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EN BANC
JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, G.R. No. 217910

Petitioner,
Present:
BERSAMIN, J., Chief Justice,

CARPIO,
-versus- PERALTA,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA,
CAGUIOA,
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, REYES, A., JR.,
Respondent. GESMUNDO,
REYES, J., JR.,
HERNANDO,
CARANDANG,
LGBTS CHRISTIAN CHURCH, LAZARO-JAVIER,
INC., REVEREND CRESENCIO INTING, and
"CEEJAY" AGBAYANI, JR., ZALAMEDA, JJ.
MARLON FELIPE, AND MARIA
ARLYN "SUGAR" IBANEZ,
Petitioners-in-Intervention.
ATTY. FERNANDO P. PERITO,

ATTY. RONALDO T. REYES,
ATTY. JEREMY I. GATDULA,
ATTY. CRISTINA A. MONTES,
AND ATTY. RUFINO
POLICARPIO III, Promulgated:
Intervenors-Oppositors. September 3,
x-----------------------------------------------------. ?
I
Decision 2 G.R. No. 217910
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Cultural hegemony often invites people to conform to its impositions

on their identities. Yet, there are some who, despite pressures, courageously
choose to be authentic to themselves. This case is about the assurance of
genuine individual autonomy within our constitutional legal order. It is
about the virtue of tolerance and the humane goal of non-discrimination. It
is about diversity that encourages meaningful-often passionate-
deliberation. Thus, it is about nothing less than the quality of our freedom.
This Court does not have a monopoly in assuring this freedom. With
the most difficult political, moral, and cultural questions, the Constitution
requires that we share with the political departments of government,
especially with Congress, the quest for solutions which balance interests
while maintaining fealty to fundamental freedoms.
Adjudication enables arguments between parties with respect to the

existence and interpretation of fundamental freedoms. On the other hand,
legislation ideally allows public democratic deliberation on the various ways
to assure these fundamental rights. The process of legislation exposes the
experiences of those who have been oppressed, ensuring that they are
understood by those who stand with the majority. Often, public reason
needs to be first shaped through the crucible of campaigns and advocacies
within our political forums before it is sharpened for judicial fiat.
Judicial wisdom is, in large part, the art of discerning when courts
choose not to exercise their perceived competencies.
In this case, this Court unanimously chooses the path of caution.
Those with sexual orientations other than the heteronormative, gender

identities that are transgender or fluid, or gender expressions that are not the
usual manifestations of the dominant and expected cultural binaries-the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and other gender and
sexual minont1es (LGBTQI+) community-have suffered enough
marginalization and discrimination within our society. We choose to be
careful not to add to these burdens through the swift hand of judicial review.
Marriage, as conceived in our current laws, may hew to the dominant

heteronormative model, but asserting by judicial fiat that it should-with all
its privileges and burdens-apply to same-sex couples as well will require a J
prec1s1on in adjudication, which the circumstances in this case do not

present. To do so assumes a blind unproven judicial faith that the shape of
marriage in our current laws will be benign for same-sex couples.
Progressive passion asserted recklessly may unintentionally impose more
burdens rather than less.
The pleadings assert a broad right of same-sex couples to official legal

recognition of their intimate choices. They certainly deserve legal
recognition in some way. However, whether such recognition should come
by way of the exact same bundle of rights granted to heterosexual couples in
our present laws is a proposition that should invite more public discussion in
the halls of Congress.
Given the factual context of this case, this Court declines, for now, to
grant the broad relief prayed for in the Petition.
Furthermore, the exercise of this Court's power of judicial review is

among the most elementary matters imparted to aspiring lawyers. One who
brandishes himself a lawyer is rightly presumed to be well-acquainted with
the bare rudiments of court procedure and decorum. To forget these rules
and practices-or worse, to purport to know them, but really, only to exploit
them by way of propaganda-and then, to jump headlong into the taxing
endeavor of constitutional litigation is a contemptuous betrayal of the high
standards of the legal profession.
Lawyers, especially those engaged in public interest litigation, should

always be mindful that their acts and omissions before the courts do not only
affect themselves. By thrusting themselves into the limelight to take up the
cudgels on behalf of a minority class, public interest lawyers represent the
hopes and aspirations of a greater mass of people, not always with the
consent of all the members of that class. Their errors and mistakes, their
negligence and lethargy have a ripple effect even on persons who have no
opportunity to consent to the stratagems and tactics employed by ill-
prepared and sophomoric counsels.
On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed prose
before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 His Petition sought to "declare A11icles
1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence,
nullify Articles 46(4) 2 and 55(6)3 of the Family Code." 4 ~r
1.
1
Rollo, pp. 3-33.
2 FAMILY CODE, art. 46 states:
ARTICLE 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3
of the preceding Article:
Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing 5

Magallona v. Executive Secretary, 6 Araullo v. Executive Secretary,7 and the
separate opinion 8 of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
(Associate Justice Brion) in Arau/lo. Again citing Associate Justice Brion's
separate opinion, he claims that this Court should follow a "'fresh' approach
to this Court's judicial power" 9 and find that his Petition pertains to a
constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion. 10 He also asserts
that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a
prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, 11 and that the issues he raised
were of such transcendental importance 12 as to warrant the setting aside of
procedural niceties.
Falcis further argues that his Petition complied with the requisites of
judicial review: (1) actual case or controversy; (2) standing; (3) was raised at
the earliest opportunity; and ( 4) that the constitutional question is the very !is
mota of the case. 13 As to standing, he claims that his standing consisted in
his personal stake in the outcome of the case, as he "is an open and self-
/)
(I) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of a sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of
the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at
the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
FAMILY CODE, art. 55 states:
ARTICLE 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(I) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines
or abroad; ·
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the I ife of the petitioner; or
(I 0) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
4
Rollo, p. 31.
5
Id. at 6-7.
6
671 Phil. 243 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
7
752 Phil. 716 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
Id. at 797-841.
9
Rollo, p. 7.
10
Id. at 7-8.
11
Id. at 9.
12
Id. at I 0-11.
13
Id. at 11-12.
identified homosexual" 14 who alleges that the Family Code has a "normative
impact" 15 on the status of same-sex relationships in the country. He was also
allegedly injured by the supposed "prohibition against the right to marry the
same-sex[,]" 16 which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines. 17
Falcis justifies the direct recourse to this Court by citing, in addition

to the alleged transcendental importance of the issues he raised, the
supposed lack of need for trial concerning any factual issues. He also insists
that the constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code were the
very !is mota of his case. 18
According to Falcis, a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted

as these two (2) provisions regulate fundamental rights such as "the right to
due process and equal protection, right to decisional and marital privacy, and
the right to found a family in accordance with religious convictions." 19
Falcis further claims that strict scrutiny should be the test used in
appraising the constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code, and
that the compelling state interest involved is the protection of marriage
pursuant to Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution, not the protection of
heterosexual relationships. 20 He argues that like opposite-sex couples, same-
sex couples are equally capable of founding their own families and fulfilling
essential marital obligations. 21 He claims that contrary to Chi Ming Tsai v.
Court of Appeals, 22 procreation is not an essential marital obligation.
Because there is allegedly no necessity to limit marriage as only between a
man and a woman, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are supposedly
unconstitutional for depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without
substantive due process of law. 23
To support his allegation that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test,

Falcis extensively referenced and quoted-devoting more than five (5) pages
of his 29-page Petition-the separate concurring opinion of retired Chief
Justice Reynato Puno (retired Chief Justice Puno) in Ang Lad/ad Party-list v. J' J
14
Id. at 12. Although petitioner refers to himself as a "homosexual" and repeatedly uses the terms
"homosexual," "heterosexual," and "sexuality," this Court will not use these terms as "the term
'homosexuality' has been associated in the past with deviance, mental illness, and criminal behavior,
and these negative stereotypes may be perpetuated by biased language." (American Psychological
Association, "Avoiding Heterosexual Bias in Language," American Psychologist September 1991,
Volume 46, Issue No. 9, 973-974.) Any use shall only be in the context of a faithful reference to the
parties' pleadings and/or averments, legal provisions, and works by other authors.
is Id. .
16 Id.
11 Id.
18
Id. at 13.
19
Id. at 14.
20
Id. at 17-18.
21
ld.atl8.
22
334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
23
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
Commission on Elections. 24 However, he claims that retired Chief Justice

Puno incorrectly concluded that the appropriate test is intermediate or
heightened review. 25 Nonetheless, he argues that even under the rational
basis test, there is a violation of the equal protection clause since there is no
substantial distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 26
Finally, Falcis claims that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny
the existence of "individuals belonging to religious denominations that
believe in same-sex marriage" 27 and that they have a "right to found a family
in accordance with their religious convictions." 28 He claims that the
religious weddings conducted by these denominations have been denied civil
recognition "unlike the religious convictions of Catholics and Muslims." 29
On June 30, 2015, this Court ordered the Civil Registrar General to
comment on the Petition. 30
On June 22, 2015, Fernando P. Perito (Perito) filed prose anAnswer-

in-lntervention31 to the Petition. He claims that the Petition failed to comply
with several requirements of Rule 65, including: (1) the annexing of a
certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject of the case;
(2) there being no act of any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; and (3) that the Petition had to be filed within 60
days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, or resolution. 32 Perito also
claims that Falcis did not present, any statistics or evidence showing
discrimination against the LGBTQI+' community 33 and that Falcis did not
show any specific injury, such as the denial of a marriage license or refusal
of a solemnizing officer to officiate a same-sex marriage. 34
Perito further points out that F alcis is estopped from questioning the
validity of the Family Code, it having been effective since 1987.35 He also
extensively cites the Christian Bible as authority for defending Articles 1 and
2's limitation of marriage as between a man and a woman. 36
This Answer-in-Intervention was treated by this Court as a motion to j

24
Id. at 21-27 citing Ang Lad/ad Party-list v. Commission on Elections, 632 Phil. 32 (20 I 0) [Per J. Del
Castillo, En Banc].
25
Id. at 26-27.
26
Id. at 28.
27
Id. at 29.
2s Id.
29
Id. at 30.
30
Id. at 34-35.
31
Id. at 36-52.
32
Id. at 39.
33
Id. at 41--43.
34 Id. at 43.
35
Id. at 44.
36
Id. at 45-51.
intervene with answer-m-mtervention, which was granted in this Court's

July 28, 2015 Resolution. 37 This Court, in the same Resolution, further
required Falcis to reply to the Answer-in-Intervention.
Falcis filed his Reply38 to the Answer-in-Intervention on September

21, 2015. He reiterates his claims concerning his compliance with
procedural requirements. His Reply was noted in this Court's October 6,
2015 Resolution. 39
The Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam)40 on March 29, 2016. It prays
that this Court deny due course to or dismiss the Petition. It notes that the
Petition was not in the nature of a class suit, but was instead personal only to
Falcis. 41 Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to show injury-in-fact
and an actual case or controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory
opinion that this Court cannot issue. 42
The Civil Registrar General also faults Falcis for not impleading
Congress, as his Petition actually challenged the current legislative policy on
same-sex marriage, and not any act committed by the Civil Registrar-
General. 43 Finally, it claims that Falcis has not proven that the issues in this
case are of such transcendental importance, there being no law or facts
contained in his Petition to determine any principles concerning the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage in the Philippines. 44
On April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church),

Reverend Crescencio "Ceejay" Agbayani, Jr. (Reverend Agbayani), Marlon
Felipe (Felipe), and Maria Arlyn "Sugar" Ibafiez (Ibafiez)--collectively,
petitioners-intervenors-whose counsel was Falcis himself, filed a Motion
for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. 45 They
ask this Court to allow them to intervene in the proceedings, claiming that:
( 1) they offer further procedural and substantive arguments; (2) their rights
will not be protected in a separate proceeding; and (3) they have an interest
in the outcome of this case. They adopt by reference the arguments raised ;:
by Falcis in his Petition. 46
37
Id. at 53-55.
38
Id. at 66-74.
39
Id. at 76-77.
40 Id. at 111-130.
41
Id. at ll5.
42
Id. at l 15-ll6.
43
Id. at 116.
44
Id. at 123-124.
45
Id. at 132-134.
46
Id. at 132-133.
Subsequently, they filed their Petition-in-Intervention,47 which is a

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the same
reliefs as those in Falcis' Petition, namely: (1) the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code; and (2) the
invalidation of Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code. 48
Similar to Falcis, petitioners-intervenors claim that a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 is an appropriate remedy. 49 They aver that the
requisites of judicial review are present. First, they have an actual case or
controversy since petitioners-intervenors Reverend Agbayani, Felipe, and
Ibanez were supposedly denied a marriage license on August 3, 2015. 50
Second, they have legal standing. LGBTS Church claims third-party
standing, even as it also claims that its own right to religious freedom was
directly, not just indirectly violated. Petitioners-intervenors Reverend
Agbayani, Felipe, and Ibanez claim standing on the basis of their supposed
attempts to secure marriage licenses. This was despite LGBTS Church
claiming that it has third-party standing because its own members, which
included petitioners-intervemors Reverend Agbayani, Felipe, and Ibanez,
were "unlikely" 51 to file suit. 52
Petitioners-intervenors restate Falcis' claims that the issues were

raised at the earliest opportunity, that the constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2
of the Family Code is the lis mota of the case, and that a direct recourse to
this Court was proper. 53
Petitioners-intervenors use arguments from Christian theology to

prove that there should be no civil restriction against same-sex marriage. 54
They also claim that the lack of civil recognition for their religious
ceremonies, as contrasted with the recognition granted to "Filipino Catholics
and Filipino Muslims[,]" 55 violate the equal protection clause. 56
This Court noted the Motion to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention

in its June 7, 2016 Resolution. 57
On August 10, 2016, Falcis filed a Motion to Set the Case for Oral ~
47
Id.atl35-155.
48
Id. at 136.
49
Id. at 138.
50
Id. at 139.
51
Id. at 140.
52
Id. at 139-140.
53
Id. at 140-143.
54
Id. at 144-150.
55
Id. at 151.
56
Id. at 150-151.
57 Id. at 158-159.
Arguments. 58 He also filed a Reply 59 to the Comment (Ad Cautelam), again

reiterating his procedural arguments.
In compliance with this Court's December 6, 2016 Resolution, 60 the

Office of the Solicitor General manifested61 that it was maintaining the
arguments stated in its Comment (Ad Cautelam), but reserved its right to
comment on the Petition-in-Intervention. Its Manifestation was noted in this
Court's February 7, 2017 Resolution. 62
On March 28, 2017, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Admit Petition-in-Intervention and required the Civil Registrar
General and Perito to comment on the Petition-in-Intervention. 63
The Civil Registrar General filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam) on the
Petition-in-Intervention, 64 which this Court noted in its August 8, 2017
Resolution. 65 The Civil Registrar General claims that the issues raised in the
Petition are political questions, saying that marriage's legal definition is a
policy issue for Congress to determine, 66 and that any amendment to the
definition in Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code should be addressed to
Congress. 67
In a March 6, 2018 Resolution, 68 this Court set the case for oral
arguments, with a scheduled preliminary conference on June 5, 2018. 69
Perito manifested that he would not be able to attend the preliminary
conference. 70
During the preliminary conference, Falcis, who appeared on his own

behalf and on behalf of petitioners-intervenors, was ordered to show cause
why he should not be cited in direct contempt:
Considering that petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III was attired

with a casual jacket, cropped jeans and loafers without socks, Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen directed him to show cause by June 6,
2018, why he should not be cited in direct contempt for his failure to
observe the required decorum during the preliminary conference which is j
58
Id. at 160-161.
59
Id. at 162-177.
60
Id. at 182-183.
61
Id. at 185-190.
62
Id. at 191-192.
63
Id. at 193-194.
64
Id. at 210-233.
65
Id. at 234.
66
Id. at 214-220.
67
Id. at 222-225.
68
Id. at 235.
69
Id. at 238.
70
Id. at 255-256.
a formal session of the Court. Petitioner was likewise advised to request a

briefing from his former professors, or the law firm he is going to retain,
on the proper protocols to be observed inside the Court, to facilitate an
orderly and smooth proceeding during the oral argument. 71
On June 6, 2018, Falcis filed his Compliance72 with the show-cause

order. In a July 3, 2018 Resolution, 73 this Court found Falcis guilty of direct
contempt of court:
Atty. Falcis acted in a contumacious manner during the June 5,

2018 preliminary conference.
Atty. Falcis is not an uninformed layperson. He has been a

member of the Philippine Bar for a number of years. As an officer of the
court, he is duty bound to maintain towards this Court a respectful attitude
essential to the proper administration of justice. He is charged with
knowledge of the proper manner by which lawyers are to conduct
themselves during judicial proceedings. His Lawyer's Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility exhort him to maintain the requisite
decency and to afford dignity to this Court.
Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence.

Under Rule 18.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer
shall not handle any legal matter v'.rithout adequate preparation." Atty.
Falcis' appearance and behavior during the preliminary conference reveal
the inadequacy of his preparation. Considering that the Advisory for Oral
Arguments was served on the parties three (3) months prior to the
preliminary conference, it was inexcusably careless for any of them to
appear before this Court so barely prepared.
The preliminary conference was not mere make-work. Rather, it

was essential to the orderly conduct of proceedings and, ultimately, to the
judicious disposition of this case. Appearance in it by counsels and parties
should not be taken lightly.
Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even

uttering a word, he recklessly courted disfavor with this Court. His
bearing and demeanor were a disservice to his clients and to the human
rights advocacy he purports to represent. 74 (Citation omitted)
Falcis was admonished to properly conduct himself in court and to be

more circumspect of the duties attendant to his being a lawyer. He was
sternly warned that any further contemptuous acts shall be dealt with more
severely. 75
}
On June 8, 2018, Ronaldo T. Reyes, Jeremy I. Gatdula, Cristina A. '
71 Id. at 258.
72
Id. at 273-275.
73
Id. at 601-605.
74
Id.at 603--604.
75
Id. at 604.
Montes, and Rufino Policarpio III (intervenors-oppositors) filed a Motion

for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Opposition-in-Intervention. 76 They
claim that they have a legal interest in this case since the grant of the Petition
would run counter to their religious beliefs. 77
In their Opposition-in-Intervention,78 they claim that this Court has no

jurisdiction to act upon the Petition, none of the requisites of justiciability
having been met. They further assert that they have standing to intervene in
these proceedings as the proposed definition of marriage in the Petition is
contrary to their religious beliefs and religious freedom as guaranteed in
Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. They claim to be concerned
taxpayers who seek to uphold the Constitution. 79
Intervenors-oppositors argue that granting the Petition would be

tantamount to judicial legislation, thus violating the doctrine of separation of
powers. They claim that the definition of marriage in the Family Code was a
valid exercise of legislative prerogative which this Court must uphold. 80
Further, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Civil
Registrar General, as there was no violation of the equal protection clause or
of Falcis' right to liberty. They claim that there are substantial differences
between opposite-sex and same-sex unions that account for state recognition
only of the former, and that such limitation is for the common good. 81 For
them, children's welfare is a compelling state interest justifying intrusion
into certain liberties, including the non-recognition of same-sex marriage.
They assert that there was no violation of the right to privacy since Falcis
and petitioners-intervenors "are not prohibited from publicly identifying as
homosexuals or from entering into same-sex relationships[.]" 82
On June 13, 2018, Atty. Aldrich Fitz U. Dy (Atty. Dy), Atty. Keisha
Trina M. Guangko (Atty. Guangko), Atty. Darwin P. Angeles (Atty.
Angeles), and Atty. Alfredo B. Molo III (Atty. Molo) entered their
appearance as co-counsels for Falcis and petitioners-intervenors .83
The Civil Registrar General filed its Supplemental Comment with

Leave of Court84 on June 14, 2018. Addressing the substantive issues of the
Petition, it claims that since the Constitution only contemplates opposite-sex
marriage in Article XV, Section 2 and other related provisions, Articles 1 and
,,,·
:J
76
Id. at 276-280.
77
Id. at 277.
78 Id. at 281-289.
79
Id. at 283.
80
Id. at 284.
81
Id. at 284-285.
82
Id. at 286.
83
Id. at 290-293.
84
Id. at 294-341.
2 of the Family Code are constitutional. 85
Oral arguments were conducted on June 19, 2018 86 and June 26,
2018. 87 On June 26, 2018, this Court ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within 30 days. 88
On July 25, 2018, both the Civil Registrar General 89 and intervenors-
oppositors90 filed their respective Memoranda, which were noted in this
Court's July 31, 2018 Resolution. 91
On July 26, 2018, rather than file their memoranda, Falcis and
petitioners-intervenors, through counsels Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and
Atty. Christoper Ryan R. Maranan (Atty. Maranan) of Molo Sia Dy Tuazon
Ty and Coloma Law Offices, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum. 92 Without this Court's prior favorable action on their Motion
for Extension, they filed their Memorandum 93 on August 3, 2018.
In its August 7, 2018 Resolution, 94 this Court denied the Motion for
Extension and dispensed with Falcis' and petitioners-intervenors'
Memorandum. The Resolution read, in part:
[W]ith the exception of Intervenor-Oppositor Atty. Fernando P.

1
Perito, the other parties in this case have fully complied with this Court's
Order within the imposed deadline. These show that even considering the
complexity of issues to be resolved in this case, the parties are capable of
submitting and filing their respective Memoranda. 95
In the same Resolution, Falcis, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and

Atty. Maranan were all required 96 to show cause why they should not be
cited in indirect contempt for failing to comply with this Court's June 26,
2018 Order. 97
On August 9, 2018, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty. Maranan

:?'
85
Id. at 303-336.
86
Id. at 596--600.
87
Id. at 600-A--600-C.
88
Id. at 600-C.
89
Id. at 606--671-A.
90
Id. at 672-703.
91
Id. at 703-A-703-8.
92
Id. at 704-710.
93
Id. at 715-843.
94
Id. at 711-714.
95
Id.at712.
96
Id. at 713.
97
Id. at 600-A--600-C.
filed their Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Memorandum. 98

They, along with Falcis, filed their Manifestation and Compliance with the
August 7, 2018 Resolution on August 13, 2018. 99
For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the Petition
and/or the Petition-in-Intervention are properly the subject of the exercise of
our power of judicial review. Subsumed under this are the following
procedural issues:
First, whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code creates an
actual case or controversy reviewable by this Court;
Second, whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus

Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the LGBTQI+ community gives him
standing to challenge the Family Code;
Third, whether or not the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural

defects of the Petition; and
Fourth, whether or not the application of the doctrine of

transcendental importance is warranted.
Should the Petition and/or Petition-in-Intervention show themselves to

be appropriate subjects of judicial review, this Court may proceed to address
the following substantive issues:
First, whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom
to marry are cognates of the right to life and liberty;
Second, whether or not the limitation of civil marriage to opposite-sex

couples is a valid exercise of police power;
Third, whether or not limiting civil marriages to opposite-sex couples

violates the equal protection clause;
Fourth, whether or not denying same-sex couples the right to marry

amounts to a denial of their right to life and/or liberty without due process of
law·
'
,1?
'
Fifth, whether or not sex-based conceptions of marriage violate
98
Id. at 924-928.
99
Id. at 1348-1353.
religious freedom;
Sixth, whether or not a determination that Articles 1 and 2 of the

Family Code are unconstitutional must necessarily carry with it the
conclusion that Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code, on
homosexuality and lesbianism as grounds for annulment and legal
separation, are also unconstitutional; and
Finally, whether or not the parties are entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
From its plain text, the Constitution does not define or restrict
marriage on the basis of sex, 100 gender, 101 sexual orientation, 102 or gender
}
identity or expression. 103
/
100
Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 70
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862 (2015), available at
<https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdt> (last visited on September 2, 2019),
provides:
[S]ex is typically assigned at birth (or before during ultrasound) based on the appearance of
external genitalia. When the external genitalia are ambiguous, other indicators (e.g., internal
genitalia, chromosomal and hormonal sex) are considered to assign a sex, with the aim of
assigning a sex that is most likely to be congruent with the child's gender identity. For most
people, gender identity is congruent with sex assigned at birth ([known as] "cisgender"); for
[transgender and gender non-conforming] individuals, gender identity differs in varying degrees
from sex assigned at birth.
101
Republic Act No. 11313 (2019), sec. 3(d) defines gender, as follows:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act:
(d) Gender refers to a set of socially ascribed characteristics, norms, roles, attitudes, values and
expectations identifying the social behavior of men and women, and the relations between them[.]
Gender has also been defined in Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Clients, 67 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 10, 11 (2012), available at
<https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/amp-a0024659.pdt> (last visited on September 2, 2019),
as follows:
Gender refers to the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with a person's
biological sex. Behavior that is compatible with cultural expectations is referred to as gender
normative; behaviors that are viewed as incompatible with these expectations constitute gender
nonconformity.
102
Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 70
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862 (2015), available at
<https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdt> (last visited on September 2, 2019),
provides:
Sexual orientation: a component of identity that includes a person's sexual and emotional
attraction to another person and the behavior and/or social affiliation that may result from this
attraction. A person may be attracted to men, women, both, neither, or to people who are genderqueer,
androgynous, or have other gender identities. Individuals may identify as lesbian, gay, heterosexual,
bisexual, queer, pansexual, or asexual, among others.
103
Republic Act No. 11313 (2019), sec. 3(f) defines gender identity and /or expression, as follows:
(t) Gender identity and/or expression refers to the personal sense of identity as characterized,
among others, by manner of clothing, inclinations, and behavior in relation to masculine or
feminine conventions. A person may have a male or female identity with physiological
characteristics of the opposite sex, in which case this person is considered transgender[.]
Gender identity has also been defined in Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and
Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862 (2015), available at
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution concerns the family and operates

in conjunction with Article II, Section 12. 104 Article XV, Section 1 pertains
to the family in general, identifying it "as the foundation of the nation[,]"
and articulates the State's overarching commitment to "strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development." 105 Article XV,
Section 2 concerns marriage, in particular, and articulates a broad
commitment to protecting its inviolability as a social institution. It states:
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual definition of marriage, the

Constitution is capable of accommodating a contemporaneous understanding
of sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics
(SOGIESC). The plain text and meaning of our constitutional provisions do
not prohibit SOGIESC. These constitutional provisions in particular, and the
Constitution in general, should be read through the lens of "a holistic
approach in legal interpretation" 106 :
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic
rather than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the
historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial
interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social ideals.
The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is
,)1?
<https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdt> (last visited on September 2, 2019), as
follows:
Gender identity: a person's deeply felt, inherent sense of being a boy, a man, or male; a girl, a
woman, or female; or an alternative gender (e.g., genderqueer, gender nonconforming, gender neutral)
that may or may not correspond to a person's sex assigned at birth or to a person's primary or
secondary sex characteristics. Because gender identity is internal, a person's gender identity is not
necessarily visible to others. "Affirmed gender identity" refers to a person's gender identity after
coming out as [transgender and gender non-conforming] or undergoing a social and/or medical
transition process.
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression, and Sex Characteristics at the Universal Periodic
Review, ARC INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX ASSOCIATION 14 (2016), available at
<https://ilga.org/downloads/SOGIESC_ at_UPR_report.pdt> (last visited on September 2, 2019),
provides:
Gender expression: External manifestations of gender, expressed through one's name, pronouns,
clothing, haircut, behavior, voice, or body characteristics. Society identifies these cues as masculine
and feminine, although what is considered masculine and feminine changes over time and varies by
culture. Typically, transgender people seek to make their gender expression align with their gender
identity, rather than the sex they were assigned at birth.
104
CONST., art. II, sec. 12 provides:
SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
105
CONST., art. XV, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION I. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
106
Davidv. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529,573 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the
word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution - saligan -
demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy. 107
As a social institution, the family is shaped by economic forces and

other social structural forces, such as ideologies and politics. 108 For
instance, the discovery of agriculture has transformed the concept of family
and marriage by elevating the ownership of property as a central
consideration:
[T}he right to own land and pass it on to heirs meant that women's
childbearing abilities and male domination became more important.
Rather than kinship, marriage became the center of family life and was
increasingly based on a formal contractual relationship between men,
women, and their kinship groups. The property and gender implications of
marriage are evident in the exchange of gifts between spouses and families
and clearly defined rules about the rights and responsibilities of each
marital partner. During the Middle Ages, economic factors influenced
marital choices more than affection, even among the poor, and women's
sexuality was treated as a form of property (Coltrane and Adams 2008:54).
Wealth and power inequalities meant that marriages among the elite and/or
governing classes were based largely on creating political alliances and
producing male children (Coontz 2005). Ensuring paternity became
important in the transfer ofproperty to legitimate heirs, and the rights and
sexuality of women were circumscribed. Ideologies of male domination
prevailed, and women, especially those who were married to powerful
men, were typically treated like chattel and given very few rights. 109
(Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, this has placed great significance on procreation as a

purpose or end of the family.
Then, in the 18 th century, women and children were seen as capable of

operating factory machinery and, thus, entered the factory labor system to
meet the surge in the demand for workers. 110 This "potential for economic
independence altered families by making children less reliant on families for
their survival and women freer from male domination." 111
Eventually, the economic transition that came with the spread of

industrialization resulted in massive social, geographical, and familial ,J
changes: J'
107
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 757 Phil. 483, 521 (2015) [Per J. Leonen,
En Banc]. See also J. Leanen, dissenting in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478 (2013)
[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
108
SHIRLEY A. HILL, FAMILIES: A SOCIAL CLASS PERSPECTIVE 2 (2011), available at
<https://us.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/4 I 3 74_ l .pdt> (last visited September 2,
2019).
109
Id. at 7.
110
Id. at 18-19.
111
Id. at 19.
Industrialization shifted populations from rural to urban areas in search of

work; for example, in 1830 most Americans still lived in rural areas and
were employed in farming, but by 1930, most lived in towns and cities and
were engaged in non-farming occupations. Urbanization, immigration,
and adjustment to the industrial labor market took a toll on the stability of
families. Industrial production undermined the family-based economy,
food production technologies reduced the need for farmers, and essentials
once produced by families were now produced in massive quantities in
factories. New professional institutions emerged (e.g., public schools,
hospitals) and assumed responsibility for many of the functions once
fulfilled by families, ultimately making people less dependent on the
family and leading some social scientists to predict its demise. 112
This reorganization of work in the industrial economy "disrupted the

gender order of many families by pulling women into the paid labor force
and spawning new visions of gender equality." 113 As a consequence,
marriage based on free choice, romantic love, and companionship
developed. 114
Eventually, the modern family was seen primarily as:
... a nuclear, marriage-based entity in which men provided economically

for their families and women performed housework and took care of
children. . . . Socially defined notions of masculinity and femininity
reflected these gendered family roles; for example, men were
characterized as being naturally aggressive and rational-traits valuable in
the competitive area of work-and women as being essentially
submissive, domestic, and nurturing. 115
The evolution of the social concept of family reveals that

heteronormativity in marriage is not a static anthropological fact. The
perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the changing
roles undertaken by men and women, especially under the present economic
conditions.
To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept

of the complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced
by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.
It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents,
families formed by sterile couples, families formed by couples who
preferred not to have children, among many other family organizations.
Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.
f.
112 Id.
113
Id. at 21.
114
Id. at 21-22.
115
Id. at 23-24.
II
In a proper case, a good opportunity may arise for this Court to review
the scope of Congress' power to statutorily define the scope in which
constitutional provisions are effected. This is not that case. The Petition
before this Court does not present an actual case over which we may
properly exercise our power of judicial review.
There must be narrowly-framed constitutional issues based on a

justiciable controversy:
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text

may be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.
It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the
document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained
from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve
to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the

realization that the business of understanding the Constitution is not
exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our
constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government, and
even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise; a justiciable controversy may ensue
requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality at which
interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic
moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a
framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle
underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory
opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that
are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained. 116 (Citations omitted)
Founded on the principle of supremacy of law, judicial review is the

courts' power to decide on the constitutionality of exercises of power by the
other branches of government and to enforce constitutional rights. 117
Judicial review is inherent in this Court's judicial power. Article VIII,

Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
•'
/
\
116
Davidv. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529, 574-575 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
117
Gayacao v. Executive Secretary, 121 Phil. 729, 732-733 (1965) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc]. See
also Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Article VIII, Section 1 expands the territory of justiciable questions

and narrows the off-limits area of political questions. In Estrada v.
Desierto: 118
To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political
question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds.
Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine
which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential
considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law. In
the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a
question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962
case of Baker v. Carr, viz:
" ... Prominent on the surface of any case held to

involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political departnient or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable, standards for resolving it, or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable
from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's
presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political
questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously

confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and
outer perimeters of a political question. Our leading case is Tafiada v.
Cuenca, where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part )
of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary
118
406 Phil. I (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against
the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts
are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power ofdoing nothing. In sync and
symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is
section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to
" . . . review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension
thereof. ... " 119 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Nonetheless, the expansion of this Court's judicial power is by no

means an abandonment of the need to satisfy the basic requisites of
justiciability. 120 In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines
v. Department ofLabor and Employment: 121
As a rule, "the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only

if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a
justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned." A controversy is said to be justiciable if: first, there is
an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of
judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have
standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; third, the
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth,
resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the
case. 122
Fundamentally, for this Court to exercise the immense power that

enables it to undo the actions of the other government branches, the
following requisites must be satisfied: ( 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination;
(2) the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise
the constitutional issue; (3) the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity, thus ripe for adjudication; and (4) the matter of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case, or that
constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case. 123
)
119
ld.at41-43.
120
Ocampo v. Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227, 288 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] citing Belgica v. Hon.
Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
121
G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/64411>
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
122 Id.
123
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 296 Phil. 56, 63--64 (1993) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
See also J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil.
28 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
III
This Court's constitutional mandate does not include the duty to

answer all of life's questions. 124 No question, no matter how interesting or
compelling, can be answered by this Court if it cannot be shown that there is
an "actual and an antagonistic assertion of rights by one party against the
other in a controversy wherein judicial intervention is unavoidable." 125
This Court does not issue advisory opinions. 126 We do not act to
satisfy academic questions or dabble in thought experiments. We do not
decide hypothetical, feigned, or abstract disputes, or those collusively
arranged by parties without real adverse interests. 127 If this Court were to do
otherwise and jump headlong into ruling on every matter brought before us,
we may close off avenues for opportune, future litigation. We may forestall
proper adjudication for when there are actual, concrete, adversarial
positions, rather than mere conjectural posturing:
Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII,

Section 1 does not provide license to provide advisory opinions. An
advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or
hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient
concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this
Court. After all, legal arguments fr~m concretely lived facts are chosen
narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no
such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind
the future parties who may have more motives to choose specific legal
arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the
parties, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly
determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional text. 128
(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
As this Court makes "final and binding construction[s] of law[,]" 129

our opinions cannot be mere counsel for unreal conflicts conjured by
enterprising minds. Judicial decisions, as part of the legal system, 130 bind
actual persons, places, and things. Rulings based on hypothetical situations
weaken the immense power of judicial review. 131 f
124
See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, 732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
125
Bacolod-Murcia Planters' Association, Inc. v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, Inc., 140 Phil. 457,
459 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, First Division].
126
Serrano v. Amores, 159 Phil. 69, 71 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
127
Spouses Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, 686 Phil. 236, 248 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second
Division].
128
Provincial Bus Operators Association ofthe Philippines v. Department ofLabor and Employment, GR.
No. 202275, July 17, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/64411> [Per J.
Leonen, En Banc].
129
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 661 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
En Banc].
13
° CIVIL CODE, art. 8 which states:
ARTICLE 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
131
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 661-{i62 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-
IV
It is not enough that laws or regulations have been passed or are in

effect when their constitutionality is questioned. The judiciary interprets and
applies the law. "It does not formulate public policy, which is the province
of the legislative and executive branches of govemment." 132 Thus, it does
not-by the mere existence of a law or regulation-embark on an exercise
that may render laws or regulations inefficacious.
Lest the exercise of its power amount to a ruling on the wisdom of the
policy imposed by Congress on the subject matter of the law, the judiciary
does not arrogate unto itself the rule-making prerogative by a swift
determination that a rule ought not exist. There must be an actual case, "a
contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence." 133
IV(A)
In Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 134 the

petitioner did not assert a specific act committed against it by the
Commission on Elections in enforcing or implementing the questioned law.
This Court found that there was no actual case or controversy.
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 135 the core issue that the petitioner
prayed for this Court to resolve was deemed to be delving into the policy or
wisdom underlying the law. This Court noted that the full discretionary
authority to formulate policy was vested in Congress.
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism

Council, 136 the possibility of abuse in the execution of law was deemed
insufficient to trigger judicial review. This Court emphasized that there must
first be an actual act of abuse.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Roque, 137 no actual case or

controversy existed as the respondents could not point to an instance when
the assailed law was said to have been implemented against them. ,'J
Bernabe, En Banc].
132
Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, 369 Phil. 617, 627 (1999) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
133
Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government, 80 I Phil. 4 72, 486 (20 I 6) [Per J.
Carpio, En Banc].
134
314 Phil. 131 (1995) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
135
602 Phil. 64 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
136
646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
137
718 Phil. 294 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
In Cora/es v. Republic, 138 the petition to assail an executive issuance

was found to be premature and "based entirely on surmises, conjectures[,]
and speculations."
In our 2018 ruling in Provincial Bus Operators Association of the

Philippines, 139 an alleged diminution of the petitioners' income, wholly
based on speculation, did not warrant the exercise of judicial review.
IV(B)
There are instances when this Court exercised the power of judicial
review in cases involving newly-enacted laws.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 140 this Court fixed the point at which a
legal issue matures into an actual case or controversy-at the pre-occurrence
of an "overt act": 141
In the unanimous en bane case Tanada v. Angara, this Court held that
when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of
this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate

on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute . ... The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld.' Once a 'controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is
raised before this Court . .. , it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. '
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly

emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the )
138
716 Phil. 432 (2013) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
139
G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/64411 >
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
140
391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
141
Id. at 107.
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of

discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed
by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy:
" ... Judicial power includes not only the duty of the
courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental
law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such
act unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our

constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have in.fringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case,
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the
courts. 142 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of

the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 143 this Court stated:
"[t]hat the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness." 144
Subsequently, this Court, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement

Network, Inc., 145 stated:
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the

occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to
provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is
qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable
the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. 146 (Emphasis in the
original)
This Court's liberality in scrutinizing a petition for an actual case or

controversy was more recently illustrated in Belgica and Spouses Jmbong v.
A
142
Id. at 107-108.
143
144
Id. at 484.
145
146
Id. at 481 citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En
Banc]; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976); and Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 138-148 (1974).
Ochoa. 147 In Belgica, this Court found that there was an actual case or
controversy:
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by

the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are
ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization - such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD
910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for
the Presidential Social Fund - are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds. 148
Belgica was followed by Arau/lo v. Aquino III, 149 where this Court
stated:
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated

cases. The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the
constitutionality of the DAP and: its relevant issuances satisfy the
requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised
herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged
executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of
the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public
funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or
utilized by reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave
rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the
Court. 150
In Spouses Imbong, this Court found that there was an actual case or
controversy, despite the Petition being a facial challenge:
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged
by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also

known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail
the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press ),• ,•
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
147
732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
148
Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 520 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
149
737 Phil. 457 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
150
Id. at 533.
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are

externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from

the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary,
ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have

seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated
by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient
that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as
a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. 151
(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
IV(C)
Here, the Petition cannot be entertained as a facial challenge to

Articles 1, 2, 46( 4), and 55(6) of the Family Code.
A facial challenge is "an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its

flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties,
but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech
or activities." 152 It is distinguished from "as-applied" challenges, which
consider actual facts affecting real litigants. 153
Facial challenges are only allowed as a narrow exception to the

requirement that litigants must only present their own cases, their extant
factual circumstances, to the courts. In David v. Arroyo: 154 /
1~
151
732 Phil. 1, 125-126 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
152
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452,489 (2010)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
153 Id.
154
522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
[F]acial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong

medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
"generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that
a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a
law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar
in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth

technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular
litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties. 155
However, in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 156 this Court

distinguished those facial challenges that could be properly considered as
presenting an actual case or controversy:
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a

facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully
delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, "we must view these statements
of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines
are used to mount 'facial' challenges to penal statutes not involving free
speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation

of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground - absence of
due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, f
overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality
155
Id. at 776-777.
156
727 Phil. 28 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one

from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance

mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he
claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it
involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the
statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect"
on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A
person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under
an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in
order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus
chills him into silence. 157 (Citations omitted)
To be entertained by this Court, a facial challenge requires a

showing of curtailment of the right to freedom of expression, because its
basis is that an overly broad statute may chill otherwise constitutional
speech. 158
The imperative of justiciability was reiterated in Philippine

Constitution Association v. Philippine Government: 159
In Province of North Cotabato v. GRP (MOA-AD case), ... the

Court explained the limits of the power of judicial review and the
prerequisites for the judicial determination of a case.
In [that] case, the Court rejected the argument of the Solicitor

General that there was no justiciable controversy that was ripe for
adjudication. . . . The Court ruled that "[w]hen an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute." Moreover, in the MOA-AD case, the Executive was about to
sign the initialed MOA-AD with the MILF in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in
the presence of representatives of foreign states. Only the prompt issuance
by this Court of a temporary restraining order stopped the signing,
averting the implications that such signing would have caused.
In the present case, however, the Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that there is no actual case or controversy requiring a full-blown
resolution of the principal issue presented by petitioners.
Unlike the unconstitutional MOA-AD, the CAB, including the

FAB, mandates the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for
such peace agreements to be implemented. In the MOA-AD case, there
was nothing in the MOA-AD which required the passage of any statute to
implement the provisions of the MOA-AD, which in essence would have J
157
Id. at 126-127.
158
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, 815 Phil. 1067, 1104 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-
Bemabe, En Banc].
159
801 Phil. 472 (2016) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
resulted in dramatically dismembering the Philippines by placing the

provinces and areas covered by the MOA-AD under the control and
jurisdiction of a Bangsamoro Juridic~l Entity.
Further, under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch assumed the

mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-
AD. The Executive branch guaranteed to the MILF that the Constitution
would be drastically overhauled to conform to the MOA-AD . . . . the
Executive branch usurped the sole discretionary power of Congress to
propose amendments to the Constitution as well as the exclusive power of
the sovereign people to approve or disapprove such proposed
amendments. . . . such ultra vires commitment by the Executive branch
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Even if there were today an existing bill on the Bangsarnoro Basic

Law, it would still not be subject to judicial review. The Court held in
Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power to declare a proposed bill
constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of
rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power
of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. As the Court in
Montesclaros noted, invoking Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a
proposed bill. The power of judicial review comes into play only after the
passage of a bill, and not before. Unless enacted into law, any proposed
Bangsarnoro Basic Law pending in Congress is not subject to judicial
review. 160 (Citations omitted)
Ultimately, petitions before this Court that challenge an executive or

legislative enactment must be based on actual facts, sufficiently for a proper
joinder of issues to be resolved. 161 If litigants wish to assail a statute or
regulation on its face, the burden is on them to prove that the narrowly-
drawn exception for an extraordinary judicial review of such statute or
regulation applies.
When faced with speculations-situations that have not yet fully

ripened into clear breaches of legally demandable rights or obligations-this
Court shall refrain from passing upon the case. Any inquiries that may be
made may be roving, unlimited, and unchecked. 162 In contrast to political
branches of government, courts must deal with specificities:
160
Id. at 486-491.
I
161
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452,481 (2010)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc] citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629 (2010)
[Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976); and Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-148 (1974).
162
See J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28
(2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on

what the text of the law should be. In political forums, particularly the
legislature, the creation of the text of the law is based on a general
discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow
for general application by the executive branch. Thus, the creation of the
law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights of
certain individuals, per se.
Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on

existing facts established on a specific case-to-case basis, where parties
affected by the legal provision seek the courts' understanding of the law.
The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of

government is essential in order to ensure that the rights of the general
public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this balance, branches
of government must afford due respect and deference for the duties and
functions constitutionally delegated to the other. Courts cannot rush to
invalidate a law or rule. Prudence dictates that we are careful not to veto
political acts unless we can craft doctrine narrowly tailored to the
circumstances of the case. 163
Jurisprudence on justiciability in constitutional adjudication has been

unequivocal on the requirement of actual cases and controversies. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission: 164
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who

is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as
the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then,
this power ofjudicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very !is mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature
is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their /)
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the ;{'
163
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 337 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
164
63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
government. 165 (Emphasis supplied)
Even now, under the regime of the textually broadened power of

judicial review articulated in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the requirement of an actual case or controversy is not
dispensed with. 166 In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers,
Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.: 167
Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the

traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case
or controversy. For a dispute to be justiciable, a legally demandable and
enforceable right must exist as basis, and must be shown to have been
violated.
The Court's expanded jurisdiction - itself an exercise of judicial

power - does not do away with the actual case or controversy
requirement in presenting a constitutional issue, but effectively simplifies
this requirement by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse
of discretion in the assailed governmental act. 168 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
V(A)
It is the parties' duty to demonstrate actual cases or controversies

worthy of judicial resolution.
Pleadings before this Court must show a violation of an existing legal

right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. In a concurring
opinion in Belgica: 169
Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement

that there must be an actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render
an advisory opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other
constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware
that in the exercise of their various powers, they do interpret the text of the
Constitution in the light of contemporary needs that they should address.
A policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other
departments that have not yet been done would unnecessarily tax our
resources. It is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator
and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Our power of judicial
review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law. This
power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted {l
165
Id. at 158-159.
166
Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 809 Phil. 453, 529 (2017) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
167
802 Phil. 116 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
168
Id. at 140-141.
169
721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The
rationale that defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to
our rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a
convincing violation of a right, but the impact should be shown to be so
grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial
review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that should
be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they
legitimately represent. 170
Facts are the basis of an actual case or controversy. To reiterate,

"there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate
the issues." 171 Thus, as illustrated in Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc.:
Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and

supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations,
the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become

pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake
and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized,
lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 93 72 does

not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and
merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable. 172 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
V(B)
Parties coming to court must show that the assailed act had a direct
adverse effect on them. In Lozano v. Nograles: 173
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite

of "ripeness". In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with
whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is
the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the
170
,f
Id. at 661.
171
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452,481 (2010)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
172
646 Phil. 452, 482-483 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
173
607 Phil. 334 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed
by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether
an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in. 174 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
VI
The need to demonstrate an actual case or controversy is even more

compelling in cases concerning minority groups. This Court is a court of
law. We are equipped with legal expertise, but we are not the final authority
in other disciplines. In fields such as politics, sociology, culture, and
economics, this Court is guided by the wisdom of recognized authorities,
while being steered by our own astute perception of which notions can
withstand reasoned and reasonable scrutiny. This enables us to filter
unempirical and outmoded, even if sacrosanct, doctrines and biases.
This Court exists by an act of the sovereign Filipino people who

ratified the Constitution that created it. Its composition at any point is not
the result of a popular election reposing its members with authority to decide
on matters of policy. This Court cannot make a final pronouncement on the
wisdom of policies. Judicial pronouncements based on wrong premises may
unwittingly aggravate oppressive conditions.
The scrutiny on the existence of actual facts becomes most necessary

when the rights of marginalized, minority groups have been thrust into
constitutional scrutiny by a party purporting to represent an entire sector.
VI (A)
In Ang Lad/ad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 175 this Court

acknowledged that the LGBTQI+ community has historically "borne the
brunt of societal disapproval":
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual
conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of
societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this
censure - religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of
marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the )
174
Id. at 341.
175
632 Phil. 32 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,

therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law. 176 (Citation omitted)
A common position taken by those who socially disapprove of the

LGBTQI+ community is that this community violates the complementarity
of the sexes. Relying on natural law, the concept asserts that the sexual
differences between a man and a woman are constitutive of one's identity,
out of which the family is created. 177
Consequently, this views the sexual orientation, gender identity, and

gender expression of members of the LGBTQI+ community as unnatural,
purely ideological, or socially constructed. These identities are criticized for
being "often founded on nothing more than a confused concept of freedom
in the realm of feelings and wants, or momentary desires provoked by
emotional impulses and the will of the individual, as opposed to anything
based on the truths of existence." 178 Lacking "an essential and indispensable
finality" 179-that is, procreative possibility-"homosexual acts are
intrinsically disordered and can in no case be approved of." 180
However, contrary to this view, same-sex conduct is a natural

phenomenon:
Homosexuality has been observed in most vertebrate groups, and

also among insects, spiders, crustaceans, octopi and parasitic worms. The
phenomenon has been reported in close to 1000* animal species, and is
well documented for half that number, but the real extent is probably much
higher.
The frequency of homosexuality varies from species to species. In

some species, homosexuality has never been reported, while in others the
entire species is bisexual. In zoos around 1 in 5 pairs of king penguins are
of the same sex. The record is held by orange fronted parakeets, where
roughly half of all pairs in captivity are of the same sex. 181
At the moment, there is no consensus among scientists about the exact

reasons as to how an individual develops a particular sexual orientation. 182
,'J
176
/
Id. at 75.
177
CONGREGATION FOR CATHOLIC EDUCATION, "MALE AND FEMALE HE CREATED THEM": TOWARDS A
PATH OF DIALOGUE ON THE QUESTION OF GENDER THEORY IN EDUCATION 14-15 (2019).
178
Id. at 11.
179
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Persona Humana: Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics (I 975), available at
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_l9751229_p
ersona-humana_en.html> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
180 Id.
181
University of Oslo Natural History Museum, Homosexuality in the Animal Kingdom (2009)
<https://www.nhm.uio.no/besok-oss/utstillinger/skiftende/tidligere/againstnature/gayanimals.html>
(last visited on September 2, 2019).
182
American Psychological Association, Sexual Orientation & Homosexuality,
It has been suggested in scientific studies that sexual orientation 1s

1
polygenetic and sociocultural:
Although we emphasize the polygenicity of the genetic effects on

same-sex sexual behavior, we identified five SNPs whose association with
same-sex sexual behavior reached genome-wide significance. Three of
these replicated in other independent samples whose measures related to
identity and attraction rather than behavior. These SNPs may serve to
generate new lines of enquiry. In particular, the finding that one of the
replicated SNPs (rs28371400-15q21.3) is linked to male pattern balding
and is nearby a gene (TCF12) relevant to sexual differentiation strengthens
the idea that sex-hormone regulation may be involved in the development
of same-sex sexual behavior. Also, that another replicated SNP
(rs34730029-llq12.l) is strongly linked to several genes involved in
olfaction raises intriguing questions. Although the underlying mechanism
at this locus is unclear, a link between olfaction and reproductive function
has previously been established. Individuals with Kallmann syndrome
exhibit both delayed or absent pubertal development and an impaired
sense of smell because of the close developmental origin of fetal
gonadotropin-releasing hormone and olfactory neurons.
Our study focused on the genetic basis of same-sex sexual

behavior, but several of our results point to the importance of sociocultural
context as well. We observed changes in prevalence of reported same-sex
sexual behavior across time, raising questions about how genetic and
sociocultural influences on sexual behavior might interact. We also
observed partly different genetic influences on same-sex sexual behavior
in females and males; this could reflect sex differences in hormonal
influences on sexual behavior (for example, importance of testosterone
versus estrogen) but could also relate to different sociocultural contexts of
female and male same-sex behavior and different demographics of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual groups. With these points in mind, we acknowledge
the limitation that we only studied participants of European ancestry and
from a few Western countries; research involving larger and more diverse
samples will afford greater insight into how these findings fare across
different sociocultural contexts.
Our findings provide insights into the biological underpinnings of

same-sex sexual behavior but also underscore the importance of resisting
simplistic conclusions-because the behavioral phenotypes are complex,
because our genetic insights are rudimentary, and because there is a long
history of misusing genetic results for social purposes. 183 (Citations
omitted)
Sexual orientation has also been correlated with physiological features

in the brain. In 1991, neuroscientist Simon LeVay (LeVay) conducted
research on "the anterior hypothalamus, which contains four cell groups
called the interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus (INAH)." 184
'I
(
<https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/orientation> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
183
Andrea Ganna, et al., Large-scale GWAS reveals insights into the genetic architecture of same-sex
sexual behavior, 365 SCIENCE 1, 6-7 (2019). Available at
<https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6456/eaat7693> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
184
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Review of the evidence: sexual orientation, in GENETICS AND HUMAN
LeVay's "research found that a particular group of neurons called INAH3

was significantly larger in heterosexual men than in homosexual men." 185
Other researchers that same year also proposed that the anterior commissure,
a bundle of nerves that connects a small region of the right and left sides of
the brain, "is bigger in homosexual men than in heterosexual men." 186 These
studies propose that there are anatomical differences between men of
different sexual orientations.
To insulate the human species from the natural phenomenon of same-

sex conduct is to reinforce an inordinately anthropocentric view of nature.
Giving primacy to "human reason and sentience[,]" 187 anthropocentrism is
"the belief that there is a clear and morally relevant dividing line between
humankind and the rest of nature, that humankind is the only principal
source of value or meaning in the world." 188
This "human-nature dualism contains a problematic inconsistency and

contradiction," 189 for it rejects the truth that human beings are part of
°
nature. 19 Further, human superiority is conceived from the lens of human
cognitive abilities 191 and imposes a socially constructed moral hierarchy
between human beings and nature. 192
Human-nature dualism lays the foundation "for a cultural context that

legitimized domination. . . . [which] is at the root of other modem
'imaginary oppositions' such as the split between reason-emotion, mind-
body, and masculine-feminine." 193 This dichotomy propels numerous forms
of gender oppression in that anything attached to reason and culture is
associated with masculinity, while anything attached to emotion, body, and
nature is associated with femininity. 194 This anthropocentric view can only
manifest itself "in a violent and self-destructive manner, fatal both to human
and non-human life[.]" 195
)·
BEHAVIOUR: THE ETHICAL CONTEXT 104 (2014). f

185 Id.
186 Id.
187
Martin Coward, Against Anthropocentrism: The Destruction of the Built Environment as a Distinct
Form of Political Violence, 32 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 419, 420 (2006).
188
Ronald E. Purser, Changkil Park, and Alfonso Montuori, Limits to Anthropocentrism: Toward an
Ecocentric Organization Paradigm?, 20 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1053, 1054 ( 1995).
189
Id. at 1057.
190
Id. at 1057-1058.
191
Thomas White, Humans and Dolphins: An Exploration ofAnthropocentrism in Applied Environmental
Ethics, 3 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 85, 87 (2013).
192
Amy Fitzgerald & David Pellow, Ecological Defense for Animal Liberation: A Holistic Understanding
of the World, in COUNTERPOINTS, VOL. 448, DEFINING CRITICAL ANIMAL STUDIES: AN
INTERSECTIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH FOR LIBERATION 29 (2014 ).
193
Ronald E. Purser, Changkil Park & Alfonso Montuori, limits to Anthropocentrism: Toward an
Ecocentric Organization Paradigm?, 20 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1053, 1057 (1995).
194
Amy Fitzgerald & David Pellow, Ecological Defense for Animal Liberation: A Holistic Understanding
of the World, in COUNTERPOINTS, VOL. 448, DEFINING CRITICAL ANIMAL STUDIES: AN
INTERSECTIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH FOR LIBERATION 29(2014 ).
195
Adam Weitzenfeld and Melanie Joy, An Overview of Anthropocentrism, Humanism, and Speciesism in
Critical Animal Theory, in COUNTERPOINTS, VOL. 448, DEFINING CRITICAL ANIMAL STUDIES: AN
INTERSECTIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH FOR LIBERATION 6 (2014).
VI (B)
In the realm of the social sciences, a great number of 20 th -century

psychoanalysts unfortunately viewed homosexuality as something
pathological. 196 This influenced the field of American psychiatry in the mid-
20th century that when the American Psychological Association published
the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1952, "it listed
all the conditions psychiatrists then considered to be a mental disorder.
DSM-I classified 'homosexuality' as a 'sociopathic personality
disturbance. '" 197
It was not until the research of biologist Alfred Kinsey and other
scientists challenged the orthodoxy that homosexuality was delisted as a
mental disorder in the next iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual:
The Kinsey reports, surveying thousands of people who were not

psychiatric patients, found homosexuality to be more common in the
general population than was generally believed, although his now-famous
'10%' statistic is today believed to be closer to 1%-4%. This finding was
sharply at odds with psychiatric claims of the time that homosexuality was
extremely rare in the general population. Ford and Beach's study of
diverse cultures and of animal behaviors, confirmed Kinsey's view that
homosexuality was more common than psychiatry maintained and that it
was found regularly in nature. In the late 1950s, Evelyn Hooker, a
psychologist, published a study in which she compared psychological test
results of 30 gay men with 30 heterosexual controls, none of whom were
psychiatric patients. Her study found no more signs of psychological
disturbances in the gay male group, a finding that refuted psychiatric
beliefs of her time that all gay men had severe psychological
disturbances. 198
However, the official removal of homosexuality from the Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual as a mental disorder was not the last word on the
subject. Homosexuality was still considered a "disorder," and it was not
until several years later that all traces of what was mistakenly thought to be a
"disease" would be completely removed from the manual:
In any event, the events of 1973 did not immediately end

psychiatry's pathologizing of some presentations of homosexuality. For in
'homosexuality's' place, the DSM-II contained a new diagnosis: Sexual
Orientation Disturbance (SOD). SOD regarded homosexuality as an
illness if an individual with same-sex attractions found them distressing /;
and wanted to change. The new diagnosis legitimized the practice of {'
196
Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 568 (2015).
191 Id.
198
Id. at 569-570.
sexual conversion therapies (and presumably justified insurance

reimbursement for those interventions as well), even if homosexuality per
se was no longer considered an illness. The new diagnosis also allowed
for the unlikely possibility that a person unhappy about a heterosexual
orientation could seek treatment to become gay.
SOD was later replaced in DSM-III by a new category called 'Ego

Dystonic Homosexuality' (EDH). However, it was obvious to
psychiatrists more than a decade later that the inclusion first of SOD, and
later EDH, was the result of earlier political compromises and that neither
diagnosis met the definition of a disorder in the new nosology. Otherwise,
all kinds of identity disturbances could be considered psychiatric
disorders. 'Should people of color unhappy about their race be considered
mentally ill?' critics asked. What about short people unhappy about their
height? Why not ego-dystonic masturbation? As a result, ego-dystonic
homosexuality was removed from the next revision, DSM-III-R, in 1987.
In so doing, the APA implicitly accepted a normal variant view of
homosexuality in a way that had not been possible fourteen years
earlier. 199 (Citations omitted)
Homosexuality was officially removed from the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual in 1986. 200 According to the American Psychological
Association:
[L]esbian, gay and bisexual orientations are not disorders. Research has
found no inherent association between any of these sexual orientations and
psychopathology. Both heterosexual behavior and homosexual behavior
are normal aspects of human sexuality. Both have been documented in
many different cultures and historical eras. Despite the persistence of
stereotypes that portray lesbian, gay and bisexual people as disturbed,
several decades of research and clinical experience have led all
mainstream medical and mental health organizations in this country to
conclude that these orientations represent normal forms of human
experience. Lesbian, gay and bisexual relationships are normal forms of
human bonding. Therefore, these mainstream organizations long ago
abandoned classifications of homosexuality as a mental disorder. 201
(Emphasis supplied)
The American Psychological Association's rev1s10n marked the

"beginning of the end of organized medicine's official participation in the
social stigmatization of homosexuality" 202 as similar movements also
followed. In 1990, the World Health Organization removed homosexuality
per se from the International Classification of Diseases.
Social forces have likewise shaped the use of penal laws to further f
199
Id. at 571.
200
Gregory M. Herek, Facts About Homosexuality and Mental Health,
<https://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts_mental_health.html> (last visited on September 2,
2019).
201
American Psychological Association, Sexual Orientation & Homosexuality,
<https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/orientation> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
202
Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 568 (2015).
discrimination and persecution of the LGBTQI+ community:
To a large extent, the religious and medical discourses became the

bases for legal or state-prescribed discourses in early Western societies.
As a result, the argument that homosexuality is both a sin and a sickness is
strengthened. An illustration of this would be the laws against same-sex
relations in colonies of the British Empire during the 19th century. The
inclusion of Section 377, which refers to carnal intercourse between same-
sex individuals, as an offense "against the order of nature" and "unnatural"
is a clear indication that homosexuality is viewed as both a sin and a
sickness (Carey, 2011; Kannabiran & Singh, 2009). Although the said
legislation did not explicitly mention male-to-male or female-to-female
sexual relations as a crime, they are considered to be "against the order of
nature" and punishable by law (Indian Penal Code, 1860). Among the
countries that adopted this law were Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Brunei, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall
Islands, Myanmar (Burma), Nauru, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu, and
Western Samoa in the Asia Pacific region; and Botswana, Gambia, Ghana,
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the African region
(Human Rights Watch, 2008). Germany, one of the most powerful
countries during the Second World War, likewise had its own version of
the sodomy law stated in Paragraph 175 of the German Criminal Code
(Awareness Harmony Acceptance Advocates [AHAA], 2014).
LGBT discrimination has a long history and serves as a remnant of

the colonial era when the most powerful nations used laws as mechanisms
of control over morality and standards of behavior (Human Rights Watch,
2008; United Nations Human Rights Commission [UNHRC], n.d.). The
criminalization of homosexuality led to the LGBT people's repression,
which persisted even beyond the end of the Second World War when the
international community pushed for the recognition and respect for human
rights.
As of 2015, 113 United Nations member states have legally

recognized same-sex relations (ILGA, 2015). Also, key international
documents and human rights instruments were achieved, among them the
Yogyakarta Principles in 2006, the UNHRC Resolution on Human Rights,
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) in 2011, and the UNHRC
Core State Obligations on LGBT Human Rights in 2012. 203
A 2012 coalition report 204 submitted by OutRight Action

Intemational, 205 together with 40 Philippine LGBTQI+ and human rights
groups206 and 13 activists, 207 to the 106th Session of the United Nations 1?
.I
203
Ma. Theresa Casal De Vela, The Emergence of LGBT Human Rights and the Use of Discourse Analysis
in Understanding LGBT State Inclusion, LX PHIL. J, PUB, AD. 72, 75-79 (2016).
204
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Violations on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Homosexuality in the Philippines, October 2012. Available at
<https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/iglhrc_philippines_ hrc 106.pdt> (last visited on
September 2, 2019).
205
Formerly known as the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission.
206
The groups are: Babaylanes, Inc.; Amnesty International Philippines - LGBT Group (AIPh-LGBT);
Human Rights Committee208 showed that from 1996 to 2012, 163 LGBTQI+
persons have been murdered due to their gender identity, gender expression,
or sexual orientation. 209 The report documented discriminatory acts against
LGBTQI+ groups and persons both by State and non-State actors.
In 2016, EnGendeRights, Inc. and OutRight Action International, as

with 34 Philippine groups and individuals,21° submitted a report211 to the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 212 This
report documented the lack of national anti-discrimination, gender
recognition, and hate crime legislation, as well as cases of discrimination by
police, 213 health workers, 214 educators, 215 employers, 216 and the judiciary217
A
Bacolod and Negros Gender Identity Society (BANGIS); Bisdak Pride - Cebu; Cagayan De Oro Plus
(CDO Plus); Changing Lane Women's Group; Coalition for the Liberation of the Reassigned Sex
(COLORS); Elite Men's Circle (EMC); EnGendeRights, Inc.; Filipino Freethinkers (FF); Fourlez
Women's Group; GAYAC (Gay Achievers Club); KABARO-PUP; LADLAD Cagayan De Oro;
LADLAD Caraga, Inc.; LADLAD Europa; LADLAD LGBT Party; LADLAD Region II; Lesbian
Activism Project Inc. (LeAP!), Inc.; Lesbian Pilipinas; Link Davao; Metropolitan Community Church
- Metro Baguio City (MCCMB); Miss Maanyag Gay Organization of Butuan; OUT Exclusives
Women's Group; OUT Philippines LGBT Group; Outrage LGBT Magazine; Philippine Fellowship of
Metropolitan Community Churches (MCC); Philippine Forum on Sports, Culture, Sexuality and
Human Rights (TEAM PILIPINAS); Pink Watch (formerly Philippine LGBT Hate Crime Watch
(PLHCW); Pinoy Deaf Rainbow - Philippines; ProGay Philippines; Queer Pagan Network (PQN);
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc.; Redbridge Books Publishing Co. (LGBTQI+ Publishing
House); Society of Transsexual Women Advocates of the Philippines (STRAP); The Order of St.
Aelred Friendship Society (OSAe); TLF Share Collective, Inc.; TMC Globe Division League;
Tumbalata, Inc.; and UP Babaylan.
207
The individuals are Aleksi Gumela, Alvin Cloyd Dakis, Amel Rostom Deiparine, Bemz Benedito,
Carlos Celdran, Ian Carandang, Mae Emmanuel, Marion Cabrera, Mina Tenorio, Neil Garcia,
Raymond Alikpala, Ryan Sylverio, and Santy Layno.
208
Formed pursuant to Part IV of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Human
Rights Committee is a group of experts tasked with monitoring the compliance of State parties to the
Convention. The Philippines is a State party to the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights. See also Disini, Jr. v. Secretary ofJustice, 727 Phil. 28 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
209
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Violations on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Homosexuality in the Philippines, October 2012,
<https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/iglhrc_philippines_ hrc 106.pdt> 6 (last visited
on September 2, 2019).
210
The groups and individuals are: Society of Transsexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP); A SEAN
SOGIE Caucus (ASC); Association of Transgender People in the Philippines (ATP); Bahaghari
Advocacy Group; Benilde Hive' Bohol LGBTs, Families, Friends, and Allies; Catholic Diocese of
One-Spirit Philippines; Coalition for the Liberation of the Reassigned Sex (COLORS); Cordillera
Rainbow Connection; DowneLink Philippines Community; Filipino Free Thinkers; Galang
Philippines; ILGA World Trans* Secretariat; Initiative and Movement for Gender Liberation against
Discrimination (IM GLAD); !pride Manila; Kapederasyon LGBT Organization; LADLAD Caraga;
LGBT Bus; LGBT Pinoyed; Metropolitan Community Church - Metro Baguio; Metropolitan
Community Church - Quezon City; Metropolitan Community Church of Marikina; Old Balara Pride
Council; Pinoy FTM; Pinoy LGBT Channel, Philippine Online Chronicles Promoting Rights and
Equality for Society's Marginalized (PRISM) Rainbow Rights Project, Inc.; SHINE Mindanao; The
Lovelife Project for Health and Environment, Inc.; TransMan Pilipinas; Trippers Philippines, Inc.;
Universal LGBT Club; Alvin Cloyd Dakis; and Marlon Lacsamana.
211
"RE: PHILIPPINE LBT COALITION REPORT for 64th SESSION of CEDAW"; EnGendeRights,
Inc. and OutRight Action International; June 9, 2016, available at
<https://www.outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/INT_ CEDAW_ NGO _pHL_242 l 5_E.pdt>
212
The Philippines is a State party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.
213
RE: PHILIPPINE LBT COALITION REPORT for 64th SESSION ofCEDAW, EnGendeRights, Inc. and
OutRight Action International; June 9, 2016, at 7-8. Available at
<https://www.outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/lNT_ CEDAW_ NGO_?HL_ 24215 _ E.pdt>
against LGBTQI+ persons.
A more recent report submitted in 2017 218 by civil society

organizations 219 to the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations
Human Rights Council continued to document human rights violations
against LGBTQI+ persons, including an existing legal framework
inadequate to address systemic problems of discrimination and exclusion.
This is not to say that there is a universal experience for the

LGBTQI+ community. To do so would be to "provide homogenized and
distorted views" 220 of the community, "advancing the interest of more
privileged individuals." 221 As first noted by American professor Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw:
This focus on the most privileged group members marginalizes

those who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be
understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination. I suggest
further that this focus on otherwise-privileged group members creates a
distorted analysis of racism and sexism because the operative conceptions
of race and sex become grounded in experiences that actually represent
only a subset of a much more complex phenomenon. 222
Axes of privilege and empowerment, on one hand, and oppression and

marginalization, on the other, provide a spectrum that reflects the diversity
of lived experiences of LGBTQI+ persons and groups. This is not confined
to the spheres of SOGIESC: class and economic status, ethnicity, religion,
age, disability, and other identities223 all play roles in the intersections of
LGBTQI+ persons.
Therefore, any entity that attempts to speak for and on behalf of a

~,I
214
Id. at 8.
215
Id.at9-10.
216
Id. at 10-11.
217
Id. at 11-12.
218
Universal Periodic Review, Joint submission of civil society organizations on the situation of Lesbian,
Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer (LGBTQI) persons in the Philippines (20 I 7). Available at
<https://aseansogiecaucus.org/images/resources/upr-reports/Philippines/Philippines-UPR-JointReport-
3rdCycle.pdf> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
219
Id. at 24. Submitted by ASEAN Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression Caucus;
Association of Transgender People of the Philippines; Babaylanes, Inc.; GALANG Philippines;
LGBTS Christian Church, Inc.; Metropolitan Community Church of Marikina City; Metro Manila
Pride; MUJER-LGBT Organization; PDRC/Deaf Resources Philippines; SHINE SOCCSKARGEN,
Inc.; Side B Philippines; The Philippine LGBT Chamber of Commerce; and TLF Share.
220
Doug Meyer, An Jntersectional Analysis of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Peoples
Evaluations ofAnti-Queer Violence, 26 GENDER AND SOCIETY 849, 850 (2012).
221 ld.
222
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 140 (1989).
223
Doug Meyer, An Jntersectional Analysis of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Peoples
Evaluations ofAnti-Queer Violence, 26 GENDER AND SOCIETY 849, 852 (2012).
diverse community must be able to adequately thread the needle in

representation of them, assisting this Court's understanding with sufficient
facts that would enable it to empower, and not further exclude, an already
marginalized community.
VI(C)
There is a perception within the LGBTQI+ community that the

Philippines is considered among the most gay-friendly countries in the
world. 224
Accounts on the pre-colonial Philippine society report that different

SOGIESC expressions were recognized and accepted in the islands.
For instance, the Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala, published in

1860, and the Vocabulario de la Lengua Bicol, in 1865, both make reference
to the word asog, which refers to men who dress in women's clothes and
keep relations with fellow men. 225 These persons exercised significant roles
in the pre-colonial Philippine society and were even revered as authorities:
[F]rom the earliest encounters between the Spanish and the natives,
gender-crossing was already very much a reality in a number of
communities across the entire archipelago. Local men dressed up as-and
acting like-women were called, among others, bayoguin, bayok, agi-
ngin, asog, bido, and binabae. The Spanish thought them remarkable not
only because they effectively transitioned from male to female, but also
because as spiritual intermediaries or babaylan, they were revered figures
of authority in their respective communities. It's important to remember
that their taking on the customary clothes of women-as well as their
engagement in feminine work-was of a piece with a bigger and more
basic transformation, one that redefined their gender almost completely as
female. More than mere cross-dressers, these "men" were gender-
crossers, for they didn't merely assume the form and behavior of women.
Their culture precisely granted them social and symbolic recognition as
binabae ("womanlike''). 226 (Emphasis supplied)
It has been noted that it was difficult to recognize the asogs,

bayoguins, and binabayis as men because they carried extraordinary
clothing, appearance, and actions similar to women. 227 This has been j)
224
Philip C. Tubeza, PH ranks among most gay-friendly in the world , The Philippine Daily Inquirer,
<http://globalnation.inquirer.net/76977/ph-ranks-among-most-gay-friendly-in-the-world> (last
accessed September 2, 2019).
225
Jay Jomar F. Quintos, A Glimpse Into the Asog Experience: A Historical Study on the Homosexual
Experience in the Philippines, 9(2) PLARIDEL: A PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, MEDIA,
AND SOCIETY, available at <http://www.plarideljournal.org/article/a-glimpse-into-the-asog-experience-
a-historical-study-on-the-homosexual-experience-in-the-philippines/> 155, 156-157 (2012).
226
J. Neil C. Garcia, Nativism or Universalism: Situating LGBT Discourse in the Philippines, 20 KRITIKA
KULTURA 48, 52-53 (2013).
227
considered a manifestation of freedom as they had "liberty over their choice

of wear, behavior, beliefs and way of living." 228
Aside from this fluidity in gender expression, it has also been

observed that "the local concept of matrimony was not imprisoned into
male-and-female only." 229 According to various cronicas y relaciones, the
bayoguin, bayok, agi-ngin, asog, bido, and binabae, among others, "were
"married" to men, who became their maridos ("husbands"), with whom they
indulged in regular sexual congress." 230
It was only during the arrival of the Spanish colonizers in the

Philippine islands that these activities previously engaged in by the asog,
bayoguin, and binabayi became suppressed:
The right of men to wed their fellow men was suppressed, and the
tradition of the asog wearing long skirts and feminine clothes vanished.
More than these, men were banned from having sexual relations with
fellow men for this ran contrary to the dominant religion anointed by the
Spanish. The church had a corresponding punishment for the natives who
violated this rule. All sinners had to go through the sanctity of confession,
for confession was the spring that cleansed man's sins (Rafael, 1988). 231
In contemporary times, as this Court has noted, there is no penalty in

the Philippines for engaging in what may be called "homosexual
conduct." 232 Notably, Republic Act No. 11166, or the Philippine HIV and
AIDS Policy Act, states a policy of non-discrimination in Section 2:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policies. - ...
Policies and practices that discriminate on the basis of perceived or

actual HIV status, sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and
expression, age, economic status, disability, and ethnicity hamper the
enjoyment of basic human rights and freedoms guaranteed in the
Constitution and are deemed inimical to national interest.

I
AND SOCIETY, available at <http://www.plarideljournal.org/article/a-glimpse-into-the-asog-experience-
a-historical-study-on-the-homosexual-experience-in-the-philippines/> (last visited on September 2,
2019) 155, 159 (2012).
22s Id.
229 Id.
230
J. Neil C. Garcia, Nativism or Universalism: Situating LGBT Discourse in the Philippines, 20 KRITIKA
KULTURA 48, 53 (2013).
231
AND SOCIETY 155, 161 (2012), available at <http://www.plarideljournal.org/article/a-glimpse-into-the-
asog-experience-a-historical-study-on-the-homosexual-experience-in-the-philippines/> (last visited on
September 2, 2019).
232
Ang Lad/ad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 632 Phil. 32, 75 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, En
Banc].
However, discrimination remains. Hence, the call for equal rights and
legislative protection continues.
To address the continuing discrimination suffered by the LGBTQI+

community in the Philippines, a number of legislative measures have been
filed in Congress.
For instance, the following bills were filed in the 17th Congress: (1)
House Bill No. 267, or the Anti-SOGIE (Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity or Expression) Discrimination Bill,233 which was eventually
consolidated, along with other bills, into House Bill No. 4982 23 4; (2) House
Bill No. 79, which focused on the same subject as House Bill No. 267; 235 (3)
House Bill No. 2952, which aims to establish LGBT help and protection
desks in all Philippine National Police stations nationwide; 236 House Bill No.
5584, which aims to define domestic violence against individuals, including
members of the LGBTQI+ community other than women and children; 237
and Senate Bill No. 1271, otherwise known as the Anti-Discrimination
Bill. 238
As of the 18 th Congress, steps are being taken to pass the Sexual

Orientation, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression (SOGIE) Equality Bill,
with at least 10 congressional bills 239 and four Senate bills240 against
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity pending.
While comprehensive anti-discrimination measures that address the

specific conditions faced by the LGBTQI+ community have yet to be
enacted, Congress has made headway in instituting protective measures.
Republic Act No. 11313, or the Safe Spaces Act, specifically addresses
"transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs" and penalizes gender-based
street and public spaces sexual harassment:
(a) Catcalling refers to unwanted remarks directed towards a person,

commonly done in the form of wolf-whistling and misogynistic,
transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs;
1
,I
',
233
H. No. 267, 17th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017).
234
235
236
237
238
S. No. 1271, 17th Cong., 1st Sess. (2016).
239
H. Nos. 95, 134,160,258,640, 1041, 1359, 2167, 2211, and 2870, 1st Sess. (2019).
240
S. Nos. 159,315,412, and 689, 1st Sess. (2019).
SECTION 4. Gender-based Streets and Public Spaces Sexual

Harassment. - The crimes of gender-based streets and public spaces
sexual harassment are committed through any unwanted and uninvited
sexual actions or remarks against any person regardless of the motive for
committing such action or remarks.
Gender-based streets and public spaces sexual harassment includes

catcalling, wolf-whistling, unwanted invitations, misogynistic,
transphobic, homophobic and sexist slurs, persistent uninvited comments
or gestures on a person's appearance, relentless requests for personal
details, statement of sexual comments and suggestions, public
masturbation or flashing of private parts, groping, or any advances,
whether verbal or physical, that is unwanted and has threatened one's
sense of personal space and physical safety, and committed in public
spaces such as alleys, roads, sidewalks and parks. Acts constitutive of
gender-based streets and public spaces sexual harassment are those
performed in buildings, schools, churches, restaurants, malls, public
washrooms, bars, internet shops, public markets, transportation terminals
or public utility vehicles.
In the absence of a comprehensive national law, local government

units have passed ordinances recognizing and upholding SOGIESC. In
Quezon City, City Ordinance No. 2357, or the Quezon City Gender-Fair
Ordinance, was passed. 241 In Davao City, Ordinance No. 0417-12 was
passed, penalizing acts that discriminate sexual and gender orientation. 242 In
2018, the Davao City Government announced that it would establish an "all-
gender" comfort room to accommodate members of the LGBTQI+
community. 243 Its purpose, Vice Mayor Bernard Al-ag stated, is "to reduce
discrimination in the preferred gender of the people." 244
Meanwhile, the San Juan City Government passed Ordinance No. 55,
which provides for anti-discrimination of members of the LGBT
community. 245 The Mandaluyong City Government passed Ordinance No.
698 in 2018 to "uphold the rights of all Filipinos especially those
discriminated by reason of gender identity and sexual orientation." 246 In
2019, during the Metro Manila Pride March and Festival, the Marikina City
241
Rio N. Araja, Herbert orders QC City Hall LGBT Workers to Band Together, MANILA STANDARD,
e
September 7, 2017. Available at <http://manilastandard.net/sunday-lgu-section-pdf/ncr/24633 7/herbert-
orders-qc-city-hall-lgbt-workers-to-band-together.html> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
242
Available at <http://ordinances.davaocity.gov.ph/pdNiewer.aspx> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
243
F. Pearl A. Gajunera, Davao to Put Up "All-Gender" CR at City Council Site - Al-ag, MANILA
STANDARD, April 18, 2018, available at <http://manilastandard.net/lgu/mindanao/263538/davao-to-put-
up-all-gender-cr-at-city-council-site-al-ag.html> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
244 Id.
245
OutrageMag.com Staff, City of San Juan passes LGBT anti-discrimination ordinance, OUTRAGE,
October 2, 2017. Available at <http://outragemag.com/city-of-san-juan-passes-lgbt-anti-
discrimination-ordinance/> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
246
Mikee dela Cruz, Mandaluyong City passes LGBT anti-discrimination ordinance, OUTRAGE, May 28,
2018. Available at <http://outragemag.com/mandaluyong-city-passes-lgbt-anti-discrimination-
ordinance/> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
Government announced the enactment of City Ordinance No. 065, its anti-
discrimination ordinance. 247
Moreover, the Philippine Commission on Women has listed other

local government units that adopted anti-discrimination ordinances to
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity:
Angeles City in Pampanga, Antipolo City, Bacolod City in Negros

Occidental, Batangas City in Batangas, Candon City in Ilocos Sur, Cebu
City, Dagupan City in Pangasinan, ... Mandaue City, Puerto Princesa, ..
. Vigan City in Ilocos Sur, Municipality of San Julian in Eastern Samar,
Province of Agusan del Norte, Province of Batangas[,] and Province of
Cavite. 248
The history of erasure, discrimination, and marginalization of the

LGBTQI+ community impels this Court to make careful pronouncements-
lest it cheapen the resistance, or worse, thrust the whole struggle for equality
back to the long shadow of oppression and exclusion. The basic requirement
of actual case or controversy allows this Court to make grounded
declarations with clear and practical consequences.
VII
Here, petitioner has no actual facts that present a real conflict between
the parties of this case. The Petition presents no actual case or controversy.
Despite a goal of proving to this Court that there is a continuing and

pervasive violation of fundamental rights of a marginalized minority group,
the Petition is woefully bereft of sufficient actual facts to substantiate its
arguments.
A substantive portion of the Petition merely parrots the separate

concurring opinion of retired Chief Justice Puno in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party,
concerning the concept of suspect classifications. Five (5) pages of the 29-
page Petition are block quotes from retired Chief Justice Puno, punctuated
by introductory paragraphs of, at most, two (2) sentences each.
A separate opinion is the expression of a justice's individual view

r
247
Katrina Hallare, Marikina mayor signs anti-discrimination ordinance, INQUIRER.NET, June 29, 2019.
Available at <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1135560/marikina-mayor-signs-anti-discrimination-
ordinance> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
248
Philippine Commission on Women, Policy Brief No. 11, Enacting an Anti-Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Law, available at <http://www.pcw.gov.ph/wpla/enacting-anti-
discrimination-based-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-law> (last visited on September 2, 2019).
apart from the conclusion held by the! majority of this Court. 249 Even first
I
year law students know that a separate opinion is without binding effect. 250
This Court may adopt in a subsequent case the views in a separate opinion,
but a party invoking it bears the burden of proving to this Court that the
discussion there is the correct legal analysis that must govern.
Petitioner made no such effort. He did not explain why this Court
should adopt the separate opinion of retired Chief Justice Puno. It is not
enough, as petitioner has done, to merely produce copious quotations from a
separate opinion. Even more curious, petitioner would eventually betray a
lack of confidence in those quotations by ultimately saying that he
"disagrees with the former Chief Justice's conclusion." 251 From his
confused and disjointed reference to retired Chief Justice Puno, petitioner
would arrive at the conclusion that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code must
be examined through the lens of the strict scrutiny test.
In his separate concurring opinion in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, retired

Chief Justice Puno referred to submissions made by petitioner Ang Ladlad
Party-List before respondent Commission on Elections on the "history of
purposeful unequal treatment" 252 suffered by the LGBTQI+ community.
This Court, however, cannot recognize Ang Ladlad Party-List's allegations,
since they were made by a different party, in a different case, on a different
set of facts, for a different subject matter, concerning a different law, to a
different governmental body. These are not "actual facts" sufficient to
engender a justiciable controversy here. They cannot be summarily
imported and given any weight in this case, to determine whether there is a
clash of rights between adversarial parties.
All told, petitioner's 29-page initiatory pleading neither cites nor

annexes any credible or reputable studies, statistics, affidavits, papers, or
statements that would impress upon this Court the gravity of his purported
cause. The Petition stays firmly in the realm of the speculative and
conjectural, failing to represent the very real and well-documented issues
that the LGBTQI+ community face in Philippine society.
Even petitioner's choice of respondent exposes the lack of an actual

case or controversy.
He claims that he imp leaded the Civil Registrar General as respondent .')
,,
/
249
See Garcia v. Perez, 188 Phil. 43 (1980) [Per J. De Castro, First Division]; Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil. Inc., 502 Phil. 748 (2005) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
250
See Roque v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 75 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
251
Rollo, p. 26.
252
Ang Lad/ad LGBT Party v. Commission on Election, 632 Phil. 32, 111 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, En
Banc].
because "it is the instrumentality of the government that is tasked to enforce

the law in relation with (sic) marriage[.]" 253
Lest pet1t10ner himself forget, what he asserts as ground for the

allowance of his suit is the existence of grave abuse of discretion; 254
specifically, grave abuse of discretion in the enactment of the Family Code:
20. Petitioner submits that a prima facie case of grave abuse of

discretion exists in the passage of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code.
Limiting the definition of marriage as between man and woman is, on its
face, a grave abuse of discretion[.] 255
Respondent Civil Registrar General was not involved in the

formulation or enactment of the Family Code. It did not participate in
limiting the definition of marriage to only opposite-sex couples. That is the
province and power of Congress alone.
His choice of the Civil Registrar General as respondent is manifestly

misguided. No factual antecedents existed prior to the filing of the Petition
apart from the passage of the Family Code. Petitioner has never applied for
a marriage license. He has never even visited the premises of respondent's
office, or of anyone acting under its authority. Petitioner has never bothered
to show that he himself acted in any way that asked respondent to exercise
any kind of discretion. Indeed, no discretion was ever exercised by
respondent. Without an exercise of discretion, there could not have been
abuse of discretion, let alone one that could conceivably be characterized as
"grave."
This rudimentary, but glaring, flaw was pointed out by Chief Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin during the oral arguments:
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor. We believe that it is proper to implead the Civil
Registrar-General because when it comes to Rule 65 Petitions, Your
Honors, in the way that petitions, petitioners invoked it, it's in the
expanded ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Yeah. I understand. Now, the expanded jurisdiction under the
Second Paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII, refers to abuse of .
discretion. f
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honors.
253
TSN dated June 19, 2018, p. 90.
254
Rollo, pp. 8-10.
255
Id. at 9.
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
The Civil Registrar has no discretion. Meaning, it has only a
ministerial duty to issue you a license or to deny you that license. So,
could you not ever resulted (sic) to mandamus in the Regional Trial Court
of where you have a refusal? You should have done that.
ATTY. FALCIS:
Your Honor, with this Court's indulgence, we are of the submission
that in other laws that were questioned, other, the constitutionality of other
laws that were questioned . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, you cannot make your case similar to those other laws because
those other laws were against other branches of government. They were
seeking genuine judicial review. Here, you are asking us to perform a
very ordinary task of correcting somebody s mistake which was not even a
mistake because there was no instance where you asked that official to
function as such. 256 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner himself admitted that he has not suffered from respondent's

enforcement of the law he is assailing:
JUSTICE BERNABE:
Have you actually tried applying for a marriage license?
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honors, because I would concede that I do not have a
partner and that even if I do have a partner, it is not automatic that my
partner might want to marry me and so, Your Honors, I did not apply or I
could not apply for a marriage license. 257
Petitioner noted258 that grave abuse of discretion may be shown by

prima facie evidence. This does not help his case. What it indicates is his
own acknowledgement that proof cannot be dispensed with, and that he
cannot win his case based on pure allegations of actual or imminent injury
caused by respondent. 259 The burden is on petitioner to point to any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent to avail of this Court's
extraordinary certiorari power of review. 260
By petitioner's own standards, his Petition lacks an essential requisite

that would trigger this Court's review.
J
256
TSN, June 19, 2018, pp. 90-91.
257
Id. at 67-68.
258
Rollo, p. 8.
259
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 140-141 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
26
° Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 809 Phil. 453, 529 (2017) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
VIII
A ware of the need to empower and uphold the dignity of the

LGBTQI+ community, this Court is mindful that swift, sweeping, and
indiscriminate pronouncements, lacking actual facts, may do more harm than
good to a historically marginalized community.
A proper ventilation of issues requires an appreciation of marriage

past its symbolic value and towards a holistic view of its practical, cross-
cutting, and even permanent consequences. This entails an overlapping
process of articulation, deliberation, and consensus, which members of the
LGBTQI+ community must undertake within their circles and through the
political branches of the government, towards crafting a policy that truly
embraces the particularities of same-sex intimacies.
VIII (A)
Despite seeking access to the benefits of marriage, petitioner

miserably fails to articulate what those benefits are, in both his filed
pleadings and his submissions during oral arguments.
More than being the "foundation of the family[,]" 261 the state of
marriage grants numerous specific rights and privileges that affect most, if
not all, aspects of marital and family relationships.
VIII (A)(l)
Included in the bundle of rights granted by the Family Code to

married spouses is the right of support, shown in the obligation of each
spouse to "render mutual help and support" 262 and to provide support to the
family. 263 For instance, spouses are mandated to contribute to the expenses
for the management of the household. 264 Likewise, spouses are jointly
responsible for the "sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education[,] and transportation" 265 of 'the family. 266 The entitlement to this
,7
261
CONST, art. xv, sec. 2.
):
262
FAMIL y CODE, art. 68 provides:
ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
263
FAMILY CODE, art. 70 provides:
ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for
such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or
absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties.
264
ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The
expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
265
right continues even during proceedings for legal separation, annulment of

marriage, or declaration of nullity of marriage. 267
As these obligations are enforceable, they concomitantly grant either

spouse relief when the other spouse reneges on his or her duty or commits
acts that "tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the
family[.]" 268 Either spouse may likewise object to the profession,
occupation, business or activity of the other spouse on "valid, serious, and
moral grounds." 269
Although the Family Code does not grant the right to compel spouses
to cohabit with each other, 270 it maintains that spouses are duty bound to
"live together" 271 and to "fix the family domicile." 272 This is consistent with
the policy of promoting solidarity within the family. 273
Furthermore, the Family Code allows spouses to constitute a family

274
home, which shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or
attachment. 275 The family home may not be sold, donated, assigned, or
ARTICLE 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
;
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
266
FAMILY CODE, art. 70.
267
ARTI CLE 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties
of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After final judgment granting the petition, the
obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the
court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of
such order.
268
ARTICLE 72. When one of the spouses neglects his/her duties to the conjugal union or commits
acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
may apply to the court for relief.
269
ARTICLE 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
270
See Arroyo v. Vasques de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 60 (1921) [Per J. Street, En Banc].
271
272
ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall x the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
273
274
F AMIL y CODE, art. 152 provides:
ARTICLE 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on
which it is situated.
275
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
otherwise encumbered by either spouse without the other's written

consent. 276 Though an unmarried head of a family may constitute a family
home, 277 only those persons enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code
may be considered beneficiaries. 278
The Civil Code also offers an expansive coverage on the rights and
privileges of spouses should either of them die. The law grants surviving
legitimate spouses the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the
deceased spouse. 279 Accordingly, "no human remains shall be retained,
interred, disposed of[,] or exhumed" 280 without proper consent from the
legitimate spouse, who shall have a better right than the other persons
enumerated in Article 199 of the Family Code.
In relation to this, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7170 permits the

surviving spouse to donate all or any part of the body of the deceased
legitimate spouse, as long as there is no actual notice of contrary intentions
by the deceased, or of opposition by a member of his or her immediate
family. 281
The Civil Code also covers the successional rights granted to spouses.
This includes the division and partition of the deceased spouse's estate
among the surviving spouse and other surviving descendants, ascendants,
and collateral relatives.
276
ARTICLE 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the
t
owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's
spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide.
277
FAMILY CODE, art. I 52.
278
ARTICLE 154. The beneficiaries ofa family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of
the family for legal support.
279
CIVIL CODE, art. 305 provides:
ARTICLE 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
in accordance with the order established for support, under article 294 [now Article 199 of the Family
Code]. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
28
° CIVIL CODE, art. 308 provides:
ARTICLE 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without
the consent of the persons mentioned in articles 294 [now Article 199 of the Family Code] and 305.
281
Republic Act No. 7170 (1992), sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Person Who May Execute a Donation. -
(a) Any of the following, person, in the order of property stated hereunder, in the absence of
actual notice of contrary intentions by the decedent or actual notice of opposition by a
member of the immediate family of the decedent, may donate all or any part of the decedent's
body for any purpose specified in Section 6 hereof:
(1) Spouse;
(2) Son or daughter of legal age;
(3) Either parent;
(4) Brother or sister of legal age; or
(5) Guardian over the person of the decedent at the time of his death.
(b) The persons authorized by sub-section (a) of this Section may make the donation after \\or
immediately before death.
A surviving spouse succeeds concurrently with the deceased spouse's

legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants. 282 As compulsory
heirs, they are entitled to receive a specific and definite pmiion of the
deceased's estate. 283
In cases where the deceased spouse left a will, the surviving spouse is
entitled to one-half of the testator's entire estate. 284 If the spouse survives
with legitimate or illegitimate children or descendants and/or acknowledged
natural children, he or she receives a share equivalent to the share of a
legitimate child. 285
If either spouse dies without any will and the surviving spouse is the
sole heir of the deceased, the spouse is entitled to the entire estate "without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews[,] and nieces" 286 of
the deceased. If the spouse survives with the legitimate or illegitimate
children or descendants of the deceased then the spouse is entitled to receive
the same amount of share that a legitimate child is entitled to receive. 287
The Civil Code also covers situations where the spouses were married
in articulo mortis, and one ( 1) of them died three (3) months after such
marriage. In these cases, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the
deceased's estate. However, where the spouses were living together as
husband and wife five (5) years before a spouse dies, the surviving spouse is f
entitled to half of the estate. 288
282
CIVIL CODE, art. 887(3) provides:
ARTICLE 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(3) The widow or widowerL.]
283
ARTICLE 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.
284
CIVIL CODE, art. 900 provides:.
ARTICLE 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-
half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other
half.
285
ARTICLE 897. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants,
and acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall be
entitled to a portion equal to the legitirne of each of the legitimate children which must be taken from
that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of.: CIVIL Coor:, art. 898. If the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and with illegitimate children other than
acknowledged natural, or natural children by legal fiction, the share of the surviving spouse shall be
the same as that provided in the preceding article.
286
ARTICLE 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children
and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire
estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under article I 00 I.
287
CIVIL CODE, at1. 999 provides:
ARTICLE 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such
widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.
288
Aside from the rights and privileges between married spouses, the
Civil Code also provides for the relationships between the spouses, as
parents, and their children. Consistent with the constitutional provision on
the "right and duty of parents in rearing the youth," 289 the Family Code
states that spouses shall exercise joint parental authority, 290 legal
guardianship, 291 and custody over common children.
Parental authority encompasses a bundle of rights for unemancipated

children. This includes the right to represent the common children in
matters affecting their interests and to impose discipline on them as may be
necessary, among others. 292
The Family Code likewise provides that spouses shall exercise legal
guardianship over the property of the minor child by operation of law. 293
This entitles the spouses to a right over the fruits of the child's property,
which shall be used primarily for child support and secondarily for the
family's collective needs. 294
I
?
ARTICLE 900. If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in / '
articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of
the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, except when they have
been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the
surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph.
289
CONST., art. II, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
29
° FAMIL y CODE, art. 211 provides:
ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary.
291
ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case
of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
292
ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to
their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(I) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire
in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; To demand from them respect and
obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perf01m such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
293
294
FAMILY CODE, art. 226 (2) provides:
Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 8552 covers the rights and privileges
attached to adoption. One (1) of the significant rights granted by this law is
the legitimate spouses' right to jointly adopt a child. Spouses who jointly
adopt shall exercise joint parental authority and custody over the adoptee. 295
The adoptees shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as

legitimate children of the adoptive parents. 296 As legitimate children, they
may bear the surname of their adoptive parents. 297 They are likewise
granted the right to receive support, the legitime, and other successional
rights from both of the adoptive parents.
Moreover, inter-country adoption permits Filipino c1t1zens

permanently residing abroad to jointly file for adoption with their spouse.
Though Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8043 restricts adopters to persons
who are "at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen ( 16)
years older than the child to be adopted, at the time of application[,]" the
same provision allows an exception in favor of an adopter who is the
legitimate spouse of the adoptee' s natural parent. 298
ARTICLE 226. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be
limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
j
295
Republic Act. No. 8552 (1998), sec. 7( c) provides:
SECTION 7. Who May Adopt. -The following may adopt:
(c)
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
296
Republic Act. No. 8552 (1998), sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided
by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the
adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
297
CIVIL CODE, art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
298
Republic Act. No. 8043 ( 1995), sec. 9 provides:
SECTION 9. Who May Adopt. - An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may
file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to
be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to
be adopted or the spouse of such parent;
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his
national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in
his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted ofa crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(t) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values
and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to
implement the provisions of this Act;
VIII (A)(2)
Marriage has consequences in criminal law as well.
For instance, anyone who, after having suddenly come upon his or her
legitimate spouse in the act of committing sex with another, kills any or both
is only liable to suffer destierro. Should the offending spouse inflict
physical injuries upon his or her spouse or the other person, he or she shall
be exempt from criminal liability. 299
Marital relations also influence the imposable penalty for crimes.

Any person's criminal act in defense of his or her spouse is a justifying
circumstance, 300 while immediate vindication of a grave offense to one's
spouse is a mitigating circumstance. 301 That the victim is the spouse of the
offender is considered an alternative circumstance, which may be considered
as aggravating or mitigating depending on "the nature and effects of the
crime and the other conditions attending its commission." 302 Commission of
Ji
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is
allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other
applicable Philippine laws.
299
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 247 provides:
ARTICLE 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.- Any
legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall
inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their
parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise
have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
3
oo REV. PEN. CODE, art. 11(2) provides:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances.- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and
those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
301
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 13(5) provides:
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances.-The following are mitigating circumstances:
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
302
ARTICLE 15. Their concept.- Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the
other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication, and the degree of
instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended
party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative
by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.
the crime in full view of the spouse of the victim-spouse is also an

aggravating circumstance in the crime of rape. 303 The Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003, as amended, also qualifies trafficking if the offender is
a spouse of the trafficked person. 304 Further, a spouse who is an accessory to
a crime is generally exempt from criminal liability. 305
In the crimes of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape,

the marriage between the offending and the offended party extinguishes the
criminal action and remits the penalty already imposed upon the offender. 306
In marital rape, "the subsequent forgiveness" of the offended wife
extinguishes the criminal action or penalty against the offending husband. 307
)}
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance
when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
303
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-B as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (1997), provides:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph I of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity[.]
304
Republic Act No. 9208 (2003), sec. 6(d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 10364 (2012), sec. 9 provides:
SECTION 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be
considered as qualified trafficking:
(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or
employee.
305
ARTICLE 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability .-The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provision of paragraph I of
the next preceding article.
306
ARTICLE 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness. - The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor, in any case, ifhe shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case,
if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him.
The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
307
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-C as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (1997), provides:
ARTICLE 266-C. Effect of pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty; Provided, That the crime shall not be
extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage be void ab initio.
Likewise, adultery and concubinage cannot be prosecuted when the offended

spouse has pardoned the offenders or has consented to the offense. 308
Bigamy is committed by a person who has been previously married

and who contracts a subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
legally dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by a court judgement. 309 Penalizing the act of
contracting a subsequent marriage where one is still legally married to
another person safeguards the institution of marriage, protecting the rights
and status of the legitimate spouse.
VIII (A)(3)
The State's interest in marriage and married persons extends to

taxation.
Under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic

Act No. 10963, the income taxes of married individuals are generally
computed separately based on their respective total taxable income. 310
308
RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a
x
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case
of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private
prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute
the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial
even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including the
guilty parties, if both are alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to the offense or
pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor in any case,
if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies or becomes
incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents, or
guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses of
seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is a
minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to
file the action granted to parents, grandparents, or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and
shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding
paragraph.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the offenses
mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended
party.
The prosecution of complaints for violation of special laws shall be governed by their provisions
thereof.
3 9
o REV. PEN. CODE, art. 349 provides:
ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgement rendered
in the proper proceedings.
310
TAX CODE, sec. 24 (A)(2)(a), as amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (2017), provides in part:
For married individuals, the husband and wife, subject to the provision of Section 51 (D) hereof,
shall compute separately their individual income tax based on their respective total taxable income:
However, for any income that "cannot be definitely attributed to or

identified as income exclusively earned or realized by either of the
spouses," 31I Section 24 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended,
provides that the amount shall be equally divided between the spouses for
the computation of their respective taxable incomes.
Further, in the computation of an individual's taxable income, the

National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, excludes from the
computation of the gross income any amount received by an heir of an
official or employee from the employer "as a consequence of separation of
such official or employee from the service of the employer because of death
sickness or other physical disability or for any cause beyond the control of
the said official or employee." 312 Likewise, benefits received by a spouse
from the Social Security System, in accordance with Republic Act No. 8282,
as well as benefits received from the Government Service Insurance System,
in accordance with Republic Act No. 8291, are excluded from the
computation of an individual's gross income. 313
On the filing of income tax returns, the National Internal Revenue

Code, as amended, provides that married individuals, regardless of
citizenship or residence, "who do not derive income purely from
compensation," shall file an income tax return that includes the income of
both spouses, except "where it is impracticable for the spouses to file one
return," in which case each spouse may file separate income tax returns. 314
Provided, That if any income cannot be definitely attributed to or identified as income exclusively
earned or realized by either of the spouses, the same shall be divided equally between the spouses for
J
the purpose of determining their respective taxable income.
311
TAX CODE, as amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (2017), sec. 24 (A)(2)(a).
312
TAX CODE, as amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (2017), sec. 32 (B)(6)(b) provides:
SEC. 32. Gross Income. - ...
(B) Exclusions from Gross Income. - The following items shall not be included in gross income
and shall be exempt from taxation under this Title:
(6) Retirement Benefits, Pensions, Gratuities, etc. -
(b) Any amount received by an official or ~mployee or by his heirs from the employer as a
consequence of separation of such official or employee from the service of the employer because of
death sickness or other physical disability or for any cause beyond the control of the said official or
employee.
313
TAX CODE, as amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (2017), sec. 32 (B)(6)(e)(t) provides:
SEC. 32. Gross Income. -
(B) Exclusions from Gross Income. - The following items shall not be included in gross income and
shall be exempt from taxation under this Title:
(6) Retirement Benefits, Pensions, Gratuities, etc.-
(e) Benefits received from or enjoyed under the Social Security System in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8282.
(t) Benefits received from the GSIS under Republic Act No. 8291, including retirement gratuity
received by government officials and employees.
314
TAX CODE, as amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (2017), sec. 5 l(D) provides:
SECTION 51. Individual Return. -
As for estate tax, the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended,

provides that "the capital of the surviving spouse of a decedent" 315 is not
deemed part of the gross estate. Consequently, "the net share of the
surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property" is "deducted from the
net estate of the decedent." 316
Likewise, when the decedent is a Filipino citizen or a resident of the

Philippines, the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, allows a
deduction of the "current fair market value of the decedent's family
home" 317 up to PIO million from the amount of the gross estate. Further,
"any amount received by the heirs from the decedent's employee as a
consequence of the death of the decedent-employee in accordance with
Republic Act No. 4917" 318 is also deducted from the amount of the gross
estate.
VIII (A)(4)
Even the Labor Code and other labor laws are influenced by the
institution of marriage.
The narrow definition of "dependents" under the Labor Code includes

"the legitimate spouse living with the employee." 319 As a consequence, the
}'
(D) Husband and Wife. Married individuals, whether citizens, resident or nonresident aliens, who
do not derive income purely from compensation, shall file a return for the taxable year to include the
income of both spouses, but where it is impracticable for the spouses to file one return, each spouse
may file a separate return of income but the returns so filed shall be consolidated by the Bureau for
purposes of verification for the taxable year.
315
TAX CODE, as amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (2017), sec. 85 (H) provides:
SECTION 85. Gross Estate. -The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated: Provided, however, that in the case of a nonresident decedent who at the time of his
death was not a citizen of the Philippines, only that part of the entire gross estate which is situated in
the Philippines shall be included in his taxable estate.
(H) Capital of the Surviving Spouse. - The capital of the surviving spouse of a decedent shall
not, for the purpose of this Chapter, be deemed a part of his/her gross estate.
316
TAX CODE, sec. 86 (C), as amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (2017), provides:
SECTION 86. Computation of Net Estate. - For the purpose of the tax imposed in this Chapter,
the value of the net estate shall be determined:
(C) Share in the Conjugal Property. - The net share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal
partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property shall, for
the purpose of this Section, be deducted from the net estate of the decedent.
317
TAX CODE, as amended by Rep. Act No. 10963 (2017), sec. 86 (A)(7) provides:
(7) The Family Home. - An amount equivalent to the current fair market value of the decedent's
family home: Provided, however, That if the said cun-ent fair market value exceeds Ten million pesos
(PIO, 000,000), the excess shall be subject to estate tax.
318
TAX CODE, as amended by Rep. Act No. l 0963 (2017), sec. 86 (A)(8).
319
LABOR CODE, art. 173(i) provides:
ARTICLE 173. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Title, unless the context indicates
otherwise:
legitimate spouse is entitled to compensation from the state insurance fund

in case of the disability or death of the employee. 320
Further, under the Social Security Act of 1997321 and the Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997,322 the legal spouse of the member is
included in the list of his or her dependents.
Similarly, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration Act includes

the legal spouse in the list of dependents of overseas Filipino workers. 323
Thus, certain benefits afforded to overseas Filipino workers are extended to
the legal spouse. 324
:)
I
I '
(i) "Dependents" means the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or over twenty-one
years of age provided he is incapable of self-support due to a physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; the legitimate spouse living with the employee; and the parents
of said employee wholly dependent upon him for regular support.
320
LABOR CODE, art. 178 provides:
ARTICLE 178. Limitation of Liability. - The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for
compensation to the employee or his dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned
by the employee's intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious
negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title.
321
Republic Act No. 1161 (1954), as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (1997), sec. 8(e)(I) provides:
SECTION 8. Terms Defined. - For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:

(I) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
322
Presidential Decree No. 1146 ( 1977) as amended by Republic Act No. 8291 ( 1997), sec. 2(t) provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. - Unless the context otherwise indicates, the following terms
shall mean:
(t) Dependents - Dependents shall be the following: (a) the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the member or pensioner; (b) the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted child, including
the illegitimate child, who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, not over the age of majority, or is
over the age of majority but incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to a mental or physical
defect acquired prior to age of majority; and (c) the parents dependent upon the member for support[.]
323
Republic Act No. 10801 (2016), sec. 7(c) provides:
SECTION 7. Definition ofTerms. -As used in this Act:
(c) Dependent refers to any of the following:

(1) The legal spouse;
(2) The legitimate, illegitimate, legitimated, and legally adopted child, who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over the age of majority, or is over the age of majority but
incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to a mental or physical defect; and
(3) The parents who rely primarily upon the member-OFWs for support[.]
324
Republic Act No. 10801 (2016), sec. 35(e) provides:
SECTION 35. Benefits and Services to OFWs -
(e) Social Benefits. -A member-OFW shall be covered with the following social benefits:
( 1) Death and Disability Benefits:
(i) Death Benefits. - A member shall be covered with life insurance for the duration of his/her
employment contract. The coverage shall include one hundred thousand pesos (Pl00,000.00) for
natural death and two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) for accidental death;
(ii) Disability and Dismemberment Benefits. - Disability and dismemberment benefits shall be
included in a member's life insurance policy, as provided for in the impediment schedule
The Labor Code confines an employee's "primary beneficiaries" to

his or her dependent spouse, until he or she remarries, and his or her
dependent children. 325 Primary beneficiaries are entitled to receive full
death benefits under the Labor Code. 326
' ')
contained in the OWW A Manual of Systems and Procedures. The coverage is within the range of
)'
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to fifty thousand pesos (PS0,000.00);
(iii) Total Disability Benefit. - In case of total permanent disability, a member shall be entitled to
one hundred thousand pesos (Pl00,000.00); and
(iv) Burial Benefit. -A burial benefit of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) shall be provided in
case of the member's death.
Based on actuarial studies, the Board may increase the amount of the abovementioned
benefits.
(2) Health Care Benefits. - Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, the OWWA
shall develop and implement health care programs for the benefit of member-OFWs and their
families, taking into consideration the health care needs of women as provided for in Republic Act
No. 9710, or the Magna Carta of Women, and other relevant laws.
(3) Education and Training Benefits. - A member, or the member's designated beneficiary, may
avail any of the following scholarship programs, subject to a selection process and accreditation of
participating institutions:
(i) Skills-for-Employment Scholarship Program. - For technical or vocational training
scholarship;
(ii) Education for Development Scholarship Program. - For baccalaureate programs; and
(iii) Seafarers' Upgrading Program. - To ensure the competitive advantage of Filipino seafarers
in meeting competency standards, as required by the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, treaties and agreements, sea-based members
shall be entitled to one upgrading program for every three (3) membership contributions.
The annual scholarship lists of all these programs shall be submitted to the Board.
325
LABOR CODE, art. l 73U) provides:
ARTICLE 173. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Title, unless the context indicates
otherwise:
U) "Beneficiaries" means the dependent spouse until he/she remarries and dependent children,
who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants, who
are the secondary beneficiaries: Provided, That the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit.
326
LABOR CODE, art. 194 provides:
ARTICLE 194. Death. - (a) Under such regulations as the Commission may approve, the
System shall pay to the primary beneficiaries upon the death of the covered employee under this Title,
an amount equivalent to his monthly income benefit, plus ten percent thereof for each dependent child,
but not exceeding five, beginning with the youngest and without substitution, except as provided for in
paragraph U) of Article 167 149 hereof: Provided, however, That the monthly income benefit shall be
guaranteed for five years: Provided, further, That if he has no primary beneficiary, the System shall pay
to his secondary beneficiaries the monthly income benefit but not to exceed sixty months: Provided,
finally, That the minimum death benefit shall not be less than fifteen thousand pesos.
(b) Under such regulations as the Commission may approve, the System shall pay to the primary
beneficiaries upon the death of a covered employee who is under permanent total disability under this
Title, eighty percent of the monthly income benefit and his dependents to the dependents' pension:
Provided, That the marriage must have been validly subsisting at the time of disability: Provided,
further, That if he has no primary beneficiary, the System shall pay to his secondary beneficiaries the
monthly pension excluding the dependents' pension, of the remaining balance of the five-year
guaranteed period: Provided, finally, That the minimum death benefit shall not be less than fifteen
thousand pesos.
(c) The monthly income benefit provided herein shall be the new amount of the monthly income
benefit for the surviving beneficiaries upon the approval of this decree.
(d) Funeral benefit. -A funeral benefit of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) shall be paid upon
the death of a covered employee or permanently totally disabled pensioner.
In addition, under the Social Security Act of 1997 327 and the
Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, 328 the dependent spouse
is included in the list of primary beneficiaries of the employee, until he or
she remarries.
The Social Security Act of 1997 entitles the "primary beneficiaries as

of the date of retirement" to receive the retirement benefits of the retired
member upon his or her death. 329 They are also entitled to receive death
benefits "[u]pon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36)
monthly contributions prior to the semester of death." 330 The primary
beneficiaries as of the disability are also entitled to receive the monthly
pension of a permanent total disability pensioner upon the pensioner's
death. 331
On the other hand, the Government Service Insurance System Act of

1997 entitles the dependent spouse, as a primary beneficiary, to survivorship
pension upon the death of a member. 332 This entitlement is likewise
,i/
/'I
327
Republic Act No. 1161 (1954), as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (1997), sec. 8(k) provides:
SECTION 8. Terms Defined. - For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he/she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the
member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of
the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the
absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her
dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their
absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence
of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
328
Presidential Decree No. 1146 (1977) as amended by Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 2(g) provides:
SECTION 2. Primary beneficiaries - The legal dependent spouse until he/she remarries and the
dependent children[.]
329
Republic Act No. 1161 (1954) as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (1997), sec. 12-B(d) provides:
SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. -
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement
shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries and
he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his secondary beneficiaries
shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the total monthly pensions corresponding to the
balance of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the dependents' pension.
330
Republic Act No. 1161 (1954), as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (1997), sec. 13 provides:
SECTION 13. Death Benefits. - Upon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six
(36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to
the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries
shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly pension. If he
has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or secondary beneficiaries
shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly
contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly pension, whichever is higher.
331
Republic Act No. 1161 (1954) as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (1997), sec. 13-A(c) provides:
SECTION 13-A. Permanent Disability Benefits. -
(c) Upon the death of the permanent total disability pensioner, his primary beneficiaries as of the
date of disability shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary
beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the total monthly pensions
corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed period excluding the dependents' pension.
332
Republic Act No. 1146 (1954) as amended by Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 21 provides:
afforded to qualified beneficiaries "[u]pon the death of an old-age pensioner

or a member receiving the monthly income benefit for permanent
disability." 333 Further, funeral benefits are provided under the Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997. 334
Moreover, under the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration Standard Employment Contract, 335 a seafarer's beneficiaries
1
SECTION 21. Death of a Member. - (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries
)'
shall be entitled to:
(1) survivorship pension: Provided, That the deceased:
(i) was in the service at the time of his death; or
(ii) if separated from the service, has at least three (3) years of service at the time of his death and
has paid thirty-six (36) monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding
his death; or has paid a total of at least one hundred eighty ( 180) monthly contributions prior to his
death; or
(2) the survivorship pension plus a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of his
average monthly compensation for every year of service: Provided, That the deceased was in the
service at the time of his death with at least three (3) years of service; or
(3) a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (I 00%) of his average monthly
compensation for each year of service he paid contributions, but not less than Twelve thousand
pesos (P12,000.00): Provided, That the deceased has rendered at least three (3) years of service
prior to his death but does not qualify for the benefits under the item (1) or (2) of this paragraph.
(b) The survivorship pension shall be paid as follows:
(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he/she shall receive the basic survivorship
pension for life or until he/she remarries;
(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the basic survivorship
pension for as long as they are qualified, plus the dependent children's pension equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the basic monthly pension for every dependent child not exceeding five (5),
counted from the youngest and without substitution;
(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, the dependent spouse
shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he/she remarries, and the dependent
children shall receive the dependent children's pension mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph (2) hereof.
(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to:
(I) the cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of his average monthly
compensation for each year of service he paid contributions, but not less than Twelve thousand
pesos (P12,000): Provided, That the member is in the service at the time of his death and has at
least three (3) years of service; or
(2) in the absence of secondary beneficiaries, the benefits under this paragraph shall be paid to his
legal heirs.
(d) For purposes of the survivorship benefits, legitimate children shall include legally adopted and
legitimate children.
333
Presidential Decree No. 1146 (1977) as amended by Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 22 provides:
SECTION 22. Death of a Pensioner. - Upon the death of an old-age pensioner or a member
receiving the monthly income benefit for permanent disability, the qualified beneficiaries shall be
entitled to the survivorship pension defined in Section 20 of this Act, subject to the provisions of
paragraph (b) of Section 21 hereof. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump
sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the said period.
334
Presidential Decree No. 1146 (1977) as amended by Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 23 provides:
SECTION 23. Funeral Benefit. - The amount of funeral benefit shall be determined and
specified by the GSIS in the rules and regulations but shall not be less than Twelve thousand pesos
(P12,000.00): Provided, That it shall be increased to at least Eighteen thousand pesos (P 18,000.00)
after five (5) years and shall be paid upon the death of:
(a) an active member as defined under Section 2(e) of this Act; or
(b) a member who has been separated from the service, but who may be entitled to future benefit
pursuant to Section 4 of this Act; or
(c) a pensioner, as defined in Section 2(o) of this Act; or
(d) a retiree who at the time of his retirement was of pensionable age under this Act but who opted
to retire under Republic Act No. 1616.
335
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 010-10 (2010), or Amended Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, defines the
"beneficiaries" as "the person(s) to whom the death compensation and other benefits due under the
are entitled to a list of compensation and benefits in the event of the

seafarer's work-related death. 336
Meanwhile, under Republic Act No. 7192, or the Women in

Development and Nation Building Act, "[m]arried persons who devote full
time to managing the household and family affairs" shall be entitled to
voluntary coverage under Pag-IBIG, the Government Service Insurance
System, and Social Security System, which is equivalent to half of "the
salary and compensation of the working spouse." 337 These contributions
"shall be deducted from the salary of the working spouse. " 338
VIII (A)(S)
Aside from influencing provisions in substantive law, the status of

marriage is also recognized in the Rules of Court.
employment contract are payable in accordance with rules of succession under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended."
;
336
POEAMemorandum Circular No. 010-10 (2010), sec. 20 (B) provides:
SECTION 20. Compensation and Benefits. -
B. Compensation and Benefits for Death

1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand
US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000)
to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the
exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
2. Where death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a declared war zone or war
risk area, the compensation payable shall be doubled. The employer shall undertake
appropriate war zone insurance coverage for this purpose.
3. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct
from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seafarer is entitled to under
Philippine laws from the Social Security System, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration,
Employee's Compensation Commission, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation and Home
Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund).
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related
injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the
seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the
Philippines at employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local
government laws or regulations do not pennit the transport of such remains. In case
death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in
accordance with the master's best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall
communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer's remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency
equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at
the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
337
Republic Act No. 7192 ( 1992), sec. 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSJS and SSS Coverage. - Married persons who devote full
time to managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the working spouse's consent, be
entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan - Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno), Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half
(1/2) of the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The contributions due thereon shall be
deducted from the salary of the working spouse.
The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and regulations necessary to effectively
implement the provisions of this section.
338
Republic Act No. 7192 (1992), sec. 8.
For instance, spouses may not be compelled to testify for or against

each other during their marriage. 339 Likewise, during or even after their
marriage, spouses, by reason of privileged communication, "cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage[.]" 340
Moreover, the law accords to family courts exclusive jurisdiction over

petitions for guardianship, custody of children, adoption of children, and
support, as well as complaints for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage, and property relations. 341
A disputable presumption under our Rules on Evidence is that a man

and a woman who deport themselves as spouses have entered into
marriage. 342 It is also presumed that a property that is acquired by a man and
a woman, who have the capacity to marry and live exclusively with each
other as spouses without being actually married, was obtained by their joint
efforts, work, or industry. 343 If such man and woman have acquired property
339
SECTION 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. - During their marriage, neither the
j
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
340
SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. -The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
341
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to
marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different
status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines."
342
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3(aa) provides:
SECTION 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage[.]
343
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3(bb) provides:
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and
who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry[.]
through their actual joint contribution, their contributions shall also be

presumed as equal. 344
VIII (A)(6)
Marriage likewise affects the application of other special laws.

Several statutes grant a range of rights in favor of legitimate spouses.
Among these is the National Health Insurance Act of 2013, which gives a
legitimate spouse, as a "legal dependent," the right to receive health care
benefits. 345 This right includes inpatient hospital care and payment for the
services of healthcare professionals, and diagnostic and other medical
services, among others. 346
)
344
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3( cc) provides:
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit are equal[.]
345
Republic Act No. 7875 (1995), sec. 4(f) provides:
SECTION 4 ....
(f) Dependent - The legal dependents of a member are: 1) the legitimate spouse who is not a
member; 2) the unmarried and unemployed legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged
children as appearing in the birth certificate; legally adopted or stepchildren below twenty-one (21)
years of age; 3) children who are twenty-one (21) years old or above but suffering from congenital
disability, either physical or mental, or any disability acquired that renders them totally dependent on
the member for support; 4) the parents who are sixty (60) years old or above whose monthly income is
below an amount to be determined by the Corporation in accordance with the guiding principles set
forth in Article I of this Act.
346
SECTION 10. Benefit Package - Subject to the limitations specified in this Act and as may be
determined by the Corporation, the following categories of personal health services granted to the
member or his dependents as medically necessary or appropriate shall include:
(a) Inpatient hospital care:
(I) room and board;
(2) services of health care professionals;
(3) diagnostic, laboratory, and other medical examination services;
(4) use of surgical or medical equipment and facilities;
(5) prescription drugs and biologicals; subject to the limitations stated in Section 37 of this Act;
(6) inpatient education packages;
(b) Outpatient care:
(1) services of health care professionals;
(2) diagnostic, laboratory, and other medical examination services;
(3) personal preventive services; and
(4) prescription drugs and biologicals, subject to the limitations described in Section 37 of this
Act;
(c) Emergency and transfer services; and
(d) Such other health care services that the Corporation shall determine to be appropriate and cost-
effective: Provided, That the Program, during its initial phase of implementation, which shall
not be more than five (5) years, shall provide a basic minimum package of benefits which
shall be defined according to the following guidelines:
(I) the cost of providing said package is such that the available national and local government
subsidies for premium payments of indigents are sufficient to extend coverage to the widest
possible population
(2) the initial set of services shall not be less than half of those provided under the current
Medicare Program I in terms of overall average cost of claims paid per beneficiary household
per year
Furthermore, the Insurance Code, as amended by Republic Act No.

10607, acknowledges that every person has an insurable interest in the life of
his or her legitimate spouse. 347 This allows a married person to enter into an
insurance policy upon the life of his or her spouse as owner and/or
beneficiary.
As to survivorship benefits, legitimate spouses of retired chairpersons

and commissioners of constitutional commissions-the Commission on
Audit, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections-as well as of
the Ombudsman are entitled under Republic Act No. 10084 to receive all
the retirement benefits that the deceased retiree was receiving at the time of
his or her demise. 348 Likewise, surviving legitimate spouses of deceased
members of the judiciary, who were retired or eligible to retire at the time of
death, are entitled to all the retirement benefits of the deceased judge or
justice under Republic Act No. 910, as amended. 349 In both cases, the
surviving legitimate spouse shall continue to receive such benefits until he or
she remarries.
1/
I (
(3) the services included are prioritized, first, according to its cost-effectiveness and, second,
according to its potential of providing maximum relief from the financial burden on the
beneficiary: Provided, That in addition to the basic minimum package, the Program shall
provide supplemental health benefit coverage to beneficiaries of contributory funds, taking
into consideration the availability of funds for the purpose from said contributory funds:
Provided, further, That the Program shall progressively expand the basic minimum benefit
package as the proportion of the population covered reaches targeted milestones so that the
same benefits are extended to all members of the Program within five (5) years after the
implementation of this Act. Such expansion will provide for the gradual incorporation of
supplementary health benefits previously extended only to some beneficiaries into the basic
minimum package extended to all beneficiaries: and Provided, finally, That in the phased
implementation of this Act, there should be no reduction or interruption in the benefits
currently enjoyed by present members of Medicare[.]
347
SECTION 10. Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health:
(a) Of himself, of his spouse and of his children;
(b) Of any person on whom he depends wholly or in part for education or support, or in whom he
has a pecuniary interest;
(c) Of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or respecting
property or services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the performance; and
(d) Of any person upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends.
348
Republic Act No. I 0084 (2009), sec. I provides:
SECTION 1. In case of the death of a retired Chairman or Commissioner of the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Elections, the Civil Service Commission and the Ombudsman, the surviving
legitimate spouse of said deceased retiree shall be entitled to receive on a monthly basis all the
retirement benefits that the said deceased retiree was receiving at the time of his/her demise under the
provisions of applicable retirement laws then in force. The said surviving legitimate spouse shall
continue to receive such retirement benefits during his/her lifetime or until he/she remarries: Provided,
That if the surviving legitimate spouse is receiving benefits under existing retirement laws, he/she shall
only be entitled to the difference between the amount provided for in this Act and the benefits he/she is
receiving.
349
Republic Act No. 910 (1954) as amended by Republic Act. No. 9946 (2009), sec. 3(2) provides:
SECTION 3 ....
Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court m the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has
retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be
entitled to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received
had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement
benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.
Similarly, the surv1vmg legitimate spouses of police or military

personnel, including firefighters, who died in the performance of duty or by
reason of their position, shall be given special financial assistance under
Republic Act. No. 6963. They are also entitled to receive whatever
compensation, pension, or any form of grant, to which the deceased person
or his or her family was entitled. 350
In addition, Republic Act No. 9049 entitles surv1vmg legitimate

spouses of deceased awardees of medals of valor to a lifetime monthly
gratuity pay of P20,000.00, which shall accrue in equal shares and with the
right of accretion, until he or she remarries and the common children reach
the age of majority. This is separate from the pension, to which the
surviving legitimate spouse is also entitled. 351
Under Republic Act No. 10699, the "primary beneficiaries" of a

deceased national athlete or coach, which include the surviving legitimate
spouse, shall be entitled to a lump sum amount of P30,000.00 for funeral
expenses. 352
Republic Act No. 6173 entitles spouses who are both public officials
and employees the right to jointly file their statement of assets, liabilities,
and net worth and disclosure of business interests and financial
connections. 353
350
Republic Act No. 6963 (I 990), sec. I provides:
R
SECTION 1. The family [surviving legal spouse and his legitimate children or parents, or
brothers and sisters, or aunts and uncles] or beneficiary of any police or military personnel, including
any fireman assisting in a police or military action, who is killed or becomes permanently incapacitated
while in the performance of his duty or by reason of his office or position, provided he has not
committed any crime or human rights violations by final judgment on such occasion, shall be entitled
to the special financial assistance provided for in this Act in addition to whatever compensation,
donation, insurance, gift, pension, grant, or any form of benefit which said deceased or permanently
incapacitated person or his family may receive or be entitled to.
351
SECTION 2. A Medal of Valor awardee will henceforth be entitled to a lifetime monthly gratuity
of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). This gratuity is separate and distinct from any salary or
pension which the awardee is currently receiving or will receive from the government of the
Philippines: Provided, That in the event of death of the awardee, the same shall accrue in equal shares
and with the right of accretion to the surviving spouse until she remarries and to the children,
legitimate, or adopted or illegitimate, until they reach the age of eighteen (18) or until they marry,
whichever comes earlier: Provided, further, That such gratuity shall not be included in the
computation, of gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under Title Ill, Chapter VI of
Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as then "Tax Reform Act of 1997."
352
Republic Act No. I 0699 (2015), sec. 7 provides:
SECTION 7. Death Benefits. - Upon the death of any national athlete and coach, the primary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to cover for
the funeral services: Provided, That if the athlete and coach has no primary beneficiaries, the secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to said benefits.
For purposes of this Act, primary beneficiaries shall refer to the legitimate spouse, legitimate or
illegitimate children. Secondary beneficiaries shall refer to the parents and, in their absence, to the
brothers or sisters of such athlete and coach.
353
Republic Act No. 6713 (1989), sec. 8 provides in part:
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly
or separately.
Meanwhile, legitimate spouses of persons arrested, detained, or under

custodial investigation for lawful reasons are granted visitation rights under
Republic Act No. 7438. 354
Republic Act No. 9505, or the Personal Equity and Retirement Act,
prescribes the aggregate maximum contribution of Pl 00,000.00 per
contributor. The same law includes a provision in favor of married
contributors, such that each spouse may make a maximum contribution of
Pl 00,000.00 or its equivalent in any convertible foreign currency per year. 355
Republic Act No. 8239, otherwise known as the Philippine Passport

Act, also grants diplomatic passports to legitimate spouses of "persons
imbued with diplomatic status or are on diplomatic mission[.]" They
include the president, vice president, members of Congress and the judiciary,
cabinet secretaries, and ambassadors, among others. 356 Moreover, an official
354
Republic Act No. 7438 (1992), sec. 2(t) provides:
~)
SECTION 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of
Public Officers. -
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any
national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by
any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person's "immediate family" shall include his/her spouse, fiance or fiancee, parent or child, brother or
sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
355
SECTION 5. Maximum Annual PERA Contributions. - A Contributor may make an aggregate
maximum contribution of One hundred thousand pesos (Pl00,000.00) ors its equivalent in any
convertible foreign currency at the prevailing rate at the time of the actual contribution, to his/her
PERA per year: Provided, That if the Contributor is married, each of the spouses shall be entitled to
make a maximum contribution of One hundred thousand pesos (PI00,000.00) or its equivalent PERA:
Provided, further, That if the Contributor is an overseas Filipino, he shall be allowed to make
maximum contributions double the allowable maximum amount.
356
Republic Act No. 8239 (1996), sec. 7(a) provides:
SECTION 7. Types of Passport.- The Secretary or the authorized representative or consular
officer may issue the following types of passports:
(a) Diplomatic passport for persons imbued with diplomatic status or are on diplomatic
mission such as:
I. The President and former Presidents of the Republic of the Philippines;
2. The Vice-President and former Vice-Presidents of the Republic of the Philippines;
3. The Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
4. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;
5. The Cabinet Secretaries, and the Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Department
of Foreign Affairs;
6. Ambassadors, Foreign Service Officers of all ranks in the career diplomatic service; Attaches,
and members of their families;
7. Members of the Congress when on official mission abroad or as delegates to international
conferences;
8. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and delegates to international or regional
conferences when on official mission or accorded full powers by the President;
9. Spouses and unmarried minor-children of the above-mentioned officials when accompanying
or following to join them in an official mission abroad.
passport shall be issued in favor of the legitimate spouses of all government

officials who are "on official trip abroad but who are not on a diplomatic
mission or delegates to international or regional conferences or have not
been accorded diplomatic status" when accompanying them. 357
More recently, in Republic Act No. 11035, legitimate spouses of

science, technology, or innovation experts engaged in a long-term program
have been granted certain privileges, such as roundtrip airfares from a
foreign country to the Philippines and other special relocation benefits. 358
VIII (B)
Yet, orienting same-sex relationships towards a state-sanctioned

marriage cannot be attuned solely to its benefits and advantages. This
approach usually ignores the burdens associated with marriage. As a
legally-binding relationship that unites two (2) individuals, marriage
becomes an "enabling constraint" 359 that imposes certain duties on married
couples and even limitations on their actions.
The law imposes certain limitations on the property relations between

spouses. For instance, the Family Code prescribes that in the absence of any ~,,i,.,-·
The President of the Philippines and the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs may grant
diplomatic passports to officials and persons other than those enumerated herein who are on official
mission abroad.
357
Republic Act No. 8239 (1996), sec. 7(b) provides:
SECTION 7....
(b) Official Passport to be issued to all government officials and employees on official trip abroad
but who are not on a diplomatic mission or delegates to international or regional conferences
or have not been accorded diplomatic status such as:
1. Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Cabinet other than the Department of
Foreign Affairs, the Associate Justices and other members of the Judiciary, members of the
Congress and all other government officials and employees traveling on official business and
official time; '
2. Staff officers and employees ofthe Department of Foreign Affairs assigned to diplomatic and
consular posts and officers and representatives of other government departments and agencies
assigned abroad;
3. Persons in the domestic service and household members of officials assigned to diplomatic or
consular posts;
4. Spouses and unmarried minor children of the officials mentioned above when accompanying
or following to join them.
358
SECTION 7. Term-Specific Benefits, Incentives, and Privileges. - Balik Scientist shall be
eligible for the benefits, incentives, and privileges under the following terms of engagement:
(c) Long-Term Program:

(1) One (1) round-trip airfare originating from a foreign country to the Philippines, exempt from
Philippine Travel Tax, for the awardees, their spouses, and minor dependents;
(2) Special Relocation Benefits:
(i) Special nonimmigrant visa, for awardees, their spouses, and minor children: Provided, That the
validity of the visa shall cover the duration of the awarded long-term engagement;
(ii) Exemption from the requirement to secure an alien employment permit from the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for Balik Scientists and their Spouses[.]
359
William M. Hohengarten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1495, 1498-
1499 (1994).
settlement between the spouses, their properties shall be governed by the

regime of absolute community of property. 360
Under this regime, each spouse is considered a co-owner of all the

properties they brought into the marriage, as well as those properties they
will acquire after marriage, regardless of their actual contribution. 361
The spouses may also choose a system of conjugal partnership of

gains as their property regime. Under this, "the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts
or by chance[. ]" 362 Here, each spouse retains power and control over his or
her exclusive properties, such that he or she may mortgage, encumber,
alienate, or dispose of them during the marriage even without the consent of
the other spouse. 363 However, each spouse bears the burden of proving that
those properties acquired during the marriage form part of their exclusive
property, as the law creates a presumption that property is conjugal even if
the properties were made, contracted or registered in the name of only one
spouse. 364
The spouses may also decide on a separation of property during the

marriage, subject to a judicial order. 365 Should the spouses choose this
property regime, they may, in their individual capacity, dispose of their own
properties even without the consent of the other. 366 However, despite the
separation, the law mandates that the income of the spouses shall account for
the family expenses. 367
,I'
i?
36
° FAMILy CODE, art. 7 5 provides in part:
ARTICLE 75 .... In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is
void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
361
ARTICLE 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the
community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
362
363
ARTICLE 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his/her
exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with
regard to the same.
364
ARTICLE 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
365
ARTICLE 103. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
366
ARTICLE 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his/her own
separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from
his/her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during
the marriage from his/her separate property.
367
ARTICLE 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in
Donations made by reason of marriage are also governed by the

Family Code. 368 While the provisions on ordinary donations under the Civil
Code may apply, there are specific rules which restrict the kind of donations
that can be made during marriage and even between the spouses. For
instance, the Family Code provides that, should the married spouses choose
a property regime other than the absolute community of property, the
husband and the wife cannot donate more than one-fifth of their present
property to each other. 369 If the spouses select the absolute community of
property regime, they are proscribed from donating any part of the
community property without the consent of the other spouse. 370
Corollary to the right granted to spouses, as parents, over the person

and property of their children is the responsibility to discipline them as may
be required under the circumstances. Thus, under the law, spouses exercise
joint parental authority directly and primarily. They are solidarily liable for
the damage caused by the acts or omissions of their minor children who are
living in their company and under their parental authority. 371 The courts
may admonish those who exercise parental authority over delinquent
children. 372
While married persons may jointly adopt or be adopted, the law

provides that either spouse may not adopt or be adopted without the written
consent of the other spouse. 373 Thus, should a spouse seek to adopt his or
her own illegitimate child, the other spouse must still consent. 374
case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.
)'
The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary.
368
FAMILY CODE, arts. 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, and 87.
369
FAMILY CODE, arts. 84 provides:
ARTICLE 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of
property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their
present property. Any excess shall be considered void.
37
° FAMILY CODE, arts. 98 provides:
ARTICLE 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the
other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the
community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
371
ARTICLE 220. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law;
See Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 288 Phil. 797 (1992) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
372
ARTICLE 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or
guardian may in a proper case be judicially admonished.
373
SECTION 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. -After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

374
Republic Act. No. 8552 (1998), sec. 7(c)(ii).
Some crimes include marital relations among their elements. For

instance, parricide covers the killing of one's legitimate spouse and is
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death. 375
In the crimes of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief, no criminal

liability is incurred if the spouse is the offender. 376
Further, Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits the spouse of any public official from
"requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage
from any other person having some business, transaction, application,
request, or contract with the government, in which such public official has to
intervene." 377 Spouses of the president, vice president, senate president, and
speaker of the House of Representatives are also forbidden to intervene in
any business, transaction, contract, or application with the govemment. 378
Moreover, in determining the unexplained wealth of a public official, the
spouses' properties, bank deposits, and manifestly excessive expenditures
are also considered. 379
j
375
ARTICLE 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
376
ARTICLE 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No criminal, but only civil liability shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse
before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime.
377
SECTION 4. Prohibition on private individuals. - (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having
family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of
such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift,
material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application,
request, or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family
relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The
word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections,
and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assure free access to such public officer.
378
SECTION 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. - It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any
relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines,
the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application
with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the
assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with
the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him
the approval of which is not discretionary on the part on the official or officials concerned but depends
upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to
any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
379
Republic Act. No. 3019 (1960), sec. 8, as amended by Batas Pambansa Big. 195 ( 1982), provides:
SECTION 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth. - lf in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a
public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the
In civil actions, spouses are generally joint parties in a case

irrespective of who incurred the obligation. 380 In criminal actions, the court
may also cite in contempt the spouse of a drug dependent who refuses to
cooperate in the treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependent. 381
Thus, the claim for a state-sanctioned marriage for same-sex couples

should come with the concomitant willingness to embrace these burdens, as
well as to submit to the State certain freedoms currently enjoyed outside the
institution of marriage:
Critical awareness of the state's role as now-fundamental partner in the

recognition and protection of a form of sexual rights should push us to
regard these "victories" as necessarily ethically compromised.
The moral atrophy that has kept us from recognizing the tragedy of
these strategies and outcomes is where more critical, and indeed
discomfiting, work needs to be done by theorists and activists alike. This
means rethinking the horizon of success. "Victory" in the sense ofgaining
the state as a partner, rather than an adversary, in the struggle to
recognize and defend LGBT rights ought to set offa trip wire that ignites a
new set of strategies and politics. This must necessarily include a
deliberate effort to counteract, if not sabotage, the pull of the state to enlist
rights-based movements into its larger governance projects, accompanied
by an affirmative resistance to conceptions of citizenship that figure
nationality by and through the creation of a constitutive other who resides
in the state's and human rights' outside. 382 (Emphasis supplied)
Yet, petitioner has miserably failed to show proof that he has obtained
even the slightest measure of consent from the members of the community
.f
name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary
and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the
name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their
acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or
manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents
including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth
including frequent travel abroad of a non-official character by any public official when such activities
entail expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into
consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.
The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative
suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation wealth is
completed.
380
SECTION 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.
381
SECTION 73. Liability of a Parent, Spouse or Guardian Who Refuses to Cooperate with the
Board or Any Concerned Agency. -Any parent, spouse or guardian who, without valid reason, refuses
to cooperate with the Board or any concerned agency in the treatment and rehabilitation of a drug
dependent who is a minor, or in any manner, prevents or delays the after-care, follow-up or other
programs for the welfare of the accused drug dependent, whether under voluntary submission program,
or compulsory submission program, may be cited for contempt by the court.
382
Katherine Franke, Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. I, 42 (2012).
that he purports to represent, and that LGBTQI+ persons are unqualifiedly

willing to conform to the State's present construct of marriage.
VIII (C)
Limiting itself to four (4) specific provisions in the Family Code, the
Petition prays that this Court "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as
unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of
the Family Code." 383 However, should this Court rule as the Petition asks,
there will be far-reaching consequences that extend beyond the plain text of
the specified provisions.
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code provide a definition and spell out
basic requisites, respectively. Without passing upon the validity of the
definition under Article 1, this Court nonetheless observes that this definition
serves as the foundation of many other gendered provisions of the Family
Code and other laws.
A significant number of prov1s10ns under current marriage

arrangements pertain to benefits to or burdens on a specific sex (and are
therefore dependent on what is assigned at birth based on the appearance of
external genitalia). As our current laws are confined to a heteronormative
standard, they do not recognize the existence and specificities of other forms
of intimacy.
For instance, an incident of marriage granted by the law to spouses,

specifically to wives, is the option to adopt their husbands' surname under
the Civil Code. 384 The law also provides that should a marriage be annulled
and the wife is an innocent party, she may continue to employ her husband's
surname unless the court decrees otherwise, or when she or the former
husband remarries. 385 If the husband dies, the wife may still use his surname
as though he were alive. 386 ,1
/
383
Rollo, p. 31.
384
ARTICLE 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
385
ARTICLE 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume
her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
386
ARTICLE 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living,
in accordance with article 370. ·
In case of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the

husband or of a donor, the Family Code specifies that, to establish paternity
and filiation, the husband must consent to the procedure in a written
instrument prior to the child's birth. 387
The Family Code also contains provisions that favor the husband over
the wife on certain matters, including property relations between spouses.
For one, the administration over the community property belongs to the
spouses jointly, but in case of disagreement, the husband's decision
prevails. 388 Similarly, the administration over conjugal partnership
properties is lodged in both spouses jointly, but in case of disagreement, the
husband's decision prevails, without prejudice to the wife's right to file a
petition before the courts. 389 And, in case of a disagreement between the
spouses on the exercise of parental authority over their minor children, the
father's decision shall also prevail. 390
Our penal laws likewise contain sex-specific provisions. For instance,

adultery is committed by a wife who had sex with a man who is not her
husband. 391 In contrast, concubinage is committed when a husband keeps a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, has sex under scandalous circumstances,
or cohabits in another place with a woman who is not his wife. 392 While a
p
387
F AMIL y
CODE, art. 164(2) provides:
ARTICLE 164 ....
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband
or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that
both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with
the birth certificate of the child.
388
ARTICLE 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision. !
389
FAMILY CODE, art. 124(2) provides:
ARTICLE 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both
spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
39
o FAMILY CODE, art. 211(1) provides:
ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary.
391
ARTICLE 333. Who are guilty of adultery. -Adultery is committed by any married woman who
shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of
her knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently be declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods.
If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being abandoned without justification
by the offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding
paragraph shall be imposed.
392
ARTICLE 334. Concubinage. -Any husand who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
or shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or
shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by pricion correcional in its minimum and
woman who commits adultery shall be punished with imprisonment, a man

who commits adultery shall only suffer the penalty of destierro. Further, a
husband who engages in sex with a woman who is not his wife does not
incur criminal liability if the sexual activity was not performed under
"scandalous circumstances. " 393
In labor law, Republic Act No. 8187, otherwise known as the

Paternity Leave Act of 1996, provides that "every married male employee in
the private and public sectors shall be entitled to a paternity leave 394 of seven
(7) days with full pay for the first four (4) deliveries of the legitimate spouse
with whom he is cohabiting."395
VIII (D)
The litany of provisions that we have just recounted are not even the
entirety of laws relating to marriage. Petitioner would have this Court
impliedly amend all such laws, through a mere declaration of
unconstitutionality of only two (2) articles in a single statute. This Court
cannot do what petitioner wants without arrogating legislative power unto
itself and violating the principle of separation of powers.
Petitioner failed to account for any of these provisions. He failed to

consider whether his own plea for relief necessarily encompassed these and
other related provisions. Thus, he failed in his burden of demonstrating to
this Court the precise extent of the relief he seeks. He merely stated that we
may somehow grant him relief under his generic, catch-all prayer for "other
just and equitable reliefs." During the oral arguments:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what is your prayer?
ATTY. FALCIS:
The prayer of the petitions, Your Honor, initially says that to
declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as null and void. However,
j
medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
393
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 334.
394
Republic Act No. 8187 ( 1996), sec. 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Term. - For purposes of this Act, Paternity Leave refers to the
benefits granted to a married male employee allowing him not to report for work for seven (7) days but
continues to earn the compensation therefor, on the condition that his spouse has delivered a child or
suffered a miscarriage for purposes of enabling him to effectively lend support to his wife in her period
ofrecovery and/or in the nursing of the newly-born child.
395
SECTION 2. Notwithstanding any law, rules and regulations to the contrary, every married male
employee in the private and public sectors shall be entitled to a paternity leave of seven (7) days with
full pay for the first four (4) deliveries of the legitimate spouse with whom he is cohabiting. The male
employee applying for paternity leave shall notify his employer of the pregnancy of his legitimate
spouse and the expected date of such delivery.
For purposes of this Act, delivery shall include childbirth or any miscarriage.
we also prayed for other just and equitable reliefs which we are of the
position that in relation with (sic) Republic vs. Manalo that there is an
alternative option for this Court in the exercise of its expanded power of
judicial review to, in the light that the provisions is (sic) found
(interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Wait a minute. You are saying or claiming that the proper reading
of Republic vs. Manalo under the ponen[c}ia of Justice Peralta is that there
is an alternative consequence to a finding that a provision is
unconstitutional. Normally, if a provision is unconstitutional, it is void ab
initio. And you are now saying that the Court has created new
jurisprudence in Republic vs. Manalo that when we find a provision to be
unconstitutional that it can be valid? '
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honor. What petitioners are saying that our
interpretations of this Court's guide in Republic vs. Manalo is that ...
(interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So in essence you are asking the Court to find or to found new
jurisprudence in relation to situation (sic) like yours?
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honors, we are only asking for a statutory interpretation
that was applied in Republic vs. Manalo that two interpretations that would
lead to finding (sic) of unconstitutionality the Court adopted a liberal
interpretation, did not declare Article 26 paragraph 2 as unconstitutional.
But because the Constitution is deemed written into the Family Code as
well (sic) interpreted it in light of the equal protection clause. 396
Petitioner miserably failed to discharge even the most elementary

burden to demonstrate that the relief he prays for is within this Court's power
to grant. It is curious, almost negligent, for him as petitioner and counsel not
to present to this Court any other provision of law that will be affected as a
consequence of his Petition.
VIII (E)
There is a myriad of laws, rules, and regulations that affect, or are

affected by marriage.
Yet, none was ever mentioned in the Petition or the Petition-in-

Intervention.
Whether by negligence or sheer ineptitude, petitioner failed to present f..

to this Court even more than a handful of laws that provide for the benefits
396
TSN, June 19, 2018, p. 26.
and burdens which he claims are being denied from same-sex couples. He
confined himself to a superficial explanation of the symbolic value of
marriage as a social institution.
This Court must exercise great caution in this task of making a

spectrum of identities and relationships legible in our marriage laws, paying
attention to "who and what is actualized when the LGBT subject is given a
voice." 397 We must be wary of oversimplifying the complexity ofLGBTQI+
identities and relationships, and even render more vulnerable "a range of
identities and policies that have refused to conform to state-endorsed
normative homo- or heterosexuality." 398
Thus, an immediate announcement that the current marriage laws

apply in equal and uncalibrated measure to same-sex relationships may
operate to unduly shackle those relationships and cause untold confusions on
others. With the sheer inadequacies of the Petition, this Court cannot
arrogate unto itself the task of weighing and adjusting each of these many
circumstances.
VIII (F)
Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex

relations will earn state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it
may thresh out the many issues that may arise:
Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework,

and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due
to this inherent "legalness" of marriage, the constitutional right to marry
cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that
exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must create the "thing" to
which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes
an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework. 399
(Emphasis supplied)
During oral arguments, Members of this Court pointed to civil unions

that promote more egalitarian partnerships:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
What I'm asking you, Atty. Falcis, is other people, heterosexual
couples that go into marriage more second class than what you can create. )
397
Katherine Franke, Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights, 44 CO LUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 38 (2012).
398
Id. at 41-42.
399
William M. Hohengarten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1495, 1496
(1994).
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honors, ...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Because, well, it's a pre-packaged set of law. In fact, if you trace
that law it comes from the Spanish Civil Code. Okay, the Partidas and
then the Nueva Recopilacion and coming from the fuer sus fuegos before,
correct?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And in sealed patriarchy, in fact there are still some vestiges of that
patriarchy in that particular Civil Code and there are a lot of limitations, it
is not culturally created. It's not indigenous within our system. Can you
imagine same-sex couples now can make their own civil union, correct?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The idea of some legal scholars which is to challenge even the
constitutionality of marriage as a burden into their freedoms is now
available to same sex couples?
ATTY.FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor, but that is not by choice, Your Honors. Same-
sex couples do not have the choice out of marriage because we're not even
allowed to opt thing (sic) ...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So isn't it accurate to say that you are arguing to get into a
situation which is more limited?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Your Honors, there are some situations that would be limited under
marriage. But there are other situations that are ...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
But you see, Atty. Falcis, that was not clear in your pleadings?
And perhaps you can make that clear when you file your memoranda?
What exactly in marriage, that status of marriage? So that status of
marriage creates a bundle of rights and obligations. But the rights and
obligations can also be fixed by contractual relations, is that not correct?
And because it can be fixed by contractual relations, you can actually
create a little bit more perfect civil union. In fact, you can even say in
your contract that we will stay together for ten years, after ten years, it's
renewable, correct? That cannot be done by heterosexual couples wanting
to marry. But if that is your belief then it can be established in that kind of
an arrangement, correct? You may say not conjugal partnership or ()
absolute community, you will specify the details of the co-ownership or
the common ownership that you have of the properties that you have. You
will say everything that I make is mine, everything that you make because
you're richer therefore will be shared by us. That's more [egalitarian],
correct? That's not in the Civil Code, right?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor. 400 (Emphasis supplied)
In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what marriage

seeks to acknowledge. Not all intimate relationships are the same and,
therefore, fit into the rights and duties afforded by our laws to marital
relationships. 401
For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably

confines a class of persons to the rather restrictive nature of our current
marriage laws. The most injurious thing we can do at this point is to
constrain the relationships of those persons who did not even take part or
join in this Petition to what our laws may forbiddingly define as the norm.
Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of loving freely, which
petitioner himself consistently raised:
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the

commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by
legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as
romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal
history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and defined by the
intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will
always be different for each couple. It is that which we should
understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free
as possible, bound not by social expectations but by the care and love
each person can bring. 402 (Emphasis supplied)
Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay

other more inclusive and egalitarian arrangements that the State can
acknowledge. Many identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community.
Prematurely adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of
facts is presumptuous. It may unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+
community's capacity to create a strong movement that ensures lasting
recognition, as well as public understanding, of SOGIESC.
/
?
400
TSN, June 19, 2019, pp. 41-42.
401
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018,
<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/64093> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
402 Id.
IX
Petitioner has no legal standing to file his Petition.
Legal standing is a party's "personal and substantial interest in the

case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. " 403 Interest in the case "means a material interest, an interest
in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest." 404
Much like the requirement of an actual case or controversy, legal

standing ensures that a party is seeking a concrete outcome or relief that may
be granted by courts:
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court

of justice on a given question." To possess legal standing, parties must
show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have]
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees that
the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed

actual case and controversy are both "built on the principle of separation
of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by
the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of
government." In addition, economic reasons justify the rule. Thus:
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening

1
the standing of persons who de sire to litigate constitutional

issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of
our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient
judicial service to our people is severely limited. For
courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of
suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their
dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective
dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly
confronts our judiciary today.
Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, interest being "material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case[,] [not just] mere curiosity about the question involved." Whether
a suit is public or private, the parties must have "a present substantial
interest," not a "mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or /J
consequential interest." Those who bring the suit must possess their own ,,%
403
People v. Vera, 95 Phil, 56, 89 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
404
Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618,633 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
right to the relief sought. 405 (Citations omitted)
Even for exceptional suits filed by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned

citizens, this Court has noted that the party must claim some kind of injury-
in-fact. For concerned citizens, it is an allegation that the continuing
enforcement of a law or any government act has denied the party some right
or privilege to which they are entitled, or that the party will be subjected to
some burden or penalty because of the law or act being complained of. 406
For taxpayers, they must show "sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation[.]" 407 Legislators, meanwhile, must
show that some government act infringes on the prerogatives of their
office. 408 Third-party suits must likewise be brought by litigants who have
"sufficiently concrete interest" 409 in the outcome of the dispute.
Here, pet1t10ner asserts that he, being an "open and self-identified

homosexual[,]" 410 has standing to question Articles 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of
the Family Code due to his "personal stake in the outcome of the case": 411
30. Petitioner has a personal stake in the outcome of this case.

Petitioner is an open and self-identified homosexual. Petitioner has
sustained direct injury as a result of the prohibition against same-sex
marriages. Petitioner has grown up in a society where same-sex
relationships are frowned upon because of the law's normative impact.
Petitioner's ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships is impaired because of the absence of a legal incentive for
gay individuals to seek such relationship. 412
Petitioner's supposed "personal stake in the outcome of this case" is

not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would
endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a "law's normative impact";
"impairment" of his "ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous
same-sex relationships"; as well as injury to his "plans to settle down and
have a companion for life in his beloved country"; 413 or influence over his
"decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country" 414 cannot be
recognized by this Com1 as sufficient interest. Petitioner's desire "to find
and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships" 415 and "to
405
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of labor and Employment, G.R.
t
No. 202275, July I 7, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/64411> [Per .I.
Leon en, En Banc].
406
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
407
Id. at 896.
4os Id.
409
White Light Corporation v. City o/Mani/a, 596 Phil. 444,456 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc],
410
Rollo, p. 12.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
41s Id.
settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country" 416 does
not constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement.
This Court will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code
for his admitted inability to find a partner.
During the oral arguments, petitioner asserted that the very passage of
the Family Code itself was the direct injury that he sustained:
JUSTICE BERNABE:
Now, what direct and actual injury have you sustained as a result
of the Family Code provisions assailed in your Petition?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Your Honors, we are of multiple submissions. The first would be
that as an individual I possess the right to marry because the right to marry
is not given to couples alone; it is individual, Your Honors. Second, Your
Honors, we are guided by this Court's pronouncements in the case of
Pimentel v. Aguirre that the mere enactment of a law suffices to give a
person either an actual case or standing. Because, Your Honors, we are
invoking the expanded power of judicial review where in the most recent
cases especially the one penned by Justice Brion, Association of Medical
Workers v. GSS, this Court said that under the expanded power of judicial
review, the mere enactment of a law, because Article VIII, Your Honors,
Section 1 says that "Any instrumentality, the grave abuse of discretion of
any instrumentality may be questioned before the Supreme Court, Your
Honor." And, therefore, the direct injury that I suffer, Your Honor, was the
passage of a law that contradicts the Constitution in grave abuse of
discretion because of the disregard of other fundamental provisions such
as the equal protection clause, the valuing of human dignity, the right to
liberty and the right to found a family, Your Honors. 417 (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable

danger that the Family Code poses to him. His assertions of injury cannot,
without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause, the
existence of the Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Code is the
definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is plainly non sequitur.
Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury.

Petitioner fails to show how the Family Code is the proximate cause of his
alleged deprivations. His mere allegation that this injury comes from "the
law's normative impact" 418 is insufficient to establish the connection
between the Family Code and his alleged injury.
If the mere passage of a law does not create an actual case or ~:'
I(
416 Id.
417
TSN, June 19, 2018, pp. 66---67.
418
Rollo, p. 12.
controversy, neither can it be a source of direct injury to establish legal

standing. This Court is not duty bound to find facts 419 on petitioner's behalf
just so he can support his claims.
It does not escape this Court's notice that the Family Code was
enacted in 1987. This Petition was filed only in 2015. Petitioner, as a
member of the Philippine Bar, has been aware of the Family Code and its
allegedly repugnant provisions, since at least his freshman year in law
school. It is then extraordinary for him to claim, first, that he has been
continually injured by the existence of the Family Code; and second, that he
raised the unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code at the
earliest possible opportunity. 420
Petitioner has neither suffered any direct personal injury nor shown
that he is in danger of suffering any injury from the present implementation
of the Family Code. He has neither an actual case nor legal standing.
The Petition-in-Intervention was also authored by petitioner. He only

filed it after the Office of the Solicitor General had filed a Comment (Ad
Cautelam) pointing out the procedural flaws in his original Petition. Still,
the Petition-in-Intervention suffers from the same procedural infirmities as
the original Petition. Likewise, it cannot cure the plethora of the original
Petition's defects. Thus, it must also be dismissed.
Interventions are allowed under Rule 19, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal

interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected
in a separate proceeding.
Intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and

supplemental to existing litigation. 421
(
419
Knights ofRizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 809 Phil. 453 (2017) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
420
Rollo, pp. 3-33.
421
Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 ( I 939) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
X (A)
Intervention requires: (1) a movant's legal interest in the matter being

litigated; (2) a showing that the intervention will not delay the proceedings;
and (3) a claim by the intervenor that is incapable of being properly decided
in a separate proceeding. 422 Here, while petitioners-intervenors have legal
interest in the issues, their claims are more adequately decided in a separate
proceeding, seeking relief independently from the Petition.
The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from confusion as to its real

purpose. A discerning reading of it reveals that the ultimate remedy to what
petitioners-intervenors have aveffed is a directive that maffiage licenses be
issued to them. Yet, it does not actually ask for this: its prayer does not seek
this, and it does not identify itself as a petition for mandamus (or an action
for mandatory injunction). Rather, it couches itself as a petition of the same
nature and seeking the same relief as the original Petition. It takes pains to
make itself appear inextricable from the original Petition, at the expense of
specifying what would make it viable.
It does not escape this Court's notice that the Petition and Petition-in-
Intervention were prepared by the same counsel, Falcis, the petitioner
himself. The Petition-in-Intervention impleaded the same single respondent,
the Civil Registrar General, as the original Petition. It also merely
"adopt[ed] by reference as their own all the arguments raised by Petitioner in
his original Petition[.]" 423 Notably, a parenthetical argument made by
petitioner that barely occupied two (2) pages 424 of his Petition became the
Petition-in-Intervention's entire subject: the right to found a family
according to one's religious convictions.
Even though petitioners-intervenors Reverend Agbayani and Felipe,

and Ibafiez and her paiiner, all claim that they have "wish[ ed] to be married
legally and have applied for a marriage license but were denied[,]" 425 they
only echoed the original Petition's prayer, merely seeking that Articles 1, 2,
46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code be declared unconstitutional. Despite
impleading respondent Civil Registrar General and asserting that they have a
fundamental right to marry their partners, petitioners-intervenors never saw
it proper-whether as the principal or a supplemental relief-to seek a writ
of mandamus compelling respondent Civil Registrar General to issue (7
marriage licenses to them.
422
Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, 626 Phil. 498 (20 I0) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
423
Rollo, p. 132.
424
Id. at 29-30.
425
Id. at 136.
X(B)
Given these, this Court can only arrive at the conclusion that the
Petition-in-Intervention was a veiled vehicle by which petitioner sought to
cure the glaring procedural defects of his original Petition. It was not a bona
fide plea for relief, but a sly, tardy stratagem. It was not a genuine effort by
an independent party to have its cause litigated in the same proceeding, but
more of an ill-conceived attempt to prop up a thin and underdeveloped
Petition.
Petitioner, as both party and counsel to petitioners-intervenors,

miserably failed in his pretenses. A petition-in-intervention cannot create an
actual case or controversy when the main petition has none. In De Borja v.
Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at
Visayas: 426
We stress that neither the OSG's filing of its Comment nor the
petition-in-intervention of PUMALU-MV, PKSK, and TDCI endowed De
Borja's petition with an actual case or controversy. The Comment, for
one, did not contest the allegations in De Borja's petition. Its main role
was to supply De Borja's petition with the factual antecedents detailing
how the alleged controversy reached the court. It also enlightened the
RTC as to the two views, the mainland principle versus the archipelagic
principle, on the definition of municipal waters. Even if the Comment did
oppose the petition, there would still be no justiciable controversy for lack
of allegation that any person has ever contested or threatened to contest
De Borjas claim offishing rights.
The petition-in-intervention, on the other hand, also did not dispute

or oppose any of the allegations in De Borja's petition. While it did
espouse the application of the archipelagic principle in contrast to the
mainland principle advocated by the OSG, it must be recalled that De
Borja did not advocate for any of these principles at that time. He only
adopted the OSG's position in his Memorandum before the RTC. Thus,
the petition-in-intervention did not create an actual controversy in this
case as the cause of action for declaratory relief must be made out by the
allegations of the petition without the aid of any other pleading. 427
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court cannot, and should not, sanction underhanded attempts by

parties and counsels to unscrupulously abuse the rules on intervention so that
they may cure the glaring defects and missteps in their legal strategies.
,,f
/
426
809 Phil, 65 (2017) [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].
427
Id. at 84.
X(C)
Even if the Petition-in-Intervention is not a sham foisted by petitioner

upon this Court, it still does not satisfy the requirements of justiciability.
Petitioners-intervenors invoke "third-party standing" as their basis for

filing suit. But the requisites of third-party standing are absent here.
For a successful invocation of third-party standing, three (3) requisites

must concur:
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several

exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party
standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental
importance.
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing
as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v.
Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized
the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided
three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an
'injury-in-fact', thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in
the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation
to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests." 428 (Citations omitted)
Regarding injury-in-fact, petitioner-intervenor LGBTS Christian

Church claims that its ability to recruit, evangelize, and proselytize is
impaired by the lack of state recognition of the same-sex marriage
ceremonies it conducts429 as part of its religion. But there is no legally
demandable right for a sect or denomination's religious ceremonies to be
given State imprimatur. Likewise, and in a manner similar to petitioner, the
Family Code has not been shown to be the proximate cause of petitioners-
intervenors' alleged injury.
As to the requirement of some hindrance to a third party's ability to

protect its own interests, petitioners-intervenors claim that "the relative
silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our
nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may
also be construed as a hindrance[.]" 430 This is a direct quotation from White
Light Corporation v. City of Manila 431 but was made without any
explanation or discussion. In White light Corporation, there was an actual,
demonstrable dearth of special interest groups involving patrons of White f.
428
White Light Corporation v. City oflvlanila, 596 Phil. 444, 456 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
429
Rollo, p. 140.
430 Id.
431
596 Phil. 444,456 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
Light Corporation's businesses. Here, petitioners-intervenors rely on

nothing more than a bare allegation. They presented no proof that there is
"relative silence in constitutional litigation" from groups concerned with
LGBTQI+ causes that entitles them to raise arguments on behalf of third
parties.
XI
Petitioner's choice of remedy further emphasizes his ignorance of

basic legal procedure.
Rule 65 petitions are not per se remedies to address constitutional

issues. Petitions for certiorari are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses
of officers or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitions
for prohibition are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses of officers or
bodies exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. 432 Rule
65, Sections 1 and 2 state:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. - When any tribunal, board

or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the

judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of

any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. ,,,
A..:'
432
See Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452 (20 I 0)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; Galicto v. Aquino, 683 Phil. 141 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc];
Philippine Migrant Rights Watch, Inc. v. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, 748 Phil. 348
(2014) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; and Cawad v. Abad, 765 Phil. 705 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En
Banc].
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy

of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46.
Here, petitioner justifies his resort to Rule 65 on the basis of this

Court's prior pronouncements that certiorari and prohibition are the remedies
for assailing the constitutionality of statutes. 433 He cites, in particular,
Magallona and Araullo. Petitioner ev.en faults this Court, asserting that its
failure to create a "specific remedial vehicle under its constitutional rule-
making powers" 434 made his resmi to Rule 65 appropriate.
Yet, petitioner's presentation of his case, which is lacking in an actual

or imminent breach of his rights, makes it patently obvious that his proper
remedy is not Rule 65, but rather, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Who May File Petition. - Any person interested

under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof:
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunda
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real

property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court has been categorical 435 that, in certain instances,

declaratory relief is proper should there be a question of the constitutionality
of a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation. The remedy of declaratory relief acknowledges
that there are instances when questions of validity or constitutionality cannot
be resolved in a factual vacuum devoid of substantial evidence on record 436
for which trial courts are better equipped to gather and determine.
Here, considering that there is an abysmal dearth of facts to sustain a

finding of an actual case or controversy and the existence of a direct injury
to petitioner, a petition for declaratory relief resolved after full-blown trial in
433
434
Rollo, pp. 6-7.
9
Id. at 7.
435
See Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor <f Manila, 465 Phil. 529 (2004) [Per C. J. Davide,
Jr., En Banc]; Galicto v. Aquino, 683 Phil. 141 (2012) (Per J. Brion, En Banc]; and Concepcion v.
Commission on Elections, 609 Phil. 201 (2009) [Per .I. Brion, En Banc].
436
Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico, 246 Phil. 714 ( 1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, En Banc].
a trial court would have been the more appropriate remedy.
As discussed, contrary to the basic requirement under Rule 65,

petitioner failed to show that respondent Civil Registrar General exercised
any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. From this, no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can be
appreciated. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition require the proper
allegation not only of a breach of a constitutional provision, but more
important, of an actual case or controversy. 437
Not even the weightiest constitutional issues justify a blatant disregard

of procedural rules that attempts to bypass or set aside judicious remedial
measures put in place by this Court, under the guise that such remedies
would take more than a modicum of effort and time on the part of a
petitioner. 438 The requisites of justiciability should not be so lightly set
aside.
XII
An equally compelling and independently sufficient basis for

dismissing this Petition is petitioner's violation of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts.
XII (A)
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts ensures judicial efficiency at all

levels of courts. It enables courts at each level to act in keeping with their
1
peculiar competencies. This is so, even as this Court has original and
concurrent jurisdiction with the regional trial courts and the Court of
Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections :439
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented
before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law
which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform
these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the .~
I!,
437
In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement, 751
Phil. 30 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. See also]. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in
Cawadv. Abad, 764 Phil. 705 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
438
Concepcion v. Commission on Elections, 609 Phil. 201 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
439
751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In
many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be
national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts
at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still
be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court

that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It
is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review
of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its
writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be
novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new
ground or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the
light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather
than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it
truly performs that role. 440 (Citations omitted)
Very recently, in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation

and Communications, 441 this Court traced the jurisdictional history of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. We noted that while the 1973 Constitution442 conferred on
this Court original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs, the same
power was later extended to the Court of Appeals443 and the regional trial
courts 444 through Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
This concurrence of jurisdiction persists under the 1987

Constitution445 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 446
440
441
Id. at 329-330.
,I
G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1 /64970>
[Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].
442
1973 CONST., art. X, sec. 5( 1) provides: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(I) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
443
Batas Pambansa Big. 129, sec. 9(1) provides:
SECTION 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals exercise:
(I) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes[.]
444
Batas Pambansa Big. 129, sec. 21(1) provides:
SECTION 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases.- Regional Trial Court shall exercise original
jurisdiction:
(I) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus,
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions[.]"
445
CONST., art. V, sec. 5(1) provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(I) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus."
446
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, secs. I, 2, and 3.
Time and again, this Court has held that the concurrent jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals and the regional trial courts with this Court does not
give parties absolute discretion in immediately seeking recourse from the
highest court of the land. 447 In Gios-Samar, we emphasized that the power
to issue extraordinary writs was extended to lower courts not only as a
means of procedural expediency, but also to fulfill a constitutional
imperative as regards: (1) the structure of our judicial system; and (2) the
requirements of due process. 448
Considering the structure of our judicial system, this Court explained

in Gios-Samar:
In Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. (Alonso), this Court had

occasion to articulate the role of the CA in the judicial hierarchy, viz.:
The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded

by litigants. The CA stands between the RTC and the
Court, and its establishment has been precisely to take over
much of the work that used to be done by the Court.
Historically, the CA has been of the greatest help to the
Court in synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in an
orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors
that ordinarily might escape detection. The Court has thus
been freed to better discharge its constitutional duties and
perform its most important work, which, in the words of
Dean Vicente G. Since, "is less concerned with the
decision of cases that begin and end with the transient
rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more
intertwined with the direction of national policies,
momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation
of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental
rights." ...
Accordingly, when litigants seek relief directly from the Court,

they bypass the judicial structure and open themselves to the risk of
presenting incomplete or disputed facts. This consequently hampers the
resolution of controversies before the Court. Without the necessary facts,
the Court cannot authoritatively determine the rights and obligations of the
parties. The case would then become another addition to the Court's
already congested dockets. 449 (Citations omitted)
Enabling lower courts to grant extraordinary writs has contributed

greatly to the practical concern of decongesting dockets. More important, it
facilitates the need to enable factual issues to be fully ventilated in
,t1'i'
?
447
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12,
2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/64970> [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc];
and Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, 809 Phil.
315 (2017) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
448 Id.
449 Id.
proceedings before courts that are better equipped at appreciating evidence,

and ultimately bringing to this Court only issues of paramount and pervasive
importance. As the final interpreter of the laws of the land, the cases
brought before this Court should more appropriately be raising pure
questions of law, with evidentiary matters having been authoritatively settled
by lower courts.
If this Court were to burden itself with settling every factual nuance of
every petition filed before it, the entire judicial machinery would bog down.
Cases more deserving of this Court's sublime consideration would be
waylaid. In Gios-Samar, this Court further explained:
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent

inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent
further over-crowding of the Court's docket; and (3) prevent the inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases
which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as the court better equipped
to resolve factual questions. 450 (Citations omitted)
Likewise, this Court discussed how the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

serves the constitutional right of litigants to due process:
While the term "due process of law" evades exact and concrete definition,
this Court, in one of its earliest decisions, referred to it as a law which
hears before it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. It means that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules
which govern society. Under the present Rules of Court, which governs
our judicial proceedings, warring factual allegations of parties are settled
through presentation of evidence. Evidence is the means of ascertaining, in
a judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact. As earlier
demonstrated, the Court cannot accept evidence in the first instance. By
directly filing a case before the Court, litigants necessarily deprive
themselves of the op[p ]ortunity to completely pursue or defend their
causes of actions. Their right to due process is effectively undermined by
their own doing. 451 (Citations omitted)
Immediately elevating evidentiary matters to this Court deprives the

parties of the chance to properly substantiate their respective claims and
defenses. It is essential for courts to justly resolve controversies. Parties
who proceed headlong to this Court deny themselves their own chance at
effective and exhaustive litigation.
)
450 Id.
451 Id.
Thus, this Court's dismissal of petitions that inextricably entail factual

questions and violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts does not merely
arise out of a strict application of procedural technicalities. Rather, such
dismissal is a necessary consequence of the greater interest of enabling
effective litigation, in keeping with the right to due process. The parties'
beseeching for relief inordinately inflates this Court's competence, but we
find no consolation in flattery. In the end, it is never for this Court to
arrogate unto itself a task that we are ill-equipped to perform:
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction

with the R TC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct
recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law.
Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under
Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the
determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the
Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by
structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance;
these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies.
This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It
operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this
Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the
Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an
invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of
the issue or cause raised. 452 (Citations omitted)
XII (B)
The distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is

settled. A question of fact exists when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity
of the facts presented; a question of law exists when the issue arises as to
what the law is, given a state of facts. 453
That the issues involved are of transcendental importance is an oft-

cited justification for failing to comply with the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts and for bringing admittedly factual issues to this Court.
Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an

exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In cases of transcendental
importance, imminent and clear threats to constitutional rights warrant a
direct resort to this Court. 454 This was clarified in Gios-Samar. There, this
Court emphasized that transcendental importance-originally cited to relax
rules on legal standing and not as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts-applies only to cases with purely legal issues. 455 We explained ,f
452 Id.
453
Benito v. People, 753 Phil. 616 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
454
The Diocese of Bacolodv, Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
455
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12,
that the decisive factor in whether this Court should permit the invocation of
transcendental importance is not merely the presence of "special and
important reasons[,]" 456 but the nature of the question presented by the
parties. This Court declared that there must be no disputed facts, and the
issues raised should only be questions of law: 457
[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual

issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will
refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of
compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance
of the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper trial
courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve
factual questions. 458
Still, it does not follow that this Court should proceed to exercise its
power of judicial review just because a case is attended with purely legal
issues. Jurisdiction ought to be distinguished from justiciability. Jurisdiction
pertains to competence "to hear, try[,] and decide a case." 459 On the other
hand,
[d]etermining whether the case, or any of the issues raised, is justiciable is

an exercise of the power granted to a court with jurisdiction over a case
that involves constitutional adjudication. Thus, even if this Court has
jurisdiction, the canons of constitutional adjudication in our jurisdiction
allow us to disregard the questions raised at our discretion. 460
Appraising justiciability is typified by constitutional avoidance. 461

This remains a matter of enabling this Court to act in keeping with its
capabilities. Matters of policy are properly left to government organs that
are better equipped at framing them. Justiciability demands that issues and
judicial pronouncements be properly framed in relation to established facts:
Angara v. Electoral Commission imbues these rules with its

libertarian character. Principally, Angara emphasized the liberal deference
to another constitutional department or organ given the majoritarian and
representative character of the political deliberations in their forums. It is
not merely a judicial stance dictated by courtesy, but is rooted on the very
nature of this Court. Unless congealed in constitutional or statutory text
and imperatively called for by the actual and non-controversial facts of the
case, this Court does not express policy. This Court should channel
democratic deliberation where it should take place.
456
2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/64970> [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].
Id.
f
457 Id.
ill w. I
459
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta, 815 Phil. 740, 768 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
460
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and
Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019,
<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64970> [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].
461 Id.
Judicial restraint is also founded on a policy of conscious and

deliberate caution. This Court should refrain from speculating on the facts
of a case and should allow parties to shape their case instead. Likewise,
this Court should avoid projecting hypothetical situations where none of
the parties can fully argue simply because they have not established the
facts or are not interested in the issues raised by the hypothetical
situations. In a way, courts are mandated to adopt an attitude of judicial
skepticism. What we think may be happening may not at all be the case.
Therefore, this Court should always await the proper case to be properly
pleaded and proved. 462
Thus, concerning the extent to which transcendental importance

carves exceptions to the requirements of justiciability, "[t]he elements
supported by the facts of an actual case, and the imperatives of our role as
the Supreme Court within a specific cultural or historic context, must be
made clear" :463
They should be properly pleaded by the petitioner so that whether there is

any transcendental importance to a case is made an issue. That a case has
transcendental importance, as applied, may have been too ambiguous and
subjective that it undermines the structural relationship that this Court has
with the sovereign people and other departments under the Constitution.
Our rules on jurisdiction and our interpretation of what is justiciable,
refined with relevant cases, may be enough. 464
Otherwise, this Court would cede unfettered prerogative on parties. It

would enable the parties to impose their own determination of what issues
are of paramount, national significance, warranting immediate attention by
the highest court of the land.
XII (C)
In an attempt to divert this Court's attention from the glaring

fundamental missteps of his Petition, petitioner-almost predictably-
invokes transcendental importance. 465 This invocation fails to satisfy this
Court of the need to resolve the Petition on the merits. It fails to alleviate
glaring deficiencies, whether as to having violated the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts, or the lack of legal standing.
Even if this Court were to go out of its way in relaxing rules and
proceed to resolve the substantive issues, it would ultimately be unable to do
,f
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 Id.
465 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
so, as petitioner himself failed to present even an iota of evidence

substantiating his case.
Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Associate Justice Jardeleza)'s

interpellation during oral arguments highlighted this. Citing as an example
the experience of then attorney and later Justice Thurgood Marshall when he
attacked the "separate but equal" approach to schools in the segregation era
of the United States, Associate Justice Jardeleza emphasized the need for a
contextualization of petitioners' arguments using factual and evidentiary
bases:
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
. Now, did Thurgood Marshall go direct to the US Supreme
Court?
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
That is the point of Justice Bersamin. And my point, you should
read, ... how the NAACP, ... plotted/planned that case and they had a lot
of evidence, as in testimonial evidence, on the psychological effect of
separate but allegedly equal schools. So, do you get my point about why
you should be better off trying this case before the RTC?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
... And I'll give you another good example, that is why I asked
questions from Reverend Agbayani. Even if the church remains as a party
with standing, do you know why I asked that series of questions of (sic)
him?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Because, Your Honor, what he was saying were factual issues,
Your Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Yes. And what does Escritor tell you?
ATTY. FALCIS:
In terms of religious freedom, Your Honor?
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Yes. What does Escritor with respect to hierarchy of courts tell
you?
ATTY. FALCIS: ·7
Estrada v. Escritor remanded back the case, Your Honor, to the )'
lower courts for ...
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Escritor tells you that you should reread it carefully. The religious
claim is based on religious conviction, right?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Just like a fundamental right, religious conviction. Bago ka
dumating sa conviction the first word is religious. That's why I was
asking is there a religion? Is there a ~eligion, to start with? Now, what is
the difference between a religion and a sect? What, how many people
need/comprise a religion? Can you have a religion of one? That is
described in Escritor, that's one, is there a religion? No. 2, Escritor says,
is the claim/burden being put by the government something that impinges
on a practice or belief of the church that is a central tenet or a central
doctrine. You have to prove that in the RTC, that was I was (sic) asking,
that's why I was asking what is the tenet of MCC? What is the different
tenet? And you have to prove that and the question for example a while
ago, you were asked by Justice Leanen, "What is the history of marriage
in the Philippines?" You have your view, right? The government has a
different view about the history and if I just listen to you, you will give me
your views and if I just listen to the SOLGEN, he will give me his views.
What I'm saying is the Court needs a factual record where experts testify
subject to cross examination. Yun po ang ibig sabihin ng hierarchy of
courts .... 466 (Emphasis supplied)
At another juncture during the oral arguments, when interpellating

Gatdula:
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
. . . Mr. Falcis, for example, adverted to Brown v. Board of
Education. And it should interest you and it is a fascinating history on
how a group of people spearheaded by the NAACP effected social change
"separate but equal is not constitutional" .... And remember, the question
there was separate but equal schools for black children and white children,
"Was it causing psychological harm to the black children?" Of course, the
whites were saying "no" because it's equal, they have equal facilities. The
famous psychologist that they presented there is named Kenneth Clark,
who had his famous doll test, manika. He was able to prove that to the
satisfaction of the trial court that indeed black children sometimes even
think that, you know, when you present them with dolls, that they are
white. That is the type of evidence I think that we need in this case. Now,
very quickly and I will segue to Obergefell, again, five cases four different
states. They presented the Chairman of the Department of History of
· Yale. We heard a lot, the government is talking of tradition and history.
But again, for example, SolGen is citing Blair and Robertson, that, of
course, qualifies as a Learned Treaties, right? But again, for the
proposition that the history of this country is in favor of same sex, I would
love first to hear, as an expert, probably the Chairman of History of
Ateneo and UP. As in Obergefell, they also had the Department of
Psychology, Head of Washington and Lee University. So, my plea to both /
ofyou, especially to the petitioner, at this point in time, I am not willing to A.
466
TSN,June 19,2018,pp.109-110.
ask you in your memo to discuss the merits because unless the petitioner
convinces me that we have a proper exception to the hierarchy of court
rules then I think, for the first time, this Court should consider that, when
we say there is a violation of the hierarchy of rules, we stop, we don't go
to merits. And that's why I'm, I cannot go, for the life of me, to the merits
if you have this question of fact in my mind. "Who, which couples can
better raise a child?" Again I say, "That is a question offact". I am not
a trier of fact, and my humble opinion is try it first. 467 (Emphasis
supplied)
The lack of material allegations and substantiation in petitioner's

pleadings is glaring. He had nothing but this to say:
25. Lastly, Petitioner submits that the instant petition raises an

issue of transcendental importance to the nation because of the millions of
LGBT Filipinos all over the country who are deprived from marrying the
one they want or the one they love. They are discouraged and stigmatized
from pursuing same-sex relationships to begin with. Those who pursue
same-sex relationships despite the stigma are deprived of the bundle of
rights that flow from a legal recognition of a couple's relationship -
visitation and custody rights, property and successional rights, and other
privileges accorded to opposite-sex relationships. 468
Petitioner's cursory invocation of transcendental importance-

miserably bereft of proof-cannot possibly impress this Court. It only
reveals petitioner's cavalier foolhardiness. Transcendental importance is not
a life buoy designed to save unprepared petitioners from their own mistakes
and missteps. Its mere invocation is not license to do away with this Court's
own rules of procedure. 469 In Lozano v. Nograles: 470
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal

approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent
requirements of "personal injury" to the broader "transcendental
importance" doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an
open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that
prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is

not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised
only to remedy a particular, concrete injury. When warranted by the
presence of indispensable minimums for judicial review, this Court shall
not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront
it. (Emphasis in the original)
~
,I
467
TSN, June 26, 2018, pp. 101-102.
468
Rollo, p. 11, Petition.
469
In The Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement,
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
470
607 Phil. 334 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
Lacking even the indispensable minimum required by this Court, the

Petition here cannot be resuscitated by an unthinking parroting of
extraordinary doctrines.
XIII
The primordial duty of lawyers to their clients and cause is to act to

the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with all good fidelity. 471
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client

and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Competence and diligence should be a lawyer's watchwords:
CANON 18 -A lawyer shall serve his client with competence

and diligence.
Rule 18.01 A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he

knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may
render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to

him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request
for information.
XIII (A)
Lawyers should be mindful that their acts or om1ss10ns bind their

clients. 472 They are bound to zealously defend their client's cause, diligently
and competently, with care and devotion:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and /2
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be ..,K·
471
Lawyer's Oath.
472
Ramos v. Atty. Jacoba, 418 Phil. 346 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession. 473 (Citations
omitted)
XIII (B)
Here, petitioner wagered in litigation no less than the future of a

marginalized and disadvantaged minority group. With palpable vainglory,
he made himself the lead plaintiff and also represented himself, only seeking
assistance from other counsel for oral arguments. 474 By deciding to place
this burden upon himself, petitioner should have acted with utmost care and
thoughtfulness, drawing upon the limits of his skill and knowledge, to
represent the LGBTQI+ cause.
However, at every stage of these proceedings, petitioner only exposed

his utter lack of preparation, recklessness, and crudeness.
Petitioner had already been previously sanctioned for his negligence

and incompetence during the June 5, 2018 preliminary conference. There,
this Court underscored his ignorance of basic court procedure. In its July 3,
2018 Resolution, 475 this Court already reminded petitioner of the duty and
responsibility that counsels have to the cause they purport to represent:
Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence.

Under Rule 18.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer
shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Atty.
Falcis' appearance and behavior during the preliminary conference reveal
the inadequacy of his preparation. Considering that the Advisory for Oral
Arguments was served on the parties three (3) months prior to the
preliminary conference, it was inexcusably careless for any of them to
appear before this Court so barely prepared.
The preliminary conference was not mere make-work. Rather, it

was essential to the orderly conduct of proceedings and, ultimately, to the
judicious disposition of this case. Appearance in it by counsels and parties
should not be taken lightly.
Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even

I
473
Santiago v. Fojas, 318 Phil. 79, 86-87 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
474
Rollo, pp. 290-293.
475
Id. at 601-605.
uttering a word, he recklessly courted disfavor with this Court. His

bearing and demeanor were a disservice to his clients and to the human
rights advocacy he purports to represent. 476
As a result, petitioner was found guilty of direct contempt of court

and admonished. He was sternly warned that any further contemptuous acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
XIII (C)
Undeterred by this Court's stern warning, petitioner, along with co-

counsels, Attys. Angeles, Guangko, and Maranan of Molo Sia Dy Tuazon Ty
and Coloma Law Office, failed to comply with this Court's June 26, 2018
Order to submit the required memorandum of both petitioner and petitioners-
intervenors within 30 days, or until July 26, 2018. 477 Because of this, the
Memorandum was dispensed with. Petitioner and his co-counsels were all
ordered to show cause why they should not be cited in indirect contempt. 478
Their explanations479 are patently unsatisfactory. They fault the

impulsivity of youth, other supposedly equally urgent professional work,
reliance on Court pronouncements in other cases, and work disruptions
caused by floods and typhoons. 480 These were the same bases raised in their
prior Motion for Extension, which this Court found to be utterly lacking in
merit and denied. These reasons failed to impress then, and they fail to
impress now. As we observed then, the complexity of issues and other
professional work did not delay the filing of memoranda by other parties. 481
There is no compelling reason to treat petitioner and his co-counsels
differently. After all, it was petitioner who set all of these events in motion;
the other parties merely responded to what he sought.
Petitioner and his co-counsel's reference to the "impulsivity of

youth" 482 utterly fails to impress. If at all, this Court sees this as a
deodorized admission of unreadiness and impotence.
In any case, as this Court has already stated in its July 3, 2018
Resolution:
Atty. Falcis is not an uninformed layperson. He has been a J..
476
Id. at 603-604.
477
Id. at 711.
478
Id.at713.
479
Id. at 1348-1353, Manifestation and Compliance.
480
Id. at 1349.
481
Id. at 712.
482
Id. at 1349.
member of the Philippine Bar for a number of years. As an officer of the

court, he is duty bound to maintain towards this Court a respectful attitude
essential to the proper administration of justice. He is charged with
knowledge of the proper manner by which lawyers are to conduct
themselves during judicial proceedings. His Lawyer's Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility exhort him to maintain the requisite
decency and to afford dignity to this Court. 483
Youth and professional inexperience do not excuse the manifest

inability of sworn court officers to follow lawful orders. Like petitioner,
Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko and Atty. Maranan are members of the
Philippine Bar, charged with basic knowledge of the rules of pleading and
practice before the courts, especially this Court. They are not uninformed
laypersons whose ignorance can be excused by inexperience. It bears noting
that Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty. Maranan are part of the law firm
Molo Sia Dy Tuazon Ty and Coloma Law Offices and are, thus, presumably
guided by more experienced litigators who should have been able to
competently advise them on what is expected of those who appear before
this Court.
XIV
Diligence is even more important when the cause lawyers take upon
themselves to defend involves assertions of fundamental rights. By
voluntarily taking up this case, petitioner and his co-counsels gave their
"unqualified commitment to advance and defend [it.]" 484 The bare minimum
of this commitment is to observe and comply with the deadlines set by a
court.
Lawyers who wish to practice public interest litigation should be ever

mindful that their acts and omissions before the courts do not only affect
themselves. In truth, by thrusting themselves into the limelight to take up
the cudgels on behalf of a minority class, they represent the hopes and
aspirations of a greater mass of people, not always with the consent of all its
members. Their errors and mistakes have a ripple effect even on persons
who did not agree with or had no opportunity to consent to the stratagems
and tactics they employed.
One who touts himself an advocate for the marginalized must know
better than to hijack the cause of those whom he himself proclaims to be
oppressed. Public interest lawyering demands more than the cursory
invocation of legal doctrines, as though they were magical incantations 't
swiftly disengaging obstacles at their mere utterance. Public interest
483
Id. at 603.
484
Samonte v. Atty. Jumamil, 813 Phil. 795,803 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
advocacy is not about fabricating prestige. It is about the discomfort of

taking the cudgels for the weak and the dangers of standing against the
powerful. The test of how lawyers truly become worthy of esteem and
approval is in how they are capable of buckling down in silence, anonymity,
and utter modesty-doing the spartan work of research and study, of writing
and self-correction. It is by their grit in these unassuming tasks, not by
hollow, swift appeals to fame, that they are seasoned and, in due time,
become luminaries, the standard by which all others are measured.
Petitioner courted disaster for the cause he chose to represent. He

must have known what was at stake. Yet, he came to this Court scandalously
unprepared, equipped with nothing more than empty braggadocio. For a
shot at fame, he toyed with the hopes and tribulations of a marginalized
class.
By failing to represent his cause with even the barest competence and
diligence, petitioner betrayed the standards of legal practice. His failure to
file the required memorandum on time is just the most recent manifestation
of this betrayal. He disrespected not only his cause, but also this Court-an
unequivocal act of indirect contempt.
A person adjudged guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a

fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both. 485 To serve as a reminder to the bench and bar, and in light
of petitioner's being earlier adjudged guilty of contempt of court for a
similar offense-for which he was specifically warned that any further
contemptuous acts shall be dealt with more severely-this Court, while
declining to mete out the penalty of imprisonment by way of clemency,
imposes on petitioner the penalty of a fine.
Similarly, parties who come before this Court to intervene in a

proceeding should be prepared to fully participate in all its stages, whenever
this Court requires them to. Records show that after oral arguments,
intervenor-oppositor Perito also never filed a memorandum pursuant to the
June 26, 2018 Order. He has not made any manifestation or explanation for
his noncompliance. His failure to comply with this Court's order likewise
constitutes indirect contempt.
What we do in the name of public interest should be the result of a

collective decision that comes from well-thought-out strategies of the
movement in whose name we bring a case before this Court. Otherwise,
premature petitions filed by those who seek to see their names in our /?
~·
jurisprudential records may only do more harm than good. Good intentions
485
RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, sec. 7.
are no substitute for deliberate, conscious, and responsible action. Litigation

for the public interest of those who have been marginalized and oppressed
deserves much more than the way that it has been handled in this case.
A Final Note
Our freedom to choose the way we structure our intimate relationships

with our chosen significant other in a large sense defines us as human
beings. Even opposite-sex couples continually adjust the day-to-day terms
of their partnership as their relationships mature. It is in the sanctuary of
their spaces that we authentically evolve, become better human beings, and
thus contribute meaningfully within our society. After all, the
companionship and understanding that we inevitably discover with the
person we choose to spend the rest of our lives with provide the foundation
for an ethic of care that enriches a democracy.
This Court sympathizes with the petitioner with his obvious longing
to find a partner. We understand the desire of same-sex couples to seek, not
moral judgment based on discrimination from any of our laws, but rather, a
balanced recognition of their true, authentic, and responsive choices.
Yet, the time for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be here. This is
not the case that presents the clearest actual factual backdrop to make the
precise reasoned judgment our Constitution requires. Perhaps, even before
that actual case arrives, our democratically-elected representatives in
Congress will have seen the wisdom of acting with dispatch to address the
suffering of many of those who choose to love distinctively, uniquely, but no
less genuinely and passionately.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and the

Petition-in-Intervention are DISMISSED.
This Court finds petitioner Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III, his co-
counsels Atty. Darwin P. Angeles, Atty. Keisha Trina M. Guangko, Atty.
Christopher Ryan R. Maranan, as well as intervenor-oppositor Atty.
Fernando P. Perito, all GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF
COURT.
Atty. Falcis is sentenced to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos

(PS,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice. Atty. Angeles, Atty.
Guangko, Atty. Maranan, and Atty. Perito are REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect of their duties as counsel. They
are STERNLY WARNED that any further contemptuous acts shall be dealt /y
with more severely. f
Let copies of this Decision be included in the personal records of Atty.

Falcis, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, Atty. Maranan, and Atty. Perito, and
entered in their files in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
<
Associate Justice .,
WE CONCUR:
~
Associate Justice
,tu_
~n.~
ESTELA Jj~ER.NABE EZA ,,..,,,.,_
Ass~iate J Associate Justice
~~j::~;~ u
~
ALF ANDRE
Ass !J REYES, JR.
e Justice
4~~JR
Vl:sociate Justice
RAM~~~
Associate Justice ~~ Associate Justice
,,.,---
AM HEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the court.
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
Clerk of Court En Banc

Supreme Court

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SUPREMF: COURT CF THE PH!UPP!:\!

3L\epublic of tbe ~btltpptnes

JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, G.R. No. 217910

BERSAMIN, J., Chief Justice,

ATTY. FERNANDO P. PERITO,

Cultural hegemony often invites people to conform to its impositions

Adjudication enables arguments between parties with respect to the

In this case, this Court unanimously chooses the path of caution.

Those with sexual orientations other than the heteronormative, gender

Marriage, as conceived in our current laws, may hew to the dominant

prec1s1on in adjudication, which the circumstances in this case do not

The pleadings assert a broad right of same-sex couples to official legal

Furthermore, the exercise of this Court's power of judicial review is

Lawyers, especially those engaged in public interest litigation, should

Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing 5

Falcis justifies the direct recourse to this Court by citing, in addition

According to Falcis, a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted

To support his allegation that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test,

Commission on Elections. 24 However, he claims that retired Chief Justice

On June 22, 2015, Fernando P. Perito (Perito) filed prose anAnswer-

This Answer-in-Intervention was treated by this Court as a motion to j

intervene with answer-m-mtervention, which was granted in this Court's

Falcis filed his Reply38 to the Answer-in-Intervention on September

The Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor

On April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church),

Subsequently, they filed their Petition-in-Intervention,47 which is a

Similar to Falcis, petitioners-intervenors claim that a petition for

Petitioners-intervenors restate Falcis' claims that the issues were

Petitioners-intervenors use arguments from Christian theology to

This Court noted the Motion to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention

Arguments. 58 He also filed a Reply 59 to the Comment (Ad Cautelam), again

In compliance with this Court's December 6, 2016 Resolution, 60 the

During the preliminary conference, Falcis, who appeared on his own

Considering that petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III was attired

a formal session of the Court. Petitioner was likewise advised to request a

On June 6, 2018, Falcis filed his Compliance72 with the show-cause

Atty. Falcis acted in a contumacious manner during the June 5,

Atty. Falcis is not an uninformed layperson. He has been a

Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence.

The preliminary conference was not mere make-work. Rather, it

Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even

Falcis was admonished to properly conduct himself in court and to be

Montes, and Rufino Policarpio III (intervenors-oppositors) filed a Motion

In their Opposition-in-Intervention,78 they claim that this Court has no

Intervenors-oppositors argue that granting the Petition would be

The Civil Registrar General filed its Supplemental Comment with

2 of the Family Code are constitutional. 85

[W]ith the exception of Intervenor-Oppositor Atty. Fernando P.

In the same Resolution, Falcis, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and

On August 9, 2018, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty. Maranan

filed their Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Memorandum. 98

Second, whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus

Third, whether or not the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural

Fourth, whether or not the application of the doctrine of

Should the Petition and/or Petition-in-Intervention show themselves to

Second, whether or not the limitation of civil marriage to opposite-sex

Third, whether or not limiting civil marriages to opposite-sex couples

Fourth, whether or not denying same-sex couples the right to marry

Sixth, whether or not a determination that Articles 1 and 2 of the