is rooted in the natural law, and remotely in the Eternal Law of
God Himself.
 ARTICLE 2.
CONSCIENCE

a) DEFINITION OF CONSCIENCE
Conscience is the practical judgment of reason upon an individual act as good and to be
performed, or as evil and to be avoided.
i. It is a judgment of reason, that is, it is a reasoned conclusion. Although the term
conscience is also used to designate the act of reasoning out the right and wrong of a situation
before choosing what to do, it is more properly employed, as in our definition, to signify the
judgment which is the conclusion of that act of reasoning. Now, an act of reasoning requires a
principle, or set of principles, which the process of reasoning proceeds. By principles we mean
things known with certainty with which we may compare new facts or proposed actions and so
discover new truths – new applications of the principles.
In matters of right and wrong, we must have moral principles to start with. We acquire
these principles, - many of them, - in early life, and when we have a workable grasp of them, we
become responsible for out conduct, we cease to be infants, and we are said to have “come to
the use of reason.” Now, this acquired equipment of moral principles is called synteresis.
Synteresis is the starting point of the reasoning process which ends in the judgment of
conscience. This reasoning process may proceed so smoothly and swiftly that we are not aware
of it as a reasoning process at all; indeed, this is ordinarily the case. Still, the process is always a
fact, if only an implicit fact. Thus, when we are confronted with a possible course of action, we
compare it mentally with our moral principles, and conclude that it is good and hence to be
done (or at least permitted), or evil and hence to be avoided.
For example:
Suppose I am face to face with a difficulty from which I might extricate myself by a
clever and fictitious explanation of my conduct. My moral reasoning goes on as follows:

Lies are never allowed (principle from systeresis);

The explanation which suggests itself to me is a lie;
Therefore, this explanation is not allowed (judgment of conscience).

ii. Conscience is a practical judgment. This means that it has reference to something to
be done, i. e., either the performance or the omission of an act. The reasoning process always
ends in a judgment, but not always in a practical judgment. It is a judgment that commands,
forbids, allows, or advises, according as it declares an individual act obligatory, prohibited,
permissible, or prudent. Conscience is a dictate.
iii. Conscience is a judgment upon an individual act, here and now, in these present
circumstances, to be performed or omitted. It is also a judgment upon an individual act after it
has been performed or omitted. But it is always an individual judgment upon an individual act;
it is not a general moral judgment or principle (for such judgments belong to syntersis), but it is
the reasoned judgment, drawn from a general principle and an individual act; it applies the
general moral principle in individual action. Before action, conscience judges an act as good and
to be performed (i. e., as something obligatory, advisable, or permissible), or as evil and to be
omitted. After action, conscience is a judgment of approval or disapproval.

b) STATES OF CONSCIENCE
i. When conscience is a judgment in accordance with fact, that is, when it judges as
good that which is really good, and as evil that which is really evil, then it is correct or true.
Strictly speaking, there is a distinction between correct conscience and true conscience, but for
practical purposes the terms may be regarded as synonymous. Conscience that is not true is
erroneous. Conscience that is erroneous without the knowledge or fault of the agent is called
invincibly erroneous or inculpably erroneous, while conscience that is erroneous through the
agent’s fault, is culpably erroneous.
ii. When conscience is an altogether firm and assured judgment, in which the agent
has no fear whatever of being in error, it is called certain conscience. Conscience, when certain,
must be obeyed, whether it be correct or invincibly erroneous. For reason demands that we
obey law as manifested with certainty by the intellect, and the dictate of certain conscience is
such a manifestation, even though the conscience be invincibly erroneous. – Conscience that is
not certain, i. e., that is hesitant, that is a judgment in which the agent is aware of the possibility
of error, is called doubtful or dubious conscience.
The agent whose conscience is dubious is said to be in doubt. If the doubt concerns the
existence or applicability of a law or moral principle, it is called speculative doubt; but if the
doubt concerns the lawfulness of an individual act to be performed or omitted, it is a practical
doubt.
It is never permissible to act while in the state of practical doubt. Such doubt must be
resolved, must be dispelled and replaced by certitude, before action can be good. To act while in
the state of practical doubt about the good or evil of an action, is to “take a chance” of the action
being evil, and is so far to approve of the action even as evil; but reason requires that evil be
positively avoided. When conscience is doubtful, but grounded upon solid reasons, it is called
probable conscience, and the agent is said to have a probable opinion. We shall discuss the
matter of probability (the doctrine of which is called probabilism) is the next section of the
present Article.

c) FORMING ONE’S CONSCIENCE

To “form” one’s conscience is to get rid of doubt and achieve certainty; it is to make up
one’s mind clearly and definitely on what is required in a given individual instance; it is to
reason out the right and wrong of a given situation.
Now, it is not always possible to have absolute certitude (i. e., certitude so perfect as to
exclude even the possibility of error) in matters of conscience. But it is always possible, directly
or indirectly, to achieve moral certitude, i. e., such certitude as excludes all prudent doubt. Moral
certitude is sufficient and requisite for the guidance of the conscience-judgment when there is
question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act here and now to be determined upon. One
may never act in a practical doubt, but must banish the doubt and achieve moral certitude. How
is this to be done? Either directly, by studying the act itself and its moral determinants and so
gaining a clear knowledge of its moral quality as good or evil, or, when such study is not feasible
or is found fruitless, indirectly, by applying the reflex moral principle: A doubtful law does not
bind.
It is possible, then, to achieve moral certitude in one of two ways: 1) by direct study and
investigation which clears away doubt and gives certain knowledge, or this failing; 2) by
application of the reflex principle: A doubtful law does not bind.
When is a law doubtful? A law is doubtful when there is a solid and prudent reason for
uncertainty as to its existence or applicability in a given case. And such reasonable uncertainty
may arise either from the fact that there is no discoverable reason for the existence or
applicability of a law, or from the fact that there is an actual and positive reason against the
existence or applicability of a law. When a law is doubtful, then its dubious state is due to the
existence of a solidly probable reason, which, negatively or positively, makes for uncertainty in
the matter of the law’s existence or applicability. Now a solidly probable reason is a reason that
would be regarded as sound and sufficient by a good and prudent man; in complex matters, we
should require such a reason as would meet the approval of a good, prudent, and learned man.
One who relies upon such a reason is said to have a probable opinion. Out of this situation
emerges a doctrine for forming one’s conscience, - a doctrine called probabilism. Probabilism
teaches that when there is mere question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, a solidly
probable reason favoring its lawfulness suffices for moral certainty and renders the act
permissible. The reasoning upon which probabilism is based may be set forth as follows:

A doubtful law does not bind;

but a law against which a solidly probable reason militates is a doubtful law;
therefore, a law against which a solidly probable reason militates does not bind.
 Probabilism is of great use in dispelling doubt and forming one’s conscience, but its use
is best limited to matters of business and to the field of human positive law. In the more
abstract questions of morals there is grave danger of applying Probabilism too quickly and
without proper justification. It must always be remembered that Probabilism is deduced from a
reflex moral principle which has no place in the legitimate formation of conscience unless the
direct method (of positive study and investigation of the actual situation) proves impossible or
fruitless in the matter of dispelling doubt.
 CHAPTER IV
THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS
ARTICLE 1.
MORALITY AND ITS NORMS

a) DESCRIPTION OF MORALITY
Morality is that quality of human acts which leads us to call some of them good and
some evil.
A thing is good inasmuch as it can answer a tendency, appetite, desire. In other words, it
is good inasmuch as it serves as an end of such tendency.
In the matter of human acts – where moral good or evil is the point in question – there is
always a last end towards which the action tends. Objectively, this is the Summum Bonum, the
Limitless Good, God. Subjectively, the last end of human acts is perfect happiness in the
possession of the Summum Bonum. Such being the end of human action, it follows that human
acts are good inasmuch as they serve to carry the agent on towards the attainment of this end,
and not good, or evil, inasmuch as they fail to lead towards the last end, or even lead away from
it.

b) THE NORM OF MORALITY

Human acts which are in harmony with the eternal plan are good; those not in harmony
with it are evil. Now, the eternal plan is the Eternal Law, which is the Divine Reason (and Will)
expressing itself in the ordering of the universe. Thus, human acts are good or evil inasmuch as
they agree or conflict with the Divine Reason. Now, how is the Divine Reason recognized by
man? Obviously by human reason, which pronounces on individual human acts – in a word, by
Conscience. Hence, the Eternal Law (Divine Reason) on the one hand, and conscience (human
reason) on the other, constitute the Norm of Morality. From this it will be seen that we were
right when we said that human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict with the
dictates of reason (divine and human).
The Divine Reason, or the Eternal Law, is the ultimate Norm of Morality. But that which
serves man immediately in action, that which is available to his proximate use, is human reason
pronouncing upon the good or evil of individual human acts: in other words, conscience is the
proximate Norm of Morality.
Summing the matter up, we say that the Norm of Morality is, remotely and ultimately
(but primarily), the Eternal Law; while proximately (but secondarily) it is conscience. In reality,
then, there are not two norms but only one; for conscience in the judgment of human reason
recognizing and applying the Eternal Law in individual human acts.

c) DEFINITION OF MORALITY
Morality is the relation of human acts to their norm
Morality is that quality (or property) of human act whereby it measures up to
what it should be as a step towards the objective last end of human action, or fails so to
measure up. It consists therefore in the relation existing between human acts and the norm of
morality.
The morality of an act, its character as good or evil, is not a mere external denomination
or classification; it is not a mere label pasted on arbitrarily. It is something that belongs
inevitably to the human act as such, either to the act considered objectively as a deed
performed, or to the act considered as characterized by its circumstances, particularly the
circumstance called the end of the agent.
Some ethicians have placed the essence of the morality of human acts in freedom. This
doctrine is false. It is true that a human act is a free act; and, in a true sense, it is a moral act (i.
e., has morality, is right or wrong, good or evil) because it is free. But freedom does not
constitute morality. Morality is the property of a free act, that is, it is an inevitably present
characteristic of a free act. But it consists formally, as we have said, not in freedom itself, but in
the relation which the act bears toward the norm or measure of what it should be – toward the
Norm of Morality.

d) DIVISION OF MORALITY
i. Material and Formal
A human act considered in itself as a deed performed stands in relation to the Norm of
Morality as materially good or evil. A human act considered as conditioned by the agent’s
understanding and will, stands in relation to the Norm of Morality as formally good or evil.
Sometimes the terms objective and subjective are used respectively for material and formal in
this connection.
ii. Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Material or objective morality is intrinsic when the human act, as a deed performed,
stands by reason of its very nature in relation to the Norm of Morality as good or evil. Material
or objective morality is extrinsic when the stand or relation of an act to the Norm of Morality is
determined, not by the nature of the act itself, but by the prescription of positive law.
 ARTICLE 2.
THE DETERMINANTS OF MORALITY

It is necessary to understand what phases of the human act may be measured by the
norm, show the act as measuring up or not measuring up to that norm; in a word, these points
determine the good or evil of the act. Hence, they are called the determinants of morality.
We list three determinants of morality, viz., (a) the act itself, i. e., the object; (b) the end of the
agent; (c) the circumstances other than the end of the agent.
A human act, to be a morally good act, must be found in agreement with the Norm or
Morality on all three points, i. e., it must be good in itself or objectively, in its end, and in its
circumstances. A human act is evil if it fails to conform with the Norm of Morality in any one of
the points or determinants.

a) THE OBJECT
By the object is meant the human act performed, the deed done. If an act as object
(i. e., in itself) is good or evil, we say that it has objective morality. If an act, considered
abstractly, is indifferent (i. e., neither good nor bad), its morality is determined by the end for
which it is performed and by the circumstances which affect it. Now certain actions are in
themselves, or objectively, good, and certain others are objectively evil: and this morality is
intrinsic, i. e., resides in the act independently of positive law prescribing or forbidding the act.
This assertion recommends itself at once to the normal mind as a true statement; yet some
moralists have denied it. It is therefore necessary to prove briefly that some acts are
intrinsically good, and some intrinsically evil.
Now those that deny the intrinsic morality of any human act must admit, as all other
men do, that there are certain acts which have always and everywhere been regarded as good,
and other which have been universally considered evil. The acceptance of these acts as
respectively good and evil is a fact to be explained. We explain it by stating the doctrine of
intrinsic morality: men have always regarded certain acts as good in themselves because, as a
matter of fact, they are good; and they have regarded others as intrinsically evil, because they
are evil.
Our opponents declare that what we call intrinsic morality is merely the result of long
established custom among men, or of special human legislation, or of the arbitrary decision of
God’s will that some acts are good and some evil.
i. Custom cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as good in
themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. How did the custom come into being? If as a
dictate of right reason, because all people saw that certain things were in line with their
rational desires and certain other things opposed to these, then the argument falls to nothing,
and is merely an indefinite restatement of the true doctrine that certain acts are perceived by
right reason as good and other acts as evil – in a word, that certain acts are perceived as
intrinsically good or evil. If the custom did not arise as a dictate of right reason among men,
then it arose out of circumstances. Since circumstance can be artificially arranged, it would be
possible to get current a movement to change the present moral views of men.
ii. Human legislation cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as good
in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. If human legislation means law in the true
sense, then we are back in our won position, for true human law is an ordinance of reason in
line with the Eternal Law, and it exists because there really are acts good in themselves to be
prescribed, and acts evil in themselves to be forbidden. Acts are not good because true law
prescribes them; they are prescribed by law because they are good. Nor are acts evil because
true law forbids them; the law forbids them because they are evil.
Now if legislation be taken to mean, not a reasonable ordinance, but the whimsical and
arbitrary decree of a ruler or ruling body, then legislation may change the whole scheme of
morality.
iii. The arbitrary decision of God’s will cannot account for the universal acceptance of
some acts as good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. God is infinitely perfect;
His acts are therefore infinitely right and reasonable. Hence an arbitrary decision of the Divine
Will without reference to the Divine Reason is so impossible as to be absolutely unthinkable.
In view of the truth established – viz., that there is such a thing as intrinsic morality – we
are forced to reject many moral theories as false.
Among those so rejected we find:
i. The Theory of Moral Instinct or Moral Sense (called Moral Intuitionism or Moral
Sensualism), which asserts that we discern good and evil by a blind instinct or by a sense
faculty, and not by our understanding. We have seen that we know good and evil by the
conscience-judgment, by reason. When we do good or evil as a human act, we know, we
understand, that we are doing good or evil. Therefore, we do not act by blind instinct. Nor is our
conscience a sense-judgment. For the relation of acts to the Norm of Morality is an abstract
relation, not a material or bodily thing such as the senses require for their object.
ii. The Theory of Usefulness (called Utilitarianism), which asserts that what is discerned
as useful (to individual men or to human society) is good, and what is found harmful is evil. It is
true that good is ultimately useful, and evil harmful; but the usefulness comes from goodness,
not goodness from usefulness; and harmfulness comes from evil, not evil from harmfulness.
Certain human acts are, as we have proved, intrinsically good or evil; and hence their
usefulness or uselessness can have nothing to do with their nature. Further, the theory of
utilitarianism would make the code of morals as changeable as the stock market rates; for what
is useful (in a merely temporal and material sense) is variable and differs for times and
persons: but the Norm of Morality, to be a norm or law, must be a stable thing. Again, how
would the test of usefulness be established? Acts would have to be “tried out” first without any
rule at all to discover which acts might be listed as useful, and hence good, and which as
harmful, and hence forbidden as evil.
To sum up:
The object of a human act, the act itself as a deed done or to be done, that is, the act
considered as a fact, has often its own intrinsic morality. Even if the act be in itself indifferent, it
may have extrinsic morality, which is still objective, that is, as an object, the act may stand in
harmony or in disagreement with the prescriptions of positive moral law. Hence, in
determining whether any human act is good or evil, we look first to the object. The object is the
primary determinant of morality. If the object be evil, our quest ends there; the act is definitely
evil and forbidden; nothing can make it good. But if the act is good as an object, it may still be
vitiated by its circumstances, particularly by that circumstance called “the end of the agent.”
Hence, if we find an act good in itself as an object, we have still to look to the end of the agent
and to the other circumstances before pronouncing it good and permissible as an individual act.

b) THE END OF THE AGENT

By the end of the agent we mean that which the agent (doer, performer of an act)
intends or wishes to achieve by his act.
A human act which is good in itself (i. e., as object) may still be evil by reason of the end
(of the agent) for which it is performed. But a human act which is evil in itself cannot be made
good by reason of the end for which it is performed. In other words, the influence of the end of
the agent can be strong enough to swerve an act out of line with reason, but it cannot be strong
enough to bring a bad act into line with reason.
Now the question arises: How far does the influence of the end of the agent extend? Is a
good act ruined entirely by a bad end? Is a bad act made worse by a bad end? What if there are
several ends, or many, some good, some evil? The answer to these questions may be easily
discerned in the following principles:
i. An objectively good act performed for a good purpose (i. e., a good end of the
agent) takes on a new goodness from the good end; and if it has several good ends, it
takes on a new goodness from each.
ii. An objectively evil act performed for an evil purpose (i. e., an evil end of agent)
takes on a new malice of evil from the evil end; and if it has several evil ends, it takes a
new malice from each.
 iii. An act which is objectively good, but done for an evil end, is entirely evil if the
evil end is the whole motive of the act; likewise the act is entirely evil if the evil end is
gravely evil (i. e., mortally sinful), even though it is not the whole motive of the act; but
the act is only partially evil if the evil end is neither gravely evil (i. e., is not mortally
sinful) nor the whole motive of the act.
iv. An objectively evil act can never become good by reason of a good end. The
primary determinant of morality is the object, the act itself. If an act in itself is evil, it is and
remains evil in spite of every circumstance. The end does not justify the means. The end does not
specify the means: that is, supposing a choice of different means all of which are good, the
nature of the end in view will determine which of the available good means is to be chosen as
most suitable or practicable.
v. An act which is indifferent objectively becomes good if done for a good end, and
evil if done for evil end.

c) THE CIRCUMSTANCES
Circumstances are conditions that affect an act – and may affect it morally – although
they do not belong to the essence of the act as such. In other words, circumstances are
conditions without which the act could exist, but which happen to affect or qualify it is its
concrete performance. Examples of circumstance are place, time, company, etc., in which an act
if performed.
We enumerate seven circumstances. Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo,
quando? which may be freely translated as follows:

Who, what, where, with what ally,

in what condition, when and why?

To explain these circumstances in detail:

WHO? Circumstance of person. Who is the agent? To whom is the action done?
WHAT? Circumstance of quantity or quality of the object, i. e., the act. What is the extent
of the act? Was the injury inflicted serious or slight? Was the amount stolen large or small?
WHERE? Circumstance of place. A theft committed is the presence of the Blessed
Sacrament is theft plus sacrilege, the latter evil coming from the circumstance of place.
WITH WHAT ALLY? Circumstance of means or instrument. (This “ally” does not mean
“companion,” for the latter circumstance is that of person.)
IN WHAT CONDITION? How? Circumstance of manner. Was the agent in good faith or bad?
Was the agent’s evil disposition intensely malicious or only slightly so?
WHEN? Circumstance of time. Did the agent miss Mass on Sunday, or on a day when he
was not obliged to attend? How long did the agent retain an evil thought or intention, for a long
period or momentarily?
WHY? Circumstance of end of the agent. The circumstances which merely increase or
diminish the moral quality of an act, leaving it in the same species or nature, are called
circumstances which make the act better or worse. The circumstances that adds a specifically
new moral character to the act are called circumstances that change the nature of the act.

The ethical principles involved in the matter of circumstances as determinants of

morality are the following:
i. An indifferent act becomes good or evil by reason of its circumstances.
ii. A good act may become evil by reason of circumstances.
iii. A good or evil act (objectively) may become better or worse by reason of
circumstances, and may even take on specifically new goodness or malice from its
circumstances.
iv. An evil act can never be made good by circumstances.
v. A circumstance which is gravely evil (mortally sinful) destroys the entire
goodness of an objectively good act.
 vi. A circumstance which is evil, but not gravely so (not mortally sinful), does not
entirely destroys the goodness of an objectively good act.
 CHAPTER V
THE PROPERTIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS
ARTICLE 1.
THE PROPERTIES OF HUMAN ACTS

a) THE IMPUTABILITY OF HUMAN ACTS

A human act is, by definition, both knowing and free. It proceeds entirely from a
knowing and free agent, from a rational being. Thus it belongs to the agent; it is his act. This is
what is meant by saying that a human act is imputable to the agent, or that a human act has the
property of imputability.
Every human act has its morality; every human act, either objectively or in its end or
circumstances, is, as an individual deed done, a good or an evil act. Hence, it follows that, when
an act is imputed to the agent, it is imputed to him as good or evil. Thus imputability involves
the notion of praiseworthiness or culpability.
Human acts are imputable, and hence the agent is responsible, accountable, answerable
for them. He is answerable for them as good or evil, that is, he is answerable for them on the
score of their morality, and, logically, his answers must be made to Him who imposes the Norm
of Morality. Imputability, therefore, means the accountability that man must bear for his human
acts before Almighty God.

b) THE MERIT AND DEMERIT OF HUMAN ACTS

The dictionary defines merit as the quality, state, or fact of deserving well or ill. We may
divide this definition, and describe merit as the quality, state, or fact of deserving well; and we
may describe demerit as the quality, state, or fact of deserving ill.
It is a property of such acts, since it belong to them by natural necessity. Thus merit and
demerit are really extensions of the property of imputability in human acts: for such acts are
imputed to their agent as worthy of praise or blame, of reward or punishment. Still, while a
man “deserves well” for his good acts, he has in that fact no strict title to reward; nor does the
subject of human law look for a premium from the State for being a good citizen. Something
more is required to establish a claim to reward. The human act which is good, and which
confers a benefit upon him from whom reward is looked for, a benefit not already due, and a
benefit for the conferring of which it is somehow understood that reward will be forthcoming –
such is the human act which establishes a claim to reward.
Now, God has established his Eternal Law. He has made sanctions for it, i. e.,
inducements to lead reasonable men to obey its prescriptions, and punishments to deter men
from violating them. By this very fact He has given promise of reward and threat of punishment.

ARTICLE 2.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS

A man does more easily that which he has done before, and the more frequent the
repetition of an act, the easier becomes its performance. In a word, human acts tend to form
habits. Since human acts have morality, the habit of performing any human act will be a moral
habit. If it is a good moral habit, it is a virtue. If it is an evil moral habit, it is vice. Vice and virtue
are not matters of a single human act, nor of an act once or twice repeated, but of an act
frequently repeated. Frequent repetition of an act makes the agent strongly inclined towards
that act, and in this strong inclination lies the active or operative habit of so acting.

a) VIRTUES
A virtue may be natural or supernatural; it may be infused into the soul by God, or
acquired by repeated acts; it may be a physical virtue, an intellectual virtue, a theological virtue,
or a moral virtue. Thus, the native disposition one may have for study is a natural virtue; divine
Faith is supernatural virtue; fortitude is acquired virtue; bodily strength or perfection is a
physical virtue; wisdom is an intellectual virtue; faith is a theological virtue; fortitude is a moral
virtue. In Ethics, we deal only with acquired moral virtues.
An acquired moral virtue is a morally good operative habit. It is a moral habit of acting
in accordance with the dictates of reason.
The chief moral virtues are: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are
called cardinal virtues, and the name derives from the Latin cardo, a hinge; for as a door
depends for its proper action in opening and closing upon its hinges, so do all moral virtues
depend upon the “hinges” of the cardinal virtues.
i. Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables one quickly and clearly to
know, in concrete circumstance, the best means to an end, and it further inclines one to take
these means promptly and accurately. Strictly, then, prudence is an intellectual virtue, not a
moral (or “will” virtue), but we list it with the moral virtues because it has an immediate
connection with the actual willing of the means to an end which this virtue enables the
understanding to grasp. The marks of prudence, as we may learn from its definition, are a
certain watchfulness and clearsightedness, on the one hand, and cautious promptitude and
precision on the other. A prudent man is never precipitate or headlong; he does not embroil or
entangle a situation; he is not cocksure, headstrong, or self-confident. Nor, on the other hand, is
he weak, hesitant, or overcautious. The ancients counseled prudence in the axiom, “Virtue
stands in the middle,” that is, virtue does not run to extremes; prudence preserves the “meson”
or sane balance of Aristotle, and makes human action avoid the evil of falling too short or of
overwhelming its object; it makes human action fall just right according to the norm of right
reason.
ii. Justice is the virtue which inclines one with constancy always to render to everyone
his own. Man has, by his rational nature, a clear knowledge of something owed to God, to his
country, and to his fellowmen. Justice is the virtue which steadily inclines man to recognize and
pay this debt. A just man, therefore, is a religious man, an obedient, peaceloving, kind, grateful,
and truthful man.
iii. Fortitude is the virtue which inclines one to face dangers with intrepidity, especially
such dangers as threaten life. Fortitude, like all virtues, observes the “meson” or balance. It is
not rashness, overboldness, or presumptuous love of danger for its own sake or for ostentation;
nor, on the other hand, is it supineness or dead submission. It involves a largeness of mind and
soul, and combines with these the power of fadeless endurance.
iv. Temperance is the virtue which controls one in the pursuit and use of the pleasures
of life, especially of those pleasures that attract most strongly, and in which there is a
consequent danger of excess and disorder. Temperance keeps the desire and use of sense-
pleasure particularly, within the bounds of right and reasonable action. Temperance, therefore,
is not insensibility nor the extinction of natural tendencies. It is the regulation of tendencies,
the sane self-mastery which reason (conscience) dictates.

b) VICES
A vice is a morally evil operative habit. A single evil human act is a sin. Vice is the habit
of sin. We distinguish different vices inasmuch as different habits of sin stand opposed to
virtues. For vice is a habitual lack of virtue; and it stands opposed to virtue either by defect or
by excess. Virtue stands in the middle, being neither defective nor excessive when measured by
the requirements of right reason; while vice lies upon either hand.
To give but a few examples of vice as opposed to the cardinal moral virtues:
Opposed to prudence by defect we find, among other vices, imprudence, precipitateness
(to cause (something) to happen quickly or suddenly), lack of docility (lack of submissiveness,
lack of compliance, lack of passivity), carelessness, improvidence (extravagance, carelessness,
lavishness squandering), etc. Opposed to prudence by excess, we find the vices of oversolitude
(over+seclusion, isolation), smartness, trickery, fraud, etc.
Opposed to justice we find the vices of injustice, irreligion (absence, indifference,
rejection of, or hostility towards religion), impiety (wickedness, godlessness, ungodliness,
unholiness, irreligion), irreverence (disrespect, mockery), mendacity (deceit, falsehood,
dishonesty), ingratitude(thanklessness, lack of appreciation), cruelty, etc.
 Opposed to fortitude we find weakspiritedness, inconstancy, impatience, etc. as vices by
defect; while we find the following as vices by excess: presumptuous (arrogant, presuming,
bigheaded), boldness, stubbornness, insensibility, etc.
Opposed to temperance by defect we find pride, lust, anger, gluttony, etc.; while we find
opposed by excess the vices of fanatical rigorousness, too great selfeffacement (too great
conduct oneself inconspicuously, too great act or fact of keeping oneself in the background), or
selfabjection (too great self-low, self-downcast state, too great self- degradation, to great self-
humbling), affectation (artificial and designed to impress, pretended feeling, showing off,
pretentiousness, exaggeration), morose (miserable, down, low, depressed) and gloomy conduct,
etc.

<<<<<<<<<<<<(END OF GENERAL ETHICS)>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

D671 / E681 explain morality and its norms
SYLLABUS differentiate the determinants of
TLO1. RECOGNIZE THE MORALITY OF AN ACT morality
1. GENERAL ETHICS MORALITY AND ITS NORMS
1.1. HUMAN ACTS a) DESCRIPTION OF MORALITY
explain the human act in itself b) THE NORM OF MORALITY
explain the voluntariness of human c) DEFINITION OF MORALITY
acts d) DIVISION OF MORALITY
explain the modifiers of human acts THE DETERMINANTS OF MORALITY: a) THE
a) DEFINITION OF THE HUMAN ACT OBJECT b) THE END OF THE AGENT c) THE
b) CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS CIRCUMSTANCES
i. The Adequate Cause of Human Acts. 1.5. THE PROPERTIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
(A) Elicited Acts (B) Commanded Acts HUMAN ACTS
ii. The Relation of Human Acts to Reason: explain the properties of human acts
(a) Good (b) Evil (c) Indifferent, describe the consequences of human
c) CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT: i. acts
Knowledge ii. Freedom iii. Voluntariness. THE PROPERTIES OF HUMAN ACTS: a) THE
THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HUMAN ACTS IMPUTABILITY OF HUMAN ACTS b) THE MERIT AND
a) KINDS OR DEGREES OF VOLUNTARINESS DEMERIT OF HUMAN ACTS
b) INDIRECT VOLUNTARINESS THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS
THE MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACTS
a) IGNORANCE LO2. GIVE JUSTIFICATION TO A DECIDED ACTION
b) CONCUPISCENCE: antecedent; consequent TAKEN TO BE MORALLY GOOD OR BAD
c) FEAR 2. SPECIAL ETHICS
d) VIOLENCE 2.1. INDIVIDUAL ETHICS 9HRS
e) HABIT 2.1.1. RIGHTS AND DUTIES 135
1.2. THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS explain individual ethics in rights and
explain ends in general duties
explain the ultimate end of human 2.1.2. MAN’S PERSONAL OFFICE 170
acts explain the duties of man towards his
a) DEFINITION OF END soul and his body
b) CLASSIFICATION OF ENDS 2.2. SOCIAL ETHICS
THE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS 2.2.1. FAMILY 226 9HRS
a) THE OBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS explain the morality in society,
b) THE SUBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS marriage and in the rights and duties
1.3. THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS of parents
explain law as a norm of human act 2.2.2. NATION (STATE) 9HRS
explain conscience as a norm of explain the nature, origin, and ends of
human act states 255
LAW: a) DEFINITION OF LAW b) CLASSIFICATION OF explain the rights and duties of man
LAWS c) IMPORTANT CLASSES OF LAWS workers and as professionals 264
CONSCIENCE: a) DEFINITION OF CONSCIENCE b) 2.2.3. GLOBAL COMMUNITY 285
STATES OF CONSCIENCE c) FORMING ONE’S explain the rights and duties of
CONSCIENCE nations, one towards another by
1.4. THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS international law in peace and in war
(END OF SPECIAL ETHICS)
 PART II
SPECIAL ETHICS

The following sentences should be memorized,

1. Man, as individual person, has right and duties which affect and determine his
proper conduct with reference to God, to himself, and to his fellowemen.
2. Man, as a member of human society, has rights and duties which affect him in the
family, in civil, professional, and religious society, and in international relations.

BOOK 1
INDIVIDUAL ETHICS
CHAPTER 1
RIGHTS AND DUTIES
ARTICLE 1.
RIGHTS

a) DEFINITION OF RIGHTS
Taking the word “right” as a substantive, we may view it objectively, or as a thing, as
when we say, “This is my right.” “That is his right.” “The wise man will see that he gets his
rights.” In this sense, right is defined as that which is owed or that which is due. Again, we may
view the term right subjectively, i. e., as residing in the one who possesses it (its subject), and
thus considered, it is a moral power residing in a person, - a power which all others are
bound to respect – of doing, possessing, or requiring something. It is in this subjective sense
that we use the term right in Ethics.
Right is founded upon law. For the existence of a right in one person involves an
obligation is all others of not impeding or violating the right. Now, it is only law that can impose
such an obligation. And whether this law, upon which right is based, be the natural law or
positive law, it is (as all true law) founded ultimately upon the Eternal Law. Hence, the ultimate
basis of right is the Eternal Law.

b) DIVISION OF RIGHT
i. Right is natural or positive according as it is founded upon the natural law or positive
law. Again, as positive law is both divine and human, we distinguish divine right and human
right. Further, according to the division of human law, we have ecclesiastical right and civil right.
The right to preserve one’s life is a natural right; the right of the Church to teach is a divine
right; the rights established by Canon Law are Ecclesiastical rights/ the right of citizens to vote
is a civil right.
ii. Right is also distinguished as right of property (or possession) and right of
jurisdiction. The right of property is the power one has of disposing of a thing possessed
according to one’s own wish or benefit: to sell, to keep, to lend, to change, to give away. The
right of property is called a right in property or possession when goods are owned, but not in
hand. Thus, my right to my books bought and paid for, but not yet delivered to me, is a right to
property. – The right of jurisdiction is the lawful power of a duly constituted superior to make
laws and to govern his subjects.
iii. Right is alienable when its subject (i. e., its possessor) may lawfully cede or renounce
it. Thus, I may renounce my right of eating meat on a nonabstinence day; thus, too, I may
renounce my right in property by giving it away. – Right is inalienable when its subject is not
free to renounce, but must retain it. Such is my right to life.
iv. Right is juridical (or perfect) when it is a legal right, a right strictly enjoined by law,
natural or positive. In other words, it is a right which must be respected, allowed, fulfilled, as a
matter of strict justice. Thus, the right of my grocer to the amount I owe him is a perfect or
juridical right; so also is the right of parents to the respect of their children. – Right is
nonjuridical (or imperfect), or moral, or “a claim”) when it is founded on a virtue other than
justice. Such a right is very often founded upon the virtue of charity. Thus, the right of a
benefactor to gratitude, or the right of a poor man to alms, is an imperfect or moral right, or a
claim. The things that are required by seemliness or the fitness of things are the object of
imperfect right. Thus, it is seemly and fitting that we be liberal and kindly in our dealings with
others: and we say that others have an imperfect right, a claim, to such conduct on our part.

c) PROPERTIES OF RIGHT
Since right is an inviolable moral power by its very definition – for we have defined right
as moral power which all are bound to respect – we do not list inviolability as one of the
properties of right. Inviolability belongs to the essence of right as such. We list three properties
of right, as follows: coaction, limitation, collision.
i. Coaction is the power which right enjoys of forcefully preventing its violation.
Ordinarily the moral power call coaction must be exercised through process of law. Between
man and man (not between man and society) coaction may be exercised by personal force or
violence only when all other means have failed.
ii. Limitation is the natural terminus of right, beyond which it cannot be exercised
without violating the right of another. A right ceases to be a right at the point where it impinges
injuriously upon another’s right. If I wish to remove my old house and to build a better one in
its place, I may not burn my present house, though that would be the easiest way to get rid of
old and useless lumber; such an action would endanger the houses of my neighbors, that is,
such an action would violate my neighbors’ right to the secure and unmenaced possession of
their property.
iii. Collision is the apparent conflict of two rights in such wise that one cannot be
exercised without violation of the other. We say it is an “apparent” conflict; for a real conflict of
rights cannot exist; when rights collide, the greater prevails and the lesser ceases to be a right.
All right is founded on law; all law is an ordinance of reason (when it is strictly and truly law);
and there can be no conflict between the ordinances of reason, for “it would not be reasonable
for reason to contradict itself.” In apparent collision of rights, that is the prevailing right, to
which the other cedes (or in face of which the other disappears), which: (1) belongs to the
more universal order; or (2) is concerned with the graver matter; or (3) is founded upon the
stronger title or claim. Thus, a soldier may place the welfare of his country ahead of his private
right to life; thus, the right to life which belongs to a man trespassing on my grounds is a
greater right than my right to privacy, and I may not take his life for the act of trespass; thus, the
claim upon my charity possessed by poor relatives is stronger than the claim possessed by
other poor persons.

d) THE SUBJECT OF RIGHT

By the subject of right we mean the person who possess right.
The subject of right is a person. It is not an irrational creature. For right is a moral
power, and belongs only to those that can exercise moral acts. Therefore, brute animals have no
rights. Again, we may argue, creatures that have right have obligations; and no creature can
have rights which is incapable of assuming and discharging obligations. But animals have no
capacity of assuming or discharging obligations (i. e., moral obligations, duties). Therefore,
animals have no rights.
What of cruel treatment of animals? Such treatment is morally bad, not because it
violates any rights that animals may have, but because it outrages reason. Cruelty to animals
does not square with the right reasonable order of things which reason (and ultimately the
moral law) demands. For this reason, cruelty to animals is morally evil.
What of vivisection (noun the practice of performing operations on live animals for the
purpose of experimentation or scientific research (used only by people who are opposed to such
work)? Animals are created to man’s use. Now it is a most valuable use of animals to employ
them for the furtherance of biological knowledge. Hence, vivisection is not illicit in itself. But to
inflict injury or pain upon animals where no necessity or use is served, is not reasonable; nay, it
is contrary to reason; and hence is evil.
As to sentiment about animals, especially pet animals, it is to be said that the sane
treatment of them, the treatment required by reason, is ordinary care for their needs; and with
this may be associated a certain extremes are unreasonable and hence evil: the extreme of
cruelty on the one hand, and the extreme of excessive care or consideration for animals, on the
other.
The subject of rights must be capable of assuming and discharging obligations, i. e.,
duties. God’s rational creatures have rights and duties; and His rational creatures are men and
angels. But in Ethics, the science of human acts, we consider man as the person who is the
subject of rights; and, indirectly, we must consider God as the subject of rights when we come
to consider man as having duties towards God.
 ARTICLE 2.
DUTIES

a) DEFINITION OF DUTY
A duty considered objectively, i. e., as an object or thing, is anything one is obliged to do
or to omit. Thus, we speak of our daily work as our duty. Thus, too, we say, “It is your duty to do
this;” “It is one’s duty to avoid evil companionship;” “My duties are very numerous.”
Ethics takes the term duty subjectively, i. e., as affecting the subject bound by it, and
so considered duty is defined as a moral obligation incumbent upon a person of doing or
omitting (avoiding) something.
Duty is a moral obligation, i. e., an obligation resting as a requirement upon a free will.
Hence, the subject of a duty is a person, and only a person. Brute animals do not have duties.
We distinguish moral obligation from physical obligation. A person is morally obliged to assist
at religious services; he is, however, not bound and carried to the service by force. A moral
obligation binds the will; and, as we say in General Ethics (Ch. 1, Art. 3, d), the will is not subject
to physical compulsion.
A duty is the correlative of a right. A right in one imposes a duty on all others of
respecting it, of not violating it. Duty, like right, is based on law.

b) DIVISION OF DUTY
i. A duty imposed by the natural law is natural; a duty which comes from positive law is
positive. The duty of worshipping God is a natural duty; as also is the duty of preserving one’s
life. The latter example shows us that an inalienable right is also a duty. The duty of hearing
Mass on certain feast days is a positive duty, as is the duty of paying taxes.
ii. A duty which requires the performance of an act is affirmative; a duty which requires
the omission or avoidance of something is negative. The primary requirement of the natural
law, “Do good; avoid evil” gives us, in a single example, an instance of both positive and negative
duty. Again, we have the matter exampled in the Decalogue: “Honor thy father and thy mother”
is an affirmative law enjoining an affirmative duty; while negative duty is enjoined by the law,
“Thou shalt not kill.”
iii. A duty which obliges in strict justice, and so corresponds to a perfect right, is a
perfect or juridical duty. A duty which does not obligate according to justice, but according to
charity or some other virtue, and so corresponds to a nonjuridical right, is a nonjuridical, and
imperfect, or moral duty. The obligation of paying to an employee the wage agreed upon is a
perfect duty, while the duty of giving alms to the needy is a moral duty.
iv. There are greater and lesser duties, and where these seem to conflict, the lesser
ceases to be a duty, and the greater prevails. That is the greater duty (in an apparent collision)
which comes from the higher power, the higher law. Thus, duties towards God come before
duties towards men, and if a parent forbids his child to hear Mass on Sunday, the duty of
obeying parent ceases, in this instance, to bind the child, while the duty towards God prevails.
Similarly, if a superior commands his subject to steal, the subject has not, in this instance, the
duty of obedience, for the duty which comes from the natural law – the duty of justice –
prevails.
Again: where there is an apparent conflict of duties, that which is concerned with the
graver matter prevails, while the other ceases to be a duty.
Finally: when there is an apparent conflict of duties, that duty prevails – the other
ceasing to be a duty – which arises out of the more solid title or claim.
To sum up: In an apparent conflict of duties the greater prevails and the lesser ceases to
be a duty; and that is the greater duty which comes from the higher law, or is concerned with
the graver matter, or is grounded upon the more solid title or claim.

c) EXEMPTION FROM DUTY

Duty is founded upon law. Now there is an old saying that “Necessity knows no law.”
What of the value of this saying in moral matters? When there is an imminent evil that cannot
be avoided except by a violation of duty, is one exempted from the duty? In other words, does
necessity exempt from duty?
We shall presently state principles which answer these questions. But first we must
distinguish grades or degrees of necessity, and we must recall a principle enunciated in General
Ethics about the binding force of different laws.
There are THREE DEGREES OF NECESSITY. By necessity we mean the conflict of a duty and a
danger; or, more accurately, we mean the state in which one finds oneself when the performing
a duty means enduring an evil. Now, since there are degrees of evil to be endured, there are
degrees of necessity. Thus, we distinguish extreme necessity, grave necessity, and common or
ordinary necessity.
One is in EXTREME NECESSITY when one’s choice lies between duty and death, or between
duty and an evil fairly comparable with death. Thus, the Christians taken prisoner by the early
persecutors, and faced with the alternative of death or denial of their faith, were in extreme
necessity. –
One is in GRAVE NECESSITY when one’s choice lies between duty and a notable evil less
than death, such as loss of health, good name, or very valuable property. Thus, a man who will
be considered an embezzler unless he secretly and unlawfully employs a fund which he holds in
trust for another, is in grave necessity. –
One is in COMMON or ORDINARY NECESSITY when one’s choice lies between duty and the
enduring or ordinary evils or common hardships. Thus, a man of sound health who must
disregard the Lenten fast or endure some weakness and occasional headaches, is in common or
ordinary necessity.
We learned that a negative law of the natural order binds always and at every moment,
i. e., admits of no exception in any circumstances whatever. We also learned that an affirmative
law binds always, but not at every moment, i. e., its prescription is to be fulfilled, but not in all
circumstances; such fulfillment may, in certain circumstances, be postponed till the adverse
circumstances are changed.
We come now to the PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE EXEMPTING FORCE OF NECESSITY:
i. Common or ordinary necessity never exempts from duty. This principle needs no
proof. It is evidently true. If it were otherwise, there would be no such thing as duty at all. For
duty is obligation, and obligation ordinarily involves some measure of difficulty or selfdenial. If
common necessity exempted one from duty, one might escape every duty, for it is quite the
easiest thing in the world to find a difficulty or an inconvenience in anything one does not feel
inclined to do.
ii. No necessity exempts from a negative natural duty. A negative natural duty is a duty
that comes from a negative law of the natural order. It is a basic principle of Ethics, a primal
demand of reason, that what is intrinsically evil may never, under any circumstances, be
lawfully done.
iii. Extreme or grave necessity exempts from a natural affirmative duty, provided there
is no involved violation of a negative precept of the natural law. The affirmative prescriptions of
the natural law require definite acts of virtue as means to man’s last end. But the achieving of
man’s end does not require precisely this positive act of virtue at this exact moment of time or
in these precise circumstances. Hence, when extreme or grave necessity presses, man may defer
the act of virtue until the circumstance of necessity has been changed.
Thus, a man is required by the natural law to restore ill-gotten money. But if the original
money has been spent and present restitution would mean extreme or grave evil; if for
example, it would mean extreme poverty for the man and his family, loss of social position, and
loss of good name, the restitution might be deferred until happier times, or, at least, full
payment might be so deferred while the man is question does all that he can to make partial
payments and to prepare himself, even at the continuous cost of common hardships and
sacrifices, to make restitution in full. If, however, the deferring of restitution would put the
person to whom it is due in extreme poverty, then the withholding of payment would be itself a
violation of the negative law that forbids us to injure others, and in this case restitution, even at
the greatest cost, would have to be made.
 iv. Extreme or grave necessity exempts from duty imposed by human positive law,
provided there is no involved violation of negative natural law. This is quite obvious in view of
the principle just explained. For certainly that which is sufficient to exempt from a prescription
of the natural law, is a fortiori sufficient to exempt from human positive law. ( Argumentum a
fortiori (pron. /ˈɑː fɔːrtɪˈoʊriː/; Latin: "from a/the stronger [thing]") is a form of argumentation which draws
upon existing confidence in a proposition to argue in favor of a second proposition that is held to be implicit
in the first. The second proposition may be considered "weaker," and therefore the arguer adduces a
"stronger" proposition to support it. [wiki])
 CHAPTER III
MAN’S PERSONAL OFFICE

By office we mean duty or system of duties. By personal in our title we mean that which
is done by and to the acting person, the human agent. In a word, man’s duties towards himself.
These duties are concerned with matters of soul and of body.

ARTICLE 1.
DUTIES OF MAN TOWARDS HIS SOUL

The soul of man has two faculties or powers or capacities for action, viz., the knowing
faculty or intellect, and the choosing faculty or will. Duties are obligations, things to be
done. Hence, man’s duties of soul consist in things to be done by intellect and will.

a) DUTIES OF THE INTELLECT

Man is bound to use his faculties for the achievement of his last end; this is the law of
nature; for this purpose were faculties given, as is evident from their nature and function.
Hence, man has the duty of exercising his intellect and of perfecting it. The intellect is
perfected by knowledge of truth. Some truths must be known if man is to achieve his last end as
a rational being, and some truths are not of this necessary character. Thus, we distinguish
necessary knowledge, and free or nonnecessary knowledge.
Man must, of necessity, know the truths that related to the last end and the means of
achieving it. Man did not establish this last end; he is not free to change it. The end is there to
be achieved; man exists to achieve it; hence, it is distinctly “up to man” to discover this last end
and the means of reaching it. Now, the last end of man is God; and the means of reaching God
and eternal happiness in the possession of God are morally good human acts. Therefore, man
must know God, and must know what makes human acts morally good, and he must know how
he himself is to maintain such goodness in his acts. This is the body of necessary knowledge
that man is bound to acquire. Hence, man must know God and the basic prescriptions of the
natural law, and his intellect must be equipped with the virtues of wisdom and prudence.
Further, man must know the special duties of his state of life and the bearing these have upon
his actions towards others – for all this is required by the general ethic in the matter, viz., “man
must know what makes human acts morally good, and how to maintain such goodness in his
own acts.”
Matter of free knowledge, matters in which, absolutely considered, man has no natural
obligation, are history, science, letters, and “book-learning” in general. Still, reason counsels (but
does not command) the acquiring of such knowledge, for it is rational to perfect one’s faculties
in every possible way. Thus, all studies of a speculative or practical nature which have no direct
bearing upon the achievement of man’s end, are matters of free knowledge. Excessive devotion
to such studies, however, a devotion that would divert man from acquiring the essential and
necessary knowledge which is pertinent to the achieving of his last end, is forbidden by the
natural law. In all this we are speaking absolutely, i. e., without taking conditions or related
considerations into account. When such considerations are brought to bear, we see that certain
matters of free-knowledge become obligatory. Thus, a boy who would refuse to learn his letters
or to go to school would violate the natural law which requires obedience to parents. Again, a
man who would refuse to learn a trade, business, profession, or even the manner of performing
acts of common labor, would violate the natural law which requires him to take ordinary care of
bodily life and health in himself and in his dependents, and hence, to have some means of
gaining a livelihood.

b) DUTIES OF THE WILL

As the intellect is perfected by the knowledge of truth, so the will is perfected by the
quest of that which is good. Now, the foremost good is the good of the last end. This good is,
objectively, God; and subjectively it is eternal happiness in God. Hence the first obligation of the
will is to tend towards the achieving of happiness in the possession of God, and therefore, the
will must tend towards or love of God as the Supreme Good.
To attain the last end, the will must follow the rule of right reason, and must acquire a
readiness in this matter. Such readiness is acquired in the moral virtues of prudence, justice,
fortitude, and temperance. These virtues are necessary to keep the will prompt in its choice of
good, and in its repression of the sudden impulses of inordinate passion which would thwart
the achievement of the limitless good and happiness.
 ARTICLE 2. DUTIES OF MAN TOWARDS HIS BODY

a) LIFE
With regard to bodily life man has a twofold duty, viz., the duty of conserving it in
integrity, and the duty of avoiding death, mutilation, and needless danger. These two duties are
really only two views – one positive and the other negative – of the same duty.
Man does not own his body. God owns it. God alone has the right to dispose of it and of
its life and health. Life and health have been given to man as great blessings, as goods to be
conserved and used. Like all true goods that man may possess, life and health, and all that
pertains directly to these goods, are to be used for the achievement of man’s last end.
Therefore, absolutely speaking, man is bound to exercise ordinary care for the conservation of
life and health. Thus, he is obliged to maintain the integrity and perfection of his members, to
take such nourishment as is required for the proper development or maintenance of bodily life,
to observe the requirements of reason in matters of cleanliness and proper dress, to keep the
senses strictly under control. These are man’s positive duties with regard to his body.
Man’s negative duties with regard to bodily life and health oblige him to avoid suicide,
the needless mutilation of his members, intemperance, and all unreasonable use of objects or
practices that could be harmful to life or limb or bodily health.
Suicide is self-murder. It is the direct taking of one’s own life upon one’s own authority.
Suicide can never, under any circumstances, be permitted. Suicide, clearly regarded as simple
and direct self-murder, is absolutely contrary to the natural law, and is never permitted. Suicide
is an injury done to God, to society, and to the person committing it.

b) OTHER GOODS
Besides the goods of soul and body there are others, such as prosperity, good name,
honor, external liberty, etc. These are usually required, in greater or less measure, for the full
perfection of bodily life. They are also required by the man who has dependents. Hence, a man
must have employment or some means of livelihood. He must take care of those dependent
upon him and provide for their future. He must earn a good name and achieve an honest place
in the estimation of his fellows. Thus, ordinarily, a man must exert himself to obtain a
sufficiency of the good of this world.
But, apart from the necessity imposed by the duties of one’s state of life, man is quite
free to neglect the matter of worldly prosperity, nay, he may find it much to his advantage to do
so. For the absence of care about worldly possessions ordinarily favors one’s progress in virtue,
and removes many obstacles from the path in which one must walk to attain one’s last end. Of
course, it does not follow that the pursuit of honest prosperity, good name, etc., is wrong. As
long as both the matter and the manner of such a quest are kept within the moral law, they are
quite licit. Goods of fortune, fame, honor, liberty, etc., are gifts of God, though they are not gifts
of the first rank. As long as they are used according to reason, and not abused, they can be
made to serve man’s purpose in attaining his least end, notwithstanding the fact that they are
likely to be abused and to be a hindrance to man’s true work rather than a help.
 BOOK SECOND
SOCIAL ETHICS
CHAPTER 1
THE FAMILY

Society rests upon the family.

ARTICLE 1. SOCIETY

a) DEFINITION OF SOCIETY
A society is a stable moral union of a plurality of persons for the purpose of
achieving a common end by the use of common means.
It is stable union, not a mere loose assembly or group; it is a more or less permanent
group, bonded in a common effort to achieve a common end. It is a moral union, not, on the one
hand, a flock or herd, nor, on the other hand, a number of individual human beings held by a
physical bond, as a line of prisoners are held by a chain. It consists of a plurality of persons, i. e.,
of some or many human beings, and these are allied together for the achievement of a common
end by the use of common means.
When we speak of society in general we mean the human race, for humanity is a society
permanently bonded by the common nature of its members, and tending by the use of means
available to all, to the common end, which is, objectively, God, and subjectively, eternal
happiness. Man is social by nature, and not, as some philosophers have taught, by free choice.
Human society is therefore a natural institution, or, more properly, an institution of God, the
author of human nature.
That society is natural to man is easily proved. Man cannot exist without others. Not
only does a man need parents in order to be born, but he needs the care of others for a very
long time after birth – something that is not true of brute animals, which are quickly able to
look after themselves. Again, a child must be supported and educated by others; he needs the
guidance and control of mature minds; he needs association with cultivated persons if he is to
develop his powers of soul; he needs society for the exercise of splendid tendencies (called
“social virtues”), such as benevolence, pity for the distressed, love of virtuous and heroic
conduct, etc. Finally, man needs society in his old age; wretched indeed would be his condition
if he had to battle through life as a solitary, and to lie down at the last to starve and die when his
poor strength was spent and his shrunken body unable to procure the means of its support.
The needs of man call for society, not merely the conveniences of man, as the “social compact
theorists” teach. These needs are natural; and hence society, in answering natural need, shows
itself a natural institution.
We may sum up the whole argument thus: Man has the natural right to life, health,
integrity of members, goods of reputation and honor, goods of soul, and certain goods of
fortune. But, it would be altogether impossible for man to procure and preserve these things
without society, and his natural right to them would be therefore an illusory thing, a thing
without meaning. Therefore, the very voice of nature which proclaims man’s rights, proclaims
the necessity of human society.

b) DIVISION OF SOCIETY
i. A society is natural or free, according as it is a requirement of human nature or the
result of free agreement among men. Human society achieves its reality in the Family and the
State; hence the Family and the State are natural societies. A debating club, or a workman’s
union, is a free society.
ii. A society is simple or composite according as it is or is not joined in confederation
with other societies. A confederation is a composite society, and its purpose is not to absorb the
minor societies (simple societies) which make it up, but to protect them and keep them
working harmoniously and according to order. Thus, an independent literary society is a simple
society; while the Catholic Students’ Mission Crusade is composite, being composed of various
individual Units, each of which preserves its own proper identity. If the confederation of
societies is such that the minor societies which make it up are fused into such union that their
proper identity is lost, the result is not a composite society, but merely a larger simple society.
iii. A society is perfect or imperfect according as it contains in itself all that its nature
demands, both as to end and means to the end, and is self-sufficient and independent; or, on the
other hand, lacks such self-sufficiency. Civil society (i. e., the State) and the Church are perfect
societies. All other societies are imperfect.
iv. A society is equal or unequal according as authority in the society is vested in the
entire social group, or is vested in one or more persons to whom the others are subjected. Thus,
a literary club which decides all matters by votes is an equal society, while the Family is an
unequal society with the chief authority vested in the father.

c) SOCIAL AUTHORITY
Authority is the right and power of ordering others to act in a certain manner, and
of exacting obedience. Such a right and power is a natural requirement of society. Authority is
necessary. For human society is a group of free beings who are made for the same end, but are
not necessitated or compelled in any particular action. Thus, we find the world full of varying
and opposed opinions, of men of entirely different dispositions, or selfish men, of ambitious
men. If there were not authority among men, what a disorder there would be! The human bond
of a common nature, and common natural requirements, would remain, it is true, and would
continue to make clear the natural character of human society; but the ends of that society
would be defeated; men would be at all manner of cross purposes, hindering and thwarting one
another in every conceivable way. Surely, if society is to serve its normal purpose of getting men
on towards their last end, of helping them to work together to this common end, there must be
order, there must be peace in the main, there must be forbearance, there must be endurance.
Society is futile without these things. But nature is never futile, being the expression of the
Eternal Reason and Wisdom. Hence, as nature requires society, nature requires order in society.
As order is impossible without authority, nature itself requires authority in society.
Social authority, then, must exist. What of its extent or its limits? It is obvious that its
limits are fixed by its purpose. Social authority exists alone for the right ordering of those
things that are necessary to the attainment of the end of society, and which could not exist
without authority. Hence, the government of a community, and the individual person in
authority, may not make use of place and power to enforce decrees that are mere whims. They
may not abuse their office. It is true indeed that “a public office is a public trust.” An office, i.e., a
place of authority in society, demands of the officer honesty and honor, prudence and fidelity,
courage and enduring attention to duty. The abuse of authority, by extending its limits beyond
their due and proper place, is injustice and tyranny, and against such abuse the subjects of
authority have the right to protest, and, when there is no other way of achieving justice, to
revolt.
 ARTICLE 2. MARRIAGE

a) DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE
We may speak of the married state and of the act of marriage, i. e., the act of being
married. The married state constitutes conjugal society, and it is obviously of this that we
speak in the present Article.
Conjugal society is the stable union entered into by a man and a woman for the
procreation and education of children and for mutual support and helpfulness.
From this definition we learn that the parties to the marriage contract must be a man
and a woman, and these must be free to make the marriage contract. When we speak of the
indissolubility of marriage, we shall see that the existence of one such marriage contract
renders another impossible for either of the parties while both are alive. We also learn from the
definition that the primary end of marriage is the generation and education of children, for it is
by these means that the human race is kept in existence and brought to the proper
development of its mental and moral powers. Finally, the definition indicates the secondary end
of marriage, viz., the mutual love and helpfulness that the married persons are to find in this
state. Of course, both primary and secondary ends of marriage are subordinate to the last end
of man, viz., God, and everlasting happiness, and marriage is meant to help men towards this
great ultimate end.
The ends of marriage indicate that it is a natural institution. Marriage is natural because
rational nature inclines man towards it. It would not be necessary for the proper care and
training which rational nature inclines man to give to his children, for it is the good of offspring
that constitutes the primary end of marriage, and this includes not only birth, but rearing and
training. Parents naturally incline to the work of rearing their children safely to full maturity.
Hence, nature inclines man to a stable union; men are inclined by reason to marry, not merely to
mate. In the second place, nature indicates the necessity of marriage in the fact that the sexes
are not identical but supplementary, so that there is a general and normal need of one for the
other.
Marriage then is natural, and conjugal society is a natural society. But, it is not natural as
breathing is natural; it is not a thing absolutely required of every man and every woman. It is
natural, inasmuch as nature is evidently framed for it, and inclines man towards it; but is
actualization, the fulfillment of the natural inclination, is a matter of individual man’ free
choice. The primary end of matrimony, viz., the generation and education of children, is
sufficiently achieved without requiring every man and every woman to marry; and hence
nature does not impose it as a universal and individual duty. Exceptions are not only in accord
with the requirements of nature, but are sometimes very desirable and even necessary.
Mankind taken collectively, i. e., as a group, is bound by the obligation of the natural law to
marriage and the conjugal society; but taken distributively, i. e., as individuals, mankind is not
so bound. Hence, it is lawful for anyone (otherwise free) to marry or to remain single. Those
who choose to remain single are bound to the life of celibacy in perfect personal continence.

b) THE UNITY OF MARRIAGE

By the unity of marriage is meant the stable union of one man and one woman. States
opposed to unity are polygamy, or plurality of wives, and polyandry, or plurality of husbands.
Both polygamy and polyandry are opposed to the natural law. This fact is evident from the ends
of marriage as a natural office. Marriage, as we have seen, is a natural state, established for the
achievement of certain ends. Anything, therefore, which opposes the attaining of these ends, is
opposed to the natural office and state of marriage. But, what is opposed to a natural office and
state is opposed to the natural law itself.
Polyandry would give several heads to one family; it would render doubtful, and
insolubly doubtful, the matter of determining the father of each child; the duty of educating the
children could (and would) be shirked and neglected by all the husbands, for none of them
could know with certitude that he had a duty towards this or that child. Thus, polyandry
defeats the primary end of marriage, for who is there that can even imagine a wife and several
husbands bonded together in love, and lending one another mutual support and help?
Polygamy is opposed to the natural law as a degradation of woman, for it makes wives
little (if anything) more than slaves. Again, it thwarts the secondary end of marriage, for it
would lead (and has led, wherever practiced) to bitterness, jealousy, domestic strife, and great
unhappiness.
To conclude: The unity of marriage is a requisite of the natural law. Unity is a property
or attribute of true marriage, i. e., a quality that is necessarily consequent upon the very nature
of marriage.

c) THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF MARRIAGE

The indissolubility of marriage means its perpetuity. To say that marriage is
indissoluble is to say that the marriage – contract, once validly made, cannot be broken, but
remains in effect until it is naturally dissolved by the death of one of the parties. Indissolubility
is a property or attribute of marriage, and thus belongs to marriage by natural necessity.
Married people may, under conditions that make living together humanly impossible or at least
trying in the extreme, bring about a separation from bed and board; but such a separation does
not dissolve marriage, and neither of the separated parties is free to marry as long as the other
lives. In a word, then, indissolubility of marriage means that there is no such thing as lawful
divorce.
The proof of this position on the perpetuity of marriage may be undertaken in two ways:
first, by showing positively that marriage, to fulfill its natural ends, must be indissoluble; and
secondly, by a negative demonstration, showing the evil of divorce. We offer the two proofs:
i. Marriage is a natural office, which has for its primary end the procreation and
education of children. Now, while the procreation of children does not continue throughout the
whole of the normal married life, the training, the education of children continues until the
parents are well advanced in years. But, it is when the children are reared that marriage, in a
particular way, begins to fulfill its secondary end, and gives to the aged couple the consolation
and support of mutual and enduring love. Hence, properly to fulfill its ends, marriage must be
“a world without end bargain.”
ii. That is an evil, and opposed to the natural order which leads to disturbances and
unhappiness among men and gives rise to social discords. Now – as the records of courts,
schools, reformatories, and prisons amply prove – the breaking up of homes through divorce is
one of the greatest, if not the very greatest, of causes of these social ills. Therefore, divorce is an
evil, and is opposed to the natural order.
 ARTICLE 3. RIGHT AND DUTIES OF PARENTS

a) PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Authority is a natural necessity in any society. Hence, we may conclude at one that it
is a necessity in conjugal society. The ends of marriage cannot be served if there is a
disagreement and strife between parents upon the matter of procreation and education of
children; and, obviously, such discord is the direct frustration of the love and mutual
helpfulness which marriage is naturally meant to give to husband and wife. Therefore, there
must be authority in the family.
What is the source of this authority? It is nature, and not the State. Individual men
and women existed upon earth before there was any such thing as civil society, and at that time
they had the rights which were obviously the heritage and the intention of their nature, and
which could be fulfilled perfectly without civil society. These men and women had the right to
marry, the right to have children, and the right and duty of educating children. These rights,
then, belong to mankind by a title that is valid prior to any claims of civil society in the matter.
It is true, indeed, that the State itself is a natural society, and as such is necessary to man.
But, this necessity is not lodged in the individual man as such, but in individual men as
members of a considerable group. As soon as the number of persons in any locality or territory
is large enough to make civil authority an evident natural convenience; as soon as the number
of human beings is large enough to make possible the violation of one another’s rights, the
working of men to cross purposes, the rise of discord and turmoil, the existence of bullying,
domineering, injustice, and enslavement; so soon does civil society become a natural
requirement called State. The family is the foundation and the fountain source of the State; for
from the family comes the citizens that constitute the State. Hence, it is an absurd and topsy-
turvy piece of thinking that essays to trace the origin of domestic authority to the State.
Granted, then, that there must be authority in the family, and that this authority comes
from the natural law, a further question arises. In what member or members of the family
does this authority reside? In the parents, and not in the children; so much is obvious. But, in
which of the parents? The parents themselves, while not a family, constitute conjugal society;
and in this society there must be authority. Is that authority lodge equally in husband and wife?
It could not be so; for, although husband and wife are equals, and are meant to achieve
the ends of their state by harmonious effort, it is evident that, where there are but two
members in a society, equal authority could bring about a deadlock on any issue, and could
thwart the very end for which the society exists. It is unreasonable to think that a society, which
is a stable union, could be marked by essential instability; it is absurd to suppose that a society,
which is a union of persons working for a common end, could be so constituted as to render
impracticable and even impossible the achievement of any end at all. Yet this is precisely what
those must think and suppose who assert the equal authority of husband and wife in conjugal
society. One of the couple, therefore, must have the first place of authority. There must be one
head of conjugal society and of the family.
Parental authority, like all authority, must be exercised according to the dictates of
reason. It has its limits. It is itself an authority subject to the authority of God. Hence, parents
cannot require their children, and the husband cannot require his wife, to do anything that is
contrary to the law of God, of nature. Authority that is exercised for injustice ceases to be
authority, and has no binding force whatever.

b) THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

By the education of children we mean much more than their schooling. We mean their
thorough training and development in things bodily, mental, and spiritual, from infancy to
maturity. For this reason we speak of education as physical, intellectual, and moral.
Physical education is achieved by due development of bodily powers and health. Hence,
those in charge of education must see that children are properly fed, suitably clothed, and
sufficiently sheltered. They must see that children get air, and sunlight, and exercise. They must
care diligently for children who are sick.
 Intellectual education is achieved by instruction in the truths that man must know, and
in those that he finds of use and of grace and culture. Those in charge of education must impart
such truths patiently and perseveringly. They must train children in the knowledge of God and
of duties; they must impart such knowledge as will enable the children to make their way in
life, to support themselves according to the measure of their physical needs; and they must give
to the children such opportunities of cultural enlightenment as are suitable to their condition
and to the proper perfecting of mental powers.
Moral education is achieved by training the will to embrace and fulfill the great duties
which intellectual education makes known to the mind. The child must be shown how to do the
thing for which life was given him. He must be trained to the practical love and service of God,
and to the love of his neighbor as himself.
Those who have charge of education must see to all these matters. How, who are “those
in charge of education”? We answer: the parents, first, last, and exclusively!
What of the State? Has not the State the right to control education and the duty to
impart it?
Consider:
The State does not beget children; infants are not committed to the State, but to their
parents. If the parents do not care for the life and training of the child, the whole world is
unanimous in condemning them. No one condemns the State. Now, if there is just
condemnation for neglected duty, there is a right to exercise that duty. Therefore, parents, and
not the State, have the right to educate their children. This right is inalienable, it is a right that
parents must see through to effective realization; and that is only saying that it is a duty. Parents
have the right and the duty to educate their children.
But, how is the State to assure itself of good citizens if it does not train them up? Let the
State do all it can to encourage sound education, especially moral education. But, let it not
invade the home, and try to make itself superior to the family, the primal society upon which
the State itself is founded. For the State may just as well and as lawfully tell a man what his
children shall have for breakfast, and how they shall eat it, and at what particular table, as it
may lawfully decide upon a set form of education and thrust this upon the children.
The part of the State, then, is to furnish opportunity for learning; to foster it; to be
its patron. If parents neglect the education of their children, the State may compel them to look
to their duties, and this is all. If the parents decide that this or that child shall learn a trade, that
is their business; no wrong is done to the child; no obstacle is placed in the way of that child to
thwart the achievement of its last end; and the State has no right to interfere.
We conclude: Parents have the right and duty of educating their children. This they
must do in accordance with the natural law, the law of God, and with the prescriptions of true
religion and morality.
 CHAPTER II
THE STATE, MAN’S WORK
ARTICLE 1. THE STATE

a) DEFINITION AND ORIGIN OF THE STATE

In the earlier Chapters we have spoken frequently of the State or civil society, but there is
need for a direct and summary discussion of the subject here.
Aristotle defines the State as a perfect natural society. The definition may be amplified
and expressed as follows: The State is a perfect natural union of families, established for
their common temporal good under a definite government.
To explain the definition: The State is a natural society, for men, by an impulse and urge
of nature, form civil groups and establish governments. The State is a perfect society, for it
requires no other society upon which it depends for its peculiar function; in its own sphere it is
self-sufficient and independent. The State exists for the common temporal good of those that
make it up, and these members are, first, families, and, secondly, the individuals that compose
families; and the State is meant to serve its members in temporal and external things. On this
score the State differs from the Church, which serves the eternal and spiritual interests of men.
Finally, the State is constituted under a definite form of government, that is, the members of the
Sate are under the same authority in civil matters (i. e., temporal and external matters); and
this is only saying that the State is a society, for authority is essential to any society; and the
State must therefore have authority and a seat of authority or government, whether this be in
the form of monarchy, democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, or any other governing power.
The origin of the State is indicated in the definition we have given, for we have called
the State a natural society. The State has its origin in the natural urge and impulse of rational
man to form civil society and set up government; it is a requirement of reason for life in society.
Those who deny this doctrine declare that man has established the convenience of civil society
by free government, and that the State is not naturally necessary to man. The agreement, say
these theorists, was a social contract or social compact and security, and to this end they
sacrificed, in the terms of the contract, the great freedom and advantages that were theirs in
solitary life.
Suffice it to say that it has no historical foundation whatever. Over against it as mere
theory stands the unquestionable fact of the existence of civil society; and this fact is a
primitive, universal, and constant phenomenon among men. Now, a primitive, universal, and
constant phenomenon existing among men who are different in every way except in their
nature – for men are different in talent, in ability, in character, in tastes, in dispositions or
temperament, not to mention the mere external differences which are so marked that no two
men are precisely alike in all particular bodily features, not even in one such feature – such a
phenomenon, we say, has no explanation except in the one changeless thing about man, that is,
his nature. Hence, we assert that civil society, i. e., State, is natural to man, and that the tendency
or impulse of men which brings the Sate into being is a tendency which expresses a
requirement of rational nature for life in human society.
Of course, the actual form of government is not thing naturally necessary, but is chosen
and established by agreement or arrangement on the part of men. If the individual forms of
governing power (monarchy, democracy, etc.) were of natural necessity, then there would be
but one form in all communities or countries. The question may be asked, “Which is the best
form of government?” Aristotle, four centuries before Christ, and St. Thomas Aquinas, in the
thirteenth century, have both declared that this question has no absolute answer; and we are
unable to answer it absolutely today. The question has a conditioned or qualified answer,
however, and it is this: that form of government is the best for any given people or time which is
found best suited to achieve the ends of governments (i. e., the external and temporal welfare of
the governed, and, indirectly, the promotion of men towards their eternal last end) among that
people at that time.

b) THE EXTENT OF STATE AUTHORITY

 Authority is essential to society; hence, it is essential to civil society or the State. The
nature of this authority is indicated by the ends which the society exists to achieve; and the
same ends limit and define the extent to which such authority may be lawfully exercised. Now,
the State exists to promote man’s material and temporal welfare itself is a good subordinated to
the eternal and spiritual welfare of men. Hence, the State in pursuing its ends must not
contravene the higher good, the eternal interests of man. On the contrary, the State must, in its
own sphere, render to men such service as may be helpful to them in the attainment of their
last eternal end.
The authority of the State comes from God. For, every natural requirement is created by
the God who created nature; and the answer to such requirement is a thing divinely given. Now,
civil society is a natural requirement of men, and is from God; and this requirement is met by
authority is the State, and this, too, must be from God. But God does not work at cross
purposes; He does not make State authority a thing to contradict His own eternal plan and
providence. Hence, State authority has very definite limits beyond which it cannot lawfully go.
We are now to assert more generally the limits of the good and necessary thing called State
authority.
The State must not interfere with the rights of the individual or the family in matters
strictly personal and private. It must not, therefore, interfere with the rights of parents to
educate their children, nor with the conduct of the home, nor with the personal practices of
any citizen, except in so far as it may (and should) accurately define what the natural law
already requires in cases of a collision of rights
The State should protect, stimulate, and help its citizens in the proper exercise of human
liberty. It should strive to remove obstacles which hamper the activity of liberty – such as war,
excessive taxes, political dissensions. It should take repressive measure against violations of the
rights of citizens; and, where the natural law in not definite, it should clearly define these
rights. It should help individual liberty by doing for its citizens what they cannot do for
themselves, as individuals or as groups; and thus, the State should open and improve ports and
canals; conduct public works such as improved means of transport on a large scale, model
factories, etc.; promote technical instruction in all branches of industry; help necessary or
useful individual efforts by generous subsidies; and so on. To do all this well, the State should
exact a certain and equable sacrifice of money from all citizens (taxation).
State authority, with noble ends and due limitations, comes from God. It resides in the
people by the gift of God, and by them is conferred upon a chosen ruler. The ruler is responsible
to God and to the people. God confers authority upon the whole people, not by any special act,
but by creating them; for He creates them men, as free and rational agents who are to live
together in human society, and the authority is a plain essential required by reason in these
circumstances.
Such being the character of State authority, it follows that the true laws, which it enacts,
i. e., laws that are ordinances of reason for the common good, laws that are just, honest,
possible of observance, useful, permanent, and promulgated, are binding upon the conscience
of men. Men cannot disregard such laws without moral guilt; for they are due enactments of
authority which comes from God, and in so far they are particular expressions and applications
of the Eternal Law, which is the Norm of Morality.
When civil authority is abused, an injustice is committed against the members of
the State. In this case the rulers – who are responsible to God and to the people, and who are in
office to protect, inspire, and help the citizens of the community – falsify their trust, and
become oppressors and tyrants. Redress in such circumstances cannot be had through courts
that are the allies of tyrannous rulers. How are the people to obtain redress? By the due
resistance. Of course, if the tyranny is not extreme, prudence counsels a long and patient
sufferance. But if, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, “a long train of abuses and
usurpations … evinces a design to reduce them (i. e., the citizens) under absolute despotism,”
then it is the right of the people to resist. In this case, the tyrannous government is an unjust
aggressor, and resistance is the one lawful means of overcoming it. Notice that such
resistance is not rebellion. Rebellion is an unjust aggression on the part of citizens against the
State as duly constituted and established; and as such, rebellion is always a direct violation of
the natural law. But resistance, even armed resistance, is justified self-defense. As long as the
State is not wholly corrupt, wholly faithless to its natural purpose of caring for the common
material welfare of its people, it continues to be the State, and an attempt to overthrow it is
rebellion, a thing always wrong. But when the State has become the oppressor of its citizens,
when it has ceased to be in any sense an institution working for the welfare of the citizens, then
it is the enemy and the aggressor of the citizens, and may be resisted, and lawfully resisted, even
to the extent of war and bloodshed.
 ARTICLE 2. MAN’S WORK

a) LABOR
Labor or work is man’s effort applied to production of goods. It is effort of mind or
body partially or wholly applied to the production of utilities. While the term labor is
ordinarily used to denote hired labor, and sometimes manual or bodily labor, it really signifies
the effort of the professional man (clergyman, lawyer, physician, surgeon, actor, journalist,
businessman) as well as that of the mechanic, the “day laborer,” and the farmer. All human
effort unites in different proportions the activities of body (muscular effort), intellect (mental
effort), and will (moral effort). And any human effort, no matter what proportion of muscle,
mind, and will be involved, which tends partially or entirely to the production of goods, utilities,
commodities, values, results – in a word, that can in any manner be translated into terms of
dollars and cents – is labor or work.
Labor is a means of attaining to man’s last end, and indeed, speaking generally, an
indispensable means. For man’s faculties of body and mind were given him for the attainment
of his last end; these faculties require the maintenance of bodily, mental, and moral life and
effectiveness; and to this maintenance labor, or its fruit, is a direct means.
Labor is man’s right and duty. Speaking generally, it is a necessary means to his last end,
and therefore his inalienable right. Speaking particularly, labor of some kind is the duty of each
and all, for it is the opportunity of gaining merit for the life to come. Further, labor is a solace, a
source of interest and pleasure, of peace and happiness.
If labor be a thing productive of fruits that can be, in any manner whatever, translated
into terms of dollars and cents, what of intellectual and spiritual labor? What of the hard
study of the student? What of the continuous prayers of the contemplative? The student
prepares himself, ordinarily speaking, for gainful occupation; and even the recluse, the finished
scholar who studies and writes, pours out the wealth of his mind that takes shape in
manuscripts and books, and is transferred and circulated among men by buying and selling.
The contemplative, the rare soul called to “the better part,” wins countless favors for humanity;
in example and through the fruits of active divine worship, such a soul keeps the world from
forgetting the high principles of the Christian religion and morality which alone make labor
possible among the mass of men to whom it is a hardship in itself, a thing that requires effort
and perseverance and from labor so encouraged come the goods of material wealth.
Thus, there is a distinctly traceable relation between the highest and most spiritual
occupation, and the labor that leads to material goods. Still, practically speaking, we need not
go to such lengths to establish the justice of our definition of labor. In Ethics, we consider labor
chiefly in the sense that the term carries to the economist and the sociologist. We mean the
work that is done, wholly or partially, for self – support or gain, by the professional man, the
businessman, the farmer, the mechanic, and the man who uses bodily effort on “a job.” In a
word, we mean that which is done, wholly or partially, or in any manner, for a wage.

b) ASSOCIATIONS
Association is the active gathering together of men to form a society. Here, we do not
speak of the natural association inseparable from the family and from the human race (human
society) as such; nor do we mean by association the formation of the natural and perfect
society called the State, nor the higher perfect society called the Church. We mean the coming
together of men to form a private society for the better achievement of private ends. Thus, we
have associations that are religious, such as a sodality; political, such as a society for research;
industrial, such as a labor union; commercial, such as a board of trade; literary, such as a study
circle or debating club; etc.
To form associations with his fellows for the better achievement of lawful ends that the
associates as individuals could not achieve, or count not achieve readily, is the right of man, and
a natural right. For man is inclined by nature towards the orderly development of his faculties,
and to realize this natural disposition he needs to conjoin his powers with those of others in
association distinct from domestic and civil society. Such association masses and focuses the
powers and the efforts of individual; it coordinates, combines, intensifies, and directs these
efforts for the achieving of a lawful end. Thus, the end is achievable, and readily achievable, by
the conjoined work of the associates, whereas, though a lawful good towards which each may,
or even must, strive, it would not be so achievable by individual and separate effort. Hence,
association is often a better means to a lawful end than individual effort; just as “tow heads are
better that one,” and just as ten hands will lift a greater weight that two.
Now, man has a natural right to achieve lawful ends; hence, he has the natural right to
the use of the means, and of the better means, to that achievement. It follows that the right of
association is a natural right. again: as a single person requires the union of head and hands
and tools to accomplish a piece of work and a s he has the natural right to combine these things
in the production of the work, so, by a true parity, Tom and Dick and Harry may unite to achieve
a certain end, and they have the natural right so to unite; and in uniting they constitute a moral
person, a single moral personality, which has rights that are not to be limited more than those
of physical persons.
Now, if men may lawfully unite in association for the achievement of a lawful end,
workers may so unite. Thus, “professional associations” may lawfully exist. Of such
associations, the more important for Ethics (as being the most common, and as presenting the
most obvious field of application for matters of right) exist among industrial workers, and are
known as “labor unions,” or, collectively, as “organized labor.” With such associations we shall
deal in brief detail.
Workers are not machines, not tools, not workhorses. They are men. As men they have
rights to goods of soul, of body, and of fortune. They have duties too: duties to God, to self, to
fellowmen. When these facts or their implications are ignored by those that have the control of
the means of production (capitalists and employers), an injustice is done, and this is an
injustice against the natural law. So much is evident. Now, individual workmen are powerless to
combat such injustice if it exists, and to prevent its existence if it threatens. Organized labor can
resist or prevent such injustice. Hence, organization of labor is lawful as a necessary means to
protect natural right.
Labor unions must strive to obtain for workers that fullness of rounded human life, that
orderly development of faculties, and seemly use thereof, that belong to individual men by right
of nature. Therefore, the effort of such unions must be to secure to men true freedom in the
making of wage contracts, and there is no true freedom when the worker has the alternative of
accepting this sort of work, or wage, or working condition, or hours of work, or of starving.
Hence, labor unions must seek to establish and maintain decency in work, justice in wages,
humanity in the working schedule, sanitary conditions in the places of employment. In a word,
labor unions must seek to fix the conditions of labor justly, so that the workman may be kept
out of servitude, and may live free to do “all that may become a man,” neither attempting more,
nor accepting less.
Labor unions, like other moral and physical persons, must not exceed their rights. They
must fulfill their duties. If labor unions are not used for lawful ends, they are abused. They must
not, therefore, demand exorbitant returns for work, nor unreasonable hours, nor bring to
naught their efforts for a just wage and decent living conditions by prosecuting accidental and
trifling demands. Nor must hey be too quick to employ coercive methods in gaining their just
ends, but must reserve such methods (strikes, boycotts) as the last reluctant resort.

c) WAGES
Wages are the price of work. Wages are the sum of money, or money equivalent,
exchanged for a certain amount of work, or for a certain time of service. The nominal wage is
the sum named in the wage contract; the real wage is the exchange value of this sum.
In other words, the nominal wage is the face value of the money paid, and the real wage
is the amount of good this money will buy.
Workman and employer agree on the wage to be paid; the workman gives his labor, in
terms of products (piece of work) or of time (day-work, monthly work, etc.), and the employer
pays money. Thus, between the employer and the laborer there is a contract made, and this
contract is bilateral, since there is an obligation imposed by the contract upon both parties to it.
Now, as we have seen, a true contract requires freedom in the parties. But if the workman is
forced to accept the employer’s terms, or starve, he has no real freedom in the matter; and
unless the terms offered are humanly liberal, an injustice is done to the worker. Out of this
situation arises the question of a just wage. Certainly, the worker is entitled to justice; hence, he
is entitled to a just wage. But what, precisely, is a just wage?
If men were free to regard human labor as a material good to be disposed of like any
commodity; if they were free to buy and sell it as they are free to buy and sell tools, or land, or
domestic animals; then the matter of deciding upon the actual amount of a just wage would be
comparatively simple. Men would simply look for the market value of labor and dispose of it at
that price. It has a human element. It follows, therefore, that a wage contract, a contract in
which labor is exchanged for money, must not be an agreement which turns a man into a
chattel; it must not a an agreement to the detriment of man with the performance of duties of
vocation, such as the founding and supporting of a family, the provision for age and sickness in
himself and in his dependents. In a word, the wage contract must be such as takes into account
at least the minimum essentials of a proper, full, and rounded human life.
A just wage is obviously not to be computed in figures; no nominal just wage can be
fixed, for nothing is so variable as the exchange value of money. But something like a fixed
requirement for a just wage may be established in real terms, i. e., in terms of what such a wage
must be a living wage, i. e., such as will enable the recipient to live a decent and respectable, if
frugal, life, and to provide something for times of age, ill-health, or unemployment.
Thus far, we speak of a personal just wage. But what of a family wage, i. e., a wage
sufficient for the founding, support, and rearing (education) of a family? Sound economists and
ethicians are agreed that a family wage is a matter of moral obligation upon the employer,
although some of the authorities base this obligation upon charity, while others base it upon
strict justice.
The details of this matter must be worked out by the economist and the sociologist.
Ethics lays down basic principles, but cannot discuss all the particulars that must be considered
in the actual application of these principles. The elemental principles may be reduced to these:
Justice must be done. Justice means giving to every man what is his due. The worker must be
given, in the way of wages, what is his due. Now, certainly, it is just that the laborer be able to
live in humanly decent circumstances, and to support those who belong to him, by the fruits of
his work. In the matter of determining, at any time and in any circumstance, just what amount
will meet the requirements of justice in the wage contract, recourse must be had to the
consensus of opinion among wise, prudent, upright, and experienced men. And, the Christian
employer will not fail to meet in this matter the full demands of justice and the requirements of
Christian charity as well.
But what of the employer? Is he not entitled to a return, to a just profit, to his own
“wages” in fact? Certainly, he is. Yet if he cannot obtain a due return without injustice to others,
he has no alternative but to leave the ranks of employers and enter upon the state of an
independent worker or of an employee.

d) COERCIVE MEASURES
Workers and employers alike have human rights. Sometimes these rights require
defence. When there is no adequate defence except coercion, workers resort to strikes and
boycotts, and employers to lockouts. We must say a brief word on each of these coercive
measures.
i. Strikes. – A strike is a cessation of work by agreement of the workers for the purpose
of bettering the conditions of labor. A strike may be for the purpose of enforcing better wages,
shorter hours of work, better working conditions, or all of these together. It is a lawful measure
when used, under due conditions, for the defence or enforcement of the workers’ rights. The
conditions requisite for a just strike are: (1) That it be the only available means of reaching a
just settlement of the difficulties between employer and employees; (2) That the matter at
stake be of an importance sufficient to warrant the hardship and damage that must be borne by
the workers, the employers, the families of both, and the community at large; (3) That there be
a reasonable hope of success in obtaining the good for which the strike is called.
Hence, a strike that is called for the purpose of bettering conditions that are already just;
or a strike in violation of a just contract which the employer has not first violated; or a strike
that means direct violation of the rights of others or of the community; or a strike that is too
hastily undertaken where the matter might have been settled by arbitration; or a strike that is
obviously hopeless to begin with, and is therefore, not an apt means to the desired end – each
of these is an unjust and an unlawful strike. Yet, when the requisite conditions are present,
strikes are lawful; and the State has, therefore, no right to make a law prohibiting them . Still,
the State, within the just limits of its authority, ought to interfere to punish or prevent the abuse
of strikes. Thus, the State may break up a strike that is becoming a menace to society. The State
has the further duty of working out means to prevent the perpetual recurrence of strikes, and
to this end it should create boards of arbitration before which employers and employees could
adjust their relations with the secure hope of being justly dealt with.
ii. Boycotts. – A boycott is a refusal to have business (or social) dealings with a certain
person or institution. It is, when just, a moral force exercised upon a person (physical or moral)
to bring the latter to the practice of justice, or, more accurately, to make him give up the practice
of injustice. A boycott, to be just, must be directed against a true abuse, a truly unjust condition.
It must be kept within the limits of justice and charity. It must be a means that is apt; a means
that offers solid probability of success in the achievement of its end. It must entirely without
violence or the threat of violence. Like the strike, the boycott is to be regarded as last resort, to
be employed either when other available means have failed, or when there is obviously no
other means available.
iii. Lockouts. – A lockout is the refusal of an employer to furnish work to employees,
and is used to suppress injustice on the part of workers. The employer, like the worker, may
suffer injustice. The lockout is his last resource, just as the strike is that of the workers. And,
under due conditions – conditions which are, when duly adapted, essentially the same as those
required for a just strike – the lockout is lawful. When unlawful, the lockout is a grave injustice
against the workers and against the common good.
 CHAPTER III
THE WORLD – FAMILY OF NATIONS
ARTICLE 1. INTERNATIONAL LAW

a) DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Man enters at birth into the society of his fellows, not only of some, but of all. For all men
have the same nature, and all are directed to the achieving of the same end. Thus, there is a
kind of universal community which we may call international society. The immediate members
of this international society are nations, or civil societies, or States, and, since these are moral
persons, they are the apt and proper subjects of rights and duties. The body of these rights and
duties makes up what is called International Law.
International law is, therefore, defined as the sum total of rights and duties,
natural and positive, by which nations are bound in their relations with one another.
To explain the definition: We say that international law is the sum total of rights and
duties, for nations are moral persons and as such can and do have rights and duties. We
continue, natural and positive, because some of these rights and duties are founded upon the
natural law while others are the result of positive law or of international treaties and compacts.
Finally, we say, by which nations are bound in their relations with one another, for international
law does not express the rights and duties of individual men one to another, nor the rights and
duties of a State or nation with regard to its citizens and the direction of its internal affairs, but
of the rights and duties of nations with regard to nation.
Now, just as a man, a physical person, has the right to preserve his life, health, and
integrity, and to perfect his powers of mind and body by the exercise of free human activity
within the bounds of honest and moral conduct, so a nation has the right to preserve and to
perfect itself. And, this right being granted, it follows that other nations are in duty bound to
respect it, and to refrain from lawlessly violating it. Hence:
i. No nation may lawlessly trespass upon the territory of another; nor may large nations
feel free of this law with regard to small ones. All nations are equal in natural rights; and might
does not make right.
ii. No nation may unjustly interfere with the internal affairs of another. Thus, no nation
may incite citizens of another to rebel against their lawful government.
iii. A nation may interfere to assist a nation a nation unjustly oppressed. The principle of
non – intervention is fallacious in theory and impossible in practice. Of this, we shall speak in
detail later on.
iv. A nation has the right to acquire new territory by accession, by first occupancy, and
by treaty; and it has the right of dominion over all of its territory together with watercourses,
and over neighboring seas to an extent required for its security; it has the right to develop its
natural resources.
v. A nation has the right to recognition and respect on the part of other nations and their
citizens; her embassies in other countries are sacred and inviolable.

b) THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION

Nations are bound in justice and in charity to respect all lawful rights of other nations.
Against the obligation of charity the so-called “principle of non-intervention” offends. We shall
speak of this in brief detail.
The principle of non-intervention may be formulated as follows: No nation has the right
of aiding another which is in the throes of internal dissension or which is attacked by another
nation. This principle is fallacious in theory and impossible in practice.
The principle of non-intervention is fallacious in theory. A nation has the right to self-
preservation, and has the further right to use means to this end which are necessary or useful,
so long as this use involves no violation of another’s rights. Now, one of the licit means of self-
preservation is the asking of aid from another when unjustly attacked: this is true of individual
men and of nations, nor is there any alien right violated by such a request, or by acceding to
such a request. Therefore, a nation in distress may ask for help, and such help may lawfully be
given, nor may any third nation licitly prevent such help being given. Similarly, a man unjustly
attacked may lawfully cry for help, and help may be given, nor may any third person lawfully
interfere to prevent such help being given. And when a nation is in the throes of internal
disorder or anarchy, it may ask for help and lawfully receive it, just as a man, suddenly stricken
by sickness, may ask the aid of others and the ministrations of a physician. As sick man’s
request, so it would be uncharitable and inhuman for one nation to refuse to help another in
taking lawful measures to put down sedition and internal disorder.
The principle of non-intervention is impossible in practice. Suppose nation A is attacked
unjustly by nation B. Nation A calls upon Nation M for assistance. Nation M refuses aid. But by
its very refusal, Nation M is aiding nation B, the aggressor. The principle of non-intervention
requires that no favor be shown by either side; and here we have Nation M, professing
adherence to the principle, yet, in the very act of adherence, contradicting the principle, for not
to aid the oppressed is to show favor to the oppressor.
 ARTICLE 2. PEACE AND WAR

a) PEACE
Peace may be defined as a state of concord, order, and security among nations. It is
a positive thing, not to be defined as a mere absence of war. Peace is a term applicable also to a
single civil society when its citizens and its governing power are working harmoniously
together with mutual trust. Further, peace is the state of the individual man whose life is lived
in accordance with the requirements of law, when his conscience is tranquil, his mind and heart
unperturbed, yet manfully active. True peace comes to the individual and through him to the
nation and the world, by his steady effort to achieve his last end by the knowledge, love, and
service of God in the practice of the true religion.
Peace is not mere quiet, it is not inactivity, it is not repose, it is not laziness. On the
contrary, it is found in activity, in free human activity conducted in accordance with the
requirements of justice and charity, and marked by prudence, fortitude, and temperance. Peace
is the greatest earthly god for which men or nations may strive; it is the essential condition of
true development; it is the soul of security; it is the foundation of justice.
Good will means willingness to work for the attaining of the end for which life was given.
Good will is not the mark of the man who is content to sit with folded hands; it is rather the
mark of him who is ready to be up and doing, not with the unnatural fever of mere external
action, but with the prudent and persevering effort to live life in all acts as it should be live. And
to such a man is peace apportioned.
This does not mean an alertness of eye or body, but an alertness of soul and mind and
heart. Such alertness is best cultivated in the aloofness from the distraction that comes from sin
and from inordinate efforts exercised in the quest of material goods. One must not think,
therefore, that the life of the recluse, the hermit, the contemplative, is a lazy life, or an inactive
life; on the contrary, it is a life of the greatest alertness and of the most active strides in the
direction of the last end.
As peace in the home is an inestimable blessing, so peace in the world is an unbounded
good to all nations. Nations, therefore, have the right and the duty to foster peace. Peace is not
fostered by mere sentimental talk; it is not fostered by the evasions of diplomatists; it is not
fostered by jealousies, suspicions, emulations. Peace is fostered by the cultivation of morality.
We must leave the statement for the apologist (noun a person who offers an argument in defense
of something controversial.) to prove, for it is outside the province of Ethics to deal with the
matter in any detail; yet the fact truly is that men and nations will continue to cry “Peace,
Peace!”

b) WAR
War is defined as a condition of armed and active hostility between two or more
nations.
War is distinguished from rebellion, which is an unlawful uprising of citizens against
their government; from revolution, which is a justified resistance against tyranny; and from the
public conflict called civil war; for war is a conflict between nations.
Wars are divided into just and unjust, offensive and defensive. (1) A just war is one
that fulfills the conditions necessary to make war a lawful undertaking. We shall discuss these
conditions in a moment. (2) An unjust war is one that fails to meet the requisite conditions. (3)
An offensive war is one that injuring or destroying another State, or for the purpose of
enrichment at the expense of another State. Offensive wars are always unlawful. (4) A defensive
war is one that is undertaken upon provocation to protect the rights of citizens or to uphold the
honor of the State. We must notice that it is not always the offensive party that first declares
war; war may be first declared by the party of the defence.
The first offence may be in the nature of acts of hostility and injustice done before war is
declared and enduring in their effects to that time.
The conditions necessary for a just war are the following: (1) War must be declared
by competent authority, for a just cause, and it must be undertaken with an honest intention.
The last named requirement warn us that a war – granted the cause is just and that it is
declared by competent authority – is rendered unjust if undertaken for revenge, lust for power,
hatred of the opponent, etc. (2) War must be the last resource, undertaken only when all other
means of settlement have been found unavailing. (3) The war must offer a reasonable prospect
of success; else war would be a greater evil than the wrongs it seeks to right. (4) War must be
conducted in a manner approved by civilized peoples. Hence, there must be no wanton
slaughter or destruction which has no direct effect on the outcome of the war; there must be no
direct killing or maltreatment of noncombatants, there must be no use of inhuman and
barbarous methods, such as the poisoning of wells and streams, the using of envenomed
weapons, the poisoning of the air by noxious gases; there must be no use of means that are
intrinsically evil and against the natural law, such as lies, perjury, inciting to reason, etc.; there
must be no continuation of hostile acts after an armistice or peace has been declared.
War is licit when all the conditions mentioned are met. For, just as an individual has the
right to repel force with force, just as a man may defend himself, under certain conditions, by
the indirect slaying of his unjust aggressor, so may a nation defend itself. Now, the only means
available to a nation for repelling force with force is war. Again, the State has the duty of self-
preservation and of defending the rights of its citizens; and it is clear that there are times when
this duty cannot be performed by a State without repelling unjust aggression, i. e., without
waging war. Hence, wars are sometimes licit.
But, however lawful, wars are certainly regrettable. To prevent the great evils that wars
inflict upon the peoples of the world, the establishment of an international tribunal has long
been thought of, and more than once attempted, as a court before which nations could adjust
their difficulties without recourse to war.

<<<<< END OF SPECIAL ETHICS >>>>>

http://docslide.us/documents/code-of- and respect the supreme authority of the
professional-ethics.html October 20, 2015 state.
10. DUTY TO THE STATE 2. A marine officer
CODE OF ETHICS FOR FILIPINO MARITIME shall strive to become an exemplary citizen
OFFICER by a devoted or fruitful fulfillment of his civic
duties.
DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 11. DUTY TO THE STATE 3. He shall perform
1. DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 1. A marine his professional duties in conformity with
officer shall strive to elevate, maintain and existing laws.
contribute to the honor and dignity of the 12. DUTY TO THE STATE 4. He shall endeavor
profession. to assist and cooperate with the proper
2, DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 2. He shall authorities in the enforcement of marine and
conduct himself with the traditional custom law and regulations.
decorum of an officer and a gentlemen 13. DUTY TO THE STATE 5. He shall offer to
restraining himself from all acts contrary to the state his full knowledge, experience and
the established rules of morality and material passion in time of national
personal discipline.‡ emergency.
3. DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 3. He shall
continually improve his professional DUTY TO THE PUBLIC
competency by keeping up with the latest 14. DUTY TO THE PUBLIC 1. Every officer
technical and scientific knowledge being shall compose himself as an officer and a
applied in the Marine fields. gentleman, and act honorably when dealing
4. DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 4. It shall be with the general public.
his obligation to prepare himself for the next 15. DUTY TO THE PUBLIC 2. He should be
higher license by constant reading, diligent most concerned with the safety of every
studies and keen observation of shipboard man, woman or child who boards his ship as
activities. a passenger by following all safety measures
5. DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 5. He shall prescribed for boardship use.
make financial gain secondary only to the 16. DUTY TO THE PUBLIC 3. He shall
service that the entire profession can render contribute his professional knowledge for
for the economic growth of the country. the general well fare and comfort of the
6. DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 6. A marine riding public interest. These are integrated
officer shall not hesitate to consult his fellow obligations of the professions.
officers in matters affecting, the honor and
integrity of the profession. DUTY TO SUPERIOR
7. DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 7. He shall 17. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 1. Marine officers in
expose, without fear or favor, to the proper a subordinate capacity shall be always under
authorities of the profession corrupt or the tradition to respect a superior officer.
dishonest conduct of members of the 18. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 2. Subordinates shall
profession whose existing practice can render the necessary assistance if possible
degrade the reputation of other above and beyond the call of duty, see that
practitioners. their superiors or the entire organization can
8. DUTY TO THE PROFESSION 8. Every be assured of a successful operations on
marine officer should aid in safeguarding the undertaking duly assigned duties.
profession against the admission of morally 19. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 3. A subordinate
unfit or professionally unqualified persons to shall strive to gain the confidence and
its ranks. respect of his superior through prompt and
efficient performance of his assigned duties.
DUTY TO THE STATE 20. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 4. A marine officer
9. DUTY TO THE STATE 1. A marine officer, in shall promptly and efficiently follow and
his capacity as a person of high technical obey all lawful orders of his superior without
potentialities and delegated with leadership questioning his integrity.
for the discipline of his men shall recognize
21. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 5. Subordinates relation by sharing individual knowledge for
should always remember that he can only professional advancement.
give recommendations to his superiors and 32. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW PRACTITIONERS
must give the proper assistance within or 2. He should associate with his colleagues in
beyond his specific duties. reputable and recognized marine society to
22. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 6. Subordinate further broader his knowledge.
should always remember the command of 33. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW PRACTITIONERS
responsibility of a superior and must give 3. He should never attempt to issue
the proper assistance within or beyond his statement to the general public concerning
specific duties. the shortcomings of his fellow officers.
23. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 7. A subordinate DUTY TO HIS FELLOW PRACTITIONERS 4.
should never openly criticize the actuation of The following acts specified of a marine
the superior with other subordinate officer officer shall be deemed to be unethical, a
more particularly with unlicensed personnel. breach of professional ethics subject to
24. DUTY TO SUPERIOR 8. In the event of immediate disciplinary actions:
inquiries he should only state actual facts but 34. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
never his opinion as to whatever his superior PRACTITIONERS 4A. Open criticisms of
is right or wrong. fellow officer without the knowledge of
the other.
DUTY TO SUBORDINATE 35. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
25. DUTY TO SUBORDINATE 1. A superior PRACTITIONERS 4B. Spreading false
shall always conduct himself with the proper information on the professional
decorum, benefitting his rank or designation competency and ability of other
in his acts or deeds and thoughts to set an practitioners.
example for his subordinates. 36. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
26. DUTY TO SUBORDINATE 2. He should PRACTITIONERS 4C. Degrading the
give the necessary training, guidance and colleagues in order to acquire his
opportunities for the improvement of his position.
subordinates, competency and overcome his 37. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
shortcomings as demanded by his license as PRACTITIONERS 4D. False
a marine officer. recommendation on the competency of
27. DUTY TO SUBORDINATE 3. He should another officer.
continually mold the character of his 38. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
subordinates to impress on them the PRACTITIONERS 4E. Maliciously
importance of command responsibilities. withholding information or knowledge
28. DUTY TO SUBORDINATE 4. He should which may place others in a controversial
give merits unselfishly when due, to inspire situation.
his subordinates to achieve greater results. 39. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
29. DUTY TO SUBORDINATE 5. He should not PRACTITIONERS 4F. Tending to accept a
hesitate to listen to the advice of his position lower than his highest license to
subordinates; however, he must always displace another applying for the same.
exercise discretion before implementation. 40. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
30. DUTY TO SUBORDINATE 6. He should not PRACTITIONERS 4G. Exerting political
hesitate to admit error in his decision when influence to displace a co marine officer.
it is obvious, but it must be done within the 41. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
circle of his staff. PRACTITIONERS 4H. certifying that he
can work better or render service more
DUTY TO HIS FELLOW PRACTITIONERS satisfactorily than another.
31. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW PRACTITIONERS 42. DUTY TO HIS FELLOW
1. Every marine officer should work together PRACTITIONERS 4I. Openly expressing that
in mutual cooperation and harmonious he holds exclusive methods of practice or style
of service.