The defendant-appellee argues that the plaintiff-appellant cannot avail of the provisions of Rule 70 regarding forcible entry cases because such cases cannot involve issues of ownership. The defendant-appellee claims that he has registered ownership documents for the property, including a tax declaration and affidavit of ownership registered with the municipal assessor, which indicate he is the rightful owner. Therefore, the municipal trial court did not have proper jurisdiction to hear the case and correctly dismissed the complaint.
The defendant-appellee argues that the plaintiff-appellant cannot avail of the provisions of Rule 70 regarding forcible entry cases because such cases cannot involve issues of ownership. The defendant-appellee claims that he has registered ownership documents for the property, including a tax declaration and affidavit of ownership registered with the municipal assessor, which indicate he is the rightful owner. Therefore, the municipal trial court did not have proper jurisdiction to hear the case and correctly dismissed the complaint.
The defendant-appellee argues that the plaintiff-appellant cannot avail of the provisions of Rule 70 regarding forcible entry cases because such cases cannot involve issues of ownership. The defendant-appellee claims that he has registered ownership documents for the property, including a tax declaration and affidavit of ownership registered with the municipal assessor, which indicate he is the rightful owner. Therefore, the municipal trial court did not have proper jurisdiction to hear the case and correctly dismissed the complaint.
The defendant-appellee argues that the plaintiff-appellant cannot avail of the provisions of Rule 70 regarding forcible entry cases because such cases cannot involve issues of ownership. The defendant-appellee claims that he has registered ownership documents for the property, including a tax declaration and affidavit of ownership registered with the municipal assessor, which indicate he is the rightful owner. Therefore, the municipal trial court did not have proper jurisdiction to hear the case and correctly dismissed the complaint.
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The case discusses a property dispute between Ramon Nieto and Keith Ilagan over possession of a parcel of land in Cainta, Rizal. Nieto claims he owns the land based on documents of sale and tax declarations, while Ilagan claims he has been occupying the land since 2009 when his previous home was destroyed.
The defendant Keith Ilagan claims that he started occupying the disputed land in October 2009 after his previous home was destroyed by a typhoon. He argues that at the time the land was unoccupied and there were no signs it belonged to the plaintiff.
The defendant lists his counter statements of facts which include that the land was unoccupied when he moved there in 2009, there were no fences or structures indicating ownership by the plaintiff, and he has been occupying it since.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 70 RIZAL
RAMON NIETO Plaintiff-Appellant,
-versus- Civil Case No. 100-2013 For: Forcible Entry (Ejectment)
Defendant-Appellee KEITH ILAGAN, by undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, in answer to the allegations raised by the Plaintiff- Appellant in his Memorandum, respectfully states:
PREPARATORY STATEMENT
The appealed case steamed from an ejectment case filed by Plaintiff Ramon Nieto (Plaintiff-Appellant), which sought to recover the material possession of a parcel of land against Defendant Keith Santos (Defendant- Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 2 of 11
Appellee) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cainta Rizal therein docketed as Civil Case No. 100-2013. On February 11, 2014, the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta rendered the decision dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff aggrieved with the dismissal of the case filed a Notice of Appeal on April 15, 2014. Hence, this memorandum in response to the memorandum filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant.
COUNTER STATEMENTS OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff-Appellant, Ramon Nieto, claims to be the lawful owner of a parcel of commercial/residential land consisting of 1,200 sq. m., more or less, that is located in San Andres, Cainta, Rizal. He acquired title over the said land in 1985, by way of absolute sale from the previous owner thereof, STEVE ONA, as shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale, a copy of which is marked as Exhibit A. The said land is not covered by a Torrens certificate of title.
2. That As a result of the sale, Plaintiff-Appellant was issued Tax Declaration No. 11111-1985, a copy of which is marked as Exhibit B, as well as official receipts evidencing the payment of real property taxes from 1985 up to 2012, copies of which are marked as Exhibit C and Exhibit C-1 to 27 .
3. Plaintiff-Appellant then planted trees and other plants on the property. He also erected a perimeter fence around the premises. In January 2009, he also built a 1-room nipa hut, which since then he occupied from time to time.
4. Sometime in July 2009, Plaintiff-Appellant went to Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Japan and Vietnam for an extended vacation. Upon his return in December 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant went to visit his Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 3 of 11
property in San Andres, Cainta, Rizal. He then discovered that Defendant-Appellee was occupying the subject property.
5. Plaintiff-Appellant thereupon demanded from Defendant-Appellee to vacate the subject premises. The Defendant-Appellee did not heed said demand. Plaintiff-Appellant again sent another demand in March 2013, as shown by a copy of the letter dated March 3, 2013, a copy of which is marked as Exhibit D. The Defendant-Appellee also did not heed this later demand.
6. Due to Defendant-Appellees failure to heed the demand letters sent by Plaintiff-Appellant, the latter filed the Complaint for Forcible Entry with prayer to wit:
"x x x that Judgment be rendered ordering the defendant KEITH ILAGAN to peaceably turn over the physical possession of the subject property to plaintiff RAMON NIETO; that defendant be directed to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of the subject property, for every month starting February 2013 until the plaintiff is actually restored to the physical possession of the property; and that defendant be commanded to remove any and improvements he erected on the property."
7. The answer was filed by Keith Ilagan in due time and materially alleges that he started occupying the subject premises in October 2009, after a storm (Typhoon Ondoy) destroyed his house in San Isidro, Cainta, Rizal. Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 4 of 11
8. At that time, the subject premises were not occupied or claimed by any person, including the plaintiff. In fact, there was nothing in the said premises that indicated that the plaintiff owns the subject property. There was no fence to enclose the property. There were no structures erected thereat, not even those mentioned by the plaintiff in his complaint. 9. The defendant declared the property for taxation purposes in October 2009, as shown by Tax Declaration No. 2000-2009, a copy of which is attached and marked as Exhibit 1. Said tax declaration shows that the property has a market value of P 850,000.00. He also paid real property taxes in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, as shown by the official receipts attached and marked as Exhibits 2-5. The defendant likewise registered with the Municipal Assessor of Cainta, Rizal, and an Affidavit of Ownership over the subject premises, a copy of which is attached and marked as Exhibit 6. 10. Defendant contends that plaintiff has no right to claim the property, much less oust the defendant from the possession thereof. 11. Defendant likewise prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
DECISION OF THE MTC
On April 11, 2014, the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta rendered a decision which dismissed the complaint (page 7, Decision). In dismissing the complaint, the MTC found that plaintiff cannot avail himself of the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, because an ejectment case should not involve ownership issues. (page 3, Decision); that even assuming that the plaintiff can raise the issue of ownership, the trial court has no jurisdiction to resolve the same, since the property has a market value of P 850,000.00 ( page 4 Decision); that even if the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the respective claims of ownership of the parties, it would appear that defendant Keith Ilagan is the owner of the subject premises, because he has Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 5 of 11
an affidavit of ownership that was duly registered with the Municipal Assessor of Cainta, Rizal ( page 4, Decision).
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
Defendant-appellee raises the following counter-arguments to the assignment of errors raised by the Plaintiff-appellant:
I. The Plaintiff-Appellant cannot avail of the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the lower court has no Jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on the merits.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto; any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof. 1
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court tells us the two mandatory allegations in filling forcible entry cases for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction, to wit:
1 Munoz v. Yabut, G. R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011 Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 6 of 11
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
In the case of Abad v Farrales, 2 the Supreme Court explained the two mandatory allegations required in filing forcible entry cases, that: Two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff has prior physical possession of the property. Second, the defendant deprived him of such possession by force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.
As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff-Appellant had prior physical possession of the property as evidenced by the fact of planting trees and other plants and erecting a perimeter fence on the premises. Further, sometime in January 2009, he also built a 1-room nipa hut, which since then he occupied from time to time.
However the second requirement that the defendant deprived him of such possession by force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth was missing. The plaintiff-appellant failed to allege that defendant Keith Ilagan deprived him of such possession under the circumstances required by the law.
2 Abad v. Farrales, G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011 Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 7 of 11
Further, it is not enough of course that the allegations of the complaint make out a case of forcible-entry. The plaintiff must also able to prove his allegation that he had prior physical possession that gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. 3
Here, the Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove that he had prior physical possession over the disputed property. The alleged prior physical possession of plaintiff is a self-serving claim because it was not supported by any evidences. Whereas the defendant sufficiently prove that he has prior physical possession over the disputed property as shown by the Tax Declaration No. 2000-2009, the official receipts of the real property taxes in 2009,2010, 2011 and 2012 paid by the defendant, and the duly registered Affidavit of Ownership.
Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta did not erred in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff because of his failure to allege the two mandatory required allegations in forcible entry cases so that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.
II. Even assuming that the MTC has Jurisdiction over the complaint still there was necessity to determine the ownership of the subject property.
The defendant-Appellee agree with the Plaintiff-Appellant that in ejectment suits the only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of property involved independent of any claim of ownership by
3 Abad v. Farrales, G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011 Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 8 of 11
any of the party litigants. However, this recognized rule is not absolute because when the defendant raises in his pleadings the issue of ownership as defense and the question of who has the prior physical possession cannot be determined without deciding the issue of ownership the court of first level may determine the issue of ownership. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court Section 16 specifically provides:
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Also, the Supreme Court in Gustilo v. Gustilo ruled that:
The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. But where the parties raise the issue of ownership, as in this case, the courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not final and binding as regards the issue of ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession when it is inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The adjudication on the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. 4
From the above-quoted rule and the jurisprudence decided by the Supreme Court that there is necessity in determining the issue of ownership of the subject property when the defendant raises the issue of ownership as defense in his pleadings. In defendants Answer he raised the issue of ownership over the disputed property.
4 Gustilov Gustilo, G.R. No 175497, October 19, 2011 Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 9 of 11
Hence, the MTC is still allowed assuming that it has jurisdiction to determine the issue of who between the party litigants is the owner of the property but only for the purpose of determining the issue of who has the prior possession over the subject property.
III. Assuming that the MTC has jurisdiction to resolve the Complaint. The amount of the property is P850,000.00
As previously discussed from the preceding paragraph the MTC did not erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it has jurisdiction the cause of action of plaintiff is not for forcible entry cases but an ordinary civil action involving possession over the disputed property. The MTC has still without jurisdiction to the complaint because Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states:
(1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 10 of 11
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."
Consequently, the MTC has jurisdiction over the claim of possession if the jurisdictional amount required by the law is not beyond the limit allowed. However, plaintiff-appellants claim does not fall within the jurisdictional amount required by the law. Therefore, the complaint must be dismissed.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is humbly prayed of this Honorable Court that the Decision dated 11 April 2014 of the court a quo be affirmed and that this appeal be dismissed.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Quezon City for Rizal, 16 May 2014.
ATTY. MAESHACH M. SOMBILON Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Atty. Roll. No. 52284 IBP Lifetime No. 11087/Quezon City PRT No. 1102584/01-05-14-Quezon City MCLE Exemption No. 111-042386
Appellees Memorandum Nieto vs. Ilagan Civil Case No. 100-2013 Page 11 of 11
Copy Furnished: Atty. Marie Dianne V. Espiritu Jhocson Espiritu Karim Law Counsel for Petitioner 27 th Floor Trafalgar Bldg. 888 HV Dela Costa St., Makati city
WRITTEN EXPLANATION (Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
Filing and service of this Memorandum of Appeal to the above- mentioned parties was accomplished through registered mail since personal service could not be effected due to the distance between the parties, and the heavy volume of deliveries of the messengers of the law firm of the undersigned counsel.
In Re Coastal Seafood Enterprises of Little River, Inc., Murray Bowman Brown, United States of America v. 8.4 Acres of Land Located in Little River Township, Horry County, South Carolina, With Improvements Thereon, Known as Little River Campground One Parcel of Real Property Located on Watson Avenue, Little River Village, Horry County, South Carolina, With Improvements Thereon, in Re Coastal Seafood Enterprises of Little River, Inc. In Re Eva Frye Wood. In Re Murray Bowman Brown, Claimant-Appellant, and the United Carolina Bank Bankers Mortgage Corporation, United States of America v. 8.4 Acres of Land Located in Little River Township, Horry County, South Carolina, With Improvements Thereon, Known as Little River Campground One Parcel of Real Property Located on Watson Avenue, Little River Village, Horry County, South Carolina, With Improvements Thereon One (1) 1980 Cadillac Eldorado, Vin Gl579ae622602, 823 F.2d 546, 4th Cir. (1987)