David Price

Global Democracy
Promotion: Seven Lessons
for the New
Administration

A professed commitment to worldwide democracy promotion has

been a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy for many years and was given a distinctive
emphasis by the outgoing administration. President George W. Bush calls it ‘‘the
urgent requirement of our nation’s security, and the calling of our time.’’1
Promoting democracy, however, is not merely a matter of advocacy via an
international megaphone. Policies of the Bush administration have led many to
question the methods used to promote democracy or even the goal itself. Despite
such criticism, much of it warranted, democracy promotion remains a central
plank of U.S. foreign policy, an expression of U.S. values, and a tool that can be
used to pursue the strategic interests of the United States. It is critically
important, therefore, to learn from the mistakes of the past seven years and to
rethink and refine the theory and practice of democracy promotion.
Direct congressional involvement in the enterprise was pioneered by the Task
Force on the Development of Parliamentary Institutions in Central and Eastern
Europe, an initiative led by Reps. Martin Frost (D-TX) and Gerry Solomon
(R-NY) in the early 1990s. The Task Force established parliament-to-parliament
relationships aimed at nurturing legislative institutions in emerging democracies.
Even though the transition from showcase parliaments, typical of communist
regimes, to fully functioning and independent legislative bodies was varied

Representative David Price (D-NC) represents the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill area of

North Carolina. He chairs the House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC) and the
Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, and formerly taught political science and
public policy at Duke University. The views he expresses in this article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect those of HDAC.
This article is a work of the United States Government and is not subject to copyright
protection
The Washington Quarterly ¥ 32:1 pp. 159
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and uneven, several countries undertook it

E lections must be
successfully, laying a solid foundation for
representative government in the region. The
part of a more Frost-Solomon Task Force offered the experi-
sophisticated ence of Congress as a guiding light on this path.
For the last three years, Rep. David Dreier
strategy (R-CA) and I have led a similar effort with the
supporting House Democracy Assistance Commission
democratic (HDAC), the institutional descendant of the
Frost-Solomon Task Force. The bipartisan
development. commission of 20 House members has sought
to strengthen the institutional capacities of
partner legislatures in Afghanistan, Colombia,
Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Mongolia,
Timor-Leste, and Ukraine. HDAC has worked with parliamentary colleagues
and their staffs in all these countries on nearly every aspect of legislative
governance, from budgetary analysis and committee oversight to personnel
management and constituent relations. Implementation of the programs has
occurred through close collaboration with U.S. embassies around the world, as
well as democracy programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and executed by experienced organizations such as the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute
(IRI), the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), and the Asia Foundation. As a
result, HDAC has been in a unique position to witness both the successes and
failures of U.S. efforts to promote democracy worldwide.
HDAC’s founding premise is that democracy is not just about elections* /

what is equally essential to lasting democracy is what happens between elections.

Democracy requires strong institutions in legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government. An important threshold is reached when a free and fair
democratic election is held. Yet advancing voters’ concerns through peaceful,
constitutional, and responsive means requires moving beyond elections to the
practical work of developing the capacities of democratic institutions.
Too often, U.S. democracy promotion efforts have failed to penetrate beyond
the rhetorical or superficial, and the Bush administration’s track record in this
regard is decidedly mixed. The most consequential mistake has been to assume
that democracy could spring fully formed from the barrel of a gun, most notably
in the case of Iraq. Bush’s failure to avoid the errors of his predecessors, despite
acknowledging and disavowing them, has also been damaging. Like many
executives before him, the current president has allowed a myopic, short-term
view of foreign affairs to obscure our national security vision. In places like
Kenya and Pakistan, the United States has allowed its friendships with

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pro-Western, anti-terrorist leaders to cloud its judgment in the wake of

ascendant popular opposition to such leaders. In other places, such as Ethiopia
and Saudi Arabia, short-term calculations of self-interest have muted U.S.
advocacy for democratic reforms. With the democracy agenda and strategic
interests of the United States increasingly overlapping, what policy course the
new president and his administration pursue is an urgent and critical question.

A New Way Forward: Seven Practical Lessons

The United States must no longer repeat mistakes that have poorly served the
nation’s long-term interests and have often underperformed in abetting short-
term objectives. Admittedly, U.S. commitment to democracy abroad cannot
always be absolute*after all, the United States is a nation with a complex and
/

extensive agenda on the international stage. Yet, it is imperative that the United
States be far less ready to sacrifice the democracy agenda for other goals.
Supporting the growth of democracy extends beyond supporting democratic
reforms and pressing non-democratic leaders. It must also include the difficult,
sustained work of building and supporting democratic institutions. With that
aim in mind, this article offers seven practical lessons for the consideration of the
new president and his administration.

Understand the Limits of Elections

Many trace the disastrous chain of events that led to a schism in the Palestinian
territories and a Hamas takeover of Gaza to the Palestinian elections of 2005.
The Bush administration, eager to promote democracy, vocally called for
elections. Many analysts, meanwhile, cautioned that Hamas would be well-
prepared to take advantage of Fatah’s corruption and listlessness through near-
term elections, an analysis that turned out to be quite prescient. The United
States followed Hamas’s victory by cutting off foreign aid and refusing to engage
with the new, democratically elected government.
Elections are a vital component of a democratic society, but successful
elections are better viewed as a component of a democratic transition, the
success of which is determined by many other factors. Elections do little good for
democratic development if the institutions that are charged with carrying out
the popular mandate are ineffective or unresponsive. Moreover, as the Hamas
example also shows, there is an inherent foreign policy tension in advocating
free elections. The United States endorses free elections but is unable to control
the outcome. The victors of democratic elections, therefore, may not always be
democrats or friends of the United States.
Despite the inherent tension, the United States should continue to not only
encourage but, in some cases, demand democratic elections. In fact, the current
administration has erred in some cases by not calling more strenuously for

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near-term elections, as with the military-led government of Bangladesh.

Nevertheless, the next administration must be much more aware of the limits
of elections, and ensure that the call for elections is predicated on a more
sophisticated and comprehensive strategy for supporting democratic develop-
ment.

Side with the Democrats

Realism is a necessary aspect of U.S. foreign policy. The United States has to rely
on friendly relations with non-democratic leaders around the world for a variety
of strategic reasons. Relationships with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and
King Abdullah II of Jordan are essential in working toward peace and stability in
the Middle East. The U.S. economy simply cannot afford a breakdown in the
relationship with Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the United States has depended on
autocratic leaders in Central Asia for military bases and flyover rights in
connection with the military campaign in Afghanistan. The United States’
leading role in the world means that U.S. security interests will sometimes require
the administration to act in ways contrary to the ideals promoted through its
foreign policy. The United States, however, needs to reconcile its realism with its
commitment to democracy. While the latter does not mean that the United
States must always condemn non-democratic leaders with whom realism may
argue for friendship, it does mean that the United States cannot be seen as taking
sides against legitimate, popularly backed democracy movements.
The administration’s response to the 2007 elections in Pakistan provides a
perfect example of what not to do. Just as a group of pro-democracy reformers
won a free and fair election in a region where doomsayers feared that Taliban-
types would triumph in an open system, the Bush administration publicly took
the side of a military dictator who had just rigged his own election and then
ejected the Supreme Court justices who dared to challenge him. The
administration justified its relationship with President Pervez Musharraf of
Pakistan in terms of security. Yet, publicly appearing to stand with Musharraf
and against the new, democratically elected government not only undermined
democracy, but also risked undermining the very security interests the United
States sought to protect by damaging U.S. access to, and credibility with, the
new government of Pakistan.
Such scenarios simply cannot be repeated. U.S. respect for the outcomes of
free and fair elections cannot be, or appear to be, contingent on whether ‘‘our’’
side is victorious. The degree of positive engagement with election winners will
obviously vary with circumstances*Hamas/ currently represents a limiting case.
When the United States, however, is seen as intervening against democracy, it
not only undermines the democracy agenda but also the credibility of U.S. global
leadership.

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Engage the Islamists

Traveling throughout the Middle East has given
HDAC a unique opportunity to examine poli- U .S. policymakers
tical Islamism in a variety of forms. There are should treat Islamist
numerous Islamist political parties that are fully
parties’ ascent as an
committed to assertive, yet peaceful, participa-
tion in democratic systems. In many instances, opportunity for
these parties are highly organized and represent engagement.
part of the political mainstream. In Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Yemen, and
elsewhere, Islamist parties are on the rise.
Rather than an unmitigated cause for alarm, U.S. policymakers should treat
their ascent as an opportunity for engagement. Not every situation*and / not
every Islamic party*is / alike, and they should not be treated in such a manner. If
U.S. foreign policy is perceived as opposing the earnest, democratic ambitions of
such parties, it will only add fuel*and
/ perhaps radicalism*to / their fire. When
these increasingly popular parties actually take power, their policies will be
shaped by their experiences in the opposition and their perception of the U.S.
posture toward their political participation. Engagement with these parties offers
the United States an opportunity to encourage their commitment to democracy
as well as the expression of their views and grievances through democratic
means. In the long run, integrating such parties into open political systems may
be the best way to dissociate Islamism from the impulse toward political
extremism.
Engaging Islamists also requires discontinuing silent U.S. endorsement of
leaders who play up the specter of Islamist parties as the chief reason to slow
democratic reform. As Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway
have argued, ‘‘Where the government chooses heavy-handed repression as the
means to deal with the growing influence of mainstream Islamist movements,
the reformers [within the movements] may very well lose out.’’2
On the other hand, an open, pluralist political system that allows Islamist
parties to participate*and / often forces them to confront the burden of
responsibility that such participation brings*generally
/ ‘‘strengthens the side
of reformers and encourages parties to change even further.’’3 Recognition of
this reality should challenge the next administration to press more forcefully for
democratic reforms by pro-Western allies, such as Egypt and Jordan, who have
used the Islamist specter to limit political freedom.

Emphasize Institutions, Not Individuals

Bush’s too-cozy relations with world leaders who have suppressed democratic
movements, such as Musharraf and (for a time) President Vladimir Putin of

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 David Price

Russia have demonstrated the dangers of reducing U.S. international statesman-

ship to personal relationships. Yet, overly personalizing diplomacy is just as risky
when the leaders are firmly committed to democracy. Lavishing excessive
personal attention on leaders such as Presidents Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan,
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and Viktor Yuschenko of Ukraine*all staunch
/

democrats*can undermine their credibility and popularity among their voters.

/

Moreover, such leaders cannot last forever.

Far more important is the construction of effective, enduring institutions,
which requires a shift from personal attention to an institutional focus. The
United States should support developing capacity in the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches, fostering vibrant civil society and media, and promoting
active political debate. In fact, successfully supporting the development of
democracy might even entail enabling the political participation of leading critics
of key U.S. allies. A healthy opposition is a critical component of a functional
and lasting democracy; HDAC insists on the inclusion of oppositions parties in all
its programs. The United States must beware that in supporting a friendly sitting
government, it oftentimes becomes complicit in shutting out the legitimate
opposition. Events in Georgia in late 2007, which culminated in sudden
elections, demonstrate that when opposition views do not find a platform in
government, they often find an outlet in the streets. The new U.S. president
should surely support the efforts of democratic leaders around the world, but must
keep in mind that it is the institutions, not individual leaders, which will endure.

Include the Legislatures

Legislative institutions are essential to responsive and sustainable democracies,
and U.S. democracy building efforts should approach them as full and necessary
partners. Too often, however, U.S. administrations and even members of
Congress have limited bilateral engagement with a foreign country to its
executive mansion*a/ bad habit that simply must change.
Many developing democracies face urgent challenges to distribute resour-
ces*whether
/ they are land, wealth, or government services*equitably
/ among
their citizens, and to assure claimant groups and communities that their needs
have been fairly considered. Legislatures are uniquely positioned to confront
these challenges. Moreover, the institutional strengths of legislatures, such as
oversight of budgets and executive policies, are vital elements in battling the
most pervasive threats to democracy: corruption, strongman executives, and
dominance by the military. Legislatures offer forums for resolving regional, tribal,
or ideological conflicts peacefully, marking a radical change for many newly
democratic societies.
U.S. officials must take greater pains to include legislators in bilateral
policymaking, giving them seats at the table as the U.S. government develops

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aid packages, devises capacity-building programs, and explores bilateral issues

through official visits between capitals. HDAC has, at the very least, helped to
reverse the trend of Congress organizing delegation visits to other nations that
leave legislatures off their itineraries.
In addition to institutional-strengthening efforts, more must be done to
empower legislatures to act effectively and independently. This requires access to
information. The Afghan Loya Jirga’s inability to obtain basic information
regarding the amount of aid provided by the United States to the Afghan
National Army and police forces has astonished HDAC’s members. Without
such information, oversight of the development of these forces is impossible.
Diplomatic missions should share detailed information on foreign aid and other
cooperative activities with legislatures as a common practice. The missions
should also seek the advice of the legislatures as they develop major aid
initiatives. Doing so will empower the legislative branch and reinforce its status
as a branch of government that is equal with the executive.

Deploy Resources Strategically

Democracy assistance has grown dramatically in the last 20 years, and is now the
third largest activity of USAID, after health and economic growth, accounting
for between $1 billion and $1.5 billion in foreign aid each year.4
Yet, approximately one quarter of this money has been spent in just two
countries*Afghanistan
/ and Iraq*over
/ the last several years, with a handful of
other countries claiming a disproportionate share of the remainder. In all, ten
countries account for more than half of all democracy and governance funding in
the president’s fiscal year 2009 budget.5 U.S. officials need to take a hard look at
the distribution of democracy assistance funding and make sure that it is being
spent wisely. The high-profile crises of the day notwithstanding, democracy
assistance funding must be allocated to sustain programs in nations still in the
midst of democratic transitions and to support nations beginning such
transitions. The rug cannot be pulled out from under nations just as they are
beginning to stabilize. The administration must also avoid devoting outsized
portions of the budget to a concentrated group of recipients to the detriment of
burgeoning democracies that do not necessarily grab the headlines at the time.
One necessary shift is a far greater emphasis on Africa, which currently
appears to have the most significant and promising stream of emergent
democracies. Recent developments have led the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to join Botswana, Ghana, Kenya (despite its
recent troubles), and Mali, among others, as promising democracies on that
continent. Yet, Africa receives less than half as much in democracy assistance
funding as any other region in the world on a per-country basis. Africa, however,
does receive a greater share of some other foreign aid programs. For example,

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nearly 95 percent of the President’s Emergency

T he priority
Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) funding
has been spent in Africa.6 Likewise, while the
should be to Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
support nations was initially criticized for failing to put down
roots in Africa, approximately half of the
undertaking or MCC compacts currently active are in African
continuing nations.7 This assistance, however, only un-
transitions to derscores the need for a greater focus on
strengthening democratic institutions. Active,
democracy. effective democratic institutions are needed to
prioritize, manage, and oversee this assistance,
preventing corruption, and ensuring that our
aid achieves the greatest possible impact.
In choosing HDAC partners, we have considered the strategic importance of
candidate countries and their level of need, but we have paid particular attention
to the parliaments’ commitment to reform and interest in a partnership. The
crucial question that U.S. policymakers need to ask themselves is: where is the
support the U.S. has to offer most likely to be well-utilized and to have the
greatest marginal impact? While this is not a complete guide for the allocation of
democracy promotion efforts, it contains important positive lessons. The priority
should be to support nations that are undertaking or continuing a transition to
democracy, rather than cases which may have more immediate strategic
significance but for which a transition to democracy is still wishful thinking.
In fact, a clear distinction between cooperation*or working to support the
/

existing democratic aspirations of governments, officials, and reformers*and /

subversion*or working to undermine undemocratic but sovereign govern-

/

ments*must be made for democracy promotion to be more effective. The

/

failure of the current administration to make this distinction has sparked a

growing global backlash against efforts to ‘‘export’’ democracy, which is a
remarkable outcome given democracy’s enduring appeal. Even though democ-
racy promotion will not be greeted with equal enthusiasm among all contending
factions in countries where the United States is involved, it should still be
conceived as a strategy of cooperation and partnership in situations where
democratic institutions and practices have gained a foothold. To conflate it with
whatever efforts we undertake to bolster opponents of adversarial regimes in
places like Cuba and Iran is to invite confusion and suspicion of our motives.
Democracy promotion is not ‘‘regime change.’’
This is not to say that the United States should not work to undermine and
limit the influence of global despots like Than Shwe of Burma or Robert
Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Such efforts have an important place in U.S. national

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security strategy, but confronting despotism

and building sustainable democracies are two
different things, and they should be treated as
C onfronting
such. Moreover, supporting nations that gen- despotism and
uinely want and choose democracy will help building
to confront autocracy. For example, the out-
spoken criticism of Mugabe’s recent violent sustainable
repression of democratic opposition, and the democracies are
pressure placed on that regime by many
two different
African leaders, would never have occurred
at the height of the ‘‘big man’’ era of the things.
1960s, 70s, and 80s, when corrupt dictators-
for-life held the reigns of power in capitals
across much of the continent. The spread of democracy around Zimbabwe is an
important enabler of democrats within that nation.
The distinction between supporting the development of democracy and
undermining adversarial, autocratic regimes is not just a matter of rhetoric, but
of funding as well. The administration has budgeted substantial ‘‘governing
democratically and justly’’ funding for programs targeting adversarial regimes:
$20 million in Cuba, $65 million in Iran, $2 million in North Korea, and
$5 million in Venezuela for FY 2009. The $65 million for Iran is equal to roughly
one-third of the FY 2009 funding allocated for the entire sub-Saharan African
region, excluding Sudan. An investment of that kind could fund the proposed
democracy and governance program three times over in the Congo, which is a
new democracy and perhaps a keystone to establishing a stable democratic
system on the continent because of its enormous size and tendentious relation-
ships with its neighbors.

Finish the Job

Supporting nascent democracies is not an overnight job. In fact, U.S.
democracy assistance programs last a decade on average.8 HDAC, however,
has encountered diplomatic missions that are pulling up the stakes of
democracy programs just as a country is about to reach the finish line.
Consider the following current examples. In Ghana, USAID will reportedly
end its democracy programs in FY 2009, just as Ghana holds its first true
transition from one freely and fairly elected president to another. In the last
three years in Macedonia, USAID has dramatically scaled back its democracy
and governance programs just as Macedonia has begun to reach the threshold
for NATO and EU membership (the legislative strengthening program there is
scheduled to close its doors in 2009). In Timor Leste, Bush’s FY 2009 budget
eliminates ‘‘good governance’’ funding, just six years after it gained

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 David Price

independence. And finally, in Namibia, the administration zeroed out

democracy and governance funding at the end of FY 2007 while Namibia’s
promising democracy continues to struggle to overcome single-party dom-
inance. Abandoning institutional strengthening efforts before the job is done
threatens to squander multi-year investments that often range in the tens of
millions of dollars. The next president must ensure that U.S. democracy
programs endure until democracy has firmly taken root.
Admittedly, this advice begs several questions: When is it clear that
democracy has taken root? Is there any end in sight to these commitments?
Such questions are valid, and suggest the need to further refine the current
approach. First, improved metrics are needed to assess the state of democracy in
nations around the world and to determine the precise needs and points of entry
for U.S. assistance. One useful tool might be an annual global assessment of
democracy, similar to the State Department’s annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices.
Second, while clear endpoints may be nearly impossible to establish,
democracy assistance programs must take better account of clear thresholds.
For example, membership in NATO and the EU are hugely significant
milestones for developing democracies in Eastern Europe. Consecutive multi-
party elections involving peaceful transfers of power between civilian leaders are
similarly important markers. With the Millennium Challenge Account’s
emphasis on measuring and rewarding good governance, the United States
should view the attainment of compact eligibility, or at least the MCC’s good
governance standards, as another critical goalpost. Closing up shop just before
these thresholds are crossed risks taking the wind out of the sails of reformers
who are driving emerging democracies toward such goals.
Finally, the new administration must acknowledge the simple truth that
democracy is not created overnight. The administration needs to do a much
better job of convincing policymakers and the American public that commit-
ments must be sustained over the long term, and that investments of manpower
and resources are clearly in the interest of U.S. national security. If democracy
assistance efforts are to have any hope of success, we must move past that great
U.S. desire for immediate gratification.

Conclusion

Supporting the development of democratic systems around the world is critical

to America’s moral leadership even as it enhances U.S. national security.
Democracy is an antidote to terrorism and violent conflict because it facilitates
economic opportunity and channels societal grievances into peaceful and
predictable processes for addressing them. If U.S. officials are serious about the

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spread of democracy as a foreign policy goal,

they must become far more serious about
deploying the right means to achieve it. In T he U.S. must
addition to the other pressing challenges on the become far more
international agenda, the new president should serious about
undertake a major and comprehensive reform of
the foreign aid architecture guided by a more deploying the right
coherent and sophisticated view of the democ- means to achieve
racy agenda. This new architecture should be democracy.
based on three major imperatives:
First, nations within the community of
democracies should help new members of the
club demonstrate to their citizens that democracy makes a difference to the
quality of their daily lives, a tangible ‘‘democracy dividend.’’ HDAC recently led
a delegation to Pakistan to assess the status of governance there following its
recent parliamentary elections. One Pakistani leader told the delegation: ‘‘the
Chinese come to Pakistan and build textile factories. The Russians come and
build steel mills. Americans come and spend billions of dollars, but what is there
to show for it?’’9 The United States needs a strategy that pairs institutional
capacity-building work with development projects to address fundamental
problems that have the potential to undermine democracy such as economic
inequality, intractable poverty, and public health crises. Along with other
international donors, the United States must increasingly work to ensure that
new democracies can deliver the promise of a new day.
A second necessity is to focus on diplomacy and development at the grassroots
level. The recent trend toward ‘‘Fortress America’’-style embassies on the
outskirts of town is a metaphor for our broader diplomacy. Too often, embassy
contacts are limited to the political and economic elite, a modus operandi that
curtails public diplomacy and conveys exactly the wrong message. Too often,
development dollars do not reach the average citizens of recipient nations. In
fact, an estimated 80 percent of development funding is spent within the United
States. U.S. soft power*the potency of the nation’s cultural, intellectual, and
/

governmental capital to attract foreign interest*depends on the ability to

/

extend beyond capital cities and embassy compounds. As the foreign aid
apparatus is reformed, we must find ways to ensure that the benefits of U.S.
generosity and power serve as examples and penetrate deeply and broadly. The
democracy agenda, too, will be enhanced by increased engagement at the
grassroots level, which of course is where the heart of democracy truly lies.
Finally, the U.S. agenda for global engagement needs to rediscover a sense of
moral and political humility. U.S. foreign policies must be open to new insights
and interpretations. This is particularly true when it comes to the work of

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democracy. Inherent in the notion of democracy is that it is the citizens of a

society themselves who must choose their own best way. The new administration
would do well to remember Mohandas K. Gandhi’s wise warning that ‘‘The spirit
of democracy cannot be imposed from without. It has to come from within.’’10 On
HDAC, we have adopted the term ‘‘partnerships’’ advisedly. Our aim is to
support, advise, and facilitate as emerging democracies find their own way.

Notes

1. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘‘President Sworn-In To Second
Term,’’ January 20, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.
html.
2. Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway, ‘‘Islamist Movements and The
Democratic Process In The Arab World,’’ Carnegie Paper No. 67 (Washington D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2006).
3. Ibid.
4. Dinorah Azpuru, Steven E. Finkel, Anibal PLrez-LiMþn, and Mitchell A. Seligson,
‘‘Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has the United States Been Doing?’’ Journal
of Democracy 19, no. 2 (April 2008): 150
/59.
5. The top ten recipient nations of ‘‘Governing Justly and Democratically’’ funding in
FY 2009 budget are: Afghanistan ($248.0 million), Iraq ($198.0 million), Sudan
($77.4 million), Iran ($65.0 million), Pakistan ($55.2 million), Egypt ($45.0 million),
Lebanon ($37.0 million), Liberia ($35.9 million), Indonesia ($35.2 million), and Russia
($30.3 million). See, U.S. Agency for International Development, ‘‘Congressional
Budget Justifications: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2009,’’ http://www.usaid.gov/
policy/budget/cbj2009/).
6. The United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, The Power of
Partnerships: Third Annual Report to Congress on PEPFAR (2007), Appendix III,
http://www.pepfar.gov/press/c21604.htm. The estimate is calculated from funding data
for PEPFAR focus countries provided in the report. The report does not provide
country-specific data for other (non-focus country) bilateral assistance provided
through PEPFAR. According to the report, which covers FYs 2004-2006, $3.366
billion of the $3.380 billion in funding provided to focus countries has been spent in
Africa.
7. The Millennium Challenge Corporation has compacts signed or in implementation in
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique,
Namibia, and Tanzania. See, http://www.mcc.gov/countries/index.php.
8. Azpuru et al., ‘‘Trends in Democracy Assistance.’’
9. Pakistani official during a meeting with HDAC delegation to Islamabad, Pakistan, May
27, 2008.
10. D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi Vol 3: 1930
/34,
(Bombay, India: The Times of India Press, 1961), p. 301.

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