HANDBOOK OF

CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
HANDBOOK OF
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
SIXTH EDITION

Volume One: Theoretical Models of Human Development

Volume Editor

RICHARD M. LERNER

Editors-in-Chief

WILLIAM DAMON and RICHARD M. LERNER

John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Copyright © 2006 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.

Published simultaneously in Canada.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

Handbook of child psychology / editors-in-chief, William Damon & Richard M. Lerner.—

6th ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. Theoretical models of human development / volume editor,
Richard M. Lerner — v. 2. Cognition, perception, and language / volume editors,
Deanna Kuhn, Robert Siegler — v. 3. Social, emotional, and personality development /
volume editor, Nancy Eisenberg — v 4. Child psychology in practice / volume editors, K.
Ann Renninger, Irving E. Sigel.
ISBN 0-471-27287-6 (set : cloth)
— ISBN 0-471-27288-4 (v. 1 : cloth) — ISBN 0-471-27289-2 (v. 2 : cloth)
— ISBN 0-471-27290-6 (v. 3 : cloth) — ISBN 0-471-27291-4 (v. 4 : cloth)
1. Child psychology. I. Damon, William, 1944– II. Lerner, Richard M.
BF721.H242 2006
155.4—dc22
2005043951
Printed in the United States of America.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
In memory of Paul Mussen, whose generosity of spirit
touched our lives and helped build a field.
Contributors

Paul B. Baltes Kurt W. Fischer

Max Planck Institute for Human Development Graduate School of Education
Berlin, Germany Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Peter L. Benson
Search Institute Jacqueline J. Goodnow
Minneapolis, Minnesota School of Behavioural Science
Thomas R. Bidell University of Sydney
Denver, Colorado Sydney, Australia

Jochen Brandstädter Gilbert Gottlieb

Department of Psychology Center for Developmental Science
University of Trier University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Trier, Germany Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Urie Bronfenbrenner Stephen F. Hamilton

Department of Human Development Department of Human Development
Cornell University Cornell University
Ithaca, New York Ithaca, New York
Anton Bucher
Giyoo Hatano
University of Salzburg
Human Development &
Salzburg, Austria
Education Program
Beverley D. Cairns University of the Air
Social Development Research Center Chiba City, Japan
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina Richard M. Lerner
Department of Child Development
Robert B. Cairns Tufts University
Social Development Research Center Medford, Massachusetts
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina Robert A. LeVine
Graduate School of Education
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
Harvard University
Claremont Graduate University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Claremont, California

Glen H. Elder Jr. Robert Lickliter

Carolina Population Center Department of Psychology
The University of North Carolina Florida International University
Chapel Hill, North Carolina Miami, Florida

vii
viii Contributors

Ulman Lindenberger Michael J. Shanahan

Max Planck Institute for Human Development Department of Sociology
Berlin, Germany University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
David Magnusson
Department of Psychology Richard A. Shweder
Stockholm University Committee on Human Development
Stockholm, Sweden University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
Hazel R. Markus
Department of Psychology Linda B. Smith
Stanford University Department of Psychology
Stanford, California Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
Peggy J. Miller
Department of Speech Communication Margaret Beale Spencer
University of Illinois Department of Psychology
Champaign, Illinois University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Pamela A. Morris
MDCR Håkan Stattin
New York, New York Department of Social Sciences
Örebro University
Fritz K. Oser Örebro, Sweden
Department of Education
University of Freiburg Ursula M. Staudinger
Freiburg, Switzerland Jacobs Center for Lifelong Learning and
Institutional Development
Willis F. Overton International University Bremen
Department of Psychology Bremen, Germany
Temple University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Esther Thelen
Department of Psychology
Kevin Rathunde Indiana University
Department of Family and Consumer Sciences Bloomington, Indiana
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah Jaan Valsiner
Department of Psychology
Peter C. Scales Clark University
Search Institute Worcester, Massachusetts
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Douglas Wahlsten
W. George Scarlett Department of Psychology
Department of Child Development University of Windsor
Tufts University Ontario, Canada
Medford, Massachusetts

Arturo Sesma Jr.

Search Institute
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology,
Sixth Edition
WILLIAM DAMON

Scholarly handbooks play several key roles in their dis- not only has endured over time but has evolved into a
ciplines. First and foremost, they reflect recent changes thriving tradition across a number of related academic
in the field as well as classic works that have survived disciplines.
those changes. In this sense, all handbooks present their All through its history, the Handbook has drawn on,
editors’ and authors’ best judgments about what is most and played a formative role in, the worldwide study of
important to know in the field at the time of publication. human development. What does the Handbook’s history
But many handbooks also influence the fields that they tell us about where we, as developmentalists, have been,
report on. Scholars—especially younger ones—look to what we have learned, and where we are going? What
them for sources of information and inspiration to guide does it tell us about what has changed and what has re-
their own work. While taking stock of the shape of its mained the same in the questions that we ask, in the
field, a handbook also shapes the stock of ideas that will methods that we use, and in the theoretical ideas that we
define the field’s future. It serves both as an indicator draw on in our quest to understand human development?
and as a generator, a pool of received knowledge and a By asking these questions, we follow the spirit of the sci-
pool for spawning new insight. ence itself, for developmental questions may be asked
about any endeavor, including the enterprise of studying
human development. To best understand what this field
THE HANDBOOK’S LIVING TRADITION has to tell us about human development, we must ask how
the field itself has developed. In a field that examines
Within the field of human development, the Handbook of continuities and changes, we must ask, for the field itself,
Child Psychology has served these key roles to a degree what are the continuities and what are the changes?
that has been exceptional even among the impressive The history of the Handbook is by no means the whole
panoply of the world’s many distinguished scholarly story of why the field is where it is today, but it is a fun-
handbooks. The Handbook of Child Psychology has had a damental part of the story. It has defined the choices
widely heralded tradition as a beacon, organizer, and en- that have determined the field’s direction and has influ-
cyclopedia of developmental study for almost 75 years— enced the making of those choices. In this regard, the
a period that covers the vast majority of scientific work Handbook’s history reveals much about the judgments
in this field. and other human factors that shape a science.
It is impossible to imagine what the field would look
like if it had not occurred to Carl Murchison in 1931 to
assemble an eclectic assortment of contributions into THE CAST OF CHARACTERS
the first Handbook of Child Psychology. Whether or not
Murchison realized this potential (an interesting specu- Carl Murchison was a scholar/impresario who edited
lation in itself, given his visionary and ambitious na- The Psychological Register; founded and edited key psy-
ture), he gave birth to a seminal publishing project that chological journals; wrote books on social psychology,

ix
x Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition

politics, and the criminal mind; and compiled an assort- which still is fresh today, Bühler described intricate
ment of handbooks, psychology texts, autobiographies of play and communication patterns among toddlers, pat-
renowned psychologists, and even a book on psychic be- terns that developmental psychology would not redis-
liefs (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Harry Houdini were cover until the late 1970s. Bühler also anticipated the
among the contributors). Murchison’s initial Handbook critiques of Piaget that would appear during the socio-
of Child Psychology was published by a small university linguistics heyday of the 1970s:
press (Clark University) in 1931, when the field itself
Piaget, in his studies on children’s talk and reasoning, em-
was still in its infancy. Murchison wrote:
phasizes that their talk is much more egocentric than so-
cial . . . that children from 3 to 7 years accompany all their
Experimental psychology has had a much older scientific
manipulations with talk which actually is not so much in-
and academic status [than child psychology], but at the
tercourse as monologue . . . [but] the special relationship
present time it is probable that much less money is being
of the child to each of the different members of the house-
spent for pure research in the field of experimental psy-
hold is distinctly reflected in the respective conversations.
chology than is being spent in the field of child psychol-
(Buhler, 1931, p. 138)
ogy. In spite of this obvious fact, many experimental
psychologists continue to look upon the field of child psy-
chology as a proper field of research for women and for Other Europeans included Anna Freud, who wrote on
men whose experimental masculinity is not of the maxi- “ The Psychoanalysis of the Child,” and Kurt Lewin,
mum. This attitude of patronage is based almost entirely who wrote on “Environmental Forces in Child Behavior
upon a blissful ignorance of what is going on in the and Development.”
tremendously virile field of child behavior. (Murchison, The Americans whom Murchison chose were equally
1931, p. ix) notable. Arnold Gesell wrote a nativistic account of his
twin studies, an enterprise that remains familiar to us
Murchison’s masculine allusion, of course, is from an- today, and Stanford’s Louis Terman wrote a comprehen-
other era; it could furnish some good material for a social sive account of everything known about the “gifted
history of gender stereotyping. That aside, Murchison child.” Harold Jones described the developmental ef-
was prescient in the task that he undertook and the way fects of birth order, Mary Cover Jones wrote about chil-
that he went about it. At the time Murchison wrote the dren’s emotions, Florence Goodenough wrote about
preface to his Handbook, developmental psychology was children’s drawings, and Dorothea McCarthy wrote
known only in Europe and in a few forward-looking about language development. Vernon Jones’s chapter on
American labs and universities. Nevertheless, Murchison “children’s morals” focused on the growth of character,
predicted the field’s impending ascent: “ The time is not a notion that was to become lost to the field during the
far distant, if it is not already here, when nearly all com- cognitive-developmental revolution, but that reemerged
petent psychologists will recognize that one-half of the in the 1990s as the primary concern in the study of
whole field of psychology is involved in the problem of moral development.
how the infant becomes an adult psychologically” Murchison’s vision of child psychology included an
(Murchison, 1931, p. x). examination of cultural differences as well. His Hand-
For his original 1931 Handbook, Murchison looked to book presented to the scholarly world a young anthropol-
Europe and to a handful of American centers (or “ field ogist named Margaret Mead, just back from her tours of
stations”) for child research (Iowa, Minnesota, the Uni- Samoa and New Guinea. In this early essay, Mead wrote
versity of California at Berkeley, Columbia, Stanford, that her motivation in traveling to the South Seas was to
Yale, Clark). Murchison’s Europeans included a young discredit the views that Piaget, Levy-Bruhl, and other
“genetic epistemologist ” named Jean Piaget, who, in an nascent “structuralists” had put forth concerning “ani-
essay on “Children’s Philosophies,” quoted extensively mism” in young children’s thinking. (Interestingly,
from interviews with 60 Genevan children between the about a third of Piaget’s chapter in the same volume was
ages of 4 and 12 years. Piaget’s chapter would provide dedicated to showing how Genevan children took years
American readers with an introduction to his seminal to outgrow animism.) Mead reported some data that she
research program on children’s conceptions of the called “amazing”: “In not one of the 32,000 drawings
world. Another European, Charlotte Bühler, wrote a ( by young ‘primitive’ children) was there a single case
chapter on children’s social behavior. In this chapter, of personalization of animals, material phenomena, or
 Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition xi

inanimate objects” (Mead, 1931, p. 400). Mead parlayed in the Handbook tradition, made an appearance as au-
these data into a tough-minded critique of Western psy- thor of a major chapter ( by far the longest in the book)
chology’s ethnocentrism, making the point that animism on prenatal and perinatal growth. Three other physio-
and other beliefs are more likely to be culturally in- logically oriented chapters were added as well: one on
duced than intrinsic to early cognitive development. neonatal motor behavior, one on visual-manual func-
This is hardly an unfamiliar theme in contemporary psy- tions during the first 2 years of life, and one on physio-
chology. Mead also offered a research guide for develop- logical “appetites” such as hunger, rest, and sex.
mental fieldworkers in strange cultures, complete with Combined with the Goodenough and Gesell shifts in
methodological and practical advice, such as the follow- focus, these additions gave the 1933 Handbook more of a
ing: Translate questions into native linguistic categories; biological thrust, in keeping with Murchison’s long-
don’t do controlled experiments; don’t do studies that standing desire to display the hard science backbone of
require knowing ages of subjects, which are usually un- the emerging field.
knowable; and live next door to the children whom you Leonard Carmichael was president of Tufts Univer-
are studying. sity when he organized Wiley’s first edition of the
Despite the imposing roster of authors that Murchison Handbook. The switch from a university press to the
assembled for the 1931 Handbook of Child Psychology, long-established commercial firm of John Wiley &
his achievement did not satisfy him for long. Barely 2 Sons was commensurate with Carmichael’s well-
years later, Murchison put out a second edition, of which known ambition; indeed, Carmichael’s effort was to
he wrote: “Within a period of slightly more than 2 years, become influential beyond anything that Murchison
this first revision bears scarcely any resemblance to the might have anticipated. The book (one volume at that
original Handbook of Child Psychology. This is due time) was called the Manual of Child Psychology, in
chiefly to the great expansion in the field during the past keeping with Carmichael’s intention of producing an
3 years and partly to the improved insight of the editor ” “advanced scientific manual to bridge the gap between
(Murchison, 1933, p. vii). The tradition that Murchison the excellent and varied elementary textbooks in this
had brought to life was already evolving. field and the scientific periodical literature”
Murchison saw fit to provide the following warning in (Carmichael, 1946, p. viii).
his second edition: “ There has been no attempt to sim- The publication date was 1946, and Carmichael com-
plify, condense, or to appeal to the immature mind. This plained that “ this book has been a difficult and expensive
volume is prepared specifically for the scholar, and its one to produce, especially under wartime conditions”
form is for his maximum convenience” (Murchison, (Carmichael, 1946, p. viii). Nevertheless, the project was
1933, p. vii). It is likely that sales of Murchison’s first worth the effort. The Manual quickly became the bible of
volume did not approach textbook levels; perhaps he re- graduate training and scholarly work in the field, avail-
ceived negative comments regarding its accessibility. able virtually everywhere that human development was
Murchison exaggerated when he wrote that his sec- studied. Eight years later, now head of the Smithsonian
ond edition bore little resemblance to the first. Almost Institution, Carmichael wrote, in the preface to the 1954
half of the chapters were virtually the same, with minor second edition, “ The favorable reception that the first
additions and updating. (For the record, though, despite edition received not only in America but all over the
Murchison’s continued use of masculine phraseology, world is indicative of the growing importance of the
10 of the 24 authors in the second edition were women.) study of the phenomena of the growth and development of
Some of the authors whose original chapters were the child” (Carmichael, 1954, p. vii).
dropped were asked to write about new topics. So, for Carmichael’s second edition had a long life: Not until
example, Goodenough wrote about mental testing rather 1970 did Wiley bring out a third edition. Carmichael was
than about children’s drawings, and Gesell wrote a gen- retired by then, but he still had a keen interest in the
eral statement of his maturational theory that went well book. At his insistence, his own name became part of the
beyond the twin studies. title of the third edition; it was called, improbably,
But Murchison also made some abrupt changes. He Carmichael’s Manual of Child Psychology, even though it
dropped Anna Freud entirely, auguring the marginaliza- had a new editor and an entirely different cast of authors
tion of psychoanalysis within academic psychology. and advisors. Paul Mussen took over as the editor, and
Leonard Carmichael, who was later to play a pivotal role once again the project flourished. Now a two-volume set,
xii Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition

the third edition swept across the social sciences, gener- plained.) In any case, Carmichael acknowledged the
ating widespread interest in developmental psychology roots of his Manuals, if not always their original editor.
and its related disciplines. Rarely had a scholarly com- His choice to start with those roots is a revealing part
pendium become both so dominant in its own field and so of the Handbook’s history, and it established a strong
familiar in related disciplines. The set became an essen- intellectual legacy for our present-day descendants of
tial source for graduate students and advanced scholars the early pioneers who wrote for the Murchison and
alike. Publishers referred to Carmichael’s Manual as the Carmichael editions.
standard against which other scientific handbooks were Although Leonard Carmichael took the 1946 Manual
compared. in much the same direction established by Murchison
The fourth edition, published in 1983, was now re- back in 1931 and 1933, he did bring it several steps fur-
designated by John Wiley & Sons to become once again ther in that direction, added a few twists of his own, and
the Handbook of Child Psychology. By then, Carmichael dropped a couple of Murchison’s bolder selections.
had passed away. The set of books, now expanded to four Carmichael first appropriated five Murchison chapters
volumes, became widely referred to in the field as “ the on biological or experimental topics, such as physiologi-
Mussen handbook.” cal growth, scientific methods, and mental testing. He
added three new biologically oriented chapters on ani-
mal infancy, physical growth, and motor and behavioral
WHAT CARMICHAEL CHOSE FOR THE maturation (a tour de force by Myrtal McGraw that in-
NOW EMERGENT FIELD stantly made Gesell’s chapter in the same volume obso-
lete). Then he commissioned Wayne Dennis to write an
Leonard Carmichael, who became Wiley’s editor for adolescence chapter that focused exclusively on physio-
the project in its now commercially funded and ex- logical changes associated with puberty.
panded versions (the 1946 and 1954 Manuals), made On the subject of social and cultural influences in de-
the following comments about where he looked for his velopment, Carmichael retained five of the Murchison
all-important choices of content: chapters: two chapters on environmental forces on the
child by Kurt Lewin and by Harold Jones, Dorothea Mc-
Both as editor of the Manual and as the author of a spe- Carthy’s chapter on children’s language, Vernon Jones’s
cial chapter, the writer is indebted . . . [for] extensive
chapter on children’s morality (now entitled “Character
excerpts and the use of other materials previously pub-
Development—An Objective Approach”), and Margaret
lished in the Handbook of Child Psychology, Revised Edi-
tion. (1946, p. viii)
Mead’s chapter on “primitive” children (now enhanced
by several spectacular photos of mothers and children
Both the Handbook of Child Psychology and the Handbook
from exotic cultures around the world). Carmichael also
of Child Psychology, Revised Edition, were edited by Dr.
stayed with three other Murchison topics (emotional de-
Carl Murchison. I wish to express here my profound appre-
ciation for the pioneer work done by Dr. Murchison in pro-
velopment, gifted children, and sex differences), but he
ducing these handbooks and other advanced books in selected new authors to cover them. But Carmichael
psychology. The Manual owes much in spirit and content dropped Piaget and Bühler.
to the foresight and editorial skill of Dr. Murchison. Carmichael’s 1954 revision, his second and final edi-
(1954, p. viii) tion, was very close in structure and content to the 1946
Manual. Carmichael again retained the heart of Murchi-
The first quote comes from Carmichael’s preface to son’s original vision, many of Murchison’s original
the 1946 edition, the second from his preface to the authors and chapter topics, and some of the same mate-
1954 edition. We shall never know why Carmichael rial that dated all the way back to the 1931 Handbook.
waited until the 1954 edition to add the personal tribute Not surprisingly, the chapters that were closest to
to Carl Murchison. Perhaps a careless typist dropped Carmichael’s own interests got the most significant up-
the laudatory passage from a handwritten version of the dating. Carmichael leaned toward the biological and
1946 preface and its omission escaped Carmichael’s physiological whenever possible. He clearly favored ex-
notice. Or perhaps 8 years of further adult development perimental treatments of psychological processes. Yet he
increased Carmichael’s generosity of spirit. (It also still kept the social, cultural, and psychological analyses
may be possible that Murchison or his family com- by Lewin, Mead, McCarthy, Terman, Harold Jones, and
 Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition xiii

Vernon Jones, and he even went so far as to add one new on Carmichael’s last Manual, Paul Mussen wrote, “ The
chapter on social development by Harold and Gladys 1954 edition of this Manual had only one theoretical
Anderson and one new chapter on emotional develop- chapter, and that was concerned with Lewinian theory
ment by Arthur Jersild. which, so far as we can see, has not had a significant
The Murchison and Carmichael volumes make for lasting impact on developmental psychology” (Mussen,
fascinating reading, even today. The perennial themes of 1970, p. x). The intervening years had seen a turning
the field were there from the start: the nature-nurture away from the norm of psychological research once
debate; the generalizations of universalists opposed by fondly referred to as “dust-bowl empiricism.”
the particularizations of contextualists; the alternating The Mussen 1970 edition—or Carmichael’s Manual,
emphases on continuities and discontinuities during on- as it was still called—had a new look and an almost
togenesis; and the standard categories of maturation, entirely new set of contents. The two-volume edition
learning, locomotor activity, perception, cognition, lan- carried only one chapter from the earlier books,
guage, emotion, conduct, morality, and culture—all Carmichael’s updated version of his own long chapter
separated for the sake of analysis, yet, as authors on the “Onset and Early Development of Behavior,”
throughout each of the volumes acknowledged, all some- which had made its appearance under a different title in
how inextricably joined in the dynamic mix of human Murchison’s 1933 edition. Otherwise, as Mussen wrote
development. in his preface, “It should be clear from the outset . . .
These things have not changed. Yet, much in the early that the present volumes are not, in any sense, a revision
editions is now irrevocably dated. Long lists of chil- of the earlier editions; this is a completely new Manual”
dren’s dietary preferences, sleeping patterns, elimina- (Mussen, 1970, p. x).
tion habits, toys, and somatic types look quaint and And it was. In comparison to Carmichael’s last edi-
pointless through today’s lenses. The chapters on chil- tion 16 years earlier, the scope, variety, and theoretical
dren’s thought and language were written prior to the depth of the Mussen volumes were astonishing. The
great contemporary breakthroughs in neurology and field had blossomed, and the new Manual showcased
brain / behavior research, and they show it. The chapters many of the new bouquets that were being produced.
on social and emotional development were ignorant of The biological perspective was still strong, grounded by
the processes of social influence and self-regulation that chapters on physical growth ( by J. M. Tanner) and phys-
soon would be revealed through attribution research and iological development ( by Dorothy Eichorn) and by
other studies in social psychology. Terms such as cogni- Carmichael’s revised chapter (now made more elegant
tive neuroscience, neuronal networks, behavior genetics, by some excerpts from Greek philosophy and modern
social cognition, dynamic systems, and positive youth de- poetry). But two other cousins of biology also were rep-
velopment were of course unknown. Even Mead’s rendi- resented, in an ethological chapter by Eckhard Hess and
tion of the “primitive child” stands as a weak straw in a behavior genetics chapter by Gerald McClearn. These
comparison to the wealth of cross-cultural knowledge chapters were to define the major directions of biologi-
available in today’s cultural psychology. cal research in the field for at least the next 3 decades.
Most telling, the assortments of odd facts and norma- As for theory, Mussen’s Handbook was thoroughly
tive trends were tied together by very little theory permeated with it. Much of the theorizing was organ-
throughout the Carmichael chapters. It was as if, in the ized around the approaches that, in 1970, were known
exhilaration of discovery at the frontiers of a new field, as the “ three grand systems”: (1) Piaget’s cognitive-
all the facts looked interesting in and of themselves. developmentalism, (2) psychoanalysis, and (3) learning
That, of course, is what makes so much of the material theory. Piaget was given the most extensive treatment.
seem odd and arbitrary. It is hard to know what to make He reappeared in the Manual, this time authoring a
of the lists of facts, where to place them, which ones comprehensive (and, some say, definitive) statement of
were worth keeping track of and which ones are expend- his entire theory, which now bore little resemblance to
able. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the data presented in his 1931/1933 sortings of children’s intriguing verbal
the Carmichael manuals seems not only outdated by expressions. In addition, chapters by John Flavell, by
today’s standards but, worse, irrelevant. David Berlyne, by Martin Hoffman, and by William
By 1970, the importance of theory for understanding Kessen, Marshall Haith, and Philip Salapatek all gave
human development had become apparent. Looking back major treatments to one or another aspect of Piaget’s
xiv Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition

body of work. Other approaches were represented as quite on center stage. Research topics now ranged from
well. Herbert and Ann Pick explicated Gibsonian the- children’s play to brain lateralization, from children’s
ory in a chapter on sensation and perception, Jonas family life to the influences of school, day care, and dis-
Langer wrote a chapter on Werner’s organismic theory, advantageous risk factors. There also was coverage of
David McNeill wrote a Chomskian account of language the burgeoning attempts to use developmental theory as
development, and Robert LeVine wrote an early version a basis for clinical and educational interventions. The
of what was soon to become “culture theory.” interventions usually were described at the end of chap-
With its increased emphasis on theory, the 1970 Man- ters that had discussed the research relevant to the
ual explored in depth a matter that had been all but ne- particular intervention efforts, rather than in whole
glected in the book’s previous versions: the mechanisms chapters dedicated specifically to issues of practice.
of change that could account for, to use Murchison’s old This brings us to the efforts under the present edito-
phrase, “ the problem of how the infant becomes an adult rial team: the Handbook’s fifth and sixth editions ( but
psychologically.” In the process, old questions such as really the seventh and eighth editions, if the germinal
the relative importance of nature versus nurture were re- two pre-Wiley Murchison editions are counted). I must
visited, but with far more sophisticated conceptual and leave it to future commentators to provide a critical sum-
methodological tools. mation of what we have done. The volume editors have
Beyond theory building, the 1970 Manual addressed an offered introductory and/or concluding renditions of
array of new topics and featured new contributors: peer their own volumes. I will add to their efforts here only
interaction (Willard Hartup), attachment (Eleanor Mac- by stating the overall intent of our design and by com-
coby and John Masters), aggression (Seymour Feshback), menting on some directions that our field has taken in
individual differences (Jerome Kagan and Nathan Kogan), the years from 1931 to 2006.
and creativity (Michael Wallach). All of these areas of in- We approached our editions with the same purpose
terest are still very much with us in the new millenium. that Murchison, Carmichael, and Mussen before us had
If the 1970 Manual reflected a blossoming of the shared: “ to provide,” as Mussen wrote, “a comprehen-
field’s plantings, the 1983 Handbook reflected a field sive and accurate picture of the current state of knowl-
whose ground cover had spread beyond any boundaries edge—the major systematic thinking and research—in
that could have been previously anticipated. New the most important research areas of the psychology of
growth had sprouted in literally dozens of separate lo- human development ” (Mussen, 1983, p. vii). We as-
cations. A French garden, with its overarching designs sumed that the Handbook should be aimed “specifically
and tidy compartments, had turned into an English gar- for the scholar,” as Murchison declared, and that it
den, a bit unruly but glorious in its profusion. Mussen’s should have the character of an “advanced text,” as
two-volume Carmichael’s Manual had now become the Carmichael defined it. We expected, though, that our
four-volume Mussen Handbook, with a page-count in- audiences may be more interdisciplinary than the read-
crease that came close to tripling the 1970 edition. erships of previous editions, given the greater tendency
The grand old theories were breaking down. Piaget of today’s scholars to cross back and forth among fields
was still represented by his 1970 piece, but his influence such as psychology, cognitive science, neurobiology,
was on the wane throughout the other chapters. Learning history, linguistics, sociology, anthropology, educa-
theory and psychoanalysis were scarcely mentioned. Yet tion, and psychiatry. We also believed that research-
the early theorizing had left its mark, in vestiges that oriented practitioners should be included under the
were apparent in new approaches, and in the evident con- rubric of the “scholars” for whom this Handbook was
ceptual sophistication with which authors treated their intended. To that end, for the first time in 1998 and
material. No return to dust bowl empiricism could be again in the present edition, we devoted an entire vol-
found anywhere in the set. Instead, a variety of classical ume to child psychology in practice.
and innovative ideas were coexisting: Ethology, neurobi- Beyond these very general intentions, we have let
ology, information processing, attribution theory, cul- chapters in the Handbook’s fifth and sixth editions take
tural approaches, communications theory, behavioral their own shape. We solicited the chapters from authors
genetics, sensory-perception models, psycholinguistics, who were widely acknowledged to be among the leading
sociolinguistics, discontinuous stage theories, and con- experts in their areas of the field, although we know
tinuous memory theories all took their places, with none that, given an entirely open-ended selection process and
 Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition xv

no limits of budget, we would have invited a large num- has a way of moving in alternating cycles (or spirals, for
ber of other leading researchers whom we did not have those who wish to capture the progressive nature of sci-
the space—and thus the privilege—to include. With entific development). In our time, developmental study
very few exceptions, every author whom we invited has cycled away from classic topics such as motivation
agreed to accept the challenge. Our only real, and great, and learning—not in the sense that they were entirely
sadness was to hear of the passing of several authors forgotten, or that good work ceased to be done in such
from the 1998 edition prior to our assembly of the pres- areas, but in the sense that they no longer were the most
ent edition. Where possible, we arranged to have their prominent subjects of theoretical reflection and debate.
collaborators revise and update their chapters. Some of the relative neglect was intentional, as scholars
Our directive to authors was simple: Convey your got caught up in controversies about whether psycholog-
area of the field as you see it. From then on, the authors ical motivation was a “real” phenomenon worthy of
took center stage—with, of course, much constructive study or whether learning could or should be distin-
feedback from reviewers and volume editors. No one guished from development in the first place. All this has
tried to impose a perspective, a preferred method of in- changed. As the contents of our current edition attest,
quiry, or domain boundaries on any of the chapters. The developmental science always returns, sooner or later, to
authors expressed their views on what researchers in concepts that are necessary for explaining the heart of
their areas attempt to accomplish, why they do so, how its concerns, progressive change in individuals and so-
they go about it, what intellectual sources they draw on, cial groups over time, and concepts such as learning and
what progress they have made, and what conclusions motivation are indispensable for this task. Among the
they have reached. exciting features of this Handbook edition are the ad-
The result, in my opinion, is still more glorious pro- vances it presents in theoretical and empirical work on
fusion of the English garden genre, but perhaps con- these classic concepts.
tained a bit by some broad patterns that have emerged The other concept that has met some resistance in
over the past decade. Powerful theoretical models and recent years is the notion of development itself. For
approaches—not quite unified theories, such as the some social critics, the idea of progress, implicit in the
three grand systems—have begun once again to organize notion of development, has seemed out of step with
much of the field’s research and practice. There is great principles such as equality and cultural diversity. Some
variety in these models and approaches, and each is genuine benefits have accrued from that critique; for
drawing together significant clusters of work. Some example, the field has worked to better appreciate di-
have been only recently formulated, and some are com- verse developmental pathways. But, like many critique
binations or modifications of classic theories that still positions, it led to excesses. For some, it became ques-
have staying power. tionable to explore issues that lie at the heart of human
Among the formidable models and approaches that development. Growth, advancement, positive change,
the reader will find in this Handbook are the dynamic achievement, and standards for improved performance
system theories, the life span and life course ap- and conduct, all were questioned as legitimate subjects
proaches, cognitive science and neuronal models, the of investigation.
behavior genetics approach, person-context interaction Just as in the cases of learning and motivation, no
theories, action theories, cultural psychology, and a doubt it was inevitable that the field’s center of gravity
wide assortment of neo-Piagetian and neo-Vygotskian sooner or later would return to broad concerns of devel-
models. Although some of these models and approaches opment. The story of growth from infancy to adulthood is
have been in the making for some time, they have now a developmental story of multifaceted learning, acquisi-
come into their own. Researchers are drawing on them tions of skills and knowledge, waxing powers of attention
directly, taking their implied assumptions and hypothe- and memory, growing neuronal and other biological ca-
ses seriously, using them with specificity and control, pacities, formations and transformations of character
and exploiting their implications for practice. and personality, increases and reorganizations in the un-
Another pattern that emerges is a rediscovery and derstanding of self and others, advances in emotional and
exploration of core processes in human development behavioral regulation, progress in communicating and
that had been underexamined by the generation of re- collaborating with others, and a host of other achieve-
searchers just prior to the present one. Scientific interest ments documented in this edition. Parents, teachers, and
xvi Preface to Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition

other adults in all parts of the world recognize and value and current set of scientific theories and findings
such developmental achievements in children, although available in the field today.
they do not always know how to understand them, let
alone how to foster them. February 2006
The sorts of scientific findings that the Handbook’s Palo Alto, California
authors explicate in their chapters are needed to pro-
vide such understanding. The importance of sound sci- REFERENCES
entific understanding has become especially clear in
recent years, when news media broadcast story after Bühler, C. (1931). The social participation of infants and toddlers. In
story based on simplistic and biased popular specula- C. Murchison (Ed.), A handbook of child psychology. Worcester,
MA: Clark University Press.
tions about the causes of human development. The
Carmichael, L. (Ed.). (1946). Manual of child psychology. New York:
careful and responsible discourse found in these chap- Wiley.
ters contrasts sharply with the typical news story about Carmichael, L. (Ed.). (1954). Manual of child psychology (2nd ed.).
the role of parents, genes, or schools in children’s New York: Wiley.
growth and behavior. There is not much contest as to Mead, M. (1931). The primitive child. In C. Murchison (Ed.), A
handbook of child psychology. Worcester, MA: Clark University
which source the public looks to for its information and Press.
stimulation. But the good news is that scientific truth Murchison, C. (Ed.). (1931). A handbook of child psychology. Worces-
usually works its way into the public mind over the long ter, MA: Clark University Press.
run. The way this works would make a good subject for Murchison, C. (Ed.). (1933). A handbook of child psychology (2nd
ed.). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
developmental study some day, especially if such a
Mussen, P. (Ed.). (1970). Carmichael’s manual of child psychology.
study could find a way to speed up the process. In the New York: Wiley.
meantime, readers of this edition of the Handbook of Mussen, P. (Ed.). (1983). Handbook of child psychology. New York:
Child Psychology will find the most solid, insightful Wiley.
Acknowledgments

A work as significant as the Handbook of Child Psychol- colleagues at Publications Development Company for
ogy is always produced by the contributions of numerous undertaking the enormous task of copy editing and pro-
people, individuals whose names do not necessarily ap- ducing the thousands of pages of the Sixth Edition.
pear on the covers or spines of the volumes. Most impor- Their professionalism and commitment to excellence
tant, we are grateful to the more than 150 colleagues were invaluable resources and provided a foundation
whose scholarship gave life to the Sixth Edition. Their upon which the editors’ work was able to move forward
enormous knowledge, expertise, and hard work make productively.
this edition of the Handbook the most important refer- Child development typically happens in families. So
ence work in developmental science. too, the work of editors on the Handbook moved along
In addition to the authors of the chapters of the four productively because of the support and forbearance of
volumes of this edition, we were fortunate to have been spouses, partners, and children. We thank all of our
able to work with two incredibly skilled and dedicated loved ones for being there for us throughout the several
editors within the Institute for Applied Research in years on which we have worked on the Sixth Edition.
Youth Development at Tufts University, Jennifer Davi- Numerous colleagues critiqued the chapters in man-
son and Katherine Connery. Their “can-do” spirit uscript form and provided valuable insights and sug-
and their impressive ability to attend to every detail gestions that enhanced the quality of the final
of every volume were invaluable resources enabling products. We thank all of these scholars for their enor-
this project to be completed in a timely and high mous contributions.
quality manner. William Damon and Richard M. Lerner thank the
It may be obvious, but we want to stress also that John Templeton Foundation for its support of their re-
without the talent, commitment to quality, and profes- spective scholarly endeavors. In addition, Richard M.
sionalism of our editors at John Wiley & Sons, this edi- Lerner thanks the National 4-H Council for its support
tion of the Handbook would not be a reality and would of his work. Nancy Eisenberg thanks the National Insti-
not be the cutting-edge work we believe it to be. The tute of Mental Health, the Fetzer Institute, and The In-
breadth of the contributions of the Wiley staff to the stitute for Research on Unlimited Love—Altruism,
Handbook is truly enormous. Although we thank all Compassion, Service ( located at the School of Medi-
these colleagues for their wonderful contributions, we cine, Case Western Reserve University) for their sup-
wish to make special note of four people in particular: port. K. Ann Renninger and Irving E. Sigel thank
Patricia Rossi, Senior Editor, Psychology, Linda Wit- Vanessa Ann Gorman for her editorial support for Vol-
zling, Senior Production Editor, Isabel Pratt, Associate ume 4. Support from the Swarthmore College Provost’s
Editor, and Peggy Alexander, Vice President and Pub- Office to K. Ann Renninger for editorial assistance on
lisher. Their creativity, professionalism, sense of bal- this project is also gratefully acknowledged.
ance and perspective, and unflagging commitment to the Finally, in an earlier form, with Barbara Rogoff ’s en-
tradition of quality of the Handbook were vital ingredi- couragement, sections of the preface were published in
ents for any success we may have with this edition. Human Development (April 1997). We thank Barbara
We are also deeply grateful to Pam Blackmon and her for her editorial help in arranging this publication.

xvii
Contents

1  DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE, DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS, AND

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1
Richard M. Lerner

2  DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: PHILOSOPHY,

CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGY 18
Willis F. Overton

3  THE MAKING OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 89

Robert B. Cairns and Beverley D. Cairns

4  DEVELOPMENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND IMPLICATIONS

FOR METHODOLOGY 166
Jaan Valsiner

5  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BIOLOGY FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:

A DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS VIEW 210
Gilbert Gottlieb, Douglas Wahlsten, and Robert Lickliter

6  DYNAMIC SYSTEMS THEORIES 258

Esther Thelen and Linda B. Smith

7  DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ACTION AND THOUGHT 313

Kurt W. Fischer and Thomas R. Bidell

8  THE PERSON IN CONTEXT: A HOLISTIC-INTERACTIONISTIC APPROACH 400

David Magnusson and Håkan Stattin

9  THE DEVELOPING PERSON: AN EXPERIENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 465

Kevin Rathunde and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi

10  ACTION PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 516

Jochen Brandtstädter

xix
xx Contents

11  LIFE SPAN THEORY IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 569

Paul B. Baltes, Ulman Lindenberger, and Ursula M. Staudinger

12  THE LIFE COURSE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 665

Glen H. Elder Jr. and Michael J. Shanahan

13  THE CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT: ONE MIND,

MANY MENTALITIES 716
Richard A. Shweder, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Giyoo Hatano, Robert A. LeVine, Hazel R. Markus,
and Peggy J. Miller

14  THE BIOECOLOGICAL MODEL OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 793

Urie Bronfenbrenner and Pamela A. Morris

15  PHENOMENOLOGY AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS THEORY: DEVELOPMENT

OF DIVERSE GROUPS 829
Margaret Beale Spencer

16  POSITIVE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS 894

Peter L. Benson, Peter C. Scales, Stephen F. Hamilton, and Arturo Sesma Jr.

17  RELIGIOUS AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT THE LIFE SPAN 942

Fritz K. Oser, W. George Scarlett, and Anton Bucher

Author Index 999

Subject Index 1037

CHAPTER 1

Developmental Science, Developmental

Systems, and Contemporary Theories of
Human Development
RICHARD M. LERNER

FROM DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TO DIVERSITY—A FUNDAMENTAL ASSET OF

DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 11
IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIONAL METATHEORIES FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS OF A POSITIVE
FOR DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 5 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 11
FROM DEFICIT TO DIVERSITY IN FRAMING THE RESEARCH AGENDA OF
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 12
VESTIGES OF REDUCTIONIST MODELS 7 CONCLUSIONS 13
USING THE DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS REFERENCES 14
PERSPECTIVE FOR THEORY, RESEARCH,
AND APPLICATION 10

Much like the universities within which they are typically genetic and sociobiological instances of such split con-
formulated, theoretical innovations in human develop- ceptions); ( b) irreparable problems with the methods
ment usually move at glacial speed. As described by associated with the empirical tests of ideas derived
Cairns and Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this vol- from the theory (e.g., see Gottlieb, Walhsten, & Lick-
ume), decades may elapse between the formulation of a liter, Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume, Garcia
new approach to human development and its ascendancy Coll, Bearer, & Lerner, 2004, and Lerner, 2002, for dis-
and proliferation in variations of the initial model as it is cussions of such problems in behavior genetics and so-
used in research and organized into a network, or “ fam- ciobiology); or (c) substantive “overreaching,” that is,
ily” (Reese & Overton, 1970) of related theories. Finally, attempting to account for phenomena beyond the scope
it passes from the scene, losing its role as an active or in- of the model (e.g., see Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg,
fluential frame for research and application. This diminu- Hetherington, & Bornstein, 2000; Elder & Shanahan,
tion of influence can occur for many reasons. Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume; Horowitz,
There may be the identification of (a) fundamental 2000; Shweder et al., Chapter 13, this Handbook, this
conceptual flaws, including empirically counterfactual volume; Suomi, 2004a, 2004b, for discussions of this
assertions (e.g., see Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, problem in genetic reductionist accounts, as occur in
this volume, for examples of theories that split nature- behavior genetics and sociobiology, of social behavior
variables from nurture-variables in attempting to ac- or of the social and cultural institutions of society; see
count for human development, and also Lerner, 2004a, Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this vol-
2004b, for a discussion of these problems in behavior ume, and Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook,
this volume, for discussions of this problem in neona-
The preparation of this chapter was supported in part by tivist accounts of cognitive development; and see
grants from the National 4-H Council and from the John Tem- Bloom, 1998, for a discussion of this problem in behav-
pleton Foundation. iorist accounts of language development).

1
2 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

Cairns and Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this Among the interrelated, and in fact “ fused” (Tobach
volume) note as well that a theoretical innovation in & Greenberg, 1984), defining features of contempo-
one period may actually constitute a return to ideas rary developmental systems theories of human devel-
from an earlier era. When theoretical ideas are initially opment are (a) relationism, the integration of levels of
introduced, they may not become popular or even ac- organization; ( b) historical embeddedness and tempo-
cepted for several reasons. There may be a lack of con- rality; (c) relative plasticity; and (d) diversity (Damon
ceptual preparedness for the ideas or vocabulary used & Lerner, 1998; Lerner, 2004a, 2004b). As discussed
in a theory (e.g., see Flavell, 1963, for a discussion of in the Cairns and Cairns chapter, these four components
why Piaget’s early formulations, e.g., in 1923, were not of developmental systems theories of human develop-
embraced in the United States for almost 40 years). In ment have a long and rich tradition in the history of the
addition, the ideas in a theory may not be able to be field (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this
tested optimally because of methodological limitations volume). For example, Cairns and Cairns describe
(e.g., the absence of statistical procedures for model- James Mark Baldwin’s (1897/1906) interest in the
ing multilevel, hierarchically embedded, and recipro- study of development-in-context, and thus in inte-
cal relations across time; e.g., see Nesselroade & Ram, grated, multilevel, and hence interdisciplinary scholar-
2004). Moreover, the “spirit of the times,” the zeitgeist ship. These interests were shared as well by Lightner
(Boring, 1950), may preclude acceptance of ideas that Witmer, the founder in 1896 of the first psychological
would require realigning the sociology of the science. clinic in the United States (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3,
Cairns and Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this vol- this Handbook, this volume; Lerner, 1977).
ume) recount the challenges of instituting a truly multi- Cairns and Cairns also describe the conception of de-
disciplinary field of child development given the more velopmental processes within developmental systems the-
than 50-year predominance of psychologists and of ories—involving reciprocal interaction, bidirectionality,
psychogenic (and reductionist) theories in that field. plasticity, and biobehavioral organization (all modern
Nevertheless, such conceptual, methodological, and emphases)—as integral in the thinking of the founders of
sociological constraints on the acceptance of a theoreti- the field of human development. Wilhelm Stern (1914)
cal orientation may be overcome (e.g., through the sort stressed the holism that is associated with a developmen-
of evidentiary process involved in the paradigmatic rev- tal systems perspective about these developmental
olutions discussed by Kuhn, 1962). As such, a theory in- processes. Other contributors to the foundations and
troduced in one historical period may be rediscovered or early progress ofthe field of human development (e.g.,
a newer instantiation of it may be generated, albeit being John Dewey, 1916; Kurt Lewin, 1935, 1954; and John B.
“old wine in a new bottle.” Watson, 1928) stressed the importance of linking child
The focus within the contemporary study of human development research with application and child advo-
development on concepts and models associated cacy (Bronfenbrenner, 1974; Zigler, 1998). This orienta-
with developmental systems theories (Cairns & Cairns, tion toward the application of developmental science is a
Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Gottlieb et al., contemporary view as well, derived from the stress on
Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume; Lerner, 2002; plasticity and temporal embeddedness within develop-
Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume) is a mental systems theories.
case in point, especially given that the roots of these
models may be linked to ideas in developmental sci-
ence that were presented at least as early as the 1930s
and 1940s (e.g., Maier & Schneirla, 1935; Novikoff, FROM DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
1945a, 1945b; von Bertalanffy, 1933), if not even sig- TO DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
nificantly earlier. Table 1.1 presents the defining fea-
tures of developmental systems theories and, as Cairns In the almost decade that has passed between placing
and Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) il- the fifth edition of the Handbook of Child Psychology
lustrate, there are parallels between the ideas pre- into production and the appearance of the sixth edition,
sented in this table and the interests of and concepts there has been a remarkably rapid change in the predom-
used by late nineteenth-century and early twentieth- inant theoretical foci used to study human development.
century founders of the study of child development. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the contemporary
 From Developmental Psychology to Developmental Science 3

TABLE 1.1 Defining Features of Developmental Systems Theories

A Relational Metatheory
Predicated on a postmodern philosophical perspective that transcends Cartesian dualism, developmental systems theories are framed by a
relational metatheory for human development. There is, then, a rejection of all splits between components of the ecology of human
development (e.g., between nature- and nurture-based variables), and between continuity and discontinuity and between stability and
instability. Systemic syntheses or integrations replace dichotomizations or other reductionist partitions of the developmental system.

The Integration of Levels of Organization

Relational thinking and the rejection of Cartesian splits is associated with the idea that all levels of organization within the ecology of
human development are integrated, or fused. These levels range from the biological and physiological through the cultural and historical.

Developmental Regulation across Ontogeny Involves Mutually Inf luential Individual ← → Context Relations
As a consequence of the integration of levels, the regulation of development occurs through mutually inf luential connections among all
levels of the developmental system, ranging from genes and cell physiology through individual mental and behavioral functioning to society,
culture, the designed and natural ecology and, ultimately, history. These mutually inf luential relations may be represented generically as
Level 1 ← →, Level 2 (e.g., Family ← → Community), and in the case of ontogeny may be represented as individual ← → context.

Integrated Actions, Individual ← → Context Relations, Are the Basic Unit of Analysis within Human Development
The character of developmental regulation means that the integration of actions—of the individual on the context and of the multiple levels
of the context on the individual (individual ← → context)—constitute the fundamental unit of analysis in the study of the basic process of
human development.

Temporality and Plasticity in Human Development

As a consequence of the fusion of the historical level of analysis—and therefore temporality—in the levels of organization comprising the
ecology of human development, the developmental system is characterized by the potential for systematic change, by plasticity. Observed
trajectories of intraindividual change may vary across time and place as a consequence of such plasticity.

Relative Plasticity
Developmental regulation may both facilitate and constrain opportunities for change. Thus, change in individual ← → context relations is
not limitless, and the magnitude of plasticity (the probability of change in a developmental trajectory occurring in relation to variation in
contextual conditions) may vary across the life span and history. Nevertheless, the potential for plasticity at both individual and contextual
levels constitutes a fundamental strength of all human development.

Intraindividual Change, Interindividual Dif ferences in Intraindividual Change, and the Fundamental Substantive Significance
of Diversity
The combinations of variables across the integrated levels of organization within the developmental system that provide the basis of the
developmental process will vary at least in part across individuals and groups. This diversity is systematic and lawfully produced by
idiographic, group differential, and generic (nomothetic) phenomena. The range of interindividual differences in intraindividual change
observed at any point in time is evidence of the plasticity of the developmental system, and makes the study of diversity of fundamental
substantive significance for the description, explanation, and optimization of human development.

Optimism, the Application of Developmental Science, and the Promotion of Positive Human Development
The potential for and instantiations of plasticity legitimate an optimistic and proactive search for characteristics of individuals and of their
ecologies that, together, can be arrayed to promote positive human development across life. Through the application of developmental
science in planned attempts (interventions) to enhance (e.g., through social policies or community-based programs) the character of
humans’ developmental trajectories, the promotion of positive human development may be achieved by aligning the strengths (operationized
as the potentials for positive change) of individuals and contexts.

Multidisciplinarity and the Need for Change-Sensitive Methodologies

The integrated levels of organization comprising the developmental system require collaborative analyses by scholars from multiple
disciplines. Multidisciplinary knowledge and, ideally, interdisciplinary knowledge is sought. The temporal embeddedness and resulting
plasticity of the developmental system requires that research designs, methods of observation and measurement, and procedures for data
analysis be change-sensitive and able to integrate trajectories of change at multiple levels of analysis.

emphases on developmental systems theories, not as a applying developmental science). What Cairns (1998)
new lens for the study of human development, but as and I (Lerner, 1998) observed in our respective chapters
a return to the historical roots of the field (e.g., in taking in the fifth edition of the handbook as theoretical trends
an integrative approach to nature and nurture, in or cutting-edge interests in developmental science have
stressing multidisciplinarity, in considering the role of become, at this writing, clear indicators of the main-
spirituality as a vital dimension of human life, and in stream and distinctive features of the field. Indeed, the
4 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

centrality of systemic and multidisciplinary thinking, volume; Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook,
spanning and integrating basic and applied scholarship, this volume; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter 8, this
has been associated with a change in the very label of Handbook, this volume; Rathunde & Csikszentmihalyi,
the field during this time period. Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume).
A decade ago, most scholars studying human devel- The range of chapters in this edition of the Hand-
opment labeled the field either as developmental psy- book illustrates the diverse theoretical family of mod-
chology or, if they were not themselves psychologists els that are instances of or, at the least, are framed by
(e.g., Elder, 1998), as a field wherein psychological sci- developmental systems ideas about the relational
ence was the predominant lens through which to study processes linking the multiple, integrated levels of or-
the span of human life. Today, however, the field has ganization within the ecology of human development.
become much more deeply and broadly multidiscipli- These models conceptualize both traditional areas of
nary (and, in some subareas, actually interdisciplinary interest within the study of human development, such
or, in other words, disciplinarily integrative, e.g., see as biological development (Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5,
Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this vol- this Handbook, this volume); perceptual and motor de-
ume; Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this vol- velopment (Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook,
ume; Shweder et al., Chapter 13, this Handbook, this this volume); personality, affective, and social devel-
volume). As a consequence, more and more scholars of opment (Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this
human development refer to their field as developmen- volume; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this
tal science (e.g., see Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12,
Handbook, this volume; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter this Handbook, this volume; Magnusson & Stattin,
8, this Handbook, this volume), and at least one leading Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Rathunde &
graduate textbook in the field has changed its title from Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this vol-
Developmental Psychology (Bornstein & Lamb, 1999) ume); culture and development (Shweder et al., Chapter
to Developmental Science (Bornstein & Lamb, 2005). 13, this Handbook, this volume); and cognitive devel-
The change of name for the field studying the human opment (Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this
life span reflects in large part key intellectual changes volume; Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook,
across the past decade: (a) the certain demise of split this volume), and emergent areas of intellectual interest
conceptions of the nature-nurture issue, and of reduc- such as spiritual and religious development (Oser,
tionistic approaches to either nature formulations Scarlett, & Bucher, Chapter 17, this Handbook, this
(sociobiology or behavior genetics) or to nurture formu- volume); the development of diverse children (Spencer,
lations (e.g., S-R [stimulus-response] models or func- Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume); and positive
tional analysis approaches) (Overton, Chapter 2, this human development (Benson, Scales, Hamilton, &
Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter 4, this Hand- Sesma, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume).
book, this volume); ( b) the ascendancy of focus on de- Indeed, the potential plasticity of human develop-
velopmental systems models, conceptions that seek to ment that is a defining feature of ontogenetic change
fuse systemically the levels of organization involved in within the dynamic, developmental system (Baltes
the ecology of human development (from biology and et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume; Got-
physiology through culture and history; e.g., see Baltes, tlieb et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume;
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, Chapter 11, this Hand- Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this vol-
book, this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this ume) provides a rationale for both the application of
Handbook, this volume; Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5, this developmental science (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3,
Handbook, this volume; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume) and for the possibility that
this Handbook, this volume); and (c) the emphasis on re- positive development may be promoted across the life
lations among levels and not on the main effects of any course of humans through the identification and align-
level itself, as constituting the fundamental units of ment of resources in individuals and their contexts that
analysis of developmental analysis (e.g., see Bronfen- foster health and positive growth (Benson et al., Chap-
brenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this vol- ter 16, this Handbook, this volume). Moreover, the em-
ume; Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this phasis on how the individual acts on the context to
 Implications of Relational Metatheories for Developmental Science 5

contribute to the plastic relations with the context that Finally, this exciting and innovative period in devel-
regulate adaptive development (Brandtstädter, Chap- opmental theory and methodology has been framed by
ter 10, this Handbook, this volume) fosters an interest a renewed appreciation of the philosophical grounding
in person-centered (compared with variable-centered) of developmental science in postmodern ideas. The
approaches to the study of human development (Mag- philosophical ideas that have had the most attraction to
nusson & Stattin, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this vol- developmental scientists are relational conceptions that
ume; Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; transcend fruitless debates (e.g., regarding maturation
Rathunde & Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Hand- versus early experience as the basis for learning, or
book, this volume). Furthermore, given that the array neonativist versus empiricist bases of early cognitive
of individual and contextual variables involved in development; e.g., see Spelke & Newport, 1998) predi-
these relations constitute a virtually open set (e.g., cated on false dichotomies that split apart the fused de-
there are over 70 trillion potential human genotypes velopmental system (e.g., see Overton, 1998, 2003,
and each of them may be coupled across life with an Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, 1998,
even larger number of life course trajectories of social Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume).
experiences; Hirsch, 2004), the diversity of develop-
ment becomes a prime, substantive focus for develop-
mental science (Lerner, 2004a; Spencer, Chapter 15,
this Handbook, this volume). The diverse person, con- IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIONAL
ceptualized from a strength-based perspective (in that METATHEORIES FOR
the potential plasticity of ontogenetic change consti- DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
tutes a fundamental strength of all humans; Spencer,
Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume), and ap- The ascendancy of a developmental systems frame for
proached with the expectation that positive changes the conduct of developmental science has been a prod-
can be promoted across all instances of this diversity uct and a producer of a shift in the paradigm, or philos-
as a consequence of health-supportive alignments be- ophy of science, framing discourse within the field
tween people and setting (Benson et al., Chapter 16, (Overton, 1998, 2003, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this
this Handbook, this volume), becomes the necessary volume). As noted, the field has changed from being
subject of developmental science inquiry. predicated on a positivist and reductionist metatheory,
These theoretical emphases in developmental sci- wherein a key assumption was that the universe was
ence have been coupled with enormous advances in uniform and that it was permanent. It has shifted to a
quantitative statistical approaches, arguably especially postmodernist conception that transcends Cartesian
in the longitudinal methods required to appraise the splits between the real and the epiphenomenal (e.g., as
changing relations in the developmental system be- instantiated within past eras as nature versus nurture,
tween the individual and the context (e.g., see Duncan, maturation versus learning, continuity versus disconti-
Magnuson, & Ludwig, 2004; Laub & Sampson, 2004; nuity, stability versus instability, or simply constancy
McArdle & Nesselroade, 2003; Molenaar, 2004; Nes- versus change; Brim & Kagan, 1980; Lerner, 2002;
selroade & Ram, 2004; Phelps, Furstenberg, & Colby, Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). The
2002; Singer & Willett, 2003; Skrondal & Rabe- integrative, relational metatheory that has emerged by
Hesketh, 2004; von Eye, 1990; von Eye & Bergman, avoiding all splits (Overton, 1998, Chapter 2, this
2003; von Eye & Gutiérrez Peña, 2004; Willett, 2004; Handbook, this volume) focuses instead on the con-
Young, Savola, & Phelps, 1991). Moreover, there has struction of relations across the range of levels of
been an increased appreciation of the importance of organization constituting the ecology of human devel-
qualitative methods, both as valuable tools for the opment (e.g., Baltes, 1997; Baltes et al., Chapter 11,
analysis of the life course and as a means to triangulat- this Handbook, this volume; Bronfenbrenner, 2005;
ing quantitative appraisals of human development. As Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,
such, there has been a growth in the use of traditional this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Hand-
qualitative methods, along with the invention of new book, this volume; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this
qualitative techniques (e.g., Mishler, 2004). Handbook, this volume).
6 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

Moreover, within the context of the relational human being—the relations among variables that were
metatheory that has served as a product and a producer generalizable across time and place—were in some way
of developmental systems thinking (Lerner, 2002), deficient (cf. Gould, 1981, 1996). They were, to at least
there has been a rejection of an idea that is derived from some observers, less than normatively human.
the positivist and reductionist notion that the universe
is uniform and permanent—that the study of human be- FROM DEFICIT TO DIVERSITY IN
havior should be aimed at identifying nomothetic laws DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
that pertain to the generic human being. This idea was
replaced by a stress on the individual, on the impor- For colleagues trained in developmental science within the
tance of attempting to identify both differential and po- past decade, the prior philosophical grounding and associ-
tentially idiographic laws as involved in the course of ated philosophical assumptions about science may seem
human life (e.g., Block, 1971; Magnusson, 1999a, either unbelievably naive or simply quaint vestiges from
1999b), and on regarding the individual as an active an unenlightened past. In what, for the history of science,
producer of his or her own development (Brandtstädter, is a very short period (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, this
1998, 1999, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume; Handbook, this volume), participants in the field of human
Lerner, 1982; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981; Lerner, development have seen a sea change that perhaps qualifies
Theokas, & Jelicic, 2005; Rathunde & Csikszentmiha- as a true paradigm shift in what is thought of as the nature
lyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume). Similarly, of human nature and in the appreciation of time, place,
the changed philosophical grounding of the field has al- and individual diversity for understanding the laws of
tered developmental science from a field that enacted human behavior and development (Bronfenbrenner &
research as if time and place were irrelevant to the exis- Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume; Elder &
tence and operation of laws of behavioral development Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume; Over-
to a field that has sought to identify the role of contex- ton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Shweder et al.,
tual embeddedness and temporality in shaping the de- Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter
velopmental trajectories of diverse individuals and 4, this Handbook, this volume).
groups (e.g., see Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Hand- The publication in 1998 of the fifth edition of the
book, this volume; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter Handbook of Child Psychology, edited by William
14, this Handbook, this volume; Elder, Modell, & Parke, Damon, heralded that the field of human development
1993; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, rejected the hegemony of positivism and reductionism.
this volume). As evidenced by the chapters in all four volumes of the
Arguably, the most profound impact of the relational Damon (1998) Handbook, and arguably especially in the
metatheory on the practice of developmental science volume of that edition that corresponds to the present
has occurred in the conceptualization of diversity, of one, Theoretical Models of Human Development (Damon
interindividual differences, in developmental trajecto- & Lerner, 1998), the majority of the scholarship then
ries (Lerner, 2004a, 2004b; Spencer, Chapter 15, this defining the cutting edge of the field of human develop-
Handbook, this volume). From the perspective of the ment was associated with the sorts of developmental
uniformity and permanence assumptions, individual systems models of human development that fill the
differences—diversity—were seen, at best, through a pages of the present edition of this volume of the Hand-
lens of error variance, as prima facie proof of a lack of book and that, as projected by Cairns and Cairns in
experimental control or of inadequate measurement. At 1998, were at the threshold of their time of ascendancy
worst, diversity across time or place, or in the individ- within developmental science.
ual differences among people, was regarded as an indi- The view of the world that emerged from the chapters
cation that a deficit was present. Either the person in the fifth edition of Volume 1 of the Handbook (Damon
doing the research was remiss for using a research de- & Lerner, 1998) and that is confirmed across the chapters
sign or measurement model that was replete with error of the present volume (including those chapters repre-
(with a lack of experimental control sufficient to elimi- sented in both editions and those chapters new to this
nate interindividual differences), or the people who edition) is that the universe is dynamic and variegated.
varied from the norms associated with the generic Time and place therefore are matters of substance, not
 Vestiges of Reductionist Models 7

error; and to understand human development, one must tive of error variance or as necessarily reflective of a
appreciate how variables associated with person, place, deficiency of human development.
and time coalesce to shape the structure and function of
behavior and its systematic and successive change
(Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume; VESTIGES OF REDUCTIONIST MODELS
Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,
this volume; Benson et al., Chapter 16, this Handbook, Despite the contemporary emphasis on a relational
this volume; Elder, 1998; Elder, Modell, & Parke, 1993; metatheory and on developmental systems theories, the
Magnusson, 1999a, 1999b; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998, remnants of reductionism and deficit thinking still re-
Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Shweder et al., main at the periphery of developmental science. These
Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume; Spencer, Chap- instances of genetic reductionism exist in behavior ge-
ter 15, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter 4, netics (e.g., Rowe, 1994; Plomin, 2000), in sociobiology
this Handbook, this volume). (e.g., Rushton, 1999, 2000), and in at least some forms
Accordingly, diversity of person and context has of evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buss, 2003). These ap-
moved into the foreground of the analysis of human de- proaches constitute today’s version of the biologizing
velopment (Lerner, 1991, 1998, 2002, 2004a, 2004b). errors of the past, such as eugenics and racial hygiene
The dynamic, developmental systems perspective fram- (Proctor, 1988).
ing the contemporary study of human development does As explained by Collins et al. (2000), these ideas are
not reject the idea that there may be general laws of no longer seen as part of the forefront of scientific the-
human development. Instead, there is an insistence on ory. Nevertheless, their influence on scientific and pub-
the presence of individual laws as well and a conviction lic policy persists. Renowned geneticists, such as Bearer
that any generalizations about groups or humanity as a (2004), Edelman (1987, 1988), Feldman (e.g., Feldman
whole require empirical verification, not preempirical & Laland, 1996), Ho (1984), Lewontin (2000), Müller-
stipulation (Lerner, 2002; Magnusson & Stattin, Chap- Hill (1988), and Venter (e.g., Venter et al., 2001); and
ter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Overton, Chapter 2, eminent colleagues in comparative and biological psy-
this Handbook, this volume). chology, such as Greenberg (e.g., Greenberg & Haraway,
To paraphrase the insight of Kluckhohn and Murray 2002; Greenberg & Tobach, 1984), Gottlieb (1997,
(1948), made more than a half century ago, all people 2004), Hirsch (1997, 2004), Michel (e.g., Michel &
are like all other people, all people are like some other Moore, 1995), and Tobach (1981, 1994; Tobach, Gianut-
people, and each person is like no other person. Today, sos, Topoff, & Gross, 1974), alert us to the need for con-
then, the science of human development recognizes tinued intellectual and social vigilance, lest such flawed
that there are idiographic, differential, and nomothetic ideas about genes and human development become the
laws of human behavior and development (e.g., see Em- foci of public policies or social programs.
merich, 1968; Lerner, 2002). Each person and each Such applications of counterfactual ideas remain real
group possesses unique and shared characteristics that possibilities, and in some cases unfortunate realities,
need to be the core targets of developmental analysis. due at least in part to what Horowitz (2000) described as
Differences, then, among people or groups are not the affinity of the “Person in the Street ” to simplistic
necessarily indicators of deficits in one and strengths in models of genetic effects on behavior. These simple and,
the other (Spencer, Chapter 15, this Handbook, this vol- I must emphasize, erroneous models are used by the Per-
ume). Certainly, it is not useful to frame the study of son in the Street to form opinions or to make decisions
human development through a model that a priori sets about human differences and potentials.
one group as the standard for positive or normative Genetic reductionism can, and has, led to views of
development and where another group, when different diversity as a matter of the “ haves” and the “ have nots”
from this normative one, is therefore defined as being in (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Rushton, 1999,
deficit. If there is any remaining place in developmental 2000). There are, in this view, those people who mani-
science for a deficit model of humans, it is useful only fest the normative characteristics of human behavior
for understanding the thinking of those individuals who and development. Given the diversity-insensitive as-
continue to treat diversity as either by definition indica- sumptions and research that characterized much of the
8 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

history of scholarship in human development even into As shown in Table 1.2, these genetic reductionist
the 1990s, these normative features of human develop- ideas may have profound and dire effects on public poli-
ment were associated with middle-class, European cies and social programs (Lerner, 2004a, 2004b). The
American samples (Graham, 1992; McLoyd, 1998; table presents “A” beliefs about whether genetic reduc-
Shweder et al., Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume; tionist ideas are believed to be either (1) true or (2) false.
Spencer, 1990, Chapter 15, this Handbook, this vol- The table presents also “B” public policy and social pro-
ume). In turn, there are those people who manifest gram implications that would be associated with genetic
other characteristics, and these individuals were gener- reductionism were it in fact (1) true or (2) false under
ally non-European American and non-middle-class. either of the two belief conditions involved in “A.” More-
However, if the former group is regarded as normative, over, the “A.2.B.2.” quadrant of the table not only pres-
then the characteristics of the latter groups are re- ents the policy and program implications of believing
garded as nonnormative (Gould, 1996). When such an that the genetic reductionist conception is believed to be
interpretation is forwarded, entry has thus been made false when it is in fact false. In addition, this quadrant il-
down the slippery slope of moving from a description of lustrates the policy and program implications of believ-
between-group differences to an attribution of deficits ing developmental systems theory to be true when it is in
in the latter groups (Lerner, 2002, 2004a, 2004b). fact the case. Table 1.2 demonstrates that if genetic re-
Such an attribution is buttressed when seen through ductionism is believed to be true, then irrespective of
the lens of genetic reductionism because in this concep- whether it is in fact true (and, it must be emphasized that
tion, it must be genes that provide the final, material, it is incontrovertibly not true), a range of actions may be
and efficient cause of the characteristics of the latter promoted that constrain people’s freedom of associa-
groups (e.g., see Rowe, 1994; Rushton, 2000). These tion, reproductive rights, and even survival.
non-European American or non-middle-class groups are, In contrast, Table 1.3 presents the different implica-
in the fully tautological reasoning associated with ge- tions for policies and programs of strict environmental
netic reductionism, behaviorally deficient because of the (radical contextual) reductionist theories. As empha-
genes they possess, and because of the genes they pos- sized by Overton (1998, 2003, Chapter 2, this Hand-
sess, they have behavioral deficits (e.g., see Rushton, book, this volume), split and reductionist conceptions
2000). Simply, the genes that place one in a racial group are equally philosophically problematic and empirically
are the genes that provide either deficits or assets in be- flawed. Both of these split conceptions thus can be ex-
havior, and one racial group possesses the genes that are pected to result in problems for the conduct of science
assets and the other group possesses the genes that are and for the application of science to policies and pro-
deficits. grams. This comparability of problems between genetic

TABLE 1.2 Policy and Program Implications That Arise If the Hereditarian (Genetic Reductionist) “ Split ” Conception of Genes
(A) Were Believed to Be True or False; and (B) Were in Fact True or False

A. Hereditarian “split ” conception is believed to be:

1. True 2. False

B. Public policy and social program implications if hereditarian “split ” position were in fact:

1. True 2. False 1. True 2. False

Repair inferior genotypes, making Same as A.1, B.1 Wasteful and futile humanitarian Equity, social justice, equal
them equal to superior genotypes policies opportunity, affirmative action
Miscegenation laws Wasteful and futile programs of Celebration of diversity
Restrictions of personal liberties of equal opportunity, affirmative Universal participation in civic life
carriers of inferior genotypes action, equity, and social justice Democracy
(separation, discrimination, distinct Policies and programs to quell social Systems assessment and engagement
social tracts) unrest because of unrequited Civil society
Sterilization aspirations of genetically
Elimination of inferior genotypes from constrained people
genetic pool Deterioration of culture and
destruction of civil society
 Vestiges of Reductionist Models 9

TABLE 1.3 Policy and Program Implications That Arise If the Strict Environmentalist (Radical Contextual) “ Split ” Conception
of Context (A) Were Believed to Be True or False; and (B) Were in Fact True or False

A. Strict environmental “split ” conception is believed to be:

1. True 2. False

B. Public policy and social program implications if environmentalist “split ” position were in fact:

1. True 2. False 1. True 2. False

Provide all children with same Same as A.1, B.1 Wasteful and counterproductive Programs that are sensitive to
educational or experiential regimen diversity-sensitive policies individual differences and that seek
to maximize their common potential / Wasteful and counterproductive to promote a goodness of fit between
aptitude programs based on individual individually different people and
Eliminate all individualized differences contexts
educational or training programs Policies and programs to quell social Affirmative actions to correct
Standardized assessments for all unrest because of unrequited ontogenetic or historical inequities
children aspirations of people promised that in person-context fit
Penalties for parents, schools, and the individualized program they Celebration of diversity
communities when children manifest received would make them equal to Universal participation in civic life
individual differences in achievement all other people Democracy
Educate all parents, caregivers, and Deterioration of culture and Systems assessment and engagement
teachers to act in a standard way in destruction of civil society
Social justice
the treatment of all children
Civil society

and environmental reductionist approach can be seen in This result obtains although the strict environmentalist
the A.2.B.1. quadrant of Table 1.3. In turn, and as was perspective is associated with a set of problematic pol-
also the case for the A.2.B.2 quadrant in Table 1.2, this icy and program implications that differ from those
quadrant of Table 1.3 presents the policy and program problems linked to the hereditarian perspective.
implications of believing that the split, environmentalist Despite the theory and research that lends support to
conception is (correctly) believed to be false and is in a dynamic conception of gene ↔ experience coaction,
fact false. As in Table 1.2, then, this quadrant illus- some proponents of genetic reductionism maintain that
trates the policy and program implications of believing concepts and methods regarding genes as separable from
developmental systems theory to be true when, in fact, context are valid and overwhelmingly, or irrefutably, ev-
it is true. ident. The media continue to tell this story and, perhaps
Both tables demonstrate that if the split, reductionist more often than not, the Person in the Street is per-
conceptions of human development are believed to be suaded by it.
true, then irrespective of whether they are in fact The challenge that such language use and public dis-
true (and they incontrovertibly are not true; e.g., see course represents is not merely one of meeting our sci-
Gottlieb, 1997; Hirsch, 1997; Horowitz, 2000; Lerner, entific responsibility to amend incorrect dissemination
2002; Venter et al., 2001), a range of actions constrain- of research evidence. Horowitz (2000) reminds us that
ing the freedom of association, reproductive rights, and an additional, and ethical, responsibility is to support
even survival of people would be promoted. Thus, as social justice. She emphasizes that such action is critical
shown in Table 1.2, if the hereditarian conception were in the face of the simplistically seductive ideas of ge-
correctly regarded as false (and conversely the develop- netic reductionism, especially when coupled with the
mental systems conception were correctly seen as true), deficit model. She explains:
then policies and programs aimed at social justice and
If we accept as a challenge the need to act with social
civil society for the diverse families and children of the responsibility then we must make sure that we do not use
United States would be promoted. Similarly, Table 1.3 single-variable words like genes or the notion of innate in
shows that if the developmental systems perspective is such a determinative manner as to give the impression that
correctly seen as true and if the strict environmentalist they constitute the simple answers to the simple questions
conception is correctly regarded as false, corresponding asked by the Person in the Street lest we contribute to belief
results for social justice and civil society are promoted. systems that will inform social policies that seek to limit
10 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

experience and opportunity and, ultimately, development, with genetic reductionist approaches to human develop-
especially when compounded by racism and poorly advan- ment, found in both behavior genetics and sociobiology,
taged circumstances. Or, as Elman and Bates and their col- subtle and nuanced problems of language continue to
leagues said in the concluding section of their book suggest that these split approaches to human develop-
Rethinking Innateness (Elman et al., 1998), “If our careless, ment remain legitimate. I have noted the potentially
under-specified choice of words inadvertently does damage
enormous negative consequences of such problematic
to future generations of children, we cannot turn with inno-
language in our scientific discourse—especially if the
cent outrage to the judge and say ‘But your Honor, I didn’t
realize the word was loaded.’ ” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 8)
Person in the Street believes that employing such terms
means that the genetic reductionist ideas about social
Overton (Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume) points policy should be countenanced. As a consequence, we
also to the need to appreciate the subtlety of language to must be assiduous and exact in the terms we use to ex-
avoid loading our scientific language with phrases that, on plain why split conceptions in general, and genetic re-
a manifest level, may seem to reject the split thinking of ductionist ones in particular, fail as useful frames for
genetic reductionism but, on a deeper, structural level, scientific discourse about human development. Indeed,
employ terms that legitimate the language of such think- as Lewontin (1981, p. 245) has cautioned, “ The price of
ing remaining part of scientific discourse. He notes: metaphor is eternal vigilance.”

In its current split form no one actually asserts that mat-

ter, body, brain, genes or society, culture, and environment USING THE DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS
provide the cause of behavior or development: The back- PERSPECTIVE FOR THEORY, RESEARCH,
ground idea of one or the other being the privileged deter- AND APPLICATION
minant remains the silent subtext that continues to shape
discussions. The most frequently voiced claim is that be- Developmental systems theories offer another vision of
havior and development are the products of the interac- and vocabulary for the role of genes and, more gener-
tions of nature and nurture. But interaction itself is
ally, of biology in human development. As illustrated in
generally conceptualized as two split-off pure entities that
Tables 1.2 and 1.3, these theories of human development
function independently in cooperative and/or competitive
provide a different view of the role of genes in behavior
ways (e.g., Collins et al., 2000). As a consequence, the de-
bate simply becomes displaced to another level of dis- and development and offer a different, if admittedly
course. At this new level, the contestants agree that more complex, story to the Person in the Street (Lerner,
behavior and development are determined by both nature 2004a, 2004b). It is predicated on a relational metathe-
and nurture, but they remain embattled over the relative ory (Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume)
merits of each entity’s essential contribution. (Overton, and thus eschews splits between nature and nurture, or-
Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume, p. 33) ganism and environment, or any of the other Cartesian
dualities that have been part of the discourse in past his-
Similarly, he explains: torical eras of developmental science (see Cairns &
Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Overton,
Moving beyond behavior genetics to the broader issue of Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chap-
biology and culture, conclusions such as “contemporary ter 4, this Handbook, this volume). Developmental sys-
evidence confirms that the expression of heritable traits tems theories stress that genes, cells, tissues, organs,
depends, often strongly, on experience” (Collins et al.,
whole organisms, and all other, extraorganism levels of
2000, p. 228) are brought into question for the same rea-
organization composing the ecology of human develop-
son. Within a relational metatheory, such conclusions
fail because they begin from the premise that there are
ment are fused in a fully coacting, mutually influential,
pure forms of genetic inheritance termed “ heritable and therefore dynamic system (Bronfenbrenner, 2005;
traits” and within relational metatheory such a premise Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,
is unacceptable. (Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Hand-
volume, p. 36) book, this volume; Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5, this Hand-
book, this volume; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this
Whereas contemporary development science rejects Handbook, this volume; Tobach, 1981).
the philosophical, theoretical, and (in large part) This bidirectional relation between the individual
methodological features of the split thinking associated and the complex ecology of human development may be
 Features and Implications of a Positive Human Development Perspective 11

represented as the individual ↔ context. Because the diversity—seen as the potential for systematic intraindi-
broadest level of the context is history, temporality is al- vidual change, represents a potential for life-span
ways a part of the fused systems of individual ↔ context change. Therefore, diversity, characterized as intraindi-
relations. Thus the potential for systematic change vidual plasticity, is a key asset or developmental strength
(plasticity) exists across the life span (Baltes et al., that may be capitalized on to promote a person’s posi-
1998, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume; Elder, & tive, healthy developmental change. Across people, di-
Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume). Of versity, characterized as interindividual differences,
course, the system that promotes change through the represents a sample of the range of variation that defines
coaction of multiple levels of organization can also act the potential material basis for optimizing the course
to constrain it. Therefore, this fusion of the potential for of human life. Any individual may have a diverse range of
both constancy and change makes plasticity relative and potential developmental trajectories and, as well, all
not absolute (Lerner, 1984, 2002). groups—because of the necessarily diverse developmen-
Nevertheless, the temporality of human development tal paths of the people within them—will have a diverse
and the presence of at least relative plasticity indicate range of developmental trajectories. Diversity, seen as
that one may be optimistic that means may be found, at both intraindividual change and as interindividual differ-
one or more levels of the ecology of human development, ences in intraindividual change, is both a strength of indi-
to apply developmental science in ways that promote pos- viduals and an asset for planning and promoting means to
itive development across the life span (Bronfenbrenner, improve the human condition (Benson et al., Chapter 16,
2005; Ford & Lerner, 1992; Lerner, 2002, 2004c; Mag- this Handbook, this volume; Lerner, 2004c; Spencer,
nusson & Stattin, 1998). Moreover, because no two peo- Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume).
ple, even monozygotic (MZ) twins, will have the same The diversity of individual ↔ context relations that
history of individual ↔ context relations across the life comprises change within the dynamic developmental
span, the individuality of each person is lawfully assured system, along with the optimism about improving
(Hirsch, 1970, 1997, 2004). As noted, the presence of human life that derives from the relative plasticity of
over 70 trillion potential human genotypes means that the humans, means that it is possible to apply developmental
probability of two genetically identical children arising science to promote positive development across the life
from any set of parents is quite small—about one in 6.27 span (Benson et al., Chapter 16, this Handbook, this vol-
billion—and that the probability of two genetically iden- ume; Damon, 1997, 2004; Lerner, 2002, 2004a, 2004b,
tical but non-MZ children arising from one specific cou- 2004c). As such, it is useful to describe the features and
ple is slightly less than one in 160,000 (Hirsch, 2004); implications for science and application of the positive
thus, there is an obviously low probability that any two human development perspective derived from develop-
people, with the exceptions of MZs, will have an identical mental systems theories.
biological genotype (to use a redundancy).
However, the probability that two people, including
MZs, will have an identical history of events, experi-
ences, and social relationships, that is, a social genotype FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS OF
(to use an oxymoron), is so dismally small as to be A POSITIVE HUMAN
equivalent to what most of us would regard as impossi- DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE
ble. The integration of biology and context across time
means that each person has a developmental trajectory The fused system of individual ↔ context relations that
(a dynamically changing phenotype) that is, at least in provides the potential for relative plasticity across the life
part, individually distinct. span constitutes a fundamental strength of each person.
This strength is present to differing extents in all infants,
children, adolescents, adults, and aged individuals. Rela-
DIVERSITY—A FUNDAMENTAL ASSET tive plasticity diminishes across the life span but, as the
OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT research of Baltes, in the Berlin Study of Aging (e.g.,
Baltes et al., 1998, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this vol-
Diversity is a distinctive and, in fact, a defining feature ume; Baltes & Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2002), elegantly
of the human life course (Spencer, Chapter 15, this demonstrates, there is evidence for the presence of plas-
Handbook, this volume). Within an individual over time, ticity into the 10th and 11th decades of life.
12 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

The fused developmental system provides a potential researchers involved with human lives and as citizens of
for change not just in people but also in the contexts in a civil society (Fisher, 1993, 1994, 2003; Fisher, Hoag-
which individuals develop. This latter potential means wood, & Jenson, 1996; Fisher & Tryon, 1990).
that families, neighborhoods, and cultures are also rela- Moreover, without a scientific agenda that integrates
tively plastic and that the level of resources—or devel- description, explanation, and optimization, human de-
opmental assets—that they possess at any point in time velopment science is, at best, an incomplete scholarly
may also be altered across history. Contextual strengths endeavor. A developmental science that is devoid of
and assets in support of positive development may be en- knowledge of the individual and group ranges among di-
visioned within the terms suggested by Benson et al. verse groups, and that is devoid of knowledge of the
(Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume), as the com- range of assets in diverse contexts, is an incomplete de-
munity nutrients for healthy and positive development. velopmental science. It is also inadequate, when seen
These assets can be grown, aligned, and realigned to im- from the perspective of the need for evidence-based pol-
prove the circumstances of human development. icy and program applications.
At any given place or point in time, both individuals
and levels of the context within this plastic developmen-
tal system may manifest problems or may be deficient in FRAMING THE RESEARCH AGENDA OF
some aspect of individual, family, or community life HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
that is needed for improved functioning. The presence of
plasticity does not mean that people are not poor or that What becomes, then, the key empirical question for
they do not lack social nutrients that would enhance developmental scientists interested in describing, ex-
their development. What relative plasticity across the plaining, and promoting positive human development?
developmental system does mean, however, is that all The key question is actually five (5) interrelated “ what ”
people have strengths that, when integrated with the de- questions:
velopmental assets of communities, may be capitalized
on to promote positive change. As such, problems or 1. What attributes (?) of
deficits constitute only a portion of a potentially much
2. What individuals (?) in relation to
larger array of outcomes of individual ↔ context rela-
tions. Problems are not inevitable, and they are certainly 3. What contextual /ecological conditions (?) at
not fixed in a person’s genes. 4. What points in ontogenetic, family or generational,
The role of developmental science is to identify those and cohort or historical, time (?) may be inte-
relations between individual strengths and contextual grated to promote
assets in families, communities, cultures, and the natu- 5. What instances of positive human development?
ral environment, and to integrate strengths and assets to
promote positive human development (Lerner, 2004a, Answering these questions requires a nonreductionist
2004b). A system that is open for change for the better is approach to methodology. Neither biogenic, nor psy-
also open for change for the worse. The research and ap- chogenic or sociogenic approaches are adequate. Devel-
plications of developmental scientists should be aimed opmental science needs integrative and relational models,
at increasing the probability of actualization of the measures, and designs (Lerner, Dowling, & Chaudhuri,
healthy and positive portions of the distribution of po- 2005). Examples of such methodology in developmental
tential outcomes of individual ↔ context relations. systems-oriented research are the scholarship of Eccles
The scientific agenda of the developmental scientist is and her colleagues on stage ↔ environment fit (e.g., Ec-
more than just to describe and to explain human develop- cles, Wigfield, & Byrnes, 2003); of Damon and his col-
ment. It is also to work to optimize it (Baltes, 1968, leagues on the community-based youth charter (Damon,
1987, 1997; Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this 1997, 2004; Damon & Gregory, 2003); of Benson and his
volume). Efforts to enhance human development in its colleagues at Search Institute on the role of developmen-
actual ecology are a way to test theoretical ideas about tal assets in positive youth development (e.g., Benson
how systemic relations coalesce to shape the course of et al., Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume; Leffert
life. These efforts stand as well as ethical responsibili- et al., 1998; Scales, Benson, Leffert, & Blyth, 2000); of
ties of human development scholars, in their roles both as Theokas (2005; Theokas & Lerner, 2005; see too Lerner
 Conclusion 13

et al., 2005) on the role of actual developmental assets in cultural anthropology, sociology, and community
associated with families, schools, and neighborhoods youth development research and practice have been mak-
on positive youth development; and of Leventhal and ing for several years. Most certainly, participants in our
Brooks-Gunn (2004), and of Sampson, Raudenbush, and community-based research and applications are experts
Earls (1997) on the role of neighborhood characteristics in the character of development in their families and
on adolescent development. neighborhoods. Accordingly, research that fails to capi-
The methodology employed in individual ↔ context talize on the wisdom of its participants runs the real dan-
integrative research must also include a triangulation ger of lacking authenticity and of erecting unnecessary
among multiple and, ideally, both qualitative and quanti- obstacles to the translation of the scholarship of knowl-
tative approaches to understanding and synthesizing edge generation into the scholarship of knowledge appli-
variables from the levels of organization within the de- cation (Jensen, Hoagwood, & Trickett, 1999).
velopmental system. Such triangulation may usefully in-
volve the classic approach offered by Campbell and Fiske
(1959) regarding convergent and discriminant validation CONCLUSIONS
through multitrait-multimethod matrix methodology.
Diversity-sensitive measures are needed within such ap- Contemporary developmental science—predicated on a
proaches, and they must be used within the context of relational metatheory and focused on the use of develop-
change-sensitive—and hence longitudinal—designs mental systems theories to frame research on dynamic
(Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this vol- relations between diverse individuals and contexts—con-
ume; Lerner et al., 2005; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter stitutes a complex and exciting approach to understand-
8, this Handbook, this volume). Trait measures developed ing and promoting positive human development. It offers
with the goal of excluding variance associated with time a means to do good science, informed by philosophically,
and context are not optimal choices in such research. To conceptually, and methodologically useful information
reflect the richness and strengths of our diverse human- from the multiple disciples with knowledge bases perti-
ity, our repertoire of measures must be sensitive to the nent to the integrated, individual ↔ context relations
diversity of person variables, such as race, ethnicity, re- that compose human development. Such science is also
ligion, sexual preferences, physical ability status, and more difficult to enact than the ill-framed and method-
developmental status, and to the diversity of contextual ologically flawed research that followed split and reduc-
variables such as family type, neighborhood, community, tionist paths during the prior historical era (Cairns &
culture, physical ecology, and historical moment. Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Overton,
It is particularly important that our designs and our Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter
measures be sensitive to the different meanings of time. 4, this Handbook, this volume). Such science is also more
Insightful formulations about the meanings of time in the difficult to explain to the Person in the Street.
dynamic developmental system have been provided by As illustrated eloquently by the work discussed in
Elder (1998; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 6, this Hand- this volume, the richness of the science and the applica-
book, this volume), Baltes (Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this tions that derive from developmental systems perspec-
Handbook, this volume), and Bronfenbrenner (2005; tives, as well as the internal and ecological validity of
Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this work, are reasons for the continuing and arguably
this volume). Our methods must appraise, then, age, fam- still growing attractiveness of this approach. Moreover,
ily, and historical time and must be sensitive to the role this approach underscores the diverse ways in which hu-
of both normative and nonnormative historical events in mans, in dynamic exchanges with their natural and de-
influencing developmental trajectories. signed ecologies, can create for themselves and others
Finally, our designs should be informed not just by opportunities for health and positive development. As
colleagues from the multiple disciplines with expertise Bronfenbrenner (2005) eloquently puts it, it is these re-
in the scholarly study of human development. Our meth- lations that make human beings human.
ods should be informed as well by the people and com- Accordingly, the relational, dynamic, and diversity-
munities we study (Lerner, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; sensitive scholarship that now defines excellence in de-
Villarruel, Perkins, Borden, & Keith, 2003). They, too, velopmental science may both document and extend the
are experts about development—a point our colleagues power inherent in each person to be an active agent in
14 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

his or her own successful and positive development Baltes, P. B. (1997). On the incomplete architecture of human on-
(Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this vol- togeny: Selection, optimization, and compensation as founda-
tions of developmental theory. American Psychologist, 52,
ume; Lerner, 1982; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981; 366–380.
Lerner, Theokas, et al., 2005; Magnusson & Stattin, Baltes, P. B., Lindenberger, U., & Staudinger, U. M. (1998). Life-
1998, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Rathunde span theory in developmental psychology. In W. Damon
& Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this (Editor-in-Chief ) & R. M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child
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sufficient science of human development, we must inte- From successful aging of the young old to the dilemmas of the
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CHAPTER 2

Developmental Psychology: Philosophy,

Concepts, Methodology
WILLIS F. OVERTON

METATHEORY 20 EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES 54

THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT 22 Plato and Aristotle and the Relational
What Changes in Development: Expressive-Constitutive Developmental Tradition 55
and Instrumental-Communicative Functions Modernity and the Rise of the Split Tradition 56
of Behavior 22 Modernity and the Elaboration of
The Nature of Developmental Change: Transformational Relational Metatheory 58
and Variational 25 The Marxist Split Tradition 65
A Unified Concept of Development 28 Culture and Development in Split and
SPLIT AND RELATIONAL METATHEORIES 30 Relational Metatheories 66
Split Metatheory 30 Pragmatism 68
Relational Metatheory 32 METHODOLOGY: EXPLANATION
DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION: RELATIONAL AND UNDERSTANDING 70
HISTORY AND RELATIONAL MODELS 39 Split Mechanical Explanation 71
DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION: Relational Scientific Methodology 75
SPLIT APPROACHES 41 CONCLUSIONS 80
DEVELOPMENTALLY ORIENTED EMBODIED REFERENCES 80
ACTION METATHEORY 47
Embodiment 47
Person-Centered Embodiment, Action, and
Development 49

Throughout its history, psychology and its sub disci- privileged position, builds a research program on this
plines, including developmental psychology, have been concept, and then strives to demonstrate observationally
captives of numerous fundamental contradictory posi- that the nonprivileged concept can be denied or marginal-
tions. These basic dichotomies, called antinomies, ized. This standard approach to the antinomies has never
include subject-object, mind-body, nature-nurture, been successful because it ultimately represents merely
biology-culture, intrapsychic-interpersonal, structure- an attempt to suppress one concept, and one research pro-
function, stability-change, continuity-discontinuity, gram’s suppressed concept becomes another program’s
observation-reason, universal-particular, ideas-matter, privileged base. In the nature-nurture battles, for exam-
unity-diversity, and individual-society. While often ex- ple, while virtually all combatants these days acknowl-
plicitly denying the relevance of philosophy to its opera- edge some type of interaction, it is a rare program that
tions, psychology has implicitly used the philosophical promotes nature and nurture as co-equal reciprocally de-
assumptions of a seventeenth-century ontological dual- termined complementary processes (Overton, 2004a).
ism, a nineteenth-century epistemological empiricism, This chapter explores how basic conceptual assump-
and an early twentieth-century neopositivism, to build a tions have historically shaped, and how they continue to
standard orthodox approach to the resolution of the antin- shape, proposed solutions to empirical problems includ-
omies. This approach elevates one concept of the pair to a ing, very fundamentally, the antinomy problem. The focus

18
 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology 19

of the chapter is on development. We look at the flag as he goes on to note that “all the empiricism in the
impact various conceptual models have on our very un- world can’t salvage a bad idea” (p. 27). Broadly, the mar-
derstanding of the concept of development and, as a ginalization of all things philosophical, and, hence, the
consequence, on the theories and methods designed to marginalization of any extended examination of concep-
empirically explore development across several series, tual foundations, has rested on a forced dichotomy, which
including phylogenesis (development of the species— locates philosophy in a space of reason and reflection
evolution), embryogenesis (development of the embryo), split off from observation and experimentation, and psy-
ontogenesis (development of the individual across the chology in a space of observation and experimentation
life span), microgenesis (development across short time split off from reason and reflection.
spans), orthogenesis (normal development), and pathogen- This marginalization of conceptual foundations in con-
esis (development of pathology, here psychopathology). temporary psychology is ironically itself the product of
My thesis is that historically two broad abstract metathe- the acceptance of some basic ontological and epistemolog-
ories, often termed worldviews, have constituted the basic ical—hence philosophical—assumptions. These assump-
conceptual contexts within which alternative ideas about tions begin with the idea of splitting reason from
the nature and operations of empirical science, psychol- observation, and follow with the epistemological notion
ogy, and especially developmental psychology, have that knowledge and, indeed, reason itself originates in ob-
emerged and grown. Split metatheory, based on a view of servation and only observation. These assumptions then
the world as decomposable into a foundation of fixed pure lead to a particular definition of scientific method as en-
forms, has yielded the antinomies, and associated con- tailing observation, causation, and induction-deduction,
cepts such as foundationalism, elementarism, atomism, and only observation, causation, and induction-deduction.
reductionism. Relational metatheory, emerging from a Morris R. Cohen (1931), a philosopher, captured the spirit
view of the world as a series of active, ever-changing of this conceptual splitting long ago when he criticized its
forms replaces the antinomies with a fluid dynamic “anti-rationalism . . . bent on minimizing the role of rea-
holism and associated concepts such as self-organization, son in science” and pointed out that the motto of this ap-
system, and the synthesis of wholes. proach is the split “Don’t think [reason]; find out
Because the focus of the chapter is a conceptual analy- [observe]” (p. 76).
sis of development—its concepts, theories, and meta- Over the past 50 or so years, many powerful arguments
theories—a discussion of the place of concepts in any have been mounted against this split between reason and
empirical science, along with a discussion of the nature observation and the subsequent denial of reflection.
and functioning of those fundamental conceptual systems Some of these arguments are discussed later in this chap-
called metatheories, represent a necessary preamble. ter. Indeed, enough arguments have emerged that the atti-
Wittgenstein (1958) once remarked that “in psychology tude itself has often been declared dead, as in the claim
there are empirical methods and conceptual confusions” that the methodology called neopositivism is dead. Yet,
(p. xiv). To avoid validating such a pessimistic judgment, like the mythical Hydra, new forms of this split continue
it is essential that psychology, or any empirical science, to appear and exert a contextual shaping effect. The split
focus some significant portion of its energy on the clari- is often found in the disparagement of reason itself, as in
fication of concepts that are central to its theories and some contemporary versions of so-called postmodern
methods. Conceptual clarification and the exploration of thought. Sometimes, the split is found in explicit and im-
conceptual foundations have traditionally been the plicit attacks on theory, as in a particular rhetoric that
principle provinces of philosophy, and therein lies the states that all theories must be induced directly from ob-
rub. Within the psychological community, philosophical servations (i.e., must be “data based” or “data driven”).
thought—and, as a consequence, any focus on conceptual It is also found in a dogmatic retort given to any reflec-
clarification—has tended to be assigned the role of the tive critique—“ that’s just philosophy.” Often, it is found
anti-science. As Robert Hogan (2001) commented, “Our in the celebration of the analytic over the synthetic, as
training and core practices concern research methods; the when analytic methods of observation are presented as
discipline is . . . deeply skeptical of philosophy. We em- the only acceptable tools for expanding our knowledge
phasize methods for the verification of hypotheses and domain, with the consequence that theory is often re-
minimize the analysis of the concepts entailed by the hy- duced to method, as when flow charts illustrating possi-
potheses” (p. 27). However, Hogan also raises a warning ble relations among empirical variables are offered as
20 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

guiding theories. Frequently, it is found in the valuing of Any discussion of metatheory requires a constant re-
the instrumental over the expressive, as when behavior is minder of the importance of maintaining distinctions
understood only in the context of the success or failure of between various levels of analysis or discourse (Figure
adjustment to some external criteria and never as an index 2.1). Theories and methods refer directly to the empiri-
or expression of an embodied self-organizing system that cal world, while metatheories and metamethods refer to
constitutes the psychological subject. the theories and methods themselves. The most con-
In whatever of these or other multiple forms it ap- crete and circumscribed level of analysis or discourse is
pears, the significant point is that the split between rea- the observational level. This is one’s current common-
son and observation, along with the subsequent sense level of conceptualizing—not pristine, interpreta-
marginalization of reason and reflection, is itself the di- tion free “seeing”—the nature of objects and events in
rect consequence of a conceptual position favoring a par- the world. For example, one might describe the develop-
ticular approach to knowledge building. This conceptual mental changes in some domain as smooth and continu-
position operates as a foundation for building other con- ous, abrupt and discontinuous, or some combination of
cepts, theories, and methods. The position is not in itself both. Regardless of which characterization is chosen,
a given in any self-evident or directly observational or whether this characterization is treated as a narrow
fashion, but simply a specific claim, and, as with any observation or a broad inductive inference, the asser-
claim or argument, reasons must be presented to support tion functions at the observational level of dealing with
the value of the claim. These reasons and the claim itself the world.
require reflection and clarification before they can be Although the observational, commonsense, or folk
rationally accepted as valid or rejected as invalid. It is level of analysis has a sense of immediacy and concrete-
just possible that the split between reason and observa- ness, we can and do focus our attention on this common-
tions is part of a very bad foundation for our discipline,
but this cannot be decided without further exploring con-
ceptual issues. To paraphrase Hogan, all the observation
in the world can’t salvage conceptual confusions. Metatheoretical Discourse
Ontological-Epistemological Groundings

METATHEORY

In scientific discussions, the basic concepts to be ex-

plored in this chapter are often termed metatheoretical.
Metatheoretical Discourse
Metatheories transcend (i.e., “meta”) theories in the Metatheories
sense that they define the context in which theoretical
concepts are constructed, just as a foundation defines
the context in which a house can be constructed. Further,
metatheory functions not only to ground, constrain, and
sustain theoretical concepts but also functions to do the Theoretical Discourse
(Reflective)
same thing with observational methods of investigation.
When specifically discussing background ideas that
ground methods, these are here termed metamethods.
Methodology would also be an appropriate term here if
this were understood in its broad sense as a set of princi- Observational Discourse
(Commonsense)
ples that guide empirical inquiry (Asendorpf & Valsiner,
1992) and not as particular methods themselves.
The primary function of metatheory—including
metamethod—is to provide a rich source of concepts out Domain of Inquiry
of which theories and methods grow. Metatheory also
provides guidelines that help to avoid conceptual confu-
sions and what may ultimately be unproductive ideas Figure 2.1 Levels of discourse in understanding a domain
and methods. of inquiry.
 Metatheory 21

sense understanding and we do think about it. In so sues of knowing) and ontological (i.e., issues of reality)
doing, we have moved to a ref lective level of analysis, principles. In this chapter, much of the discussion con-
and here the first critical differentiation is the theoreti- cerns ideas that have a very high range of application.
cal level of discourse. Here, thought is about organizing Metatheories and metamethods are closely interre-
and reformulating observational understandings in a lated and intertwined. For example, when considering
broader and more abstract field. At the theoretical level, the very nature of development, a prevailing metatheory
concepts are about the observational level and these may claim that change of form (transformational
range from informal hunches to highly refined theories change) is a legitimate and important part of the under-
about the nature of things, including human behavior standing of developmental change. If a prevailing
and change. Classical developmental theories such as Pi- metatheory asserts the legitimacy of transformational
aget’s, Vygotsky’s, and Werner’s, for example, contain change, then theories of development will include some
theoretical principles (e.g., stages) that hypothesize that type of “stage,” “phase,” or “level” because these are
ultimately a combination of continuous and discontinu- theoretical concepts used to designate transformational
ous changes will best define human development. Skin- change: If transformational change and stage, phase, or
nerian and social learning theories alternatively have level are part of one’s metatheory, then the related
hypothesized that all change is best represented as metamethod will prescribe the significance of methods,
strictly continuous. which assess patterns and sequence of patterns appro-
Beyond the theoretical level, the next level of reflec- priate for empirically examining these concepts in any
tive thought is the metatheoretical level of analysis. given specific domain. If a metatheory prescribes that
Here, thought is about basic concepts that impact on transformational change is unimportant to our under-
both the theoretical and observational level. A metathe- standing of development, then any theoretical concepts
ory itself is a set of rules, principles, or a story (narra- of stage, phase, or level, will be viewed negatively, and
tive), that both describes and prescribes what is methods of pattern and sequential assessment will be
acceptable and unacceptable as theory—the means of understood to be of marginal interest.
conceptual exploration of any scientific domain. For Broadly, a metatheory presents a vision of the nature
example, in the metatheory termed “atomism” only con- of the world and the objects of that world (e.g., a
tinuous change is possible and thus only theories metatheory might present a picture of the child as an
committed to strict continuity are formulated. A “active agent ” who “constructs” his or her known world,
metamethod is also a set of rules, principles, or a story, but another metatheory might picture the child as a
but this story describes and prescribes the nature of ac- “recording device” that “processes” information). A
ceptable methods—the means of observational explo- metamethod presents a vision of the tools that will be
ration—in a scientific discipline. When metatheoretical most adequate to explore the world described by the
ideas—including metamethod—are tightly interrelated metatheory.
and form a coherent set of concepts, the set is often Any rich understanding of the impact of the metathe-
termed a model or paradigm. These coherent sets can oretical requires an historical appreciation of the
themselves form a hierarchy in terms of increasing gen- emergence of specific alternative metatheoretical ap-
erality of application. Thus, a model that contains the proaches to knowledge. Developmental psychology was
basic concepts from which a theory of memory will be born and spent its early years in a curious metatheoreti-
constructed is a relatively low level model because it ap- cal world. This world, which began in the seventeenth
plies only to memory. Models such as “developmental century, has been called the modern world or “moder-
systems” (e.g., Lerner, 2002) or “equilibrium models” nity.” In the past century, the modern world has under-
(see Valsiner 1998a) apply to a number of domains in- gone major crises and these have formed the context for
cluding social, cognitive, and emotional domains and alternative contemporary metatheories. Before dis-
function at a higher level in the hierarchy. The hierarchi- cussing specific metatheories and their historical ori-
cal dimension of any given set of metatheoretical ideas gins, an examination of the broad ways that metatheory
also forms a coherently interrelated system of ideas, and impacts how we understand the very nature of develop-
the model operating at the pinnacle of this hierarchy is ment requires attention. This discussion establishes a
termed a worldview (Overton, 1984). Worldviews are developmental framework serving as a general context
composed of coherent sets of epistemological (i.e., is- for the remainder of the chapter.
22 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT clear that although age may operate fairly well at an ob-
servational level of discourse, at a reflective level it fails
When exploring nature of development the one feature to make any meaningful distinctions. Age has no unique
that virtually all agree on is that above all else develop- qualities that differentiate it from time; age is simply
ment is about change. It is common to speak of the devel- one index of time. Most important, there is nothing
opment of various art forms, societies, different unique or novel about units of age-time, such as years,
economic systems, religion, philosophy, science, and so months, weeks, minutes, and so on. Should we then say
on, and in each case changes that the area goes through that development is about changes that occur in time as
are the focus of attention. In developmental psychology, some have (e.g., Elman, 2003), or that time is a “ theoret-
the situation is the same. As a branch of psychology, de- ical primitive?” Time can hardly be a theoretical any-
velopmental psychology considers changes in behavior thing, as time, in and of itself, does nothing. As
and the processes implied by the behavior such as in- Wohlwill (1973) once pointed out, time cannot be an in-
tending, thinking, perceiving, and feeling. As a develop- dependent variable, it is merely a dimension along which
mental psychology, the focus is upon these changes as processes operate. All change—even if entirely transi-
they occur across the entire life span from conception to tory—occurs “in” time, so we come back to simply say-
death, or within certain periods, such as infancy, child- ing that development is about change. The implication
hood, adolescence, adulthood, and the late mature years. here is that to arrive at meaningful distinctions that can
Although the focus on change is straightforward and direct a broad area of scientific inquiry we must explore
noncontroversial, major problems arise when consider- further the nature of change itself. Before doing this,
ing whether every type of change should be accepted however, we shall consider a second problematic out-
as developmental and, if not, what is the peculiar nature come of defining development as something like
of the change we call developmental. Perhaps, general “changes in observed behavior across age.” This is the
agreement would occur that the types of behavioral problematic meaning of “change of observed behavior.”
changes that occur when we become fatigued or tired
would not be termed developmental change. But what What Changes in Development: Expressive-
about other changes that are transitory or easily re- Constitutive and Instrumental-Communicative
versed? For example, if someone is struck on the head Functions of Behavior
they may change from a conscious to a nonconscious
state; is this development change? Or, a pigeon can be Behavior is clearly the observational focus of our empir-
trained to peck at a button when a light comes on, and ical investigations—the dependent variable of our
then trained to not peck at the button when the light research efforts. The problem is whether “change in ob-
comes on; is this development change? The answer to served behavior ” introduces the reflective distinction
these and other questions about the nature of develop- needed to articulate a broad inquiry. Observed behavior,
ment change depend to a significant degree on the or action more generally—at any level from the neuronal
metatheory that is employed to ground a definition of to the molar—can reflect both expressive-constitutive
development. and instrumental-communicative functions. Expressive
One of the most popular characterizations of de- action expresses or reflects some fundamental organiza-
velopmental change, at least among developmental psy- tion or system. For example, in human ontogenesis be-
chologists, has been some variant of the idea that devel- havior is often understood to be diagnostic of some
opment is defined as “changes in observed behavior cognitive, affective, or motivational system (see the sys-
across age.” This understanding is certainly a quick and tems described in the cubes on the left of Figure 2.2).
ready pragmatic definition suitable to act as an opera- These systems have characteristic forms of activity that
tional guide to a series of empirical investigations. are expressed as actions and patterns of action in the
However, if this understanding were used to broadly world (center horizontal lines of Figure 2.2). A verbal-
give meaning to the domain of inquiry called develop- ization may reflect the nature of the child’s system of
mental psychology, some very significant problems thought. A cry, in a particular context, may reflect the
would emerge. status of the child’s attachment system. A series of be-
The first problem involves linking developmental haviors may reflect the child’s intentional system. This
change to age. On any close examination, it becomes expressive function is constitutive in the sense that it en-
 The Concept of Development 23

Figure 2.2 The development of the psychological subject: Levels of transformational and variational change emerging through
embodied action in a sociocultural and physical world.

tails the creative function of human action (Taylor, 2.2) through their action (center horizontal lines of Fig-
1995). It reflects the base from which new behaviors, in- ure 2.2). We see in the next section that dynamic systems
tentions, and meanings are constituted. When inquiry is (as a “ what ” of developmental change) and transforma-
directed toward the assessment or diagnosis of the na- tion (as a “ type” of developmental change) are closely
ture, status, or change of the underlying psychological or related.
biological system, the expressive function is central to Instrumental action is behavior that serves as a means
inquiry. When exploring the expressive function of an ac- to attaining some outcome; it is the pragmatic dimension
tion, the dynamic system that is reflected in the action of action (see center horizontal lines of Figure 2.2). For
expression is the what that changes in development. Dy- example, in human ontogenesis an expressive cognitive
namic systems become transformed ( left cubes of Figure act or thought may also be the means to solve a problem.
24 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

An emotional act of crying may, while being expressive as an expression of a system of locomotion, but
from one perspective, also instrumentally lead to acquir- investigations may also focus on walking as instru-
ing a caregiver, and walking, which may be expressive mental to attaining a goal. Similarly, emotions may be
when considered as reflecting a broad dynamic system explored as expressions of affective organization (e.g.,
of locomotion, may also be instrumental in acquiring Boesch 1984; Sroufe, 1979) or as instrumental in at-
nourishment. Communicative action extends action into taining a particular outcome (e.g., Saarni, Mumme, &
the domain of the intersubjective (relation of the person Campos, 1998). Finally, although language develop-
cubes at the left and social world at the right of Figure ment may be, and often has been investigated as a
2.2). Broadly, the expressive-constitutive is the process means of communicative functioning, it also has been
whereby we come “ to have the world we have,” and the alternatively examined as an expression of affective-
instrumental-communicative is the process whereby “ we cognitive organization (e.g., Bloom, 1998; Bloom &
order the things in that world” (Taylor, 1995, p. ix). Tinker, 2001).
Expressive-constitutive and instrumental-communica- From these and other examples it becomes clear
tive functions of action have each been the focus of that any given action can be understood from
developmental investigations. However, conceptual con- the perspective of either its expressive-constitutive
fusions arise and impact on empirical inquiry, if it is left or its instrumental-communicative features. Neither
unclear whether the focus of a specific investigation the expressive-constitutive nor the instrumental-
is on the expressive-constitutive or the instrumental- communicative are given to direct observation, both
communicative dimension of behavior. are reflective characterizations drawn and refined
Consider some examples from human ontogenesis from commonsense understandings, and each may
that make either expressive-constitutive functions or be a legitimate focus of inquiry. When, however,
instrumental-communicative functions the focus of in- the distinction between expressive-constitutive and
quiry. Investigations of the infant-caregiver attach- instrumental-communicative is not made explicit, “ob-
ment relationship measure the proximity seeking served behavior ” becomes ambiguous. This ambiguity
action of the child to the caregiver. When considered fosters confusion about the specific aim of inquiry and
as proximity seeking, the action has an instrumental how it contributes to our general understanding of de-
character to it. However, Bowlby and his colleagues velopment. Further, this ambiguity allows implicit val-
have been primarily interested in this action as an ex- ues to seep in, eventually splitting and contextualizing
pression of an underlying attachment organization; the field under the influence of hidden metatheoretical
hence, their focus is on the expressive. Bowlby and assumptions. For example, consider what occurs when
colleagues use proximity seeking as diagnostic of an “observed behavior ” is implicitly framed by historical
underlying attachment system. Piagetian tasks such as behavioristic and neopositivistic values. Because early
the object permanence task, or the conservation task, behaviorism and neopositivism excluded the idea that
when examined from an instrumental perspective, “organization” or “system” could be a fundamental
constitute successful or unsuccessful problem-solving object of inquiry (i.e., excluded the possibility that
activities. However, Piaget and his colleagues con- any person-centered mental systems could be included
structed and used these tasks expressively to diagnosis as legitimate explanations of human behavior),
specific forms of cognitive organization (e.g., “observed behavior ” became implicitly identified
schemes, operations). Alternatively, while students’ with the instrumental-communicative and only the
grade point averages may be understood as reflecting, instrumental-communicative.
in part, some intellectual organization, the focus of a Splitting into a dichotomy and privileging one con-
number of social-cognitive investigations have been on cept over another in this example leads directly to
the instrumental quality of this action as an adaptation the theory and methods wars over which concept consti-
or adjustment to the social-cultural context. In tutes the “legitimate” or “significant ” or “meaningful”
fact, many investigations that take a sociocultural approach to empirical inquiry. For example, the classi-
point of view (see Pinquart and Silbereisen, 2004) cal battles between the Piagetians, Wernerians, Erikso-
limit their developmental interests to instrumental nians on the expressive-constitutive side, and the
“child outcomes,” “coping behaviors,” and the other Skinnerians, the Spence-Hull learning theorists, and so-
behaviors considered as adaptations to the cultural cial learning theorists of the Dollard and Miller school
context. As another example, walking can be examined on the instrumental-communicative side represented ex-
 The Concept of Development 25

actly this split. Each side, if not the principal figures press). An interesting example of an approach that be-
themselves, classically assumed that its part consti- gins to promote this kind of integration is found in the
tuted the whole. With respect to methods, the effects in the work of Dodge and colleagues on the develop-
are more subtle or at least less explored. For example, ment of aggressive behavior. Information processing
an examination of issues of validity and reliability illus- generally, and Dodge’s (1986) social information pro-
trates that validity is central to expressive interests and cessing theory specifically, are fundamentally con-
reliability is central to instrumental interests. The often cerned with the instrumental deployment of behaviors
repeated Research Methods 101 lesson, which privi- during real-time social and physical interactions in the
leges reliability with the claim that reliability concerns world. However, Dodge and Rabiner (2004) make a
must be the start of measurement, is a story told by clas- very strong, explicit, and clear case for the expressive
sical instrumentalists. significance of “latent mental structures” in the devel-
This example of the impact of metatheoretical as- opmental process as these impact on how the child “en-
sumptions represents one of three potential solutions to codes, interprets, and responds in a variety of social
the relation of the expressive and the instrumental. situations” (p. 1005; see also Arsenio & Lemerise,
This “nothing-but ” solution takes the instrumental- 2004; Crick & Dodge, 1994).
communicative as privileged and marginalizes the ex- To acknowledge both the distinction between expres-
pressive. As another example, this is the solution of any sive-constitutive and instrumental-communicative func-
perspective that advocates an exclusively “ functional” tions of action, and to acknowledge that they constitute
approach to a topic of inquiry (e.g., see the work on the two legitimate parts of a single whole, is to make an as-
functional theory of emotions, Saarni et al., 1998); any sertion of inclusivity. This acknowledgment recognizes
theory that advocates an exclusively “adaptationist ” that each function assumes a legitimate role in a unified
view of a domain of interest; any theory that explicitly whole of developmental inquiry and that the nature of
denies or marginalizes the status of mental structures, any specific inquiry is always relative to the goals of
mental organization, or biological systems as legiti- that inquiry. From this relational perspective, issues as-
mate, if partial, explanations of behavior. sociated with ambiguities arising from contextualizing
The second potential metatheoretical solution re- development as “changes in observed behavior ” are re-
verses the privileged—marginalization process. This duced significantly by insisting on the substitution of
“nothing-but ” solution offers the expressive as privi- the phrase “changes in expressive-constitutive and
leged and the instrumental as the marginal. Approaches instrumental-communicative features of observed be-
offering biological and/or mental systems as both neces- havior.” This substitution does not, however, resolve the
sary and sufficient for the explanation of behavior would problem of exactly what kinds of change should be
be examples of this solution. called developmental. For this problem, further reflec-
The third metatheoretical solution presents the ex- tion is needed on change itself.
pressive and the instrumental as co-equal complemen-
tary process that function within a relational matrix. In
The Nature of Developmental Change:
this third approach, expressive and the instrumental are
Transformational and Variational
accepted, not as dichotomous competing alternatives,
but as different perspectives on the same whole (this If developmental inquiry is to be an inclusive discipline,
solution is illustrated in Figure 2.2). Like the famous the issue of “developmental change” needs to be ap-
ambiguous figure that appears to be a vase from one proached from as broad a perspective as possible. Per-
line of sight and the faces of two people from another haps, the broadest conceptualization of developmental
line of sight, the expressive and instrumental represent entails the recognition and incorporation of two funda-
two lines of sight, not independent processes. System mental types of change; transformational and varia-
and adaptation, like structure and function, are separa- tional (see Figure 2.2). Transformational change is
ble only as analytic points of view. Focusing inquiry change in the form, organization, or structure of any
on the diagnosis of underlying dynamic biological system. The caterpillar transforms into the butterfly,
and psychological systems in no way denies that behav- the tadpole to the frog, water transforms into ice and
iors have an adaptive value; focusing on adaptive value gas, the seed transforms into the plant, and cells trans-
in no way denies that the behaviors originate from form into the organism. All nonlinear dynamic systems,
some dynamic system (see Overton and Ennis, in including the human psyche, undergo transformational
26 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

change. Transformational change results in the emer- rectional in character. A transformational change is one
gence of novelty. As forms change, they become increas- that necessarily implies a direction toward some end
ingly complex. This increased complexity is a state or goal. Here, it is critical to recognize the
complexity of pattern rather than a linear additive com- metatheoretical distinction between subjective and ob-
plexity of elements. As a consequence, new patterns ex- jective teleology. Subjective teleology involves subjec-
hibit novel characteristics that cannot be reduced to tively held “purposes,” “aims,” or “goals” (e.g., “I
(i.e., completely explained by), or predicted from, ear- intend to become a better person”) and is irrelevant to
lier components (indicated by the four system cubes on the definition of transformational developmental
the left side of Figure 2.2). This emergence of novelty is change. Objective teleology involves the construction of
commonly referred to as qualitative change in the sense principles or rules designed to explain phenomena under
that it is change that cannot be represented as purely ad- investigation (e.g., “ the development of x moves from
ditive. Similarly, reference to “discontinuity” in devel- lack of differentiation to more equilibrated levels of dif-
opment is simply the recognition of emergent novelty ferentiation and hierarchic integration”). The rule so
and qualitative change (Overton & Reese, 1981). Con- constructed conceptually finds, discovers, or identifies
cepts of stages, phases, or levels of development are the sequential order and the end state. Any theory con-
theoretical concepts, which reference transformational sists of explanations of some topic or domain and a de-
change with the associated emergent novelty, qualita- velopmental transformational theory must articulate
tive change, and discontinuity. Each of the grand devel- what is developing.
opmental figures of the twentieth century—Piaget, It is a conceptual confusion to argue that adequate
Vygotsky, Werner—acknowledged the centrality of descriptions are more important than the positing of
these features of transformational development; Piaget endpoints (e.g., Sugarman, 1987), or similarly to sug-
and Werner via their ideas of development proceeding gest a movement away from endpoints and toward “a
through phases of differentiation and reintegration; more neutral, person-time-and-situation-geared concep-
Vygotsky (1978) in his argument that development tion of development,” (Demetriou & Raftopoulos, 2004,
is not “ the gradual accumulation of separate p. 91). There is no neutral standpoint, and no description
changes . . . [but] a complex dialectical process charac- could occur without a positing of endpoints. The ques-
terized by . . . qualitative transformations of one form tion is what one would possibly describe if one did not
into another [with an] intertwining of external and in- understand development as tending toward some speci-
ternal factors” (p. 73). (See also Schneirla, 1957.) fied end? If one wishes to describe/explain the course of
The philosopher E. Nagel (1957) articulated the acquiring language, then adult language is, of necessity,
broad dimensions of transformational change when he the endpoint. No description of the language of the child
described development as entailing two fundamental would be possible without this ideal endpoint. In a simi-
features: (1) “ the notion of a system, possessing a defi- lar fashion, if one wishes to describe/explain the trans-
nite structure [i.e., organization] . . .” and (2) “ the no- formational development of reasoning, thought, problem
tion of a set of sequential changes in the system yielding solving, personality, or anything, a conceptual endpoint
relatively permanent but novel increments not only in its must serve as the ideal ultimate model.
structures [i.e., organization] but in its modes of opera- A portion of this confusion over the positing of devel-
tion [i.e., functions] as well” (p. 17). opmental endpoint arises from the mistaken notion that
It is important to emphasize that transformational positing an ideal necessarily leads to an “adultomorphic
change references relatively enduring and irreversible perspective [that] forces one to view earlier behaviors
changes in dynamic systems (e.g., the biological system; and functions as immature versions of adult functions”
the psychological subject or person as a system; the cog- (Marcovitch & Lewkowicz, 2004, p. 113). Central to this
nitive, affective, and motivational systems) and changes argument is its failure to recognize that nonlinearity
that are sequential in nature. The enduring and irre- (discontinuity) is characteristic of transformational de-
versible characteristic of transformational change elim- velopmental change. For example, Piaget’s interest in
inates relatively transient or easily reversible changes as examining the development of reasoning process led him
developmental change, while the sequential character to take deductive propositional reasoning as the end-
establishes its teleological (goal oriented) nature. Se- point of inquiry. However, Piaget described several quite
quence implies an order and any order is necessarily di- different forms of reasoning (e.g., preoperational and
 The Concept of Development 27

concrete operational) that function as discontinuous The sense of self and identity (Chandler, Lalonde,
precursors to this adult form. It also needs to be noted Sokol, & Hallett 2003; Damon & Hart, 1988; Nucci,
that endpoints can be posited with respect to content 1996) have been portrayed by some as moving through a
(e.g., the adult memory model, the adult reasoning sequence of transformations. Emotions have been un-
model), with respect to structure (e.g., Werner’s, 1957, derstood as differentiations from an initial relatively
orthogenetic principle “development . . . proceeds from global affective matrix (Lewis, 1993; Sroufe, 1979).
an initial state of relative globality and lack of differen- Physical changes, such as changes in locomotion, have
tiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articula- also been conceptualized as transformational changes
tion, and hierarchic integration,” p. 126), and with (Thelen & Ulrich, 1991).
respect to function (e.g., see Valsiner, 1998a discussion Variational change refers to the degree or extent that
of equilibrium models; Piaget’s discussions of levels of a change varies from a standard, norm, or average (see
adaptation). One cannot condemn the positing of end- the arrows on the right side of Figure 2.2). Take the
points and then make claims that distal evolutionary pecking of the pigeon; changes in where, when, and how
(i.e., adaptational) determinants play a role in develop- rapidly pecking occurs are variational changes. The
ment (Marcovitch & Lewkowicz, 2004). Distal adapta- reaching behavior of the infant, the toddler’s improve-
tions are endpoints. ments in walking precision, the growth of vocabulary,
A related conceptual confusion occurs when the con- and receiving better or worse grades are all examples of
cept of “maturation” is introduced into the definition of variational change. From an adaptive (instrumental)
development as in “development refers to the matura- point of view, developmental variational change is about
tion of various systems.” The problems here are a skill or ability becoming more precise and more accu-
twofold. First, if maturation is simply understood ac- rate. This type of change can be represented as linear; as
cording to its traditional dictionary meanings (i.e., “ the completely additive in nature. As a consequence, this
emergence of personal and behavioral characteristics change is understood as quantitative and continuous.
through growth processes,” Merriam-Webster’s Online At any given level of form (i.e., any level of a dy-
Dictionary, Tenth Edition; “ the process of becoming namic system), there are quantitative and qualitative
completely developed mentally or emotionally,” Cam- variants that constitute variational change. If thinking is
bridge International Dictionary of English, online edi- understood as undergoing transformational change, then
tion), then it is tautological with and adds nothing to the at any given transformational level, variational changes
already discussed definition of transformational fea- are found in variants of thought (e.g., analytic styles and
tures of development. Second, if maturation is taken to synthetic styles). If emotions are presented as undergo-
suggest the action of biological systems, then the con- ing transformational change, then at any transforma-
cept of, and potential mechanisms of development have tional level, variational change is reflected in
become conflated, and this represents a serious concep- differences in the degree of emotionality (more or less
tual confusion. anxious, empathic, altruistic, and so on). If identity is
Embryological changes constitute some of the clear- thought of as undergoing transformational change, then
est and most concrete examples of transformational or at any transformational level, there is variational change
morphological change (Edelman, 1992; Gottlieb, 1992). in the type of identity assumed (i.e., individualistic or
Through processes of differentiation and reintegration, communal). If memory undergoes transformational
movement occurs from the single celled zygote to the change, there is variational change in differences in
highly organized functioning systems of the 9-month memory capacity, memory style, and memory content.
fetus. Some cognitive and social-emotional phenomena Transformational change has been identified with
of human ontogenesis have also been conceptualized as normative issues such as changes that are typical of
reflecting transformational change. For example, overt phyla, species, and individuals. In ontogenesis, for ex-
action may undergo a sequence of transformations to ample, normative changes in cognitive, affective, and
become symbolic thought, and further transformations motivational systems have been the central issue of con-
lead to a reflective symbolic thought exhibiting novel cern. The focus here is sequences of universal forms
logical characteristics (see boxes on left side of Figure whose movement defines a path or trajectory. As sug-
2.2). Memory may reflect transformational changes gested earlier, when tracing developmental trajectories,
moving from recognition memory to recall memory. concepts of irreversibility, discontinuity (nonadditivity,
28 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

nonlinearity), sequence, and directionality are associ- solution is seldom explicitly articulated, some stage the-
ated with transformational change. Variational change ories such as Erik Erikson’s (1968) theory of psychoso-
has been identified with differential issues across and cial development have elevated transformational change
within individuals and groups. Interest has focused on to a point that the importance of the variational seems to
local individual and group differences that suggest a disappear below the horizon.
particularity, and a to-and-fro movement of change. As described earlier, the third metatheoretical ap-
Concepts of reversibility, continuity, and cyclicity are proach does not split transformation and variation into
associated with variational change. When change is con- competing alternatives, but rather it understands the
sidered both in terms of life forms and physical systems, transformational-variational as a fundamentally neces-
transformational change is identified with what has sary and real whole containing co-equal complementary
been called the “arrow of time,” and variational change processes. This solution asserts a reality in which the
is identified with the notion of the “cycles of time” processes assume differentiated functional roles, but
(Overton, 1994a, 1994c; Valsiner, 1994). each process in itself explains and is explained by the
Incorporating transformational and variational other. Transformational systems produce variation and
change into a broad understanding of development variation transforms the system (this solution is illus-
raises the issue of how these two forms are to be re- trated in Figure 2.2). This relational metatheoretical
lated. The same three metatheoretical solutions that stance is described in detail later as a “ take on reality”
have historically appeared with respect to the concept that, as suggested earlier, resolves many of developmen-
of the expressive-instrumental appear again for the tal inquiry’s most controversial problems, and opens
transformational-variational. The first solution splits new paths of investigation.
the pair, thus forming a dichotomy, and treats the in-
strumental as privileged bedrock. This solution margin- A Unified Concept of Development
alizes transformational change by claiming that it is
mere description, which itself requires explanation. Es- When transformational-variational change and changes
sentially, this claim is the promise that all apparent in expressive constitutive instrumental communicative
transformational change will ultimately be explained— action are cast into a relational matrix, they reflect
perhaps as our empirical knowledge increases—as the complementary images of the totality of developmental
product of variation and only variation. An important change. The expressive-constitutive and instrumental-
consequence of this solution is that the associated communicative dimension articulates what it is that
metamethod will prescribe methods that can assess lin- changes during development. In the domain of develop-
ear additive processes, but will marginalize methods mental psychology, it is the psychological subject (or dy-
that assess nonlinear processes. A classic example of namic systems that explain the functioning of the
this general solution was the Skinnerian demonstration subject) and the subject’s action that become fore-
that given only variations in pecking and reinforce- ground. Piaget and Skinner, for example, each construct
ment, it was possible to train pigeons to hit Ping-Pong a radically different vision of the nature of the changing
balls back and forth over a net. Thus, it was claimed that subject, but both focus on the subject. Piaget considers
the apparent developmental novelty of playing Ping- both the expressive and instrumental to each be essential
Pong was in reality “nothing-but ” the continuous addi- features of what changes. “Schemes” and “operations”
tive modifications in variation. This solution is also are identified as the source of the subject’s expressive-
adopted by those who portray cognitive development as constitutive action, while “procedures” are conceived as
either a simple increase in representational content (see instrumental strategies designed to succeed in the actual
Scholnick & Cookson, 1994) or as an increase in the ef- world. For Skinner, the expressive is denied or marginal-
ficiency with which this content is processed (Siegler, ized, and “operants” represent the subject’s instrumen-
1996; Sternberg, 1984). tal adjustments to a changing environment.
The second metatheoretical solution treats transfor- The transformational-variational dimension articu-
mational change as the bedrock reality and marginalizes lates the nature of the change taking place. It is the
the significance of variation. Variation is seen as rather action rather than the function of the action that be-
irrelevant noise in a transformational system. While this comes the foreground. Here, actions that are expressive-
 The Concept of Development 29

instrumental in function, vary and transform. Later in opment). From this perspective, developmental inquiry
the chapter, for example, the neo-Darwinian theory of necessarily becomes interdisciplinary and comparative
evolutionary change is discussed, as is developmental in nature.
systems theory. In these cases, the primary focus is on This inclusive relational definition of development is
variational and transformational change of action, while a starting point for further excursions both backward,
the expressive-instrumental functions of the action fade into the nature and history of the metatheoretical con-
to background. cepts that frame the definition (and other basic features)
Casting the dimensions of what changes, and the na- of developmental inquiry, and forward to conceptual,
ture of change, as complementary lines of sight reveals theoretical, and methodological consequences of under-
that the dimensional features can be recombined de- standing development in this fashion. In gazing forward
pending on the goal of inquiry. For example, it is possi- to consequences of this understanding, light is cast on a
ble to form a transformational-expressive dimension. significant but often obscured conceptual feature of
This focus explores the sequence of system changes— some of the classical developmental controversies. Con-
whether affective, emotional, physical, or cognitive sider these often debated questions: Is development
system—which become reflected in sequential changes universal (typical of most people, despite specific bio-
in the cognitive-affective meanings that the psycho- logical circumstances, culture, or social background) or
logical subject projects onto her world. Similarly, the particular (typical of only some people)? Is development
variational-instrumental dimension can be thought of as necessarily directional or contingently directional? Is
focusing inquiry on variational changes in action that development irreversible or reversible? Is development
result in procedures or strategies—again whether affec- continuous ( linear; i.e., capable of being represented ad-
tive, emotional, physical, cognitive, and so on—which ditively) or discontinuous (nonlinear, i.e., emergent novel
the subject employs in adjustment and adaptation. forms or stages appear)? Is development fundamentally
These reflections on changes in expressive-instru- about biology or culture? Each of these questions be-
mental action and transformational-variational change comes a debate only when the conceptual pair is cast as
provide a base from which it is possible to suggest a rel- an antinomy. From an inclusive relational metatheoreti-
atively inclusive definition of development that moves cal position, all such debates necessarily evaporate, as
beyond the ambiguities of “change in observed behavior the conceptual pairs become co-equal, indissociable
across age” and more reasonably begins to carry the load complementarities. Thus, for example, from the rela-
of all of developmental inquiry. Development within this tional perpective it is possible to assert with some confi-
context is understood to refer to formal (transfor- dence, on both rational and empirical grounds, that
mational) and functional (variational) changes in the while the content of memory or memory strategies, as
expressive-constitutive and instrumental-communicative well as the content of thinking or thinking styles, is par-
features of behavior. Behavior is understood broadly in ticular (variable change), recall memory and symbolic
this definition, thus not limiting developmental inquiry thought are typical acquisitions of all human ontogenesis
to a specific field of investigation. Disciplines as diverse (transformational change). Similarly, there would appear
as history, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, evolu- to be little doubt that a raised grade point average can be
tionary biology, neurobiology, and psychology, as well reversed (variable change), but this in no way denies that
as natural science investigations of system changes all the movement from babbling to language may be more
become potential forms of developmental inquiry. De- profitably understood as sequential and directional and
velopmental change within this inclusive definition irreversible (transformational change). Reflection, as
includes at least—as suggested earlier—phylogenesis well as commonsense observation, suggests that there is
(i.e., the development of phyla, or evolutionary change), some coherence to behavior and that this coherence be-
ontogenesis (i.e., the development of the individ- comes expressed (expressive) in action; yet, there is also
ual), embryogenesis (i.e., the development of the em- little to deny that this activity functions in the context
bryo), microgenesis (i.e., development across short time of a world that imposes demands on it (variable, instru-
scales, such as the development of an individual percept mental). Reflection on several scientific disciplines, as
or individual memory), pathogenesis (i.e., the develop- well as commonsense observation, also suggests that in
ment of pathology), and orthogenesis (i.e., normal devel- some arenas novelty emerges (transformational), while
30 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

in others arenas changes are more reasonably represented extended discussion of split and relational metatheo-
as additive (variational). And hundreds of years of failed ries, there is a section devoted to epistemological-
attempts to successfully sort behavior into discrete na- ontological issues. There, a history of the philosophical
ture piles and nurture piles should suggest that perhaps a traditions that establish the conceptual frameworks
relational approach that eliminates all “which one and all for split and relational approaches will be described
how much” questions might offer a more productive con- along with further implications for concepts and theo-
ceptual foundation for investigations into the operation of ries of development drawn from these traditions.
biology and culture processes in development. Finally, these traditions will serve as background for
Along with casting light on conceptual debates that a section exploring split and relational approaches
have long framed developmental inquiry, an inclusive to the metamethods and methods of developmental
understanding of development has ripple effects that psychology.
move out to implications for empirical methods. The
most general implication is that empirical inquiry in
this context abandons the aim of broad-based debunk- SPLIT AND RELATIONAL METATHEORIES
ing found historically in instrumentalist approaches to
science (see the later discussion of methodology). Earlier it was mentioned that the most general and ab-
Within a relational metamethod, questions of whether stract metatheories have traditionally been called
stages exist (transformational change, discontinuity, se- “ worldviews.” In developmental psychology, the most
quence) or are absent (variational change, continuity) widely discussed worldviews have been those described
disappear. In place of these questions, inquiry that by Steven Pepper (1942) as the mechanistic, the contex-
takes the transformational pole of change as its object tualist, and the organismic (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Over-
directs itself to empirically examine the plausibility of ton, 1984; Overton & Reese, 1973; Reese & Overton,
various alternative models of stage, phase, or level 1970). The worldviews discussed here are closely re-
change (nonlinear change). Inquiry taking variational lated to Pepper’s categorization. Split metatheory en-
change as its object would be explicitly recognized as tails all of the basic categories described by Pepper as
irrelevant to stage issues as such, and relevant to issues mechanistic, including a commitment to viewing the ul-
such as the stability of individual differences across timate nature of the universe, and hence the nature of
age, time, or stages. Such change-specific inquiry opens the psychological subject, as reactive, uniform, and
the door to a greater recognition of the importance of fixed. Relational metatheory alternatively embraces
change-specific techniques of measurement. For exam- most of the basic categories described by Pepper as con-
ple, investigations with the central aim of examining textualistic and organismic, including a commitment to
transformational (nonlinear) and expressive acts often understanding the ultimate nature of both universe and
call for the application of contemporary order-scaling persons as active, organized, and changing. Relational
techniques and correlational techniques to assess metatheory however, departs from Pepper’s skepticism
changes in transformational patterns, and latent traits about the possibility of uniting contextualism and organ-
(see, the later discussion of methodology; e.g., Bond & ism, and offers what it considers to be a productive rap-
Fox, 2001; Fischer & Dawson, 2002; Sijtsma & Mole- prochement (Overton & Ennis, in press).
naar, 2002). Studies of variational change (stability,
continuity), those tracing the trajectory of variational
Split Metatheory
change (i.e., the developmental function), and those ex-
ploring instrumental acts typically call for traditional Split metatheory entails several basic defining
correlational procedures and traditional experimental principles, including “splitting,” “ foundationalism,” and
procedures (see the later discussion of methodology, “atomism.” Splitting—a concept that emerged from the
and, e.g., Appelbaum & McCall, 1983). thinking of Rene Descartes—is the separation of com-
The following sections describe and examine in de- ponents of a whole into mutually exclusive pure forms or
tail the nature of split and relational metatheories, elements. In splitting, these ostensibly pure forms are
along with an important metatheory nested within the cast into an exclusive “either/or ” framework that forces
relational. These sections also describe the impact of them to be understood as contradictions in the sense that
these metatheories on various concepts and issues in one category absolutely excludes the other (i.e., follows
the field of developmental psychology. Following the the logical law of contradiction that it is never the case
 Split and Relational Metatheories 31

that A = not A). But, in order to split, one must accept bedrock foundational primacy for material sociocultural
the twin principles of foundationalism and atomism. objects; hence, his presentation of dialectical material-
These are the metatheoretical axioms that there is ulti- ism. Wertsch acknowledges Marx’s contribution and
mately a rock bottom unchanging nature to reality (the frames his own work within the person-social antinomy
foundation of foundationalism), and that this rock bot- by endorsing both a split interpretation of Vygotsky
tom is composed of elements—pure forms—(the atoms (i.e., “In pursuing a line of reasoning that reflected their
of atomism) that preserve their identity regardless of concern with Marxist claims about the primacy of social
context. A corollary principle here is the assumption forces Vygotsky and his colleagues . . . contended that
that all complexity is simple complexity in the sense that many of the design features of mediational means origi-
any whole is taken to be a purely additive combination nated in social life,” 1991, p. 33, emphasis added) and a
of its elements. split interpretation of Luria:
Splitting, foundationalism, and atomism are all prin-
As stated by Luria (1981, p. 25), “in order to explain the
ciples of decomposition; breaking the aggregate down to
highly complex forms of human consciousness one must
its smallest pieces, to its bedrock (Overton, 2002). This
go beyond the human organism. One must seek the origins
process also goes by other names including reductionism of conscious activity and ‘categorical’ behavior not in the
and the analytic attitude (Overton, 2002). Split metathe- recesses of the human brain or in the depths of the spirit,
ory requires another principle to reassemble or recom- but in the external conditions of life. Above all, this means
pose the whole. This is the principle of unidirectional that one must seek these origins in the external processes of
and linear (additive) associative or causal sequences. social life, [emphasis added] in the social and historical
The elements must be related either according to their forms of human existence.” (Wertsch, 1991, p. 34)
contiguous co-occurrence in space and time, or accord-
ing to simple efficient cause-effect sequences that pro- At times, social constructivist and sociocultural
ceed in a single direction (Bunge, 1962; Overton & splitting becomes more subtle. Cole and Wertsch (1996)
Reese, 1973). Split metatheory admits no determination begin one article by acknowledging, on the basis of sev-
other than individual efficient causes or these individual eral direct Piagetian quotes, that Piaget—a traditional
causes operating in a conjunctive (i.e., additive) plural- villain of both socioculturalist and social construc-
ity: No truly reciprocal causality is admitted (Bunge, tivists, who is often inaccurately accused of privileging
1962; Overton & Reese, 1973). the person—“did not deny the co-equal role of the social
All antinomies emerge from a split metatheoretical world in the construction of knowledge” (p. 251). How-
context. The individual-social or individual-collective ever, these authors then switch the ground of the issue
or person-social antinomy, for example, represents from the social world specifically to culture mediation
all behavior and action as the additive product of entailed by the social world and argue, both in heading
elementary bedrock pure forms identified as person (“ The Primacy of Cultural Mediation,” p. 251) and in
and sociocultural. Arising from this splitting, behavior text, that culture is to be privileged:
is understood as an aggregate composed of these two
Social origins take on a special importance in Vygotsky’s
pure forms, and the question becomes one of the pri-
theories that is less symmetrical than Piaget’s notion
macy or privileged quality of one or the other. of social equilibration. . . . For Vygotsky and cultural-
Nativism-empiricism or nature-nurture is a closely re- historical theorists more generally, the social world does
lated antinomy in which the pure forms consist of, on have primacy over the individual in a very special sense.
the one hand, some basic biological form or element Society is the bearer of the cultural heritage. . . . (p. 353,
(e.g., DNA, genes, neurons) and, on the other hand, emphasis added)
some basic environmental element (e.g., parents, soci-
ety, culture). These examples are explored in this and The field of behavior genetics provides a second ex-
following sections. ample of an approach to inquiry that is grounded and de-
Recently, the pursuit of the person-sociocultural an- fined within a split metatheory. The broad goal of
tinomy has been a defining characteristic of contempo- behavior genetics, using the methods of family, twin,
rary sociocultural (e.g., Cole & Wertsch, 1996; Wertsch, and adoption studies, is to partition (split) the variation
1991) and social constructivist approaches (e.g., Ger- in any behavioral score (e.g., a measure of personality,
gen, 1994). These follow the work of Marx who pursued psychopathology, intelligence, language, cognition) into
the broader ideas-matter antinomy, and claimed a the proportion of the variation caused by foundational
32 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

genes (pure form) and the proportion caused by the bedrocks of certainty, and analysis is about creating cat-
foundational environment (pure form; Plomin, 1986, egories, not about cutting nature at its joints. Relational
1994). “Behavior genetic models use quantitative ge- metatheory builds on Latour’s proposal. It begins by
netic theory and quasi-experimental methods to decom- clearing splitting from the field of play and in so doing it
pose phenotypic (measured) variance into genetic and moves toward transforming antinomies into co-equal, in-
environmental components of variance” (McGuire, dissociable complementarities. As splitting and founda-
Manke, Saudino, Reiss, Hetherington, & Plomin, 1999, tionalism go hand in hand, removing the one also
p. 1285). The primary tool employed to effect this split- eliminates the other. Splitting involves the conceptual
ting is the quantitative formula, called the “ heritability assumption of pure forms, but this assumption itself
index” or “ heritability coefficient.” This index itself springs from the acceptance of the atomistic assumption
entails a commitment to the additive components-of- that there is a fixed unchanging bedrock bottom to real-
variance statistical model (including analysis of vari- ity composed of elements that preserve their identity re-
ance and all correlation based statistics), which has a gardless of context. Thus, acceptance of atomism leads
basic assumption that each score is a linear function of directly to the belief that the mental (ideas, mind) and
independent elements (i.e., the score is the sum of com- the physical (matter, body) are two absolutely different
ponent effects, Winer, 1962, p. 151; also see Overton & natural kinds of things. And if nature were composed of
Reese, 1973). Further, it is generally assumed that the such natural kinds, then it would seem reasonable to be-
correlational patterns produced through the application lieve in the possibility of cutting nature at its joints. A
of this formula are reflections of an underlying causal relational metatheory rejects atomism and replaces it
reality in which genes and environment primarily con- with holism as a fundamental guiding principle. Within
tribute additively to the behavior under investigation this conceptual frame, fixed elements are replaced by
(Vreeke, 2000). Within the behavior genetic frame, the contextually defined parts with the result that—as the
ultimate goal is to discover the specific genetic causal philosopher John Searle (1992) has suggested—“ the fact
pathways. The idea here is to unravel and parse conjunc- that a feature is mental does not imply that it is not phys-
tive pluralities of efficient causes believed—within the ical; the fact that a feature is physical does not imply
context of a split metatheory—to explain any behavior, that it is not mental” (p. 15). Similarly, the fact that a
and thereby arrive at an ultimate genetic bedrock of ex- feature is biological does not suggest that it is not cul-
planation. As Plomin and Rutter (1998) say with respect tural; the fact that a feature is cultural does not suggest
to the anticipated discovery of genes associated with that it is not biological. Building from this base of
specific behaviors: holism, relational metatheory moves to specific princi-
ples that define the relations among parts and the rela-
The finding of genes will provide the opportunity to un- tions of parts to wholes. In other words relational
ravel the complicated causal processes. . . . No longer will
metatheory articulates principles of analysis and syn-
we have to focus on how much variation in the general
thesis necessary for any scientific inquiry, which in-
population is genetically influenced; instead we can make
the crucial transition from “ black box” inferences regard-
clude (a) the identity of opposites, ( b) the opposites of
ing genetic influences to the observation of specific identity, and (c) the synthesis of wholes.
genes. (p. 1238)
Holism

Relational Metatheory Holism is the conceptual principle that the identities of

objects and events derive from the relational context in
In an analysis of the historical failures of split metathe- which they are embedded. The whole is not an aggregate
ory, as well as the emptiness of its seeming rival—post- of discrete elements, but an organized and self-
modern thought—Bruno Latour (1993) has proposed a organizing system of parts, each part being defined by
move away from the extremes of Cartesian splits to a its relations to other parts and to the whole. Complexity
center or “middle kingdom” position where entities and in this context is organized complexity (Luhmann, 1995;
ideas are represented not as pure forms, but as forms von Bertalanffy, 1968a, 1968b), in that the whole or
that flow across fuzzy boundaries. This is a movement dynamic system is not decomposable into elements
toward what Latour terms “relationism” a metatheoreti- arranged in additive linear sequences of cause-effect re-
cal space where foundations are groundings, not lations (Overton & Reese, 1973). Nonlinear dynamics
 Split and Relational Metatheories 33

are a defining characteristic of this type of complexity. tity of each concept of a formerly dichotomous pair is
In the context of holism, principles of splitting, founda- maintained, while simultaneously affirming that each
tionalism, and atomism are rejected as meaningless ap- concept constitutes, and is constituted by, the other. For
proaches to analysis, and fundamental antinomies are example, both nature and nurture maintain their individ-
similarly rejected as false dichotomies. ual identity, while it is simultaneously understood that
The rejection of pure forms or essences found in the fact that a behavior is a product of biology does not
holism has broad implications for developmental psy- imply that it is not equally a product of culture; con-
chology. For example, as suggested in the last section, versely, the fact that a behavior is a product of culture
the nature-nurture debate is framed by the agenda of does not imply that is not equally a product of biology.
splitting and foundationalism. In its current split form, This is accomplished by considering the identity and
no one actually asserts that matter, body, brain, and differences as two moments of analysis. The first mo-
genes or society, culture, and environment provide the ment being based on the principle of the identity of op-
cause of behavior or development: The background idea posites; the second being based on the principle of the
of one or the other being the privileged determinant re- opposites of identity.
mains the silent subtext that continues to shape discus-
sions. The most frequently voiced claim is that behavior The Identity of Opposites
and development are the products of the interactions of The principle of the identity of opposites establishes the
nature and nurture. But interaction itself is generally identity among fundamental parts of a whole by casting
conceptualized as two split-off pure entities that func- them not as exclusive contradictions, as in the split
tion independently in cooperative and/or competitive methodology, but as differentiated polarities (i.e., co-
ways (e.g., Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg, Hetherington, equals) of a unified (i.e., indissociable) inclusive matrix,
& Bornstein, 2000). As a consequence, the debate sim- as a relation. As differentiations, each pole is defined
ply becomes displaced to another level of discourse. At recursively; each pole defines and is defined by its op-
this new level, the contestants agree that behavior and posite. In this identity moment of analysis, the law of
development are determined by both nature and nurture, contradiction is suspended and each category contains
but they remain embattled over the relative merits of and, in fact, is its opposite. Further—and centrally—as
each entity’s essential contribution. Population behavior a differentiation this moment pertains to character, ori-
genetics continues its focus on the classical question gin, and outcomes. The character of any contemporary
of how much each form contributes to a particular be- behavior, for example, is 100% nature because it is
havior. Other split approaches continue the battle over 100% nurture. There is no origin to this behavior that
which of the two pure forms determines the origin and was some other percentage—whether we climb back
function of a specific behavior. Thus, despite overt con- into the womb, back into the cell, back into the genome,
ciliatory declarations to the contrary, the classical or back into the DNA—nor can there be a later behavior
which one and how much questions (see Anastasi, 1958; that will be a different percentage. Similarly, any action
Schneirla, 1956), continue as potent divisive frames of is both expressive and instrumental, and any develop-
inquiry. However, it would be impossible to cast ques- mental change is both transformational and variational.
tions of development as issues of “nativism” and “em- There are a number of ways of articulating this prin-
piricism” (Spelke & Newport, 1998) were it not for the ciple, but perhaps the clearest articulation is found in
assumption of pure forms. Rejecting atomism and em- considering the famous ink sketch by M. C. Escher titled
bracing holism on the other hand eliminates the idea of Drawing Hands. As shown in Figure 2.3, here a left and
pure forms and consequently makes any notion of natu- a right hand assume a relational posture according to
ral foundational splits untenable. This destroys the sci- which each is simultaneously drawing and being drawn
entific legitimacy of which one and how much questions by the other. In this relational matrix, each hand is iden-
in any arena of inquiry. tical—thus co-equal and indissociable—with the other
But the acceptance of holism does not, in itself, offer in the sense of each drawing and each being drawn. This
a detailed program for resolving the many fundamental is a moment of analysis in which the law of contradiction
antinomies that have framed developmental psychology (i.e., Not the case that A = not A) is relaxed and identity
and other fields of scientific inquiry. Such a program re- (i.e., A = not A) reigns. In this identity moment of analy-
quires principles according to which the individual iden- sis, pure forms collapse and categories flow into each
34 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

metatheory, the goals of sociocultural or social con-

structivist approaches in attempting to elevate society
and culture to a privileged primary position is simply a
conceptual confusion.
If the principle of the identity of opposites introduces
constraints, it also opens possibilities. One of these is
the recognition that, to paraphrase Searle (1992), the
fact that a behavior is biologically or person determined
does not imply that it is not socially or culturally deter-
mined, and, the fact that it is socially or culturally de-
termined does not imply that it is not biologically or
person determined. The identity of opposites establishes
the metatheoretical position that genes and culture, like
culture and person, and brain and person, and so on, op-
erate in a truly interpenetrating manner.
Because the idea and implications of suspending the
Figure 2.3 Drawing Hands by M. C. Escher. ©2006 law of contradiction in some contexts and applying it in
The M. C. Escher Company–Holland. All rights reserved. others is not a familiar one, some clarifying comments
www.mcescher.com. Used by permission. are needed. Relational metatheory, owes much to the
notion of the dialectic as this was articulated by the nine-
other. Each category contains and is its opposite. As a teenth-century philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831).
consequence, there is a broad inclusivity established For Hegel, historical—and by extension developmental—
among categories. If we think of inclusion and exclusion change is a dynamic expressive-transformational process
as different moments that occur when we observe a re- of growth, represented and defined by the dialectic. Cen-
versible figure (e.g., a necker cube or the vase-women il- tral to Hegel’s dialectic is the idea of a process through
lusion), then in this identity moment we observe only which concepts or fundamental features of a dynamic
inclusion. In the next (opposite) moment of analysis the system dif ferentiate and move toward integration. Any
figures reverse, and there we will again see exclusivity initial concept or any basic feature of a dynamic sys-
as the hands appear as opposites and complementarities. tem—called a “ thesis” or an “affirmation”—contains
Within this identity moment of analysis, it is a useful implicit within itself an inherent contradiction that,
exercise to write on each hand one of the bipolar terms of through action of the system in the world, becomes dif-
a traditionally split antinomies (e.g., person and culture) ferentiated into a second concept or feature—the “an-
and to explore the resulting effect. This exercise is more tithesis” or “negation” of the thesis. As a consequence,
than merely an illustration of a familiar bi-directionality even in the single unity of thesis there is the implicit con-
of effects suggested by many scientific investigators. The tradictory relation of thesis-antithesis, just as in the
exercise makes tangible the central feature of the rela- unity of the single organic cell there is the implicit dif-
tional metatheory; seemingly dichotomous ideas that are ferentiation into the unity of multiple cells. This points
often been thought of as competing alternatives can enter to the fundamental relational character of the dialectic.
into inquiry as co-equal and indissociable. It also con- As thesis leads to antithesis—producing the differen-
cretizes the meaning of any truly nonadditive reciprocal tiation of a relational polarity of opposites—a potential
determination (Overton & Reese, 1973). space between them is generated, and this becomes the
If inquiry concerning, for example, person, culture, ground for the coordination of the two. The coordination
and behavior is undertaken according to the principle of that emerges—again through the mechanism of action of
the identity of opposites various constraints are im- the system—constitutes a new unity or integration—
posed, as with any metatheory. An important example of called the “synthesis.” The coordinating synthesis is it-
such a constraint is that behavior, traits, styles, and so self a system that exhibits novel systemic properties
on cannot be thought of as being decomposable into while subsuming the original systems. Thus, a new
the independent and additive pure forms of person relational dynamic matrix composed of three realms—
and culture. Thus, from the perspective of relational thesis-antithesis-synthesis—is formed. The integration
 Split and Relational Metatheories 35

that emerges from the differentiation, like all integra- all, but gives us a picture. . . . . And this picture seems to
tions, is incomplete. The synthesis represents a new dy- determine what we have to do and how—but it does not do
namic action system—a new thesis. Thus, begins a new so. . . . Here saying “ There is no third possibility” . . . ex-
growth cycle of differentiation and integration. presses our inability to turn our eyes away from this pic-
In this relational scheme, the polarity of opposites ture: a picture which looks as if it must already contain
both the problem and its solution, while all the time we
(i.e., thesis and antithesis) that emerges from the initial
feel that it is not so. (para. 352)
relatively undifferentiated matrix (i.e., thesis) does not
constitute cut-off (split) contradictory categories that
The transformation of competing alternatives into
absolutely exclude each other. Having grown from the
co-equal, indissociable partners is illustrated in a recent
same soil as it were, the two, while standing in a contra-
exchange of comments concerning research on the topic
dictory relation of opposites, also share an identity.
that social psychology refers to as the “ fundamental at-
Hegel referred to this relation as the “identity of oppo-
tribution error.” In this exchange, one group (Gilovich &
sites” (Stace, 1924) and illustrated it in his famous ex-
Eibach, 2001) proceeded from a split position and noted
ample of the master and slave. In this example, Hegel
that “ human behavior is not easily parsed into situa-
demonstrated that it is impossible to define or under-
tional and dispositional causes” (p. 23); they further
stand the freedom of the master without reference to the
claimed that it is difficult to establish “a precise
constraints of slavery; and consequently impossible to
accounting of how much a given action stems from the
define the constraints of slavery without the reference to
impinging stimulus rather than from the faculty or dis-
the freedom of the master. Freedom thus contains the
position with which it makes contact ” (p. 24). The reply
idea of constraint as constraint contains the idea of free-
to this comment, from a group committed to an identity
dom, and in this we see the identity of the opposites
of opposites (Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein, 2001), asserts
freedom and constraint.
that they reject such a position because it reflects confu-
The justification for the claim that a law of logic—
sion between competing and complementary accounts.
for example, the law of contradiction—can reasonably
They argue that the problem with the question:
both be applied and relaxed depending on the context of
inquiry requires a recognition that the laws of logic
How much John’s going out with Sue stems from her
themselves are not immutable and not immune to back-
beauty rather than from his love of beautiful women . . . is
ground ideas. In some metatheoretical background tra-
not that it is difficult to answer; it is that it is conceptually
ditions, the laws of logic are understood as immutable
incoherent. It is incoherent because it construes two
realities given either by a world cut off from the human classes of accounts that are in fact complementary as if
mind or by a prewired mind cut off from the world. they were competing. The heart of our argument is that
However, in the background tradition currently under one must take this point seriously: All behavior is jointly a
discussion the traditional laws of logic are themselves product of environmental stimuli and dispositions. (p. 43)
ideas that have been constructed through the reciprocal
action of human minds and world. The laws of logic are A similar, but somewhat more subtle, example is
simply pictures that have been drawn or stories that have found in a recent dialogue on spatial development. Uttal
been told. They may be good pictures or good stories in (2000) began this dialogue with the seemingly comple-
the sense of bringing a certain quality of order into mentary view that his claims about spatial development
our lives, but they are still pictures or stories, and it is “are based on the assumption that the relation between
possible that other pictures will serve us even better. maps and the development of spatial cognition is recipro-
Wittgenstein (1953/1958), whose later works focused cal in nature” (p. 247). However, in an analysis of Uttal’s
on the importance of background or what we are calling position, Liben (1999) raises the question of whether
metatheoretical ideas, made this point quite clearly Utall is operating within the context of an identity of op-
when he discussed another law of logic—the law of the posites, which she proposes as her own approach:
excluded middle—as being one possible picture of the
world among many possible pictures: As I read his thesis, Uttal seems to be suggesting an inde-
pendent contribution of maps, positing that exposure to
The law of the excluded middle says here: It must either maps can play a causal role in leading children to develop
look like this, or like that. So it really . . . says nothing at basic spatial concepts. My own preference is to propose a
36 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

more radically interdependent [emphasis added] role of or- dependent items represent an abstraction that may prove
ganismic and environmental factors. (p. 272) useful for certain analytic purposes, but such abstrac-
tions in no way deny the underlying identity of oppo-
A third, more general, illustration of the power of the sites. The analytic and the synthetic are, themselves,
principle of the identity of opposites to transform com- two poles of a relational matrix, as are the notions of ab-
peting alternatives into co-equal, indissociable partners stract and concrete (e.g., Lerner, 1978; Overton, 1973;
is found in returning to the nature-nurture debate. As al- see also Magnusson & Stattin, 1998, for an extended
ready suggested, within relational metatheory behavior, discussion of alternative forms of interaction).
traits, and styles cannot be thought of being decompos-
able into independent and additive pure forms of genes The Opposites of Identity
and environment. From this perspective, the goals of be- While the identity of opposites sets constraints and
havior genetics simply represent conceptual confusion. opens possibilities, it does not in itself set a positive
The percentages derived from the application of heri- agenda for empirical inquiry. The limitation of the iden-
tability indices, whatever their value, can never be taken tity moment of analysis is that, in establishing a flow of
as a reflection of the separate contributions of genes and categories of one into the other, a stable base for inquiry
environment to individual differences because the rela- that was provided by bedrock elements of the split
tion of genes and environment (a left and a right Escher- metatheory is eliminated. Re-establishing a stable base
ian hand) is not independent and additive. Moving within relational metatheory requires moving to a
beyond behavior genetics to the broader issue of biology second moment of analysis. This is the oppositional
and culture, conclusions such as “contemporary evi- moment, where the figure reverses and the moment be-
dence confirms that the expression of heritable traits de- comes dominated by exclusivity. In this opposite mo-
pends, often strongly, on experience” (Collins et al., ment of analysis, it becomes clear that despite the earlier
2000, p. 228) are brought into question for the same rea- identity, Escher’s sketch shows a right hand and a left
son. Within a relational metatheory, such conclusions hand. In this moment, the law of contradiction (i.e., Not
fail because they begin from the premise that there are the case that A = not A) is reasserted and categories
pure forms of genetic inheritance termed “ heritable again exclude each other. As a consequence of this ex-
traits” and within relational metatheory such a premise clusion, parts exhibit unique identities that differentiate
is unacceptable. each from the other. These unique differential qualities
Within the nature-nurture debate, and in other areas, are stable within any general dynamic system and may
the identity of opposites also calls for a reinterpretation form relatively stable platforms for empirical inquiry.
of the very notion of interaction. In split metatheory, The platforms created according to the principle of the
“interaction” has been defined as two independent pure opposites of identity become standpoints, points of view,
forms—biological and cultural—that join to produce an or lines of sight, in recognition that they do not reflect
event. This has been called “conventional interaction- absolute foundations (Harding, 1986). They may also be
ism” (Oyama, 1989; see also, Lerner, 1978; Overton, considered under the common rubric levels of analysis,
1973). In this metatheoretical context, it is possible for when these are not understood as bedrock foundations.
interaction to be understood as the cooperation or com- Again, considering Escher’s sketch, when left as left
petition among elements (e.g., Collins et al., 2000) or as and right as right are the focus of attention, it then be-
a quantitative situation in which one or the other ele- comes quite clear that—were they large enough—one
ment contributes more or less to a behavior (e.g., Scarr, could stand on either hand and examine the structures
1992). But consider again Escher’s drawings. Do the two and functions of that hand. Returning to the nature-
hands contribute to the drawing and in some sense inter- nurture example, while explicitly recognizing that any
act? They do interact, but not in an additive fashion such behavior is 100% biology and 100% culture, alternative
that contributions to drawing and being drawn could be points of view permit the scientist to analyze the behav-
parceled out and ascribed to one or the other hand. In ior from a biological or a cultural standpoint. Biology
the relational approach, any concept of interaction (e.g., and culture no longer constitute competing alternative
interaction, co-action, transaction) must be taken to en- explanations; rather, they are two points of view on an
tail interpenetration; interdefinition; fusion (Tobach & object of inquiry that has been both created by, and will
Greenberg, 1984); and, most broadly, relations. Here in- only be fully understood through multiple viewpoints.
 Split and Relational Metatheories 37

To state this more generally, the unity that constitutes organism, the person (see Figure 2.4a). Persons—as inte-
human identity and human development becomes dis- grated self-organizing dynamic system of cognitive,
covered only in the diversity of multiple interrelated emotional, and motivational processes and the actions
lines of sight. this system expresses—represent a novel level or stage of
structure and functioning that emerges from, and consti-
The Synthesis of Wholes tutes a coordination of, biology and culture (see Magnus-
Engaging fundamental bipolar concepts as relatively sta- son & Stattin, 1998, for an analysis of a methodological
ble standpoints opens the way, and takes an important focus on the person).
first step, toward establishing a broad stable base for At the synthesis then, there is a standpoint that coor-
empirical inquiry within a relational metatheory. How- dinates and resolves the tension between the other two
ever, this solution is incomplete as it omits a key rela- members of the relation. This provides a particularly
tional component, the relation of parts to the whole. The broad and stable base for launching empirical inquiry.
oppositional quality of the bipolar pairs reminds us that A person standpoint opens the way for the empirical
their contradictory nature still remains, and still re- investigation of universal dimensions of psychological
quires a resolution. Further, the resolution of this ten- structure-function relations (e.g., processes of percep-
sion cannot be found in the split approach of reduction to tion, thought, emotions, values), their individual differ-
a bedrock reality. Rather, the relational approach to a ences, and their development across the life span.
resolution is to move away from the extremes to the cen- Because universal and particular are themselves rela-
ter and above the conflict, and to here discover a novel tional concepts, no question can arise here about
system that will coordinate the two conflicting systems. whether the focus on universal processes excludes the
This is the principle of the synthesis of wholes, and this particular, it clearly doesn’t as we already know from the
synthesis itself will constitute another standpoint. earlier discussion of polarities. A process viewed from a
At this point, the Escher sketch fails as a graphic rep- universal standpoint in no way suggests that it is not con-
resentation. While Drawing Hands illustrates the identi- textualized. The general theories of Jean Piaget (1952),
ties and the opposites, and while it shows a middle space Heinz Werner (1940/1957), James Mark Baldwin (1895),
between the two, it does not describe a coordination. The William Stern (1938), and Erik Erikson (1968); the at-
synthesis for this sketch is an unseen hand that has drawn tachment theory and object relations theories of John
the drawing hands and is being drawn by these hands. Bowlby (1958); Harry Stack Sullivan (1953); and Don-
The synthesis of interest for the general metatheory ald Winnicott (1965, 1971) all are examples of develop-
would be a system that is a coordination of the most uni- mentally oriented relational person standpoints.
versal bipolarity imaginable. Undoubtedly, there are sev- It is important to recognize that one standpoint of
eral candidates for this level of generality, but the synthesis is relative to other synthesis standpoints. Life
polarity between matter or nature, on the one hand, and and society are coordinated by matter, and thus, within
society, on the other, seems sufficient for present pur- psychological inquiry, biology represents a standpoint as
poses (Latour, 1993). Matter and society represent sys- the synthesis of person and culture (Figure 2.4b). The
tems that stand in an identity of opposites. To say that an implication of this is that a relational biological
object is a social object in no way denies that it is matter; approach to psychological processes investigates the
to say that an object is matter in no way denies that it is biological conditions and settings of psychological
social. The object can be analyzed from either a social or
a physical standpoint, and the question for synthesis be-
comes the question of what system will coordinate these Person Biology Culture
Standpoint Standpoint Standpoint
two systems. Arguably, the answer is that it is life or liv-
ing systems that coordinate matter and society. Because
our specific focus of inquiry is the psychological, we can
reframe this matter-society polarity back into our
nature-nurture polarity of biology and culture. In the Biology Culture Person Culture Biology Person
(a) (b) (c)
context of psychology then, as an illustration, write “ bi-
ology” on one and “culture” on the other Escher hand, Figure 2.4 Relational standpoints in psychological inquiry:
and what system coordinates these systems?—the human (a) person, ( b) biology, and (c) culture.
38 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

structure-function relations and the behaviors they ex- ogy makes the social constructivist assertion that social
press. This exploration is quite different from split— discourse is “prior to and constitutive of the world”
foundationalist approaches to biological inquiry that (Miller, 1996, p. 99), it becomes clear that this form of
assume an atomistic and reductionistic stance toward cultural psychology has been framed by split foundation-
the object of study. The neurobiologist Antonio Dama- alist background ideas. Similarly, when sociocultural
sio’s (1994, 1999) work on the brain-body basis of a claims are made about the “primacy of social forces,” or
psychological self and emotions is an excellent illustra- claims arise suggesting that “mediational means” (i.e.,
tion of this biological relational standpoint. And in the instrumental-communicative acts) constitute the neces-
context of his biological investigations Damasio (1994) sary focus of psychological interest (see, e.g., Wertsch,
points out: 1991), the shadow of split foundationalist metatheoreti-
cal principles are clearly in evidence.
A task that faces neuroscientists today is to consider the A recent example of a relational developmentally
neurobiology supporting adaptive supraregulations [e.g.,
oriented cultural standpoint emerges in the work of
the psychological subjective experience of self ]. . . . I am
Valsiner (1998b), which examines the “social nature of
not attempting to reduce social phenomena to biological
phenomena, but rather to discuss the powerful connection
human psychology.” Focusing on the social nature of the
between them (p. 124). . . . Realizing that there are biolog- person, Valsiner stresses the importance of avoiding the
ical mechanisms behind the most sublime human behavior temptation of trying to reduce person processes to social
does not imply a simplistic reduction to the nuts and bolts processes. To this end, he explicitly distinguishes be-
of neurobiology. (p. 125) tween the “dualisms” of split foundationalist metatheory
and “dualities” of the relational stance he advocates.
A similar illustration comes from the Nobel laureate neu- Ernst Boesch (1991) and Lutz Eckensberger (1990, 1996)
robiologist Gerald Edelman’s (1992; Edelman & Tononi, have also presented an elaboration of the relational cul-
2000) work on the brain-body base of consciousness: tural standpoint. Boesch’s cultural psychology and Eck-
ensberger’s theoretical and empirical extensions of this
I hope to show that the kind of reductionism that doomed draw from Piaget’s cognitive theory, from Janet’s dy-
the thinkers of the Enlightenment is confuted by evidence
namic theory, and from Kurt Lewin’s social field-theory
that has emerged both from modern neuroscience and
and argues that “cultural psychology aims at an integra-
from modern physics. . . . To reduce a theory of an indi-
vidual’s behavior to a theory of molecular interactions is
tion of individual and cultural change, an integration of
simply silly, a point made clear when one considers how individual and collective meanings, a bridging of the gap
many different levels of physical, biological, and social in- between subject and object ” (e.g., Boesch, 1991, p. 183).
teractions must be put into place before higher order con- In a similar vein, Damon (1988) offers a vision of the
sciousness emerges. (Edelman, 1992, p. 166) cultural standpoint in his discussion of “ two complemen-
tary developmental functions, . . . the social and the per-
A third synthesis standpoint recognizes that life and sonality functions of social development ” (p. 3). These
matter are coordinated by society, and again granting are presented by Damon as an identity of opposites. The
that the psychological inquiry is about psychological social function is an act of integration serving to “estab-
processes, culture represents a standpoint as the synthe- lish and maintain relations with other, to become an ac-
sis of person and biology (Figure 2.4c). Thus, a relational cepted member of society-at-large, to regulate one’s
cultural approach to psychological processes explores the behavior according to society’s codes and standards”
cultural conditions and settings of psychological struc- (p. 3). The personality function is the function of indi-
ture-function relations. From this cultural standpoint the viduation; an act of differentiation serving the formation
focus is upon cultural differences in the context of psy- of the individual’s personal identity that requires “dis-
chological functions as complementary to the person tinguishing oneself from others, determining one’s own
standpoint’s focus on psychological functions in the con- unique direction in life, and finding within the social
text of cultural differences. network a position uniquely tailored to one’s own partic-
This standpoint is illustrated by “cultural psychol- ular nature, needs, and aspirations” (p. 3). Although oth-
ogy,” or “developmentally oriented cultural psychology.” ers could also be mentioned as illustrative (e.g.,
However, not all cultural psychologies emerge from rela- Grotevant, 1998; Hobson, 2002), it should be noted
tional metatheory: For example, when a cultural psychol- in conclusion here that Erik Erikson (1968), was operat-
 Development and Evolution: Relational History and Relational Models 39

ing from exactly such a relational line of sight when he parts—initially genes-environment—in a manner that is
described identity as “a process ‘located’ in the core of often nonlinear in nature. The nonlinear character of this
the individual and yet also in the core of his communal growth means that as the system transforms, novel fea-
culture” (p. 22). tures and novel levels of functioning emerge, and these
As a final point, concerning syntheses and the view cannot be reduced to (i.e., completely explained by) ear-
from the center, it needs to be recognized that a rela- lier features. Thus, the genetic-environmental system
tional metatheory is not limited to three syntheses. For transforms through action into the cellular-environmen-
example, discourse or semiotics may also be taken as a tal system, and then into the organ-environmental sys-
synthesis of person and culture (Latour, 1993). In this tem, and ultimately the person-environmental system.
case, biology and person are conflated and the biologi- Further transformations of the person-environment sys-
cal /person and culture represents the opposites of iden- tem result in developmental changes in cognitive, affec-
tity that are coordinated by discourse. tive, and motivational subsystems. Variants of the
In summary to this point, the argument has been developmental systems metatheory are found in perspec-
made that metatheoretical principles form the ground tives described by Thelen and Smith (1998) as “dynamic
out of which grow the concepts and methods of any do- systems”; by Magnusson and Stattin (1998) as a “ holistic
main of empirical inquiry. Split metatheory produces di- person” approach; and by Wapner and Demick (1998) as
chotomous understandings of the world and methods a “ holistic, developmental, systems-oriented” approach.
that rely exclusively on the analytic ideal of the reduc- Developmental systems metatheory operates close to the
tion of psychological process and behaviors to fixed level of theory itself and sometimes merges with specifi-
elements, followed by the additive linear causal recom- cally theoretical concepts.
position of elements. Split metatheory has led to the cre- In a later section, an important metatheory that op-
ation of a broad array of antinomies that constrict erates at a midlevel between relational metatheory and
empirical inquiry. Relational metatheory heals these developmental system is described. This interrelated
splits by generating inclusive holistic understandings of set of concepts is termed developmentally oriented em-
the world, and methods that are inherently analytic- bodied action metatheory. It functions to extend
synthetic. The relational framework promotes a truly relational metatheory and further grounds several im-
multidisciplinary, multimethod approach to inquiry in portant developmental and developmentally relevant
which each individual approach is valued not as a poten- concepts including the nature and function of the sys-
tially privileged vantage point, but as a necessary line of tems and subsystems that become the central domain of
sight on the whole. developmental analysis. Before turning to this descrip-
Relational metatheory grounds the unified definition tion, the next section examines development and evolu-
of development discussed earlier, and offers methods for tion as these concepts are expressed in relational and
unraveling many conceptual knots that impact on our ex- split metatheories.
ploration of developmental change. However, the abstract
nature of relational metatheory requires that other iso-
morphic metatheories mediate between this level and the DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION:
more circumscribed levels of both theory and empirical RELATIONAL HISTORY AND
observation. Again, the notion of levels of analyses and RELATIONAL MODELS
levels of metatheory become critical to a full under-
standing of the impact of basic concepts on empirical in- Development and evolution have been indissociable
quiry. Currently, developmental systems constitutes the complementary concepts throughout the history of de-
best example of a metatheory that is nested within rela- velopmental psychology. As Broughton (1981) pointed
tional metatheory. Developmental systems (Gottlieb, out, it was the American developmental psychology pio-
Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 1998; Lerner, 2002; Overton, neer James Mark Baldwin “ who first attempted a syn-
2003; Oyama, 2000), takes seriously the centrality of thesis of philosophy and the life sciences through a
holism, activity, organization, change, and nonlinearity. description of progressive stage by stage intellectual de-
This approach specifically conceptualizes the individual velopment (Baldwin, 1897/1973) and its continuities
organism as an active self-organizing systems that devel- and discontinuities with biological organization and
ops through the co-action or transaction of individual adaptation (Baldwin, 1902/1976)” (p. 396). Baldwin’s
40 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

concern with the complementarity of evolution and indi- extensively explored this relation. Piaget’s work is best
vidual development led him to explorations of the rela- known for its person-centered approach to conceptual
tion between the genome and the phenotype, and development from infancy through adolescence. How-
specifically questions concerning how individual adap- ever, when Piaget turned his attention to process expla-
tations during the course of ontogenesis might impact on nations of this and other forms of development he moved
species evolution (1902/1976). An important outcome of to a broad based epigenetic stance and there explored
this work was the proposal of a process termed “organic fundamental biological × psychological × environmental
selection” (1895) and known later as the “Baldwin ef- interactions. It was in this context that he produced two
fect ” (see Piaget, 1967/1971, 1974/1980; see also major works (1967/1971, 1974/1980) that grappled both
Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), which empirically and conceptually with the genotype-pheno-
offered a non-Lamarckian alternative to Darwin’s split type relation. Based on his own empirical studies with
mechanistic process of natural selection. Broadly, or- the common snail, Limnaea stagnalis, Piaget, like Bald-
ganic selection refers to the possibility of a phenotypic win, became convinced of the inadequacy of the neo-
adaptation coming to be replaced by a genetic mutation. Darwinian gene dominated explanation according to
Such a replacement runs counter to the classical Darwin- which a random (genetic) variation and natural (envi-
ian and neo-Darwinian gene centered position that the ronmental) selection process is presumed to account for
sole function of the environment is to select from what adaptations that occur both intra- and intergenera-
the genome provides. tionally across the course of organic life. He similarly
In Europe, the work of another founder of develop- became convinced that a Lamarckian solution in which
mental psychology, William Stern (1938), also pre- phenotypic adaptations come to have a direct impact on
sented a framework for a developmental psychology in the genome was equally untenable. In place of both of
which evolutionary and individual developmental these, Piaget eventually (1967/1971, 1974/1980) pro-
processes were tightly interwoven: “In the concept of posed a model of the “phenocopy.” This model describes
development lies not merely a bare sequence of states a mechanism whereby individual phenotypic adaptations
and phases, but evolution; preparation, germination, indirectly impact the genome and ensure intergenera-
growth, maturation, and recession as a meaningful pro- tional transmission of some behavioral characteristics
cess that is by nature of an organized kind” (p. 30). The model builds upon Piaget’s own general conceptual-
Heinz Werner later carried this framework to North ization of the “equilibration” process, found in his writ-
America in his Comparative Psychology of Mental ings on ontogenetic development, and on Baldwin’s
Development (1940/1948). Here, and in other works, notion of organic selection.
Werner articulated the complementarity of evolution The model of the phenocopy begins with a recogni-
and development through an insistence that developmen- tion that individual development includes the several
tal psychology entails a comparative approach to formal levels of organization described earlier, as each inter-
similarities as well as material and formal differences acts (i.e., interpenetrates) with its environment (i.e.,
among ontogenetic, phylogenetic and other change se- levels of DNA, protein production, cell formation, tis-
quences, as follows: sue growth, organ formation, the organism as a whole,
the organization of behavior, and ultimately, in the case
Such a developmental approach rests on one basic assump-
of human development, affect, motivation, and cogni-
tion, namely, that wherever there is life there is growth
tion). The dynamic organized systems of behavior pres-
and development, that is, formation in terms of system-
atic, orderly sequence. This basic assumption, then entails
ent at birth are not the direct reflection of some split-off
the view that a developmental conceptualization is appli- biologically determined innate mechanism, but the
cable to the various areas of life science. . . . Developmen- product of an epigenetic process that grows these levels
tal psychology does not restrict itself either to ontogenesis across the period of prenatal development. The model
or phylogenesis. . . . (1957, p. 125) accepts Baldwin’s notion of organic selection with re-
spect to this ascending series. Variational products of
Of all the developmentalists, who have articulated lower (earlier) levels may be selected according to mod-
and emphasized the basic complementarity of individual ifications produced at higher levels. For example, “ the
development and evolution, it was Jean Piaget who most extremely complex internal processes of the germ
 Development and Evolution: Split Approaches 41

cell . . . may effectively allow, prevent, or modify the changes in ontogenetic development (novel behavioral
transmission of mutations arising within the DNA” (Pi- adaptations) occurring across generations and encour-
aget, 1974/1980, p. 51). aging new environmental relations. In the second stage,
Piaget’s unique contribution lies in the further rela- which may or may not entail changes in structural genes,
tionally based proposal that, along with this ascending the new environmental relations evoke latent anatomical
effect, there is a descending one in which a disequilib- or physiological change, and in the final stage genetic
rium at higher levels may, in certain situations, cause dis- changes occur. As Gottlieb (2002) points out, “It is im-
equilibrium at lower ones ultimately resulting in a portant to observe that, in this theory, evolution has al-
genomic copy of the phenotype or “phenocopy.” The ready occurred phenotypically at the behavioral,
preadapted action systems available at birth function in anatomical, and physiological levels before the third
an environment that presents conflicts and obstacles, and stage is reached. Hence, new variations and adaptations
the impact of these obstacles represents a system disequi- arise before they are selected for and are therefore not a
librium. Importantly, these environmental obstacles do consequence of natural selection” (p. 217).
not constitute a specific message sent back to the system; In summary, from its origins and continuing in the
this would be the beginning of a Lamarckian solution. work of various developmental systems approaches, de-
Rather, the sole function of disequilibrium is to feed back velopmental psychology has operated within a relational
to the system that something has gone wrong and, thus, to frame with respect to the conceptualization of develop-
set in motion reequilibration processes, which are repre- ment and evolution as a reciprocal complementarity.
sented as variational exploratory activity. Exploratory However, beginning in the 1990s with the emergence of
activity constitutes phenotypic variations and in many so-called evolutionary psychology (Buss, 1999; Tooby &
cases the adaptation that results from this variation has Cosmides, 1992) and later evolutionary developmental
no generalized impact on the biosystem (e.g., the French psychology (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002) this comple-
have been speaking French for more than a thousand mentarity was fractured by a split-off conceptualization
years, but there have been no suggestions that French is that embraces a genetic determinism and an additive
genetically transmitted). However, the disequilibrium concept of interaction. In this split account, genetic pro-
may impact on lower levels of organization and cause fur- grams established across the course of evolution deter-
ther disequilibrium all the way down to the genomic level. mine behavioral variation, while culture selects the
The response to this descending disequilibrium will pro- individual variants that constitute individual develop-
duce variational exploratory activity at each level im- mental adaptations. This split perspective on evolution
pacted. If the disequilibrium reaches to the genomic and development arose out of earlier ethological and so-
level, the variants selected will ultimately represent a ge- ciobiological approaches, but its fundamental concepts
netic copy of the phenotype. are grounded in neo-Darwinian metatheory. There have
In presenting the phenocopy model, Piaget (1974/ been a number of excellent critiques of the conceptual
1980) explicitly acknowledged the close connection be- problems raised by nonrelational accounts of evolution-
tween his own work on equilibration and modern theo- ary and developmental evolutionary psychology (e.g.,
ries of self-organizing systems (i.e., dynamic systems Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003; Mameili & Bateson, in
that resist disorder and transform random process into press; Rose & Rose, 2000). We now focus on the way that
ordered structures; p. 110). It is not surprising that oth- split neo-Darwinian metatheory comes to impact these
ers operating from a contemporary developmental and other areas of traditional developmental interest.
systems perspective have continued to argue for a rela-
tional reciprocity of development and evolution (e.g., In- DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION:
gold, 2000; Oyama, 2000) and have continued to explore SPLIT APPROACH ES
the genotype-phenotype developmental relation. Re-
cently, Gottlieb (2002), after reviewing the selective Neo-Darwinian metatheory has been variously termed
breeding and early experience literature, proposed a the neo-Darwinian synthesis and the modern synthesis.
three-stage model for the developmental-behavioral ini- It emerged in the 1940s based on a marriage of the evo-
tiation of evolutionary change that is highly consistent lutionary position of Darwin, called classical Darwin-
with Piaget’s. The first stage of Gottlieb’s model entails ism, and the genetics of Mendel. There is some irony to
42 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

the use of the term “modern” as the approach is now dent causes, or gene pools that exert their influence in a
some 60 years old. It is well known that the core of the one-way outward causal flow of direction. This indepen-
synthesis is the duality of random variation and natural dent causal aggregate and the transmission of causes
selection. From the beginning, both for Mendel with re- from this aggregate then results in the outward manifes-
spect to genetics and for Darwin with evolution, there tation called the phenotype.
was a rigid separation (i.e., split) between the internal This metatheory has come to acquire a number of
and the external. For evolutionists, the statement: “Mu- metaphors that support and enhance interpretations of
tations are random with respect to their environment ” split-off entities, fragments, aggregates, and linear unidi-
meant that the processes that accounted for the variation rectional causality (see Nijhout, 1990; Oyama, 1989).
between individuals were independent of the evolution- Metaphors include the “ bean bag” concept of the genome
ary process that selects individuals. For geneticists, the as independent packages, the notion that “instructions
genotype constituted the internal state of the organism, are transmitted,” and the idea of a “program,” “ blue-
and the phenotype constituted the outside or outward print,” or “instructions.”
manifestation (see Figure 2.5). The internal aggregate produces random variation,
Along with the split between inner and outer, the but it is the external natural selection that determines
most important feature of the neo-Darwinian synthesis the appearance of change. The phenotype constitutes the
is that evolutionary change is defined in terms of varia- observed variability of behavior. The environment oper-
tion in gene frequencies and only variation in gene fre- ates upon this variability as an independent causal agent
quencies. Thus, the metatheory establishes that change to select those characteristics that promote survival.
is understood as variation, not transformation. Transfor- Two points need emphasis about this dualistic (i.e., split
mational change is essentially written out of the story internal and external) understanding of causes. First, we
and treated as epiphenomenal. Within the metatheory, have here the prototype for biological causes (internal)
genes (or DNA, to be more precise) cause phenotypes by and social-cultural causes (external) as split, indepen-
“supplying information,” “instructions,” or “programs.” dent forces. Causality remains linear (additive) and uni-
Genes themselves are thought of as packages of indepen- directional in the split model. When we tell the inside
story, there is no reciprocal causation; causes simply op-
erate independently and in a single direction, from inter-
Internal External
nal toward external. The outside story replicates this;
Environment—Adaptation there is no reciprocal causation and the direction is now
external toward internal.
The second point to note about the dualistic narra-
Selection tive of evolution as variation is the manner in which the
concept of “adaptation” becomes formulated and es-
tablished as a central feature of the external story
Genotype (Gould, 1986; Lewontin, 2000). Adaptation is identi-
Altruism fied with “adjustment ” and consequently refers to a
Hostility
Response 1 change designed to fit an independent context. Context
Response 2
(i.e., social-cultural factors) selects those characteris-
tics that best fit; hence, the central notion of competi-
tion and survival of the fittest.
Phenotype
In summary, the evolutionary metatheory described
by the neo-Darwinian synthesis involves an internal ag-
gregate gene pool that presents a package of solutions
Genes and an external environment that presents various prob-
lems to be solved (see Lewontin, 2000). This “adapta-
Random Variation Natural Selection
tionist ” program splits subject (genes) and object
(environment) into isolated bits of reality and assigns
chance variation to the former and contingent selection
Figure 2.5 The split neo-Darwinian metatheory. to the latter. The overall process is entirely contingent.
 Development and Evolution: Split Approaches 43

All elements—inside and outside—are fundamentally treating the inside story as epiphenomenal, while argu-
interchangeable, and any outcome could have been oth- ing that the outside story provides the fundamental
erwise had other elements randomly appeared. At no causes of behavior. The claim here is that there is suffi-
point does any fundamental principle of organization cient genetic variability for either violence or gentle-
enter the process; hence, all change is, in principle, re- ness, and social-cultural factors are the real cause of
versible (Overton, 1994a). violent behavior. Both strategies usually decry the idea
There are many possible applications of this split of dualism, but they deal with the dualism by suppress-
neo-Darwinian metatheory to issues of developmental ing the functional reality of one or the other sides of the
change. Those described below are selected to illustrate neo-Darwinian narrative.
the breadth and depth to which this form of thinking has A third split nature-nurture strategy has been
impacted on developmental issues, theory, concepts, and called conventional interactionism (Oyama, 1989; see
methodology. also, Lerner, 1978; Overton, 1973). Dualism, although
clearly a functional part of the scheme, is ignored by
Split Neo-Darwinian Metatheory: this strategy, and it is insisted that any characteristic
Developmental Applications is partially the effect of each factor. This strategy
The first example of the impact of this split evolutionary sometimes places the duality on a continuum and ar-
metatheory, on developmental understanding is the fa- gues that various characteristics are more or less de-
mous/infamous nature-nurture issue. Although the termined by one or the other factor (e.g., see Scarr,
neo-Darwinian metatheory did not generate the nature- 1992). This is the quantitative additive compromise
nurture controversy (that had more to do with the origi- that was mentioned earlier with respect to split issues
nal great splitters, Galileo and Descartes, who are generally. In the final strategy, bio/social interaction-
discussed in a later section), it supports its continuance ism, dualism is celebrated. Generally, this approach
and limits “solutions” to attempts to put nature pieces makes claims that the biological sets the limits, or es-
and nurture pieces back together. The controversy is tablishes “predispositions,” or “constraints” for be-
supported by the neo-Darwinian radical rupture of the havior and the social-cultural determines behavioral
whole into an inside (gene, biology) story that comes to expression. This compromise is the most direct reflec-
be called nature, and an outside (social-cultural, experi- tion of the neo-Darwinian metatheory of the nature of
ence) story called nurture. Once this split is confirmed change (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1991).
as ontologically real, behaviors or characteristics (e.g., These four nature-nurture strategies do not exhaust
altruism, aggression, empathy, thinking, language) are the list of possible “solutions,” nor are they necessarily
explained as the causal outcome of one or the other, or mutually exclusive. Each tends at times to merge into an-
some additive combination of the two. The controversy other. However, neither the complexities of nature-
becomes the questions of which one fundamentally de- nurture nor even the details of alternative nonsplit solu-
termines change, or how much does each contribute in- tions are central here (see Overton, 2004a, for an ex-
dependently to determining change, or how does each tended discussion). Rather, the central point of emphasis
contribute to determining change (Anastasi, 1958; is that the whole class of traditional solution strategies
Lerner, 1978; Overton, 1973). emerges because and only because of the acceptance of a
The “solution” to the nature-nurture issue under this particular metatheoretical story about the nature of
split metatheory requires choosing among several things. This is the story in which “nature” (genetics, bi-
strategies designed to deal with combining and/or ology) is identified with an ontologically real inside
suppressing independent pieces. First, included among called nurture that is radically split from an ontologi-
these strategies is biological determinism, which treats cally real outside called “nurture” (experience, social-
the outside story as epiphenomenal, and argues that the cultural). If this conceptual distinction is rejected as an
fundamental causes of behavior are given by the inside ontological description of “ the Real,” the controversies
story. For example, this strategy argues that the capac- themselves evaporate.
ity for violence is given by the genes (the real cause) A second example of the use of the neo-Darwinian
and social-cultural events simply trigger the underlying metatheory as a template for understanding develop-
biological capacity. Social determinism, the mirror mental phenomena emerges from the behaviorist litera-
image of biological determinism, is the strategy of ture. In this arena, several have noted (Oyama, 1989;
44 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

Skinner, 1984; Smith, 1986, 1990) that Skinner’s model explanation. The consequence of this split story is
represented a direct application of the neo-Darwinian that only variability is allowed as fundamentally real
story. Skinner’s operants had to originate from some- developmental change, and explanation can occur
where, but Skinner’s behavioristic outside story of the only within the categories of “ biological causes” and
subject (instrumental as opposed to expressive function “social-cultural causes” (see Lewontin, 2000).
of behavior) never required an articulation or elabora- The investigation of mechanisms of development con-
tion on these internal origins. All that was required was stitutes another important contemporary example of the
the output of the inside neo-Darwinian story; the ran- neo-Darwinian metatheory of variational change and
dom variation of a set of operant (instrumental) re- internal-external causes being applied to conceptually
sponses. Given this base, Skinner’s outside story can contextualize an important developmental psychological
and does focus on natural selection or “selection by con- issue (see Hoppe-Graff, 1989; Sternberg, 1984 for a
sequences” as presenting “ the real” functional variables general discussions of developmental mechanisms).
in the development of behavior. Siegler (1989, 1996; Siegler & Munakata, 1993) pre-
More central to contemporary developmental psy- sented a scheme that represents hypothesized mecha-
chological interests than Skinner’s position is the work nisms of cognitive development as being analogous to
of Belsky, Steinberg, and Draper (1991), who used the several genes. Each mechanism produces alternative
neo-Darwinian metaphor as a frame for a developmental types (random selection), and the environment selects
theory of socialization. Their strategy for explaining (natural selection) these types according to fitness cri-
socialization has been to wed a social-biological ap- teria (see Figure 2.6).
proach to Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) behavioral ecology. For Siegler (1989), a mechanism of cognitive devel-
Sociobiology asserts the adaptationist strategic claim opment is any “mental process that improves children’s
that natural selection favors behavioral strategies that ability to process information” (p 353). This means that
increase fitness. Sociobiology also provides the authors the developmental outcome (effect) of any mechanism
with an inside story biologically grounded in “ the mod-
ern view of evolution” (p. 663; i.e., the 1940s “modern”
synthesis or neo-Darwinian synthesis). Behavioral ecol- Internal External
ogy, alternatively, represents the outside story; the ar- Environment—Adaptation
gument that behavior strategies are “contextually
conditioned,” shaped, or selected by the environment.
“From sociobiology we take the maxim that natural se- Selection
lection tends to favor behavior that increases fitness.
From behavioral ecologists we take the maxim that be-
havioral strategies that contribute to reproductive suc- Analogy
cess are . . . contextually conditioned” (p. 648). And, Strategy 1
“central to our theory is the notion drawn from modern Strategy 2
Strategy 3
evolutionary biology that humans . . . adjust their life Strategy 4
histories in response to contextual conditions in a man-
ner that will enhance reproductive fitness—or at least
would have in the environment of evolutionary adapta-
Associate Phenotype
tion” (p. 663). The issue here does not entail the cri-
tique of this approach at either a theoretical or an Strategy
observational level of discourse. The issue here con- Genes
cerns a recognition that this approach arises from a par-
ticular metatheory, and the consequences of accepting Random Variation Natural Selection
this metatheory, are different from those that follow
from accepting another metatheory. This metatheory
fosters split theoretical and observational understand- Figure 2.6 The neo-Darwinian metatheory and mecha-
ings of the nature of developmental change and its nisms of development (variational change).
 Development and Evolution: Split Approaches 45

(cause) is improvement in stored knowledge. Improve- environments. Effective selection among the variants
ment here refers either to increases in amount of knowl- is essential for producing progressively more successful
edge stored or to the effectiveness of the machinery that performance. Achieving these functions of variation
stores and accesses the knowledge. Thus, ultimately, de- and selection may be essential for any developing sys-
velopment is defined in terms of stored knowledge. This tem” (p. 3).
in itself limits developmental change to variational In addition, Kuhn and her colleagues (D. Kuhn,
change; there is no room here for transformational Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995) have proposed
change as a fundamental type of change. To account for a wide ranging cognitive position concerning the devel-
the change in stored knowledge, Siegler proposes five opment of scientific reasoning that parallels Siegler’s
broadly conceived “mechanisms” of development: (1) with respect to the exclusivity of variational change and
synaptogenesis (a member of the broader class of neural adaptation. In their scheme, knowledge acquisition
mechanisms), (2) associative competition, (3) encoding, strategies, metacognitive competence, and metastrate-
(4) analogy, and (5) strategy choice. gic competence are presumed to be available in rudi-
Each proposed developmental mechanism is under- mentary forms in young children and constitute the
stood as being analogous to an individual gene. Each is elementary building blocks of scientific reasoning.
an internal packet with an outward flow of causality These skills appear as intraindividual variability of be-
from genotype to phenotype. The strategy choice gene, havior in problem solving, and development or change
to take one example of the five mechanisms (see Figure “appears as a gradual shift in the distribution of the
2.6), causes variation in the phenotype. The result is use of a set of strategies of varying adequacy” (p. 9).
variation in external behavior as in learning Strategy 1, White (1995), in commenting on this movement “ toward
Strategy 2, or Strategy 3, and so on. As a specific anal- an evolutionary epistemology of scientific reasoning”
ogy, consider the idea of tail length in an animal. The (p. 129) notes the striking similarity to the historical be-
human would have an innately prewired set of alterna- havioral “scheme of trial-and-error learning proposed by
tive strategies just as the rat would have a set of alterna- Edward L. Thorndike (1898) at the turn of the century”
tive genes for tail length (or technically, alleles at a (p. 134) and contrasts it with the Piagetian perspective
particular locus). that emphasizes the dialectic of transformational and
Having presented the inside story of variational and variational change as codefining fundamental features
only variational change, the outside story then comes of development (Overton, 1990):
into play for Siegler. The alternative strategies are con-
ceived as being in competition for survival. The envi- Instead of wide-sweeping structural changes in the logical
engines available to the child, there are changes in cognitive
ronment selects (i.e., causes) the strategy that is to
elements that the child can call into play when confronted
survive, and that strategy is the one that best facilitates
with a problematic situation. The changes are not wide
the processing of information and, hence, the building sweeping. They are more local, particulate. Yet there is
of stored knowledge. The rat might phenotypically ap- transfer. . . . The emergence of scientific reasoning de-
pear with a tail length of 1″, 2″, or 3″ depending on pends on an orchestration of a number of cognitive elements
which had been selected; individual children might that have to work together. Change, as it occurs, is by no
come with Strategy 1, Strategy 2, or Strategy 3. means irreversible. (White, 1995, p. 135, emphasis added)
In summary, for Siegler, fast and effective knowledge
acquisition defines human development and is explained It needs to be emphasized again that, in the examples
by phenotypical behaviors, which are a result of underly- described, the type of change being identified as devel-
ing causal mechanisms that are built into the system. opmental follows directly from the neo-Darwinian
Considering knowledge acquisition, the phenotypical be- metatheory as variational change and not transforma-
havior, and the underlying mechanism as a totality con- tional or morphological change. Siegler’s proposed
stitutes both a description and an explanation of devel- mechanisms of development, along with Kuhn’s,
opment. Siegler and Munakata (1993) have said: “ The Skinner’s, the social biology/ behavioral ecology, and
centrality of variation and selection within . . . change socialization approaches, contemporary evolutionary
mechanisms does not seem coincidental. Multiple com- psychology, and recent forays into developmental
peting entities seem essential for adaptation to changing evolutionary psychology all describe change in which no
46 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

fundamental transformational novelty emerges. In each These critics are not becoming anti-Darwinian or
example, forms and the change of forms—changes in anti-evolutionary. They are simply articulating the need
forms of thought from infancy to childhood, and to ado- for modification and expansion of the neo-Darwinian
lescence, or changes in forms of personality organiza- story. Evolutionary biologists, developmental biolo-
tion, or changes in emotional organization from global gists, neurobiologists, geneticists, paleontologists, an-
affect to differentiated specific emotions—are simply thropologists, and psychologists speak in many
excluded from discussion or treated as epiphenomenal. different voices when they argue this point, but they
In each of the neo-Darwinian generalizations, inside uniformly agree on the following: Regardless of the
causes (nature) provide a variational base of behaviors, level of analysis one chooses to explore, concepts of or-
while outside causes (nurture) winnow down and shape ganization, system, structure, or form—as well as the
that variation. Variation and the winnowing and shaping transformation of organization, system, structure, or
process constitute the definition and explanation of de- form—must enter into a new evolutionary synthesis in
velopment within this story. Transformational or mor- every bit as central a fashion as concepts of variation
phological change has simply been excluded from the and selection enter the current narrative. Develop-
fundamental story of development and treated as mere ment—conceived as ordered changes in the form, orga-
appearance. nization, or structure of a system—must be directly
integrated into the current narrative of variational
Split Neo-Darwinian Metatheory: A Flawed change and selection.
Story of Change? Gilbert (2003), a developmental biologist, describes
These several examples have been presented to demon- the origin of the exclusion of development (transforma-
strate how split metatheory—specifically neo-Darwinian tional change) from evolution:
metatheory—can impact on the understanding and expla-
The developmental approach became excluded from the
nation of developmental change in various domains. Next,
Modern Synthesis. . . . It was thought that population ge-
we turn to the question of the ultimate viability of this
netics could explain evolution, so morphology and develop-
metatheory. ment were seen to play little role in modern evolutionary
The split between variational change and transforma- theory. (p. 778)
tional change that is a part of the neo-Darwinian story
has created a broad paradox in the life sciences: On the Edelman (1992), a neurobiologist, goes on to articulate
one hand a significant number of psychologists have been the dominant theme of most contemporary revisionist
turning to the neo-Darwinian story as a context within critics by arguing for the need to reintroduce the cen-
which to understand developmental change; on the other trality of form and change of form (transformation) into
hand, many who work more directly in the fields of bio- an expanded neo-Darwinian narrative:
logical and evolutionary change complain that the neo-
Darwinian story is outdated and deeply flawed because The part of Darwin’s program that needs most to be com-
it fails to incorporate developmental change. More pleted . . . is concerned with how animal form, tissue
specifically, these critics argue that it is flawed because structure, and tissue function could have arisen from an-
cestors—the problem of morphologic evolution. (p. 48)
it omits the kind of developmental change defined as
transformational change. These critics, from the fields Morphology—the shape of cells, tissues, organs, and fi-
of biology, evolutionary biology, evolutionary develop- nally the whole animal—is the largest single basis for be-
mental biology, and anthropology include Brooks (1992; havior. (p. 49)
Brooks & Wiley, 1991), Edelman (1992), Gilbert (2003; To accomplish it [completing Darwin’s program] we need
Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff, 1996), Goodwin (1992), Gould to show how development (embryology) is related to evolu-
(2000), Kauffman (1992, 1995), Ingold (2000), and tion. We need to know how genes affect form through de-
Lewontin (2000). This same criticism has been articu- velopment. (p. 51)
lated within the psychological community by a variety of
developmental systems oriented investigators (e.g., Bate- Along with the criticism that there is more to the
son, 1985; Gottlieb, 1992, Chapter 5, this Handbook, this story of evolution than variational changes in gene fre-
volume; Kuo, 1967; Lehrman, 1970; Schneirla 1957; To- quencies, the revisionists argue against the interpreta-
bach, 1981; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). tion of genes as independent split-off atomic entities,
 Developmentally Oriented Embodied Action Metatheory 47

and they call for a recognition that “genomic regulatory and adaptation (the function) are two poles of the same
networks underlying ontogeny, exhibit powerful relational matrix, two aspects of the same whole. It is
‘self-organized’ structural and dynamical properties” neither that organization will ultimately be reduced
(Kauffman, 1992, p. 153). As a consequence of recog- to adaptation, nor that organization provides the varia-
nizing the genome itself as a self-organizing system tion and adaptation the selection. Novel organization
(i.e., an active form-changing organization), there is a emerges from processes of adaptation, but adaptation
call to “invent a new theory of evolution which encom- operates under the constraints of current organization.
passes the marriage of selection and self-organization” Organization and change of organization (transforma-
(Kauffman, 1992, p. 153; see also Varela et al., 1991). tional change) become the focus when inquiry is di-
Further, this group points out that evolutionary rected toward issues of emergent novelty, sequence, and
theory—as limited to random variation and natural se- irreversibility. Adaptation becomes focal as inquiry is
lection—has become too sharply focused on the mainte- directed toward issues of activity, process, and varia-
nance of diversity (i.e., focused on the reversible, and tion. Structure and function are not independent split-
the cyclical) while ignoring the significance of the origin off either/or solutions to problems; structure and
and developmental paths of diverse forms (i.e., the trans- function, organization and activity, form and process,
formational, and the directional; Brooks, 1992; Lewon- are alternative perspectives on the same whole.
tin, 2000). In summary, the neo-Darwinian “modern synthesis” is
Finally, the revisionists argue that the concept of a split metatheory that has consequences for developmen-
adaptation to a split-off environment, as described by tal inquiry across a broad range of domains. As a narrative
the neo-Darwinian metatheory of natural selection, se- that speaks of variational change exclusively, it provides a
verely limits understanding. They argue for a healing of conceptual context for, and reinforces, other narratives
the dualism of a split-off internal and external through a that would claim development is about variational change
relational recognition that it is both the case that biolog- and only variational change, and that explanation is about
ical organisms construct their social-cultural world, and biological causes and/or social-cultural causes. It is only
that the social-cultural world constructs biological or- within a relational metatheory that variation and transfor-
ganisms (Edelman, 1992; Lewontin, 2000). mation become indissociable complementarities and only
Virtually all of the themes argued by contemporary within this metatheory do evolution and development re-
evolutionary revisionists assert the need for an under- turn to the same complementary position.
standing that is relational in nature; an understanding
where inside and outside, variation and transformation,
DEVELOPMENTALLY ORIENTED
biological and social-cultural as well as other fundamen-
EMBODIED ACTION METATHEORY
tal splits are viewed as analytic distinctions, not onto-
logical cuts in nature. This relational understanding
This section describes a metatheory that is consistent
yields distinctions that allow an investigator to stand at
with relational metatheory but operates at a midlevel
a particular line of sight and explore from that particular
between relational metatheory and developmental sys-
point of view without declaring that point of view to be
tem. This interrelated set of concepts is termed develop-
“ the real.” An illustration of these themes in human on-
mentally oriented embodied action metatheory. It
togenesis is found in the contrast between the split-off
functions to extend relational metatheory and further
adaptationist story found, for example, in Skinnerian
grounds several important developmental and develop-
theory and the social learning theories discussed earlier,
mentally relevant concepts including the nature and
and the relational picture of adaptation found in the
function of the systems and subsystems that become the
work of Jean Piaget. Like Skinner (1984) and social
central domain of developmental analysis
learning theories, Piaget (1952) introduces adaptation as
a fundamental and central theoretical concept. However,
Embodiment
unlike these neo-Darwinian theorists, Piaget’s concept
of adaptation is always understood as the complement Several basic terms define a developmental oriented
of a second central theoretical concept, organization. embodied action approach. Each term is associated
As with the modern evolutionary revisionists, Piaget with relational principles. For the moment, embodiment
stresses time and time again that organization (the form) is the most central of these basic concepts, because
48 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

embodiment is a concept of synthesis that bridges Person

and integrates biological, sociocultural, and person- Embodiment
centered approaches to psychological inquiry. Until re-
cently, the trend of developmental inquiry over the past
several decades had been moving toward ever increas-
ing fragmentation of the object of study. Beginning in
the early 1980s, the examination of human develop-
ment aggressively promoted split and foundational ap-
proaches to inquiry, including variable oriented,
discourse, modular, and domain specific inquiry. Each
of these was advanced with claims that it presented the
bedrock foundation from which scientific knowledge Biological Cultural
must grow. The result was that inquiry into human de- Embodiment Embodiment
velopment was increasingly split into biologically de- Figure 2.7 Embodied person, biology, culture.
termined, culturally determined, and bio-culturally
determined behavior, innate modules of mind, situated
cognitions, domain specific understandings, and com- we make sense of what we experience depend on the
municative and instrumental functioning. What be- kinds of bodies we have and on the ways we interact
came lost in the exclusivity of these projects was the with the various environments we inhabit ” (1999, p. 81).
psychological subject as a vital integrated embodied As a relational concept embodiment includes not
center of agency and action. This is the embodied per- merely the physical structures of the body but the body
son—functioning as a self-organizing dynamic action as a form of lived experience, actively engaged with the
system—expressively projecting onto the world, and world of sociocultural and physical objects. The body as
instrumentally communicating with self and world, form references the biological line of sight, the body as
thoughts, feelings, wishes, beliefs, and desires. This is lived experience references the psychological subject
the embodied person who emerges from and transacts standpoint, and the body actively engaged with the world
with the relational biological-cultural world, thereby represents the sociocultural point of view. Within a rela-
developmentally transforming his or her own expres- tional perspective, embodiment is a concept that bridges
sive and adaptive functioning and the world itself. and joins in a unified whole these several research
Embodiment is the affirmation that the lived body points of synthesis without any appeal to splits, founda-
counts in our psychology. It is not a split-off disengaged tionalism, elements, atomism, and reductionism (see
agent that simply moves around peeking at a preformed Figure 2.7).
world and drawing meaning directly from that world. It
Biological Embodiment
is not a set of genes that causes behavior nor a brain nor a
culture. Behavior emerges from the embodied person ac- Contemporary neuroscience has increasingly endorsed
tively engaged in the world. The concept of embodiment the significance of embodiment as an essential feature of
was first fully articulated in psychology by Maurice the biological line of sight as it addresses psychological
Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1963) and it represents a rela- issues. For example, Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999)—ex-
tional movement away from any split understanding of ploring the neurological dimension of emotions—and
behavior as an additive product of biological and socio- Gerald Edelman (1992; Edelman & Tononi, 2000)—
cultural determinants. exploring the neurological dimensions of consciousness—
Embodiment is the claim that perception, thinking, along with Joseph LeDoux (1996)—exploring the neuro-
feelings, desires—the way we behave, experience, and logical dimension of emotions—all support an embodied
live the world—is contextualized by our being active approach to biological-psychological inquiry and all
agents with this particular kind of body (Taylor, 1995). argue that the cognitive, affective, and motivational sys-
The kind of body we have is a precondition for our hav- tems and actions that constitute mind can no longer be
ing the kind of behaviors, experiences, and meanings thought of as the direct expression of genetic modulari-
that we have. As Johnson states, “Human beings are ties (as nativists such as Steven Pinker, 1997, would
creatures of the flesh. What we can experience and how claim), nor can they be thought of as a functionalist piece
 Developmentally Oriented Embodied Action Metatheory 49

of software, nor even as merely a function of brain our body that we both conceive and perform actions”
processes. Rather, they argue, these meanings must be (p. 312, emphasis added).
considered in a fully embodied context (see also, Gallese,
2000a, 2000b). As Damasio says: Person-Centered Embodiment, Action,
and Development
Mind is probably not conceivable without some sort of em-
bodiment (1994, p. 234). And further, commenting on The person-centered or psychological subject point of
contemporary perspectives on mind, “ This is Descartes’ synthesis constitutes the standpoint that frames the
error: the abyssal separation between body and mind. major focus of any specifically psychological theory of
. . . The Cartesian idea of a disembodied mind may well development. This point of synthesis maintains a theoret-
have been the source, by the middle of the twentieth ical and empirical focus on the psychological processes
century, for the metaphor of mind as software pro- and patterns of psychological processes as these explain
gram . . . [and] there may be some Cartesian disembodi- the psychological subject’s actions and the development
ment also behind the thinking of neuroscientists who insist of these actions in the world (see Figure 2.8–A). This
that the mind can be fully explained in terms of brain
approach to developmental inquiry requires the descrip-
events [i.e., connectionism], leaving by the wayside the
tion of five critical interwoven concepts—person, agent,
rest of the organism and the surrounding physical and so-
cial environment—and also leaving out the fact that part of
action, experience, and person-embodiment. Before de-
the environment is itself a product of the organism’s pre- tailing these concepts this person-centered standpoint
ceding actions.” (1994, pp. 249–250) needs to be briefly contrasted with what have been
termed “ variable” approaches.

Similarly, Edelman (1992) argues: Variable and Person-Centered Standpoints

Variable approaches focus inquiry on biological, cul-
The mind is embodied. It is necessarily the case that cer- tural, and individual variables as these are understood to
tain dictates of the body must be followed by the operate as predictors, correlates, risk factors, or an-
mind. . . . Symbols do not get assigned meanings by formal tecedent causes of behavior. The distinction between
means; instead it is assumed that symbolic structures are this and a person-centered or child-centered standpoint
meaningful to begin with. This is so because categories are is similar to that described some time ago by Block
determined by bodily structure and by adaptive use as a (1971), and more recently elaborated by Magnusson
result of evolution and behavior. (p. 239) (1998; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998) and others (e.g.,
Cairns, Bergman, and Kagan, 1998; Hart, Atkins, & Fe-
Sociocultural Embodiment gley, 2003; NICHD Early Child Care Research Net-
From the cultural point of synthesis, social construc- work, 2004; Robins & Tracy, 2003). As Magnusson has
tivists not committed to a split metatheoretical approach suggested, from a variable approach various individual
(e.g., Harre, 1995; Sampson, 1996) have come to em-
brace embodied action as a relational anchoring to the
relativism of split-off discourse analysis. Sampson Living Body
(1996) argues for “embodied discourses” as these “refer Embodiment
Socio-
to the inherently embodied nature of all human en- Person-Level cultural
deavor, including talk, conversation and discourse it- Cognition (Knowing) and
Conation (Wishing) Physical
self ” (p. 609; see also, Csordas, 1999; Ingold, 2000; Emotion (Feeling) Instrumental Action World
Overton, 1997). Perhaps the most fully articulated con- Subperson-Level Expressive/
temporary employment of embodiment in a developmen- Agency Constitutive
Self-Organizing Action
tally oriented cultural psychology is found in Boesch Action Systems
Inquiry Focus
(1991). Boesch’s presentation of The I and the body is a (Points-of-View)
discussion of the centrality of embodiment for a cultural A. Person-centered
Biological B. Sociocultural-centered
psychology. Thus, he states “ The body, obviously, is Systems C. Biology-centered
more than just an object with anatomical and physiolog-
ical properties: it is the medium of our actions, it is with Figure 2.8 Embodied action: A relational approach to inquiry.
50 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

variables (i.e., “child factors,” “child characteristics”) biology, culture, discourse, narrative, or computer sci-
and contextual environmental and biological variables ence. Psyche initially referenced “soul” and later
are understood as the explanatory actors in the “mind,” and if psychology is not to again lose its mind—
processes being studied (see Figure 2.9). From a person- as it did in the days of the hegemony of behaviorism—
centered standpoint, self-organizing dynamic action keeping the psychological subject as the center of action
systems—which identify psychological mechanisms— is a necessary guard against explanatory reduction to bi-
operate as the main vehicles of explanation. Although ology, culture, discourse, and so on.
variable approaches often suggest a split-off exclusivity, The second benefit that accrues to maintaining, a
they can in fact be transformed into to yet another nec- person-centered approach as a necessary point of
essary point of view of relationally integrated inquiry. A view is that this perspective again highlights the fact
variable-centered approach inquiry, aiming at the pre- that any act can be profitably understood—in a comple-
diction of events, states, and movements, and a person- mentary bipolar fashion—as both expressive-constitutive
centered approach, aiming at explaining psychological and as instrumental-adaptive. Split or dichotomous
processes and their transformation come into conflict approaches—especially split-off variable approaches—
only in the reductionistic case where one or the other is lead to the illusion that acts exhibit only adaptive-
asserted as the exclusive foundational aim of inquiry. In instrumental-communicative functions. A person-
this context, it is important to recognize that the comple- centered approach argues that any act may also be
mentarity here is one of aim and not one suggesting that understood as an expression of an underlying dynamic
variable inquiry is oriented to research methods and organization of cognitive, affective, and conative mean-
person-centered inquiry is oriented to conceptual con- ings, and this expression operates to constitute the
text. Both approaches entail the translation of theory world as known, felt, and desired. Here, Bloom’s work
into the empirically assessable, and the translation of (Bloom & Tinker, 2001) on the development of lan-
the empirically assessable into theory. Perhaps the guage provides an excellent illustration of the power of
clearest example of an important contemporary develop- conceptualizing language acquisition in the context of
mental theory that grounds itself within a variable tradi- the expression of person-centered cognitive, affective,
tion is found in Bronfenbrenner’s bioecological model and conative-motivational meanings, rather than exclu-
(Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998). sively as an instrumental tool operating solely for com-
The single most important value of recognizing a municative ends.
person-centered standpoint as a necessary point of syn- A third benefit derived from a person-centered point
thesis, along with the biological (Figure 2.8–B) and cul- of view is that it provides the necessary context for the
tural (Figure 2.8–C) points of synthesis, is that it resolution of certain important problems related to our
rescues psychology generally, and developmental psy- general understanding of psychological meaning.
chology specifically, from becoming a mere adjunct to Specifically, a person-centered approach is a necessary
frame for solving the so-called symbol-grounding prob-
lem. This is the question of how to explain that represen-
tational items (i.e., a symbol, an image) come to have
Socio- psychological meaning (Bickhard, 1993). I return to this
cultural
Reflections of and problem in a more detailed fashion later.
Culture and Biology Cause Physical
(Conceptualized as (Correlate) With these examples of some of the benefits of a
(Risk Factor) World
Person Factors) Factors child- or person-centered approach to developmental in-
(Predictor)
Instrumental Behavior
quiry as background, it is possible to turn to a specific
description of this metatheoretical approach, which en-
Cause
(Correlate) tails the five critical interwoven concepts of person,
(Risk Factor)
(Predictor) agent, action, experience, and person-embodiment.
Inquiry Factors
Biological Person-Agent
Factors
Person and agent are complementary Escherian levels of
Figure 2.9 A variable approach to inquiry. analysis of the same whole (see Figure 2.8–A). The person
 Developmentally Oriented Embodied Action Metatheory 51

level is constituted by genuine psychological concepts identified solely with a symbolic level of reflection.
(e.g., thoughts, feelings, desires, wishes) that have inten- Following Brentano (1973/1874), all acts, even those
tional qualities, are open to interpretation, and are avail- occurring at the most sensory-motor level of function-
able to consciousness (Shanon, 1993), or in other words ing intend some object.
have psychological meaning. The agent level—called the Action is often distinguishable from behavior, as the
subpersonal level by some (Dennett, 1987; Russell, action of the person-agent implies a transformation in
1996)—here refers to action systems or dynamic self- the intended object of action, while behavior often sim-
organizing systems. “Schemes,” “operations,” “ego,” “at- ply implies movement and states (e.g., the classically de-
tachment behavioral system,” and “executive function” fined “response” was understood as specific movement
are some of the concepts that describe these action sys- in space and time—a behavior—see von Wright, 1971,
tems. p. 199). As action, when the infant chews (act)—some-
Taken as a whole, the person-agent forms the nucleus thing that from a sociocultural standpoint is called a
of a psychological metatheory of mind. And, in this con- “ basket ”—the infant, from a person-centered stand-
text, mind is defined as a self-organizing dynamic point, is transforming this part of her known world into
system of cognitive ( knowings, beliefs), emotional (feel- a practical action—chewable. Piaget’s cognitive devel-
ings), and conative or motivational (wishes, desires) opmental theory is a good example of a child-centered
meanings or understandings, along with procedures for developmental action theory where the metatheoretical
maintaining, implementing, and changing these mean- “action” becomes translated into specific theoretical
ings. Importantly, it must be noted and underlined that a concepts. Thus, Piaget’s basic theoretical concepts of
person-centered metatheory of mind is not an encapsu- “ function,” “assimilation,” “accommodation,” “opera-
lated cognition but a theory that includes emotions, tion,” “reflective abstraction,” all reference action. And
wishes, desires, and cognition. Further, there is no ques- Piaget (1967) repeatedly affirms the centrality of action
tion about where mind is located: Mind emerges from a throughout his writings: “I think that human knowledge
relational bio-sociocultural activity matrix. In the pres- is essentially active. To know is to assimilate reality into
ent context, mind is a person-centered concept because systems of transformations. To know is to transform re-
the approach being described takes the person stand- ality. . . . To my way of thinking, knowing an object does
point. As a person-centered concept, mind bridges natu- not mean copying it—it means acting upon it ” (p. 15).
rally to both the biological (Figure 2.8–C) and the “ To know an object . . . is to act on it so as to transform
sociocultural (Figure 2.8–B). it ” (1977, p. 30). “Nothing is knowable unless the sub-
ject acts in one way or another on the surrounding
Action, Intention, Behavior
world” (1980, p. 43).
Person-agency is the source of action and a person- Action serves at least three major functions in the
centered approach establishes the framework for what development of mind (see Figure 2.1). First, action ex-
has traditionally been termed an action theory (Brand- presses cognitive-af fective-conative meaning. It is impor-
städter, 1998; Brandstädter & Lerner, 1999; Mueller & tant to recognize that meaning, like many other basic
Overton, 1998a). At the agent level, where it is not nec- concepts, has relational complementary definitions that
essary to limit a definition to the human organism, ac- are determined by the standpoint being taken (Overton,
tion is defined as the characteristic functioning of any 1994b). “I mean” and “it means” operate in a relational
dynamic self-organizing system. For example, a plant matrix. The former is concerned with person-centered
orients toward the sun. Weather systems form high and meanings, the latter with sociocultural meanings and
low pressure areas and move from west to east. Alterna- reference. From a person-centered standpoint, the focus
tively, human systems organize and adapt to their bio- of analysis is on “I mean” and secondarily on how “I
logical and sociocultural worlds. At the person level, mean” becomes associated with “it means.” Considered
action is defined as intentional activity (i.e., meaning in its expressive moment, action entails the projection of
giving activity). Intentionality, however, is not to be person-centered meanings, thus transforming the objec-
identified with consciousness: While all acts are inten- tive environmental world (i.e., an object point of view)
tional, only some intentions are conscious or self- into an actual world as known, felt, desired. World, here
conscious. In a similar fashion, intention is not to be is another relational bi-polar concept. The actual world
52 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

is the world of meanings constructed by the person—the from the person-agent or the objective environmental
known world; the environmental or objective world is the standpoint. From each perspective, experience is identi-
world of reference, examined from a sociocultural fied as the interaction of the act and the environment
standpoint. (i.e., acts intend objects), but each has a distinct empha-
The second function that action serves is the instru- sis regarding the locus of this interaction. From the
mental function of communicating and adjusting person- person-agent standpoint (Figure 2.8–A), experience is
centered meanings. Communication, dialogue, discourse, the action of exploring, manipulating, and observing the
and problem solving all call attention to the relational to- world, while from an environmental standpoint (Figure
and-fro movement between the expression of the self- 2.8–C), experience is an objective event or stimulus pres-
organizing system, and instrumental adaptive changes. ent in the context of the act. As understood from the per-
Completely adapted (i.e., successful) action entails only son-agent standpoint, when experience is described as a
the projection of meaning onto the world (e.g., If I intend feeling, the reference here is the person-centered felt
this object before me to hold water as a cup, and success- meaning of the observational, manipulative, and explo-
fully drink from it, no change occurs in my conceptual rational action.
system). Partially adapted (i.e., partially successful) ac- In the history of psychology, and especially develop-
tion results in exploratory action, or variations (e.g., If mental psychology, the complementarity of these usages
the intended cup leads to water leaking onto my shirt, I has often been lost in a world of split metatheory. As a
vary my actions such as putting my finger across a crack consequence, implicitly or explicitly, experience has
in the object). Exploratory action that is adaptive (e.g., frequently been identified with, and only with, the ob-
The finger placement permits successful drinking) jective stimulus. When this privileging of the stimulus
leads to reorganization of the system (transformational occurs it carries with it the split metatheoretical princi-
change) and new meanings (e.g., A cup is an object with- ple of investing the privileged concept with a causal
out open cracks). power. Consider, for example:
For Schneirla, experience referred to all stimulus influ-
Experience and Action. This general cycle of pro-
ences that act on the organism throughout the course of its
jected action, and exploratory variational action as the life. . . . Any stimulative influence, any stimulus that acts
accommodation to encountered resistances, constitutes on the organism in any way, is a part of experience.
the third and most general function of action: Action (Lerner, 2002, p. 152)
defines the general mechanism of all psychological de-
velopment. From a person-centered developmental ac- Here, experience is both defined exclusively by the stim-
tion standpoint all development is explained by the ulus and the stimulus is conceptualized as causally act-
action of the subject. However, this metatheoretical ing on. The consequence of such split understandings is
concept will be translated into specific theoretical con- that they again draw us back into a fruitless nature-
cepts at the level of theory itself (e.g., Piaget’s con- nurture debate in which “experience” become pitted
cepts of assimilation-accommodation and equilibration against “innate” or against “ biological maturation” as
identify action mechanisms of development). one of two competing alternative explanation of behav-
In claiming that action is the general mechanism of ior; thus, empty questions such as “Does experience in-
all development, it is necessary to recognize that within fluence behavior and change?” “How much does
an action based perspective action and experience are experience count in adolescence?” rise to the fore. When,
identical concepts. As a consequence, the claim that ac- on the other hand, experience is conceptualized as the
tion is the mechanism of development is identical to the complementary “act-environment,” these and all other
claim that experience is the mechanism of development. nature-nurture questions disappear, being replaced by
All development occurs through experience. But in this empirical explorations that examine acts in relation to
definition it should be clear that experience as action their source (person-agent) or acts in relation to the en-
excludes neither the biological nor the sociocultural. In vironment (see Overton & Ennis, in press).
fact, experience understood as action of the person- When experience is understood as entailing the de-
agent represents a synthesis of these two. velopmental action cycle of projection-transformation
Experience is itself yet another concept that acquires (of the known world) exploration-transformation (of
alternative meanings depending on whether the focus is the system), experience also becomes the psychological
 Developmentally Oriented Embodied Action Metatheory 53

bridge between biological and cultural systems. There ness that arise from the coordination of practical ac-
is no sense here of an isolated, cut off, solitary human tions; reflective and transreflective (reflective symbolic
psyche. Person-centered experience emerges from a understandings of reflective symbolic understandings)
bio-sociocultural relational activity matrix (see, for ex- meanings describe further developmental advances in
ample, Gallese 2000a, 2000b; Suomi, 2000) and this the coordination of action systems.
experience both transforms the matrix and is trans- In summary, to this point the nucleus of a relation-
formed by the matrix. Person development is not a split- ally informed person-centered developmental action
off nativism or environmentalism, or a split-off additive metatheory of mind has been described, where mind is
combination of the two. The neonate is a dynamic sys- conceptualized as a dynamic self-organizing system of
tem of practical action meanings. These meanings rep- cognitive ( knowings, beliefs), emotional (feelings), and
resent the outcome of 9 months of the interpenetrating conative or motivational (wishes, desires) meanings or
action of biology-environment, and this interpenetra- understandings, along with procedures for maintaining,
tion stretches all the way down to DNA (Gottlieb, 2002; implementing, and changing these meanings. Mind,
Lewontin, 2000). Finally, it cannot be repeated too fre- through expressive projections—transforms the world
quently that to say that development is explained by ex- as known, and—through adaptive exploration—trans-
perience does not deny that development is explained by forms itself (i.e., develops). However, this remains a nu-
biology and that development is explained by culture. cleus and only a nucleus, because it lacks the critical
What is denied is the absolute exclusivity of any of these necessary feature of embodiment.
standpoint explanations.
Person-Agent Embodied Actions
Development of Person-Agent
Person-agency is the source of action, and action is the
Psychological development of the person-agent entails source of meaning; but this action itself is embodied. As
the epigenetic stance that novel forms emerge through discussed earlier, embodiment is the claim that our per-
the interpenetrating actions of the target system, and the ception, thinking, feelings, desires—the way we experi-
resistances the target system encounters in both the ac- ence or live the world—is contextualized by our being
tual and objective sociocultural and physical environ- active agents with this particular kind of body. At the
ment. It is through interpenetrating actions that the agent level, embodiment specifies the characteristic na-
system changes and becomes differentiated. But differ- ture of the activity of any living system (e.g., the actual
entiation of parts implies a novel coordination of parts world of the fly is necessarily shaped by the nature of
and this coordination itself identifies the emergence of the fly’s embodied acts). At the person level, embodi-
novelty (see Figure 2.2). Thus, as suggested earlier, the ment affirms that—from the beginning—bodily acts
neurological action system becomes differentiated constrain and inform the nature of intentionality (Mar-
through the interpenetrating actions of neurological- golis, 1987). Intentionality is not limited to a symbolic,
environmental functioning. This differentiation leads to reflective, or transreflective system of psychological
a novel coordination or reorganization that eventually meanings. Intentionality also extends to a system of psy-
leads to the adapted level of conscious practical action chological meanings that characterize practical embod-
found in the neonate. Consciousness is a systemic prop- ied actions operating at the most minimum level of
erty of this emergent action system. The initial adapted consciousness. These most basic meanings and all others
practical consciousness is a minimum awareness of the “come from having a body with particular perceptual
meaning entailed by an act (Zelazo, 1996). Conscious- and motor capabilities that are inseparably linked”
ness cannot be reduced to or “squeezed” out of lower (Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001, p. 1). They
stages, it is the result of a transformation. Similarly, fur- arise—as Piaget repeatedly insisted—from the sensory-
ther developmental differentiations and coordinations of motor functioning that represents a concrete instantia-
actions—described as higher levels of consciousness— tion of embodied actions.
emerge through the interpenetrations of conscious ac- Varela et al. (1991) have sketched a general outline
tion and the sociocultural and physical worlds it for an embodied theory of cognition. Sheets-Johnstone
encounters (see Figure 2.2). Symbolic meaning and the (1990) provides an evolutionary anthropological per-
symbolic representational level of meanings (Mueller & spective on human embodiment and thought, and
Overton, 1998a, 1998b) describes forms of conscious- Santostefano (1995) has detailed the emotional and
54 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

cognitive dimensions of practical, symbolic, and reflec- Overton and Jackson (1973) and more recently by Dick,
tive embodied meanings. Further, many who have stud- Overton, and Kovacs (2005) has demonstrated that bod-
ied psychopathology, from R. D. Laing (1960) to ily gestures support emerging symbolic representations
Donald Winnicott (1965) and Thomas Ogden (1986), at least until the level of reflective meanings.
argue that disruptions in the embodied actions of the At the level of symbolic, reflective, and transreflec-
person-agent are central to an understanding of the de- tive conceptual functioning (see Figure 2.2), the writ-
velopment of severe forms of psychopathology (see ings of Lakoff and Johnson (1999; see also, Lakoff,
Overton and Horowitz, 1991). 1987) are well known for their detailed exploration of
At the level of practical actions (see Figure 2.2), the significance of embodiment. For Lakoff and John-
Bermudez’s (1998) work on the development of self- son, embodiment provides the fundamental metaphors
consciousness is central to an understanding of the that shape meanings at all levels of functioning. In a par-
impact of an embodied person conceptualization. allel but distinct approach, Kainz (1988) has described
Bermudez’s fundamental argument is that late emerging how the basic laws of ordinary logic (i.e., the law of
forms of meaning found in symbolic and reflective con- identity, the law of contradictions, and the law of the ex-
sciousness develop from—and are constrained by—em- cluded middle) can be understood as emerging from the
bodied self-organizing action systems available to the early embodied differentiation of self and other. Fi-
infant. Most important, these early systems entail nally, Liben’s (1999) work on the development of the
person-level somatic proprioception and exteroception. child’s symbolic and reflective spatial understanding
As these person-centered processes interpenetrate the presents a strong argument for an understanding of this
physical and sociocultural worlds, proprioception oper- development in the context of an embodied child rather
ates as the differentiation mechanism for the emergence than in the context of the disembodied eye that tradi-
of a self-consciousness action system, and exteroception tionally has framed this domain.
operates as the differentiation mechanism for the emer-
gence of an object-consciousness system. Hence, over
the first several months of life a basic practical action EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES
associated with “me” and “other ” develops, which in
turn becomes transformed into the symbolic “me” and In broad outline, to this point the chapter has explored
“other ” of early toddlerhood. Thelen’s (2000) work on the nature of the concept of development and related
the role of movement generally, and specifically “ body concepts as they are grounded and sustained within a
memory,” in infant cognitive functioning is another hierarchy of metatheories. The discussed metatheo-
closely related area that illustrates the importance of ries—split, relational, embodied action, developmental
embodiment at the level of practical actions. systems—are themselves contextualized by metatheo-
Langer’s (1994) empirical studies represent impor- retical concepts that operate at yet a higher level of dis-
tant demonstrations of the intercoordination of embod- course (see Figure 2.1). These are the epistemological
ied action systems as these intercoordinations move (i.e., issues of knowing) and ontological (i.e., issues of
development from the practical to the symbolic plane of reality) level of metatheory to which we turn next. The
meaning (see Figure 2.2). Earlier work by Held and his conceptual issues that are illustrated at these levels
colleagues (e.g., Held & Bossom, 1961; Held & Hein, have evolved across the course of history, and any clear
1958) illustrates the significance of voluntary embodied exposition of these issues itself necessitates an histori-
action at all levels of adaptation. Goodwyn, & Acredolo cal approach.
(1993) research on the use of bodily gestures as signs Metaphysics is the broad area of philosophical inquiry
expressing practical meanings in older infants suggests concerned with conceptual inquiry into the nature, ori-
the expressive and instrumental value of embodied prac- gin, and structure of the world or “ being.” Ontology is
tical gesture. Other work has elaborated on the signifi- the domain of metaphysics concerned with question of
cance of bodily representations at the symbolic and what constitutes the Real with a capital R (Putnam,
reflective levels of meaning. For example, while the use 1987). Epistemology is about knowing, and its primary
of fingers for counting is well documented (Gelman & question concerns the validity of what and how we
Williams, 1998), Saxe’s (1981, 1995) research has know. Understood relationally, epistemology is a narra-
shown cross-culturally that other bodily representations tive about how we know what is Real, and ontology is a
enter into counting systems. Further, earlier research by narrative about the Real as we know it. Historically,
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 55

each domain has offered sets of alternatives in answer as neurons. Or, as a social example, “community”
to its fundamental question. The basic epistemological merely refers to the linear aggregate of individuals.
candidates for yielding valid knowledge have been rea- Choosing split-off form as the foundational Real would
son and observation. In the ontological domain, matter assert an idealist ontology. In this choice elements, indi-
and form have been primary candidates for the Real. viduals, and bits, would achieve an identity only in the
When matter is interpreted as bits, or elements, or uni- context of the pattern or form that would constitute the
form pieces, and form is taken as pattern, structure, or Real. Within this ontological context, “system” would
organization, then uniformity and organization, as the be the foundational Real, and matter, such as neurons, a
surrogates of matter and form respectively, are the can- mere reflection of this Real. “Community” in this case
didates for what constitutes the Real. A related set of would be foundational and “individuals” would be taken
candidates for the nature of the Real concerns the as- to be an expression of this form. When the narrative is
sumed activity status of matter and form. The Real may split, as in these cases, the Real becomes an absolute
be assumed to be fundamentally inactive and unchang- foundation and this is referred to as foundationalism or a
ing, or it may be assumed to be fundamentally active and foundationalist position.
changing. Thus, it is possible to conceptualize (a) an in-
active and unchanging matter—a Newtonian favorite;
Plato and Aristotle and the Relational
( b) an active and changing matter—a pre-Newtonian un-
Developmental Tradition
derstanding, as well as Einstein’s post-Newtonian un-
derstanding of the nature of the physical world; (c) an For Plato and Aristotle, there were no radical splits be-
inactive and unchanging form—a position often attrib- tween ontology and epistemology or between the alter-
uted to Plato; and (d) an active and changing form— natives in each domain. Each took the problem of
Leibniz’s monadology and Hegel’s dialectic. knowing as his focus. Both reason and observation, and
In discussing ontology and the Real, it cannot be too form and matter constituted an indissociable comple-
strongly emphasized that there is a critical distinction mentary matrix for understanding the world. Plato fa-
between the use of the term “real” in everyday common- vored an epistemological emphasis on reason; Aristotle
sense life and the ontological. No one argues that there articulated more precisely the dialectical balance of
is a lack of reality or realness in the experienced every- reason and observation. Plato’s point of view, or line of
day world. This is commonsense realism. Commonsense sight, began from the ontological significance of form or
realism accepts the material existence of a real, actual, pattern described in his doctrine of Ideas. However, he
or manifest world and all ontological-epistemological admitted another line of sight, which was matter as a
perspectives treat people, and animals, and physical ob- “ formless, indefinite, substrate of things” (Stace, 1924).
jects as having such a real existence. The ontological Aristotle emphasized the significance of the relational
issue of the Real with a capital R (Putnam, 1987) is a nature of form and matter. Form and matter were under-
very different issue. It concerns the idea of having a stood as dialectically related, as in Escher’s Drawing
base or foundation from which everything else emerges. Hands. Formless matter or matterless form were simply
In this limited sense, the Real is defined as that which is not possible. Aristotle maintained that only individual
not dependent on something else, or that which cannot things exist, but “existence” did not imply a simple split-
be reduced to something else. off matter. Existence implied matter in the context of
If we were to approach the issue from a split under- the categories (forms) of space and time. Thus, exis-
standing, then matter and form would become a di- tence was not the criterion of the Real; the relational
chotomy. In this case, the assertion of either matter or form /matter constituted the Real. As Ross (1959) points
form as the Real would privilege the former and margin- out, “ ‘Matter’ is not for Aristotle a certain kind of thing
alize the latter as reducible Appearance. Asserting split as we speak of matter in opposition to mind. It is a
matter to be the Real yields a materialist ontology. purely relative term—relative to form” (p. 76).
Within this ontological position, form, pattern, organi- Plato and Aristotle also held a relational view of in-
zation, and ideas are cast as appearances that ultimately activity-fixity (termed “Being”) and activity-change
are assumed to find their source or origin in the founda- (termed “Becoming”). Plato is most widely known for
tional Real (i.e., matter). For example, when the concept his postulation of a realm of timeless forms (i.e., a
“system,” is used within this split ontological frame, it realm of the unchanging). In modern times, this notion
simply references the individual elements of matter such has cast Plato as the father of the search for “essences”
56 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

of nature and, thus, what has been called essentialism journey. The story of modernity is defined both by a
(see Mayr, 1982). Conceived in this split fashion, the quest for absolute certainty of knowledge (Toulmin,
fixed forms of essentialism constitute the conceptual 1990) and by an effort to expand individual freedom, es-
grounding for contemporary nativist positions that in- pecially freedom of thought. Building knowledge on ra-
terpret “structure” and “organization” as fixed and un- tional and reasoned grounds, rather than on the grounds
changing. It is unlikely, however, that Plato intended this of authority and dogma, was understood as the key to
split interpretation (Cornford, 1937; Lovejoy, 1936; each of these goals. The early protagonists who devel-
Nisbet, 1969), as Plato himself specifically stated, “ that oped the basic story line were Galileo Galilei, and his
only the divine is changeless; that the world of man and physics of a natural world disconnected from mind; Rene
society is an incessant process of development and of be- Descartes, whose epistemology elevated disconnection
coming” (Nisbet, 1969, p. 308). or splitting to a first principle; and Thomas Hobbes,
Aristotle’s relational understanding of the nature of who saw both mind and nature in a vision of atomistic
being (static, fixed, inactive, unchanging) and becoming materialism. Of the three, Descartes was to have the
(active, changing) is expressed in his concepts of the greatest and most lasting impact on the formation of
“potentiality” and “actuality” of individual things. The split metatheory.
actuality of an object of inquiry (i.e., what the object is Descartes major contributions entailed the introduc-
at a given moment) points to its being. The passage from tion and articulation of splitting and foundationalism as
potentiality to actuality points to the becoming of the core interrelated epistemological themes. As described
object (Ross, 1959, p. 176; Wartofsky, 1968). Coming earlier splitting is the formation of a dichotomy—of an
into being (i.e., becoming) constituted Aristotle’s con- exclusive either/or relationship—and foundationalism is
ceptualization of developmental change and—as in the claim that one or the other elements of the formed
unified definition of development elaborated earlier in dichotomy constitutes the ultimate Real. Nature and
this chapter—he emphasized both the transformational nurture, idealism and materialism (form and matter),
and variational nature of change as critical relational reason and observation, subject and object, constancy
features of becoming. Aristotle referred to transforma- and change, biology and culture, and so on all can be—
tional change as “generation and destruction,” and vari- and under the influence of Cartesian epistemology
ational change “alteration” (Ross, 1959, p. 101–102). are—thought of as split-off competing alternatives.
Despite the centrality of development (i.e., becoming) to Privilege the one as the Real—as the foundation—and it
his system, it is often suggested that Aristotle’s ideas follows under a split interpretation that the other is mar-
promoted an understanding of nature as a hierarchical ginalized as mere appearance or epiphenomenal.
organization of unchanging forms that later became cel- The foundation here is the final achievement of ab-
ebrated as the scala naturae or “ The Great Chain of solute certainty and the end of doubt. The foundation is
Being” (Lovejoy, 1936). The attribution of this nonevo- not a vantage point, standpoint, or point of view, and
lutionary and, hence, nondevelopmental view of nature certainty and doubt are not dialectically related as an
to Aristotle confuses his ontological-epistemological identity of opposites. Descartes’s foundationalism de-
stance with the proposal of a single possible biological scribes the final fixed secure base. It constitutes an ab-
classificatory system (Lovejoy, 1936, p. 58). Aristotle solute, fixed, unchanging bedrock; a final Archimedes
was the champion of a logic of classification, but the point (Descartes, 1969).
other side of the story is that he also recognized With splitting and foundationalism in place, the theme
the dangers and limitations of any specific system of of reductionism was firmly planted in the history of this
classification. Today, to characterize Aristotle as an tradition, and virtually all change to the present day rep-
antievolutionist who promotes a static conception of hi- resents elaboration and variation of the idea that Appear-
erarchical forms (see Mayr, 1982) misses the relational ance will ultimately be reduced to (i.e., explained
character of Aristotle’s work. by) the Real. “Eliminative reductionism,” “ontological-
reductionism,” “property ontological-reductionism,”
“ theoretical-reductionism,” “definitional-reductionism,”
Modernity and the Rise of the Split Tradition
“causal reductionism,” (Searle, 1992) “radical or leveling
In the seventeenth century with the dawn of the modern reductionism,” “microreductionism,” “smooth reduction-
age or “modernity,” split metatheory began its historical ism,” “semantic reductionism” (Shanon, 1993), and
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 57

“ biosociological reductionsim” (Bunge & Ardila, dent of mind or knower (Searle, 1992). This constituted,
1987)—while each making interesting and valuable dis- as Putnam (1990) has said, an epistemological “God’s
criminations to the plot line—add little to the theme eye view.”
(Overton, 2002). Objectivist matter thus came to constitute the onto-
Having literally invented dualism by splitting the Real logical Real to which the manifold of commonsense ex-
into a Subject piece and an Object piece, Descartes—and perience would be reduced to arrive at the goal of
all others who have since accepted the Cartesian cate- science; a systematized body of certain empirical knowl-
gories—was faced with the problem of how to put the in- edge. Support for the materialist foundation arose and
dividual pieces back together again. If there is an was further defined by Newton’s contributions. Central
absolute bedrock to nature and this bedrock is composed among these was the redefinition of the nature of matter
of individual elements, there must be a glue that can join in a way that conceived of all bodies as fundamentally
the pieces into the appearance of wholeness. Descartes inactive. Prior to Newton, matter was understood as in-
favored the solution called interactionism, a solution not herently active. Matter had been conceived in terms of
unlike some of the “conventional” interactionist posi- the relation of being (static, fixed) and becoming (ac-
tions discussed earlier with respect to the nature-nurture tive, changing). Newton, however, through his concept of
issue. According to conventional interactionism any be- inertia, split activity ( becoming) and matter ( being) and
havior is explained as the additive outcome of pure forms redefined matter as inactivity (Prosch, 1964).
of fixed elements labeled nature and pure forms of fixed The redefinition of bodies as inert matter, and the as-
elements labeled nurture. sumption of the atomicity of matter (i.e., bodies are ul-
timately aggregates of elemental matter that is uniform
Empiricism, Materialism, and Objectivism in nature, and in combination, yields the things of the
Cartesian splitting and foundationalism came to operate world), were basic for Newton’s formulation of his laws
as a permanent background frame for modernity’s split of motion. However, they were also ideas that a later
tradition. However, the specification of the nature of the generation generalized into a metaphysical worldview
ultimate foundation remained at issue. It was left to that identified the nature of the Real as fixed inert mat-
Hobbes and later empiricists to operate within the frame ter and only fixed inert matter. This “ billiard ball”
of subject split from object, mind split from body, ideas or “mechanistic” worldview entailed “ the notion that
split from matter, and to build into this frame the materi- basically everything . . . was made up of small, solid
alist identification of atomistic matter as the ultimate particles, in themselves inert, but always in motion and
ontological foundation—the Real. In the eighteenth cen- elasticitly [sic] rebounding from each other, . . . and op-
tury—a period called the Enlightenment—British em- erating mechanically” (Prosch, 1964, p. 66). Within this
piricism arose as a protest against the rational and split worldview, all human psychological processes, in-
subjective elements found in Descartes—against both cluding the cognitive (perception, thought, reasoning,
the “I” and the “think” of the famous “I think, therefore memory, language), the affective (emotions), and the
I am.” In the epistemological writings of John Locke, conative (motivation, wishes, desires), were necessarily
George Berkeley, and David Hume, reason became split reduced to a bedrock of sensations. Associations were
off from observation and empiricism arose as the doc- used as the glue designed to explain how from these sim-
trine that all knowledge originates in the senses (obser- ple sensations it would be possible to have the complex
vation) and only the senses and, hence, all knowledge ideas, emotions, and desires that are apparent in com-
must ultimately be reducible to sense information (see monsense understanding.
Overton, 1998 for an extended discussion). This empiri- With these themes at hand—splitting, foundational-
cist line of modernity continued to pursue the goal of ism, materialism, objectivism—it was a short epistemo-
building knowledge on rational and reasoned grounds, logical step to the formulation of a complete scientific
but the rational and reason came to be considered acqui- methodology termed “mechanical explanation” that
sitions, which in turn needed to be explained as arising with relatively minor modifications has extended to the
from the senses and only from the senses. This forced present day as the basic methodology of neopositivism
monism operated to marginalize subjectivity, mind, or and later instrumentalism, conventionalism, and func-
ideas, thereby creating objectivism; the belief that the ul- tionalism. This notion of explanation is discussed in a
timate material Reality exists as an absolute—indepen- later section on methodology.
58 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

While the eighteenth century empiricists focused of Leibniz’s philosophy is therefore to be looked for nei-
their enquiry primarily on cognitive issues (“complex ther in the concept of individuality nor in that of univer-
ideas”) in the nineteenth century, the Utilitarian philos- sality. These concepts are explicable only in mutual
ophy of Jeremy Bentham, passed down through James relationship; they reflect one another ” (p. 33).
and John Stuart Mill, and Alexander Baine, sought an
Leibniz
extension of the empiricist doctrine by applying the
Newtonian paradigm to the explanation of actions, val- With ontology as the line of sight, Leibniz, a contempo-
ues, morals, and politics (Halevy, 1955). The experi- rary of Locke, refused to split off being from becoming.
mental psychologies of Wundt and Titchener grew from Activity and ceaseless change were fundamental to the
this ground, followed by the functionalist perspectives nature of the Real. In his concept of substance, Leibniz
of Angell, Carr, Woodworth, and, ultimately, behavior- substituted a “pluralistic universe” in place of
ism and multiple forms of neobehaviorism, including Descartes’s dualism and Locke’s materialist monism.
learning theories and social learning theories of devel- Leibniz’s “monad” is the fundamental unit of this uni-
opment. With behaviorism, “stimuli” and “responses” verse. The monad “ ‘is’ only in so far as it is active, and
came to replace the earlier “sensations” as bedrock ex- its activity consists in a continuous transition from one
planatory concepts. new state to another as it produces these states out of it-
In the twentieth century, the split tradition continued self in unceasing succession. . . . Never is one of these
operating as a metatheory for various domains of in- elements just like another; never can it be resolved into
quiry, including developmental inquiry. In philosophy, the same sum of purely static qualities” (Cassirer,
the tradition extended its influence in the articulation of 1951, p. 29). “In Leibniz’s philosophy an inalienable
Anglo-American analytic philosophy. As the name sug- prerogative is first gained for the individual entity. The
gests, analytic philosophy has continued to maintain the individual no longer functions as a special case, as an
Cartesian split categories and to the present day, in vari- example; it now expresses something essential in it-
ous surrogate forms, pursue the analytic ideal of finding self. . . . Every individual substance is not only a frag-
the “atoms,” or absolute bedrock foundational elements ment of the universe, it is the universe itself seen from
of knowing (Rorty, 1979). The British line of this ap- a particular viewpoint. And only the totality of these
proach located its foundationalism in the analysis of unique points of view gives us the truth of reality”
“ordinary language.” The American line pursued the (Cassirer, 1951, pp. 32–33).
same goal in the “neutral data language” and “observa- From an epistemological line of sight, if substance is
tion sentences” of neopositivism, elaborated in the writ- in “continuous transition from one state to another,”
ings of Moritz Schlick, Roudolf Carnap, Gustav then understanding entails the rational discovery of the
Bergmann, Herbert Feigl, Carl Hempel, A. J. Ayer, and rule of this transition and the laws according to which it
the “earlier ” Ludwig Wittgenstein (of the Tractatus occurs. This is Leibniz’s rationalism. It differs signifi-
Logico-Philosophicus). cantly from Descartes’s in that there is no return to God
as the imprinter of these universal ideas, nor is reason
split from observation. Universal ideas as rules and
Modernity and the Elaboration of
laws, and particular experiences as observations, are re-
Relational Metatheory
lational or co-relational. Knowing may begin in observa-
As British empiricism followed its route of splitting and tion, but observation proceeds in the context of some
foundationalism, the German modern period continued system, idea, or form. Analysis is not suppressed in
to elaborate relational epistemological and ontological Leibniz’s system; it occupies a significant place in his
issue. At the forefront of the German Enlightenment thought. However, analysis is not privileged over synthe-
stands Leibniz’s grand synthesis of a universal mathe- sis; all analysis implies a whole or synthetic aspect ac-
matics and a metaphysics of individuality (Gadamer, cording to which the analysis proceeds. Cassirer (1951)
1993). For Leibniz, epistemology as the universal, the points out that, for Leibniz, the “concept of the whole
knowing of the Subject, was joined in a relational matrix has gained a different and deeper significance. For the
with ontology as the particular, the being of the Object. universal whole, which is to be grasped can no longer be
The twentieth-century philosopher, Ernst Cassirer reduced to a mere sum of its parts. The new whole is or-
(1951) captures this fundamental relational quality of ganic, not mechanical; its nature does not consist in the
Leibniz’s work when he asserts that “ the central thought sum of its parts but is presupposed by its parts and con-
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 59

stitutes the condition of the possibility of their nature vantage point, we foreground, and, thus, acquire the
and being” (p. 31). horizon of two faces turned toward each other. The two
The Leibnizian tradition is a relational tradition, and faces become a legitimate object of inquiry, moving to-
it emerged, as Cassirer suggests, from an organic under- ward a full achievement of this horizon. From another
standing of the nature of events and the nature of know- vantage point, a vase is foregrounded and a different
ing. Thus, it was within an emerging organic worldview horizon is acquired. Both horizons yield legitimate ob-
that specific features of the relational ontological- jects of study; yet, both are parts of the one whole, and
epistemological ground came to be articulated. The sig- that whole constitutes the fusion of horizons.
nificance of the legacy of the Leibnizian relational Other developmental implications of the Leibnizian
tradition for developmental inquiry is—like the signifi- relational tradition follow from the principle that activ-
cance of the legacy of the Newtonian split tradition— ity, change, and organization are as fundamental as
severalfold. First, it established a distinct rationale for stability, fixity, and uniformity. Activity-stability,
the proposal that knowing necessarily proceeds from a change-fixity, and organization-uniformity compose the
“point of view” or line of sight. The importance of per- bipolarities, or relative moments, of the ontological-
spective or point of view is traceable to Plato (Kainz, epistemological relational matrix. This became the prin-
1988), but Leibniz gave it a central significance by em- ciple of Becoming in philosophical and developmental
bedding it in the relational context of parts to whole. inquiry (Overton, 1991b). As suggested earlier, it con-
Point of view does not imply an unrestrained relativism trasts directly with the Newtonian-Humean tradition of
as it sometimes seems to suggest in contemporary usage. split off Being, where activity, change (other than ran-
A “point of view” within the Leibnizian tradition, only dom variation), and organization are treated as ulti-
becomes a point of view as it is embedded with other mately reducible Appearances.
points of view within a broader context. For example, The principle of Becoming, whose origins are trace-
Subject and Object become “points of view” only within able to the pre-Socratic works of Anaximander and Her-
a broader organic unity that joins the two within a rela- aclitus (Wartofsky, 1968), takes, as its line of sight,
tional matrix. Without this unity, they are simply iso- activity, change, and organization as necessary and
lated elements and the application of the phrase “point nonreducible features of the cosmos (Allport, 1955; Nis-
of view” is quite meaningless. bet, 1969). In the eighteenth century, Becoming was
In the postmodern era of contemporary Continental generalized from Leibniz’s ontology to an understand-
philosophy, point of view continues to exert a strong in- ing of man, society, and nature.
fluence through the concept of “ horizon” of understand- In 1725, Giambattista Vico attacked the static view
ing or inquiry. The notion of horizon appears in the of human nature and proposed that changes of society
works of Nietzsche and Husserl, but it has been most are the reflection of the imminent and necessary devel-
fully developed in the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg opment of the human mind. In 1755, Kant, in his Gen-
Gadamer (1989). A horizon is the entire range of under- eral History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens,
standing that can be generated from a particular vantage applied the notion of Becoming to the material world,
point. Achieving a horizon entails placing something in and maintained that this world continuously evolves in a
the foreground or what is termed the process of fore- systematic and ordered fashion. And from 1784 on, in a
grounding, a methodological principle that is inherently series of four volumes, Johann Gottfried Herder ex-
relational in nature. Whatever is foregrounded must be tended the idea of Becoming to include nature, living
foregrounded from something else. Consequently, fore- species, and human society alike (Toulmin & Good-
grounding makes visible this other that is joined with it field, 1965).
in a relational matrix. With respect to developmental in-
quiry, for example, to “ foreground” the subject is to rec- Hegel
ognize the object; to foreground the expressive is to In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
recognize the instrumental, or to foreground the trans- most influential figure to advance the principle of Be-
formational is to recognize the variational. It is the rec- coming was G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). For Hegel, his-
iprocity of horizons, or what is termed the fusion of tory was a necessary dynamic process of growth, defined
horizons that ultimately constitutes truth in such a as expressive-transformational change. The nature of this
relational system. The situation here is similar to the fa- change was defined by the dialectic (see earlier discus-
miliar reversible figure of the vase-person. From one sion), a process through which concepts or fundamental
60 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

features of a system dif ferentiate and move toward inte- characterized by periodicity, unevenness in the develop-
gration. This process, suggests a grounding for under- ment of different functions, metamorphosis or qualita-
standing change as directional. In split understandings, tive transformation of one form into another ” (p. 73).
there must always be a controversy over whether change It is significant also that these three major develop-
is best characterized as either cyclical (variational) or di- mentalists of the last half of the twentieth century—Pi-
rectional (transformational). Within the dialectical con- aget (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, p. 8), Werner (Werner &
text, this dichotomy is resolved through recognition that Kaplan, 1963, p. 11) and Vygotsky (1978) all considered
the polarities of thesis-antithesis constitute the cyclical development to be change entailing a spirality that
dimension of change. However, such cycles are never emerges from cycles and yields direction (see Figure
closed, as they would be in a circle. When a circle is 2.6). As Vygotsky noted specifically with respect to
opened a bit, it does not return precisely to its starting higher psychological functions, “Development, as often
point. As a consequence, with the continuation of activ- happens, proceeds here not in a circle but in a spiral,
ity, the open cycle forms a spiral (the synthesis or inte- passing through the same point at each new revolution
gration). With the repetition of spirals, a direction is while advancing to a higher level” (p. 56).
formed (see Overton 1994a, 1994c). Along with classical developmental theorists like
In the nineteenth century, the principle of Becoming Werner, Piaget, and Vygotsky, dynamic theorists, both
was extended in the works of social theorists such as from the British object-relations (e.g., Fairbairn, 1952;
Comte, Marx, and Spencer and in the writings of biolo- Winnicott, 1965) and the ego psychology schools (Erik-
gists such as Wolff, Goethe, and von Baer. And James son, 1968) have found the core dialectical Becoming no-
Mark Baldwin (1895, 1897/1973) first formulated a de- tions of “activity,” “differentiation,” and “integration”
velopmental psychology specifically in terms of dialec- central for understanding both normal and pathological
tical categories. As Broughton (1981) points out, “ his human ontogenesis (Overton & Horowitz, 1991).
[Baldwin’s] . . . orientation came to be tempered with a This discussion has focused on the historical impact
Hegelian view of dialectical progress through qualita- of the Leibnizian-Hegelian tradition as it advanced and
tively distinct levels of consciousness” (p. 399; see also, articulated the principle of Becoming. More broadly, the
Freeman-Moir, 1982). philosophical grounding of the relational developmental
In the twentieth century, Heinz Werner (1948, 1957) tradition was progressively elaborated from Leibniz to
drew his own theoretical approach from the dialectical Kant to Hegel, and it was Kant’s own contribution that
feature of the principle of Becoming. In this context, he simultaneously both advanced and retarded this pro-
proposed the orthogenetic (normal development) princi- cess. Kant’s line of sight was epistemological, and be-
ple as a universal explanatory principle, or law, of trans- cause knowing is a human activity, his focus was on the
formational change. The orthogenetic principle asserts human conditions necessary for knowledge. Hume, after
that “ whenever there is development it proceeds from an splitting reason (mind) from observation, had come to
initial state of relative globality and lack of differentia- argue that valid (universal and necessary) knowledge
tion to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, cannot be found in the observational world, which yields
and hierarchic integration” (1957, p. 126). But Werner only the particular and the contingent. Kant agreed, but
was not alone among twentieth-century developmental- adopting a relational stance, he argued that this fact
ists in constructing metatheoretical and theoretical un- does not lead to the dismissal of valid knowledge.
derstandings framed by the dialectic of Becoming. Rather, it simply demonstrates that if contingent knowl-
Piaget, for example, draws from the same image in laying edge is a feature of the observational world, then valid
out the metatheoretical grounding for his “equilibration” knowledge must be a feature of thought, of mind.
explanation of human transformational development:
“ These global transformations . . . gradually denote a Kant
sort of law of evolution which can be phrased as follows: Arguing from the relational perspective, Kant main-
assimilation and accommodation proceed from a state of tained that both valid and contingent knowledge are
chaotic undifferentiation to a state of differentiation essential aspects of human experience (i.e., both
with correlative coordination” (Piaget, 1954, p. 352). the universal and the particular, the necessary and the
Similarly, Vygotsky (1978) maintains that development contingent are features of human experience). Conse-
is best characterized as “a complex dialectical process quently, the question was not—as assumed in the
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 61

Newtonian-Humean split tradition—whether it was edge and the accessing and application of that knowl-
possible to have valid knowledge. The central question edge became the background for a later cognitive devel-
became the conditions of mind that had to be assumed opmental distinction between the development of a
to produce the experienced valid knowledge. Kant cognitive competence and the development of proce-
began the description of these conditions with the pre- dures for accessing and applying that competence
supposition that reason-thought-concepts form a rela- (Chandler & Chapman, 1994; Overton 1990, 1991a;
tional matrix with observation-intuitions-perceptions. Overton & Dick, in press).
This affirmation of the Leibnizian relational tradi-
tion—itself often described as Kant’s (1781/1966) at- Kant and the Phenomena-Noumena Split
tempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism—is Although this sketch of human cognition is grounded in
nowhere better articulated than in the famous rela- the relational, two additional features of Kant’s position
tional aphorism ascribed to him: “Concepts without are inconsistent with the relational developmental tradi-
percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are tion: Kant’s Cartesian split of phenomena and noumena,
blind.” This often repeated aphorism is a variant of and that Kant considered the categories and forms of intu-
Kant’s actual “ Thoughts without contents are empty, ition to be fundamentally unchanging. Noumena were de-
intuitions without concepts are blind. . . . The under- scribed as “things-in-themselves,” or objects and events
standing cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their independent of any representation of the object or event.
union only can knowledge be produced” (p. 45). Phenomena were described as representations of objects
From this overarching relational commitment, Kant and events as they are known by the knower. For Kant,
presented a philosophical sketch of human cognition these spheres were split. The thing-in-itself was discon-
that further affirmed both the activity and organization nected from knowing, and knowing was disconnected
features of the Becoming tradition. Kant’s description from the thing-in-itself. A direct consequence of this split
of mind basically entailed three interrelated dynamic is that the (person) point of view became a privileged po-
system components. Because Kant did not split structure sition, in the same way that the Newtonian-Humean tradi-
and function, these dynamic systems are sometimes ex- tion had made the point of view a privileged position.
amined from the structural perspective and are called One broad impact of this Kantian split for develop-
“ faculties” and “ forms.” At other times, they are exam- mental inquiry is that it came to form the background
ined from the functional perspective and called “pow- logic for the nativist side of the nature-nurture debate,
ers” or “activities”: First, sense data or content is just as the Newtonian-Humean split formed the back-
transformed into a priori categories of space and time ground logic for the nurture side. This nativism—
according to the forms of intuition or forms of percep- whether with respect to Chomskyian (1975) explanations
tion. Second, perceptions become synthesized in terms of language (see Jackendoff, 1994; Overton, 1994b;
of a priori categories of understanding. The categories of Pinker, 1997), or with respect to other contemporary
understanding (e.g., existence, reality, causality, neces- forms of neo-nativism (e.g., Astuti, Solomon, Carey,
sity) operate as a base level rule system that orders per- 2004; Baillargeon, 1993; Karmiloff-Smith, 1991; J. M.
cepts according to the very features that Hume had Mandler, 1992; Spelke & Newport, 1998)—presents a
dismissed (e.g., necessity, causality, reality, existence). picture of the human mind as a set of innate rules, un-
Third, the imaginative faculty characterizes the activity touched by history and culture; an inversion of the em-
of mind as it functions to synthesize perceptions and piricist tradition, which presents a picture of history and
categories into objects of knowledge; “ There exists culture, untouched by the human mind.
therefore in us an active power for the synthesis of the
Hegel’s Relational Developmental Reconciliation
manifold which we call imagination. . . . This imagina-
of Mind and Nature
tion is meant to change the manifold of intuition into an
image” (1781/1966, p. 112). Hegel resolved Kant’s split and moved his static cate-
In addition to these three basic components of mind, gories back into a more fully coherent relational devel-
Kant described a faculty of “judgment.” Judgment is the opmental context. Hegel (1807, Introduction) began his
active process that applies knowledge—gained through work from the position that there could be no detached
intuition, understanding, and imagination—to the prac- thing-in-itself, just as there could be no detached
tical world. This scheme of the relation between knowl- knowing-in-itself. Rather, the world of knowing and
62 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

the world of actual objects operated within the same as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone
dialectical relational matrix as other fundamental cate- constitutes the life of the whole. (Hegel, 1807, p. 2)
gories. This is the meaning of his well-known rela-
tional aphorism: “What is reasonable [the known] is The Hegelian image of growth according to active
actual [the object] and what is actual is reasonable” processes of system differentiation and integration con-
(Hegel, 1830, p. 9). Like Kant and others who held this trasts sharply with the Kantian image of fixed, a priori
line of thought, Hegel took the a subject, person cen- given active systems. A number of contemporary do-
tered, or phenomenological point of view. However, for mains of developmental inquiry reflect the legacy of
Hegel, the world of actual objects and events became a these traditions. For example, the Kantian metaphor of
dialectical feature of this perspective. mind as a fixed “steel filing cabinet ” provides back-
In his phenomenology (i.e., the study of experience) ground support for contemporary approaches to devel-
of mind (i.e., of the subject), Hegel distinguished two opmental inquiry that offer the digital computer as their
features or “moments” of consciousness: (1) the moment guiding model of the nature of mind. The computer
of knowledge (i.e., knowing, thinking, “notion”) and image itself fixes an understanding of the nature of
(2) the moment of truth (i.e., the actual or object). At cognitive-affective processes, change, and persons. The
any point, these moments may not stand in a harmonious reality that emerges from this metaphor portrays cogni-
relationship, as when what one thinks to be the case tive development as either a simple increase in represen-
(moment of knowledge) turns out to be in error with re- tational content (Scholnick & Cookson, 1994), which
spect to the actual world (moment of truth). In this di- this machine “processes,” through various linear causal
alectic history comes to play a central role, and mechanisms, or as an increase in the efficiency of the
knowledge becomes developmental, as when there is a computational machinery itself (Siegler, 1989, 1996;
lack of correspondence between these two moments Sternberg, 1984). In this picture, there is no room for
then “consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it the expressive-transformational change found in the
conform to the object ” (Hegel, 1807, p. 54). Thus, while works of Hegelian oriented investigators such as Piaget,
Kant maintained that knowing is action that remains Werner, Erikson, Bowlby, and others
static in its form, Hegel held knowing to be action that The Kantian-Hegelian contrast also grounds and sus-
transforms itself across time. tains an important debate in the domain of affective de-
In Hegel, the Kantian stable and fixed features of velopment among those who begin from a shared
mind became fluid and changing, or as Hundert (1989) understanding that “emotions are not ‘stimuli’ or ‘re-
points out, Kant’s metaphor of mind as “a steel filing sponses’ but central, organizing features of personality
cabinet ” became replaced by a metaphor of organic and behavior ” (Malatesta, Culver, Tesman, & Shepard,
growth. This metaphor of organic growth then assumes 1989, p. 5). Moving from this shared subject or person
the position as background that sustains and promotes centered point of view that takes expressive change as
future thinking from a relational-developmental per- the domain of developmental inquiry, a Kantian group
spective. The metaphor is evident in the relational con- (e.g., Ekman, 1984; Izard, 1977; Izard and Malatesta,
cepts of “differentiation” and “integration” that emerge 1987) and a Hegelian group (e.g., Lewis 1993; Sroufe,
from the dialectic, and Hegel’s description of the devel- 1979) set off on different paths concerning how best to
opment of knowledge that he presents in the first pages characterize the affective development of the child. The
of his Phenomenology, stands as a prototype for the de- Kantians argue for the adequacy of models that describe
velopmental organic vision: the infant as having a number of “discrete” basic emo-
tions innately available. The Hegelians argue that a
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom,
more adequate description suggests that the infant be-
and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter;
gins affective life—as well as social and cognitive
similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up
in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the
life—as a relatively undifferentiated action system that
fruit now emerges as the truth instead. These forms are not becomes differentiated and reintegrated through operat-
just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one ing on the actual world. Malatesta et al. (1989) capture
another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time the psychological translation of the Hegelian framework
their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity with respect to Sroufe’s work: “Affects begin as undif-
in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is ferentiated precursor states of distress and nondistress
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 63

and differentiate into specific emotions only gradually. characterizes Piaget’s (1992) writings, as he suggests
Differentiation occurs in a stage-like way as a function when he declares himself, “neither empiricist nor a pri-
of major developmental reorganizations” (p. 11). orist but rather constructivist or partisan of dialectic as
The debate over the form of emotional development a source of novelties” (p. 215).
is paralleled by a debate about the nature of the rela- Object relations as a family of theories of human de-
tionship between cognitive and emotional develop- velopment, along with Erikson’s ego theory and the
ment. This debate is also framed by split and relational cognitive-affective theories of Piaget and Werner, all
positions. The split positions assert that conceptual focus their inquiry on the psychological development of
boundaries are cuts of nature. The relational develop- the individual or the person. However, phenomenological
mental position understands them as moments of func- constructivist inquiry may take as its point of view
tioning. As Santostefano (1995) points out, “Cognition either this constructive process or the correlation be-
and emotion will remain segregated as long as investi- tween this process and cultural-biological objects. Thus,
gators view the boundary as real and the domains as within phenomenological constructivism, as within the
opposites, either independent of each other (e.g., Za- broader relational framework, theories of intrapsychic
jonc, Pietromonaco, & Bargh, 1982), parallel and inter- development and theories of interpersonal development
acting with one another (e.g., Leventhal, 1982) or with do not necessarily conflict. Consider, Piagetian in-
one dominating the other (e.g., Izard, 1982; G. Man- trapsychic and Vygotskyian interpersonal approaches to
dler, 1982)” (p. 63). development. The development of individual intrapsy-
chic dynamic organizations has been the Piagetian focus
Phenomenological Constructivism and Realism
of inquiry, but a good deal of Piaget’s own investigations
The Hegelian reconciliation of mind and nature estab- concerned the role of the interpersonal-cultural context
lished the conceptual base for a particular type of (Carpendale & Mueller, 2004; Overton, 2004b; Piaget,
constructivism that is probably best referred to as 1995; Youniss & Damon, 1992). The sociocultural inter-
phenomenological constructivism. Constructivism is personal process has been the Vygotskian focus; yet,
broadly the position that the activity of mind necessar- Vygotsky’s writings demonstrate a significant interest
ily participates in the construction of the known world. in intrapsychic dynamic organizations of the person. van
Constructivism is an epistemological position that af- der Veer and Valsiner (1994) argue that it is inaccurate
firms the necessity of the constitutive dimension of the to depict Piaget and Vygotsky as irreconcilable oppo-
person in all knowing. Constructivism is usually con- nents, as Piaget and Vygotsky did not differ about the
trasted with Realism, which is the epistemological claim development of “personal-cognitive (and affective)
that the world as known is a direct reflection of a mind- structures” (p. 6) and there is an “actual closeness of
independent world. For the realist, perception of this the basic personalistic (i.e., person centered) stand-
world is direct, without the mediating activity of mind points of both . . . [that] has gone without attention”
(see, for example, Gibson, 1966, 1979). Phenomenologi- (p. 6). As a consequence of both their reciprocal inter-
cal constructivism is the position that the mind con- ests and their metatheoretical closeness, Piaget and Vy-
structs the world as known, but the known world is a gotsky can reasonably be offered as alternative poles of
co-actor in the process of construction. Following Hegel, a broadly unified approach to developmental inquiry: Pi-
there are alternative object worlds, and it is important to aget’s intrapsychic inquiry functions in the context of
be explicit about whether inquiry is focusing on the sub- the Vygotskian interpersonal action, as Vygotsky’s in-
ject’s object world—inquiry explores phenomenological terpersonal inquiry functions in the context of the Pi-
constructivism—or the physical-cultural object world— agetian intrapsychic action.
inquiry explores implications of the settings within
which phenomenological constructivism occurs. Hilary Hermeneutics: Gadamer and the Relational
Putnam (1987) clearly captures the sense of phenomeno- Developmental Tradition
logical constructivism: “My view is not a view in Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976, 1989, 1993) in Europe,
which the mind makes up the world. . . . If one must use along Charles Taylor (1979, 1985, 1991, 1995) in
metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the North America, illustrate contemporary forms of the
mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the Leibnizian-Hegelian relational developmental philo-
world” (p. 1). Phenomenological constructivism best sophical tradition. Although both Gadamer and Taylor
64 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

reject features of the Hegelian system (e.g., the source of further projections of meaning. Through this
dogmatic notion that history must proceed according to circle of projection and correction understanding ad-
the dialectic), each draws from and extends Hegel’s no- vances, and the notion of an advance or progression is ap-
tions of the relational, the developmental, and the cen- propriate here because the hermeneutic circle is never a
trality of action as both expressive-constitutive and closed circle, and represents—following Hegel’s dialec-
instrumental-communicative. Both also contributed to tic—the open cycle whose action creates a continuing di-
an understanding of the centrality of embodiment; rectional spirality to knowing. “ The circle is constantly
Gadamer in his existential grounding of the hermeneutic expanding, since the concept of the whole is relative, and
and Taylor in his explicit discussions of embodiment. being integrated in ever larger contexts always affects the
Broadly, hermeneutics is the theory or philosophy of understanding of the individual part ” (Gadamer, 1989,
the interpretation of meaning. Its heritage goes back to a p. 190).
classical period when the hermeneutic task involved the The hermeneutic circle has formed the conceptual
discovery of the meaning of sacred texts. Schleierma- context for several features of developmental inquiry.
cher made important formative contributions during the When inquiry is focused on the transformational nature
Romantic period. Vico and Droysen later added a histor- of ontogenetic change, the hermeneutic circle becomes
ical dimension to the problem of interpretation, and the conceptual context for the Piagetian theory of
Dilthey, in his Critique of Historical Reason at the turn assimilation-accommodation, as the action mechanism
of the twentieth century developed the method of verste- of change. Assimilation constitutes the projection of ex-
hen (understanding) as a methodology for the human pressive meanings (i.e., affects, perceptions, cognitions)
sciences (Bleicher, 1980). onto a world being constituted. Accommodation consti-
Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach has been labeled tutes the action of correction, as assimilation yields par-
“ universal hermeneutics” or “philosophical hermeneu- tial success-partial failure. Psychological development
tics” (as distinct from Habermas’s “critical hermeneu- necessarily proceeds from some organization (sensory
tics” to be discussed in a later section). As heir of the motor, representational, reflective) that constitutes pre-
hermeneutic tradition, Gadamer (1989) elaborates upon understanding, and this is projected to constitute the
the method of verstehen (see the relational developmen- world as experienced. But this projection meets the de-
tal methodology section of this chapter), but it goes be- mands of a world with its own structure, and action cor-
yond a methodology to present a broad philosophical rects itself in anticipation of further projection.
position that seeks to answer the question: “How is un- When inquiry is focused on defining the scientific
derstanding possible?” nature of developmental inquiry, then the hermeneutic
circle articulates the relational scientific logic called
The Hermeneutic Circle: Transformational “abduction” or “retroduction.” This concept and its
Change. The hermeneutic circle—a reaffirmation of place in a relational metamethod will be detailed in the
the Leibnizian-Hegelian holism of the unity of parts to methodology section of this chapter.
whole—constitutes the fundamental background condi- In claiming the hermeneutic circle as the core pre-
tion for all understanding from a hermeneutic point of condition for understanding, Gadamer follows Heideg-
view. Understanding moves forward from preunderstand- ger, by grounding the concept in the existential world
ing to understanding in a circular movement. The (1989, p. 293). Through this grounding (a) epistemology
whole—whether a text that requires understanding, or and ontology are joined as relative moments in the whole
some general phenomenon of inquiry, such as human de- of understanding, and ( b) understanding is identified as
velopment—is initially approached with the meanings, or both relational (the reciprocity of the interpreter and
“prejudices” that constitute common sense. These are the tradition) and variational-transformational (the oscillat-
initial meanings of what hermeneutics terms the preun- ing movement of part and whole leads to changes in the
derstanding. These anticipatory meanings—called the form of the individual and tradition).
horizon of a particular present (Gadamer, 1989, p. 306)— The hermeneutic circle, as the precondition for un-
are projected onto the phenomenon of inquiry. As a con- derstanding, owes an obvious debt to the Leibnizian-
sequent, they form an early stage in understanding. Hegelian holistic tradition. Gadamer acknowledges this
However, the object of inquiry is not merely a figment of debt, and identifies himself as “an heir of Hegel.” How-
projection but is itself an internally coherent whole; thus, ever, this kinship is defined most significantly when
the object of inquiry reciprocally operates as a corrective Gadamer articulates the specific conditions for under-
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 65

standing; for here he endorses the Hegelian “dialectic of Piaget—between the interpersonal and the intrapsychic.
the universal and concrete as the summation of the When located in this frame, his work becomes more
whole of metaphysics” (Gadamer, 1993, p. 51). closely aligned with the Gibsonian (Gibson, 1966, 1979)
The preservation and renewal of the dialectic of realist ecological position. In this context, the person’s
universal and concrete—the transcendental and the “intentions” become reduced to instrumental acts that
immanent—defines the core of Gadamer’s approach. change through a Darwinian-like selection process in
Here universal and concrete stand in a dialectic rela- accordance with the affordances of the environment for
tionship, an identity of opposites. Each is granted an action (Reed, 1993; Rogoff, 1993).
ontological reality. Social constructivism, as a split position, tends to not
even address phenomenological constructivism. Instead,
social constructivism places itself in a dichotomous,
The Marxist Split Tradition
either/or relationship with yet a third variety of con-
Karl Marx was an early admirer of Hegel and an heir to structivism, biological constructivism. Biological con-
the Leibnizian-Hegelian tradition. His work affirmed the structivism emerges from the Kantian split. It involves
centrality of both activity and the dialectic. However, and the claim that the person cognitively-affectively con-
most importantly, Marx elevated the material world to an structs the world as known, but that genetic endowment
absolute privileged position as the source of thought. In determines the fundamental nature of the person who
this move, Marx reasserted a split tradition. Marx’s di- does the constructing. Scarr (1992) nicely illustrates bi-
alectical materialism thus became another foundationalist ological constructivism. She maintains, on the one hand,
position similar to the Newtonian-Humean tradition in that “reality” is constructed by experience, and thus, it
that both appeal to a mind-independent material world as is “not a property of a physical world” (p. 50). On the
the absolute bedrock of the Real. other hand, she asserts that “genotypes drive experi-
ences. . . . In this model, parental genes determine their
Social and Biological Constructivism
phenotypes, the child’s genes determine his or her phe-
The Marxist split tradition became the ground for a sec- notype, and the child’s environment is merely a reflec-
ond type of constructivism, social constructivism. If the tion of the characteristics of both parents and child”
material world is elevated to a privileged ontological (p. 54). The biological and social constructivist con-
status, then this world of instrumental-communicative frontation, as it turns out, is yet another manifestation
social relations, and only this world, provides the base of the split nature-nurture dichotomy.
for building the categories of thought. Once the cate- The Marxist split tradition has continued to exert a
gories of thought are acquired from the split-off social strong contextual influence over both the interpretation
world, the person projects these socially instilled cate- of Vygotsky’s approach, and, more broadly, the inter-
gories back onto the world, and, in this sense, constructs pretation of the relationship between the intrapsychic
the known world. Hence, social constructivism is the and the interpersonal. The Marxist tradition has been
constructing of the known world from an instrumental- elaborated, and these elaborations often function as the
communicative social relations foundation and only epistemological-ontological ground for conceptualizing
from this foundation. This position was later elaborated the interpersonal and social-cultural features of devel-
by the pragmatist George Herbert Mead under the rubric opment. Jurgen Habermas’s “critical theory” represents
of “social behaviorism” (Mead, 1934). Vygotsky, who the most carefully and fully articulated contemporary
was writing at about the same time as Mead, has come elaboration of the Marxist split tradition.
to be viewed as the father of the social constructivist
movement—probably because Vygotsky’s writings were Habermas and the Marxist Split Tradition
initially “discovered and propagated by small groups of In a negative sense, the core of Habermas’s work is
‘progressive’ young Marxists who saw his work as pro- the denial of any possible centrality of the expressive-
viding, among other things, a foundation for a criticism constitutive subject as a point of reference. As
of the prevailing tendency to attribute individual failure McCarthy points out, “ the key to Habermas’s approach
and success to genetic endowment ” (van der Veer & is his rejection of the ‘paradigm of consciousness’ and
Valsiner, 1994, p. 5). its associated ‘philosophy of the subject’ in favor of
When Vygotsky is placed in a social constructivist the through-and-through intersubjectivist paradigm of
framework, there is no rapprochement between he and ‘communicative’ action” (1993, p. x). Habermas himself
66 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

considers this move to an exclusive privileging of means [instrumental activity] originated in social life. As
the instrumental-communicative to be a “paradigm- stated by Luria (1981), “in order to explain the highly
change,” which leaves behind any vestige of Cartesian complex forms of human consciousness one must go be-
“subjectivism” or “metaphysics of subjectivity” (Haber- yond the human organism. One must seek the origins of
mas, 1993b, p. 296). From this position, Habermas conscious activity and ‘categorical’ behavior not in the re-
cesses of the human brain or in the depths of the spirit, but
(1991, 1992) analyzes favorably George Herbert Mead’s
in the external conditions of life. Above all, this means
“social behaviorism” as furthering the same paradigm
that one must seek these origins in the external processes
shift, and he attacks “ the moral point of view” taken by of social life, in the social and historical forms of human
expressive-constitutive oriented developmental investi- existence” (p. 25). (Wertsch, 1991, p. 33–34)
gators such as Kohlberg because here “issues of moral
cognition take precedence over questions of practical The Marxist split tradition then becomes the bridge
orientation” (1993a, p. 121). between Vygotsky and M. M. Bakhtin (1986) whose
In a more positive vein, Habermas attempts to locate contribution was a conception of meaning and language
all the traditional dialectical tensions between subject- that is thoroughly external to the expressive-constitutive
object, self-other, and reason- observation within the do- subject (Kent, 1991), as follows:
main of communication and social practice (McCarthy,
Both Vygotsky and Bakhtin believed that human commu-
1991). If this conceptualization functioned as a point of nicative practices give rise to mental functioning in the
view thereby allowing another point of view that located individual. . . . They were convinced that “ the social di-
the same tensions within the expressive-constitutive sub- mension of consciousness is primary in time and in fact. The
ject, it would constitute a powerful perspective from individual dimension of consciousness is derivative and
which to explore the instrumental-communicative fea- secondary” (Vygotsky, 1979, p. 30). (Wertsch, 1991, p. 13)
tures of development. However, Habermas insists that the
dialectical tensions must be located in the instrumental- However, in Wertsch’s estimation Vygotsky failed to
communicative realm, and only in the instrumental- sufficiently pursue the Marxist tradition, for given that
communicative realm. This insistence on exclusivity, un- Vygotsky was “interested in formulating a Marxist psy-
dercuts the potential of the position by perpetuating a chology, he made precious little mention of broader his-
split that ultimately unnecessarily constrains develop- torical, institutional, or cultural processes” (1991,
mental inquiry. p. 46). Consequently, Wertsch draws on Habermas’s
(1984) account of instrumental-communicative action,
and moves beyond Vygotsky to Bahktin’s contribution,
to pursue the general claim that “mediational means
Culture and Development in Split and
emerge in response to a wide range of social forces”
Relational Metatheories
(1991, p. 34).
The Marxist split tradition has, in recent times, been an Shweder’s (1990) approach to culture and develop-
influential background for the study of culture and de- ment is another contemporary illustration of the back-
velopment. Wertsch (1991) highlights this in his “cul- ground influence of the Marxist split tradition (see also
tural” approach to development. He begins his broadly Cole, 1995, 1996; Miller, 1996; Rogoff, 1990, 1993).
synthetic account by setting a contrast between develop- However, in proposing an outline for a “cultural psychol-
mental inquiry that focuses on “ the universals of mental ogy,” he follows a more Habermas-like strategy by lo-
functioning” and his own focus on “sociocultural cating the dialectic tension of subject and culture
specifics.” However, rather than continuing this contrast necessarily in the realm of instrumental, thereby deny-
of the universal and the particular—the transcendent and ing any reality to the fully embodied expressive subject.
the immanent—in a relational context, Wertsch explic- In Shweder’s presentation, the universal, the transcen-
itly establishes the Marxist ontological agenda, and casts dent, the ideal, and the fixed are explicitly denied any
Vygotsky and Luria solidly in this tradition, by stating: fundamental reality (1990, p. 25); thus, a dichotomy is
established that privileges the particular, the immanent,
In pursuing a line of reasoning that reflected their concern the practical, and the relative. As a result, when
with Marxist claims about the primacy of social forces Shweder (Shweder & Sullivan, 1990) identifies the sub-
[emphasis added], Vygotsky and his colleagues . . . con- ject or person of his subject-culture inquiry, it explicitly
tended that many of the design features of mediational is not, nor could it be, the universal or ideal subject
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 67

found in some domains of cognitive-affective and to reach a goal. For example, one takes a hammer to drive
personality research. Shweder explicitly excludes this a nail into the wall. There is, however, a second aspect in
subject, and instead offers the “semiotic subject ” char- any action, which Boesch calls the subjective-functional
acterized by instrumental rationality and instrumental aspect [the expressive-constitutive]. Here, the driving of
intentionality only. The final result is little different the nail may have the subjective-functional meaning that
one feels proud of being able to do so, one may also enjoy
than a straight forward Skinnerian (1971) position or
it, or it may even be related to feelings of rage. In any
frame in which it is permissible to consider “ higher
case, the action of nailing receives a meaning beyond its
mental processes” only to the extent that they are under- instrumental purpose. (p. 30)
stood as being defined by a specific repertoire of instru-
mental responses correlated with specific stimuli. From this base, Boesch (1980, 1991, 1992) and Eck-
Similarly, for Shweder, “rationality” and “intentions” ensberger (1989, 1990, 1996) formulate the beginnings of
are defined as instrumental problem solving behaviors a developmentally oriented cultural psychology that is
that are correlated with cultural contexts. more inclusive than those founded in the Marxist tradi-
When the Marxist tradition is the ground for develop- tion. Boesch’s system and Eckensberger’s extension of
mental inquiry, as in these illustrative examples, this system draw from Piaget—whom Boesch calls the
activity is central—as action is central in the Leibnizian- first action theorist—as well as from Janet’s dynamic
Hegelian relational tradition. However, it is important to theory, psychodynamic theory, and Kurt Lewin’s field-
keep in focus the fact that activity, in the Marxist theory. Elaborating on the relational theme of expressive-
tradition, is necessarily restricted to the instrumental- constitutive/instrumental-communicative action they
communicative. When Rogoff (1993) discusses cogni- argue for a cultural psychology that aims at an integration
tion—as Sweder discusses intentions or Bakhtin of “cultural and individual change . . . individual and col-
discusses language and meaning—it becomes restric- lective meaning systems . . . [and one that] should try to
tively defined as “ the active process of solving mental bridge the gap between objectivism and subjectivism”
and other problems” (p. 124). The Leibnizian-Hegelian (Eckensberger, 1990).
tradition accepts both this instrumental action, and ex- Inclusive relational developmental models of the in-
pressive mental action as relational moments. But when dividual and culture are not limited to the European
Rogoff addresses the expressive, she first reframes it as a continent. For example, as described earlier, Damon
static formulation and then rejects it as a “cognition as a (1988, 1991; Damon & Hart, 1988), presents the outline
collection of mental possessions” (p. 124). The result of of just such an approach in his discussion of “ two com-
splitting off the expressive subject, is that Rogoff ’s plementary developmental functions, . . . the social and
own “relational” approach is a relation between the the personality functions of social development ” (1988,
instrumental-communicative subject and cultural con- p. 3). Moving within the broader Leibnizian-Hegelian
texts. This she presents as an approach, which permits concepts of differentiation and integration, Damon
the consideration of “individual thinking or cultural presents the interpenetration of the two functions as an
functioning as foreground without assuming that they are identity of opposites. Furth (1969), also explicitly pre-
actually separate elements” (p. 124). This is correct, but sented a relational view of social development in which
the assumption of “separate elements” has already been “self and other as isolated entities are denied in favor of
made in the background, and the unwanted element of relations” (Youniss, 1978, p. 245), and this perspective
this assumption has already been suppressed. has been the continuing focus of Youniss and his col-
The expressive-instrumental Leibnizian-Hegelian leagues (e.g., Davidson & Youniss, 1995; Youniss &
tradition of the centrality of action is illustrated in a Damon, 1992). This relational perspective has most re-
number of action theories that focus on the role of cul- cently been expanded in the literature on infant develop-
ture in human development (see Oppenheimer, 1991 for ment (Mueller & Carpendale, 2004; Hobson, 2002)
a review). However, a particularly rich account is found through a focus on the contrast between individualist
in the work of E. E. Boesch (1991). As Eckensberger (split) and relational approaches to the origin and nature
(1989) points out: of social development:
Bosech begins with the notion that any action and any goal The basic tenet of the relational framework is that the self
has two dimensions or aspects: one . . . is the instrumental always already lives within a social world and is always al-
aspect, that an action is carried out instrumentally in order ready immersed in relations with other. These relations
68 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

are not established in the mind of the individual, but in James terms a “double-barrelled” (1912, p. 10) concept.
common space through interaction and dialogue. . . . Nei- “It recognizes in its primary integrity no division be-
ther self nor other are primary. Rather self and other are tween act and material, subject and object, but contains
sustained by particular interactive relations, and it is them both in an unanalyzed totality” (Dewey, 1925,
within and through these relations that concepts of self pp. 10–11). Experience refers to both the action of the
and other evolve. (Mueller & Carpendale, 2004, p. 219)
subject (i.e., the subject’s embodied active exploration,
active manipulation, and active observation of the ob-
Pragmatism ject world) and the object world’s active impingement
on the subject. “It includes what men do and suffer,
A final epistemological-ontological tradition that re- what they strive for . . . and endure, and also how men
quires a brief exploration to establish a grounding for an act and are acted upon” (p. 10). For purposes of empiri-
inclusive understanding of development is the American cal investigation, analysis separates this integrity into
pragmatism of Pierce, James, and Dewey. Pragmatism’s two points of view, and hence two different analytic
fundamental postulates cohere as a contextualist world- meanings. However, the empirical question is not
view (Pepper, 1942) that draws on many Leibnizian- whether experience is truly one or the other. The ques-
Hegelian themes, including holism, action, change, and tion is how each form of experience contributes to the
the dialectic. The focus of these themes is located on the understanding of human development.
instrumental rather than the expressive pole of the rela- Change and novelty are also basic to the pragmatists
tional dialectic. If Gadamer and Taylor (see also position. However, the focus of change in pragmatism is
Ricoeur, 1991) can be said to represent the phenomeno- on the variational rather than transformational. Simi-
logical perspective of the relational developmental larly, novelty is the new variant rather than the emergent
philosophical grounding, then pragmatism, particularly level of organization found in transformational change.
the work of James and Dewey, can be read as represent- This focus is due in part to pragmatism’s Darwinian
ing the instrumental perspective. evolutionary commitment (“Darwin opened our minds
Putnam (1995) describes holism as one of the chief to the power of chance-happenings to bring forth fit re-
characteristics of James’ philosophy. This holistic com- sults if only they have time to add themselves together,”
mitment leads to an “obvious if implicit rejection of James, 1975, p. 57) along with the commitment to the
many familiar dualisms: fact, value, and theory are all joint relation of the instrumental and adaptation.
seen by James as interpenetrating and interdependent ” Pragmatism’s focus on variational change and varia-
(p. 7). James (1975) addresses virtually all the tradi- tional novelty, also follow from a preference for plural-
tional dichotomies of split-off traditions, and he, along ism and diversity over unity (James, 1975, p. 79). In the
with Dewey (1925), argue for a relational interpenetrat- discourse of pragmatism, and especially in James’ writ-
ing understanding of universal-particular, inner-outer, ings, concepts of “ unity,” “order,” “ form,” and “pat-
subject-object, theory-practice, monism-pluralism, and tern” tend to be interpreted as denoting the fixed and
unity-diversity. Although affirming the ontological real- unchanging, in the sense of an Absolute Transcendental-
ity of the dialectic of interpenetration, the stress and the ism (James, 1975, p. 280) or an essentialism. When this
focus of pragmatism is, however, on the particular, the is the horizon of understanding, change in fact necessar-
outer, object, practice, pluralism, and diversity. ily becomes restricted to the sphere of diversity. If it is
Epistemologically, pragmatism repudiates the foun- only in the sphere of diversity and pluralism that there is
dationalism of an ultimate fixed object of knowledge, “some separation among things, . . . some free play of
and insists on the connection of knowledge and action. parts on one another, some real novelty or chance”
Knowledge arises out of action, out of particular prac- (p. 78), then change must be restricted to this sphere. For
tices or praxis. In this respect, James and Dewey differ pragmatism, it is in the sphere of pluralism and diversity
little from Habermas, Gadamer, Bahktin, and Taylor. that “ the world is still in process of making” (p. 289).
Rather than specifically elaborating the notion of dia- The suggestion, that pragmatism can be read as repre-
logue as the mediator of knowing (expressive and instru- senting the instrumental perspective of the relational de-
mental), the concept of experience carries this function velopmental philosophical grounding falters upon this
in pragmatism. Experience manifests its relational di- restrictive identification of unity with the static and
alectical as well as its embodied character in being what fixed, and of diversity with the active and changing. In
 Epistemological-Ontological Issues 69

the broad relational developmental tradition, activity cance of integration in contextualism. He argues rela-
and change are not split off and thus encapsulated. Unity tionally that the integration the pragmatist should stress
and synonyms of unity—including “ the universal,” “ the “is an integration of conflicts” (1979, p. 411); hence, a
transcendent,” “order,” “system,” “ form,” “pattern,” dialectical integration. He also warns the contextualist
“organization,” and “structure”—have been understood against the danger of an overemphasis on the contingent,
throughout the Leibnizian-Hegelian tradition as ontolog- the accidental, and the variable. For Pepper, the contex-
ically active and changing. As emphasized throughout tualist has been “so impressed with evidences of histori-
this chapter, the Leibnizian-Hegelian tradition grants cal change and cultural influences and the shifting
the same ontological reality to diversity and synonyms of contexts of value that he cannot easily bring himself to
diversity—including “ the concrete,” the “immanent,” accept any degree of permanence” (p. 414). Pepper
“disorder,” “plurality,” “content,” and “ function.” From chides the constricted contextualist by arguing that
the expressive and transformational point of view within “ there is much more permanence in the world than the
this tradition, structures function (act) and change and contextualist admits” (p. 414). Similarly, Hilary Putnam
self-organizing systems operate (act) and change. From has elaborated an extensive contemporary relational
the instrumental and variational point of view within reading of pragmatism. Putnam sometimes refers to
this tradition, action is variational (diversity, plurality, this reading as “internal realism” and sometimes as
and individual differences) and changing. “pragmatic realism” (1987, 1990, 1995). In either case,
A related problem concerns the ambivalent posture the—“realism” is the commonsense realism discussed
that pragmatism takes toward the notion of order or earlier—neither the Realism of mind (idealism), nor the
unity itself. If implicit, in the writing of the pragmatists, Realism of world (materialism). The “internal” and
it is clear, and explicit, in Stephen Pepper’s (1942) “pragmatic” features of his system assert the position of
distillation of the presuppositions of the pragmatists a pragmatism that includes both the expressive and the
that disorder or diversity is a fundamental category of instrumental.
pragmatism-contextualism. However, because pragma- Finally, that pragmatism need not be read as a split
tism offers itself as not denying any category that has a tradition, which suppresses order and change of form,
practical value (“I call pragmatism a mediator and rec- can even be gleaned from the writings of one of the
onciler. . . . She has in fact no prejudices whatever,” founders of pragmatism:
James, 1975, p. 43), it cannot deny order, unity, organi-
zation, pattern, or structure. Pragmatism does, however, There is in nature . . . something more than mere flux and
approach these concepts from a certain distance and change. Form is arrived at whenever a stable, even though
moving, equilibrium is reached. Changes interlock and
distrust. Most important, in some readings pragmatism
sustain one another. Whenever there is this coherence
tends to interpret order and unity as an end to be at-
there is endurance. Order is not imposed from without but
tained, rather than as a legitimate ontological real. In is made out of the relations of harmonious interactions
this case, order is treated, if not directly conceptualized, that energies bear to one another. Because it is ac-
as Appearance. Such a reading of pragmatism splits the tive . . . order itself develops. It comes to include within
dialectical relation between the transcendent and the its balanced movement a greater variety of changes.
immanent or unity and diversity found in both Gadamer (Dewey, 1934, p. 14)
and Taylor. When this split occurs, pragmatism takes on
the flattened character suggested in the postmodern ap- If pragmatism is read as joining order to disorder, and
proach of Richard Rorty. As the philosopher Thomas joining activity and change to both structure and func-
McCarthy (1991) points out, “Rorty’s epistemological tion as this quote from Dewey and the work of Putnam
behaviorism is a variant of the contextualism common to and others suggest, then pragmatism enlarges the philo-
most postmodernist thinkers” (p. 20). It entails “a radi- sophical grounding of the relational developmental
cally contextualist account [that] . . . amounts to flatten- tradition, and it enlarges the field of developmental in-
ing out our notions of reason and truth by removing any quiry. Illustrations of the impact of this expanded
air of transcendence from them” (p. 14–15). grounding of pragmatism are found, for example, in
This split reading of pragmatism is not necessarily Damon and Hart (1988) with respect to social develop-
canonical however. Pepper, in a work following his well- ment, Nucci (1996) on moral development, and in the
known World Hypotheses, acknowledges the signifi- works of Varela et al. (1991) and Wapner and Demick
70 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

(1998) for cognitive development. Piaget (1985)—con- an empirical science. The historical dialogue has ar-
sidering the relation between his earlier investigations rived at a common agreement that whatever else it may
of operational knowing (expressive-transformational) be, any empirical science is a human activity—an epis-
and contemporary explorations of procedural knowing temological activity—with certain broad orientations
(instrumental-variational)—found in this new arena “a and aims. The historical dialogue has further led to
possible synthesis of genetic structuralism, the focus of common agreement that the most general aim and orien-
all of our previous work, with the functionalism found in tation of empirical science is the establishment of a sys-
the work of J. Dewey and of E. Claparede” (p. 68). tematic body of knowledge that is tied to observational
The aim of this section has been to establish a broad evidence (Lakatos 1978b; Laudan 1977; Nagel, 1979;
epistemological-ontological grounding for an inclusive Wartofsky, 1968). Any empirical science aims at build-
understanding of development as formal (transforma- ing a system of knowledge that represents patterns of
tional) and functional (variational) changes in the relations among phenomena and processes of the expe-
expressive-constitutive and instrumental-communicative rienced world. These patterns constitute explanations
features of behavior. This has been done by following the of the phenomena and processes under consideration.
historical thread of the Leibnizian-Hegelian tradition Further, to be properly empirical, the explanations must
and noting the locations where this thread splits-off to- have implications that are in some sense open to obser-
ward exclusivity. Ultimately, the illustrations given do vational-experimental assessment.
not aim to categorize particular writings. Rather, they If science aims toward order, it begins in the flux
suggest the consequences that follow for the domain of and chaos of the everyday experience that is often
developmental inquiry when a particular path is taken. In termed common sense (see earlier discussion of
the concluding section, the epistemological-ontological commonsense level of observation, Figure 2.1, and see
grounding, the relational developmental metatheory, de- also, Nagel, 1967, 1979; Overton, 1991c; Pepper, 1942;
velopmental systems, developmentally oriented embod- Wartofsky, 1968). As the philosopher Ernst Nagel
ied action metatheory and the integrative concept of (1967) has described it, “All scientific inquiry takes its
development become the interwoven context for a discus- departure from commonsense beliefs and distinctions,
sion of the nature of the scientific understanding and ex- and eventually supports its findings by falling back
planation of developmental phenomena. This section on common sense” (p. 6). This commonsense base is
centers on issues of methodology, where methodology is what Gadamer refers to as the “anticipatory meanings”
understood broadly as metamethods for empirical scien- of preunderstanding (see earlier discussion of the
tific inquiry. Methods, in the narrow sense of specific hermeneutic circle).
techniques for designing, conducting, and evaluating em- For the science of developmental psychology, this
pirical research, are considered within the context of al- starting point includes actions that are commonly
ternative methodologies. referred to as perceiving, thinking, feeling, relating, re-
In an important sense, the discussion to the present membering, valuing, intending, playing, creating, lan-
point has constructed our developmental landscape, and guaging, comparing, reasoning, wishing, willing,
populated it with certain types of psychological sub- judging, and so on. These actions, and the change of
jects (expressive-instrumental), who change in certain these actions, as understood on a commonsense level of
ways (transformationally-variationally), and act in a experience or discourse (see Figure 2.1), constitute the
biological-cultural world that both creates and is cre- problems of developmental psychology. They are prob-
ated by them. Now, the task is to inquire into how best lems because, although they represent the stability of
to investigate the changing character of these persons practical everyday life, even the most meager reflection
and this world. This is the task of methodology. reveals they appear as inconsistent, contradictory, and
muddled. Refined, critically reflective theories and
METHODOLOGY: EXPLANATION metatheories, including systems, embodiment, cultural,
AND UNDERSTANDING biological, information processing, Piagetian, Gibson-
ian, Vygotskian, Eriksonian, Chomskyian and the rest,
The focus to this point has been developmental inquiry all represent attempts to explain (i.e., to bring order
as a broad-based knowledge-building activity. Now, we into) the contradictory, inconsistent, muddled features
turn more specifically to developmental psychology as of these various domains of inquiry.
 Methodology: Explanation and Understanding 71

There is little disagreement among scientists, histori- TABLE 2.1 Scientific Methodologies
ans of science, and philosophers of science about where
Split Tradition Relational Tradition
science begins—in common sense and the contradictions
Aristotle
that show up when we begin to examine common sense— Newton-Humean Leibniz-Hegel
and where it leads—to refined theories and laws that ex-
plain. Science is a human knowledge building activity Positivism Instrumentalism Research Programs
Conventionalism Research Traditions
designed to bring order and organization into the f lux of
everyday experience. Disagreement emerges only when Context of Discovery
the question is raised of exactly how, or by what route,
Metatheories Metatheories
science moves from common sense to refined knowledge.

Relativism and Dogmatism

Models and Theories Models and Theories
This issue—the route from common sense to science— (Heuristic Devices)
(Deduction,
constitutes the methodology of science. Historically, two a heuristic
device)
routes have been proposed, and traveled. One emerges Context of
Justification
from the Newtonian-Humean split epistemological-
ontological tradition. Those who follow this route are di- Laws Laws Laws
rected to avoid interpretation, and to carefully walk the Generalization Generalization
path of observation and only observation. On this path,
reason enters only as an analytic heuristic; a tool for
(Induction) (Induction) Abduction
overcoming conflicts by generating ever more pristine Hermeneutic Circle
observations, free from interpretation. The second route Transcendental Argument
emerges from the Leibnizian-Hegelian relational tradi- Observation Observation
tion. Those who follow this route are directed toward a Experiment Experiment
Assessment Assessment
relational dialectical path on which interpretation and (Reduction (Reduction Observation
observation interpenetrate and form an identity of oppo- and Causality) and Causality) Experiment/Assessment
sites. On this path, interpretation and observation, be-
come co-equal complementary partners in conflict
resolution. the absolute material, objective, fixed, unchanging,
The following discussion discusses these two path- foundational elements or atoms, that are, in principle,
ways (see Overton 1998 for a more extensive historical directly observable. Terms like reductionism, atomism,
discussion). We begin from the Newtonian split tradition elementarism, and analytic attitude, all identify this
of mechanical explanation and move to a contemporary step. In psychology, for many years the atoms were
relational methodology. This evolution of these scien- “stimuli” and “responses.” Today, they tend to be “neu-
tific methodologies including the empiricist variants of rons” and “ behaviors” or “contextual factors” and “ be-
positivism, neopositivism, instrumentalism, and con- haviors” or “inputs” and “outputs”—the story line
ventionalism as well as relational metamethod is out- changes, but the themes remain the same within this
lined in Table 2.1. metamethod. In keeping with the framework of empiri-
cism and materialism, the broad stricture here is to ulti-
mately reduce all phenomena to the visible.
Split Mechanical Explanation Briefly, consider one impact of this first step on de-
velopmental inquiry. Immediately, “ transformational
Mechanical explanation continues the splitting process change,” “stages” of development, and the “mental or-
by dichotomizing science into two airtight compart- ganizations,” or “dynamic systems” that change during
ments, description and explanation. There are three steps development become suspect as being somehow deriva-
to mechanical explanation. The first is considered de- tive because they are not directly observable. At best
scriptive and the second two are considered explanatory. under this storyline, transformations, stages, and mental
organization can only function as summary statements
Step 1: Reduction Description for an underlying more molecular really Real. The drive
The first step of mechanical explanation entails address- throughout this step is toward the ever more molecular
ing the commonsense object of inquiry and reducing it to in the belief that it is only in the realm of the molecular
72 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

that the Real is directly observed. This is particularly of the object of inquiry) explanations were explanations
well illustrated in the recent enthusiasm for a “microge- that made the object of inquiry intelligible and gave rea-
netic” method (e.g., D. Kuhn et al., 1995; Siegler, 1996) sons for the nature and functioning of the object (Ran-
as a method that offers “a direct means for studying cog- dall, 1960; Taylor, 1995). Today, the structure of
nitive development ” (Siegler & Crowley, 1991, p. 606, the atom, the structure of DNA, the structure of the
emphasis added). In this approach an intensive “ trial- solar system, and the structure of the universe are all
by-trial analysis” reduces the very notion of develop- familiar examples of formal pattern principles drawn
ment to a molecular bedrock of visible behavioral from the natural sciences. Kinship structures, mental
dif ferences as they appear across learning trials. structures, mental organization, dynamic systems, at-
It is important to recognize that the aim of Step 1 is tachment behavior system, structures of language, ego
to drive out interpretations from the commonsense and superego, dynamisms, schemes, operations, and
phenomena under investigation. Under the objectivist cognitive structures are familiar examples of formal
theme, commonsense observation is error laden, and it is pattern principles drawn from the human sciences. Sim-
only through ever more careful neutral observation that ilarly, reference to the sequence and directionality
science can eliminate this error, and ultimately arrive at found in the Second Law of Thermodynamics, self-
the elementary bedrock that constitutes the level of organizing systems, the equilibration process or reflec-
“ facts” or “data” (i.e., invariable observations). tive abstraction, the orthogenetic principle, or a
probabilistic epigenetic principle, are all examples of
Step 2: Causal Explanation
final pattern principles (Overton, 1994a).
Step 2 of mechanical explanation begins to move inquiry Both formal and final pattern principles entail inter-
into the second compartment of compartmentalized sci- pretations that make the phenomena under investigation
ence—explanation. Step 2 consists of the instruction to intelligible. Both, within the Aristotelian relational
find the invariant relations among the elements de- scheme, constitute legitimate explanations. However,
scribed in Step 1. More specifically, given our objects of within the split story of mechanical explanation, as
study in developmental psychology—behavior and be- guided by reductionism and objectivism, formal and
havior change—this step directs inquiry to locate an- final principles completely lose any explanatory status;
tecedents. These antecedents, when they meet certain explanation is limited to nothing but observable effi-
criteria of necessity and sufficiency, are termed cient (i.e., the force that moves the object) and material
“causes” and the discovery of cause defines explanation (i.e., the material composition of the object) causes. At
within this metamethod. The antecedents are also often best, within the mechanical story, formal and final prin-
referred to as mechanisms, but the meaning is identical. ciples may reappear in the descriptive compartment as
This is another point at which to pause and notice an mere summary statements of the underlying molecular
important impact of metatheory. Because of the particu- descriptive “Real” discussed in Step 1. In this way,
lar metatheoretical principles involved, the word transformational change and dynamic psychological sys-
“explanation” comes to be defined as an antecedent- tems become eliminated or marginalized as necessary
consequent relation, or the efficient-material proximal features of developmental inquiry.
cause of the object of inquiry. Further, science itself
comes to be defined as the (causal) explanation of natu- Step 3: Induction of Interpretation-Free
ral phenomena. It is critically important to remember Hypotheses, Theories, Laws
here that Aristotle had earlier produced a very different Step 3 of mechanical explanation installs induction as
metatheoretical story of scientific explanation. Aristo- the foundational logic of science. Step 3 instructs the in-
tle’s schema entailed complementary relations among vestigator that ultimate explanations in science must be
four types of explanation rather than a splitting. Two of found in fixed unchanging laws, and these must be induc-
Aristotle’s explanations were causal in nature (i.e., an- tively derived as empirical generalizations from the re-
tecedent material and efficient causes). Two, however, peated pristine observations of cause-effect relations
were explanations according to the pattern, organiza- found in Step 2. Weak generalizations from Step 2 regu-
tion, or form of the object of inquiry. Aristotle’s “ for- larities constitute interpretation-free “ hypotheses.”
mal” (i.e., the momentary pattern, form or organization Stronger generalizations constitute interpretation-free
of the object of inquiry) and “ final” (i.e., the end or goal theoretical propositions. Theoretical propositions joined
 Methodology: Explanation and Understanding 73

as logical conjunctions (and connections) constitute doubt against certainty as competing alternatives rather
interpretation-free theories. Laws represent the strongest than understanding doubt and certainty as a dialectical
and final inductions. relation, framed by the concept of plausibility.
Deduction reenters this story of empirical science as
a split-off heuristic method of moving from inductively Positivism and Neopositivism
derived hypotheses and theoretical propositions to Since its origin in the eighteenth century, mechanical
further empirical observations. In twentieth-century explanation has been codified in several forms as spe-
neopositivism, a “ hypothetico-deductive method” was cific methodologies or metamethods. Each of these rep-
introduced into the Newtonian empiricist metamethod resents a variation on the theme, but none of them have
but this it was simply another variation on the same changed the basic theme itself. In the middle of the
theme. The hypothesis of “ hypothetico” has nothing to nineteenth century, mechanical explanation began to be
do with interpretation, but is simply an empirical gener- formalized into a general strategy designed to demar-
alization driven by pristine data that then served as a cate empirical science from nonscience. It was at this
major premise in a formal deductive argument. Simi- time that the “age of metaphysics” came to an end. The
larly, when the mechanical explanation termed “instru- ending was defined by philosophy’s turning away from
mentalism” moved away from the hypothetico-deductive imperialistic dogmatic applications of broad philosophi-
stance to the employment of models, models themselves cal systems, and directing its reflections toward what
functioned merely as the same type of interpretation- were called the “positive” sciences. Auguste Comte,
free heuristic devices (see Table 2.1). writing a history of philosophy at the time, coined the
Another important variation on this same theme was term “positivism” when he described a division of three
the so-called covering law model of scientific explana- ages of thought: an early theological age, a metaphysical
tion. This was introduced as a part of neopositivism by age that was just passing, and an age of positive science
Carl Hempel (1942) and became the prototype of all (see Gadamer, 1993; Schlick, 1991). The positive sci-
later explanations formulated within this metatheory. ences were understood as those that located inquiry in
According to the covering law model, scientific expla- the “given” or “positive.” This positive sphere was iden-
nation takes a deductive (i.e., formal) logical form; tified as the sphere of “experience” rather than a sphere
particular events are explained when they are logically of the transcendental a priori. However, under the con-
subsumed under a universal law or law-like statement tinuing influence of the “silent ” metaphysics of the
(i.e., a highly confirmed inductive empirical general- Newtonian-Humean tradition of empiricism and materi-
ization; Ayer, 1970; Hempel, 1942). The covering law alism, the “given” of experience became defined, not as
model was particularly important for developmental commonsense observations or a commonsense level of
inquiry because it treated historical events as analo- discourse, but as observations that had been purified
gous to physical events in the sense that earlier events (i.e., reduced) of all interpretative features (i.e., re-
were considered the causal antecedents of later events duced to “data” and more specifically, a type of data
(Ricoeur, 1984). termed “sense data”). Thus, the positive sciences came
Here, then, is the basic outline of the quest for ab- to be those that were grounded in the Newtonian
solute certainty according to the Newtonian and later methodology, and positivism came to consist of the rules
empiricist stories of scientific methodology: Step 1, re- that further codified that methodology (see Table 2.1).
duce to the objective (interpretation-free) observable Following Comte, positivism was articulated across
foundation. Step 2, find the causes. Step 3, induce the the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the
law. As noted, variations appear throughout history. In early twentieth century by John Stuart Mill, Richard
fact, it would be misleading not to acknowledge that Avenarius, and Ernst Mach. In the 1920s and 1930s,
“probability” has replaced “certainty” as the favored what came to be termed neopositivism assumed a new
lexical item in the story as it is told today. Induction is it- posture in the philosophical work of the Vienna Circle,
self statistical and probabilistic in nature; however, this composed of such principal figures as Moritz Schlick,
change represents a change in style more than substance, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Gustav Bergmann, Otto
as the aim remains to move toward 100% probability, Neurath, Kurt Godel, and A. J. Ayer (see Smith, 1986).
thereby arriving at certainty or its closest approxima- This “logical” positivism—which Schlick preferred to
tion. This type of fallibilistic stance continues to pit call “consistent empiricism” (1991, p. 54)—grew in the
74 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

context of the legacy of the Newtonian-Humean tradi- scientific meaning, but also identifying the specific na-
tion that was now coming to be called analytic philoso- ture of this meaning: Within operationalism, the mean-
phy. At this point, analytic philosophy was taking its ing of a scientific concept resides in the application of
“linguistic turn” away from traditional epistemological the concept (i.e., in the definition of the concept in op-
questions of how the Real is known and replacing these erational or application terms).
with questions of what it means to make the language Neopositivism reached its zenith in the 1940s and
claim that the Real is known. In this context, logical 1950s, but ultimately both the friends and the foes of
positivism concerned itself not with knowing the Real positivism recognized its failure as a broad demarca-
but with the nature of statements that claim to know the tionist strategy. It failed for several reasons:
Real (Schlick, 1991, p. 40).
Logical positivism focused on the reductionist and 1. It became clear, as demonstrated in the work of
inductive features of Newtonian mechanical methodol- Quine (1953) and others (e.g., Lakatos, 1978b; Pop-
ogy. These were presented as the descriptive features of per, 1959; Putnam, 1983), that rich theories are not
science, and as they go hand in hand with (causal) expla- reducible to a neutral observational language.
nation as formulated in the covering law model, science
2. There was a demonstrated inadequacy of induction as
from a positivist point of view is often characterized as
the method for arriving at theoretical propositions
the description and explanation of phenomena. This re-
(Hanson 1958, 1970; Lakatos, 1978a; Popper, 1959).
ductionistic focus ultimately led to the articulation of
3. It became evident that the covering law model that it
two complementary criteria for the demarcation of sci-
introduced was highly restricted in its application
ence from nonscience (Lakatos, 1978a, 1978b; Overton,
(Ricoeur, 1984) and faulty in its logic (Popper, 1959).
1984). First, a proposition (e.g., a hypothesis, a theoret-
ical statement, a law) was acceptable as scientifically 4. It was recognized that there are theories that warrant
meaningful if, and only if, it could be reduced to words the attribution “scientific” despite the fact that they
whose meaning could be directly observed and pointed lead to no testable predictions (Putnam, 1983; Toul-
to. “ The meaning of the word must ultimately be shown, min, 1961).
it has to be given. This takes place through an act of
Instrumentalism-Conventionalism
pointing or showing” (Schlick, 1991, p. 40). The words
“ whose meaning could be directly observed” consti- With the failure of neopositivism, there arose out of the
tuted a neutral observation language—completely objec- Newtonian-Humean tradition a revised methodology
tive and free from subjective or mind-dependent called instrumentalism or conventionalism (Lakatos,
interpretation. Thus, all theoretical language required 1978b; Laudan, 1984; Kaplan 1964; Overton, 1984; Pep-
reduction to pristine observations and a neutral observa- per, 1942; Popper, 1959). This demarcationist strategy
tional language. Second, a statement was acceptable as accepted the failure of reductive-inductive features of
scientifically meaningful if, and only if, it could be positivism and admitted the introduction of theoretical
shown to be a strictly inductive generalization, drawn interpretation as an irreducible dimension of science
directly from the pristine observations. Thus, to be sci- (see Table 2.1). However, metatheories, theories, and
entifically meaningful, any universal propositions (e.g., models were treated as mere convenient or instrumental
hypotheses, theories, laws) had to be demonstrably noth- heuristic devices for making predictions. Thus, theories
ing more than summary statements of the pristine obser- in instrumentalism were restricted to the same predic-
vations themselves (see Table 2.1). tive function that formal deductive systems (the cover-
Although logical positivism was formulated primar- ing law model) performed in neopositivism. Popper
ily within the natural sciences, its tenets were exported (1959) added a unique dimension to instrumentalism
into behavioral science through Bridgman’s (1927) “op- through the claim that theories and models should be-
erationalism.” The reductionism of positivism culmi- come acceptable in the body of science, if and only if,
nated in A. J. Ayer’s (1946) “Principle of Verifiability.” they specify observational results that, if found, would
According to this principle, a statement is scientifically disprove or falsify a theory.
meaningful to the extent that, in principle, there is the Instrumentalism opened the door for interpretation to
possibility of direct experience (pristine observation) reenter science but hesitated in allowing it to become a
that will verify or falsify it. Bridgman’s operationalism full partner in the scientific process of building a sys-
extended this principle by not only setting the criteria of tematic body of knowledge. The movement to a dialecti-
 Methodology: Explanation and Understanding 75

cally defined full partnership of interpretation and ob- features by focusing primarily on some of the major
servation required a radical change; one that would (a) contributions of several of these central figures. These
abandon the splitting and foundationalism that had es- include Wittgenstein (1958) and Philosophical Investiga-
tablished pristine observation as the exclusive final ar- tions, Gadamer (1989) and Truth and Method, Hanson
biter of truth and ( b) free up the notion of scientific (1958) and Patterns of Discovery, von Wright (1971) and
explanation that was fossilized by this splitting and Explanation and Understanding, and Ricoeur (1984)
foundationalism. This move to a Libnizian-Hegelian re- and Time and Narrative.
lational alternative path from common sense to refined Wittgenstein and Gadamer provide the basic scaf-
scientific knowledge emerged in the 1950s and it contin- folding for the construction of this relational methodol-
ues to be articulated today. ogy. Wittgenstein’s fundamental contribution entailed
The concepts that constitute this relational methodol- opening the door to the recognition that it is a profound
ogy arose from diverse narrative streams including ana- error to treat the activities of science as providing
lytic philosophy, the history and philosophy of the veridical descriptions of a foundational Real. More pos-
natural sciences, the philosophy of behavioral and social itively, Wittgenstein’s contribution lies in his sugges-
sciences, and hermeneutics. Despite their often comple- tion that science is the product of some of the same
mentary and reciprocally supportive nature these narra- human actions that underlie the conceptual construc-
tives have frequently failed to connect or enter into a tions of our “ form of life” or our lebenswelt. Gadamer’s
common dialogue. Yet, their cumulative effect has been contribution was a systematic demonstration that this
to forge at least the outline of an integrated story of move beyond objectivism and foundationalism did not
scientific methodology that moves beyond the split necessitate a slide into relativism.
Cartesian dichotomies of natural science versus social Hanson’s (1958) analysis of the history of the physi-
science and explanation versus understanding, observa- cal sciences was significantly influenced by Toulmin
tion versus interpretation, and theory versus data. and by the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations.
Here briefly are some of the central characters in In this work, Hanson drew three conclusions about the
the 1950s emergence of this new metamethod: The later actual practice of the physical sciences as distinct from
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958)—whose seminal book the classical rules described by neopositivism and in-
Philosophical Investigations was first published in strumentalism. Hanson’s conclusions themselves articu-
1953—represented analytic philosophy, and he was fol- late a blueprint for the new relational methodology. The
lowed by his pupil Georg Henrik von Wright and later conclusions were: (a) There is no absolute demarcation
Hilary Putnam. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989)—whose between interpretation and observation, or between
Truth and Method was first published in 1960—repre- theory and facts or data. This was captured in his now
sented the hermeneutic tradition and later came Jurgen famous aphorism “all data are theory laden.” ( b) Scien-
Habermas, Richard Bernstein, and Paul Ricoeur. Steven tific explanation consists of the discovery of patterns, as
Toulmin (1953)—whose Philosophy of Science was pub- well as the discovery of causes (see also Toulmin, 1953,
lished in 1953—and N. R. Hanson (1958)—whose Pat- 1961). (c) The logic of science is neither a split-off de-
terns of Discovery was published in 1958—represented ductive logic, nor a split-off inductive logic, but rather,
the natural sciences. They were later followed by the logic of science is abductive (retroductive) in nature.
Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and, most
recently, Bruno Latour. Elizabeth Anscombe (1957)— Interpretation and Observation
whose Intention was published in 1957, as were William Hanson’s first conclusion, that “all data are theory-
Dray’s (1957) Laws and Explanation in History, and laden,” became the core principle of the new relational
Charles Frankel’s (1957) Explanation and Interpreta- methodology: If there is a relational reciprocity between
tion in History, represented the social sciences as did observation and interpretation, then the analytic idea of
Peter Winch (1958) and Charles Taylor (1964). reducing interpretation to a foundational observational
level makes no sense. In place of the analytic reduction-
Relational Scientific Methodology ism described in Step 1 of mechanical explanation, rela-
tional methodology substitutes a complementarity of
The story of the development of an integrated relational analysis and synthesis. Analysis and the analytic tools of
methodology of the sciences is obviously detailed and empirical science are reaffirmed in this principle, but
complex (see Overton, 1998, 2002). I outline its main there is a proviso that it simultaneously be recognized
76 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

that the analytic moment always occurs in the context of trality of ontological and epistemological background
a moment of synthesis, and that the analysis can neither presuppositions in any research program or research tra-
eliminate nor marginalize synthesis. dition (see Table 2.1).
This feature of the new relational methodology was
further supported and extended by two features of
Causality and Action Patterns
Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics.” The first was
his insistence that the alternating to-and-fro motion ex- Hanson’s second conclusion—that pattern and cause
hibited in play presents a favorable ontological alterna- have always operated as explanations in the physical sci-
tive to Cartesian foundationalism. It is this ontological ences—subverts the split stories of a clear-cut line of
theme of to-and-fro movement that grounds and sustains demarcation between the natural and social sciences. If
the relational methodology. As a consequence, scientific natural science inquiry has—throughout the modern pe-
activity—regardless of whether that activity is in the riod—centrally involved both pattern and causal expla-
natural or the behavioral or the social sciences—be- nation, then understanding and explanation need not be
comes grounded in the to-and-fro (Escherian left hand- dichotomous competing alternatives. Pattern or action-
right hand) movement of interpretation-observation. pattern explanation (Aristotle’s formal and final expla-
Gadamer’s second contribution consists of his articu- nation), which entails intention and reasons, and, causal
lation—following Heidegger—of the hermeneutic circle explanation (Aristotle’s material and efficient explana-
described earlier. In this articulation, the hermeneutic tion), which entails necessary and sufficient conditions,
circle comes to describe the basic form of how interpre- here become relational concepts (Escherian left hand-
tation and observation move to and fro; that is, the cycle right hand). Explanation then—defined as “intelligible
that opens to a spiral describes the basic structure of the ordering” (Hanson, 1958)—becomes the superordinate
new scientific methodology. concept that joins dynamic patterns and cause. In place
Inquiry moves in a circular movement from phenome- of detached causes described in Step 2 of mechanical
nological commonsense understanding of an object explanation, relational methodology thus substitutes this
of inquiry to the highly reflective and organized concept of intelligible ordering.
knowledge that constitutes scientific knowledge. The The challenge within this relational methodology is to
whole—the general field of inquiry, such as human devel- establish a justifiable coordination of the two modes of
opment—is initially approached with the meanings or explanation. Von Wright (1971) presents a richly detailed
“prejudices” that constitute both commonsense observa- and complex effort in this direction, and Ricoeur (1984)
tions and background presuppositions including metathe- later builds upon and expands this effort. Both focus on
oretical assumptions. These anticipatory meanings are explanation in the behavioral and social sciences. Von
projected onto the phenomenon of inquiry. As a conse- Wright and Ricoeur each suggest that the coordination be
quent, they form an early stage in inquiry. However, the made along the lines of an internal-external dimension.
object of inquiry is not merely a figment of projection, but Internal here refers to the domain of the psychological
is itself an internally coherent whole; the object of in- person-agent or psychological action system. External
quiry reciprocally operates as a corrective source of fur- refers to movements or states. Following from a critical
ther projections of meaning. In this circle, interpretation distinction made earlier by Anscombe (1957), any given
identifies what will ultimately count as observations, and behavior can be considered internal under one description
observations determine what will count as interpretation. and external under another description. Thus, any spe-
To paraphrase Kant, interpretation without observations cific behavior may be, to quote von Wright (1971) “inten-
is empty; observation without interpretation is blind. tionalistically understood as being an action or otherwise
Through this circle of projection (interpretation) and aiming at an achievement, or . . . as a ‘purely natural’
correction (observation; Escherian left hand-right hand) event, i.e. in the last resort, muscular activity” (p. 128).
inquiry advances; the circle remains open and consti- Within this framework, causal explanations—under-
tutes a spiral. It was the dialectic cycle of interpretation stood as Humean causes defined by the logical inde-
and observation that later grounded Thomas Kuhn’s pendence or contingency relationship between cause and
(1962, 1977) notion of interpretative paradigms in the effect—account for external movements and states.
natural sciences and Lakatos’s (1978a, 1978b) and Lau- Action-pattern explanation (i.e., action, action systems,
dan’s (1977, 1984, 1996) later discussions of the cen- intention, reason) accounts for the meaning of an act.
 Methodology: Explanation and Understanding 77

On a moment’s reflection, the situation described temological subject ”), “action,” “embodiment,” and
here is quite clear. Imagine the following behavior of “intention” are core concepts that identify Piaget’s
two figures: Figure A moves across a space and a part of focus on development. Piaget implicitly recognized the
Figure A comes into contact with Figure B. In this situ- coordination of explanatory types and focused his ef-
ation, we have states and movements, and causal expla- forts on explanation via formal action-pattern (schemes,
nation is quite appropriate. The intervening states that operations) and final action-pattern (the equilibration
identify the movement can readily be considered a series process, reflective abstraction). Many, if not all, of the
of sufficient and necessary conditions leading to the last misunderstandings of Piagetian theory that Lorenço and
state in the series. This can be easily demonstrated via Machado (1996) have articulated are derived from the
various experimental designs. fact that attacks on Piaget theory have invariably come
While this explanation could be satisfactory if the fig- from those who remain locked into the neopositivist
ures were inorganic objects, the situation changes when story of exclusive causal explanation.
the figures are identified as persons. In this latter case, it There are other implications to be drawn from a rela-
is unlikely that you will be satisfied with the causal expla- tional coordination of explanatory types, but a most im-
nation because you have been given no real psychological portant question that arises is that of exactly how action
sense of the meaning of these movements. If, however, pattern explanation is operationalized. Students from
after identifying the figures as people you further learn their first science courses are trained in experimental
that the movement of Figure A to B is the action of a man methods designed to sort out the causal status of variables.
who walks across the room and caresses his wife’s cheek, When it can be shown, under controlled conditions, that
explanation begins to operate in the context of action, in- an added variable (antecedent, independent variable) reli-
tention, reasons, and broadly meaning. The two moments ably leads to the behavior of interest (consequent, depend-
of explanation—causal explanation, on the one hand, and ent variable), this demonstrates that the variable is the
action-pattern explanation, on the other—explain differ- sufficient cause of the event. This provides the rationale
ent phenomena. They have distinct referents; movement for training and enrichment experiments often found in
and states in causal explanation and meaning in action- developmental psychology. If it can be shown, under con-
pattern explanation. Because they have different refer- trolled conditions, that when a variable is subtracted or
ents—different explananda—they are compatible. removed and the event does not occur, the variable is the
However, they don’t replace each other. Action isn’t a necessary cause of the event. This provides the rationale
cause of movement, it is a part of movement. Cause cannot for deprivation experiments. Correlations are also dis-
explain action, action is required to initiate movement. cussed in this context, and while it is made explicit that
There are a number of implications that can be drawn correlation isn’t causation, the same message treats corre-
from this analysis of the coordination of explanatory lation as a step in the direction of causal explanation.
types. One is that it demonstrates that, in principle, it is But inductees into scientific methods receive little
not possible to explain phenomena of consciousness via instruction concerning action-pattern forms of explana-
brain or neurobiological explanations. Consciousness is tion, except perhaps to be told from an implicit neoposi-
internal as defined above; consciousness is about psy- tivist or instrumentalist perspective that it would be
chological meaning and must be explained by actions- inappropriate speculation. To understand how action-
pattern explanation. The brain is external, it is about pattern explanations can be made in a legitimate scien-
states and movements, not psychological meaning. tific fashion, it is necessary to turn to Hanson’s third
Neurobiological causal explanation complements action- conclusion about the actual operation of science.
pattern explanation, but can never present “ the mecha-
nism” of consciousness. Abduction-Transcendental Argument
A second important implication is that when one Hanson concluded that neither split-off induction nor
again considers the distinction between person-centered split-off deduction constitutes the logic of science. Each
and variable inquiry, it becomes clear that action- of these enters the operation of science, but Hanson ar-
pattern explanations are the focus of the former and gued that the overarching logic of scientific activity is ab-
causal-explanations the focus of the latter. Piaget’s the- duction. Abduction (also called “retroduction”) was
ory, for example, represents a person-centered theory. originally described by the pragmatist philosopher
“Person” (child-adult), “agent ” (system, i.e., the “epis- Charles Sanders Pierce (1992). In a contemporary version
78 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

Abductive Abductive
Hypothesis Hypothesis

Background Observation Background Observation

Figure 2.10 The abductive process.

this logic is termed “inference to the best explanation”

(Fumerton, 1993; Harman, 1965). Abduction operates by Becomes
arranging the observation under consideration and all
background ideas (including all metatheoretical princi- Abductive
ples and theoretical models) as two Escherian hands (Fig- Hypothesis
ure 2.10). The possible coordination of the two is explored
by asking the question of what, given the background
ideas, must necessarily be assumed to have that observa-
tion. The inference to—or interpretation of—what must,
in the context of background ideas, necessarily be as-
sumed, then constitutes the explanation of the phenome-
non. This explanation can then be assessed empirically to
ensure its empirical validity (i.e., its empirical support
and scope of application). An important relational feature
of this logic is that it assumes the form of the familiar
hermeneutic circle by moving from the phenomenological Background Observation
level (the commonsense object) to explanation and back in
an ever-widening cycle that marks scientific progress (see
Figure 2.11). The difference between this and the earlier
described hypothetical-deductive explanation is that in Becomes
abduction all background ideas, including metatheoretical
assumptions, form a necessary feature of the process, and Abductive
the abductive explanations themselves become a part of Hypothesis
the ever widening corpus of background ideas.
The basic logic of abduction operates as follows:

1. Step 1 entails the description of some highly reliable

phenomenological observation (O is the case).
2. For step 2, with O as the explanandum, an inference
or interpretation is made to an action-pattern expla-
nation (E). This results in the conditional proposition
“If E is the case, then O is expected.”
3. Step 3 entails the conclusion that E is indeed the case.
Background Observation
Examples of this abductive action-pattern explanation—
or more specifically the one I describe next—are found Figure 2.11 Scientific progress through abduction.
 Methodology: Explanation and Understanding 79

in virtually any psychological work that assumes a cen- (1995; see also Grayling, 1993; Hundert, 1989) and used
trality of emotional, motivational, or cognitive mental in the arena of cognitive development by Russell (1996).
organization. Piaget’s work is particularly rich in ab- This is the transcendental argument and its form is:
ductive explanation. Consider the following example: 1. (We) have a (reliable) phenomenological experience
with characteristic A.
There is the phenomenal observation (O) that it is the case
that certain persons (i.e., children generally beyond the 2. (We) could not have an experience with characteris-
approximate age of 7 years) understand that concepts re- tic A unless mind has feature B.
main quantitatively invariant despite changes in qualita- 3. Therefore, mind necessarily has feature B.
tive appearances (conservation).
Piaget then infers (E) a certain type of action system The transcendental argument is designed to answer the
having specified features including reversibility (concrete how possible questions (von Wright, 1971) with respect
operations). Thus, the conditional “If (E) concrete opera- to consciousness or the organization of mind. Given some
tions, then (O) conservation, is what would be expected.” highly reliable phenomenological observation or phe-
And the conclusion, given the O, “ Therefore, concrete nomenological experience, like conservation, what must
operations explains the understanding of conservation.” we necessarily assume (i.e., what kind of action-pattern
explanation) about the nature of our consciousness or the
As Fumerton (1993) points out, it is obvious that if the nature of mind? What are the necessary conditions of in-
conditional in Step 2 is read as material implication, the telligibility? Again, we begin with the explanandum,
argument would be hopeless as it would then describe make a regressive argument to the effect that a stronger
the fallacy of the affirmed consequent (i.e., the circle conclusion must be so if the observation about experi-
would be closed and it would represent a form of vicious ence is to be possible (and being so, it must be possible).
circularity). Quite correctly, Fumerton recognizes that And this then leads to the stronger conclusion.
the “If . . . then” relation asserts some other sort of con- This then is the answer to the question of how one does
nection. Specifically, the connection is one of meaning pattern explanation in the behavioral and social sciences.
“relevance” between E & O, where relevance is defined The procedure for doing action-pattern explanation is
in terms of the intelligibility of the relation between E found in abduction and the rules of the transcendental ar-
and O (Overton, 1990). gument, and in the criteria that establish a particular
There must also be criteria established that would abductive-transcendental explanation as the best or most
allow us to choose among alternative Es, the “ best ” E. plausible of alternative explanations. Rozeboom (1997)
But this is no major hurdle because many of the tradi- provides a richly detailed operational analysis of this
tional criteria for theory or explanation selection that process along with practical advice on statistical and re-
have been available can, with profit, be used here. These search strategies associated with the process.
criteria include scope of the explanation; the explana- In conclusion, there is much more to the story of the
tion’s depth, coherence, logical consistency; the extent new relational methodology. Much of this story is detailed
to which the explanation reduces the proportion of un- in the elaboration of research methods and measurement
solved to solved conceptual and/or empirical problems in models as the specific techniques for designing, conduct-
a domain (Laudan, 1977); and the explanation’s empiri- ing, and evaluating the empirical inquiry that adjudicates
cal support and empirical fruitfulness. Note here that the best explanations, where these explanations may as-
scope, empirical support, and fruitfulness themselves sume the various shapes of transformational, variational,
bring the circle back to the observational world and thus expressive, instrumental, normative, and individual dif-
keeps the cycle open. Action-pattern explanation or the- ference features of developmental change. The work of
ory, in fact, determines what will count as further obser- Rozeboom (1997) is an example, but there are a number of
vations and the empirical task is to go into the world to others who have been active in pursuing new tools for
discover whether we can find these observations. Thus, modeling and assessment of these diverse features of de-
the cycle continually moves from commonsense obser- velopment. Even beginning to list these would be the work
vations and background presuppositions to action- of a new chapter and, consequently, I mention only an ex-
pattern explanations, returning then to more highly re- cellent summary discussion of some of these new tools
fined observations and back again to explanation. found in the work of Fischer and Dawson (2002).
A form of abduction was brought to prominence by Within this relational context, where interpretation
Kant and has recently been elaborated by Charles Taylor and observation function as a complementary identity of
80 Developmental Psychology: Philosophy, Concepts, Methodology

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CHAPTER 3

The Making of Developmental Psychology

ROBERT B. CAIRNS and BEVERLEY D. CAIRNS

DEVELOPMENT AND HISTORY 90 MATURATION AND GROWTH 132

BIOLOGICAL ROOTS: EMBRYOLOGY SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 135
AND EVOLUTION 92 MORAL DEVELOPMENT 136
THE DEVELOPMENTAL PRINCIPLE 92 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE
EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT 94 AND COGNITION 138
THE EMERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENTAL DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY
PSYCHOLOGY (1882–1912) 96 AND ETHOLOGY 140
Embryos and Infants 96 THEORETICAL TRENDS OF THE
Memory and Intelligence 100 MIDDLE PERIOD 143
TH E NEW PSYCHOLOGY IN TH E Social Neobehaviorism 143
UNITED STATES 104 Psychoanalysis 144
MAKING DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY 107 Field Theory and Ecological Psychology 145
Metaphysics and Development 108 COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE PERIOD 146
Mental Development and Social Ontogeny 109 THE MODERN ERA 147
Sociogenesis 110 SOCIAL LEARNING: RISE, DECLINE,
Toward a Critical Evaluation 111 AND REINVENTION 148
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 114 Rise 148
OTHER TRENDS IN SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 117 Decline 149
Developmental Theory 118 Reinvention 150
Child Study 119 ATTACHMENT: DISCOVERY AND LOSS 151
Development and Education 119 The Phenomena of Attachment 151
THEMES OF THE FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD 120 Attachment Theory 152
Knowledge and Consciousness 120 COGNITIVE REEMERGENCE 153
The Relations between Thoughts and Actions 121 HISTORICAL THEMES AND
Ontogeny and Phylogeny 122 CONTEMPORARY ADVANCES 154
Nature and Nurture 122 Knowledge and Consciousness 154
When Does Development End? 122 Thoughts and Actions 154
Morality and the Perfectibility of Humans 123 Ontogeny and Phylogeny 154
Social Applications 123 Nature and Nurture 155
THE MIDDLE PERIOD (1913–1946): When Does Development End? 155
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND EXPANSION 124 Morality and the Perfectibility of Humans 155
INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 125 Social Applications 155
MENTAL TESTING 126 TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE 156
LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 128 REFERENCES 157
BEHAVIORISM AND LEARNING 129

This chapter is an introduction to the ideas, people, and of the edited volume, A Century of Developmental
events that have guided scientific activity in develop- Psychology (Parke, Ornstein, Rieser, & Zahn-Waxler,
mental psychology over the past century. Its preparation 1994). The contributors are, with few exceptions, cur-
has been facilitated by several recent publications on the rently involved in contemporary research. Secondary
history of developmental psychology. The views of the commentaries can provide useful guides and interpreta-
past held by active researchers are reflected in chapters tions, but there is no substitute for consulting original

89
90 The Making of Developmental Psychology

sources. To that end, a reprint series containing histori- made in new empirical research, it will be won by those
cally significant original articles and volumes has been who look ahead rather than backward. There are also in-
prepared by Wozniak (e.g., 1993, 1995). stitutional and economic limits on scholarship where
Other recent volumes include the contributions of journal space is precious, and historical reviews and
professional historians and others who are not en- comments are afforded low priority. The upshot is that
meshed in current empirical debates of the discipline contemporaneous research articles tend to bypass the
(e.g., Broughton & Freeman-Moir, 1982; Elder, Modell, work and insights of earlier investigators. This neglect
& Parke, 1993). In addition, the social relevance and of the past has been correlated with a more general
the making of the discipline in U.S. society have been tendency to give short shrift to competing findings, con-
told expertly by Sears (1975) and White (1996). Any cepts, and interpretations. Such shortcomings in schol-
single overview—including this one—can tell only part arship, if unchecked, can undermine real progress in the
of the story.1 discipline.
Adopting the convention used in the previous Hand- Historical accounts are neither static nor immutable.
book of Child Psychology, 20 years must lapse before a As new information about the nature of developmental
contribution or event qualifies as historical. Two phenomena becomes available, perspectives on earlier
decades constitute approximately one generation in the events may shift in emphasis and interpretation. Simi-
life of our science. This rule makes the task manageable larly, as new findings and issues emerge, prior relevance
and sharpens the focus on the events of the past. can be reevaluated and viewed in a fresh light. The re-
discovery of J. M. Baldwin’s contributions is a case in
point. With the increased interest in integrative con-
cepts of cognitive, moral, and social development, it was
DEVELOPMENT AND HISTORY perhaps inevitable that researchers should rediscover
the intellectual foundation for developmental studies
It is mildly ironic that an area committed to the study of provided by Baldwin. A direct line of influence has been
the origins and development of behavior and conscious- drawn between the concepts of J. M. Baldwin and those
ness traditionally has shown little interest in its own ori- of Jean Piaget, L. S. Vygotsky, H. Wallon, and L.
gins and development. In the great handbooks of the Kohlberg (see Broughton & Freeman-Moir, 1982;
field, the first five (Carmichael, 1946; Murchison, Cairns, 1992; Valsiner & van der Veer, 1993). The con-
1931, 1933; Mussen, 1970) did not include historical struction of the intellectual history of a science is neces-
overviews; in the 1983 edition of this volume, this state sarily an ongoing enterprise.
of affairs was changed when two chapters on history One point of consensus is that developmental
were included (Borstlemann, 1983; Cairns, 1983). The psychology has its own distinctive history, which is as-
earlier reluctance to look to our past, though regret- sociated with but independent of the history of experi-
table, is understandable. If substantive progress is to be mental or general psychology. The year 1979—one
century after Wundt established a psychology labora-
1
Professor Robert Cairns died on November 10, 1999. This tory at the University of Leipzig—was the centennial
chapter is based on the chapter written by Professor Cairns of scientific psychology (Hearst, 1979). The assign-
for the 5th edition of the Handbook of Child Psychology ment involves a modest fiction, since even a casual
(1998) and was amended by Beverley D. Cairns and Richard reading of the literature of the day indicates that the
M. Lerner. As was true for the 1998 version of the chapter, enterprise of modern psychology was already well
the present version owes much to two earlier chapters that
under way in 1879 in the laboratories of Helmholtz,
Professor Cairns wrote on the history of developmental
Fechner, Weber, Lotze, James, and Galton (Littman,
psychology (Cairns, 1983; Cairns & Ornstein, 1979) and to
several people who contributed to the preparation of the ear-
1979).
lier works: Beverley D. Cairns, Peter A. Ornstein, Robert Looking backward, it might seem inevitable that the
R. Sears, William Kessen, Ronald W. Oppenheim, Alice study of behavioral development should have emerged as
Smuts, Lloyd Borstlemann, Robert Wozniak, Philip R. Rod- the focal problem for the new science of psychology.
kin, Kimberly Davidson, and the staff of the Center for De- Several of the founders of the discipline approached the
velopmental Science. subject matter of psychology from a developmental per-
 Development and History 91

spective, and the genetic theme was influential in philo- of primitive people and folk beliefs. Instinct psychol-
sophical and biological thought in the late nineteenth ogy dealt with those processes and behaviors that were
century. Alfred Binet in France, William Preyer and considered innate, thus encompassing much of what
William Stern in Germany, Herbert Spencer and George is today called comparative and evolutionary psychol-
J. Romanes in England, and several U.S. psychologists ogy. Of the three divisions, Hall considered experimen-
(from G. Stanley Hall and John Dewey to James Mark tal psychology to be the “more central and reduced
Baldwin and John B. Watson) agreed on the fundamental to far more exact methods.” These methods included
viewpoint of development, if little else. What is the fun- the use of reaction time, psychophysical procedures,
damental viewpoint? Watson, who is often depicted as and introspection to examine the relations between
an opponent of the developmental approach, indicated sensation and perception. Historical and instinct psy-
that developmental methods require the continuous ob- chology necessarily relied on observational and corre-
servation and analysis “of the stream of activity begin- lational methods, hence were seen as less likely to
ning when the egg is fertilized and ever becoming more yield general and enduring principles. Hall’s divisions
complex as age increases” (1926, p. 33). For Watson, the were consistent with the proposals of numerous
developmental approach was: writers—Auguste Compte, John Stuart Mill, Wilhelm
Wundt—who called for a second psychology to address
[the] fundamental point of view of the behaviorist—viz.
that in order to understand man you have to understand the
aspects of human mind and behavior that were based in
life history of his activities. It shows, too, most convinc- the culture (Cahan & White, 1992; Wundt, 1916). In
ingly, that psychology is a natural science—a definite part Hall’s account, the second psychology was a second-
of biology. (p. 34) class psychology.
The division between experimental and developmen-
Nor was the kernel idea of development a new one for bi- tal psychology has proved to be remarkably durable—
ological science or for psychology. It had guided the but that is getting ahead of the story. The main point is
work and thinking of physiologist Karl von Baer (1828) that developmental issues could have been nuclear con-
and those who followed his early lead in the establish- cerns for the new science, but they were not. They have
ment of comparative embryology. It was also a basic not even played a significant role in the history of exper-
theme in the earliest systematic statements of psychol- imental psychology (see Boring, 1929/1950).
ogy (Reinert, 1979). There is also consensus that the initiation of the sci-
But not all of the founders of the new science sub- entific study of children represents the convergence of
scribed to the developmental perspective or the assump- two forces, one social and the other scientific. The sci-
tion that psychology was a definite part of biology. Some entific background is the primary focus of this chapter,
of the most influential—including Wilhelm Wundt him- and our principal attention is given to the intellectual
self—had a different view. Noting the difficulties that and empirical foundations of the discipline.
one encounters in efforts to study young children in ex- But there were also social and political roots. Sears
perimental settings, Wundt argued that “it is an error to (1975) observed, in his classic chapter titled “Your An-
hold, as is sometimes held, that the mental life of adults cients Revisited,” that:
can never be fully understood except through the analy-
sis of the child’s mind. The exact opposite is the true po- By the end of the [nineteenth] century, there had devel-
sition to take” (1907, p. 336). oped a vaguely cohesive expertise within the professions
Even the father of child psychology in America, G. of education and medicine, and the origins of social work
as a helping profession were clearly visible. During the
Stanley Hall, relegated developmental concerns to
first two decades of the twentieth century, these profes-
minor league status in the new psychology. In the inau-
sions began relevant research to improve their abilities,
gural lectures at Johns Hopkins, Hall (1885) followed but their main influence on the future science was their
his mentor Wundt in holding that psychology could be rapidly expanding services for children in the schools,
divided into three areas: (1) experimental psychology, hospitals, clinics, and social agencies. This expansion con-
(2) historical psychology, and (3) the study of instinct. tinued after World War I, and it was in the next decade,
The study of children and adolescents was assigned to the 1920s, that scientists from several nonprofessionally
historical psychology, which included as well the study oriented (“pure science”) disciplines began to join the
92 The Making of Developmental Psychology

researchers from the child-oriented professions to create successive stages, from the more general to the more
what we now view as the scientific field of child develop- specific, from relatively homogeneous states to increas-
ment. But like the engineering sciences which evolved ingly differentiated hierarchically organized structures.
from physics and chemistry, child development is a prod- Although von Baer himself considered his develop-
uct of social needs that had little to do with science qua mental proposals to be revolutionary, they initially re-
science. . . . The field grew out of relevance. (p. 4, au-
ceived only modest attention. After a bout of extreme
thor’s emphasis)
fatigue, disappointment, and disillusionment, von Baer
moved to Russia in 1834 and became librarian of the
Whether it is viewed as a creation of social forces or
Academy of Science in St. Petersburg. Later, he was
as an inevitable outcome of open scientific inquiry, de-
appointed leader of a Russian Arctic expedition where
velopmental psychology was established as a separate
he conducted geographical, botanical, and biological
research discipline only within the past century. How-
research relevant to evolution and development. At
ever, its scientific roots in biology extend back at least
the end of his career, he returned to Estonia, the coun-
an additional 100 years. It was then that fundamental
try of his birth, and served as president of the Univer-
questions on the origin of life, species transmutation,
sity of Tartu.
and individual development began to generate empirical
Von Baer’s developmental principles may seem com-
investigations.
monplace to modern students; his general axioms are
mentioned in introductory chapters of texts on biologi-
cal and cognitive development. But when the ideas were
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS: EMBRYOLOGY first proposed, they challenged the then-dominant expla-
AND EVOLUTION nations for how development proceeds. Two views vied
for prominence throughout most of the nineteenth cen-
A strong case could be made that the early scientific tury: (1) preformism and (2) epigenesis (Gould, 1977).
roots of developmental psychology are to be found in Preformism held that developmental transformations
embryology and evolutionary biology rather than in ex- were illusions because the essential characteristics of
perimental psychophysics. Two core ideas in nineteenth- the individual had already formed at the beginning of
century biological thought directly shaped developmental ontogenesis. Only the size and relations of the parts to
psychology and require attention: (1) K. E. von Baer’s de- each other changed, and their essential properties were
velopmental principle and (2) C. R. Darwin’s evolution- preset and predetermined. Although preformism is dis-
ary theory. missed nowadays as drawings of a miniaturized adult in
the womb, the concept of a homunculus is not essential
to the model (Gould, 1977).
What was basic to preformism was the idea that devel-
THE DEVELOPMENTAL PRINCIPLE opment could bring about changes in the shape and rela-
tionships among organs, but development fails to bring
Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1876) ranks as one of the out new or novel properties. Hence, stability and pre-
great original biologists of the nineteenth century, dictability from embryogenesis and infancy to adulthood
alongside Curvier, Lamarck, and Darwin (Hamburger, was expected, if one’s measurement tools were adequate.
1970). Born in Estonia, of German ancestry, he did his Absurd? Perhaps, except that the proposals do not appear
pivotal work on anatomical development at Würzburg entirely unreasonable if one considers parallels in mod-
and Königsberg. The pioneer of comparative embryol- ern genetic theory, where genes endure unchanged even
ogy, von Baer discovered the human ovum and the noto- though the organisms that they create do not. Moreover,
chord (the gelatinous, cylindrical cord in the embryo of particular alleles are assumed to be associated with
vertebrates around which, in higher forms, the backbone the ontogeny of specific structural and behavioral char-
and skull develop). More relevant to this chapter, von acteristics. At another level, modern developmental
Baer generalized beyond his empirical work in embryol- researchers often assume that the primary traits and dis-
ogy and anatomy to enunciate general principles on the positions—such as attachment and aggression—develop
fundamental nature of ontogenetic change (von Baer, and become stabilized during the interchanges of infancy
1828–1837). He proposed that development proceeds, in and early childhood. These dispositions and the internal-
 The Developmental Principle 93

ized models thus generated may be transformed over de- its final stages. Moreover, the organization at succes-
velopment into age-appropriate expression, but not in un- sive stages seemed to uniquely fit the organism for
derlying type. its current circumstances. It was not merely the
The other major nineteenth-century approach to de- mechanical repetition of earlier ancestral forms, as
velopment was epigenetic. Novelties were brought about implied by the recapitulation model (de Beer, 1958).
through progressive transformations in development. To sharpen the epigenetic account, von Baer
But what determines the course of the transformations (1828–1837) offered four laws by which development
and, ultimately, the nature of the finished product? could be described:
The earlier vitalistic answer—entelechy, the Aris-
totelian vital force—was no longer acceptable to most 1. The general features of a large group of animals ap-
nineteenth-century epigeneticists. Among other prob- pear earlier in the embryo than the special features.
lems, the teleological answer looked to be an admission
2. Less general characteristics are developed from the
of ignorance. But without developmental regulation and
more general, and so forth, until the most special-
direction, what would prevent growth from occurring
ized appear.
willy nilly into diverse and monstrous forms? The con-
cept of epigenesis-as-developmental-transformations 3. Each embryo of a given species, instead of passing
could not stand alone. It required additional assump- through the stages of other animals, departs more and
tions to account for the sequential properties of develop- more from them.
ment and its orderly nature (von Bertalanffy, 1933; 4. Fundamentally, therefore, the embryo of a higher
Gould, 1977). animal is never like a lower animal, but only like
This theoretical void was filled in nineteenth-century its embryo.
biology by the recapitulation concept prominent in
Naturphilosophie, a significant philosophical movement Von Baer held that development was a continuing pro-
in Germany. Recapitulation bound together the two main cess of differentiation and organization; hence, novel-
forms of organic creation, ontogeny (individual develop- ties could arise at each stage, not merely the terminal
ment) and phylogeny (species development), into a single one. When this embryological principle was later ap-
framework. In embryonic development, organisms are plied to structures, actions, thoughts, and social behav-
assumed to pass through the adult forms of all species iors (e.g., Piaget, 1951; Werner, 1940/1948), it produced
that had been ancestral to them during evolution. Organ- far-reaching consequences. The conclusion proposed in
isms in embryogenesis experience a fast-forward replay 1828 was that developmental processes demand rigorous
of evolutionary history. With this predictable and study in their own right; they cannot be derived from
orderly progression, novel features may be added only in analogies to evolution.
the terminal or mature phases of development. This Although von Baer was recognized as a leading em-
concept, labeled the “ biogenetic law” by Ernst Haeckel bryologist, his generalizations on the nature of develop-
(1866), was enormously influential in nineteenth- ment were not immediately accepted. They were
century biology. The recapitulation hypothesis also pro- inconsistent with broadly held beliefs in biology, and
vided the biological metaphor for Hall’s account of von Baer’s rejection of the Darwinian account of evolu-
adolescence and S. Freud’s original formulations of tion probably did not help matters. Despite compelling
repression and psychosexual stages (Sulloway, 1979, empirical and comparative evidence, for most of the
pp. 198–204, 258–264). nineteenth century von Baer’s developmental general-
In opposition to prominent biologists of his day, izations fared poorly in open competition with the reca-
von Baer argued that recapitulation was based on pitulation proposal.
faulty observations and romanticism rather than Von Baer’s developmental ideas were not entirely ig-
logic. In his own research, he found that organisms of nored in his time, however. It was in Carpenter’s (1854)
related species were indeed highly similar in anat- influential physiological textbook that Herbert Spencer
omy during their early stages of embryonic growth. discovered von Baer’s formulation of the developmental
However, contrary to the expectations of the recapit- principle. Spencer (1886) wrote that von Baer’s work
ulation interpretation, species-typical differences ap- represented “one of the most remarkable indications of
peared early in the course of development, not only in embryology” and stated:
94 The Making of Developmental Psychology

It was in 1852 that I became acquainted with von Baer’s ory in modern developmental psychology. This is regret-
expression of this general principle. The universality of table because:
law had ever been with me as a postulate, carrying with it
a correlative belief, tacit if now avowed, in unity of Darwin’s contribution and its current elaborations can en-
method throughout Nature. This statement that every plant hance developmental research, whereas the latter can as-
and animal, originally homogeneous, becomes gradually sist the former by putting its hypotheses to competent
heterogeneous, set up a process of coordination among ac- test. (p. 13)
cumulated thoughts that were previously unorganized, or
but partially organized. (p. 337)
It should be noted that Charlesworth’s conclusion on
the modest impact of evolutionary theory on develop-
Spencer’s work, in turn, inspired the genetic episte- mental psychology is at variance with other judgments
mology of James Mark Baldwin and his successors, in- in the literature. For example, Kessen (1965) credited
cluding Jean Piaget. Von Baer’s other line of influence Darwin with dramatically changing our concept of chil-
on psychology appears in animal behavior and compara- dren and childhood. This effect, according to Kessen
tive psychology through the work of Z.-Y. Kuo, (1965), was both direct (through Darwin’s published ob-
Schneirla, and Carmichael in the twentieth century. The servations of his infant son) and indirect (through the
modern dynamic systems model, transactional theory, profound impact of evolutionary ideas on the develop-
developmental psychobiology, and developmental sci- mental contributions of Preyer, J. M. Baldwin, Hall, and
ence have von Baer’s principle of development as a ker- Taine). A similar conclusion is expressed by Wohlwill
nel concept (e.g., see Lerner, Chapter 1; Thelen & (1973), who tracks three lines of Darwinian influence
Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). More- on developmental thought through Baldwin, Preyer, and
over, time and timing are central in von Baer’s formula- S. Freud.
tion, consistent with modern concepts of critical periods The proposition regarding the impact of Darwin de-
in embryogenesis and sensitive periods in behavior de- pends in large measure on how broadly or narrowly Dar-
velopment, and with the concepts of neoteny and hete- win’s influence is defined. As observed above, the study
rochrony in behavioral evolution (Cairns, 1976; de Beer, of individual development is rooted in embryology, not
1958; Gottlieb, 1992; Gould, 1977). in evolution. In her overview of the history of embryol-
There have been some major revisions, of course. The ogy, Jane Oppenheimer (1959) observes that the meth-
developmental principle identified a key feature of ods and concepts of embryological science owe little
epigenesis—homogeneity giving way to heterogeneity to the concepts of evolutionary biology. Moreover, von
through progressive differentiation, then integration Baer himself explicitly rejected the Darwinian con-
into reorganized structures—but it did not solve the struction of evolution.
problem of how development is directed. In his writing, The picture becomes blurred, however, with Haeckel’s
he remained vaguely teleological, a position that seemed (1866) wedding of ontogenetic and evolutionary concepts
consistent with Naturphilosophie but out of line with his in the recapitulation principle. Haeckel was an enor-
rigorous experimental work and careful theoretical mously influential advocate of Darwinian evolution in the
analysis. Leaving the directionality issue open-ended in- second half of the nineteenth century, and his influence is
vited continued application of the recapitulation propo- strongly represented in Preyer (1882/1888–1889) and
sition. The puzzle of directionality in embryological Hall (1904). Moreover, a direct line can be drawn from
development took almost 100 years to solve (von Berta- Darwinian commentaries on the evolution of the emotions
lanffy, 1933). and intelligence to the work of comparative psychologists
Romanes (1889) and Morgan (1896), and from these piv-
EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT otal figures in the late nineteenth century to the founda-
tion of modern comparative work on psychobiological
“ To what extent and in what manner has the work of integration and concepts of learning. The importance of
Charles Darwin influenced developmental psychology?” evolutionary themes is told by Sigmund Freud himself
(Charlesworth, 1992, p. 5). In answering his question on (1957). It is also a core message in Sulloway’s (1979) in-
Darwin’s impact, Charlesworth concludes that the in- tellectual biography that was aptly titled, “Freud, Biolo-
fluence is much less direct and much weaker than has gist of the Mind.”
been traditionally accepted. He finds only few direct Those aspects of Darwin’s evolutionary theory that
links to Darwinian propositions or to evolutionary the- have had only a modest influence on developmental psy-
 Evolution and Development 95

chology concern its strong implications for the heritabil- comparative psychology (Gottlieb, 1979; Klopfer &
ity of behavior and the evolution of behavioral propensi- Hailman, 1967).
ties. At least one modern model of sociobiology views Studies of behavioral development in nonhumans
ontogenetic variation as “developmental noise” (Wilson, were also rapidly becoming a focal concern in North
1975). This is because sociobiological emphasis is on (a) America. The Canadian physiologist, Wesley Mills, of-
variations in structures of societies, not variations in in- fered an especially clear statement of the need for devel-
dividual life histories, and ( b) the biological contribu- opmental studies in a Psychological Review paper that
tors to those variations in group structures, including appeared in 1899. In the article, Mills took E. L.
the genetic determinants of aggressive behaviors, altru- Thorndike (1898) to task for his narrow view of how ex-
ism, and cooperation. As in the logic of Wundt, imma- perimental analyses can contribute to understanding an-
ture expression of these phenomena in individuals is imal learning and intelligence.
seen as ephemeral and individualistic; genetic and evo- For Mills, the notions of ecological validity and bio-
lutionary forces may be viewed more clearly when they logical constraints on learning would not be unfamiliar
are aggregated across persons into societal structures ideas. In a remarkable passage, Mills (1899) outlines a
(see Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, Chapter 5, this strategy that anticipates the importance of understand-
Handbook, this volume). ing development in context. He wrote:
In contrast, evolutionary concepts have had a major
impact on research in comparative studies of develop- Were it possible to observe an animal, say a dog, from the
moment of its birth onward continuously for one year, not-
ment in animals from the mid-nineteenth century to the
ing the precise conditions and all that happens under these
present. In England, Douglas Spalding (1873) reported
conditions, the observer being unnoticed by the creature
the remarkable effects of early experience in establish- studied, we should, I believe be in possession of one of
ing filial preferences in newly hatched chicks. His ex- the most valuable contributions it is possible to make to
perimental demonstrations seemed to confirm that comparative psychology. This would imply not one, but
phyletic and ontogenetic influences must operate in tan- several persons giving up their whole time, day and night,
dem, that the young animal was predisposed to form by turns, to such a task. As yet, but very imperfect ap-
preferences during a period of high sensitivity shortly proaches have been made to anything of the kind; never-
after hatching, and that the experiences that occurred theless, such as they have been, they are the most valuable
then were especially effective in the rapid establishment contribution thus made, in the opinion of the present
of preferences. writer, and the more of such we have the better.
George John Romanes, a young scientist who had If to such a study another were added, in which the ef-
fect of altering conditions from time to time with the spe-
the confidence of Darwin, was impressed by Spalding’s
cial object of testing the results on an animal or animals
demonstrations and, with him, emphasized the early
similarly closely observed from birth onward, we should
formation and plasticity of behavior within the frame- have another most valuable contribution to comparative
work of its evolutionary foundation. More generally, Ro- psychology; but experiment on animals whose history is
manes’s analysis of the stage-paced development of unknown must, in the nature of the case, be very much
sexuality and cognition served as a basic text for the two less valuable than in such an instance as that just pro-
most important theorists in developmental psychology, posed. (p. 273)
Sigmund Freud and James Mark Baldwin. Mental Evolu-
tion in Man (Romanes, 1889) was one of the most anno- However convincing Mills’s proposals may appear in
tated books in Freud’s library, and Sulloway (1979) retrospect, E. L. Thorndike completed the work, and ex-
suggests that it provided inspiration for Freud’s later perimental methods won the battle of the day and, for
emphasis on the early appearance of infantile sexuality. the most part, the war of the century. By the next gener-
In accord with recapitulation theory, Romanes had ation, experimental studies of learning in animals and
placed the onset of human sexuality at 7 weeks. J. M. children were dominated by Thorndikian short-term,
Baldwin (1895), for his part, gives explicit credit to Ro- nondevelopmental experimental designs, at least in the
manes and Spencer as providing inspiration and direc- United States. It should be noted, in Thorndike’s de-
tion to the work embodied in his Mental Development in fense, that the main point of his experimental laboratory
the Child and the Race. It should also be observed that work, first described in Animal Intelligence (1898, p. 1),
Romanes, whose aim was to clarify the evolution of the was to clarify “ the nature of the processes of associa-
mind and consciousness, is also regarded as the father of tion in the animal mind.” It was, in effect, the study of
96 The Making of Developmental Psychology

animal consciousness and the role that representation sufficiently diverse so that one can point to several land-
plays in learning methods. Thorndike’s statement of the mark dates, depending on which movement or which pi-
“law of effect ” proved to be enormously influential. oneer one wishes to commemorate. The founding of the
In summary, thoughtful investigators of develop- child development research institute at Clark University
ment in nonhuman animals have been concerned with and the establishment of the journal Pedagogical Semi-
evolutionary and ontogenetic issues and how they are nary, by Hall, were clearly of signal importance for the
interrelated. The focus was reflected in the work of area. But to celebrate Hall’s contributions over those of
Romanes (1889), Morgan (1896), and Mills (1898) in Alfred Binet can hardly be justified. Binet, at almost
the latter part of the nineteenth century, and in the the same time, was laying the foundations for modern
work of Z.-Y. Kuo (1930), Schneirla (1959), Tinbergen experimental child psychology at the Sorbonne and es-
(1972), and Hinde (1966) in the mid-twentieth cen- tablishing L’Année Psychologique as a prime source for
tury. This dual concern, along with the research on developmental publications. Perhaps the dilemma may
animals and young humans that it has stimulated, has be eased by recognizing that these major advances were
helped establish the conceptual and empirical founda- themselves beneficiaries of a zeitgeist that seems to
tions for a fresh developmental synthesis. Whether have begun about 1880 and gained significant momen-
Darwinian thought has been influential for modern tum with the publication of William Preyer’s The Mind
developmental psychology depends on which evolu- of the Child in 1882/1888–1889.2
tionary ideas are evaluated and which aspects of de- The book has been called “ the first work of modern
velopmental psychology are examined. psychology” (see Reinert, 1979), providing “ the greatest
stimulation for the development of modern ontogenetic
psychology” (Munn, 1965).
THE EMERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENTAL
Not everyone agrees with these high evaluations of
PSYCHOLOGY (1882–1912)
Preyer’s work or of its originality (see, for instance,
Bühler, 1930; Kessen, 1965; and below). Nonetheless,
Developmental studies flourished despite the influence
Preyer’s book served as a powerful catalyst for the fur-
of traditional psychophysical laboratories rather than
ther study of development in psychology and in biology,
because of it. The study of behavioral and mental devel-
and 1882 seems to be a reasonable date for us to begin
opment was going full steam in the 1890s. By mid-
this story of the development of modern developmental
decade, genetic or developmental psychology had its
psychology. In addition to Hall and Binet, two other per-
own scientific journals (L’Année Psychologique, 1894;
sons—James Mark Baldwin and Sigmund Freud—con-
Pedagogical Seminary, 1891, later to be renamed the
tributed much to the molding of the area. The nature
Journal of Genetic Psychology), research institutes (Sor-
and extent of their contributions are the main focus of
bonne, 1893; Clark University, 1890), influential text-
this section.
books (e.g., The Mind of the Child, 1982; L’Évolution
Intellectuelle et Morale de l’Enfant, 1893; Mental Devel- Embryos and Infants
opment in the Child and the Race, 1895), professional
organizations (e.g., Child Study Section of the Na- When The Mind of the Child was published, William T.
tional Education Association, 1893; Société Libre pour Preyer (1841–1897) intended it to be only the first in-
l’Étude Psychologique de l’Enfant, 1899), and psycho-
2
logical clinic (University of Pennsylvania, 1896). As There is some ambiguity about the actual publication date of
early as 1888, Hall was able to refer to the “nearly The Mind of the Child. In the preface to the second edition,
fourscore studies of young children printed by careful Preyer tells us that “ the first edition of this book appeared in
October, 1881” (p. xvi). That seems straightforward enough,
empirical and often thoroughly scientific observers”
but the publication date of the original German work was
(Hall, 1888, p. xxiii). The field had advanced so far that
1882. The discrepancy apparently arose because of the lag
it was christened with a name—Paidoskopie—to empha- between the time when the author signed off the Preface (in
size its newly won scientific independence (Compayré, Jena, October 6, 1881) and the time the finished book was ac-
1893). Happily, the activity survived the name. tually published. Similar ambiguity surrounds the traditional
There is, however, no strong consensus on which year assignment of 1879 as the founding of Wundt’s laboratory; it
should serve as an anchor for developmental psychol- was an ongoing enterprise at the time, and William James
ogy’s centennial. The problem is that the area is now claimed priority anyway.
 The Emergence of Developmental Psychology (1882–1912) 97

stallment of a more comprehensive study of the nature enterprise. The procedures that he endorsed, and fol-
of development. He completed the project 4 years later, lowed, belied the proposition that children, even imma-
with publication of The Special Physiology of the Em- ture and unborn ones, could not be studied objectively
bryo (Preyer, 1885). That these two contributions were and with profit.
not translated together and studied as a unit is a pity, Preyer was not the first person to undertake detailed
for, in Preyer’s mind, the issues to which they were ad- observations of his offspring for scientific purposes. A
dressed were mutually dependent and complementary. professor of Greek and philosophy at the University of
Preyer assumed that the methods and concepts applica- Marburg, Dietrich Tiedemann (1748–1803), had earlier
ble to embryological study could be applied with employed the method, and his 1787 monograph Observa-
advantage to behavioral study, and that investigations tions on the Development of Mental Capabilities in Chil-
of the one would support and complement investiga- dren (Murchison & Langer, 1927), seems to have been
tions of the other. Why then two books? As Preyer the first known published psychological diary of longi-
(1882/1888–1889) explains it: tudinal development in children, according to Reinert
(1979). In the 100 years between Tiedemann and Preyer,
I proposed to myself a number of years ago, the task of several studies appeared, some of which were suffi-
studying the child, both before birth and in the period im- ciently free of parental bias and distortion from other
mediately following, from the physiological point of view, sources to be considered useful scientific contributions
with the object of arriving at an explanation of the origin (Reinert, 1979, has an informative account of this work).
of separate vital processes. It was soon apparent to me that An article by Charles Darwin played an important
a division of the work would be advantageous to its prose- role in stimulating further interest in the endeavor. In
cution. For life in the embryo is so essentially different a 1877, it appeared in the new psychological journal Mind,
thing from life beyond it, that a separation must make it
having been triggered by the appearance, 2 months ear-
easier both for the investigator to do his work and for the
lier, of a translation of H. Taine’s (1876) parallel obser-
reader to follow the expositions of the results. I have,
therefore, discussed by itself, life before birth, in the
vations in the immediately preceding issue. Darwin’s
“Physiology of the Embryo.” (p. ix) article was based on 37-year-old notes he made during
the first two years of one of his sons. Although inferior
to the other reports in terms of systematicity of observa-
Preyer completed work on both phases of the project,
tion and depth of reporting, Darwin’s contribution
embryogenesis and postnatal development, in a signifi-
served to legitimize the method and promoted research
cant number of species (including humans). It is almost
with children.
true that his feat has yet to be matched by another single
The methodological standards that Preyer established
investigator.
for himself are admirable, even by today’s criteria. He
What drew Preyer to the study of development in the
reports that he “adhered strictly, without exception,” to
first place? That question cannot be answered defini-
the following rules:
tively, but we do know that he was trained in physiology
in Germany and, with others of his generation, came
• Only direct observations were cited by the investiga-
under the spell of Ernst Haeckel’s vision of the unity of
tor, and they were compared for accuracy with obser-
science and the centrality of development in evolution
vations made by others.
and life. Preyer recognized that the scientific program
of modern biology would be incomplete without a care- • All observations were recorded immediately and in
ful analysis of human development from conception detail, regardless of whether they seemed uninterest-
through maturity, and that such a program would neces- ing or “meaningless articulations.”
sarily be interdisciplinary. As he put it, such prenatal • To the extent possible, observations were unobtru-
and postnatal observations “are necessary, from the sive and “every artificial strain upon the child”
physiological, the psychological, the linguistic, and was avoided.
the pedagogic point of view, and nothing can supply • “Every interruption of one’s observation for more
their place” (1882/1888–1889, pp. 186–187). Beyond than a day demands the substitution of another ob-
Preyer’s appreciation that intellectual and scholarly server, and, after taking up the work again, a verifi-
breadth were required for the productive study of chil- cation of what has been perceived and noted down in
dren, he established methodological standards for the the interval.”
98 The Making of Developmental Psychology

• “ Three times, at least, every day the same child is to The third part of The Mind of the Child, “Develop-
be observed, and everything incidentally noticed is to ment of Intellect,” includes the consideration of lan-
be put upon paper, no less than that which is method- guage comprehension and production as well as the
ically ascertained with reference to definite ques- development of social cognition, including the concept
tions” [The Mind of the Child (1882/1888–1889), vol. of the self. Preyer’s discussion proceeds, with uncom-
2, pp. 187–188]. monly good sense, from a description of the onset of
landmarks of language development to an attempt to de-
In brief, most problems of observation and catego- termine when the notion of “ego,” or the self, develops.
rization were anticipated by Preyer, including those of For Preyer, it occurs when the child can recognize “as
reliability and observer agreement. belonging to him the parts of his body that he can feel
How Preyer chose to organize his findings is almost and see” (p. 189). Whatever the other merits of that pro-
as interesting as his methods and findings. For Preyer, posal, it permits Preyer to undertake a series of observa-
the mind of the child, like Gaul, can be divided into tions and mini-experiments on the matter. One section
three parts: (1) senses, (2) will, and (3) intellect. Be- deals with the ability of children to respond to their re-
cause his knowledge about the comparative development flections in a mirror; another, with the uses and misuses
of vision, hearing, taste, smell, touch, and temperature of personal pronouns by young children.
perception was surprisingly broad, many—but not all— In addition to his study of infancy and early child-
of Preyer’s (1882/1888–1889) generalizations on the hood, Preyer left another legacy to modern developmen-
“Development of Senses” were on target. A few of his talists, The Special Physiology of the Embryo (1885). To
statements were demonstrably wrong. For instance, he complete his analysis of the “origin of separate vital
wrote “ the normal human being at birth hears nothing” processes,” Preyer conducted experiments and made ob-
(p. 96). Preyer arrived at an opposite (and correct) set of servations on the embryos of invertebrates, amphibia,
conclusions on the capabilities of various nonhuman birds, and various mammals. Some of these observa-
species to hear at birth. In light of the care and precision tions—on the prenatal development of sensory and
of most of the observations, it’s puzzling that Preyer motor functions—have only recently been confirmed
made such an elementary error. In retrospect, we may and extended using modern techniques. In line with re-
speculate that a primary flaw was theoretical rather cent interpretations of early development, Preyer con-
than methodological. Preyer’s conclusions on neonatal cluded that (a) integrated, spontaneous motor activity
incompetence were colored by his general assumption was antecedent to the development of responsiveness to
that human beings were less mature at birth than were sensory stimulation, and ( b) motor activity may provide
species ancestral to them (i.e., neoteny). This was not the substrate for later mental, emotional, and linguistic
the first time, nor the last, that strongly held hypotheses performance. Because of his pioneering studies, he is
about the nature of children led to erroneous conclu- acknowledged to be the father of behavioral embryology
sions, despite disconfirming empirical evidence. (Gottlieb, 1973).
The “Development of Will” provided an informative Preyer has sometimes been depicted as the prototypic
and informed analysis of the onset of such patterns as methodologist—careful, precise, compulsive, and pedes-
sitting, grabbing, pointing, standing, and other motoric trian. On this score, Karl Bühler (1930) writes that The
acts. But Preyer was looking for more than a behavioral Mind of the Child was “a remarkable book full of inter-
inventory: He hoped to find out how the pattern arose. esting and conscientious observations, but poor in origi-
For instance, “deliberate” pointing seemed to arise from nal ideas” (p. 27) and that “Preyer himself was no pioneer
the early action of abortive “seizing” or “grabbing,” and in psychology” (p. 27). Others have echoed the exact
only at about 9 months of age did “pointing” gain the ca- words, along with the sentiment that his book was more
pacity to signal to others the child’s wants and needs. like a developmental psychophysiology than a develop-
Among other things, he concludes: “ The first deliberate mental psychology (Reinert, 1979).3
intention-movements occur only after the close of the
first three months” (p. 332). Preyer thus found, in the 3
Did cultural stereotypes play a role in the evaluation of The
study of the development of movement patterns, re- Mind of the Child? For instance, Compayré (1893) called the
flexes, and other actions, a possible clue to the system- book a “monument of German assiduousness.” Mateer (1918)
atic analysis of the onset of intentionality. remarked (in the context of comparing Frenchman Peréz’s
 The Emergence of Developmental Psychology (1882–1912) 99

Has Preyer’s empirical reputation outrun his theoret- swer was clearly speculative, but it followed the same
ical contribution to developmental psychology? The an- line of reasoning that is reflected in the structure-
swer depends in part on what aspects of theory one function bidirectional proposals offered in the next cen-
chooses to focus on. Preyer’s main concern in preparing tury by developmental psychobiologists and modern
both Mind of the Child and Special Physiology was the neurobiologists. (See also Brandtstädter, Chapter 10;
clarification of a basic issue of development: the rela- Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume.)
tions between ontogeny and phylogeny of behavior, and The theoretical import of Preyer’s behavioral
how these two processes influenced each other. His cat- timetable comes into focus when viewed in the context
egorization of the dates of onset was not an end in itself, of Haeckel’s biogenetic law. Its key assumption was that
to develop a behavioral timetable. Rather, his aim was to human maturation was accelerated with respect to an-
establish the lawful sequence of development of sensory cestral species. That is, as noted earlier, in this concept
and cognitive systems so that meaningful generaliza- humans are presumed to pass through the several stages
tions could be drawn between species and among sys- of development more rapidly than the species from
tems in development. which they were derived, so that evolutionary “novel-
Hence, for Preyer (1882/1888–1889), one key theo- ties” and distinctively human characteristics appear at
retical issue was how to reconcile competing claims of maturity, not in infancy. To be tested, the view required
the “nativists” and the “empiricists” in the origin and precise information about the relative rates of matura-
perfection of the “ vital processes” of behavior and tion; hence, the need for exactness in plotting the onset
thought. As far as human vision (or other sensory of particular behaviors. But Preyer was not a biogenetic
processes) was concerned, he concluded that “my obser- apologist. He offered the compelling hypothesis that hu-
vations show that . . . both parties are right” (vol. 1, mans’ maturation rate was retarded relative to ancestral
p. 35, emphasis added). In a discussion that constitutes species, an idea that ran counter to the accepted version
an early model for the developmental landscape of C. H. of recapitulation. Human beings should enjoy a
Waddington (1971), he speculates that “ The brain longer (not shorter) period of immaturity than their
comes into the world provided with a great number of closest phyletic relatives. Accordingly, in most “ vital
impressions upon it. Some of these are quite obscure, processes” and behavior, there should be relatively
some few are distinct ” (vol. 2, p. 211). Through experi- greater plasticity in development and opportunities for
ence, some of the pathways are obliterated, and others learning for children than for nonhuman animals (vol. 1,
are deepened. pp. 70–71, 1882/1888–1889). This is essentially an
Lest Preyer be written off as a naïve nativist, it should early statement of behavioral neoteny: The relatively
be added that his position was closer to the bidirectional slower rate of maturation should be an advantage in
approach of modern developmental psychobiology than making for an extended period of curiosity, flexibility,
to the innate ideas of Immanuel Kant. Drawing on stud- and adaptability in human beings (see also Fiske, 1883).
ies of the comparative anatomy of the brain as well as Echoes of his theoretical interpretations can be found in
cross-species comparisons of behavior, he concluded modern studies of ontogenetic-phyletic relations (e.g.,
(1882/1888–1889) that there is feedback between expe- Cairns, 1976; de Beer, 1958; Mason, 1980) and the bidi-
rience and normal structural development in the brain. rectionality of structure-function relations (e.g., Gott-
He offered a foresightful statement of the bidirectional lieb, 1976; Z.-Y. Kuo, 1967).
structure-function hypothesis, reaching the conclusion Tracing the heritage that Preyer left for developmen-
that “The brain grows through its own activity” (vol. 2, tal study, we find that he set high standards for scien-
p. 98, emphasis added). How then does the individual tific observation of behavioral development. Though not
contribute to his or her own development? Preyer’s an- unflawed, his observations were carefully recorded and
sanely written. For those who followed him, Preyer em-
“logical, brilliant style” with that of Preyer) that: “ The
bedded the study of children in the framework of biolog-
French write brilliantly and convincingly but their technique ical science, and he demonstrated how interdisciplinary
is apt to be at fault. They seem to hit intuitively upon right techniques could be employed. Beyond the methodologi-
premises and conclusions, although their data may be uncon- cal message, there was a theoretical one. Preyer was a
vincing or scanty. The German work is more stolid, more con- man of his times, evolutionary in outlook and committed
vincing in its facts but less inspiring in application” (p. 24). to the clarification of the relations between ontogeny
100 The Making of Developmental Psychology

and phylogeny, between nature and nurture. Surpris- Simon scales” (p. 81). Given the influence of this proce-
ingly, he was perhaps as influential in embryology as in dure identified with Binet’s name, it is understandable,
developmental psychology. Through his work, talented yet regrettable, that his other contributions to develop-
young men and women were recruited to experimental mental psychology have gained so little attention. As it
embryology (including Hans Spemann, who identified turns out, it took experimental child psychology some 70
“critical periods” and “organizers” in embryological de- years to catch up with some of Binet’s insights on cogni-
velopment). Perhaps most important, Preyer demon- tion and the organization of memory.
strated, by his successful integration of experimental Throughout his career, Binet was characterized by an
studies of human and nonhuman young, that the investi- independence of thought and action, starting with his
gation of behavioral development could be as much a sci- introduction to psychology. It was his third choice in ca-
entific enterprise as a social, humanistic movement. reers, after he had dropped out of law school and med-
Happily, other colleagues in America and Europe under- ical training (Wolf, 1973). In 1879/1880, Binet began
stood the message. independent reading in psychology at the Bibliothèque
Nationale in Paris. Curiously, he selectively avoided ex-
Memory and Intelligence perimental psychology (the Wundtian version) by read-
ing little or no German, and he took no trips to Leipzig.
In an article on the scientific contributions of Alfred
Shortly after he began work in psychology, he published
Binet (1857–1911), Siegler (1992) observes: “It is ironic
his first paper, a useful discussion of experiential con-
that Binet’s contribution should be so strongly associ-
tributions to the psychophysics of two-point tactile dis-
ated with reducing intelligence to a single number, the
crimination. For research training, Binet affiliated
IQ score, when the recurring theme of his research was
himself with the distinguished neurologist, Jean Martin
the remarkable diversity of intelligence” (p. 175). That
Charcot, at the Salpêtrière (a noted Paris hospital). Over
is only one of the ironies in Binet’s work and life. An-
a period of seven years, Binet collaborated with Charcot
other is that he was arguably the greatest French psy-
and Charles Féré in studies of hypnotism and its expres-
chologist of his day; yet, he was unable to obtain a
sion in normal persons and in the patient population.
professorship in France. Moreover, the intelligence test
Binet’s introduction to “experimental methods” thus was
that he developed with Simon, which was intended to
some distance removed from the then-acceptable labora-
provide guides on how “ to learn to learn,” has been used
tory procedures. His apprenticeship in research led to
over the past century as a basis for classifying children
some spectacular controversies, with young Binet in the
and adults into intellectual categories that are presumed
middle of the fray. The problem was that certain phe-
to be constant over life.
nomena reported by the Salpêtrière group defied credi-
Statements about historical priority and influence are
bility—for example, that the effects of hypnotic
delicate matters, but among non-French observers there
suggestion migrate from one side of the body to the
is no serious debate over the claim that Alfred Binet was
other by virtue of electromagnetic influences (a very
France’s first significant experimental psychologist.4
large magnet was used in demonstrations). Attempts to
What makes his work of special importance for this
replicate the phenomena elsewhere proved unrewarding.
chapter is that he was the premier early experimental
As it turned out, the research procedures followed by
child psychologist whose observations extended beyond
Binet and Féré were remarkably casual, and they gave
the laboratory. The results have been far-reaching. Jenk-
scant attention to the possible suggestibility of their sub-
ins and Paterson (1961) observed, “Probably no psycho-
jects or of themselves (see Siegler, 1992).
logical innovation has had more impact on the societies
An absurd idea? In light of our present knowledge
of the Western world than the development of the Binet-
about the brain and hypnotism, it was a thoroughly naïve
4 proposition. But this is the stuff out of which discoveries
But not France’s first child psychologist. Peréz (1851/1878)
published his The First Three Years of the Child several years are made. Féré shortly afterward (1888) became the
before Preyer’s The Mind of the Child (1882/1888–1889). first investigator to discover that emotional changes
The two authors covered the same ground, but, as Reinert were correlated with electrical changes in the human
(1979) indicates, Peréz was generally considered to be the body. Naïve or not, he is credited with discovering the
more imaginative and Preyer the more methodical. resistance method of measurement and developing the
 The Emergence of Developmental Psychology (1882–1912) 101

first statement of arousal theory (Thompson & Robin- is only a factitious one, artificial, produced by the suppres-
son, 1979, p. 444). sion of all troublesome complications. (Binet, Phillippe,
While he was at the Salpêtrière, Binet’s research Courtier, & Henri, 1894, pp. 28–30)
skills were simultaneously being sharpened in the em-
bryological laboratory of E. G. Balbiani. He became ac- Nor was he impressed by the large-scale studies by Hall
quainted firsthand with the rigorous procedures of and his students, who used the questionnaire methodol-
biological research and the then-current concepts of ogy. On the latter, Binet (1903) wrote:
evolution, development, and genetics. This work culmi- The Americans, who love to do things big, often publish
nated in 1894 with his being awarded a doctorate in nat- experiments made on hundreds or even thousands of per-
ural science from the Sorbonne and his appointment as sons. They believe that the conclusive value of a study is
Director of the Laboratory of Physiological Psychology proportional to the number of observations. That is a
at the same institution. In that year, Binet also founded myth. (p. 299)
and edited L’Année Psychologique, co-authored two
books (one dealing with the determinants of the extraor- These hardly were the sorts of comments that would en-
dinary memory feats of chess masters and calculators; dear him to his U.S. and German colleagues, and
the other, a critical treatment of the methods and ap- Howard C. Warren, one of the more generous reviewers,
proaches of experimental psychology), and published 15 reciprocated by “confessing to a feeling of disappoint-
articles. Among the articles were studies of the psychol- ment when it is considered what even a short book like
ogy of aesthetics, suggestibility, the nervous system of this might have been” (Warren, 1894).
invertebrates, perception in children, and studies on the What Binet had to offer psychology was a pragmatic,
development of memory. Only one year’s work? No, be- multimethod, multipopulation approach to the problems
cause some of the studies had been ongoing over the pre- of behavior. Instead of relying merely on introspection
vious 2 to 3 years; yes, because his publication list was and psychophysiological experimentation, Binet thor-
just as impressive in 1895 as in 1894. This pattern was oughly dissected behavioral phenomena. To explore
maintained until his death in 1911; except that, later in memory, for instance, he varied the nature of the stimuli
his career, he also wrote and supervised plays that were (memory for figures and for linguistic material; mem-
produced in Paris and London (Wolf, 1973). ory for meaningful sentences versus individual words),
Prolificacy can be embarrassing if one hasn’t much to the subjects tested (chess masters and superior “calcula-
write about. That seems not to have been a problem for tors” who performed on the stage; normal children and
Binet, due in large measure to his “ very open, curious, retarded children), measures employed (free recall,
and searching” mind. Binet was so described when, recognition, physiological measures of blood pressure,
prior to completing his doctorate, he was named laureate and electrical activity), type of design ( large group
by the Moral and Political Academy of the Institute of samples, individual analysis over long-term periods),
France (Wolf, 1973). Although he began his research and statistics employed. Through it all, Binet selected
training in the library, he soon became committed to the designs, procedures, and subjects with a purpose, not
task of expanding the empirical foundations of the area merely because they were available. To investigate imag-
in ways that seemed novel if not heretical. He early re- ination and creativity, he studied gifted playwrights and
jected the conventional methods of experimental psy- explored new techniques (inkblots, word association,
chology (as it had been practiced in Leipzig and and case history information).
Baltimore) as being narrow and misleading. On intro- Such methodological catholicism is not without pit-
spective experiments, he wrote, in his Introduction to falls. He was open not only to new discoveries but to new
Experimental Psychology: sources of error. In his day, he received high praise and
devastating criticism for his work, and both seemed
Subjects go into a little room, respond by electrical signals, earned. The early studies were vulnerable: Binet was in
and leave without so much as a word to the experi- the process of learning a trade for which there were, as
menter. . . . With the three choices only—“equal,” yet, no masters. He came out on the short end of a dev-
“greater,” or “less”—they often seem to set up the results astating exchange on the “magnetic” nature of hypno-
of the experiments in advance. Their aim is simplicity, but tism (Siegler, 1992), and there was equally justified
102 The Making of Developmental Psychology

criticism by H. S. Jennings (1898–1899) on Binet’s in- views of memory and recall (e.g., Paris, 1978). In the
terpretations of his studies on the psychic life of the words of Binet and Henri, as translated by Thieman and
lower beasts. S. Franz (1898), a student of J. M. Cattell, Brewer (1978):
took him to task for the quality of his statistical presen-
The children have a tendency to replace a word from the
tation in a series of studies on the relation between
spoken text when the word appears in a rather lofty style,
cognition and physical measures in children. Florence with another word with which they are better acquainted,
Mateer (1918) doubtless had Binet in mind when she and which they encounter more often in their own conver-
commented that “ the French write brilliantly and con- sation. Their act of memory is accompanied by an act of
vincingly but their technique is apt to be at fault ” translation. (p. 256)
(p. 24). Such errors—and the attitudes they fed—unfor-
tunately masked the fundamental brilliance of Binet’s How Binet and his colleagues chose to follow up this
work. Though shy in personal demeanor, Binet as a sci- experimental work is instructive. Noting that other re-
entist was not a timid man; he was outspoken, and his searchers might do things differently, Binet embarked
criticism of naïve generalizations and wrongheaded on an intensive study of “superior functions” in relatives
conceptualizations placed him at odds with beliefs held (namely, his two adolescent daughters) and friends.
by then-dominant leaders of the discipline. He published Binet did not give up on experimental designs so much
what he believed, and seems to have judged the long- as he extended their boundaries by conducting experi-
term gains to be worth the short-term costs to his career ments on persons whose histories and characteristics
and influence. were known intimately to him. For Binet, the key to un-
Binet reported demonstrational studies of memory locking the secrets of intelligence involved not only
and perception that he had conducted with his two mapping its outline in large-scale studies but also mak-
young daughters. The work was extended in succeeding ing a detailed tracing of its internal features in individ-
years not only with his children (through adolescence) ual analysis. This movement back and forth—from a
but also with diverse subjects and areas of memory. focus on individuals to a focus on large samples, then
Along with his collaborators, notably Victor Henri, the back to individuals—was a distinctive and deliberate re-
work was extended to persons who were extraordinarily search strategy.
talented or retarded. Because Binet operated on the Attention to two or three children, rather than to a
working assumption that the study of normal processes single individual or to large samples, inevitably leads one
was the key to understanding special talents or deficits, to a focus on the differences among them. So it was with
his laboratory also made a major investment in the Binet. He was not the first psychologist to be curious
analysis of memory in normal children, adolescents, and about differences among persons and their assessment
adults. Binet was highly sensitive to the need for conver- and explanation. Francis Galton had earlier used sensory
gent analyses that intersect on a common problem. He discrimination tests to assess differences in basic abili-
argued in 1903 that “our psychology is not yet so ad- ties. The rationale for such tests was stated succinctly by
vanced” that we can limit our analyses to information Galton (1883): “ The only information that reaches us
obtained in the laboratory; rather, complex intellectual concerning outward events appears to pass through the
functions are best understood in studies of persons avenue of our senses; and the more perceptive the senses
“ whom we know intimately, to relatives and friends.” are of difference, the larger is the field upon which our
Binet did not, however, disdain large-scale research judgment and intelligence can act ” (p. 27).
designs; he simply believed that they were insufficient In other words, modest differences at the level of
in themselves to tell the full story about the nature of sensation would be directly reflected in “complex” cog-
memory processes. In collaboration with Henri, he con- nitive functioning, or would be multiplied. A similar ra-
ducted a remarkable series of studies on memory devel- tionale (and research strategy) was recommended by the
opment that involved several hundred children. U.S. psychologist, James McKeen Cattell, in an article
In one of their analyses, Binet and Henri (1894) entitled “Mental Tests and Measurement ” (1890).
found that the children reconstructed material into Specifically, Cattell proposed that mental measurement
chunks of information that were meaningful to them. It should employ several tests of “ basic” sensory and
should be noted that this idea of active reorganization motor abilities, including assessments of color discrimi-
has now returned to occupy the attention of “modern” nation, reaction time, and other standard psychophysical
 The Emergence of Developmental Psychology (1882–1912) 103

procedures. Other experimental psychologists—includ- tests. Soon after the formation of the Société Libre pour
ing Joseph Jastrow at Wisconsin, Hugo Munsterberg at l’Étude Psychologique de l’Enfant (Society for the Psy-
Freiberg, and J. A. Gilbert at Yale and Iowa (1894, chological Study of the Child), Binet was invited to be-
1897)—concurred. come a member and he shortly became a leading voice in
Characteristically, Binet and Henri (1895) took an its activities and publications. The Société not only
approach that was radically different from that of their prodded the Ministry of Public Instruction to think con-
U.S. and German colleagues. It was, however, wholly structively about the needs of retarded children, but was
consistent with the conclusions they had arrived at in also influential in having a commission appointed to set
their earlier studies of memory development; namely, it up special classes. Binet, as a leader of the Société, was
was absurd to focus on elementary units of memory as appointed to the commission. It was not entirely coinci-
opposed to a recall for ideas and meaning. Furthermore, dental, then, that he was invited to develop tests for
from Binet’s studies of individuals, it seemed clear that identifying children who could benefit from special in-
great differences could be observed among persons of struction, and the results of the work were reported in a
“ higher ” mental functions, including language skills, series of articles in L’Année Psychologique in 1905
suggestibility, commonsense judgments, and imagina- (Binet & Simon, 1905) and later extended (Binet, 1908,
tion. Binet and Henri (1895) thus argued for a method- 1911). Although the articles offered guidelines for as-
ological strategy that was precisely opposite to that of sessment in each of three areas (medical, educational,
Galton and Cattell: psychological), their greatest attention was given to psy-
chological tests. The 30 tests of the 1905 scale followed
The higher and more complex a process is, the more it the outline offered by Binet and Henri (1895) some 10
varies in individuals; sensations vary from one individual
years earlier, except some procedures—including the
to another, but less so than memory; memory of sensations
suggested use of inkblots to study imagination—were
varies less than memories of ideas, and so on. The result is
that if one wishes to study the differences between two in-
omitted and new techniques were borrowed from other
dividuals, it is necessary to begin with the most intellec- investigators—among them, Ebbinghaus’s incomplete
tual and complex processes, and it is only secondarily sentence technique (1897) and Jacobs’s (1887) “mem-
necessary to consider the simple and elementary processes. ory for digits” test.
(p. 417) Although most of the basic concepts of intelligence
test construction were reflected in the initial scale (e.g.,
Although “complex processes” are more difficult to multiple tests arranged in order of difficulty, various
measure than simple ones, less precision is required be- areas of competence tested, age standardization, and
cause individual differences in complex functions are external validation), the refinement of the scale so it
much greater than in elementary ones. The more funda- could be used productively with normal children re-
mental problem that Binet and Henri identified is that it quired extensive further revision. The task was begun by
is easier to separate the intellect into its parts than it is Binet (1908, 1911) and completed by U.S. developmen-
to put the elements together and create a functioning, tal psychologists, notably Goddard (1911) and Terman
competent whole. The greatest challenges arise not in (1916). Despite the magnitude of their achievement,
the initial assessment of sensory elements but in deter- Binet and Simon (1905) were fully aware of the limita-
mining how they should be combined to predict intellec- tions of the technique as well as its promise. They wrote
tual performance. How should the components be in conclusion:
appropriately weighted, and what is the nature of the
process by which sensations are translated into cogni- We have wished simply to show that it is possible to deter-
tions? The solution that Binet and Henri offered was a mine in a precise and truly scientific way the mental level
wholly pragmatic one: Bypass the recombination prob- of an intelligence, to compare this level with a normal
lem and assess the complex functions directly. Given level, and consequently to determine by how many years a
this simplifying solution, Binet and Henri outlined a pro- child is retarded. Despite the inevitable errors of a first
grammatic approach to the assessment of individual dif- work, which is of a groping character, we believe that we
ferences that was completed 10 years later. have demonstrated this possibility. (p. 336)
The child study movement in France directly con-
tributed to the eventual development of workable mental They had indeed.
104 The Making of Developmental Psychology

Binet eschewed identification as a theorist, even de- and well today in the study of social development.
clining initially to offer a definition of intelligence, “a As with cognition, recent molecular analyses of social
problem of fearful complexity.” He added, in 1908: interactions appear to fare less well in prediction and
classification than do molar assessments of the same
Some psychologists affirm that intelligence can be mea-
phenomena. Exactly why molar techniques have an ad-
sured; others declare that it is impossible to measure intel-
ligence. But there are still others, better informed, who
vantage continues to be a matter of debate, and Binet’s
ignore these theoretical discussions and apply themselves analysis may still be the key.
to the actual solving of the problem. (p. 163) A second contribution is related to the first. For
Binet, the “ two sciences of psychology,” described later
Despite his disinclination to define intelligence, by Cronbach (1957), were both essential. Binet pio-
Binet was not hesitant to take a strong stand on the na- neered both experimental child psychology and the
ture of intellectual functioning and its determinants. study of individual differences. His stance on the matter
The design of the tests themselves reflects the assump- is embodied in the methodological credo: “ To observe
tion that the aim was to diagnose different levels of and experiment, to experiment and observe, this is the
functioning, not to assess the child’s “ faculty” for only method that can obtain for us a particle of truth”
thought. Consistent with this functional view of cogni- (Binet, 1904/1973, p. 293). As Binet saw it, problems in-
tive processing, Binet argued that one of the test’s pri- evitably arise when the two basic methodologies are di-
mary virtues would be to identify children who needed vorced. If questions are raised that cannot be settled by
to “learn to learn.” For Binet, intellectual adaptation re- experimentation, then they should be dismissed “since
flected dynamic, ever-changing processes that under- they are not susceptible to the sole criterion of cer-
went constant modification and reorganization; hence, tainty” that modern psychology can accept.
he focused on the ways that these processes become One other, more general legacy requires comment.
organized over time, and their “plasticity and ex- Beyond the other pioneers in the field, Binet was one of
tendibility” (1909/1978, pp. 127–128). On this score, he the first to provide convincing evidence for the proposi-
proposed a program of “mental orthopedics” that should tion that a science of human development was possible.
be followed to enhance cognitive functioning. In Les He understood the complexity of the problem, but he
Idées Modernes sur les Enfants (1909/1978), Binet persevered in the attempt to help developmental psy-
specifically deplores the notion that “ the intelligence of chology “ become a science of great social utility”
the individual is a fixed quantity” and protests the idea (Binet, 1908). Binet demonstrated that an empirical sci-
as “ brutal pessimism” (p. 126). Ironically, exactly the ence of behavioral development in humans was within
opposite assumption fueled the enthusiasm of most U.S. grasp, if the investigator maintained a profound respect
translators for the test, along with the conviction that for the information yielded from the dual methods of ob-
this “ fixed quantity” is hereditarily determined, and a servation and experimentation.
child’s “ true score” can be identified within limits of
sampling error.
How can we summarize Binet’s primary contribu- TH E NEW PSYCHOLOGY IN TH E
tions to understanding development? Beyond his spe- UNITED STATES
cific insights on psychological phenomena, three
fundamental advances may be attributed to this remark- In leading the organization of the new science of psy-
able scientist. The first concerns the insight that the as- chology in the United States, Hall (1844–1924) had no
sessment of individual differences in higher-order peer. In his long career, he proved to be an effective
cognition requires a molar rather than a molecular strat- and durable advocate, writer, and spokesman for psy-
egy. In retrospect, the idea seems to make a good deal of chology and for children in the United States. The story
sense, but it was embraced by U.S. psychology only of Hall’s career has been expertly told by Ross (1972)
after the research of Binet and Simon made the conclu- and White (1992), with the latter providing fresh in-
sion inescapable. After all, it seems intuitively obvious sights on Hall’s role in science and social policy. Born
that precise, microanalytic experimental methods in Massachusetts, Hall was a minister, professor of phi-
should be superior to molar, complex ones in predicting losophy, experimental psychologist, child psychologist,
everyday behavior. The idea dies slowly, and it is alive educational psychologist, university president, and
 The New Psychology in the United States 105

leader of the child study movement. He was also a pre- The method was initially aimed at helping teachers learn
mier figure in U.S. psychology: the first professor of what concepts children had available at the time that
psychology in the United States (at Johns Hopkins, they entered school. The procedure involved asking chil-
1883) and the first president of the American Psycho- dren brief questions about their experiences and about
logical Association (1891). As is the case with truly ef- the meaning of words—for example, “Have you ever
fective teachers, Hall had great enthusiasm and seen a cow?” or “Where are your ribs?” The answers
tolerance for ideas, and he was a master at conveying were scored right or wrong, and the percentage correct
his enthusiasm to others. He had a large vision for psy- was used to describe groups of children, not individuals.
chology and its destiny in creating better persons and a Rural children were compared with city ones, boys with
more perfect society. girls, Black children with White ones, and so on. The
But how did he fare as a scientist and a theorist in the questionnaire method, at least in terms of the kind of
light of history? In the previous edition of the Hand- questions asked, was a precursor of later general apti-
book, this chapter concluded that Hall had a large influ- tude tests of general information and vocabulary. In
ence on the growth and organization of the new Hall’s core investigation, children just entering school in
psychology in the United States, and that he provided a Boston were asked some 134 questions, such as those
foundation for the scientific study of children and ado- given above. Data collection was voluminous but hap-
lescents. It was concluded that Hall’s own research con- hazard; about half of the protocols from the 400 children
tributions were modest and his theoretical proposals tested had to be eliminated.
were flawed by being too tightly woven to the informed In commenting on this research, White (1992) writes:
beliefs of his day and too loosely linked to empirical
The questionnaire work was methodologically weak, to be
data. The grand vision of the science that he offered had
sure, but the methodological regulations psychology sub-
only modest substance. After spending several years sequently put into place have probably been excessively re-
carefully sifting the evidence, Sheldon White (1992) has strictive. Hall’s questionnaires asked people to give
arrived at a radically different conclusion regarding narrative accounts of children’s behaviors in everyday sit-
Hall’s contributions. He observes: uations, and this kind of approach is becoming more popu-
lar nowadays. (p. 33)
Recent writings usually picture Hall as a functionary and
figurehead, condense his ideas into a few slogans, quote
criticisms of his work by his often rivalrous peers, and ef-
The point is well taken. Educators were impressed by
fectively concede Hall his administrative trophies while Hall’s vision of how scientific research had the potential
ignoring most of what he had to say. (p. 33) to revolutionize educational practices (Hall, 1883,
1891). Zenderland (1988) suggests that the main impact
Some did listen to what Hall had to say because, like of the child study movement on psychology was to pave
Mark Hopkins, his mentor at Williams College, he was a the way for the acceptance of clinical psychology.
masterful teacher (White, 1992). Lewis Terman, Arnold Hall’s opportunity to shape the direction of psychol-
Gesell, and E. C. Sanford were strongly influenced ogy in the United States came when he was offered the
by Hall in their graduate training at Clark University. first professorship in psychology in the United States, at
John Dewey, James McKeen Cattell, and Joseph Jastrow Johns Hopkins University in 1884. He had been selected
took courses from Hall at Johns Hopkins. Others— over C. S. Peirce and G. S. Morris—no modest competi-
including Earl Barnes, who initiated investigations of tion. Peirce is viewed by many to be the preeminent U.S.
children at Leland Stanford Junior University in the philosopher, and Morris was a “ brilliant lecturer ”
1890s—were attracted to Hall’s method and perspectives (White, 1992). Following the general model established
through the child study movement (Goodwin, 1987; Zen- by Wundt at Leipzig, Hall set up a teaching laboratory at
derland, 1988). These scientists helped shape the face of Hopkins and recruited to it several young persons who
twentieth-century psychology in the United States. were later to play a formative role in the development of
Hall’s introduction to developmental psychology oc- the science. In the first laboratory course, the students
curred in 1880, when he returned to the United States included John Dewey, James McKeen Cattell, Joseph
from postdoctoral study in Europe with Wundt. He Jastrow, and E. H. Hartwell. With the support and en-
brought with him from Germany the “questionnaire couragement of Johns Hopkins president D. Gilman,
method” to study “ the contents of children’s minds.” Hall also established the first psychological journal in
106 The Making of Developmental Psychology

the United States, the American Journal of Psychology. sophical, physiological, anthropological, religious, and
On the basis of his success at Hopkins, Hall was offered psychological sources. Where the data fell short, Hall
in 1889 the opportunity of shaping a university himself offered speculative evolutionary and moralistic inter-
by serving as first president of Clark University. Hall re- pretations. The product was impressive in scope and
mained at Clark until his death in 1924, and established uneven in logic and scientific rigor.
there a tradition of developmental study that remains But it was often on target. Some of the insights and
strong today. discussions appear remarkably modern in content if not
In the spirit of Naturphilosophie, Hall applied the bio- in tone. On social cognition and developmental changes
genetic law to all aspects of human development. For in attitudes, Hall (1904) wrote:
Hall, the implications for the education, rearing, and re-
Children’s attitude toward punishment . . . tested by
ligious instruction of children were manifold. He
2,536 children (ages 6–16) showed also a marked pubes-
warned about the hazards of “ unnatural” and “artifi- cent increase in the sense of the need of the remedial
cial” constraints on learning and early development, function of punishment as distinct from the view of it as
and expressed disdain for parents and teachers who at- vindictive, or getting even, common in earlier years.
tempt to instruct children rather than permitting their There is also a marked increase in discriminating the
natures to unfold. According to Hall’s view of recapitu- kinds and degrees of offenses; in taking account of miti-
lation, behaviors, like morphological structures, follow gating circumstances, the inconvenience caused others,
an invariant course of development that has been deter- the involuntary nature of the offense and the purpose of
mined by ancestral evolutionary progression. Interfer- the culprit. All this continues to increase up to sixteen.
ence with that natural process would be detrimental, (vol. 2, pp. 394–395)
and likely to bring about a stunting of growth or “devel-
Similarly, in a discussion of moral reasoning, Hall
opmental arrest.”
(1904) concluded: “ Thus with puberty comes a change of
Hall’s biogenetic framework led him to a focus on the
view-point from judging actions by results to judging by
phenomena of adolescent development. In behavior, the
motives” (vol. 2, p. 394). The statement was also based on
fast-forward replay of ancestral psychological charac-
empirical data using a reformed version of the question-
teristics ended in adolescence, and the individual be-
naire method. In this context, Hall cites Schallenberger’s
came free to superimpose distinctive and individual
study (1894) on the development of moral judgments:
talents on the predetermined developmental sequence.
Hence, it should be the stage of greatest plasticity and From one thousand boys and one thousand girls of each
possibility for change. As Hall (1904) put it: age from six to sixteen who answered the question as to
what should be done to a girl with a new box of paints who
While adolescence is the great revealer of the past of the beautified the parlor chairs with them with a wish to
race, its earlier stages must be ever surer and safer and the please her mother, the following conclusion was drawn.
later possibilities ever greater and more prolonged, for it, Most of the younger children would whip the girl, but from
and not maturity as now defined, is the only point of de- fourteen on the number declines very rapidly. Few of the
parture for the super anthropoid that man is to become. young children suggest explaining why it was wrong, while
(vol. 2, p. 94) at twelve, 181, and at sixteen, 751 would explain. The mo-
tive of the younger children in punishment is revenge; with
Hall’s designation of adolescence as the time when the older ones that of preventing a repetition of the act
the child begins a fresh set of tracks was optional. comes in; and higher and later comes the purpose of re-
Other recapitulation theories propose that the adding form. With age comes also a marked distinction between
the act and its motive and a sense of the girl’s ignorance.5
on of unique features occurs in the early postnatal pe-
(vol. 2, pp. 393–394)
riod, or even prenatally (see Gould, 1977, for an in-
formed discussion of the matter). Convinced that the 5
Twenty-two thousand subjects? Not really. Schallenberger’s
adolescent period was the nuclear one for the fulfill- (1894) article in the Pedagogical Seminary actually reported
ment of human potential, Hall (1904) prepared a the responses of 3,434 girls and boys who were 6 to 16 years
two-volume compendium entitled Adolescence: Its Psy- of age. The misinterpretation arose because Schallenberger
chology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, transformed their responses to proportional scores, then
Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education. The multiplied by 1,000 to permit comparisons between age-
book offered a broad sweep of citations from philo- sex groups. Nonetheless, a sample of 3,434 boys and girls is
 Making Developmental Theory 107

Adolescence thus is “ the stage when life pivots from an cial importance was his pivotal role in the organization
autocentric to an heterocentric basis” (vol. 2, p. 301). and support of the activities of the child study move-
So far, so good, except Hall had the misfortune of ment in America, including the Child Study Section of
discovering the biogenetic law at about the time that the the National Education Association.
new generation of biologists was discarding it. If evolu- In his scientific role, Hall was more an importer and
tion and recapitulation ranked high on Hall’s psycholog- translator of scientific methods and theories than he
ical priorities, then morality and religion ran a close was a creator of them. In addition to the questionnaire
second. The linkages came about in ways that were not method and the biogenetic law, Hall helped bring
always immediately obvious but that seemed to represent Wundtian experimental procedures and Preyer’s volume
his faith in the psychic “continuity throughout the uni- on The Mind of the Child (Hall wrote the foreword to the
verse” (vol. 2, p. 208). U.S. translation) to the United States. He also helped
How does one evaluate Hall’s contributions to devel- change the face of U.S. psychology when, in 1909, he
opmental psychology? It is almost true to say that they arranged a meeting between Sigmund Freud and his
were unique. Kessen (1965) provides a perceptive and lieutenants (C. G. Jung, A. A. Brill, E. Jones, and S. Fer-
succinct summary: “ There have been diggers in the sand enczi) and the most prominent psychologists in North
pile of child study since him, but in a sense, Hall has had America. This meeting was held to commemorate the
no descendants—only heirs” (p. 151). More recently, 20th anniversary of the founding of Clark University,
White (1992) concluded that Hall made three significant and it is generally viewed as a key event in the accep-
contributions: tance of psychoanalysis in North America at a time when
Freud felt ostracized by the European scientific estab-
1. Hall provided a “ first cooperative ‘normal science’ lishment. In the same year, Clark University presented
of child development ” through his questionnaire pro- an honorary degree to William Stern, another significant
gram. The point is that the questionnaires, although pioneer in the establishment of developmental psychol-
limited as scientific instruments in the ways that Hall ogy. Throughout his career, Hall remained open to new
employed them, had great potential for describing and fresh approaches, and he promoted efforts to make
children’s lives in natural context. psychology more useful and relevant to society.
2. Hall viewed social participation as a catalyst for in- In sum, Hall was a remarkable teacher and catalyst
ternal organization, and thereby provided a “social- for the field. Some of the most significant areas of de-
biological” conception of childhood. velopmental study—mental testing, child study, early
3. Hall was guided by the need “ to arrive at a scientific education, adolescence, life-span psychology, evolution-
synthesis on the one side and practical recommenda- ary influences on development—were stimulated or
tions on the other.” anticipated by Hall. Because of shortcomings in the
methods he employed and the theory he endorsed, few
Related to the third point, one contribution should not investigators stepped forward to claim Hall as a scien-
be overlooked because it has potentially large implica- tific mentor. His reach exceeded his grasp in the plan to
tions for both developmental theory and intervention apply the principles of the new science to society. Psy-
models. Hall focused on adolescence because he be- chology’s principles were too modest, and society’s
lieved it was a period of great vulnerability and the time problems were too large. Perhaps we should use a fresh
when novel actions and beliefs were established and accounting to judge Hall’s contributions, one that takes
consolidated, for good or for ill. In his view, infants and into account the multiple facets of his influence on indi-
children were more or less buffered, a belief shared by viduals, the discipline, and society. The audit would re-
his student Arnold Gesell (see below). Although Hall’s veal that all of us who aspire to better the lot of children
reasoning about recapitulation was clearly off base, his and adolescents can claim him as a mentor.
intuitions about developmental plasticity in adolescence
were inventive and provocative.
Hall also expanded the boundaries of the academic MAKING DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY
discipline and stimulated fresh approaches to it. Of spe-
Any account of the scientific study of cognitive and so-
impressive in any era, especially before the invention of com- cial development must take note of the singular contribu-
puters, electric calculators, and mechanical pencils. tions of James Mark Baldwin (1861–1932). His role as an
108 The Making of Developmental Psychology

intellectual leader of the emergent discipline is now well From the beginning, Baldwin was more a theoretical
established. Baldwin’s Mental Development in the Child psychologist than an experimental one. He employed re-
and the Race (1895) was one of the first attempts to search findings to illustrate theoretical principles rather
construct a genetic epistemology within the framework than to systematize empirical phenomena. Primary in
of the “new psychology” (Broughton & Freeman-Moir, Baldwin’s thinking was the “conviction that no consis-
1982; Cairns & Ornstein, 1979; R. H. Mueller, 1976). tent view of mental development in the individual could
The companion volume, Social and Ethical Interpreta- possibly be reached without a doctrine of the race devel-
tions of Mental Development (J. M. Baldwin, 1897/1906), opment6 of consciousness—that is, the great problem of
was the first systematic effort by a psychologist to use the evolution of mind” (Baldwin, 1895, p. vii). In this
developmental ideas to bridge the gap between the study conviction, he followed the theoretical lead of Herbert
of social institutions (i.e., sociology) and the study of in- Spencer in philosophy and George John Romanes in bi-
dividual functioning (i.e., psychology). ology, and the empirical lead of Wilhelm Preyer and Al-
Recent scholarship has compared Baldwin’s propos- fred Binet. After this intensive but brief involvement
als with those of Jean Piaget. In this regard, Wozniak with the experimental investigation of infants, Baldwin
(1982, p. 42) writes: returned to issues of psychological and evolutionary
theory, historical commentary, editorial activities, and
Baldwin proposed a biosocial, genetic theory of intelli-
philosophical construction and systemization. The
gence, a theory of mind in the broadest sense, which was
conceptually far ahead of his time. This theory contained
study of development was no longer an empirical activ-
within it, en germe, many of the most important concepts ity for him, but questions of psychological genesis re-
of the biological theory of intelligence and of the genetic mained at the core of his theoretical and philosophical
epistemology which Piaget was to develop. speculations.
He was a key figure in the organization of psychology
Other studies show direct lines of descent of key ideas as a science, the establishment of three of its basic jour-
and concepts expressed by Baldwin to those commonly nals (Psychological Review, Psychological Bulletin, and
associated with Piaget and Vygotsky (Broughton, 1981; Psychological Abstracts), and the founding of two major
Cahan, 1984; Valsiner & van der Veer, 1988; Wozniak, departments of psychology (at the University of Toronto
1982). But it would be a mistake to view Baldwin’s think- and Princeton University) and the reestablishment of a
ing only through a Piagetian or Vygotskian lens. Bald- third (at Johns Hopkins University). He served as one of
win’s distinctive ideas on evolutionary epistemology, the first presidents of the American Psychological Asso-
cross-generational transmission of developmental ac- ciation when he was only 36 years of age. He won the
commodations, the dynamics and social embeddedness highest honors available to psychologists in his day, in-
of personality, and the dual genesis of cognition are suf- cluding the Gold Medal of the Royal Academy of Den-
ficiently provocative to demand study in their own right. mark and the first honorary Doctorate of Science degree
Baldwin is less of a “shadowy figure” now than he awarded by Oxford University. It is now generally ac-
was just 20 years ago (Broughton & Freeman-Moir, knowledged by those who have reviewed the record that
1982, p. 2). Baldwin was born in 1861 in Columbia, Baldwin stands alongside William James, John Dewey,
South Carolina, and died in 1934 in Paris. Following un- and C. S. Peirce as one of the primary intellectual forces
dergraduate training in philosophy and psychology, and involved in the founding of U.S. psychology as a science.
a year of advanced study in Europe (including a semes-
ter in Leipzig with Wilhelm Wundt), Baldwin com-
pleted a doctorate at Princeton University in 1888. In Metaphysics and Development
the 4 years that he was on the faculty at the University In an excellent analysis of the structure of Baldwin’s
of Toronto, he founded an experimental laboratory and thought, Wozniak (1982) writes, “Baldwin had deep in-
began a research program on “infant psychology.” The tellectual roots in the ‘mental philosophy’ tradition
results of this work, which were published in the journal
Science 100 years ago, dealt with the ontogeny of move- 6
Race development is one of the unconventional expressions
ment patterns, handedness, color vision, suggestibility, employed by Baldwin. Race in this context refers to variations
and research methodology (J. M. Baldwin, 1890, 1891, across the human species. In effect, cross-cultural studies of
1892, 1893). These findings provided the empirical the development of cognition are required to complement
basis for his first major work on mental development. studies of individual development in humans.
 Making Developmental Theory 109

which dominated American higher education during the mary of his life’s work is perhaps the best place to begin
nineteenth century” (p. 13). Yet, he early gained a re- (Baldwin, 1930).
spect for the emerging biological and behavioral sci-
ences, and the possibility that there might be a scientific Mental Development and Social Ontogeny
explanation for the origin of knowledge and the percep-
tion of reality. At the outset of his career, Baldwin ex- The two works of Baldwin that have proved most stimu-
plicitly oriented his empirical and theoretical work lating to modern developmental psychologists are
toward a synthesis of metaphysics and psychological sci- Mental Development in the Child and the Race (Baldwin,
ence (Wozniak, 1982, p. 14). In the early 1890s, he be- 1895), and Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental
came convinced that genetic study must be the central Development (Baldwin, 1897/1906). The earlier
theme for the synthesis of reason and reality. book presented Baldwin’s attempt to formulate a “ge-
Throughout the remainder of his career, “ the great netic epistemology.” In individual development, a key
topic of development itself ” (J. M. Baldwin, 1895, p. x) mechanism for bringing about growth in the “cognitive
dominated his work and thinking. In his day, Baldwin scheme” is the “circular reaction.” This invention of
expanded the application of genetic concepts in three Baldwin’s is linked to concepts of learning that ap-
emergent disciplines—psychology, evolutionary biology, peared later and explained how experience could be-
and sociology—and in one established discipline—phi- come internalized into habit through recurrent
losophy. Baldwin’s own scientific life illustrates his self-stimulation or imitation. A consideration of ontoge-
view that cognitive development is not limited to child- nesis challenged the then-dominant idea that conscious-
hood. As Wozniak (1982) observes: ness was “a fixed substance, with fixed attributes”
(Baldwin, 1895, p. 2). He writes with respect to the
Baldwin was himself subject of a series of intellectual
static conceptions of traditional approaches:
transformations. So great, in fact, are the differences in
conceptual structure and content among his major
The genetic idea reverses all this. Instead of a fixed sub-
books . . . that one wonders if perhaps there might not
stance, we have the conception of a growing, developing
have been three Baldwins at work: a mental philosopher
activity. Functional psychology succeeds faculty psychol-
(roughly to 1889), an evolutionary psychologist (approxi-
ogy. Instead of beginning with the most elaborate exhibi-
mately 1889–1903), and an evolutionary epistemologist
tion of this growth and development, we shall find most
(1903–1915). (p. 14)
instruction in the simplest activity that is at the same time
the same activity. Development is a process of involution
Although Wozniak’s characterization of the marked
as well as of evolution, and the elements come to be hidden
intellectual transitions in Baldwin’s career seems accu- under the forms of complexity which they build up.
rate, Baldwin appears to have moved beyond scientific . . . Now that this genetic conception has arrived, it is as-
psychology even before the turn of the century, coinci- tonishing that it did not arrive sooner, and it is astonishing
dent with his work on the Dictionary of Philosophy and that the “new” psychology has hitherto made so little of it.
Psychology. Given the scope and complexity of Bald- (1895, p. 3)
win’s work, any brief summary is likely to be mis-
leading. Shortcomings in the following account may be In Baldwin’s eyes, development proceeds from in-
corrected by consulting more complete analyses includ- fancy to adulthood through stages, beginning with a re-
ing Wozniak (1982), on the intellectual origins of ge- flexive or physiological stage, continuing through
netic epistemology; R. H. Mueller (1976) and Valsiner “sensorimotor ” and “ideomotor ” stages, and progress-
and van der Veer (1988), on the relations between psy- ing to a stage of symbolic transformations (Baldwin,
chology and sociology; and Cahan (1984), on the com- 1895). Only in the most advanced stage do “syllogistic
parison of the genetic psychologies of Baldwin and forms come to have an independent or a priori force, and
Piaget. In addition, various chapters in the previous edi- pure thought emerges—thought, that is, which thinks of
tion of the Handbook of Child Psychology (Mussen, anything or nothing. The subject of thought has fallen
1983) attempt to place Baldwin’s contributions into con- out, leaving the shell of form” (Baldwin, 1930, p. 23).
temporary and historical context (Cairns, 1983; Harter, From its earliest formulation, Baldwin’s stage theory of
1983; Sameroff, 1983). Then there are the voluminous mental development focused attention on process as
writings of Baldwin himself, including 21 books and much as on structure. Many of the terms that he em-
more than 100 articles. Baldwin’s own thoughtful sum- ployed—“accommodation,” “assimilation,” “imitation,”
110 The Making of Developmental Psychology

“circular reaction”—are commonplace in today’s text- ish,” or “generous,” or other, which has reference to one
books, although it cannot be assumed that Piagetian class only of the varied situations of his life. (p. 31)
meanings are necessarily the same as Baldwinian ones.
Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Develop- The self becomes progressively and inevitably accom-
ment: A Study in Social Psychology (Baldwin, 1897/1906) modated to others and to the traditions of society. This
appeared only 2 years later. This book is the first work by “social heredity” is mediated through imitation and the
a U.S. psychologist on social-cognitive development operation of an internal circular reaction. From each re-
in childhood; it is also the first volume in English that lationship, there emerges a refined sense of oneself and
includes “social psychology” in its title (R. H. Mueller, of others. “ The only thing that remains more or less sta-
1976). In this work, the cognitive-stage model is ex- ble is a growing sense of self which include both terms,
tended to issues of social development, social organiza- the ego and the alter ” (Baldwin, 1897/1906, p. 30).
tion, and the origins of the self. Baldwin (1895) felt that
the essential issues of social psychology had been ne-
Sociogenesis
glected because of the void that existed between the con-
cepts of psychology and sociology: One other primary developmental concern of Baldwin
involves the relations between nature and nurture and
And it is equally true, though it has never been adequately the cross-generational transmission of modifications in
realized, that it is in genetic theory that social or collec- individual development. In light of the metaphysical syn-
tive psychology must find both its root and its ripe
thesis that guided Baldwin’s thinking, it was entirely
fruitage. We have no social psychology, because we have
fitting for him to argue that the nature-nurture di-
had no doctrine of the socius. We have had theories of the
chotomy falsely “supposes that these two agencies are
ego and the alter; but that they did not reveal the socius is
just their condemnation. So the theorist of society and in- opposed forces” and that it fails to entertain the possi-
stitutions has floundered in seas of metaphysics and biol- bility that “most of man’s equipment is due to both
ogy, and no psychologist has brought him a life-preserver, causes working together ” (Baldwin, 1895, p. 77). Evolu-
nor even heard his cry for help. (p. ix) tionary adaptations and developmental accommodations
operate toward the same goals, although they are estab-
In social development, there is a “dialectic of personal lished over vastly different time intervals. Extending
growth” that progresses from an egocentric receptive this analysis to the problem of how this synchrony is es-
stage to a subjective one and, eventually, to an empathic tablished and maintained, Baldwin (1895) wrote:
social stage. In Baldwin’s (1897/1906) scheme:
It is clear that we are led to relatively distinct questions:
The development of the child’s personality could not go on questions which are now familiar to us when put in the
at all without the modification of his sense of himself by terms covered by the words, “phylogenesis” and “ontogen-
suggestions from others. So he himself, at every stage, is esis.” First, how has the development of organic life pro-
really in part some one else, even in his own thought of ceeded, showing constantly, as it does, forms of greater
himself. (p. 30) complexity and higher adaptation? This is the phyloge-
netic question. . . . But the second question, the ontoge-
Consistent with his emphasis on developmental netic question, is of equal importance: the question, How
processes of the self rather than static structures, per- does the individual organism manage to adjust itself better
sonality is not fixed by early experience or by genes. Ac- and better to its environment? . . . This latter problem is
cordingly, “personality remains after all a progressive, the most urgent, difficult, and neglected question of the
new genetic psychology. (pp. 180–181)
developing, never-to-be-exhausted thing” (p. 338). Ac-
tions are fluid, dynamic, and responsive to the immedi-
Beginning in his first developmental volume (Bald-
ate setting. In Baldwin’s (1897/1906) view:
win, 1895) and continuing through Development and
[The child’s] wants are a function of the social situation as Evolution (Baldwin, 1902), Baldwin expanded on his
a whole. . . . His wants are not consistent. They are in view of the cross-generational transmission of behavior
every case the outcome of the social situation; and it is ab- tendencies through “organic selection.” He proposed
surd to endeavor to express the entire body of his wants as that “accommodations” that occur in the lifetime of the
a fixed quantity under such a term of description as “self- individual could be transmitted to the next generation in
 Making Developmental Theory 111

the form of “adaptations” of the species by means of the from the work of Morgan (1896) and Osborn (1896). In
process that he labeled “organic selection” (Baldwin, the work on genetic logic and precision of philosophical
1895, p. 174). The essence of the idea was that ontoge- definition, Baldwin drew on contemporaries William
netic accommodations can serve to direct the course of James and C. S. Peirce in his conception of the task and
evolutionary change. How was it accomplished? On this its execution. Baldwin typically was generous in ac-
matter, there remains debate on exactly what processes knowledging these influences, and thereby highlighted
were implicated (e.g., Gottlieb, 1979, 1987; Piaget, his own distinctive insights and creativity.
1978; Vonèche, 1982). Baldwin was clearly reaching for Baldwin’s writing style and organization were un-
a developmental mechanism of directed selection that even. On some issues, as is illustrated by some quotes in
would supplement the Darwinian concept of natural se- this chapter, he was incisive, powerful, and challenging.
lection, without invoking “ the Lamarckian factor ” (i.e., He could also, however, be obtuse. William James, one
the inheritance of acquired characteristics). Over the of the few U.S. psychologists who remained friendly
years, Baldwin sharpened this concept (J. M. Baldwin, with Baldwin, gently remarked, “ This article ( like
1930). The proposal became known in biology as the much of its author’s [Baldwin’s] writing) is in places
“Baldwin effect ” (Cairns, 1983; Gottlieb, 1979), de- deficit in perspicuity” (James, 1894, p. 210). Other crit-
spite Baldwin’s large debt to the crisp logic of C. L. ics were less generous. James Sully, an important British
Morgan (1896, 1902). experimentalist and a contemporary of Baldwin, began
and ended a review of Mental Development in the Child
and the Race with the following comments:
Toward a Critical Evaluation

Since the modernity of Baldwin’s theory has become ac- This is a book which presents special difficulties to the re-
knowledged, it has seemed reasonable to evaluate its ad- viewer. One looks on a biological work—for such Profes-
equacy by modern standards. Certain shortcomings in sor Baldwin’s work seems to be quite as much as a
coherence and expression appear in a cursory examina- psychological one—for arrangement, structure, organic
tion of his books; other problems demand the examina- form: in the present case one is struck almost at first
tion of the work of Baldwin’s contemporaries. Doubtless glance by the apparent absence of these attributes. And
the most important measure of his theory has to do with the first impression is by no means dispelled as one begins
to read. . . .
its effects on subsequent investigators, including those in
To sum up my impression of Prof. Baldwin’s book. It
the present generation.
seems to me in many respects fresh and stimulating. On
Perhaps because of his openness to novel concep- the other hand, in what looks like an over-straining after
tions, Baldwin sometimes evolved the meaning of basic originality apparent newness of conception often turns on
concepts in the theoretical models that he proposed. The closer examination to be but newness of phrasing. When
relativity of his ideas to time and context renders any new ideas are put forward one misses for the most part an
static description of his theory misleading. It also con- impartial and thorough-going confronting of theory with
founds comparisons that may be made with his contem- fact. (1896a, pp. 97, 102–103, italics added)
poraries and apparent intellectual heirs, including Piaget
and Vygotsky. Unclarity was not limited to this first volume. In
Baldwin’s work illustrated another premise of his comparing Baldwin’s discussions of social development
theoretical perspective—that an individual undergoes with those of C. H. Cooley (1902), Sewney (1945) indi-
the “constant modification of his sense of himself by cated that “Cooley presented his views in a language
suggestions from others” (1897/1906, p. 30). On this that is lucid and readable, and free of the confusing and
score, his early work in mental philosophy was heavily jumbled terminology that fills the writings of Baldwin”
influenced by the metaphysical view of Scottish com- (p. 84). R. H. Mueller located an unpublished journal in
monsense philosophy in general and the intuitional real- which Cooley himself had the following comments on
ism of James McCosh, his mentor at Princeton (R. H. Baldwin’s style and motivation:
Mueller, 1976; Wozniak, 1982). During the second pe-
riod, his research laboratory owed much to the prior A great fault with strenuous writers like Baldwin is that in
work of Preyer, Binet, and Shinn. Similarly, his concep- their eagerness to produce they do not allow time enough
tions of “organic selection” seemed to have drawn much for their imaginations to grow naturally and thoroughly
112 The Making of Developmental Psychology

into the mastery of a subject. They force it, and so impair projective test. This is due in part to the assimilation by
its spontaneity, its sanity and humanness. What they write Baldwin of the terms and logical argument outlined by
may be stimulating, consecutive, attractive for a time, but C. Lloyd Morgan (1896). In a brief but brilliant essay on
it is not food to live on. A style like this Goethe calls man- this matter, reprinted as an appendix in Baldwin’s vol-
nerism or “das manirierte.” If you wish to produce any- ume on Development and Evolution, Morgan (1902)
thing of lasting value, you see to it that the subject matter,
refers to the collaboration of individual modification in
the truth, is the first interest of your mind, not your books,
development and adaptive variation in phylogenesis as
your essay, yourself as discoverer and communicator of
truth. (R. H. Mueller, 1976, p. 250)
coincident variations. The concept of coincident varia-
tion was incorporated into Baldwin’s account of organic
A modern reviewer, otherwise sympathetic to Bald- selection, but it was unclear when he accepted the im-
win, indicated that “ there is much in Baldwin’s work portant corollary that there were no direct connections
that is unfinished and confusing” (Broughton, 1981, between specific individual experiences in ontogeny and
p. 402). Examples of the unfinished business included specific variations in phylogeny. Eventually, Baldwin
theoretical discontinuities in Baldwin’s social theory, did clarify the concept (Baldwin, 1930).
and internal inconsistencies in the description of stages. All this is to say that the contributions of Baldwin did
Baldwin’s style may have been more than an incon- not arise independently of the rich intellectual context in
venience for readers. It permitted him to reform expla- which he lived and drew inspiration. Consistent with his
nations and concepts so that one and the same term model of social-cognitive development, the influences
could take on fresh nuances or alternative meanings, were bidirectional. There is now ample evidence that a
depending on its context. Imprecision in presentation large number of investigators in four disciplines were
thereby promotes projection in interpretation. Perhaps challenged by Baldwin’s proposals and conceptions on
this explains the considerable dispute as to what exactly development. In his commitment to the concept of devel-
was meant by Baldwin in his use of such terms as or- opment and its systematic application, Baldwin was
ganic selection, imitation, and genetic method. more persuasive, thoughtful, and persistent than any of
Baldwin tended to incorporate new ideas into his own his peers, including Hall. He envisioned a new genetic
developmental view, and he did not always appear to be science (Baldwin, 1930).
sensitive to possible contradictions between the new and Lawrence Kohlberg deserves credit—more than any
the old. Baldwin seems to have benefited greatly from other psychologist of the present generation—for having
Josiah Royce and William James in his concepts of the brought the attention of U.S. psychologists to the theo-
social self (Valsiner & van der Veer, 1988). He also in- retical contributions of Baldwin. Before Kohlberg’s
troduced some of the ideas of Osborn (1896) and Mor- (1969) classic article on social cognition, there was
gan (1896) in his revision of the concept of “organic scant recognition among modern developmental psy-
selection.” It was, however, a process of assimilation, chologists of the extent to which Baldwinian insights
not imitation. Most of the ideas were transformed when have persisted in the discipline. Kohlberg himself stud-
they became incorporated into a genetic framework. ied Baldwin’s work independently in graduate school to
This long-term pattern of intellectual reformulation and establish a theoretical framework for his investigation of
reconstruction may account for why Baldwin invented ethical and moral development. It is therefore fitting
new terms for old ideas and was particularly sensitive to that the primary book on Baldwin’s theory should be ed-
the issue of intellectual priority and ownership. In his ited by two of Kohlberg’s former students (Broughton &
eyes, the concepts were new inventions. Priority and Freeman-Moir, 1982) and that Kohlberg’s chapter in
recognition were especially important for Baldwin, and that volume contained some of its most noteworthy pas-
this concern may help explain his haste to publish. sages. His essay provides a succinct answer to the ques-
To illustrate, consider the concept of organic selec- tion: What are the real differences between Baldwin’s
tion. The aim of the concept was clear from the begin- and Piaget’s theories? Kohlberg (1982) writes:
ning: to link the accommodations that occur in the life
history of the individual to the adaptations that occur in In the end, the fundamental distinction between Baldwin’s
the life history of the species. But the identification of moral psychology and Piaget’s is that Piaget’s psychology
the precise mechanisms has proved to be something of a has no self. Piaget starts with an ego knowing objects, but
 Making Developmental Theory 113

knowing them first egocentrically. Development is a pro- difference in the scientific styles of the two investiga-
gressive movement toward objectivity. In contrast, for tors that, in turn, gave rise to marked differences in the
Baldwin all experience is experience of a self, not just of a content of their approaches. Baldwin used the methods
bodily and cognitive ego. This means first that central to and analyses of experimental psychology to illustrate
the self is not cognition but will. Second, it means that developmental theory. He learned early that the methods
from the start experience is social and reflective. The
of experimental psychology were inadequate to evaluate
child’s sense of self is a sense of will and capacity in the
the developmental theory that he was constructing.
relation of self to others. The individual is fundamentally
a potentially moral being, not because of social authority
Given this dilemma, he chose to abandon the scientific
and rules (as Durkheim and Piaget thought) but because issues and address the philosophical ones.
his ends, his will, his self is that of a shared social self. Piaget, alternatively, was trained in biology rather
(pp. 311–312) than philosophy. As an empirical scientist, he employed
observations to understand phenomena rather than
It is also an integrative self. Baldwin (1897/1906) him- merely demonstrate principles. Piaget was challenged to
self indicated: “In spite of the large place which I assign invent methods appropriate to the empirical issues he
to Imitation in the social life, I should prefer to have my sought to comprehend. The clinical method of direct ob-
theory known as the ‘Self ’ or the ‘Self Thought’ theory servation and the creation of developmentally appropri-
of social organization” (p. xviii). ate tasks provided him with the tools for revising,
Baldwin’s theoretical work anticipated much of Pi- extending, and evaluating his proposals. They also per-
aget’s theory of cognitive and moral development. Pi- mitted others to assess the replicability of the phenom-
aget’s use of Baldwin’s distinctive terms—from circular ena and determine the adequacy of the theory. More
reaction and cognitive scheme to accommodation, as- important, the objective tracking of phenomena over
similation, and sensorimotor—point to a direct line of time permitted Piaget and those who followed his lead to
intellectual descent. More importantly, as Cahan (1984, arrive at insights that were not self-evident to experimen-
p. 128) has observed, “ the goals, genetic approach, and talists or armchair observers. The insights, in turn, con-
epistemological assumptions underlying Piaget’s in- tributed to the vitality of Piaget’s developmental model.
quiry into cognitive development found explicit state- Despite the shortcomings in Baldwin’s theoretical
ment around the turn of the century in Baldwin’s work.” system and empirical work, his proposals have nonethe-
The mediational linkages from Baldwin are readily less exercised a large direct and indirect influence on
identified. From 1912 to his death in 1934, Baldwin’s developmental theorists in the twentieth century. As
primary residence was in Paris. His work was well re- Valsiner and van der Veer (1988) document, there are
garded in French intellectual circles in general, and by direct connections between Baldwin’s (1897/1906) con-
Pierre Janet in particular. As Piaget wrote to Mueller cepts of the development of the self in social context
(1976, p. 244): and George H. Mead’s (1934) symbolic interactionism,
on the one hand, and L. S. Vygotsky’s (1962) proposi-
Unfortunately, I did not know Baldwin personally, but his tions on the social-contextual origins of personality, on
works had a great influence on me. Furthermore, Pierre the other. Baldwin’s work was the common denomina-
Janet, whose courses I took in Paris, cited him constantly tor, since neither Mead nor Vygotsky referred to the
and had been equally very influenced by him. other directly. The Valsiner and van der Veer (1988)
analysis is consistent with independent evidence that (a)
There is also a written record in the pattern of Piaget’s Baldwin’s work had a significant influence on C. H.
citations of Baldwin. Curiously, these references ap- Cooley as well as Mead, in formulations of symbolic in-
peared in works that were published very early (1923/ teractionism; and ( b) Baldwin’s influence on Vygotsky
1926) or very late (1978) in Piaget’s career. was mediated primarily through Janet’s writings.
It would be a mistake to infer that Piaget’s theory was Valsiner and van der Veer (1988) point out that the as-
simply a revision of Baldwin’s original. As Broughton similation of Baldwin’s influence was selective. On the
(1981) and Cahan (1984) have observed, the differences one hand, Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) tended to dis-
are as great as the similarities. In addition to the in- card the developmental features of Baldwin’s self the-
sightful distinction made by Kohlberg, there is a large ory. On the other hand, Vygotsky (1962) preserved both
114 The Making of Developmental Psychology

the ontogenetic focus and the social dynamics of Bald- Paris may have facilitated the acceptance of his con-
win’s system. cepts. European psychologists tended to be more recep-
In addressing the issue of what lasting significance tive to developmental concepts and methods than their
Baldwin’s developmental concepts may have for the sci- U.S. counterparts.
ence, we first must ask why they vanished from psychol- Beyond these contributing factors, the unfinished
ogy in the first place. The primary explanation was that business in Baldwin’s agenda was to create methods,
Baldwin’s theoretical formulations were out of line with techniques, and analyses that are appropriate for devel-
the ideas and empirical trends that were to dominate the opmental study. Piaget and Vygotsky, who helped estab-
new U.S. psychology of the early twentieth century. The lish those methods and revised their concepts in the
new psychology was to be dominated by models that light of their results, had an enormous impact on modern
either denied the importance of cognition or diminished developmental thinking. Recent methodological cri-
the importance of development beyond infancy. More- tiques have suggested that the systematic study of devel-
over, his developmental concepts of the mind and of so- opmental processes requires not only different statistics,
cial processes required research methods that were but also different research designs and different ways
simply not available to the discipline. The further Bald- to organize empirical observations (Cairns, 1986;
win went beyond the study of infancy, the more specula- Valsiner, 1986; Wohlwill, 1973). Furthermore, it was
tive and removed from data he became. But the explicit in Baldwin’s proposals that the task of disentan-
fulfillment of his aim—the building of a science of de- gling development-in-context was necessarily an inter-
velopment—demanded a continuing tension between a disciplinary activity that extends beyond the traditional
drive for system and a drive for evidence. As Quine boundaries of psychology. Sully (1896a) was probably
(1981) has observed: correct when he observed that Baldwin’s Mental Devel-
opment in the Child and the Race was as relevant to biol-
If either of these drives were unchecked by the other, it ogy as it was to psychology. And R. H. Mueller (1976)
would issue in something unworthy of the name of scien- was likely accurate when he noted that Baldwin’s Social
tific theory: in the one case a mere record of observations, and Ethical Interpretation of Mental Development was as
and in the other a myth without foundation. (p. 31) relevant to sociology as to psychology.
The broader point is that Baldwin may have failed in
Baldwin lacked the cadre of colleagues and students to his larger goal even if he had written more precisely, re-
help him translate his developmental ideas into an em- cruited more students, and died of old age in Baltimore
pirical science. Without adequate methodologies, he be- rather than Paris. He would have failed because he had
came increasingly removed from the validation and envisioned a science different from any that could be ac-
correction of his ideas, and, like William James before commodated by the new psychology. It appears that
him, became increasingly drawn to philosophy and away many of the obstacles that precluded the adoption of de-
from the empirical issues of developmental psychology. velopmental concepts into the psychology of the 1890s
There were other factors that various writers have remain in place.
felt were important in limiting his influence: (a) his What might we conclude about James Mark Baldwin?
writing style failed to inspire confidence in the validity Beyond whatever shortcomings may have existed in his
of his ideas; ( b) he failed to produce students who might writing and teaching, and beyond whatever honors he
have continued his work (i.e., in the 5 years that he was coveted and disappointments he endured, he ultimately
at Johns Hopkins, no students completed the doctoral succeeded in reaching the part of the goal that was
program in psychology); and (c) his severe embarrass- within his grasp. He had insight and vision to describe
ment in a personal scandal that became public led to developmental ideas that continue to inspire and chal-
abrupt termination from his academic position at Johns lenge after 100 years.
Hopkins in 1909. After that incident, he spent little time
in the United States, and his name seems to have been
virtually blacklisted by the next generation of psycholo- DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
gists. Each of these events may have contributed to the
regression and submersion of Baldwin’s concepts in Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) stood in curious relation-
U.S. psychology. Ironically, Baldwin’s forced move to ship to the founding of developmental psychology. Un-
 Developmental Psychopathology 115

like the other investigators covered in this section, were attracted by Charcot’s demonstrations of the inter-
Freud published no empirical research on behavioral de- relations between physical symptoms and the mind, in-
velopment: He observed few children in a clinical set- cluding the use of hypnotism in the remission of hysteric
ting, and none in a traditional experimental design. Yet, symptoms and in probing the “ unconscious” mind.
psychoanalysis has emerged as one of the more impor- Binet, characteristically, was the first of the two to pub-
tant influences—if not the most important—for develop- lish on issues of sexual perversions and their origins. In
mental psychology in the twentieth century. Further, the a remarkable yet almost forgotten paper titled “Le
early acceptance of psychoanalysis in the United States Fétichisme dans l’Amour,” Binet (1887) described the
and elsewhere was due in part to the enthusiasm of Hall. ease with which sexual attractions and impulses could
As Freud (1926/1973) himself described the emergence be associated with neutral objects, and the “abnormal”
of the psychoanalytic movement: could be brought about by normal mechanisms of asso-
ciative learning. In this paper in an early volume of the
In 1909, Freud and Jung were invited to the United States
Revue Philosophique, Binet anticipated three of the
by G. Stanley Hall to deliver a series of lectures on psy-
choanalysis at Clark University, Worcester, Mass. From
major themes identified with psychoanalysis; namely,
that time forward interest in Europe grew rapidly; it (1) the continuity between mechanisms that regulate
showed itself, however, in a forcible rejection of the new normal and abnormal behaviors and emotions, (2) the
teachings, characterized by an emotional colouring which significance of sexuality in psychopathology, and (3) the
sometimes bordered upon the unscientific. (vol. 18, p. 720) essential lawfulness of human behavior.
Returning to Vienna, Freud began his neurological
Hall recognized a novel developmental idea when he saw practice, leading to a collaboration with Josef Breuer in
one. His promotion of psychoanalysis occurred at a time the writing of Studies in Hysteria (1895/1936). When
when it was suffering rejection in Europe and obscurity Freud substituted free association and dream analysis
in North America. Freud’s (1910) lectures at Clark, for hypnotism in reaching the unconscious, psychoanaly-
published in Hall’s American Journal of Psychology, re- sis was invented.
main one of the most lucid and succinct presentations of Might Binet’s concepts of unconscious have con-
psychoanalysis by its founder. tributed to the psychoanalytic movement? In a remark-
Born in Moravia and raised in Vienna, S. Freud as a able passage in Breuer and Freud (1895/1936), we find:
student showed the catholicity of interests that was to
appear in his mature work. Though anatomy and physi- The continuation of the hysterical symptoms which origi-
ology were his primary areas of concentration, he was nated in the hypnoid state, during the normal state, agrees
greatly impressed by the work of Darwin and Haeckel, perfectly with our experiences concerning posthypnotic
on the one hand, and by the ideas of British association- suggestions. But this also implies that complexes of ideas
ist John Stuart Mill, on the other. After completing incapable of consciousness co-exist with groups of ideas,
medical studies, Freud engaged in neurobiological re- which function consciously; that is to say, there is a split-
ting of the psyche. . . . It seems certain that this too can
search for several years, initiating, among other things,
originate without hypnoidism from an abundance of re-
a phyletic-ontogenetic analysis of the fetal brain and the
jected ideas which were repressed, but not suppressed from
mapping of sensory neural tracts. Freud’s early physio- consciousness. In this or that way here develops a sphere of
logical publications were well received, and he psychic existence, which is now ideationally impoverished
achieved international recognition as a highly promis- and rudimentary, and now more or less equal to the waking
ing researcher and methodologist. thoughts, for the cognition of which we are indebted above
The mid-1880s constituted a turning point in his ca- all to Binet and Janet. (p. 188, emphasis added)
reer when he decided to practice neurology, in part for
economic considerations, according to E. Jones (1953). One reason that the Binet-Janet-Freud linkage has been
To further his training in this specialty, Freud won a fel- heretofore overlooked may be that A. A. Brill failed to
lowship to study in Paris with the renowned neurologist, include this section in his earlier English translation of
J. M. Charcot. From October 13, 1885, until February Studies in Hysteria (i.e., before 1936). A mere over-
28, 1886, Freud thus worked in the facilities at the sight? Perhaps, but Sulloway (1979) proposes a less be-
Salpêtrière and, presumably, shared some of the same nign interpretation of selective recall and biased
interests as Alfred Binet. Apparently both young men citations in psychoanalysis. He asks, “Why is the history
116 The Making of Developmental Psychology

of intellectual revolution so often the history of con- diately parallel to Darwinian-Haeckelian proposals on
scious and unconscious attempts by the participants to development and evolution. These include: (a) the never
obscure the true nature and roots of their own revolu- ceasing intrapsychic struggle and competition among in-
tionary activity?” (p. 6). His answer is that there “gen- stincts for survival and expression; ( b) the psychoana-
erally exists a powerful underlying tension between the lytic focus on two immanent motivational forces that
forward-looking orientation of the would-be discoverer figure importantly in evolution-instincts that bring
and the backward-looking orientation of the historian” about reproduction (sexual, libido), and instincts that
(p. 7). Innovation, novelty, and discovery are the stuff bring about selection and destruction (aggression,
out of which new scientific movements are created. Thanatos); (c) the assumed preestablished progression
There is strong temptation to ignore or denigrate re- of the stages of ontogenesis that parallel the stages of
search and researchers who threaten the illusions of phylogenesis, hence the appearance of sexual expression
novelty or validity—despite a commitment of the scien- in human infancy; and (d) the notion of developmental
tist to balanced and thorough scholarship. Although psy- arrest or fixation, an idea introduced into recapitulation
choanalysis illustrates this temptation, it hardly theory to account for fetal teratology, whereby “mon-
constitutes a unique case in the past of developmental sters” would be produced if the ancestral stages of
psychology. phyletic evolution were not permitted to be sequentially
As Freud (1926/1973) has pointed out, psychoanaly- produced in individual development.
sis “in the course of time came to have two meanings: Later, in Moses and Monotheism (1939), Freud makes
(a) a particular method of treating nervous disorders his debt to the biogenetic law explicit. As we have al-
and ( b) the science of unconscious mental processes, ready seen, the primary U.S. psychological recapitula-
which has also been appropriately described as ‘depth tionist, Hall, recognized the fundamental harmony of
psychology’ ” (p. 720). Psychoanalysis, the theory, in- his ideas on development and evolution with those of
volves strong assumptions about the development and psychoanalysis.
evolution of personality that psychoanalysis, the method The methodological legacy of psychoanalysis requires
and therapy, does not. Why did psychoanalysis-as-theory comment. Freud’s main endeavor in life, according to
emerge as a developmental one? Freud himself, was “ to infer or to guess how the mental
One answer would be that it was demanded by the apparatus is constructed and what forces interplay and
data. The roles of, say, infant sexuality and the primacy counteract it ” (E. Jones, 1953, vol. 1, p. 45).
of early experiences would be seen as having been re- The inferences on development and infantile experi-
vealed by the use of psychoanalysis-as-method. A second ences were colored, in large measure, by statements and
possibility, not incompatible with the first, is that Freud reconstructed memories of his adult neurotic patients. It
may have been intellectually prepared to focus on the was a narrow data base, hardly adequate to construct a
formative nature of ontogenetic events by virtue of theory of normal development. But Freud had an advan-
his research training and experience in neurobiology. Re- tage that most other theorists of his day (and these days)
call that Freud had, in his physiological work, under- did not have: He, like Binet, was permitted the opportu-
taken analyses of embryogenesis. Finally, broader nity to study complex processes in “persons whom we
intellectual-scientific forces appear to have been at know intimately.” Psychoanalysis thus evolved from the
work. As Gould (1977) and others have noted, parallels exhaustive observation of single individuals over a long-
to the then-contemporary evolutionary developmental term period, including Freud’s own self analysis. The-
assumptions seem to be liberally represented throughout ory construction and its evaluation thus proceeded on an
psychoanalytic thought. That Freud should draw on bio- idiographic basis, following a research strategy not un-
logical approaches in the formulation of his theory of like the method he found effective in his earlier physio-
personality and psychopathology seems entirely reason- logical studies.
able, in light of his scientific training in the area. If the contributions of investigators who employed the
Contrary to the view that Freud employed physics as idiographic method are any indication—Preyer, Binet,
the basic model for psychoanalysis, the theory seems Baldwin, Lewin, Piaget—then the procedure seems not
more analogous to the biological thought of the day than wholly without merits. But there are pitfalls. While Binet
to either “physical” or even “medical” models. Hence, argued that it was necessary to work back and forth—
certain psychoanalytic propositions appear to be imme- verifying and testing one’s hypotheses at both levels of
 Other Trends in Science and Society 117

analysis—Freud eventually expressed a disdain for sys- cence and early adulthood—are necessarily less plastic
tematic experimental work, and the validity of the re- and malleable, hence less critical for understanding per-
sults it produced. For instance, in response to what sonality and psychopathology. Psychoanalysis is a devel-
seemed to be the experimental demonstration of repres- opmental theory, up to a point. Hence, childhood is seen
sion in the laboratory, Freud observed: “I cannot put as the “latency” period, and adolescence is viewed as a
much value on these confirmations because the wealth of period of activating the propensities and conflicts of
reliable observations on which these assertions rest the earliest years. The goal of much research in this tra-
makes them independent of experimental verification” dition has been to demonstrate that there are strong
(cited in Shakow & Rapaport, 1964, p. 129). Freud had continuities from infancy and the preschool period
earlier held that the rejection of psychoanalytic teach- throughout childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood.
ings had been for “emotional” and “ unscientific” rea- There is a formal similarity between psychoanalysis
sons. Here the suggestion appears to be that they should and most of its descendant theories—including object re-
be accepted on the same grounds. In time, the validity of lations theory and attachment theory—in that the princi-
psychoanalytic assertions came to be evaluated by pal dynamic processes of development are restricted to
dogma, not by data. That’s a pity on two counts. First, the earliest years. Once these personality dispositions
the history of developmental research indicates that and structures become established and fixed, other non-
Freud was correct in holding that idiographic methods developmental processes come into play. Under very spe-
are no less “scientific” than are nomothetic ones, though cial circumstances, such as psychoanalytic therapy, later
the more enduring advances have occurred when the two interventions are possible. As Fenichel (1945) observes,
methods have been coupled. Second, the scientific status the transference relationship in psychoanalysis is seen as
of the entire area was compromised when it became per- a reconstructive psychiatric intervention where the fixa-
missible to denigrate the value of a conclusive empirical tions and conflicts of infancy and childhood are relived
observation or experiment if it happened to be in conflict and repaired.
with a kernel hypothesis. The broader point is that psychoanalysis and its de-
In any case, psychoanalysis has thrived for 100 years scendant models implicate developmental processes—
in science and society. Its direct impact upon the health reciprocal interaction, bidirectionality, behavioral
and social sciences and literature cannot be overesti- plasticity, biobehavioral organization—only up to a crit-
mated. As a scientific orientation, the breadth of its ical point in ontogeny. In the usual case, this point is in-
roots in the evolutionary-developmental thought of Dar- fancy or very early childhood. These developmental
win and Haeckel, on the one hand, and the psychological processes become less active and less relevant, and the
associationism of J. S. Mill and British empiricism, on personality structures and dispositions that they pro-
the other, made it especially susceptible to hybridiza- duced govern the nature and quality of the individual’s
tion. For example, psychoanalysis-as-theory was as read- adaptations throughout the life course.
ily married to the hypothetico-deductive behavioral
model of C. Hull as it was to the ethological theory of
K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen. Both syntheses—social
learning theory and attachment theory—have proved to OTHER TRENDS IN SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
be exceedingly influential in developmental research, a
matter that we revisit. Psychoanalysis clearly played the leading role in setting
One kernel assumption that has made psychoanalysis the agenda for future studies of developmental psycho-
particularly attractive to developmentalists has been its pathology, but other, nearly forgotten forces were oper-
focus on the very early years as formative and determi- ating to link psychology and society. One notable event,
native. The events of infancy and early childhood are particularly relevant to child study, was the opening of
presumed to provide the foundation for adult personality the first psychological clinic in the United States. It was
and psychopathology. This broad assumption demands founded in 1896 at the University of Pennsylvania under
research on infancy and early childhood and on the the direction of Lightner Witmer, a former student of
events that occur in the familial relationships. Ironi- Wundt and Cattell.
cally, the assumption also implies that the events that The aim of Witmer’s work was to assist in the diag-
occur later in ontogeny—during childhood and adoles- nosis and treatment of children with school problems,
118 The Making of Developmental Psychology

and to apply the principles of the newly established sci- 1992). In this regard, Binet and Henri (1895) had earlier
ence to everyday concerns. What were those principles? confronted the dualism between elementarism and holism
In Witmer’s view, the study of children required a mul- in understanding children’s cognitive functioning and
tidisciplinary approach, and from the beginning he problem solving. In the same spirit:
brought together different professions, including social
workers, physicians, and practicing psychologists. In the [Stern criticized] the view that psychological elements are
carriers of psychological forces . . . a person’s actions are
absence of a treatment model, he created one. Although
defined not by single elements but by the entire structure
the clinic was essentially a local Philadelphia operation,
of environment, person, and person-environment inter-
it grew and prospered under Witmer’s leadership, and a action. Thus, a wholistic view was one of the fundamental
journal, the Psychological Clinic, was founded to de- bases from which Stern constructed his person-oriented
scribe its activities. The concept of an applied psychol- theoretical framework. (Kreppner, 1994, p. 317)
ogy, as well as a clinical psychology, caught on, and one
of the students from Witmer’s group at Pennsylvania, Consistent with the dialectic philosophy, Stern de-
Morris Viteles, led the way in the establishment of in- scribed the tug-of-war between personal dispositions
dustrial psychology in America (Viteles, 1932). and environmental constraints in development. This
brings up the issue of how plastic or malleable are ac-
Developmental Theory tions in ontogeny. The individual is a complex unit that
is not entirely determined by the forces within or the
From 1900 forward, when theoretical activity in devel- forces without. In this regard, Stern wrote:
opmental psychology was on the wane in the United
States, it began to thrive in Europe. Following the impe- This is the fact of personal plasticity or malleability, a do-
tus provided by Preyer, developmental work in German- main of intentional education or unintentional influences
speaking countries expanded, with the young William L. of the milieu. This domain is narrower than many empiri-
cists might be aware of. For the person is not only a pas-
Stern (1871–1938) playing a leading role. Stern was in-
sive recipient of the environmental forces impinging on
strumental in extending the theoretical and institutional
him, but he is also reacting to these forces. The way he
foundations of the new science in Germany from the shapes and keeps a kind of plasticity is not only a symp-
turn of the century through the early 1930s (Kreppner, tom of the conflict between activity and passivity, it is
1992). In 1909, he was sufficiently prominent in the dis- also a tool for overcoming it: It is a mirror which is a
cipline that he was awarded an honorary degree from weapon at the same time. (W. Stern, 1918, pp. 50–51,
Clark University. quoted from Kreppner, 1994, p. 318)
Kreppner (1992) has recently argued that Stern
should be viewed as the peer of Preyer, Binet, Freud, But it should be recalled that a dialectical systems
Hall, and Baldwin as a pioneer in developmental psy- perspective is not necessarily a developmental perspec-
chology. Remembered in U.S. psychology mostly for his tive. Stern’s dual interest in development and individual
proposal that the mental ages could be converted into an differences presents a dilemma. The inclusion of devel-
intellectual quotient (J. Peterson, 1925; Stern, 1911, opmental change in any discussion of characteristics
1914)—a transformation that was designed to equate in- of the self—traits and types—adds fresh complications.
telligence scores across chronological ages—little sys- The theoretical task is to resolve the tension between
tematic recognition has been given to his fundamental changing, adaptable features that promote fresh adapta-
role in establishing three areas of psychology as scien- tions, and enduring, permanent features that provide
tific disciplines: (1) differential psychology, (2) person- for predictable individual differences. On this score, the
ality psychology, and (3) developmental psychology. proposal of the IQ ratio held age constant and focused
Stern’s influence is seen in the ideas on development on individual differences; it represented the differential
that he generated, in the institutions he created, and in assessment, nondevelopmental side of Stern’s thinking.
the students whom he influenced, including Heinz His students represented both features of Stern’s
Werner and Martha Muchow. thought, from the nondevelopmental representations of
Although he completed his dissertation with Hermann topographical theory (Lewin, 1935) to the thoroughly
Ebbinghaus, Stern saw early that the study of human developmental concepts of mental development and
development required a unified perspective (Kreppner, symbolic transformation in Werner (1940/1948).
 Other Trends in Science and Society 119

His influence extended even beyond the boundaries events were relatively remote from the mainstream of
of recent retrospectives. Through the work of Gordon ongoing developmental work and thinking. They soon
Allport, Stern’s ideas became prominently represented were to become less remote with the importation by Ma-
in the classic volume Personality (Allport, 1937). teer (1918) of classical conditioning methods for study-
Stern’s strong influence is seen in Allport’s concepts of ing learning in infants and children.
the holistic nature of personality organization and func- From 1890 onward, North America joined Europe as
tioning, and idiographic and nomothetic models. In the a primary center for the scientific study of children.
study of individual differences, Stern literally wrote the Millicent Shinn’s “Notes on the Development of a
book, authoring one of the first systematic texts on dif- Child” appeared in 1893 and led to a renewed interest in
ferential psychology (1911), a volume that is still ad- individual studies. At the time, her replication and ex-
mirable in its precision and clarity. tension of Preyer’s method was considered to be a “mas-
After establishing and directing the Psychological In- terpiece” (Mateer, 1918).
stitute at Hamburg University, Stern was expelled from
Germany in 1933 by the Nazi regime. He came to the
United States in 1934, was appointed in the Department Development and Education
of Psychology at Duke University, and died in Durham,
The work of Binet, Hall, and Stern has underscored the
North Carolina, in 1938. As in the case of J. M. Bald-
intimate linkage between basic developmental research
win, his ideas have survived, but his name recognition
and educational practice. These investigators became
temporarily lapsed.
psychologists, however, and they focused on develop-
mental phenomena in their research and their writings
Child Study on education. It was a different course with John Dewey.
Cahan (1994) notes in her review of Dewey’s contribu-
In France, developmental work progressed in brilliant
tions to the science:
leaps in education and became bogged down in the uni-
versities. Binet himself was rejected in his three at-
Education was Dewey’s most enduring, comprehensive,
tempts to secure an academic appointment as chairs and synthetic philosophical problem and the one for which
became open at the Sorbonne and the Collége de France. he became best known. His interest in education “ fused
He died without having been named to a professorship in with and brought together what might otherwise have been
France, despite his preeminent role in the establishment separate interests—that in psychology and that in social
of psychology as an empirical science. Binet’s founding institutions and social life.” (p. 146)
of a laboratory for the experimental study of educational
problems inspired E. Claparéde’s establishment of the Influenced by the neo-Hegelianism of George S. Morris
J. J. Rousseau Institute in Geneva. and W. T. Harris, on the one hand, and the pragmatism
In England, James Sully (1896b) and William Drum- of C. S. Peirce and William James, on the other, Dewey
mond (1907) produced influential textbooks on psychol- evolved a distinctive view of education that focused on
ogy and on development, although there was relatively the social circumstances of the child. The dialectic be-
little novel research being conducted on children ( but tween the child and the environments in which he or she
see McDougall, 1906–1908). In this regard, Mateer lived and adapted was key to understanding the nature
(1918) observed that “on the whole English contribu- of development. In this framework, schools became the
tions to child study, in so far as it deals with the child of natural settings for the study of development.
preschool age, have been imitative rather than original Dewey held that the experiences of children in school
and very scanty in number ” (p. 28). Additionally, the could prepare them to develop those intellectual and
contributions of Hall were being brought back to Europe moral virtues that would establish a better society
whence they had originated. The British Child Study (Dewey, 1916). How is this to be achieved? According to
Association, in England, and the Society for the Psycho- Dewey, the subject matter of education should not be im-
logical Study of the Child, in France, were two posed by the agenda of the adult but should be drawn
of the more influential groups modeled after Hall’s U.S. from the child’s immediate environment and from the
association. Comparable developments were occurring child’s current interests. The task then would be to begin
in Italy, Russia, Denmark, and Portugal, but these with the child’s needs and concerns, not the teacher’s.
120 The Making of Developmental Psychology

Sound familiar? These ideas were in the air in the Hence, educational theory “ becomes political the-
early decades of the twentieth century. The Baldwin- ory, and the education is inevitably cast into the strug-
Piaget concepts of accommodation and assimilation gle for social reform” (Cremin, 1964, p. 118). In
were first cousins to the idea that there is a “constant re- Dewey’s framework, there is an explicit fusion among
organizing and restructuring of experience” (Dewey, the science of human development, educational applica-
1916, p. 82). So are the views of Stern that “ the way [the tions, social reform, and morality. Viewed in historical
child] shapes and keeps a kind of plasticity is not only a perspective, Dewey’s work and vision may be seen as
symptom of the conflict between activity and passivity, yet another legacy of his former teacher at Johns Hop-
it is also a tool for overcoming it.” Vygotsky’s “zone of kins, Hall.
proximal development ” captures a similar concept.
These interwoven ideas owe much to Hegelian idealism
and the emergent, developmental assumptions with THEMES OF THE FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD
which it has been associated.
At the level of theory, Dewey created a framework The emergence of modern developmental psychology in
for conceptualizing development and education rather the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was
than providing a tightly knit model to guide teaching hardly a coherent, systematic enterprise. For instance,
practices. There are ambiguities, however, in how the Dewey’s broad philosophical view of development and
transition is made from theory to practice. For example, the embryological concepts of von Baer and evolution-
the idea of a “restructuring of experience” does not pro- ary constructs of Darwin seemed to live in different
vide prescriptive rules on how challenging the task lands. Considered as a whole, developmental work and
must be, or how much assistance and drill the child theory were diverse, vigorous, contentious, fresh, and,
should be given. in many instances, brilliant. Despite the lack of unanim-
In a review of Dewey’s work and thought, Cahan ity in method and theory, certain themes seemed to cap-
(1994) emphasized that Dewey considered education to ture the attention and guide the work of these early
be an opportunity for society to reformulate itself, developmental investigators. Seven themes of general
and that “ the school is cast as a lever for social change” significance were:
(p. 163). This central theme was expressed early by
Dewey (1899) in a lecture at the University of Chicago: 1. The ontogeny of consciousness and intelligence.
The obvious fact is that our social life has undergone a
2. Intentionality and the correspondence between
thorough and radical change. If our education is to have thought and action.
any meaning for life, it must pass through an equally com- 3. The relations between evolution and development.
plete transformation. . . . The introduction of active occu- 4. The nature-nurture debate.
pations, of nature study, of elementary science, of art, of
5. The effects of early experience and when develop-
history; the relegation of the merely symbolic and formal
ment ceases.
to a secondary position; the change in the moral atmo-
sphere, in the relation of pupils to teachers—of discipline; 6. Moral development.
the introduction of more active, expressive, and self- 7. How the science may contribute to the society.
directing factors—all these are not mere accidents, they
are necessities of the larger social evolution. . . . To do
this means to make each one of our schools an embryonic Knowledge and Consciousness
community life, active with types of occupations that re-
“ Theory of the mind” concepts are hardly new for devel-
flect the life of the larger society, and permeated through-
opmentalists. Indeed, for both comparative and develop-
out with the spirit of art, history, and science. When the
school introduces and trains each child of society into
mental investigators, the origins of consciousness and
membership within such a little community, saturating the development of knowledge were the major empirical
him with the spirit of service, and providing him with in- concerns in the formative period of the science. The
struments of effective self-direction, we shall have the main business of comparative psychology, in the view of
deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which is Romanes (1884), was to investigate the continuity of
worthy, lovely, and harmonious. (pp. 43–44) consciousness and intelligence from animals to man. To
 Themes of the Foundational Period 121

establish the linkage, it was necessary to undertake stud- (1914) and, ironically, the denial of consciousness. In
ies of animal consciousness and of animals’ apparent the article, “How Lloyd Morgan’s Canon Backfired,”
“intelligent ” adaptations to the varied circumstances of Costall (1993) proposes that “C. L. Morgan argued that
life. Why continuity? For Romanes, continuity would the behavior of animals and humans could only be
demonstrate that human beings were on the same contin- treated in intentionalist terms; his Canon was an attempt
uum as animals in the evolutionary scheme. Using to stem anthropocentrism but has been consistently mis-
information brought to him from varied and informal understood” (p. 13; see also Wozniak, 1993). Whatever
sources, Romanes collected anecdotes on how various might have been Morgan’s own intentions, he played a
beasts (dogs, chickens, spiders, cats) demonstrated high pivotal role in extending accounts of behavioral develop-
levels of intelligence in their adaptations, and transmit- ment in animals and children beyond mentalism and
ted this knowledge to descendants through Larmarckian anthropomorphism. This was a critical step if develop-
mechanisms of hereditary transmission. mental research was to be promoted from the second-
Here C. Lloyd Morgan entered the scene. Recall class status that it had been assigned by Wundt (1907)
that Morgan’s major contribution to developmental and Hall (1885).
and evolutionary thought was his elegant refutation of Questions on the origin of knowledge were also cen-
the concept of hereditary transmission of acquired tral for early developmentalists. Not only were child
characteristics, a variation of which Baldwin labeled psychologists concerned with “ the content of children’s
“organic selection” (Klopfer & Hailman, 1967; Mor- minds” (Hall, 1891), but with how the content got into
gan, 1896, 1902). The logic of his argument against the mind. Preyer gave primary attention to the establish-
Larmarckianism extended beyond psychology and be- ment of the senses, language, and cognition, and Binet
yond behavior. and Baldwin early focused on experimental studies of
Morgan was also instrumental in helping establish childhood perception, discrimination, and memory.
some limits on the projection of higher-order cognitive J. M. Baldwin’s (1895, 1915) developmental theory on
processes to lower organisms. Initially a skeptic about the origins of knowledge arose in part from an admix-
interpreting the mental status of nonhuman animals, he ture of the speculations of the post-Kantian and the evo-
formulated a canon (or criterion) by which such attribu- lutionary views of Herbert Spencer and G. J. Romanes
tions may be permissible. Now known as Morgan’s on stages in consciousness and cognition.
Canon, it reads “In no case may we interpret an action At its root, however, were observations of infants that
as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical fac- provided empirical substance to the ideas of reflexive,
ulty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exer- sensorimotor, and ideomotor adaptations. Baldwin’s
cise of one which stands lower in the psychological mature theory of “genetic epistemology” was, essen-
scale” (Morgan, 1894/1903, p. 53). In its assumption tially, a theory of the mind. It was based for the most
that the “psychic facility” of nonhuman animals can be part on intuition and the framework that had been estab-
qualitatively different from those of human beings, lished by predecessors in philosophy and biology. It
Morgan’s criterion helped put a break on the more bla- seems no mere coincidence that the dominant concern
tant forms of nineteenth-century anthropomorphism with cognition and intelligence gave rise to the most ro-
(see also Schneirla, 1966). As a by-product, it invited a bust empirical tests and the most reliable experimental
shift from a focus on animal consciousness to a focus on methods of the period.
animal behavior, including analyses of the roles of bio-
physical and chemical processes within the organism
The Relations between Thoughts and Actions
and physical and social forces without.
The shift was nontrivial. By 1906, H. S. Jennings en- Although the problem of consciousness was the major
titled his magnificent study of the activities of parame- theme, questions of the linkages between thoughts and
cia as “ The Behavior of Lower Organisms.” Earlier, actions lagged not far behind. At what point in ontogeny
Binet’s work on infusoria and other lower beasts was la- do “ willful” acts arise, and what is the relationship
beled, “ The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms” (em- among consciousness and intention and action at any
phases added). Through Jennings and J. Loeb, the shift stage of development? These related questions were ex-
in focus paved the way for J. B. Watson’s behaviorism plored by virtually all early developmental investigators,
122 The Making of Developmental Psychology

but, again, with different emphases and different con- morphology was adaptive to the special conditions that
clusions. Binet and Freud, in part because of their expe- prevailed and, as von Baer had earlier argued, develop-
rience with hypnotism and their exposure to the work of ment was appropriately described in terms of early
Charcot, were concerned with the role of unconscious differentiation of structures in ways that became in-
processes in the direction and control of behavior, both creasingly distinctive for the species. The idea that evo-
normal and pathological. Binet’s (1892) studies of alter- lutionary modifications and developmental adaptations
ations of personality dealt with the effects of uncon- are mutually supportive has been repeatedly offered,
scious forces, and Breuer and Freud (1895/1936) made from the proposals of Morgan and Baldwin to those of
motivation and unconscious control the central theme of modern ethology and developmental psychobiology. To
psychoanalytic theory. On this score, one of the more in- be sure, the recapitulation doctrine was wrongheaded,
teresting observations from this period is the discovery but the issues to which it was addressed remain funda-
of the linkage between Binet’s and Freud’s views of un- mental for the science.
conscious processes. Similarly, Baldwin (1897/1906)
considered how conscious acts, with practice and
Nature and Nurture
time, become unconscious, and how awareness and in-
tentionality develop in step with cognitive development. A related but separable matter concerns the extent to
Nonetheless, the study of “intentionality” posed formi- which an individual’s behavior and propensities reflect
dable methodological problems that were not solved (al- the operation of experiences as opposed to an inborn,
though Preyer launched an early assault on the problem heritable potential. The “nature-nurture” problem, as la-
in his studies of infants). beled by Galton (1871), continues to tantalize develop-
mental theorists. Positions on this matter were as diverse
Ontogeny and Phylogeny then as they are now. Virtually all writers of this early
period paid at least lip service to the proposal that it was
How may development be defined: in terms of the on- not an “either/or ” proposition but a question of how the
togeny of individuals, or the ontogeny of the species? two influences were fused in the course of development.
Developmental psychology was born in the wake of the A variety of methods were employed for the study of
biological revolution created by the formulation and “natural” influence on behavior. Preyer, for instance,
widespread adoption of the Wallace-Darwin theory of assumed that the actions that develop in the absence of
species origins. The challenge to produce a similarly training must reflect the operation of innate factors in
powerful theory of individual genesis was felt by biolo- the infancy of an individual child. Galton, in a nomo-
gists and psychologists alike. The initially popular can- thetic approach, placed emphasis on the information to
didates for such a general developmental theory were be obtained from pedigree studies, familial and twin
unfortunately limited. comparisons, and selective breeding in animals. Along
Doubtless the most influential early developmental with Karl Pearson, he developed new statistical tools for
theory was the “ biogenetic law.” Virtually all early im- the evaluation of covariation and correlation, and these
portant developmental writers were recapitulationists of fit neatly with the metric scale of intelligence. They also
one sort or another. Adoption of the recapitulation per- invited the partitioning of variance into heritable and
spective did not, however, preclude consideration of environmental sources, a technique that also provided
alternative or supplementary views. On this score, the foundation for modern quantitative behavioral ge-
the delayed maturation hypothesis of Preyer and the netics and a century of controversy.
Baldwin-Morgan-Osborne proposal on organic selection
represented efforts to solve the puzzle of how develop-
When Does Development End?
ment could contribute to evolution as well as the reverse.
The “ biogenetic law” collapsed shortly after the turn All early developmentalists, by definition, assumed that
of the century, when the cornerstone assumption of re- experience played a role in the establishment and main-
capitulation was discredited in biology (Gould, 1977). tenance of basic systems of behavior, emotion, and cog-
Embryological studies indicated that morphological nition. There were radical differences among them
steps in development could not be simply accounted for regarding when they considered experience to be rele-
in terms of ancestral analogs. Even in embryogenesis, vant, since timing made all of the difference in the
 Themes of the Foundational Period 123

world (see Elder, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this vol- By 1900, the key empirical finding—that stages ex-
ume). For Hall, individual experience played a major isted in the “development of moral judgments”—had been
role in adolescence; early experience was virtually irrel- established; in that, older children gave greater weight to
evant because evolutionary forces laid the course for de- the motivation and intentions of a transgressor than did
velopment up through adolescence. For Freud, it was younger children. Similarly, striking age-developmental
just the opposite: Infancy was key; he assumed very differences were obtained in the level of abstraction of
early development to be basic in laying the foundations the “moral judgments,” and in the extent to which older
for adult behavior. Beyond infancy and early childhood, children as opposed to younger (12 to 16 years versus 6 to
the person resisted enduring changes (except under psy- 10 years) took the point of view of the offender. These
choanalytic treatment). For Preyer, it was embryogene- generalizations were drawn from voluminous question-
sis. And for Baldwin, personality development was a naire studies, based on the responses of thousands of
continuing, never-to-be-exhausted process over the life children at each age level (e.g., Hall, 1904; Schallen-
course, so turning points could occur throughout berger, 1894). The methodology, but not the conclusions,
ontogeny. was severely criticized at home and abroad. On matters
When the details of timing and plasticity of develop- of moral conduct, J. M. Baldwin’s proposals adumbrated
ment were left unspecified, investigators could talk past both Hartshorne and May on the specificity of moral con-
each and share a happy illusion that they referred to the duct, and the proposals of Kohlberg on the development
same issues and outcomes. A basic premise of psychoan- of the self and moral reasoning.
alytic theory is the strong hierarchical assumption that
very early experiences are foundational for the thoughts, Social Applications
actions, and relations that follow. Psychoanalytically
oriented writers could be radical developmentalists, but The application to the needs of society presented both
only for one phase of the life course. Once the personal- opportunities and problems. To promote the application
ity structures, motives, and “ working models” become of “scientific” principles to rearing and educating chil-
established, focus was given to the processes of mainte- dren, child study movements arose in America, and sim-
nance, not those of establishment and change. Investiga- ilar efforts were initiated on the continent and in
tors in a Baldwinian life-course perspective could look England. The problem was that scientific principles
to events that occurred over ontogeny. were in short supply. On this point, William James
In the absence of longitudinal information on the be- noted, in Talks with Teachers (1900), that “all the useful
havioral adaptations of human beings, there was no ade- facts from that discipline could be held in the palm of
quate basis for selecting or rejecting these theoretical one hand.” Not everyone, including Binet and Hall,
assumptions about the timing and functions of early ex- agreed with James. Then, as now, the temptation was
perience. Although Mills (1898) called for systematic great to go beyond commonsense beliefs in writing
longitudinal study, it took a half-century before this about children.
method was systematically explored, and still another 90 The ideas and claims of some early developmentalists
years before it became a method of choice. had political ramifications as well. One of the outcomes
was the establishment and rapid growth of the eugenics
movement, with Francis Galton as its intellectual leader
Morality and the Perfectibility of Humans
and the protection of superior genes as its goal in En-
The concern with intentionality and willfulness can be gland. One by-product of “Social Darwinism” was the
viewed as part of a broader question of ethics: How can importance attached to the newly devised metric scale
science help understand how human perfectibility may of intelligence and the belief that it would permit rapid
be achieved and imperfections avoided? This core issue identification of innate, stable differences in talent. A
was clearly pervasive in the moral psychologies of movement in Germany, promoted by Haeckel (1901),
Tetens and Carus, and it was also a matter of no little carried a message of biological ethnic superiority and
import for Spencer, Hall, Baldwin, and several others of led to dark political goals.
the era. A goal shared by many of them was to formulate There was also a very bright side to the application of
a developmental science, which, in its highest applica- developmental principles and ideas (see Sears, 1975).
tion, would supplement—or supplant—religion. Persons concerned with the science tended to act as
124 The Making of Developmental Psychology

child advocates, lending their prestige to the passage of Nazi persecution in the 1930s brought to the United
child labor laws, the revision of elementary and second- States a cadre of brilliant theorists from Europe. Some,
ary school curricula, and the promulgation of child- including Kurt Lewin, Fritz Heider, and Heinz Werner,
centered rearing and control practices. The discipline gained an opportunity to change the direction of modern
may not have directly benefited from these efforts, but social psychology and to keep alive the developmental
the welfare of children did. Then there was the enor- concept. For others, including Karl Bühler and William
mous impact that John Dewey’s concepts of human de- Stern, the exodus was a tragedy wherein their talents
velopment had on teaching and schooling practices. The and achievements were virtually unappreciated and ig-
field moved ahead to consolidate its claim to be an em- nored. And what directions might the study of social de-
pirical science as well as a progressive social movement. velopment have taken if Charlotte Bühler had been
In summary, the modern study of behavioral develop- permitted to remain safe and free at her Institute in Vi-
ment had an auspicious beginning as a vigorous, multi- enna rather than becoming an adjunct faculty member in
disciplinary undertaking that was pregnant with new Los Angeles?
ideas, fresh approaches, and novel developmental meth- Beyond societal and political influences, there was
ods. To the founders, the resolution of the basic prob- much to be accomplished within the area. There was an
lems of development seemed within grasp. Perhaps they immediate need to extend the methodological boundaries
were, but that early promise was not to be fulfilled, at of the discipline to permit systematic investigation of the
least not for another half-century. several issues claimed by its investigators and theorists.
Hence, the formulation of ways to translate ideas into re-
search operations remained a first task. Virtually all
substantive issues required attention, from social, cogni-
THE MIDDLE PERIOD (1913–1946): tive, and sensorimotor analyses to the study of language,
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND EXPANSION moral development, and psychobiological changes. In the
1920s, with the widespread granting of funds that were
One-third of the twentieth century, from 1913 to 1946, specifically assigned to support studies of children,
encompassed two world wars, an economic depression there was an explosive increase in empirical research.
of unprecedented depth and duration, the rise to world In the establishment of its empirical foundations, the
power of two new political-economic systems, and un- enterprise of child and developmental psychology be-
speakable horrors of mass destruction and genocide. came segregated into separate subareas, topics, and
These events affected the course of all intellectual and theories. No single model, not even behaviorism, was
scientific work undertaken during the period, and devel- broad enough to encompass and provide direction for
opmental psychology was no exception. the activities of researchers. The fragmentation stimu-
Paradoxically, some of the events that had tragic lated efforts to put the field back together again
worldwide consequences served to enrich and broaden through the publication of handbooks (which served to
the discipline. World War I brought attention to the ad- summarize the diverse investigations) and the founding
vantages and potential of psychological assessment, par- of development-centered journals and scientific soci-
ticularly intelligence testing. It also sent the primary eties. But in the absence of a compelling and coherent
U.S. developmental theorist, James Mark Baldwin, to general theory of development, the subareas of devel-
France, where he enjoyed greater influence than he had opmental investigation and thought evolved along sepa-
had in his own country. World War II contributed to- rate trajectories. The story of the main events and ideas
ward the establishment of psychology as a profession as of this period is perhaps best told by recounting the
well as a science. The U.S. prosperity enjoyed in the progress made in the several areas of inquiry—from
1920s was directly translated into liberal support for the mental testing and moral development to language and
discipline by private foundations and state funds. Like- thought and developmental psychobiology. That is the
wise, the depression of the 1930s and early 1940s strategy adopted in this section, beginning with some
effected a massive withdrawal of funds and, concomi- comments on the institutionalization of U.S. develop-
tantly, a drop in the level of research activity on devel- mental psychology and ending with a brief review of
opmental problems. some major theoretical ideas of this period.
 Institutions and Development 125

INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT by the Payne Foundation; the causes of morality, by the
Institute for Religious and Social Education).
The child study movement led by Hall in the 1880s and But in terms of sheer impact on the field, the Laura
1890s bore fruit some 20 years later. Child study associ- Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) must be ac-
ations had been established in one form or another in all knowledged as having the greatest influence. Through
regions of the country. Collectively, they formed a po- LSRM funds, major centers for research were estab-
tent movement for child advocacy. In 1906, an Iowa lished at three universities (California, Columbia, Min-
housewife and mother, Cora Bussey Hillis, proposed nesota). Substantial support was awarded to the existing
that a research station be established for the study and institutes at Yale and Iowa, and smaller-scale research
improvement of child rearing (Sears, 1975). Her argu- centers were created at the University of Michigan and
ment was simple but compelling: If research could im- in Washington, DC. Studies of personality and child de-
prove corn and hogs, why could it not improve the velopment at Vassar, Sarah Lawrence, and Teachers Col-
rearing of children? The campaign to establish a Child lege (Columbia) also shared in the Rockefeller support.
Welfare Research Station at the University of Iowa was And that’s not all. Under the general direction of
eventually successful. The Iowa unit was established in Lawrence Frank, the Rockefeller funds provided support
1917 and its research-laboratory school opened in 1921. for individual research projects (including C. Bühler’s
The Iowa facility—along with a comparable re- pioneering investigations) and made possible the estab-
search unit that opened shortly afterward at the lishment of the national Child Study Association (see
Merrill-Palmer Institute in Detroit—became the Child Study, vols. 1 to 3). Such liberal support for child
model for child development institutes that were to study provided stimulation for ongoing work at Stan-
spring up across the United States and Canada in the ford, Harvard, Toronto, and Cornell. All in all, the ef-
1920s and 1930s. Because one of the main functions of fect was to confirm Binet’s observation that Americans
the institutes was dissemination of information about like to do things big.
children, various publications were established, rang- To summarize in detail the specific activities and ac-
ing from university monograph series (at Iowa, Colum- complishments of these institutes from 1920 to 1940 is
bia, Minnesota, Toronto, and Berkeley) and journals beyond the scope of this review. At midstream, Goode-
(Child Development, Child Development Monographs) nough (1930b) provided an informative coverage of the
to handbooks (Murchison, 1931, 1933) and magazines work and accomplishments during a period of great
(Child Study, Parents Magazine). Most of the institutes activity. Each institute soon evolved its own “personal-
also awarded advanced degrees, thereby helping to ity” in terms of methods employed and problems ad-
create a new professional workforce. The graduates dressed. The issues that the institutes tackled should
found placements in university teaching and research illustrate the point.
positions, as well as in a wide range of applied set-
tings. An interdisciplinary organization, the Society 1. Mental testing. Virtually all of the institutes were
for Research in Child Development, was established in committed, at some level, to clarifying the problems of
1930 to provide a forum and a framework for scientific intelligence assessment and how individual differences
contributors to the discipline (Frank, 1935). in test performance came about. By the late 1930s,
The story of this “golden age” for the study of chil- studies at Iowa on the effects of enrichment on intelli-
dren in the United States has been told expertly by two gence test performance had appeared, and longitudinal
of its participants (Sears, 1975; Senn, 1975), so only an work on the stability and change of IQ had begun at
overview is required here. New funds from diverse pri- Fels and Berkeley. Anderson (1939) at Minnesota of-
vate and governmental sources were made available to fered a provocative theory of the continuity of intellec-
researchers in child development. Among the more no- tual functions, based on the extent to which early tests
table contributors were the individual sponsors of the assessed functions that overlapped with those assessed
Fels and Merrill-Palmer child study institutes, along in later tests. The faculty at Stanford, headed by Lewis
with various special-mission projects (i.e., Terman’s Terman and Quinn McNemar, strongly contested
study of gifted children, by the Commonwealth Fund; any strong claims on the malleability of intelligence
the study of the effects of motion pictures on children, (Minton, 1984).
126 The Making of Developmental Psychology

2. Longitudinal study. Most thoughtful developmen- scientific quality of the work completed, it should be
tal psychologists recognized the need for gaining ade- noted that few major theorists were associated with the
quate information about behavior and development over newly founded institutes. There were some notable ex-
a significant portion of the life span. But the lack of re- ceptions to this generalization, including Jean Piaget
sources inhibited such long-term, large-scale investiga- at the Rousseau Institute and, in the 1940s, Kurt
tions of behavior and cognition. Here is where the Lewin and Robert Sears at Iowa. For the most part, the
institutes were invaluable. Two of the institutes—Berke- institutes were devoted to the pragmatic problem that
ley and Fels—launched systematic longitudinal investi- Mrs. Hollis had identified, “How can we improve the
gations. The work complemented the already initiated way that children are reared?” The area soon learned
study by Terman at Stanford. that it had neither methods nor theories adequate to
3. Behavioral and emotional development. The study the task. The institutes focused on devising more ade-
of children’s fears and how they arise was undertaken at quate methods, leaving the primary theoretical work
Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Minnesota, California, and to others.
Washington University (St. Louis). This work, essen-
tially an extension of the projects launched by Watson MENTAL TESTING
and his collaborators at Johns Hopkins (see below),
dealt with the problems of how emotions arise in on- In the eyes of many developmentalists in the 1920s and
togeny and how fears are learned and unlearned (Jersild, 1930s, the major obstacle to establishing a credible sci-
Markey, & Jersild, 1933; M. Jones, 1931). ence of child psychology was not theoretical so much as
4. Growth and physical maturation. The early work it was methodological. Given Binet’s insights on and
of the Iowa group was concerned with the study of chil- career-long devotion to the matter, it seems altogether
dren’s physical development, including the care and fitting that he, along with his collaborators, engineered
feeding of children (Baldwin & Stecher, 1924). Simi- the most significant methodological advance of the
larly, Arnold Gesell’s institute at Yale led the way in es- first half-century of the science. Whatever may be the
tablishing graphs of normal development for use in flaws and shortcomings of the Binet-Simon method of
identifying instances of aberrant behavior or develop- intellectual assessment, it provided the tool that was re-
mental disorders (see below). The Fels Institute early quired for the precise study of children’s development,
established a tradition for clarifying the relations be- and for the translation of cognitive events into quantifi-
tween physical and behavioral development, leading to, able units. The test opened the door for comparisons of
among other things, significant advances in assessment significant psychological dimensions across ontogeny,
and diagnosis of psychosomatic relations. and for the analysis of individual differences among
5. Research methods. John Anderson and Florence persons. It also provided a reliable method for address-
Goodenough at Minnesota, Dorothy S. Thomas at Co- ing the major themes that had been identified in the
lumbia, and H. McM. Bott at Toronto recognized the first era of the field, including the problems of nature-
need for more adequate observational research methods nurture, early experience, continuity of consciousness,
(see Anderson, 1931; Bott, 1934; Goodenough, 1929; and the predictability of behavior and cognition.
D. S. Thomas, 1929). But the methodological work was Goddard (1911) deserves credit for having been the
not limited to observational techniques. Goodenough first to bring the Binet-Simon scale to the United States,
(1930a) continued to explore alternative and flexible but Lewis M. Terman and his colleagues at Stanford
methods for personality and intellectual assessment (in- University were key in extending the use of intelligence
cluding her Draw-a-Person test), and these workers led tests in the United States and worldwide through their
the way in ensuring that high levels of statistical sophis- revision of the Binet-Simon scales. The Stanford-Binet
tication would be employed in research design and individually administered tests helped establish clinical
analysis. Dorothy McCarthy at Minnesota and Jean Pi- psychology as a separate profession in clinics, schools,
aget at the J. J. Rousseau Institute began their influential the military, and industry, fulfilling one of Binet’s vi-
studies of the origins of children’s language and thought. sions (J. Peterson, 1925).
Like other students of Hall who gravitated toward ed-
This is a mere sampling of the major concerns and ucational psychology, Terman’s initial academic ap-
issues. Without detracting from the intellectual and pointment at Stanford was in the School of Education.
 Mental Testing 127

Formerly a school principal, Terman had a long-standing vice proved to be an exceedingly powerful tool for cate-
interest in the problems of individual differences in the gorization and for differentiation of cognitive abilities.
classroom. He selected as his dissertation project the Second, this comment concerns the relation of the
comparison of seven bright and seven dull boys on vari- testing movement to the rest of psychology, especially
ous measures (Terman, 1906). He had been acquainted the rest of developmental psychology. Interest in the
with Binet’s work since his research for his undergradu- use of the procedure as a research device initially rode
ate thesis at Indiana University, and, given his back- a wave of enthusiasm, followed by a period of neglect.
ground and the Barnes-associated tradition at Stanford When experimental studies of how performance on in-
for large-scale study, it seemed entirely in character that telligence tests could be modified were conducted in
Terman should attempt an extensive standardization of the 1930s, it became clear that increments of one or
the Binet-Simon scales (on some 1,000 California more standard deviations (e.g., 10 to 20 IQ points)
schoolchildren; Terman, 1916). Among other improve- were not uncommon and could be brought about in a
ments to the scale, Terman adopted a suggestion by relatively brief period (4 to 16 weeks; see H. E. Jones,
William Stern that any child’s performance could be ex- 1954, for a review of this work). In addition, Sherman
pressed in terms of an Intelligence Quotient (IQ). In his and Key (1932) demonstrated that a negative correla-
commitment to observation and standardization, Terman tion was obtained between IQ and age among children
proved to be a worthy successor to Binet. The American- living in culturally deprived Appalachia. Such findings
ized version of the test was an almost immediate success. raised questions about the environmental contributions
The method was widely adopted and the essential idea to IQ scores, and much debate about the nature and
was used to construct group tests to meet the needs of the meaning of the findings followed (see McNemar, 1940;
military (in screening recruits for World War I ) and the Minton, 1984). A parallel controversy arose over the
schools to sort out highly gifted or retarded children interpretation of twin data, and the implications of
(Goodenough, 1954). findings from the tests of monozygotics, dizygotics,
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive ac- and other types of siblings for the inheritance of intel-
count of the testing movement; useful histories of ligence. The issues subsided, without clear resolution,
mental testing, through 1925, can be found in J. Peter- in the late 1930s, then came to the forefront again some
son (1925) and K. Young (1924), and more recent ac- 30 years later.
counts can be found in Goodenough (1954), and Carroll Third, the method of intelligence testing did not
and Horn (1981). Three comments on mental testing give rise to a coherent theory of the development of in-
and its relation to developmental psychology are in telligence. The theoretical debates centered mostly
order, however. around matters of test structure and statistical analysis
First, the method paved the way for systematic com- (e.g., whether a single factor could account for the vari-
parisons across time, across persons, and across condi- ance or whether two or multiple factors were required)
tions. This was a necessary step toward the conduct of and whether the results of the experimental tests were
longitudinal studies of human behavior. It also provided being properly interpreted. There was a significant gap
the tool for comparing persons of different backgrounds, between the emerging theories of cognition (following
races, and environmental experiences, thereby permit- the model of Baldwin and Piaget) and the methods of as-
ting the researcher to address anew the problems of sessment being employed. Neither Piaget nor Baldwin
heredity and environmental influence. The study of the are mentioned in Goodenough’s (1954) comprehensive
effects of early experience on IQ was explored by Sher- chapter on “mental growth.” The gap was not unprece-
man and Key (1932), by Wheeler (1942), and by the dented: A parallel problem could be found between the
Iowa group led by Skeels and Wellman (Skeels, 1966; methods of social interactional assessment and the theo-
Skeels, Updegraff, Wellman, & Williams, 1938). In ad- ries of personality and social learning patterns (see
dition, the procedure was applied in ways not anticipated below). But the test procedures proved their worth in ed-
by its innovators. For instance, Kamin (1974) reported ucation and in the marketplace, even though they could
the tests were used as a screening device for immigrants not be readily integrated into the existing body of psy-
to the United States—a practice that was hardly appro- chological theory. Hence, the testing movement evolved
priate, given the diverse backgrounds of the persons and prospered outside the mainstream of developmental
being tested and the conditions of assessment. The de- psychology (Dahlstrom, 1985).
128 The Making of Developmental Psychology

LONGITUDINAL STUDIES comparison group), the data provide a rich yield of devel-
opment through the life span. Overall, the work consti-
According to Wesley Mills (1899), the discipline needed tutes one of the major achievements of the science in its
(a) longitudinal studies of individual organisms from first century, incorporating the efforts of three of its
birth to maturity, and ( b) systematic experimental ma- most influential figures (Binet, Terman, & Sears).
nipulations of the long-term conditions for development. Another factor that had inhibited longitudinal studies
Without that information, one could scarcely hope to was the need for research institutes that would survive
achieve a firm grasp of the processes of development, as long as their subjects. That problem was solved in the
whether nonhuman or human. Because the major hy- 1920s by the formation of the several child research
potheses about development were concerned at their root institutes across the United States. Soon afterward,
with these processes, one would have thought that longi- longitudinal projects were initiated at Berkeley, Fels
tudinal studies would have been given the highest prior- Institute, Minnesota, and Harvard. Initially, smaller
ity in the new discipline. They were not. Perhaps the short-term projects were undertaken to investigate par-
practical difficulties in mounting life-span projects in ticular issues. Mary Shirley (1931, 1933a, 1933b), for
humans seemed too formidable, or the investment and instance, completed a 2-year-long investigation of the
risks seemed too great. For whatever reasons, the infor- motor, emotional, and social development of infants. In
mation available about longitudinal development by the contrast to the cross-sectional studies of Gesell, her lon-
end of the first period of the area’s history was either gitudinal work permitted her to identify particular se-
sketchy (e.g., Binet’s study of his two daughters) or sub- quences in growth and change.
jective and retrospective (e.g., psychoanalytic inter- Experimental intervention studies of the sort that
views). But, on this fragmentary information, the most Mills (1899) had called for in animals were undertaken
influential psychoanalytic and behavioristic theories of with children. Myrtle McGraw’s (1935) work with
cognitive and personality development were formulated, Jimmy and Johnny, twins who were given different
and few data were available to assess their implications training experiences, is one of the better instances of
or correct their shortcomings. the use of what Gesell called the “co-twin” control pro-
One of the obstacles for longitudinal study—the need cedure. By providing “enrichment ” experiences prior to
for measurement—seemed to be solved by the develop- the normal onset of basic motor functions, McGraw
ment of a reliable device for the metric assessment of was able to demonstrate that experiences can facilitate
cognitive abilities. That advance was sufficient for Lewis the appearance and consolidation of climbing and other
M. Terman, who perfected the instrument and pioneered movement patterns. The “enriched” twin continued to
the first large-scale longitudinal study of behavioral- show a modest advantage over the control twin, even
cognitive characteristics in 1921. He selected 952 boys though age and associated growth greatly diminished
and girls in California, from 2 to 14 years of age, who the apparent gains (see Bergenn, Dalton, & Lipsitt,
achieved a test score of 140 IQ or above. This group com- 1994, for a more detailed account of McGraw and her
prised the brightest children (in terms of test perfor- contributions). Along with these well-known works, a
mance) who could be found in a population of about a large number of lesser-known investigations were
quarter-million (Terman, 1925). His initial aim seems to addressed to the same issues, using short-term longitu-
have been the planning of educational procedures for dinal interventions to influence intelligence test per-
gifted children. As it turned out, the sample provided the formance (e.g., Hilgard, 1933) and motor skills (e.g.,
core group for follow-up studies that continued through Jersild, 1932).
most of the twentieth century. At several stages in child- These studies of longitudinal development were lim-
hood and early adulthood, these “gifted” children-cum- ited to children, at least in the initial stages. What about
adults were reassessed, with the behavioral net widened development beyond childhood? Since the early investi-
to include personality characteristics, life accomplish- gations of Quetelet, there had been few attempts to ad-
ments, and social adaptations. Later, their spouses and dress directly the problems of developmental change
children were included in the study, and each group of during maturity. The exceptions are noteworthy because
subjects was followed through the 60th year of life they provide part of the foundation for contemporary
(Sears, 1975). Despite shortcomings in the original de- emphasis on the study of development over the entire
sign (e.g., absence of a matched nongifted control or life span of human experience. One of the first texts on
 Behaviorism and Learning 129

aging was produced by Hall (1922), shortly before his reared apart. Despite the pitfalls, diaries continued to
death. Later in the same decade, Hollingworth (1927) provide a potentially rich source of information about
published a text on development over the whole life the beliefs, attitudes, and conflicts of adolescents.
span, and some 12 years later, Pressey, Janney, and Given the amount of time, effort, and funding re-
Kuhlen (1939) extended the coverage. quired for these longitudinal studies, what could be said
The database for these extensions to developmental about their payoffs by mid-century? Were they worth
issues over the life span was meager, at best. Surpris- the investment? The early returns indicated that the
ingly little research on behavioral development in ado- highest levels of predictability were obtained when the
lescence was stimulated; perhaps Hall’s major work assessment procedures had previously established relia-
gave the appearance that all of the important questions bility and utility (i.e., intelligence and physiological
were already answered. One of the more interesting measures). In social and personality characteristics,
studies of this age group was reported by Bühler (1931), however, individual differences appeared to be demon-
who analyzed the diaries of some 100 adolescents. In strably less stable over time. Because the longitudinal
describing this work, Bühler (1931) writes: work was, for the most part, atheoretical, except for an
implicit belief in the long-term stability of human char-
Intimate friendship is by all authors, considered as a
acteristics, the early findings posed serious problems
characteristic of adolescence, not of childhood. The
for interpretation. Were the methods and measures at
same is true of that love or devotion which one calls
hero-worship. This is also considered as a very charac-
fault, or was the theoretical framework itself to blame?
teristic feature of puberty. Charlotte Bühler studied, on It took research another half-century to answer this
the basis of adolescents’ diaries, the distribution and question.
types of hero-worship during puberty. Her collection of
about one hundred authentic diaries contains contribu-
tions from different countries, different milieus, and dif-
ferent age groups. . . . There are German, Austrian, BEHAVIORISM AND LEARNING
American, Czech, Swedish, and Hungarian diaries in
this collection. Statistics show that the average age at At about the time that World War I began in Europe,
which girls begin to write diaries is thirteen years and U.S. psychology underwent an internal upheaval. John
eight months, while the average age for boys is fourteen B. Watson (1878–1957) called behaviorism a “purely
years and eleven months. In all of the girls’ diaries American production” (1914, p. ix). Its essential mes-
either a “crush” or a f lirtation plays a role, sometimes sage—that the study of humans, animals, and children
both. The period of the “crush” is from thirteen years required the objective methods of natural science—was
and nine months to seventeen years. The boys’ diaries of fundamental importance, but it was hardly novel.
show a larger variety of types of friendship. In the place
Others close to Watson, including his mentors in behav-
of the “crush,” a devoted admiration for a leader or for a
ioral biology (Jacques Loeb and H. S. Jennings) and his
girl, or often for an older woman, plays a role. (p. 408)
colleagues in psychology (e.g., K. Dunlap), had ex-
Diaries provided an innovative substitute for prospec- pressed similar ideas. But none had presented the argu-
tive longitudinal data, providing an account of the ado- ment with the persuasiveness and flair that Watson did
lescent’s most intimate thoughts, concerns, hopes, and in person and in print. As Watson (1914) put it:
wishes. But it also had certain hazards, with the prob-
lems of selection paramount (e.g., who keeps a diary, Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective
what is selectively omitted or recorded). Because of its experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical
goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspec-
inherently private nature, the method has few safe-
tion forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the sci-
guards against fraud. On this score, Sigmund Freud
entific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with
wrote a laudatory introduction to the published version which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of
of a diary that, upon critical examination, proved to be a consciousness. The behaviorist attempts to get a unitary
fake. It is a modest irony that the young Cyril Burt scheme of animal response. He recognizes no dividing line
(1920–1921) exposed the fraud. Some 50 years later, between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of
Kamin (1974) and others raised questions about biases its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of his
and the accuracy of data in Burt’s own work on twins total field of investigation. (p. 1)
130 The Making of Developmental Psychology

For Watson, there was an essential unity in animal and nate reflexes and inherent emotions provided the sub-
human psychology. The methodological differences that strate, and conditioning and learning mechanisms per-
trifurcated the discipline for Hall and divided it for mitted the elaboration of emotions and behavior in
Wundt were not valid; the study of children, animals, and development. Personality thus was the outcome of a hi-
adult human beings could be reduced to the same behav- erarchical structure, and discrete learning experiences
ioral, noncognitive techniques. Moreover, Watson called provided the essential building blocks. The conditioning
for a pragmatic psychology, one that could be applied in of early emotions—love, fear, or rage—provided the
society and useful in everyday affairs. Watson liberal- foundation for all that followed. In his stress on emo-
ized psychology by holding, in effect, that the science tions and early experience, Watson seems to have been
could apply itself to any problem of life and behavior. influenced directly by Freud (as Watson suggested in
Watson was originally trained in comparative psy- 1936, in his autobiographical statement), as well as by
chology and heavily influenced by biologist Jacques other views of personality current in the day (including
Loeb, who was “concerned with explaining animal be- McDougall’s, 1926, theory of sentiments). In any case,
havior in terms of physiol-chemical influences and with- the study of emotional development in infancy became
out the use of anthropomorphic, psychic, or mentalistic the focus for Watson’s experimental and observational
terms” (Jensen, 1962, p. x). His explanatory concept of work from 1916 to 1920. Because of his work, Watson
“ tropism” was borrowed from studies of plants, where (along with E. L. Thorndike) was credited in an early
stimulus-directed movement occurs, say, toward sun- Handbook of Child Psychology as having initiated exper-
light. At the same time, another behavioral biologist, imental child psychology (Anderson, 1931, p. 3). Binet
H. S. Jennings, agreed with Loeb on the need for objec- was overlooked again.
tive analysis, but he also emphasized the “complexity The infant work was conducted in the laboratories
and variability of behavior in lower organisms and the and newborn nursery at Johns Hopkins Hospital from
importance of internal factors as determinants of behav- 1916 through 1920; it was interrupted by Watson’s ser-
ior ” (Jensen, 1962, p. x). How Loeb—Watson’s mentor vice in World War I and terminated by his being fired
at Chicago, and Jennings—Watson’s senior colleague at from Hopkins in 1920. The series involved controlled
Johns Hopkins—outlined many of the essential ideas of observation of stimuli that elicit emotional reactions in
behaviorism is a fascinating story that has been bril- infants (Watson & Morgan, 1917), a systematic attempt
liantly documented by D. D. Jensen (1962; see also to catalogue the behavior responses present at birth and
Pauly, 1981). shortly afterward (Watson, 1926), and the experimental
Watson’s contributions to development evolved conditioning and manipulation of fear reactions (Wat-
through two stages: empirical and theoretical. Consider son & Rayner, 1920).
first his methodological and research contributions to Although Watson’s conditioning studies were only
developmental study. Consistent with his vision, Watson demonstrational and would hardly deserve publication
set about to demonstrate the relevance of purely behav- on their methodological merit, they proved to be enor-
ioral procedures to the study of human behavior. He mously influential. Following the lead of the more ex-
began his work with newborn infants and the analysis of tensive and careful work of Florence Mateer (1918) and
the conditioning of emotional reactions (Watson & Mor- of the Russian investigator N. Krasnogorski, who first
gan, 1917; Watson & Rayner, 1920). Watson was well reported in 1909 the conditioning of salivation in chil-
prepared for the task; by mid-career, he had been recog- dren (see Krasnogorski, 1925; Munn, 1954; Valsiner,
nized as one of America’s leading researchers in com- 1988), Watson boldly attacked the problem of the condi-
parative and physiological psychology (Buckley, 1989; tioning of emotions in infancy in the “case of Albert.”
Horowitz, 1992). What was impressive about this work was the finding
Why did Watson choose to work with infants? Given that fear was conditioned and, once established, resisted
the methodological outline of behaviorism, would it not extinction and readily generalized. As M. C. Jones
have been as appropriate to begin with adolescents or (1931) pointed out, “conditioned emotional responses”
adults? Watson provided the answer himself in his differ from earlier demonstrations of reflexive condi-
“lifechart ” of human activities, where he asserted that tioning in that there was one obvious discrepancy:
“ to understand man,” one must begin with the history of “Whereas the conditioned reflex is extremely unstable,
human behavior (1926). He saw personality as being emotional responses are often acquired as the result of
shaped by learning experiences from birth onward. In- one traumatic experience and are pertinacious even in
 Behaviorism and Learning 131

the absence of reinforcement ” (p. 87). According to from each other early in the child’s life, the potential of
Watson (1928), “guts can learn”, and they seemed to both would be enhanced. This “modern” view of child
have excellent memories. He wrote, “ This proof of the rearing was predictably controversial, attracting both
conditioned origin of a fear response puts us on a natu- converts and devastating criticism. Along with his emo-
ral science grounds in our study of emotional behavior. tionally cool view of personality, Watson became in-
It yields an explanatory principle which will account for creasingly extreme in his environmentalism. Although
the enormous complexity in the emotional behavior of he was developmental in his approach, Watson down-
adults” (p. 202). Conditioned emotional responses, played the role of psychobiological factors in personality
whether in the form of the “CER” of B. F. Skinner and after birth, considering learning to be the key mecha-
W. K. Estes (1944), the “ two-factor theory of anxiety” nism for the pacing and stabilizing of behavior develop-
of Solomon and Wynne (1953), or the “learned helpless- ment from birth to maturity. Biology was important, of
ness” concept of Maier, Seligman, and Solomon (1969), course, but only as it established potential for learning.
have continued to play a significant if enigmatic role in In the absence of evidence on the long-term effects of
neobehavioral accounts of personality and development. early experience or longitudinal studies of human devel-
Although Watson himself completed no further sci- opment, Watson was skating on extremely thin ice. To
entific investigations, his experimental studies with in- his credit, he said so (1926, p. 10). But Watson was in no
fants were taken up by students and colleagues through position to obtain corrective or confirming data; except
the 1920s and early 1930s (see M. C. Jones, 1931). for occasional part-time teaching at the New School, in
Mary Cover Jones (1924) explored the problem of the New York, and a lecture series at Clark University, he
extinction of emotional reactions, demonstrating how had dropped out of academia and out of scientific re-
experimentally produced fears could be “ undone.” H. E. search in 1920.
Jones (1930) clarified the short-term stability of the re- Watson nonetheless became a symbol for a scientific
sponse (not great after 2 months). Later, experimental approach to child rearing during the 1920s and 1930s
psychologists investigated the possibility of neonatal through his popular magazine articles (e.g., in Harper’s
(e.g., Marquis, 1931; Wickens & Wickens, 1940) and and Atlantic Monthly). His views extended into educa-
fetal (Spelt, 1938) conditioning, along with extensive tion, pediatrics, psychiatry, and child study, where the
studies of early motor learning. Watson’s work also stress on the acquisition of habits and avoidance of emo-
stimulated the development of observational methods to tions became translated into prescriptions for behavior-
assess children’s behaviors, on the one hand, and the es- istic child rearing. A cursory review of these materials
tablishment of the family of behavioristic theories of reveals virtually no empirical citations, except for
learning, on the other (e.g., Guthrie, 1935; Hull, 1943; references to the demonstrational studies that Watson
Skinner, 1938; Tolman, 1932). conducted or loosely supervised. It should be noted,
This brings us to Watson’s theory of psychological however, that Watson’s advice for mothers to adopt a
development, which grew both more extreme and more psychologically antiseptic approach toward their chil-
expansive the further he became removed from data in dren had not been original with him. In physician
time and space. As Watson’s ideas on child development Emmet Holt’s The Care and Feeding of Children, a best-
became elaborated, it seemed clear that he considered seller since its first edition in 1894, the same guidance
all emotions—not merely fear and rage—to be obstacles had been given on the evils of kissing children (“ Tuber-
for adaptive behavior and a happy life. Among other culosis, diphtheria, syphilis, and many other grave
things, he campaigned, in his influential best-seller, diseases may be communicated in this way”; Holt,
Psychological Care of Infant and Child (1928), against 1894/1916, p. 174) or playing with babies (“ They are
too much mother love. The child, he said, would become made nervous and irritable”; Holt, 1984/1916, p. 171).
“ honeycombed” with affection and, eventually, would Watson didn’t offer fresh guidance so much as new rea-
be a social “invalid” wholly dependent on the attention sons. In the book promotion in 1928, Watson was de-
and responses of others. Love, like fear, can make one scribed as “America’s greatest child psychologist ”
sick to the stomach. (Buckley, 1989, fig. 15).
Despite such rhetoric, Watson’s books carried a What might have happened if Watson had remained
deadly serious message for the 1920s and 1930s. Sci- involved in empirical research? We can only guess that
ence could lead to improved and efficient ways to rear his statements would have been more closely tied to
children, and if mothers and children could be liberated facts rather than speculations, and that his views about
132 The Making of Developmental Psychology

child rearing would have become less idiosyncratic and tical implications of child research, particularly for edu-
less extreme (see Buckley, 1989). But, as we have indi- cation. After earning his PhD degree, Gesell worked ini-
cated elsewhere, certain problems remained at the heart tially in schools and curriculum (as did most of the Clark
of his system (Cairns & Ornstein, 1979). Beyond the be- graduates in developmental psychology in that period).
havioristic model of an emotionless and mindless child, He returned to complete an MD degree at Yale, then
perhaps the most salient weakness in Watson’s view was founded a child study laboratory in 1911, which permit-
the assumption that development was a mechanistic ted him to extend the tradition of W. Preyer and M.
process that could be reduced to fundamental units of Shinn. Gesell (1931, 1933) early demonstrated himself
learning. Seemingly all behavior was learned, from birth to be an innovative and careful methodologist. He was
onward, and the earliest experiences were the most one of the first to make extensive use of motion pictures
basic. This was a peculiar and unnecessary position for a in behavioral analysis and to explore the advantages of
behaviorist to take. Although Watson early claimed psy- using twins as controls in experimental studies (i.e., one
chology was “a definite part of biology,” his view of de- twin is subjected to the experimental manipulation, the
velopment was nonbiological and nonorganismic. other serves as a maturational control).
Learning is an essential process in development, but it is In 1928, Gesell published Infancy and Human
not the only process. Growth, a remarkable report on several years of study of
Experimental studies of learning in children did not the characteristics of infancy. According to Gesell, one
begin and end with Watson. Another influential line of of his aims was to provide “objective expression to the
research followed the lead of E. L. Thorndike in studies course, the pattern, and the rate of mental growth in nor-
of verbal learning and in the analysis of the “law of ef- mal and exceptional children” (p. viii). The other aim
fect ” and different reward and punishment contingen- was theoretical, and the last section of the book takes on
cies (see J. Peterson, 1931, for a review of relevant “ the broad problem of heredity in relation to early men-
studies). The work followed not only the laboratory ana- tal growth and personality formation . . . and the signif-
logues used by Thorndike (following Binet & Henri, icance of human infancy” (p. ix).
1895, and Ebbinghaus, 1897), but also within-classroom Gesell (1928) was characteristically thorough in
manipulations of the efficacy of different kinds of dealing with both problems, and his normative tables
reward-punishment feedback (e.g., Hurlock, 1924). The and descriptions of how Baby Two (2 months old) differs
studies of learning and memory were, for the most part, from Baby Three and Baby Nine ring true to the contem-
divorced from conditioning research in infants and ani- porary reader. On basic characteristics of physical,
mals, studies of mental testing, and investigations of motor, and perceptual development, children showed
language and thought. Areas of inquiry that might be reasonably constant growth and age-differentiation. If
seen as potentially fitting together to form a develop- the infants selected did not, as in a couple of instances,
mental view of cognition instead evolved separately, they may be substituted for by more “representative”
each toward its own distinctive methodology, concepts, ones. All in all, the business of establishing appropriate
and discipline affiliation. It would be another 50 years norms was seen as an essential part of his medical prac-
before serious attempts were made to bring them back tice and the practical issues of diagnosis. As Gesell later
together (see Carroll & Horn, 1981; Ornstein, 1978). described it:
[The clinical practice] has always been conducted in close
correlation with a systematic study of normal child devel-
opment. One interest has reinforced the other. Observa-
MATURATION AND GROWTH tions of normal behavior threw light on maldevelopment;
and the deviations of development in turn helped to expose
While Watson served as the spokesman for behaviorism what lay beneath a deceptive layer of “obviousness” in
and environmentalism in child development, Arnold normal infancy. (Gesell & Amatruda, 1941, p. v)
Gesell (1880–1961) was gaining stature as an advocate
of the role of growth and maturation in behavior. Trained Gesell and his associates established definitive norms for
at Clark University in the early 1900s, Gesell absorbed growth and behavioral change in the first 5 years of life,
Hall’s vision of the significance of child study, the im- in a series of exhaustive and detailed reports (e.g., Gesell
portance of biological controls in behavior, and the prac- & Amatruda, 1941; Gesell & Thompson, 1934, 1938).
 Maturation and Growth 133

Few psychologists nowadays regard Gesell as a theo- is suspended in a state of greater formativeness. This in-
rist. That is a pity, for his contributions might have pro- creased modifiability is extremely sensitive to the social
vided a useful stabilizing influence during a period that milieu and is constantly transforming the context of
became only nominally committed to “developmental” adaptive behavior. In the impersonal aspects of adaptive
study. “Growth” was a key concept for Gesell. But what behavior of the nonlanguage type (general practical intel-
ligence) there is a high degree of early correspondence
did he mean by growth? Horticultural terms have long
between man and other primates. This correspondence
been popular in describing children (a classic example
may prove to be so consistent in some of its elements as to
being Froebel’s coining of “ kindergarten”). But Gesell suggest evolutionary and even recapitulatory explana-
was too astute to become trapped in a botanical analogue; tions. But transcending, pervading, and dynamically
he recognized human behavioral and mental growth as altering that strand of similarity is a generalized condi-
having distinctive properties of its own. He wrote: tionability and a responsiveness to other personalities, to
which man is special heir. This preeminent sociality ex-
Mental growth is a constant process of transformation, of ists even through the prelanguage period, long before the
reconstruction. The past is not retained with the same child has framed a single word. Herein lies his humanity.
completeness as in the tree. The past is sloughed as well (1928, p. 354)
as projected, it is displaced and even transmuted to a de-
gree which the anatomy of the tree does not suggest.
As a rule, Gesell stood close to his data. When he
There are stages, and phases, and a perpetuating knitting
ventured away, he was drawn irresistibly back to the
together of what happens and happened. Mental growth is
facts that had been meticulously collected and to his
a process of constant incorporation, revision, reorganiza-
tion, and progressive hierarchical inhibition. The reorgan- belief in the curative effects of maturation. He felt
ization is so pervading that the past almost loses its strongly that the understanding of the properties of
identity. (1928, p. 22) growth qua growth would be the key to unlocking the
central dilemmas of psychology. The same year that Wat-
What does this lead to? For Gesell, it led to a new per- son offered his polemic on the role of early stimulation
spective on the relations between heredity and environ- in child rearing, Gesell offered the counterposition on
ment. Similar to what Preyer had written some 50 years the invulnerability of the infant to experience. He wrote:
before, Gesell (1928) concluded:
All things considered, the inevitableness and surety of
The supreme genetic law appears to be this: All present maturation are the most impressive characteristics of
growth hinges on past growth. Growth is not a simple func- early development. It is the hereditary ballast which con-
tion neatly determined by X units of inheritance plus Y serves and stabilizes the growth of each individual infant.
units of environment, but is a historical complex which re- It is indigenous in its impulsion; but we may well be grate-
flects at every stage the past which it incorporates. In other ful for this degree of determinism. If it did not exist the in-
words we are led astray by an artificial dualism of heredity fant would be a victim of a flaccid malleability which is
and environment, if it blinds us to the fact that growth is a sometimes romantically ascribed to him. His mind, his
continuous self conditioning process, rather than a drama spirit, his personality would fall a ready prey to disease,
controlled, ex machina, by two forces. (p. 357) to starvation, to malnutrition, and worst of all to mis-
guided management. As it is, the inborn tendency toward
These are not the only similarities to the interpreta- optimum development is so inveterate that he benefits lib-
tions offered by earlier students of infant development. erally from what is good in our practice, and suffers less
Recall Preyer’s analysis of infancy, and the functions of than he logically should from our unenlightenment. Only
the extended immaturity of children for the plasticity of if we give respect to this inner core of inheritance can we
respect the important individual differences which distin-
behavior. The concept of neoteny was elegantly restated
guish infants as well as men. (1928, p. 378)
by Gesell, along with a fresh idea on the social respon-
siveness that is unique to humans:
The infant is more robust than he appears, in that he is
The preeminence of human infancy lies in the prolonga- buffered by psychobiological fail-safe systems and
tion and deepening of plasticity. There is specific matu- driven by an “inborn tendency toward optimum develop-
ration of behavior patterns as in subhuman creatures; but ment.” The message is a general one, issued by one who
this proceeds less rigidly and the total behavior complex observed the remarkable commonalities in infant growth
134 The Making of Developmental Psychology

as it progresses, inevitably, from the stage of the neonate in the individuality of the child but chose the dictates of
to the 1st year and beyond. the genes over the whims of the environment. He wanted to
Does this inborn inertia apply to all features of infant liberate and reassure parents but may only have added to
growth—to mental development as well as personality the arsenal of parental guilt. (p. 379)
and social development? On this matter, Gesell drew a
distinction between the mechanisms that control cogni- In retrospect, Gesell’s views may seem paradoxical
tive and social growth. In the latter instance—social only because we fail to respect the distinctions that he
growth—the essential determinants were the social ma- made. A key distinction is that social interactions of
trix present in the “ web of life” and the “conditioned children are more likely than motor and sensory struc-
system of adaptation to the whole human family.” Sound tures to be impacted by experience; hence, there is a
Watsonian? Not really, for Gesell is closer to the trans- “generalized conditionability and a responsiveness to
actional views of James Mark Baldwin than to the unidi- other personalities, to which man is special heir.”
rectional ones of behaviorism and its emphasis on the Gesell did not assume the primacy of early experience;
parental shaping of children. Gesell (1928) wrote: rather, the infant is buffered because “ the inborn ten-
dency toward optimum development is so inveterate that
All children are thus, through correlation, adapted to their
he benefits liberally from what is good in our practice,
parents and to each other. Even the maladjustments be-
tween parent and child are adaptations in a psychobiologi-
and suffers less than he logically should from our unen-
cal sense and can only be comprehended if we view them lightenment.” This is a powerful message, consistent
as lawfully conditioned modes of adaptation. Growth is with the earlier pronouncement from Hall on adoles-
again the key concept. For better or for worse, children cence. At the least, it indicates that investigators should
and their elders must grow up with each other, which look beyond infancy for the formative effects of experi-
means in interrelation one to the other. The roots of the ence, particularly the effects in “responsiveness to other
growth of the infant’s personality reach into other human personalities.”
beings. (p. 375) Gesell was a pioneering investigator who understood
the totality of the organism. He also understood that ex-
In effect, maturational changes demand interactional
periential factors must be considered in any systematic
ones, and the nature of the resolution reached between
developmental account. Although he appreciated the
the child and others at each stage is the stuff out of
multiple ways that environmental events could influence
which personality is built. Gesell offers here the outline
behavior, he declined to assign them priority in account-
for a psychobiological theory of social development.
ing for the development of basic motor, sensory, and
Where did the theory go? Not very far in Gesell’s
emotional systems.
work, for it remained in a bare outline form, with scant
Other investigators recognized the role of age-related
data to back it up. Like Baldwin before him, Gesell did
biological changes in the development of behavior, and
not have the methods (or perhaps the desire) to continue
their relations to the occurrence of basic changes in
to explore the dynamic message implicit in this psy-
emotional, cognitive, and social patterns. For example,
chobiological view of social interactions. That is doubly
M. C. Jones (1931), in discussing the development of
unfortunate, for his views on social development were at
emotions, remarks that a wariness or fear of unfamiliar
least as reasonable and no more speculative than those
persons tends to emerge in the second half of the 1st
of Watson. If enunciated more fully, they may have pro-
year of life (from 20 weeks to 40 weeks; see Bayley,
vided explicit guides for his next-door colleagues in the
1932; Washburn, 1929). Jones notes that this phenome-
Institute of Human Relations when they set about to fab-
non appears in the absence of any apparent pairing of the
ricate the first version of social learning theory. Some
stranger with some external noxious stimulus; hence, it
40 years later, the essential model was explicated by
would not fit very well with the Watsonian view of the
Bell (1968) and Bell and Harper (1977), using surpris-
conditioned elaboration of fear or of love. Other devel-
ingly similar models and metaphors.
opmental mechanisms must be at work.
In speaking of Gesell’s legacy, Thelen and Adolph
Why the relative popularity of experimental demon-
(1992) comment on some of the paradoxes in Gesell’s work:
strations of fear and its conditioning and extinction, as
His devotion to maturation as the final cause was unwa- opposed to careful longitudinal studies of the develop-
vering, yet he acted as though the environment mattered, ment of the phenomena subsumed by fear? M. C.
and his work contains threads of real process. He believed Jones’s (1931) answer was insightful and doubtless cor-
 Social and Personality Development 135

rect: “Because training and practice are more readily time would include questionnaires in the Pedagogical
subject to laboratory proof, we have at times minimized Seminary, and would ask readers to submit the results to
the importance of the less accessible intraorganismic him.
factors” (p. 78). Because of the shortcomings in the method, ranging
The availability of funding and staffing for the major from haphazard sampling procedures to problems in
child development institutes permitted the support of nonstandard administration and scoring of questions,
significant studies of maturation and growth at Teachers the questionnaire studies were hardly models of scien-
College (Columbia), Berkeley, Iowa, Minnesota, and tific research. Nonetheless, certain age-related phenom-
Fels Institute. Among the more notable studies was that ena were sufficiently robust to appear despite the
of Mary Shirley at the University of Minnesota. To ex- methodological slippage; hence, the earlier cited conclu-
tend Gesell’s cross-sectional observations, Shirley con- sion by Schallenberger about the reliance of young chil-
ducted a longitudinal investigation of motor, emotional, dren on concrete forms of punishment, with reasoning
and personality development over the first 2 years of life and empathy playing roles of increasing importance in
with 25 infants, and published the results in a compre- early adolescence. These findings were given wide cir-
hensive three-volume work (Shirley, 1931, 1933a, culation in Hall’s Adolescence, and provided the empiri-
1933b). Similarly, the Shermans at Washington Univer- cal substrate for some of the more useful sections of that
sity (St. Louis), McGraw (1935) at Teachers College, and work. In time, the criticisms took effect, and after about
K. M. B. Bridges at Montreal completed useful studies of 10 to 15 years of questionnaire studies, the method was
growth-related changes in infants and young children. no longer a procedure of choice. As Bühler notes, “little
was done in the decade after Monroe made this first
start in the direction of developmental social psychol-
SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY ogy,” and, she concludes, the studies failed because of
DEVELOPMENT “ the lack of a systematic point of view” (1931, p. 392).
Following a hiatus in work on social development, an-
In a review of studies of social behavior in children, other method was introduced for studying the social be-
Charlotte Bühler (1931) gave an American, Will S. havior of infants and children in the mid-1920s. It was
Monroe, credit for having completed the first studies of essentially an extension of the “objective” or “ behav-
“ the social consciousness of children.” Monroe’s work, ioral” procedures that had been used in the investigation
published in German (1899), reported a number of ques- of individual infants and young animals. Almost simul-
tionnaire studies dealing with various aspects of social taneously, reports of behavioral studies appeared in
development. For instance, children were asked what child study institutes in Vienna, New York (Columbia),
sort of “chum” they preferred, what kinds of moral qual- Minnesota, and Toronto. Somewhat earlier, Jean Piaget
ities they found in friends, and what their attitudes were had recorded the naturalistic verbal exchanges among
about punishment, responsibility, and discipline. Mon- young children (Piaget, 1923/1926). Five of the first
roe’s work was not, however, the first published set of eight Child Development Monographs from Teachers
studies on these matters. Earl Barnes of Stanford College (Columbia) were concerned with the methods
(who had been Monroe’s teacher) had earlier edited a and outcomes obtained by the behavioral assessments
two-volume work (Studies in Education; 1896–1897, of social patterns (Arrington, 1932; M. Barker, 1930;
1902–1903) that had covered the same ground, reporting Beaver, 1930; Loomis, 1931; D. S. Thomas, 1929).
a reasonably comprehensive set of questionnaire studies Dorothy S. Thomas, who co-authored with sociologist
of social disposition. Margaret Schallenberger (1894), W. I. Thomas The Child in America (1928), seems to
for instance, had been at Stanford and was a student of have spearheaded this attempt to apply “ the method-
Barnes at the time she completed the report discussed ological scheme of experimental sociology to children.”
earlier on age-related changes in the social judgments of In addition to the work of Thomas and her colleagues,
children. In the 1890s, questionnaires were being circu- insightful methodological papers on the procedure were
lated to teachers throughout the country, through the published by Goodenough (1929, 1930a) at Minnesota
various state child study associations (in Illinois, South and Bott (1934) at Toronto. Charlotte Bühler should her-
Carolina, Massachusetts), and literally thousands of self be credited with having pioneered the controlled ex-
children were being asked brief questions about their so- perimental observations of infants, and she seems to
cial attitudes, morals, and friendships. Hall from time to have been the first investigator to have completed an
136 The Making of Developmental Psychology

“experimental study of children’s social attitudes in the model seems to have been drawn either from a belief in
first and second year of life” (Bühler, 1931). the importance of growth and maturation, or from a
Observational studies from 1927 to 1937 generated commitment to the enduring nature of personality types,
almost as much enthusiasm as earlier questionnaire as determined by genetic, constitutional, or early expe-
studies. They were based on the assumption that the rience factors. In this regard, Bühler (1931) classified
stream of behavior could be classified into particular be- infants into three types, depending on their reactions to
havior units, and that these units could be submitted to social stimulation. “ These types were called the so-
the statistical analyses previously developed for the cially blind, the socially dependent, and the socially in-
treatment of experimental and test data. Careful atten- dependent behavior ” (1931, p. 411). Socially blind
tion was given to the basic issues of observation, includ- children don’t pay much attention to the actions and re-
ing observer agreement, code reliability, stability of actions of other persons; instead, they take toys, play,
measures, various facets of validity and generality, and and move about without regard for the other child. The
statistical evaluation. The issues attacked by the method socially dependent child, on the other hand, is “deeply
ranged from the mere descriptive and demographic—in- impressed by other’s presence and activities; . . . he
cluding size and sex composition of groups as a function observes the effect of his behavior on the other and care-
of age (Parten, 1933) and nature of play activities fully watches the other’s reactions.” The socially inde-
(Challman, 1932)—to studies of the natural occurrence pendent child “is one who—though aware of the other’s
of aggression (e.g., Goodenough, 1931) and reciprocal presence and responsive to his behavior—yet does not
patterns of interchange (Bott, 1934). By 1931, Bühler seem dependent on him, is neither intimidated nor in-
was able to cite some 173 articles, many of which dealt spired” (1931, p. 411). Bühler sees these dispositions as
directly with the observation of children’s social behav- being independent of home and rearing conditions;
ior patterns. In the following 5 to 10 years, an equal hence, they are “primary” dispositions. Retests of the
number of studies was reported, some of which are now children (who were 6 to 18 months of age) suggested to
recognized as having laid the foundation for work taken Bühler that these types were relatively stable, but she
up again in the 1970s (e.g., Murphy, 1937). In terms of adds the caveat that, “it remains to be seen, of course,
method, the reports were on a par with the current gen- whether these pioneer observations will be confirmed
eration of observational analyses of social interchanges. by other authors” (1931, p. 411).
What theoretical ideas were associated with these In retrospect, the interactional studies were es-
behavioral methods and to what extent was there a “sys- tranged from the issues being debated by the dominant
tematic” point of view? There was, as it turns out, as lit- theories of the day—psychoanalytic, learning, cogni-
tle theoretical guidance for this work as for the earlier tive—and few seemed willing to attempt to bridge the
questionnaire studies. The work was behavioral, but it theoretical or empirical gaps. As it turned out, the data
was not concerned with developmental processes, either did find a useful service in the practical areas of nursery
learning or psychobiological. J. M. Baldwin had virtu- school management and the training of young teachers.
ally been forgotten (save for some exceptions, e.g., Pi- Because the findings were either ignored or deemed ir-
aget, 1923/1926). Given D. S. Thomas’s (1929) aims relevant by those concerned with major psychological
and background, it is mildly surprising that the proce- theories of development, the method and its concerns
dures at Columbia were not more intimately linked to passed from the scene, temporarily.
the sociological models of Cooley, Mead, and Baldwin.
Perhaps that conceptual extension was part of the gen- MORAL DEVELOPMENT
eral scheme, but it failed to materialize in the work
completed at Teachers College or at the other child in- The perfectibility of humans and the establishment of a
stitutes. As it turned out, the research focused on the higher moral order had been a continuing concern for
immediate determinants of the actions and interactions developmentalists. Although questionnaires on chil-
of children, but scant information was gained about dren’s beliefs and attitudes toward transgressions and
their relationship as to how interactions are learned or punishments were useful, they had obvious shortcom-
modified, or what they mean for longer term personality ings as scientific instruments. In the 1920s and 1930s,
development. work on these issues continued, but with a self-
If there were any theoretical underpinnings for the conscious appreciation of the limits of the techniques
research on interactions and social development, the that were available. Nonetheless, there were substantive
 Moral Development 137

issues to be addressed and real-life problems to be vised various sociometric techniques, including a
solved, and it seemed entirely reasonable to expect that “Guess Who” procedure to assess peer reputation. The
the investigators of moral development would be ingen- results of this work and the authors’ interpretation on
ious enough to meet the challenge (see V. Jones, 1933). the relative specificity of moral conduct have been
Out of this need arose three major advances in the study widely discussed. For our purposes, it is sufficient to
of moral development: (1) the use of short-term experi- note that this was one of the first studies to be conducted
mental manipulations in the assessment of honesty and of short-term experimental manipulations of social be-
prosocial behaviors; (2) the employment of observations havior in school-age children. In addition, the authors
of naturally occurring rule-making and moral judg- offered a courageous theoretical statement on how ethi-
ments; and (3) the refinement of attitudinal question- cal conduct is acquired (via Thorndikian learning prin-
naires that might be employed in the assessment of ciples). It was not exactly what the sponsoring agency
particular experiences. had expected, or wanted. The Executive Secretary of the
The demonstration of the utility of short-term exper- sponsoring Institute of Social and Religious Research
imental procedures with school-age children has an wrote apologetically in the foreword:
unusual background, at least in comparing what the
sponsors had hoped to learn and what they actually got. To lay minds this volume, at first glance, may seem over-
loaded with matter that has little to do with moral and reli-
Hugh Hartshorne was a professor in the School of Reli-
gious education—a medley of tests and statistics and a
gion at the University of Southern California, and Mark
paucity of clear directions as to building character. Such
May was a psychologist at Syracuse University when readers might profitably reflect that these preliminary
they were recruited to Columbia University by the Insti- processes are inevitable if character education is ever to
tute of Social and Religious Research to conduct a mul- emerge from guesswork into a science. Medical and surgi-
tiyear project on how Sunday schools, churches, and cal science had to follow a similar road to advance from
religious youth groups could better do their job. E. L. magic and quackery. (Hartshorne & May, 1929, vol. 2, p. v)
Thorndike was a guiding force in the initiation and in-
terpretation of this research. If physical science could Hartshorne and May had concluded that traditional reli-
solve problems for the society, why could not behavioral gious and moral instruction have little, if any, relation-
science help solve some of the moral and ethical issues ship to the results of experimental tests of honesty and
that had arisen? service to others.
The project was an ambitious one: to analyze the ef- With questionnaire procedures generally in disfavor by
fects of various institutions of the society on moral be- the 1920s, the essential problem of how to quantify atti-
haviors, and to determine how the institutions could tudes remained. L. L. Thurstone, a pioneering quantita-
improve their performance. At the outset, Hartshorne tive psychologist at the University of Chicago, was
and May recognized that they must solve the problem of recruited by the Payne Foundation to determine the ef-
the assessment of moral and ethical behaviors. Follow- fects that moviegoing had on the social attitudes and prej-
ing a critique of then-available questionnaire and rating udices of children. The assignment provided Thurstone
procedures, Hartshorne and May concluded that a fresh the opportunity to develop a new technology for the as-
approach to the study of values and character was re- sessment of moral /ethnic attitudes. In a series of studies,
quired. They wrote: “Although recognizing the impor- Thurstone and his colleague, R. C. Peterson (Peterson &
tance of attitude and motive for both social welfare and Thurstone, 1933), introduced new methodologies for
individual character, as ordinarily understood, we real- gauging the effects of specific motion pictures on atti-
ized that in any objective approach to ethical conduct we tudes toward national /ethnic groups. They used a pre- and
must begin with the facts of conduct” (1929, vol. 3, posttest design, coupled with a 5-month follow-up test
pp. 361–362). Accordingly, the investigators developed (post-posttest). Although these studies seem to be little
a battery of tests and experimental settings designed to known to contemporary writers, Thurstone himself
yield information about honesty, helpfulness and coop- (1952) considered them to be highly influential for his
eration, inhibition, and persistence. The best known development of an attitude assessment methodology.
measures are the brief experimental assessments of de- Moreover, the work provided a wholly convincing demon-
ceit (permitting the misuse of answer sheets, peeping, stration of the strong effects that certain films had in de-
and other forms of cheating, all of which were moni- creasing, or increasing, racial and religious prejudice. In
tored in sly ways by the experimenter). They also de- some cases (such as the inflammatory Birth of a Nation),
138 The Making of Developmental Psychology

the unfavorable racial attitudes induced by viewing the have been explicitly guided by J. M. Baldwin’s view that
film were detected 5 months later. This study was an the young child proceeds in his thought to progressively
admirable forerunner to the research of the 1960s and discriminate himself from nonself. The major empirical
1970s concerned with the effects of television (see also, marker for this shift in thinking was movement from
V. Jones, 1933). egocentric speech to socialized speech. Piaget wrote:
A major advance was pioneered by Jean Piaget in his
“Egocentric” functions are the more immature functions,
assessments of moral reasoning (Piaget, 1932/1973).
and tend to dominate the verbal productions of children
Piaget’s clinical method—observing the actions of indi- 3–7 years of age, and, to a lesser extent, children 7–12
vidual children and carefully recording their responses— years. In this form of speech, a child does not bother to
permitted him to identify changes in the children’s know to whom he is speaking nor whether he is being lis-
employment of rules and their origins. Although the proce- tened to. He talks either for himself or for the pleasure of
dure shared the self-report properties of questionnaires, associating anyone who happens to be there with the ac-
his observations and direct inquiries permitted a more pre- tivity of the moment. This talk is ego-centric, partly be-
cise identification of the standards being invoked idiosyn- cause the child speaks only about himself, but chiefly
cratically by the children. Again, the impact of Piaget’s because he does not attempt to place himself at the point
reports seems to reflect in large measure the theoretical of view of his hearer. Anyone who happens to be there will
significance of his interpretations. serve as an audience. (1923/1926, p. 9)

Socialized speech, where the child “really exchanges his

thoughts with others, either by telling his hearer some-
TH E DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE thing that will interest him and influence his actions, or
AND COGNITION by an actual interchange of ideas by argument or even by
collaboration in pursuit of a common aim” (p. 9–10),
From 1924 onward, the problem of how language and does not emerge until about age 7 or 8, and the process is
thought develop attracted the attention of the brightest not complete until 11 or 12 years of age. Later in the
talents of the discipline. Some of them—including same volume, Piaget linked egocentricism to the child’s
Jean Piaget and L. S. Vygotsky—were concerned with tendency to personalize thought:
language as a vehicle for understanding how thought
patterns develop in the child. Others focused on lan- [Without the ability to “objectify” one’s thinking,] the
guage as a phenomenon in itself, with attention given mind tends to project intentions into everything, or con-
to the “amazingly rapid acquisition of an extremely nect every thing together by means of relations not based
on observation . . . the more the ego is made the center of
complex system of symbolic habits by young children”
interests, the less will the mind be able to depersonalize
(McCarthy, 1954).
its thought, and to get rid of the idea that in all things are
The comprehensive review articles by Dorothy
intentions either favourable or hostile (animism, artifi-
McCarthy that span this period provide an excellent cialism, etc.). . . . Ego-centrism is therefore obedient to
overview of the era (McCarthy, 1931, 1933, 1946, the self ’s good pleasure and not to the dictates of imper-
1954). At one time or another, virtually all major devel- sonal logic. It is also an indirect obstacle, because only the
opmental investigators have been drawn to the study of habits of discussion and social life will lead to the logical
language development, and so were some nondevelop- point of view, and ego-centrism is precisely what renders
mentalists as well. The intimate relationship that exists these habits impossible. (1952, pp. 237–238)
between language and thought was brought brilliantly to
In other words, Piaget shares with both Baldwin and
the attention of psychologists by Jean Piaget in a small
Freud the assumption that the child’s concept of reality
book that he published to report the results of his new
and logic develops from contact with the external world,
functional approach to the study of language develop-
emerging from an amorphous sense of the self. It is not
ment. Piaget’s study of language breathed fresh life into
insignificant that, in the foreword to The Language and
one of the oldest questions of the area: How do thought,
Thought of the Child (1923/1926), Piaget stated:
logic, and consciousness develop? Language was a mir-
ror to the mind, for Piaget; it was to be used to reflect I have also been deeply impressed by the social psychology
the nature and structure of the mental schemas that gave of M. C. Blondel and Professor J. M. Baldwin. It will like-
rise to verbal expressions. In this work, Piaget seems to wise be apparent how much I owe to psychoanalysis, which
 The Development of Language and Cognition 139

in my opinion has revolutionized the psychology of primi- points, differ considerably from ours. Thus, while the lit-
tive thought. (pp. xx–xxi) tle pupils show in their conversations coefficients
of ego-centrism more or less analogous to those we have
The method employed by Piaget and the concepts he observed, M. Katz’s children, talking among them-
embraced stimulated almost immediate worldwide at- selves or with their parents, behave quite differently.
tention and controversy. In McCarthy’s thorough re- (pp. xxiii–xxiv)
views of the empirical data that bore on this question
(including her own), she (1931, 1933, 1946, 1954) Another explanation, favored by McCarthy (1933,
traced the evolution of a huge literature on the matter. 1954), is that the problem resided in the ambiguity of
Strict interpretation of Piaget’s categories suggested the classification system employed by Piaget. For what-
that, over a wide variety of populations and settings in ever reason, there were notably few confirmations of Pi-
which young children were observed, seldom did the aget’s assertion that young children were predominantly
proportion of egocentric remarks exceed 6% to 8%. egocentric in their speech. The controversy extended
Moreover, the negative evidence came not merely from into the 1970s (see, e.g., Garvey & Hogan, 1973; E.
studies of children in the United States; an equally con- Mueller, 1972), along with replications of the earlier
vincing set of disconfirming investigations emerged disconfirmation of Piaget’s report.
from studies of Chinese (H. H. Kuo, 1937), Russians The issue was significant for the area because it had
(Vygotsky & Luria, 1929), and Germans (Bühler, implications for the understanding of virtually all psy-
1931). After identifying what was meant by the concept chological aspects of development, whether cognitive,
of egocentric as opposed to socialized speech, C. Bühler linguistic, social, or moral. Beyond the issue of whether
(1931) wrote: egocentric speech was 6% or 40% or 60%, there was
agreement that this form of communication tended to
It is agreed, however, among other authors, for example, decrease as a function of the child’s age. Why? Piaget’s
William Stern and David and Rosa Katz—that this result
answer, which seemed compatible with the earlier for-
is due to the special conditions of life in the “Maison des
mulations of Baldwin and Freud, was that egocentric
Petits” in Geneva, where Piaget’s work was done. The
Katzes (1927) emphasize, in opposition to Piaget, that
communication directly reflected young children’s
even the special relationship of the child to each of the dif- “personalized” mode of thinking, and that as children
ferent members of the household is distinctly reflected in became more objective in their views of themselves and
the respective conversations. This is surely true of all the of reality, the transition to socialized speech occurred.
dialogues they published. (p. 400) Egocentric speech became dysfunctional and was dis-
carded. A counterproposal by the Russian psychologist
This was a key point for Bühler, who had just spent L. S. Vygotsky (1939) constituted a serious challenge to
several years of her life demonstrating the quality and the Piagetian interpretation. The key to Vygotsky’s pro-
nature of the social patterns of children in infancy and posal is that, at maturity, two speech systems exist:
early childhood. She had conclusively shown the truly inner speech and socialized speech. For Vygotsky:
“social” nature of their behaviors. Note that Bühler attri-
butes the discrepant findings to the contextual-relational The relation of thought to word is first of all not a thing,
specificity of Piaget’s initial observations. Piaget seemed but a process; it is a proceeding from thought to word
to accept that explanation, at least for the time being. In and, conversely, from word to thought . . . every thought
moves, grows and develops, each fulfills a function and
the foreword to the second edition of The Language and
solves a given problem. This flow of thought occurs as an
Thought of the Child (1923/1926), he wrote:
inner movement through a series of planes. The first step
[Our] original enquiries dealt only with the language of in the analysis of the relationship between thoughts and
children among themselves as observed in the very special words is the investigation of the different phases and
scholastic conditions of Maison des Petits de L’Institut planes through which the thought passes before it is em-
Rousseau. Now, Mlle. M. Muchow, M. D. Katz, Messrs. bodied in words. (p. 33)
Galli and Maso, and M. A. Lora [Luria], after studying
from the same point of view children with different Herein lies the need for a developmental investigation
scholastic environments in Germany, Spain, and Russia, of speech functions, for it may provide us with an an-
and especially after studying children’s conversations swer as to how thought and speech are interrelated. This
in their families, have reached results which, on certain investigation:
140 The Making of Developmental Psychology

reveals, in the first place, two different planes in speech. To summarize the rest of Vygotsky’s argument and
There is an inner, meaningful semantic aspect of speech experimental work would take us beyond the limits of
and there is the external, acoustic, phonic aspect. These this overview (see McCarthy, 1954). The story did not
two aspects although forming a true unity, have their own end in the 1930s; many of the same concerns and pro-
particular laws of movement. . . . A number of facts in the posals were to reappear in the 1960s and 1970s. Unfor-
development of children’s speech reveal the existence of
tunately, the brilliant Vygotsky—who was born the
independent movement in the phonic and the semantic as-
same year as Piaget—died in 1934 at the age of 38. His
pects of speech. (1939, p. 33)
developmental views were brought forward to contem-
How does Vygotsky interpret the role of egocentric porary psychology by his colleague and collaborator,
speech and how does his interpretation differ from A. R. Luria.
Piaget’s? Although egocentric speech has no apparent The functional analysis of language development,
function of its own in Piaget’s formulation—it merely while most intriguing on theoretical grounds, consti-
reflects the child’s egocentric thinking and is thereby tuted only a portion of the total research effort devoted
doomed to disappear with the child’s cognitive to language. Researchers focused, in addition, on devel-
growth—it assumes great functional importance for opmental stages in language expression (e.g., prelinguis-
Vygotsky. Egocentric speech constitutes, in effect, a tic utterances, phonetic development, the growth of
developmental way station “a stage which precedes the vocabulary, changes in syntactic complexity as a func-
development of inner speech” (1939, p. 38). It is a form tion of age) and individual differences in language de-
of speech that aids in the young child’s thought velopment and how they arise (through experience,
processes but, rather than waning in childhood and be- schooling, early exposure, etc). The literature on these
coming dysfunctional, egocentric speech undergoes an matters was such that, by the end of this period, no child
evolution with “inner speech” and thought as its end development text could be prepared without a significant
product. Vygotsky (1939) wrote: section given to the report and summary of these find-
ings. The mass of data seemed to outrun the ability of
To consider the dropping of the coefficient of egocentric theorists to organize it in terms of meaningful models.
speech to zero as a symptom of decline of this speech
would be like saying that the child stops to count at the
moment when he ceases to use his fingers and starts to do
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY
the calculations in his mind. In reality, behind the symp-
toms of dissolution lies a progressive development, . . . the AND ETHOLOGY
formation of a new speech form. (p. 40)
The Gesellian emphasis on growth and maturation was
Vygotsky then took a significant step forward in the part of a broader attempt within developmental psychol-
analysis of both speech functions and their relation to ogy and developmental biology to unlock the secrets of
thought, by conducting some ingenious experiments on ontogeny (see McGraw, 1946). On this count, the under-
the nature of egocentric speech. He went beyond natura- standing of the mechanisms of genetic transfer was sig-
listic observations to manipulate theoretically relevant nificantly advanced by (a) the rediscovery of the work
dimensions. He determined, for instance, that the inci- of Mendel, and ( b) the revolutionary discoveries of the
dence of egocentric speech decreased sharply when chil- loci of units of chromosomal transmission. But these
dren were placed in the company of others who could not events raised a significant question for developmental-
possibly understand them—deaf and dumb children, or ists. If all somatic cells have the same genetic code, how
children speaking a foreign language. Vygotsky reports does differentiation occur in development and why do
that the coefficient of egocentric speech “sank rapidly, cells at maturity have distinctly different functions and
reaching zero in the majority of cases and in the rest di- properties? Where is the “master plan” for development,
minished eight times on the average.” While these find- and how can particular cells be induced to perform their
ings seem “paradoxical” for Piaget’s view, they were unique and special services for the organism?
consistent with the idea that “ the true source of egocen- Among the embryologists who addressed these is-
tric speech is the lack of differentiation of speech for sues, Hans Spemann (1938) provided a provocative sug-
oneself from speech for others; it can function only in gestion following his discoveries that cellular tissues
connection with social speech” (1939, p. 41). could be successfully transplanted from one area of pre-
 Developmental Psychobiology and Ethology 141

sumptive growth to another. If the transplantation oc- in virtually all phases of their adaptation. Wilson (1975)
curs at the appropriate time in development, tissues considers the species as a prototypic “ truly social” one.
from the presumptive area of the neural plate of am- How is the high level of social organization accom-
phibia could be successfully transplanted to areas where plished? Schneirla (1933) attacked the problem by un-
limbs would arise. The tissue would then develop in ac- dertaking a series of comprehensive field investigations
cord with its surroundings, so that the tissue would take in Panama and laboratory studies in his facilities at the
on the characteristics of skin or muscle, not of the brain. American Museum of Natural History. He tested the as-
On the basis of these experiments, Spemann proposed sumption that colony organization does not arise from
that extranuclear or contextual forces served to “orga- some single internal source; rather, the complex social
nize” the development of cellular materials in the course system arises as an outcome of the interdependence of
of ontogeny. Once organization occurred, during the pe- developmental events in the brood, workers, queen, and
riod that was critical for the development of its form and the contextual environmental constraints.
function, then the effects would be irreversible or highly Schneirla identified the pattern of empirical relation-
resistant to change (see Waddington, 1939). ships that provided elegant support for his developmen-
Such demonstrations provided the substantive empir- tal analysis of social organization. He discovered, for
ical examples for the formulation of a view on develop- instance, that a primary trigger for migration and forag-
ment that has come to be known as “organismic” theory ing raids in the colony was the heightened activity
or “system” theory of biological development (von produced by the developing larvae. When the larvae
Bertalanffy, 1933). In its initial form, organismic theory emerged from the quiescent phase of development, their
was concerned with the question: What directs develop- activity stimulated the rest of the colony to action, key-
ment? The answer, simply stated, is: the organism. De- ing both foraging raids and migration. When the activity
velopment is directed by the constraints inherent in the of the larval brood diminished as a consequence of
relationship among elements of the living system as they growth-related changes, the raids ceased and the no-
act on themselves and on each other. These elements can madic phase ended. The surplus food that then became
be cells, clusters of cells, or entire subsystems, such as available in the colony (due to decreased needs of the
those formed by hormonal processes. The kernel idea is young) fattened the queen and served to trigger a new
that the several features of the organism, including its ovulatory cycle, thus recreating the conditions for repro-
behavior, depend on the whole reciprocating system of duction. Looking backward on this work, Schneirla
which they form parts. The mutual regulation among (1957) concluded: “ The cyclic pattern thus is self-
components permits, among other things, possible feed- rearoused in a feedback fashion, the product of a recip-
back to the original source and self-regulation. rocal relationship between queen and colony functions,
Organismic theory was compatible with the Darwin- not of a timing mechanism endogenous to the queen.”
ian perspective of evolution as a dynamic, adaptive pro- Z.-Y. Kuo, a Chinese psychologist who completed his
cess. Development is equally dynamic. It required only a doctoral training with E. C. Tolman at Berkeley before
modest conceptual leap to consider behavior as being an returning to work in China, came to similar conclusions
essential component of the organismic system, and its de- at about the same time. Kuo was originally motivated by
velopment could be understood only in terms of other J. B. Watson’s claims about the malleability of behavior,
biological and social features of the system. Hence, given the control over the conditions of development. He
the “system” in which the organism developed was went beyond Watson and collected relevant data. In a se-
not merely under the skin. Organization could be broad- ries of provocative studies, where he produced unique
ened to include feedback from other organisms and environments for the young animals to grow up in, Kuo
from the social network in which development oc- demonstrated that key features of social patterns could
curred. Two developmental-comparative psychologists, be changed, and novel ones created. Cats, for instance,
T. C. Schneirla and Zing-Yang Kuo, led the way, in the could be made to “love” rats, not kill them, if the kittens
early 1930s, for the application of the organismic per- were raised together with rodents from infancy onward
spective to the problems of behavioral ontogeny. (Z.-Y. Kuo, 1930, 1967). Beyond behavioral plasticity,
The problem that Schneirla tackled was how to un- Kuo addressed the fundamental problem of behavioral
ravel the complex social structure of army ants, who de- origins, and when and how novel behavior patterns arise
spite their lack of gray matter, were highly coordinated in the course of ontogeny.
142 The Making of Developmental Psychology

In his study of the origin of “instinctive” behaviors, Psychology, and Schneirla was a reviewer for the same
such as pecking, vocalization, and movement patterns volume). Not until the next generation was their essen-
in birds, Kuo assumed that these characteristics arose in tial message heard and understood in both comparative
development because of necessary feedback relation- and developmental psychology.
ships among central nervous system, physiological, and Another psychobiological researcher had greater im-
behavioral functions. Pushing the organismic proposal mediate success and visibility. Leonard Carmichael
on the self-stimulative role of behavior to its limits, carried the psychological tradition of William Preyer
Kuo offered the proposal that the behavior of the em- into the 1930s. His Handbook chapters (Carmichael,
bryo itself provided feedback that would help to direct 1933, 1946) provided a scholarly reminder of the un-
its subsequent development. Preyer (1888–1889) had solved problems of the relations between biological de-
earlier suggested the possibility of such feedback ef- velopment and behavioral establishment. Carmichael
fects in development, but there were scant data relevant also brought to the attention of child psychologists the
to the proposal. impressive body of literature concerned with the analy-
The story of how Kuo explored these ideas can be sis of early biological-behavioral development. The
found in a series of papers that he published during chapter by Myrtle McGraw (1946) provided an excel-
the 1930s, and a summary appears in his later volume on lent critical overview of the basic issues of developmen-
behavioral development (e.g., Z.-Y. Kuo, 1930, 1939, tal psychobiology.
1967). He first had to solve the problem of how to keep In Europe, the study of the “ biology of behavior,” or
embryos alive while viewing their development ( he in- ethology, experienced a rebirth in Konrad Lorenz’s arti-
vented a way to produce a “ window” by removing the cle, “Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des Vogels” (1935;
external shell but keeping the embryo and the mem- translated and published in English in 1937). In this
branes surrounding it intact). Kuo was then able to plot, paper, Lorenz reasserted the contribution of evolution-
from the onset of development to hatching, the move- ary forces in the determination of behavior, and re-
ment patterns in the egg, including the initial stages of minded biologists and psychologists of the importance
heart activity, breathing, limb movement, and pecking. of early experience and its possible irreversibility.
On the basis of these observations, he concluded that the Building on the foundation laid at the turn of the twenti-
activity of the organism itself was influential in deter- eth century by an American, C. O. Whitman, and a
mining the direction of development, including leg German, O. Heinroth, Lorenz offered a convincing argu-
coordination and pecking. The initial report of these ob- ment for studying instinct and the evolutionary basis of
servations met initial skepticism (e.g., Carmichael, behavior. Taking U.S. behaviorists head on, Lorenz ar-
1933), and for good reason. Some of Kuo’s speculations gued that the effects of experiences in the “critical pe-
have not been upheld because he did not give sufficient riod” could not be accounted for in then-available
weight to the effects of spontaneous central nervous principles of learning and association. Specifically, he
system innervation in producing cycles of activity and distinguished the phenomenon of imprinting (the estab-
inactivity (Oppenheim, 1973). But his more general lishment of filial preferences and species identification
assumption that feedback functions can contribute to in precocial birds) from “association learning” on four
embryonic development has in some instances been counts. Imprinting (1) occurred only during an early
strikingly confirmed. For example, inhibition of leg critical period, (2) was irreversible in later development,
movement in the chick embryo has been found to be as- (3) was supraorganismic in its effects (not limited to the
sociated with ossification of the joints and difficulty in imprinted object but to the species of which the object
posthatching mobility (Drachman & Coulombre, 1962). was a member), and (4) took place prior to the develop-
Moreover, self-produced vocal calls by the embryo fa- mental appearance of the response that was “condi-
cilitate the development of posthatching species-typical tioned” (e.g., sexual preferences were influenced, even
preferences (Gottlieb, 1976). though they were not present in infancy). Virtually no
As powerful as were Schneirla’s and Kuo’s demon- immediate notice was taken of ethological work by de-
strations of the utility of a developmental approach to velopmental psychologists; the gulf between disciplines,
behavior, they had little immediate effect on child psy- combined with World War II, delayed the introduction
chology (although Kuo’s work was discussed at length of these ideas into the mainstream of psychological and
by Carmichael, 1933, in the revised Handbook of Child developmental thought.
 Theoretical Trends of the Middle Period 143

THEORETICAL TRENDS OF THE of selective inattention. As A. Baldwin (1967/1980) has

MIDDLE PERIOD observed, developmental theories tended to talk past
each other rather than at each other; they had different
What theoretical activity took place over this third of aims, were concerned with different issues, employed
the twentieth century? A great deal, for each of the different methods, and were challenged by different
major developmental models established in the previous findings. In due course, as the interests and concerns of
period underwent revision, modification, and extension. the discipline shifted, each of the general orientations
Behaviorism was liberalized and enlivened by a mar- was to experience its day in the sun.
riage with psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis itself was A few comments are in order on three major theoreti-
split into three recognizable subdivisions: (1) classical cal systems of the period that have not yet been singled
psychoanalysis (Munroe, 1955), (2) postpsychoanalytic out for attention: social learning theory, psychoanalysis
theory, and (3) neopsychoanalytic theory. Similarly, the and its derivatives, and Lewinian “ field theory.”
Baldwinian approach to cognitive and social develop-
ment was partitioned and extended: (a) in the theory of Social Neobehaviorism
mental development now associated with Jean Piaget;
( b) in the symbolic interactionism movement in sociol- The family of theories called “social learning” de-
ogy, anthropology, and psychiatry; and (c) in Vygot- scended from a wedding of the general behavioral mod-
sky’s expansion of the proposal that “each child is part els of the 1930s and psychoanalytic ideas of personality.
someone else, even in his own thought of himself.” During the heyday of general behavioral systems, four
Although Piaget and Vygotsky have been the most models of learning emerged as especially influential: (1)
prominent representatives of the Baldwinian develop- the behavior system of Clark Hull (1943), (2) the conti-
mental tradition in the United States, Henri Wallon guity learning model of E. R. Guthrie (1935), (3) the
(1879–1962) became almost as prominent in Eastern purposive behaviorism of E. C. Tolman (1932), and (4)
Europe, Africa, South America, and, foremost, in the operant learning theory of B. F. Skinner (1938,
France. But then, and now, he has received virtually no 1953). Despite their differences in language and in basic
recognition from the English-speaking world. His stu- assumptions about the nature of learning, the models
dent, René Zazzo (1984, p. 9) observes: “As a direct shared the belief that the principles of learning were
descendant of J. M. Baldwin and a precursor of the the- universal, transcending differences in species, age, and
oreticians of attachment, Wallon viewed the other per- circumstances.
son as basic and primary” (see also Wallon, 1984b). Beyond a faith in the universality of the basic princi-
In brief, Wallon argued for a more integrative, more ples of behavior, there was a need to specify the implica-
interactive, and more social view of the developing tions of these theories for distinctly human problems,
organism than did his contemporary and competitor, including the acquisition of personality patterns and so-
Jean Piaget (see Birns, 1984, pp. 59–65; Piaget, 1984; cial dispositions. J. B. Watson led the way early in offer-
Wallon, 1984a). ing bold speculations about the learning and unlearning
Nor was behavioral Darwinism overlooked. The of fears and loves. The challenge to the writers of the
foundations for modern ethology had been laid by Whit- 1930s was to provide a more systematic, and yet equally
man in America and Heinroth in Europe, and extended convincing, case for the learning of significant human
in the 1930s and 1940s by Lorenz and Tinbergen. The behaviors. To this end, a group of able young scientists
“organismic” approach affected theories in biology and at Yale University set about to put the study of personal-
psychology. Most immediately related to developmental ity processes on a solid empirical and behavioral basis
concerns were the developmental psychobiological the- (Maher & Maher, 1979). This group attempted to link
ory of Schneirla and Kuo and the cognitive-organismic certain concepts of psychoanalysis with assumptions
principles of Stern, Lewin, and Werner. At first blush, it drawn from the general behavioral theory of Clark Hull.
seemed as if Baldwin’s vision that “every man have his The upshot was a remarkably influential set of concepts
theory” had been fulfilled. that was to dominate theoretical formulations in child
Except for some intrafamilial squabbles, there were psychology for the next several decades.
few direct confrontations or face-offs among the major The first major collaborative effort was directed at
theories—not so much out of mutual respect as because the analysis of the controls of aggressive patterns, as
144 The Making of Developmental Psychology

viewed from a psychoanalytic-behavioral perspective. ential writers on the matter was Freud’s daughter,
The product of this collaboration, a slim volume entitled Anna Freud. Her view on the adequacy of the theory for
Frustration and Aggression, appeared on the eve of understanding personality development—indeed, all
World War II and gained immediate attention and influ- features of development—was unambiguous and uncom-
ence (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). promising. In the chapter that she prepared for the first
Although the basic hypothesis that “aggression is always edition of A Handbook of Child Psychology, Anna Freud
a consequence of frustration” (p. 27) was soon amended (1931) wrote:
by the authors themselves (see Miller, Sears, Mowrer,
Doob, & Dollard, 1941), the idea behind the work was Psychoanalysis does not permit itself to be ranged with
enthusiastically endorsed. The associationistic assump- other conceptions: it refuses to be put on an equal basis
tions of psychoanalysis were neatly melded with the with them. The universal validity which psychoanalysis
stimulus-drive assumptions of Hullian theory. postulates for its theories makes impossible its limitation
The direct application of concepts of learning and to any special sphere such as the conception of the neu-
imitation to children was soon made by Miller and Dol- rotic child or even the sexual development of the child.
lard (1941) in their book Social Learning and Imitation. Psychoanalysis goes beyond these boundaries, within
which it might even have been granted the right of judg-
This was not the first such extension; the Sears study of
ment, and encroaches upon domains which, as demon-
infant frustration (cited in Dollard et al., 1939), and
strated by the table of contents of this book, other
Mowrer’s study of enuresis (1938) had already shown specialists consider their own. (p. 561)
that social learning principles could be readily applied
to problems of child development. After World War II,
Psychoanalysis would settle for nothing less than the
the full impact of the social learning perspective was to
whole pie of developmental psychology, and it came
be felt by child psychology.
close to getting it in one form or another through the rest
of the twentieth century.
Psychoanalysis It seemed inevitable that empirically minded U.S.
psychologists would attempt to put some of the key
By the 1930s, the enterprise of psychoanalysis had un-
propositions of the theory to experimental test—indeed,
dergone multiple divisions and had exercised a signifi-
the enterprise attracted some of the best young scien-
cant impact on the study of behavioral development. The
tists in psychology. What did they find? In summing up
most obvious influence was direct, through the teach-
the then-available results of the experimental assess-
ings of Sigmund Freud himself and those who remained
ments of fixation, regression, projection, and other psy-
faithful to the orthodox theory. But equally powerful
choanalytic mechanisms, Sears (1944) wrote:
influences were indirect, mediated through the theories
of those who—like J. B. Watson, J. Piaget, and R. R.
One is driven to the conclusion that experimental psychol-
Sears—had been impressed by particular features of
ogy has not yet made a major contribution to these prob-
psychoanalytic theory. In between were the so-called
lems. . . . It seems doubtful whether the sheer testing of
post-Freudians (those who extended psychoanalytic the-
psychoanalytical theory is an appropriate task for experi-
ory within the constraints established by Freud himself ) mental psychology. Instead of trying to ride on the tail of a
and neo-Freudians (those psychoanalysts who revolted kite that was never meant to carry such a load, experimen-
by challenging certain inviolable assumptions, such as talists would probably be wise to get all the hunches, intu-
the emphasis on infantile sexuality and the primacy of itions, and experience possible from psychoanalysis and
early experience). These various themes have been ex- then, for themselves, start the laborious task of construct-
pertly traced in discussions of psychoanalytic theory ing a systematic psychology of personality, but a system
(e.g., Hall & Lindzey, 1957; Munroe, 1955). For our based on behavioral rather than experiential data. (p. 329)
present purposes, some comments on the relation be-
tween psychoanalysis and the study of behavioral devel- All this is to say that the experimental testing of psy-
opment are in order. choanalytic proposals was not a profitable enterprise.
By the late 1930s, psychoanalysis appeared to many Sears was to follow his own advice, as we shall see, and
child psychologists to be the answer to their search for a would pave the way for the modern generations of social
unifying theory of development. One of the more influ- learning theory.
 Theoretical Trends of the Middle Period 145

Despite the equivocal returns on the scientific analy- personal settings of life and depend, in large measure,
sis of the theory, its influence gained, not faded, during on the “consensual validation” of the views of “signifi-
the 1930s and 1940s. Virtually every major theoretical cant others” with whom one interacts. Because of the
system concerned with human behavior—save those that continuing impact of the social system on one’s behavior
dealt with purely physiological, motor, or sensory phe- and one’s thought of oneself, the development of person-
nomena—was accommodated to psychoanalytic theory. ality is a continuing, ongoing process. Sullivan’s views
Behaviorism (whether “radical” Watsonianism or con- had a significant impact on subsequent sociological
ventional Hullian theory) and Piagetian cognitive (Cottrell, 1942, 1969), psychiatric (G. Bateson, Jackson,
theory alike were significantly influenced in that era, Hayley, & Weakland, 1956; Jackson, 1968), and psycho-
just as ethology and social learning theory were influ- logical models of social interaction.
enced in the present one. The immediate effects on
child-rearing practices were as great, if not greater, than
Field Theory and Ecological Psychology
the earlier ones associated with Holt and Watson. With
the publication of the first edition of Benjamin Spock’s When Kurt Lewin immigrated to the United States in the
(1946) best-selling manual on infant care, the U.S. pub- early 1930s, he had already established himself as a dis-
lic was encouraged to adopt practices not inconsistent tinguished child psychologist in Germany. U.S. readers
with psychoanalytic training. The rapid growth of pro- were first introduced to his powerful theory of “ behavior
fessional clinical psychology—World War II had de- and development as a function of the total situation” in
manded specialists in diagnosis and therapy—also two articles that appeared in English in 1931. In his
underscored the need for a theory of assessment and classic theoretical paper, “Conflict between Aris-
treatment. The major tools available for the task in- totelian and Galileian Modes of Thought in Psychology”
cluded projective tests (typically based on psychoana- (1931a), Lewin offered an elegant defense for studying
lytic assumptions) and methods of psychotherapy individual children in the actual, concrete, total situation
(derived, directly or indirectly, from the psychoanalytic of which they are a part. He argued that the dynamics of
interview). Psychology as a profession and a science be- behavior—the study of the forces that exercise momen-
came increasingly indebted to psychoanalytic theory tary control over the direction and form of actions—
and practice. cannot be clarified by the use of standard statistical
But psychoanalysts themselves proved to be an intel- methods. Averages that are obtained by combining the
lectually heterogeneous lot, and the theory could hardly results of large numbers of children in a “standard” envi-
be viewed as a static, unchanging view of personality. ronment are bound to obscure the precise dynamic con-
Among the more prominent heretics were Carl Jung, Al- trols of behavior, not clarify them. “An inference from
fred Adler, Karen Horney, Eric Fromm, and Harry Stack the average to the concrete particular case is . . . impos-
Sullivan. They shared in common an emphasis on the in- sible. The concepts of the average child and of the aver-
terpersonal implications of dynamic theory, as these age situation are abstractions that have no utility
were expressed in the family system and in interper- whatever for the investigation of dynamics” (Lewin,
sonal exchanges of later childhood and maturity. With 1931b, p. 95). Lewin provided a rationale for the conclu-
this focus on “object relations,” there was a concomitant sion that had been arrived at intuitively by some of his
de-emphasis on the importance of infantile sexuality most insightful predecessors (Preyer, Binet, Freud, and
and the reversibility of very early experiences (see Piaget). The conclusion stood in sharp contrast to that
Munroe, 1955). Horney (1937) and Sullivan led the way arrived at by Galton and most U.S. psychologists.
in the neo-Freudian theory of interpersonal relations. In Lewin’s ideas about method were consistent with his
1940, in a lengthy article in Psychiatry, Sullivan out- theoretical position on the contextual relativity of psy-
lined a rapprochement between theories of symbolic in- chological experience and action. A key element in
teraction that had become associated with sociology and Lewin’s theorizing was his emphasis on the psychologi-
anthropology and a neoanalytic interpersonal theory of cal environment as opposed to the physical or objectively
psychopathology. Sullivan’s position was that the “self- determined concrete environment. Lewin observed, “All
dynamism” arises from “ the recurrent interpersonal sit- these things and events are defined for the child partly
uations of life.” Ideas about the self-dynamism (which is by their ‘appearance’ but above all by their ‘functional
not an entity but a process) are derived from the inter- possibilities’ (the Wirkwelt in v. Uexküll’s sense)”
146 The Making of Developmental Psychology

(1931b, p. 100). In endorsing animal behaviorist J. von Sears, 1944), small group processes (Lewin, Lippitt, &
Uexküll’s emphasis on the individual’s reconstructed White, 1939), and the effects of interruption and frus-
inner space (the Umwelt and the Innenwelt) as opposed to tration (R. G. Barker, Dembo, & Lewin, 1941). One of
the objective mechanical forces of the external world Lewin’s postdoctoral students, Roger Barker, carried
(see Loeb, 1912/1964), he captured an idea whose impli- the essential concepts of ecological psychology to the
cations have yet to be fully realized. Lewin formulated next generation (R. G. Barker, 1963, 1964, 1968). Urie
his psychological field theory in keeping with the gestalt Bronfenbrenner (1979) has been enormously influential
and system theoretic approaches. Although behavior is in extending the essential ideas (Bronfenbrenner, 1979,
seen as a function of both the person and the environ- 1993, 1995). Furthermore, other students inspired by
ment, these two major variables “are mutually dependent Lewin virtually sculpted the face of modern social psy-
upon each other. In other words, to understand or to pre- chology. There was also an immediate and direct con-
dict behavior, the person and his environment have to be nection to developmental psychology. Marian Radke
considered as one constellation of interdependent fac- Yarrow, an eminent developmental psychologist, was
tors. We call the totality of these factors the life space Lewin’s protégé at MIT, where she taught the graduate
(LSp) of that individual” (Lewin, 1954, p. 919). Lewin’s seminar on Lewinian theory to H. Kelley, J. Thibaut,
theory was basically a model of action, to account for the and M. Deutsch, among others.
directionality of behavior in terms of the forces present What did Lewinian theory not cover? Criticisms of
in a given psychological environment. But the effective field theory note that relatively little attention is given
forces belong neither to the person nor to the field alone; to the processes of enduring change—namely, those of
actions can be understood only in the totality of forces as learning. Although Lewin clearly acknowledges that
they are merged to determine behavior. “somatic” changes in the child can have a significant
In his work in the United States in the 1930s and influence on the psychological environment, field the-
1940s, Lewin extended this theoretical model to diverse ory gives only modest attention to how such develop-
social and developmental phenomena, including the mental changes may be integrated with modifications
analysis of conflict, social influence, level of aspiration, in psychological forces. Hence, the model is exceed-
and goal setting, as well as the effects of autocratic and ingly convincing as a descriptive model, but how it may
democratic environments. Beyond their influence on be critically tested, modified, and falsified is less
specific research programs, Lewin’s principles of behav- clear. Lewin’s emphasis woke psychology from its
ior and development became incorporated into the disci- behavioristic slumbers by pointing out that the context-
pline without being identified with his particular school free objective “stimulus” may be an illusion. The im-
of thought. For instance, his “ field theory” demanded plications for methodology and theory, especially in
attention to the context in which behavior occurred and, the study of social development and social psychology,
particularly, the individual’s personal response to that were enormous.
setting. The “environment ” was not merely the physical
and social context, but the child’s perception of that set-
ting. So one and the same “objective” environment may
be perceived differently, according to the needs of the COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE PERIOD
child and the forces that operate on him or her; con-
versely, seemingly identical responses may reflect the It seems ironic that the most notable development in
operation of quite different psychological forces. There child psychology during this period was brought about
is a contextual relativity to both stimuli and responses, initially by social and economic forces instead of scien-
and neither should be divorced from the social /environ- tific advances. Child research institutes were founded
mental matrix in which each is embedded. throughout the United States, and, once established,
This overview does not permit an account of Lewin’s they became enormously influential in the science and
developmental and social theory (excellent summaries remained so throughout the better part of the twentieth
may be found in A. Baldwin, 1967/1980, and Estes, century. Behind the foundations and the governmental-
1954). It should be noted that Lewin and the Lewinians university agencies that provided the actual financial
pioneered in the study of conflict resolution (Lewin, support for the institutes, there was a broad nationwide
1935), level of aspiration (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & coalition of concerned teachers and parents who pressed
 The Modern Era 147

for more attention, scientific and otherwise, to the cal conceptions that had stimulated the research in the
needs of children. This was the same social /political first place.
“movement ” that had been given early form and direc- At the second level, various attempts were made to
tion by Hall in the 1880s and 1890s. But the establish- establish a general integrative theory of development to
ment of study centers did not a science make, and fill the void left by the collapse of the recapitulation hy-
investigators were immediately challenged to develop pothesis. For every general developmental theory that
more adequate procedures in virtually every sector of vied for hegemony in the 1920s and 1930s, a straight
child research. Each area of study—intelligence, hon- line may be drawn backward to antecedent models of
esty, emotionality, language, thinking, perception, the 1880s and 1890s. The cognitive-developmental pro-
growth, predictability—presented its own problems of posals of J. Piaget, L. S. Vygotsky, H. Wallon, and H.
methodology and analysis, and each had to be solved in Werner were immediately linked to the concepts of J. M.
its own terms. The upshot was an inevitable fragmenta- Baldwin; the developmental psychobiology of Z-Y. Kuo,
tion of developmental study. T. C. Schneirla, and L. von Bertalanffy followed the
What were the empirical advances in the period? To prior conceptual advances in animal behavior and exper-
attempt to answer that question would be tantamount to imental embryology; the maturational model of A.
compressing the information contained in the three Gesell constituted in several respects an extension of
compendia edited by C. Murchison (1931, 1933) and L. the developmental views of W. Preyer; the scientific
Carmichael (1946). Beyond the demonstration that al- basis for Watsonian behaviorism was established by the
most all aspects of child behavior and cognition could be prior work of Morgan, Loeb, and Jennings, among oth-
profitably studied by empirical procedures—something ers; and the several versions of psychoanalysis each re-
that had been promised but not demonstrated in the ear- tained some central elements of the parent theory.
lier period—we find substantive findings that perplexed Despite obvious differences among the above mod-
the researchers themselves and seemed to defy integra- els, they shared a similarity in that they were, in a basic
tion with earlier concepts of the child. These phenomena sense, developmental. Differences among them arose
included the specificity of honesty, the rapid condition- on assumptions about how developmental processes
ability of fear in infants, the egocentricism of children, might be most adequately described and how behavioral
the physical normality (or superiority) of bright chil- phenomena might be most appropriately conceptual-
dren, and the modest predictability of behavior over ized. These assumptions, in turn, reflected which be-
time and space. Spectacular controversies were ignited havioral or cognitive phenomena were addressed by the
by studies of early experience that purported to show theory, and in which species. Although psychoanalysis
that children’s basic intellectual adaptations could be in- gained a clear edge in popular recognition and clinical
fluenced by especially beneficial or neglectful early ex- applications, organismic models became quietly influ-
periences. Perhaps more important for the science than ential in the research of psychobiological and cognitive
controversy were the less dramatic yet critical advances investigators. But none of the models achieved clear
in describing the “normal” (i.e., species-typical) course dominance, and the science could not claim as its own a
of sensorimotor, cognitive, and behavioral development. unifying theory of behavioral development that might
Theoretical activity in this period proceeded at two complement or extend the theory of biological evolu-
“levels,” specific and general. At the first level, the em- tion. Indeed, advances in identifying the contextual
pirical advances—methodological and substantive— events that determined actions and learning raised
produced information that demanded attention and questions on whether a general theory of behavioral de-
integration. Hartshorne and May (1928) offered their velopment was possible.
“specificity” proposal on altruism and honesty; C. Büh-
ler (1931), her account of three social “ types” in in-
fancy; F. Goodenough (1931), her explanation for the THE MODERN ERA
development of anger and quarrels; J. Anderson (1939),
his hypothesis on the “overlap” in successive tests of in- Following a general depression in research activity dur-
fant competence; and so on. These data-based hypothe- ing World War II, work on behavioral development
ses constituted a necessary step between empirical began an upward slope in the postwar period and has
studies of child behavior and the overarching theoreti- only recently shown signs of leveling. A new “golden
148 The Making of Developmental Psychology

age” began for the discipline and it has surpassed those had been established. They appeared in quite different
of the two previous eras (1895–1905 and 1925–1935). forms in studies of language and cognition, in investiga-
New techniques and approaches were introduced in rapid tions of basic motor and perceptual processes, and in
succession, stimulated in part by advances in electronic longitudinal studies of social and personality develop-
recording, coding, and computer analysis. The effective ment. The area also rediscovered the basic psychoana-
“life span” of research methods—from new projective lytic assumption that the first relationships were critical
procedures to questionnaires on authoritarianism or for understanding psychopathology and the core fea-
brief experimental procedures for studying learning— tures of personality.
appeared to have been shortened from about 15 to about Many of the ideas and problems that had been pur-
10 years. Promising ideas—on test anxiety, social rein- sued over the first half of the twentieth century came
forcement satiation, impulsivity, and modeling—en- again to the forefront, from the study of growth patterns
tered rapidly, dominated the area briefly, then faded in motor and sensory development, in cognitive changes
away, often without a decent postmortem or obituary. in thought and language, and in the effects of interac-
In large measure, the quickened pace of research ac- tions on social and personality development.
tivity and analysis could be attributed to great increases This section of developmental history overlaps with
in federal support for empirical research and the open- contemporary events, including those covered in other
ing of new teaching and research positions. A new insti- chapters of this edition of the Handbook. The closer one
tute established by the National Institutes of Health comes to current trends, the more difficult it is to disen-
(NIH) was devoted to research on child health and tangle ephemeral interests from enduring changes.
human development, and other institutes accepted a de- Hence, we leave for a final section of this chapter our
velopmental orientation to understanding problem be- perception of about the last 20 years of developmental
haviors (e.g., National Institute of Mental Health, science (the final decade of the twentieth century and
National Institute of Drug Abuse). In addition, the U.S. much of the 1st decade of the present century). Here,
Congress funded an unprecedented national program to however, on more secure historical ground is a discus-
provide poor and disadvantaged children with a “Head sion of some of the shifts that have occurred in develop-
Start ” prior to school entry. Two psychologists, Urie mental science up through the 1980s that helped shape
Bronfenbrenner and Edward Zigler, were instrumental the contemporary trends within the field. The focus is
in initiating the program and directing it through its on three domains: (1) social learning theory, (2) attach-
early years. Other developmental psychologists were in- ment theory, and (3) cognitive development.
volved in the creation of television programs to enhance
education and learning (e.g., Sesame Street). This period
has been one of expansion, invention, and criticism, SOCIAL LEARNING: RISE, DECLINE,
with new innovations and discoveries in virtually all AND REINVENTION
areas of developmental research and application.
One of the more visible early theoretical trends in Contrary to general impressions, there is no single “so-
this period was the rise, domination, and passing of gen- cial learning theory”; there are several. The plurality
eral learning theories. Until their grip began to fail in came about initially because there was only modest con-
the early 1960s, behavioral models of learning were sensus on which principles of learning were universal.
hegemonous in U.S. psychology, and developmental psy- Over the past half-century, a number of social learning
chology was no exception. To enter the theoretical main- theories have evolved from the basic frameworks estab-
stream, research in the several areas of child study, from lished by Skinner and the neo-Hullian theorists, each
language acquisition and cognitive learning to social be- with its distinctive emphasis and adherents. It has been
havior and child rearing, had to be couched in learning a complex and often misunderstood endeavor, and we
terms. Behaviors did not develop, they were acquired. comment here only on some of the historical highlights.
Despite their austere and parsimonious construction,
learning models appeared to be remarkably adaptable
Rise
for developmental psychologists—but not adaptive
enough. By the mid-1960s, the area began to rediscover Robert R. Sears can be recognized as the person whose
the dynamic developmental models on which the field influence was pervasive in the introduction of the psy-
 Social Learning: Rise, Decline, and Reinvention 149

choanalytic learning synthesis to the study of children. child to reconstruct the nuclear family (Bach, 1946).
One of the original members of the Yale group that cre- The interview and observational procedures provided
ated neo-Hullian social learning theory (Dollard et al., the model for a wide range of cross-cultural and cross-
1939; Miller et al., 1941), Sears was a pivotal influence age studies (e.g., Whiting & Whiting, 1975).
for students and colleagues at the Iowa Child Welfare One of the great strengths of social learning theory
Research Station, Harvard University, and Stanford and its practitioners was their openness to data, whether
University. With his colleagues at these institutions, supportive or disconfirmatory. Hence, the original
many of whom went on to develop influential revisions statement underwent revisions, both modest (e.g., Sears,
of social learning (including E. E. Maccoby, J. Whiting, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957; Sears, Rau, & Alpert, 1965)
V. Nowlis, J. Gewirtz, Richard Walters, A. Bandura, and and major (e.g., Bandura & Walters, 1959; Whiting &
Sears’s wife, Pauline Snedden Sears), Sears was instru- Whiting, 1975), in attempts to extend it and correct its
mental in bringing about major changes in the scope and shortcomings.
concerns of developmental psychology.
In the first major publication to come from this group Decline
(Sears, Whiting, Nowlis, & Sears, 1953), “aggression”
and “dependency” were seen as motives that were What were the shortcomings? Some were identified by
learned early in the life history of the child. How were the investigators themselves in three large-scale studies
they learned? The answer was not an easy one, at least of child rearing conducted in Iowa, Massachusetts, and
not for Hullians, because the theory of conditioned California. When the results of the 20-year research ef-
drives had not been elaborated by Clark Hull (1951) and fort were compiled and analyzed, the outcomes provided
had been only vaguely outlined by Freud. Drawing from only modest support for the theory that had inspired the
both of these views, Sears and his colleagues argued that work. The problem was that there were few reliable cor-
these key social motives were acquired as a universal relates between variations in child-rearing practices and
consequence of the early familial experiences of the the children’s social behavior and personality patterns.
child. Moreover, variations in the strength of the drives Eleanor Maccoby, a key participant in this work, indi-
and in their expression were produced by differences in cated that the problem lay as much in the theory as in
the quality of the parent-child relationship, as indexed by the method. Looking backward after 35 years, Maccoby
the rewards, punishments, and frustrations that occurred (1994) wrote:
in the mother-child interaction. This social learning the-
Few connections were found between parental child-rear-
ory was extended to account for the development of gen- ing practices (as reported by parents in detailed inter-
der role-typing (through internalization of parental views) and independent assessments of children’s
values and self-reinforcement) and conscience (through personality characteristics—so few, indeed, that virtually
nurturance and the withdrawal of love by the mother). nothing was published relating the two sets of data. The
The semistructured interview technique was exten- major yield of the study was a book on child-rearing prac-
sively employed to investigate parental attitudes, be- tices as seen from the perspective of mothers (Sears et al.,
liefs, and child-rearing practices. Large-scale studies 1957). This book was mainly descriptive and included
were conducted by Sears and his colleagues in Iowa, only very limited tests of the theories that led to the
Massachusetts, and California (Palo Alto). One aim was study. Sears and colleagues later conducted a study with
to replicate key findings at each of the three sites by preschoolers focused specifically on the role of identifica-
tion with the same-sex parent in producing progress to-
using a common research technique. Employing lengthy
ward social maturity. They used a much expanded range of
in-depth interviews with parents as a primary research
assessment techniques, including observations of parent-
technique, these studies attempted to relate child- child interaction. The hypothesis that identification with
rearing practices with assessment of children’s social parents was a primary mechanism mediating children’s
behavior and personality patterns. The assessments of acquisition of a cluster of well-socialized attributes was,
children capitalized on advances that had been made in once again, not supported. (see especially Sears et al.,
observational methodology, and revised or developed 1965, table 40, p. 246)
child-appropriate “projective test ” measures. Instead of
using inkblots or semistructured pictures, the investiga- Not all of the outcomes were negative, nor were all unre-
tors used dolls and dollhouses to permit the preschool liable. But the overall pattern of the findings provided
150 The Making of Developmental Psychology

scant support for the ideas that had inspired the work in successive editions of the Carmichael Manual, were
the first place. What was to blame—the theory or the seen as irrelevant for the basic issues of social learning
methods employed to test it? The methods could be crit- and social control. Instead of descriptions of develop-
icized, and so could the theory. mental change, this generation of developmentalists was
In an incisive and courageous evaluation published at concerned with explanations of change in terms of the
the height of the social learning era, Marian Radke “new” concepts of social interchange, imitation, dyadic
Yarrow and her colleagues wrote: analysis, dependency, aggression, and conscience. Over-
looked in the social learning revolution was the fact that
Childrearing research is a curious combination of loose each of these concepts had been familiar to the found-
methodology that is tightly interwoven with provocative ing generation, and the phenomena to which the con-
hypotheses of developmental processes and relationships. cepts refer had been extensively researched in the next
The compelling legend of maternal influences on child be- generation.
havior that has evolved does not have its roots in solid Coming back to the evolution of social learning theo-
data, and its precise verification remains in many respects ries, we find that, in the early 1960s, the movement was
a subject for future research. The findings from the pre- split into two major divisions, each of which was in in-
ceding analyses of data make it difficult to continue to be
tellectual debt to the parental movement and to the rein-
complacent about methodology, and difficult to continue
forcement concepts of B. F. Skinner (1953). J. Gewirtz,
to regard replication as a luxury. The child’s day-to-day
experiences contribute significantly to his behavior and
S. Bijou, and D. Baer (Bijou & Baer, 1961; Gewirtz,
development and are in many respects the essence of de- 1961) followed Skinner’s lead in applying the ideas and
velopmental theory. An exact understanding is important concepts of operant conditioning to analyses of behavior
to science and society. In attempting to build on this modification in normal and retarded children. But there
knowledge, each researcher is a methodologist and as such were problems in negotiating the theoretical transition
has a responsibility for excellence. (Yarrow, Campbell, & from pigeons to children. Just as the concept of “condi-
Burton, 1968, p. 152) tioned” or “learned motivation” had presented difficul-
ties for the initial social learning theories, the notion of
Two noteworthy contributions by Sears and his col- “conditioned” or “social reinforcement ” proved to be an
leagues require mention. In a presidential address to the enigmatic concept for the operant revision (see Gewirtz
American Psychological Association, Sears (1951) & Baer, 1958; Parton & Ross, 1965).
brought renewed attention to the theoretical concept of
social interaction and the bidirectionality of familial re-
Reinvention
lations. Although the research methods employed by the
Sears group made it difficult to study interactional phe- The resurgence of social learning theory was led by Al-
nomena directly, these concepts figured importantly in bert Bandura and Richard Walters (1963), who shifted
the conceptions that were offered in each of Sears’s the substantive and explanatory basis of the model. They
major subsequent publications. They provided the impe- argued that the wedding of learning concepts to psycho-
tus for renewed attention to the issues that had been ini- analysis tended to shortchange both models. Social
tially raised by James Mark Baldwin, and were then learning should exploit learning mechanisms, including
represented in the work of psychiatrist H. S. Sullivan cognitive processes that govern imitation and reinforce-
(1940, 1953) and sociologist Leonard Cottrell (1942). ment. In their work, “modeling” was seen as a primary
The second contribution was the reintegration of mechanism for the acquisition of novel actions and, as
child development research into the mainstream of psy- such, a key to understanding socialization and transgen-
chology, a position that it had not held for most of the erational transmission. They had, in effect, reinstituted
previous half-century. By linking the study of children the construct of “imitation” to the nuclear role that it
to the then-current theoretical systems of psychology, had played in J. M. Baldwin’s formulation.
the door was opened for a fresh generation of psycholo- The next modification in social learning theory came
gists to enter the field. The gains were not without cost, shortly afterward, when Albert Bandura revitalized the
however, in that much of the earlier developmental work theory and established it on a foundation of distinc-
was set aside or ignored by the new group. Traditional tively human, cognitive processes. The need for further
developmental studies, as embodied in the chapters of revision arose when it became clear that the short-term
 Attachment: Discovery and Loss 151

studies of imitation and social learning of children were Some characteristics of behaviorist models have re-
open to alternative, cognitive interpretations. For in- mained virtually unchanged in the several generations
stance, examination of the determinants and outcomes of social learning theories. Social learning researchers
of modeling (i.e., imitation) in children indicated that have maintained a curious stance toward the concept of
children did not behave in a fashion that was analogous development. From Watson onward, learning theories
to observation learning in animals. A similar phenome- have been developmental in the sense that they have
non was observed in the effects of social reinforcement shared the “ fundamental point ” that humans’ activities
(i.e., verbal reward) with children. Marked variations should be studied historically. Social learning views
in reinforcer effectiveness could be induced simply by have been slow to consider processes of age-related
instructions or other cognitive manipulations, leading shifts in development (Cairns, 1979; Grusec, 1994). The
to the interpretation that “social reinforcement ” in implicit assumption has persisted that the incremental
children may more appropriately be viewed in terms of changes in cognition and learning are sufficient to ac-
information transmission processes than primary count for the major phenomena of social development,
reinforcement processes (see Paris & Cairns, 1972; including their establishment, maintenance, and change.
Stevenson, 1965). Other “information” interpretations
of punishment, dependency, and conscience appeared
(e.g., Walters & Parke, 1964). A similar revision was ATTACHMENT: DISCOVERY AND LOSS
made in the interpretation of imitation and modeling,
for parallel reasons (Bandura, 1969). Patterson (1979) With the rediscovery of imitation and modeling, stu-
extended observational methods in inventive ways; dents of social learning found fresh and robust phenom-
hence, paved the way for precise assessments of social ena to analyze, and a new generation of social learning
learning hypotheses. models was born. So it was with mother-infant attach-
Along with Rotter (1954) and Mischel (1973), Ban- ment. The systematic investigation of mother-infant
dura shifted the focus of social learning from preoccu- attachment in studies of animal behavior, and subse-
pation with psychoanalytic conflicts and anxieties to quently in studies of humans, breathed new life into the
the positive, productive features of children. With the psychoanalytic framework. According to an early defi-
concepts of self-efficacy and self-regulation, he af- nition by Ainsworth (1972), attachment refers to “an af-
firmed the distinctive qualities of human adaptation, fectional tie or bond that one individual (person or
and he shifted the focus of the orientation from human animal) forms between himself and another specific in-
problems to human potential. But these are not opposed dividual” (p. 100).
foci in Bandura’s revision of social learning theory. On The prototypic attachment is that which develops be-
this score, Grusec (1994) observes: tween mothers and infants. That a strong tie develops
early in life is certainly no new revelation. However, the
Bandura’s interest in self-efficacy arose from his studies systematic study of attachment behavior in animals and
of the role of participant modeling in the treatment of pho- humans began only in the post-World War II era. Scott
bic disorders. A striking feature of the outcomes of these (1962, 1963), and Harlow (1958) opened the door for
studies was the extent to which individuals’ perceptions of the systematic study of this early affectional relation-
their own feeling of effectiveness determined how easily
ship with their now classic studies of the young puppy
changes in behavior and fear arousal were achieved and
and infant rhesus monkey. At about the same time,
maintained. According to self-efficacy theory, people de-
velop domain-specific beliefs about their own abilities
Bowlby (1958) and his former postdoctoral associates
and characteristics that guide their behavior by determin- (Ainsworth, 1963; Schaffer & Emerson, 1964) offered
ing what they try to achieve and how much effort they put influential statements on attachment in human infants.
into their performance in that particular situation or do-
main. (p. 488) The Phenomena of Attachment

In a century-long cycle, social cognition-learning refor- Harry F. Harlow (1958) announced in his American Psy-
mulations came to embrace not only J. M. Baldwin’s chological Association presidential address the results
concept of imitation but also his concept of the self as a of some dramatic findings on the importance of so-
central organizing theme. matosensory contact in the formation of the bond of the
152 The Making of Developmental Psychology

infant monkey to inanimate “surrogate” mothers. Ac- mother in a maternal condition and sculpt her physiol-
cording to the initial interpretation of these findings, ogy so that it supports the contemporaneous needs of the
tactile stimulation—or “contact comfort ”—was a more infant. A parallel feedback loop serves similar functions
powerful determinant than hunger in the infant’s forma- for the infant, and a reciprocal relationship becomes es-
tion of a social attachment. Subsequent work by Harlow tablished between the actions and states of the infant
and others led to significant modifications in the initial and those of the mother (Rosenblatt & Lehrman, 1963).
interpretations—on the necessary and sufficient condi- Biological needs and social actions become mutually
tions for the development of mammalian attachments supportive (Hofer, 1994). In effect, the actions and bio-
(e.g., Cairns, 1966), and on the stability and plasticity logical conditions of the infant and mother rapidly be-
of effects induced by early social experience (e.g., come organized around each other.
Mason & Kinney, 1974; Suomi & Harlow, 1972). 2. Proximity and mutual mother-infant engagement
Nonetheless, the image of “motherless monkeys” had a promote the establishment of a social attachment that
catalytic effect in stimulating studies of mother-infant persists in the absence of the psychobiological condi-
relations and, more generally, investigations of the de- tions that originally promoted the interaction. In most
velopment of social interactions. mammalian species, the bond is intense, and involuntary
Given the critical role assigned to early experiences separation triggers disorganization, distress, and dis-
in most developmental theories, it is curious that so lit- ruption in both the infant and the mother. The distress is
tle systematic work had been conducted on mother- so extreme that it can be assessed by a host of behavioral
infant attachment before the modern era. It is especially and biological assessments.
surprising because the intense relationship established 3. Intense social attachment can be established under
between infants and mothers is perhaps the most easily diverse conditions (e.g., the absence of milk, the ab-
detected and robust social phenomenon observed across sence of contact comfort, and, paradoxically, the pres-
mammals. At about the time when infants begin to lo- ence of intense punishment). The influence of these
comote independently, they become extremely dis- conditions depends, in large measure, on the contexts of
tressed when removed involuntarily or separated from reciprocal exchange. Moreover, attachment can develop
their mothers (or mother-surrogates). Reunion tends to in older as well as younger animals (maternal attachment
produce an immediate cessation of distress (e.g., the is but one of the special conditions). Experimental stud-
young quit crying, screaming, or bleating). Infants in ies have indicated that social attachment strength in-
this age range also express heightened weariness or fear creases with interaction, time spent, and exclusivity of
when confronted with strange persons and strange relationship.
places—or even familiar persons in strange places. 4. Maturational changes trigger modifications in the
These phenomena can be demonstrated in virtually all nature and the quality of attachment; maturation of
mammalian species; human babies show intermediate the young is synchronized with maternal behavioral
levels of intensity. and physiological changes that are consistent with the
The multiple dimensions of early formed bonds were mother’s preparation for the next generation of off-
investigated in experimental and observational work spring. New attachments are formed typically within
with birds (i.e., imprinting) and mammals (i.e., attach- minutes and hours rather than weeks and months, possi-
ment). By the mid-1960s, a comprehensive picture could bly to balance the tension between conservation and sur-
be drawn of the conditions for the emergence and main- vival (Cairns & Werboff, 1967; Mason & Kinney, 1974).
tenance of and for change in attachment relationships In this regard, the adaptation had to be rapid in order for
(Harlow, 1958; Rosenblatt & Lehrman, 1963; Scott, the vulnerable infant to live.
1963). The findings permitted four empirical general-
izations about the nature of mammalian attachment
Attachment Theory
(Cairns, 1966):
Studies of infant-mother attachment came in the wake
1. At birth and in the immediate postnatal period, of these systematic investigations, and they stimulated
there is an elegant synchrony between the actions and enormous scientific and public interest (Maccoby &
physiological states of the mother and of the infant. Masters, 1970). Psychoanalyst John Bowlby began a se-
Moreover, the actions of the infant serve to maintain the ries of seminars on these issues at the Tavistock Clinic
 Cognitive Reemergence 153

in London in the 1950s, and expanded the series in the ject relations theory, is to provide a comprehensive ac-
1960s (Foss, 1961, 1965; see Bretherton & Waters, count of psychopathology. Like ethological assumptions,
1985). Two key research programs reported in these dis- it emphasizes the formative effects of early experiences.
cussions were: (1) the observations of Schafer and Any discussion of modern “attachment theory” must
Emerson (1964) on the age of onset of attachment and include Mary D. S. Ainsworth, Bowlby’s long-term col-
(2) Ainsworth’s (1963) observational report of infant- laborator. Ainsworth conducted a pair of influential ob-
mother attachment in Uganda. Schafer and Emerson servational studies on mother-infant relations in Uganda
(1964) discovered that human infants begin to exhibit (Ainsworth, 1967) and Baltimore (Ainsworth, Blehar,
discriminative attachment at about 8 to 9 lunar months Waters, & Wall, 1978). One of the procedures to emerge
after birth, and that these attachments were formed with from the later study was a controlled observation proce-
respect to a wide range of persons who were intimately dure labeled the “Strange Situation” (Ainsworth et al.,
involved in the infants’ caretaking. 1978).7 This assessment involved a series of very brief
John Bowlby first became known for his contribu- separations (i.e., 1 to 3 minutes), with special attention
tions to object relations theory and, specifically, the sig- given to the quality of the reunions. The coding of a re-
nificance of early mother-infant bonds (i.e., Bowlby, union provided a classification procedure by which chil-
1946, 1952). Beginning in the early 1950s, he began in- dren were diagnosed as securely attached (Type B) or
formal interdisciplinary seminars that involved, along insecurely attached (Types A and C), along with vari-
with others, the eminent ethologist Robert Hinde. One ous subtypes (Ainsworth et al., 1978). A primary attrac-
outcome of these discussions was a paper published in tion of attachment theory is its presumption that these
the International Journal of Psychoanalysis where types are linked to the quality of later relationships and
Bowlby integrated concepts from object relations theory to psychopathology.
with evolutionary assumptions. He thereby generated a An extended discussion of attachment theory and its
framework of attachment that fused psychoanalysis and strengths and shortcomings is beyond the limits of this
ethology (Bowlby, 1958). In an important set of vol- chapter and would catapult the account into the contem-
umes, Bowlby described the implications of his “attach- porary period. For the current state of affairs on this
ment theory” for understanding maternal-child anxiety, enormously influential theory, the modern developmen-
separation, and loss (1969, 1973). tal version of neopsychoanalysis, see Bretherton and
In Bowlby’s view of attachment, priority is given to Waters (1985) and Goldberg, Muir, and Kerr (1995).
the events that occur during the child’s early years in
the establishment of a relatively stable attachment sys- COGNITIVE REEMERGENCE
tem. Mother-infant separation is likely to produce en-
during negative consequences. The nature of the This era also saw the reemergence of cognitive-develop-
attachment that is formed in early development gives mental questions as a central focus for thinking and re-
rise to an internal representational model formed by the search. Stimulated by a national reexamination of the
child. Moreover, the processes that give rise to an at- educational process (e.g., Bruner, 1960), in part because
tachment involve intense mutual regulation and mutual of influential volumes on Piaget (Flavell, 1963; Hunt,
organization between the mother and infant. Bowlby 1961) and Vygotsky (Cole, 1978), and in part because of
(1952) wrote: the fading vigor of social learning approaches, the prob-
lem of how mental development occurs became a domi-
If growth is to proceed smoothly, the tissues must be ex-
posed to the influence of the appropriate organizer at crit-
nant concern for developmental researchers. It is a
ical periods. In the same way, if mental development is to reemergence—rather than a revolution—because the is-
proceed smoothly, it would appear to be necessary for the sues of mind, consciousness, and mental development
undifferentiated psyche to be exposed during certain crit- were central to the discipline at its founding.
ical periods to the influence of the psychic organizer—the Virtually all aspects of the field were touched by the
mother. (p. 53) fresh emphasis. Investigations of language development,

Unlike ethological /animal behavior work, Bowlby’s ob- 7

The “Strange Situation” seems to have been modeled after
ject relations/attachment theory has a distinctive focus the assessments of attachment employed with nonhuman
on individual differences. In addition, its goal, like ob- mammals (see Scott, 1963).
154 The Making of Developmental Psychology

thinking, sensation, and information processing in chil- continue to be controversial (e.g., is there an area in the
dren flourished as they had in no earlier era. Even brain devoted to language?) despite impressive advances
hard-core behavioristic models proved to be vulnerable in understanding and methodology. At least some of the
to cognitive modifications, with the new directions matters that remain unresolved have less to do with how
on “mediational mechanisms” being provided by T. and the brain is studied than with how our constructs of the
H. Kendler (Kendler & Kendler, 1962) and M. Kuenne mind are formulated and our measures are organized
(1946). Information-processing approaches were chal- (Morrison & Ornstein, 1996; see Gottlieb et al., Chapter
lenged to build bridges to cognitive developmental 5; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter 8; Overton, Chapter 2;
studies and interpretations. Given the thrust of the move- Valsiner, Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume).
ment, it seemed inevitable that the barriers between so-
cial development and cognitive development should be
Thoughts and Actions
transcended, and that it should become once again per-
missible to refer to concepts of others and of self (see The self and its distinctive processes (e.g., self-
Harter, 1983, 1998, Chapter 9, this Handbook, Volume 3; concepts, self-efficacy, self-regulation) continue to be
Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). The recent history of this central for modern researchers. What was attributed to
movement and the statement of the rapprochement among the “ will” in the 1890s is attributed to the self and its
experimental-cognitive concepts, social cognition, and processes (motives, values, dispositions) in the 1990s.
cognitive-developmental concepts are covered in other What has changed, however, are methods, measures, and
chapters of this Handbook (e.g., see, Baltes, Linden- the findings that they yield. The multilevel, multimea-
berger, & Staudinger, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this sure methodological procedures of the late twentieth
volume; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Kuhn & Franklin, Chap- century have exposed some myths. One’s own self-
ter 22, this Handbook, Volume 2; Overton, Chapter 2, this attributions are not necessarily the same as descriptions
Handbook, this volume). of the self by others, and the differences are systemati-
cally linked to the domains assessed, the contexts of as-
sessment, and the meaning of the measures. The story of
HISTORICAL THEMES AND how the discrepancies between the self and others is now
CONTEMPORARY ADVANCES being addressed belongs, however, to today, not to the
past. The current state of information on these matters is
Now, more than 100 years after it began, developmental addressed elsewhere in this volume (see Baltes et al.,
research and theory continue to be diverse, vigorous, Chapter 11; Brandstädter, Chapter 10; Rathunde & Csik-
contentious, fresh, and in many instances, brilliant. In szentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume).
concluding this chapter, we recall the themes that were
identified in the beginning, to both take stock of the last
Ontogeny and Phylogeny
2 decades of developmental science and to describe the
progress made and the pitfalls encountered in more than How may development be best defined: in terms of the
a century of scientific work (see also Cairns, 2000; ontogeny of individuals, the ontogeny of the species, or
Cairns, Cairns, Rodkin, & Xie, 1998). the ontogeny of both? This was one of the first issues in
the systematic development of the science, and it has
been one of the last to be reassessed in the present era.
Knowledge and Consciousness
But it is now being addressed as a matter of how cross-
Understanding the mind and how it develops and func- generational transfer occurs, and how there may be
tions remains a major concern for developmentalists. turning points across generations as well as across on-
Because of advances in technology, investigators who togeny. According to a recent collaborative statement,
study the relations between brain processes and cogni- “Developmental investigation focuses attention to
tive activity have achieved spectacular advances in the ontogenies of both embryos and ancestors, and to
identifying pathways and plasticity over time. And there the process by which pathways may be repeated or
is now compelling evidence to support Preyer’s specula- redirected across successive generations” (Carolina
tion that “ the brain grows through its own activity.” Yet, Consortium on Human Development, 1996, p. 1). Inter-
plenty of controversies remain, and certain basic issues generational investigations may become a primary
 Historical Themes and Contemporary Advances 155

methodology of the future as they become feasible and across several domains. This information is reviewed, for
practical (see, e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter example, by Baltes et al. (Chapter 11, this Handbook, this
14, this Handbook, this volume; Cairns, Cairns, Xie, volume), Brandstädter (Chapter 10, this Handbook, this
Leung, & Hearne, 1998; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter volume), Elder and Shanahan (Chapter 12, this Hand-
12, this Handbook, this volume). book, this volume), Overton (Chapter 2, this Handbook,
this volume), and Valsiner (Chapter 4, this Hand-
book, this volume).
Nature and Nurture

After a century of controversy, the nature-nurture de- Morality and the Perfectibility of Humans
bate was still being contested both in public and in the
laboratory (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Lehrman, Values and moral development continue to be impor-
1953, 1970). Recall that J. M. Baldwin resolved the mat- tant for the discipline, although the work has been
ter by observing that “most of man’s equipment is due to handicapped by serious methodological challenges.
both causes working together,” and Preyer arrived at the With a few important exceptions, the conceptual
same conclusion. framework for understanding the development of per-
Today, the split conceptions of nature and nurture, sonal values was given less attention than in the ear-
and of the reductionist formulations associated with lier eras. The importance of this domain has emerged
either a nature (e.g., sociobiology or behavior genetics) in the past 20 years, as instantiated by interest in
or a nurture (e.g., Behaviorism or functional analysis moral and spiritual development (see Oser, Scarlett, &
approaches) have passed from the main stream of theo- Bucher, Chapter 17, this Handbook, this volume), posi-
retical and scientific interest (e.g., see Gottlieb, et al., tive youth development (see Benson, Scales, Hamilton,
Chapter 5; Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this vol- & Sesma, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume),
ume) and—through the lens of various versions of devel- and the use of strength-based models of human devel-
opmental systems theories (e.g., see Fischer & Bidell, opment to conceptualize and study the development of
1998; Lerner, Chapter 1; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter diverse children and adolescents (see Spencer, Chap-
8; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this vol- ter 15, this Handbook, this volume).
ume)—scientific attention has focused on models and Given this burgeoning theoretical and empirical
methods that now promise to begin to address the ques- work, it seems likely that this domain will come to the
tion of how “ both causes work together ” at the level of forefront in the next era. Indeed, the current concern
biology, interactions, and social networks. with the self and with self-organization in the social
context prepares the way for an integrated view of
morality, positive human development, and the capaci-
When Does Development End? ties for healthy functioning present in all people. As
Virtually all researchers in this discipline are develop- Kohlberg insightfully observed, “An individual is funda-
mentalists—including arch-maturationist Arnold Gesell. mentally a potentially moral being, not because of social
The naïve idea of strict preformism and unidirectional authority and rules (as Durkheim and Piaget thought)
causation has been a straw man since the beginning of but because his ends, his will, his self is that of a shared
the science. But there remain radical differences among social self ” (Kohlberg, 1982, pp. 311–312).
investigators in when they believe experiences to be ex-
tremely relevant, and when they consider them to be Social Applications
irrelevant. Early speculations on this issue were handi-
Applications continue to present large opportunities and
capped by a paucity of systematic normative and experi-
large problems. Sears (1975) concluded that the disci-
mental information. In the absence of longitudinal
pline was created to be relevant. In this regard, White
information on the behavioral adaptations of human be-
(1996) wrote:
ings, there was no adequate basis for selecting or reject-
ing these theoretical assumptions about the timing and Child study of some sort has to be part and parcel of any
functions of early experience. Neurobehavioral, cogni- social design for children. Though developmental psychol-
tive, and social developmental research in the modern ogy is not, in the traditional sense, a policy science it has
era has begun to clarify the role of time and timing nevertheless a significant role to play in the organization
156 The Making of Developmental Psychology

and management of systems of governance directed to- vestigators in Europe—from Binet and Stern to Lewin
ward children and families. (p. 413) and Bühler—have often been on a different frequency
than those in North America, and the reverse held as
As research has become increasingly more tied to well. When exceptions occurred—early, with Baldwin,
specific social concerns and social needs, some have Piaget, Vygotsky, and Freud; and later, with Magnus-
feared that the science would be compromised. That has son, Bronfenbrenner, Bandura, Bruner, and Bowlby—
not occurred. To the contrary, carefully evaluated social the entire discipline was revitalized.
applications have helped create a more robust, verifi- The contemporary press toward better integrated
able, and relevant science (Lerner, Chapter 1, this Hand- models of development arose from multiple sources.
book, this volume). Indeed the burgeoning of interest in These include social development and social ecology
applied developmental science that has occurred in the (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1995, 2005; Ford & Lerner,
past 20 years and, certainly, since the last edition of this 1992), developmental psychobiology and ethology
Handbook (e.g., see Farmer & Farmer, 2001; Fisher & (P. P. G. Bateson, 1991; Garcia Coll, Bearer, & Lerner,
Lerner, 2005; Gest, Mahoney, & Cairns, 1999; Lerner, 2004; Gottlieb, 1992; Hinde, 1970; Hood, Greenberg, &
Jacobs, & Wertlieb, 2003; and the several volumes of the Tobach, 1995), the dynamic systems approach (Lerner,
journals, Applied Developmental Science and the Journal 2002; Smith & Thelen, 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994),
of Applied Developmental Psychology) has derived at developmental psychopathology (e.g., Cicchetti &
least in part from the use of developmental systems the- Cohen, 1995; Hay & Angold, 1993), cognitive develop-
ories to discuss the plasticity of human development and ment (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; van der Veer & Valsiner,
thus the potential of applying developmental science to 1991), and developmental science (Carolina Consortium
promote positive human development. on Human Development, 1996; Magnusson, 1996). Due
One other by-product of social applications should be in part to methodological advances in the study of devel-
mentioned. The rapid growth of the discipline has cre- opment, basic perceptual and movement patterns gained
ated some unanticipated hazards for developmental fresh life and new direction. It appears that studies of
study, not the least of which is the intense competition social development, emotion, and cognition may be the
for publication space and research support. In one unfor- greatest beneficiaries of the current drive toward a more
tunate outcome, closely knit research groups have integrated developmental framework.
formed tight theoretical and/or empirical coalitions that Given the advances in theory—advances which were
promote inclusion and practice exclusion. Under these not possible until empirical data became available to sort
conditions, dominant methodologies and ideas tend to out the developmental concepts—the field now seems on
monopolize resources while ignoring or distorting com- the threshold of becoming a true interdisciplinary sci-
peting concepts and disconfirming evidence. Although ence. The longitudinal studies initiated in the 1960s
these efforts tend to self-correct in the long term, they and 1970s in Stockholm by David Magnusson, in Fin-
may create fragmentation and misunderstanding in the land by Lea Pulkinnen, and in England by Michael Rut-
short term. In this regard, efforts to achieve effective ter and David Farrington provided models for United
applications often act as catalysts to bring ideas and States researchers across the last decades of the twenti-
findings to common ground and common standards. eth century. Longitudinal research on children and ado-
lescents has triggered a new revolution in methodology
(e.g., see Duncan, Magnuson, & Ludwig, 2004; Laub &
TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE Sampson, 2004; McArdle & Nesselroade, 2003; Mish-
ler, 2004; Molenaar, 2004; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004;
In June 1994, a Nobel Foundation symposium comprised Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004; von Eye, 1990; von
of noted biologists and psychologists called for an inte- Eye & Bergman, 2003; von Eye & Gutiérrez Peña, 2004;
grated, unified framework for the study of development Willett, 2004). Important findings have been generated
(Magnusson, 1996). No single source or single investi- (e.g., Phelps, Furstenberg, & Colby, 2002; C. H. Young,
gator can be credited, since it has become an interdisci- Savola, & Phelps, 1991). This work has helped the field
plinary, international movement. In the history of the regain the vitality enjoyed in early eras. The multilevel
discipline, this is a singular event. Over the past 100 plus information is now being organized around individuals
years, the insights and emphases of developmental in- in the natural contexts of their lives. When wedded to
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CHAPTER 4

Developmental Epistemology and Implications

for Methodology
JAAN VALSINER

LOOKING AT CHILDREN: ADULTS’ Differentiation and Equilibration: Dynamics

PLAYGROUND 167 of Structures 187
Blinder 1: Monocultural Assumptions 168 James Mark Baldwin and the Developmental Logic
Blinder 2: Reducing Complexity to Socially (Genetic Logic) 187
Accepted Norms 168 Pierre Janet and the Hierarchy of Psychological
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE IN THE MAKING 169 Functions 188
BASICS OF SCIENCE: CONSISTENCY OF Heinz Werner’s Differentiation Model 189
CONCEPTS, PHENOMENA, AND METHODS 170 George Herbert Mead: Coordination of the Self
Intellectual Interdependency of Social Sciences: and the Other 190
Episodic Growth Spurts 170 Mikhail Basov’s Theory of Dynamic Structural Forms 194
Pathways to Objectivity 171 Kurt Lewin’s Topological Psychology 194
Organizing Knowledge Construction: Frames Processes in the Field of Life Space 194
of Reference 173 DYNAMIC APPROACHES IN
Methodology as an Epistemic Cycle 175 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 195
FOUNDATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL Dynamic Systems Theory 195
TH INKING 177 Progressing Equilibration 196
Special Axiomatic Features of Development 177 Development through Disequilibriae: Peirce, Bergson,
Multilevel Nature of Developmental Processes 178 and Piaget 196
DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: Development through “As-If ” Structures Unfolding
RETHINKING MORGAN’S CANON 179 in Time 198
Systemic Causality in the Biological and Post-Piagetian and Post-Vygotskian Models 199
Psychological Worlds 180 CULTURE IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 200
Dynamic Hierarchies in Developmental Processes 182 Focus on Participation 200
Variability Is the Phenomenon and Not an “ Error ” 183 Dialogical Models of the Self 201
CENTRALITY OF FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURING 185 CONCLUSIONS: FROM DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS
Centrality of Transfer and (Synthetic) TO NEW METHODOLOGY 201
Units of Analysis 186 REFERENCES 202
CONSTRUCTING GENERAL MODELS FOR
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 186

[T]he basic law of all mental development [is that] what terms of as they are (nondevelopmental child psychology)
follows always originates from what precedes and never- and as they are in the process of becoming (developmen-
theless appears opposed to it as a new creation . . . every tal psychology). Similarly, other systems—natural or cul-
stage of [this] development is already contained in the pre- tural—can be investigated either as they develop, or as
ceding and is, at the same time, a new phenomenon.
(Wundt, 1900/1973, p. 149)
This chapter benefited from the input from Kurt Fischer,
Child psychology is not necessarily developmental Gilbert Gottlieb, and particularly from the constructive cri-
psychology, and developmental psychology only partially tique of Nancy Budwig, Miguel Gonçalves, and Richard
deals with children. Children can be studied both in Lerner on an earlier version of the manuscript.

166
 Looking at Children: Adults’ Playground 167

they exist in some state of status quo. The study of chil- generalizations about phenomena that are excessively
dren is developmental only if it is done from an axiomatic context specific.
standpoint that highlights processes of transformation This claim that general knowledge can emerge from
and emergence (Valsiner & Connolly, 2003). the study of context-bound, unique phenomena is not a
Children are of social interest in any society—and contradiction of terms. It merely indicates a new chal-
so is the area of child psychology. Over the twentieth lenge to the science: How to find the generality in the
century, child psychology developed in different never-ending flow of particular phenomena?
ways in different societies. Not surprisingly, it is the
cultural-historical niche that children occupy in a given
country at the given time that guides the implementa-
tion of child-oriented social action programs (Salva- LOOKING AT CHILDREN:
tore & Pagano, 2005; Valsiner, 2003d). In Europe, child ADULTS’ PLAYGROUND
psychology was historically built on developmental bi-
ology and reflects the issues of both biological growth We study children in child psychology, yet the questions
and psychological development. In North America, it we ask and how we attempt to answer those questions
was built on the social utility of child-related knowl- remains anchored in our adult psychological concerns.
edge. Child psychology borrowed its focus from the We study infants to prove that certain early psychologi-
child study (paedology) movement—which was from cal functions are precocious—known as “inborn” (see
the beginning an interdisciplinary effort to understand Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume,
children’s ways of being, including development (Hall, on the fallacy of that argument). The contrast of nature
1883). The focus of understanding children was practi- versus nurture haunts child psychology, forcing re-
cal rather than theoretical, and the social utility of searchers into numerous disputes about their role (rather
knowledge about children prevailed over basic science. than leave the contrast behind). For example, we may
Concerns about the welfare of children in a given soci- find the at-risk or delinquent behavior of adolescents—
ety seem to motivate psychologists to study children. smoking, lies, and music videos; often a part of the ex-
In contrast, basic developmental science was built on ploration of their lives (e.g., thrill-seeking: Lightfoot,
empirical knowledge from other species (e.g., ants— 1997)—and investigate these “problems.” Yet, study of
T. C. Schneirla; ducks—G. Gottlieb). development usually ends in young adulthood. Thus,
My goal in this chapter is to demonstrate how our child development textbooks fit under the heading of
contemporary efforts to create general developmental “psychology of adolescents” and are written from the
science can transcend the historically established blind- sociomoral perspective of the parents of these adoles-
ers of child psychology. Developmental science is built cents (Lightfoot, 1997; Valsiner, 2000c, see chap. 13 for
on the comparative perspective (Valsiner, 2001a) in detailed coverage).
three ways: There are curious gaps in unstudied areas. The closer
in age the children comes to the researcher, the less their
1. Contrasting the development (ontogenetic and phylo- development is focused on. We do not include playful-
genetic) of different species, ness of 35-year-olds (or 75-year-olds) in our studies of
development, even if human beings are gregarious all
2. Considering variability within the species (of humans,
through their life course. But there had not been much
first of all—but also those of higher primates), and
attention to adults as developing persons—until the new
3. Emphasizing historical transformations of the minds
areas of “life-span development ” (Baltes, Lindenberger,
and societies.
& Staudinger, 1998; C. Bühler, 1934) and “life-course
development ” (Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this
Knowledge about child development needs a method- Handbook, this volume) emerged. The role of human ac-
ological framework that equally emphasizes the theoret- tion in its cultural contexts is relevant from birth to
ical and empirical sides of investigation. Our research death (see Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook,
efforts are empirical, yet their goal is general knowl- this volume).
edge and not the mere accumulation of data. Science is Child psychology seems to pride itself for being
about universal knowledge—and psychology deals with an empirical science, thus implying a contrast with a
168 Developmental Epistemology and Implications for Methodology

nonempirical approach, whether that be ideological, some forms of such active involvement are intuitively
theoretical, or any other concept. Yet, ironically, such foreign to monoculturally fixated researchers (e.g., Be-
claims allow for various nonempirical limitations— nigni & Valsiner, 1995, discussion of “amoral familism”
conceptual blinders—to guide the discipline. as seen by American political science in Italy). Further-
more, researchers who are “migrants” moving between
Blinder 1: Monocultural Assumptions societies may be “enmeshed” in their professional so-
cialization (which has an emphasis on nonenmeshment)
Child psychology’s writing about children is based on in ways similar to that of their research participants’ en-
the narrow perspective of Western cultural histories meshment in their lay worlds.
and sociomoral concerns; it does not represent knowl-
edge of human children in general. The researchers’
Blinder 2: Reducing Complexity to Socially
social position (usually that of an upwardly mobile
Accepted Norms
middle class—who earns its credentials accepting the
demands of social institutions) looks at the children of Child psychology has encountered a huge variety of de-
other social classes (usually lower in the power hierar- velopmental forms, yet it has failed to develop adequate
chy rather than higher) as something to be modified general theoretical models to explain that complexity
by benevolent actions. This applies both in a societal (Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this vol-
group (e.g., intervention with the children of the disad- ume). The complexity (and dynamics) of developmental
vantaged) and across societies (e.g., bringing Western phenomena calls for the use of different versions of con-
assumptions about the right ways of children’s develop- temporary—mostly qualitative—mathematical models
ment to the villagers in Africa, or immigrant communi- to provide us with general models. Instead, most of child
ties in Europe or North America). psychology continues to thrive on the basis of reduction
Our contemporary cultural psychology has revealed of complexity to averaged data and considering these av-
a “cultural myopia” of Occidental child psychology erages as established general norms.
(Chaudhary, 2004; Rogoff, 2003) so that even our Child psychology repeatedly commits the pars pro
contemporary development of cross-cultural and cul- toto error. For example, looking at a “child in the family
tural psychologies have not overcome the problem. The context ” takes one form of family relations—a neo-
differences between societies are usually seen as local dyadic family where parents dominate, which is
those between children, although those differences historically prominent in Europe and North America—
may begin with the assumptions of adults. There exist and turns it into a generalized norm. As a result, the role
many cross-cultural comparisons that reveal these lim- of grandparents, side relatives, siblings, servants, and
its. In Japan, when the child is troublesome, the typical the like does not remain in focus. When the activities of
message of the Japanese mother is “I am one with such kin group around the child are unavoidable during
you”—a symbiotic relationship. These families are observation, the researchers become puzzled by the “en-
considered “ unhealthy” from the Western psychologi- meshed” nature of the child. Indeed, the enmeshed
cal standpoint: family is the worldwide norm, and the Occidental dif-
ferentiated form is the exception. Instead of looking at
A hypothetical Turkish clinical psychologist, fresh out of
the consequences of the historical nuclearization of
his or her professional training in the United States, who
goes to a Turkish village would face a similar dilemma.
families and the corresponding psychological differenti-
Observing the human relationships there, he or she would ation of the person out of the normal state of “enmesh-
declare the whole village to be enmeshed, with everybody ment ” (i.e., a developmental question), researchers
overlapping with everybody else. (Kagitçibasi, 2003, revert to contrasts between the established final forms
pp. 167–168) of the enmeshed versus the individual ways of being. The
constructed opposites are then ordered with the re-
The world is not normatively segregated into persons searcher’s own evaluation ending up as a positive an-
who are separate from their social contexts. Just the op- chor point.
posite: They are actively enmeshed in those contexts An analogy with evolutionary biology might fit here.
( hence the need for person-context analysis; Magnusson Consider the possibility that all—or most—knowledge
& Stattin, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume), and about primates comes from research laboratories, zoos,
 Developmental Science in the Making 169

or situations where these primates are kept as pets, and velopment requires the movement from child study to
excludes direct observations of these primates in their developmental science.
variety of natural habitats. Empirical knowledge would
accumulate well and be internally coherent but not nec- DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE IN
essarily adequate. Charles Darwin undertook his voyage THE MAKING
on The Beagle precisely to diversify the data set of bio-
logical knowledge base in his time. Our contemporary Ambivalence about development, as innovation together
child psychology’s look at the data from European or with a break in what is known (i.e., a loss), repeated it-
North American specific cultural contexts of the recent self throughout the history of making child psychology
decades, as if that were the norm for children’s ways of developmental in its nature. Implementation of develop-
being in their contexts, would be similar to inferring mental ideas has been slow and filled with a recurrent
norms for animal species at large from zoo animals in erosion of focus (Cairns, 1998, Chapter 3, this Hand-
evolutionary biology. Undoubtedly, animals in zoos, like book, this volume).
professionals in their middle-class environments, live in By the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the
real contexts. Yet, these contexts are specific historical twenty-first century, we witnessed the growth of a new
particulars rather than species’ universal conditions. discipline: developmental science. This new discipline
Direct studies that address processes of development transcended the boundaries of child psychology and ad-
are rare in contemporary child psychology. Reasons for dressed issues of development in general. Its focus was
limited and selective incorporation of developmental on person-context relations (see Magnusson & Stattin,
ideas in child study continue to be closely linked with Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume) and it built on
the ideological and applied demands of society on devel- the general perspective of probabilistic epigenesis (Got-
oping child psychology (Valsiner, 1988). Children and tlieb, 1999; Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, Chapter 5,
adolescents in any society are ideologically guided by this Handbook, this volume).
their elders, as their role has been crucial in economies Since the mid-1990s, the new science has become es-
at every level of economic advancement of societies. tablished in a number of ways. There are now journals,
Children have been participating in societies on both the Developmental Science (since 1998) and Applied Devel-
sides of producers and consumers (Nieuwenhuys, 2003), opmental Science (since 1997), and a new handbook,
buyers and sellers, as well as destroyers and healers. For Handbook of Applied Developmental Science (Lerner,
example, their playful energies are utilized in the selling Jacobs, & Wertlieb, 2003). The label developmental sci-
of newspapers in the streets, or Girl Scout cookies to ence is inherently appealing to our thinking and is rele-
middle-class homes or studying in schools, or—last but vant in our social discourses in which issues of
not least—recruiting child soldiers into armies (Hun- development are progressive for institutional uses.
deide, 2005). The innovating potential of the young is Developmental science is a label meant to hold together
utilized by the social powers to fit their institutional the intellectual rebirth of a general perspective that is
goals—rather than for the sake of the humanity or the oriented toward the study of developmental processes.
rights of the children. Developmental science, as stated in the mid-1990s:
The innovative capacities of the young are not only
human privilege. Juvenile primates invent new actions refers to a fresh synthesis that has been generated to guide
and lead the process of social change (Hirata, Watanabe, research in the social, psychological, and biobehavioral
& Kawai, 2001; Kawamura, 1959). All these tasks entail disciplines. It describes a general orientation for linking
the production of novelty; yet, novelty is also something concepts and findings of hitherto disparate areas of devel-
opmental inquiry, and it emphasizes the dynamic interplay
that by its definition is not pre-controllable. Endorsing
of processes across time frames, levels of analysis, and
development involves both innovation and rupture with
contexts. Time and timing are central to this perspective.
the past, so it may lead to progress or devastation and The time frames employed are relative to the lifetime of
bear substantial risks. Such uncertainty fortifies the the phenomena to be understood. Units of focus can be as
need for knowledge about the future of children’s devel- short as milliseconds, seconds, and minutes, or as long as
opment, giving child psychologists their role in society. years, decades, and millennia. In this perspective, the
Yet such a role remains set up as similar to that of phenomena of individual functioning are viewed at multi-
fortune-tellers—while actual understanding of child de- ple levels—from the subsystems of genetics, neurobiology,
170 Developmental Epistemology and Implications for Methodology

and hormones to those of families, social networks, com- tus needs to be systematically organized and sufficiently
munities, and cultures. (Carolina Consortium on Human generalized. If compared to chemistry, psychology is
Development, 1996, p. 1) somewhere beyond the dominance of alchemy but still
without the deductive rigor of the Mendeleev’s periodic-
As stated, the general developmental orientation is ity table (Brush, 1996). While basic science has empha-
charted on a wide scale, within which the development sized its abstract and formal nature of knowledge,
of human children in their social contexts is but one of without losing touch with critical empirical questions,
the areas of inquiry. The impact of the development psychology has become an empirical science with a
from the Carolina Consortium was prominent in the major loss of abstract generalized knowledge. The so-
fifth edition of this Handbook, and continues to be so in cially embedded nature of the history of psychology can
this edition (e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14; explain the nonmonotonic growth of the discipline.
Cairns, Chapter 3; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12; Got-
tlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, Chapter 5; Magnusson &
Stattin, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume). Intellectual Interdependency of Social
Conceptual difficulties in making sense of develop- Sciences: Episodic Growth Spurts
ment are inevitable in the growth of a science that faces
a most difficult phenomenon—a constantly changing Social sciences develop by intense “ burst periods” in
object of study. The difficulty in the study of develop- different countries (Valsiner, 2003c). In the history of
ment lies in its complexity, dynamic change, and the different countries, there have been demonstrably pro-
lack of a common terminology (Valsiner, 2005b; van ductive rapid growth periods of knowledge and inven-
Geert, 1986, 1988, 1998, 2003). The major theoretical tion of new understanding: the United States in the
question is how to conceptualize this complexity and 1890s and early 1900s, as well as after World War II;
make productive use of psychologists’ mainly empiri- Russia and Germany in the 1920s, and so on (Valsiner &
cal interests for creating a general understanding of van der Veer, 2000).
development.
Child psychologists have been working on a multi- Social Interdependency of Psychology
tude of empirical topics with limited concepts of Psychology has always existed under the influence of the
development. In some cases this need not matter—nonde- societies in which it has been embedded (Dolby, 1977).
velopmental approaches to the study of children as they Throughout the twentieth century, new forms of
are (and not as they are about to become) do not require science-society relations have guided psychology away
the adoption of any developmental theoretical frame- from general theory construction (Benetka, 2002;
work. The discrepancy between the theoretical and em- Danziger, 1990, 1997). Contemporary child psychology
pirical domains in child psychology is scientifically tries to act as if general theory building is of no conse-
deleterious in those cases where the “developmental per- quence for science—a standpoint that may be consid-
spective” is being claimed in the theoretical realm—but ered damaging to the health of any science (Crick,
the empirical research methods are not set up to study 1988). It is the constant movement between empirical
development. This leads to the dissociation of specific and theoretical knowledge construction that guarantees
and general knowledge (Shanahan, Valsiner, & Gottlieb, generalizability in any science (Morgan, 1894). The
1996). General knowledge easily vanishes behind the thinking scientist creates new understanding while op-
myriad of topic- and context-specific empirical findings, erating within the constraints of one’s discipline (Knorr
thus the discipline faces a metaphorical loss of the forest Cetina,1999).
behind the trees. Yet it is the universal, basic knowledge It is not surprising that developmental science has
that is the result of empirical explorations in science— been episodically linked with child psychology in its his-
not mere “accumulation of the data.” tory, and that now, in the beginning of the twenty-first
century, we can look at the whole world again, trying to
BASICS OF SCIENCE: CONSISTENCY OF discover within which rapidly changing society one
CONCEPTS, PHENOMENA, AND METHODS could see developmental science getting a fresh start.
The society within which psychology exists has gen-
Because psychology—developmental as well as nonde- eral worldviews and myths about itself, and the re-
velopmental—is a basic science, its conceptual appara- searchers demonstrate their loyalty to the given society
 Basics of Science: Consistency of Concepts, Phenomena, and Methods 171

by implicitly accepting these assumptions. For example, As another example of such ideological favor, the
the myth of the absolute goodness of Marxism as the middle-class child from the very specific cultural-
basis for all of psychology was the guiding force in Rus- historical conditions of the United States is treated as the
sia during and after the 1920s (Valsiner, 1988). Aside norm, and all other children (of lower socioeconomic sta-
from much ideological refuse produced, this focus also tus as defined in the United States, or from other coun-
gave the world remarkably fresh ideas (such as Vygot- tries) become seen as either negatively ( lagging behind)
sky’s, Basov’s, and Bakhtin’s). Also, the concerns of or anxiously (competitively getting ahead—Indian, Japa-
high culture in the continental European traditions nese, and Chinese schoolchildren in basic sciences) val-
of the nineteenth century led to the formulations of ued deviations. There is a short step from beliefs of
ideas in Ganzheitspsychologie (Diriwächter, 2003) and exceptionalism to practices of colonialism—the quintes-
Gestalt psychology (Ash, 1998). In another example, sential Western modus operandi of the past 200 years.
psychologists’ acceptance of the value of pragmatism in Children other than those from Euri-American middle-
the “progressive era” in the United States led to behav- class background are discursively treated in ways similar
iorist orthodoxy (Watson, 1913). to “ the developing world” with all the implications that
The concentration of most of psychology in the treatment involves (see Escobar, 1995).
United States in the post-World War II era might have
The International Nature
preserved or modified some of these ideas (Valsiner,
of Contemporary Psychology
2005a), but that was no guarantee for their development.
Some aspects of the societal self-mythology led to con- By the beginning of the twenty-first century, contempo-
ceptual and methodological “ blinders” that might not rary developmental science became evenly distributed
have hindered psychology at large, but served to limit around the world; hence, the dependence on any single
developmental science. Thus, a historian of social sci- society became less relevant in this time of ideas. Now,
ence remarks: it is the economic factors of academia that determine the
nature and location of research laboratories, university
Why, in America, was history conflated with nature? The
departments, available academic jobs for developmental
determining factor, I believe, was the national ideology of
American exceptionalism. We are inclined to think of
scientists, and their access to phenomena. But no single
American exceptionalism as a kind of national myth, one society has a monopoly on basic ideas, and their transla-
that began in the exalted language of the Puritan “city tion into empirical research practices bring new knowl-
upon a hill” and today often degenerates into chants of edge, which—if adequate—may allow for application.
“America is number one.” Indeed the mythic idea of At present, one of the sacred cows of psychology’s
America was born in Europe, when inhabitants of what be- socially constructed belief in objectivity is increasingly
came the “old” world turned their imaginations on the under challenge: quantification in psychology, which
“new” one. This mythic America has been given many dif- may be more of an analogue of accounting practices
ferent concrete forms: think of Martin Luther King’s than a scientific tool.
American Dream; or the immigrant dream of success; or
the American mission to make the world safe for democ-
racy. The background to all these versions of our national Pathways to Objectivity
mythology, however, is a belief that America occupies an
exceptional place in history. (Ross, 1993, p. 103)
Quantification has been treated as a given in granting
objectivity to psychology. Cohorts of psychology stu-
Any society is exceptional in its historical unique- dents have been trained to think that quantification is
ness, but some were more conducive to the growth of the via regia to science and that statistical inference is
basic ideas than others. In addition to the United the scientific method. Quantification in psychology has
States, the social-ideological adoption of Marxist di- become a social norm—and a professional imperative—
alectics in Russia in the early Soviet period was also much to the detriment of the focus on phenomena
based on a belief of exceptionalism (e.g., being chosen (Cairns, 1986).
to build communism in a backward country). But this Together with such social transformation comes the
developmentally open philosophical stance saturated narrowing of the questions asking “ what is knowledge”
the social world—from common life to science—and and “ what is methodology.” Psychology has now become
created a favorable ground for cultivating developmen- an intellectual “ hostage” to the “empire of chance”
tal science. (Gigerenzer, 1993). Beginning from the need to study
172 Developmental Epistemology and Implications for Methodology

different children, and empirically chart the ranges of bly not captured by real numbers. Thus, Baldwin’s
existing phenomena, research practices have become claim to eliminate unreflective quantification is not a
dominated by canonical procedures of inductive infer- crusade against mathematical rigor in psychology; in
ence, coded into a socially constructed hybrid version of fact, it would open the door for innovations. The sci-
statistics as “ the scientific method” (Gigerenzer et al., ence of mathematics is in no way limited to statistics—
1989). The axioms on which statistical methods are which, after all, is merely a narrow area within applied
based allow limited use in psychology (Michell, 1999). mathematics. Formal models that developmental psy-
chology may find fitting belong in the qualitative
Quantification in Context branches of mathematics (Valsiner, 1997, chap. 3). For
Quantification in the process of data derivation is a sen- developmental science, new inferential logics are
sitive operation by the researcher that cannot be ac- needed—ones that work on the basis of qualitative data
cepted axiomatically but needs to be proven adequate in (Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this vol-
each case. Quantification is essentially transformation ume). Such logics are both rigorous in their formal
of the first level of derived data (as reflected in nominal sides and remain adequate to the phenomena.
scale, shared by both qualitative and quantitative per-
spectives) into a sequence of possibly more constrained Statistics as a Form of Inductive Logic
levels of data quality (ordinal → interval → ratio The status of statistics as one kind of inductive logic of
scale—see Laird, 2005). Some complex phenomena can inference is not deniable, but it overtakes the whole of
be irreversibly lost in the process of quantification by the scientific method when overgeneralized and consti-
being turned into data that fail to represent these aspects tutes a sociohistorical construction of psychology as sci-
of the phenomena that are crucial for the researcher’s ence. Psychology’s objectivity of knowledge is often
theoretical claims. equated with the use of large numbers of subjects ( large
In any science, the decision to quantify the data—or N), “random sampling,” use of “standardized methods,”
avoid quantification—depends on the research question. differences between averages (and the statistical signif-
Voices against excessive and automatic quantification icances of those differences), and the use of currently en
have been quite loud all through the history of psychol- vogue brand-name data analytic packages. Even if such
ogy. Among others, James Mark Baldwin—by the end characterization of received research practices is some-
of his life—was explicit about the reasons why quantifi- what of a caricature, it refers to a large problem in
cation is a problem for developmental psychology. He psychology’s methodology. Methods are increasingly
proclaimed: segregated from theories, alienated from the phenomena
they are applied to, and compared one to another as if
The . . . quantitative method, brought over into psychology they were opposites This can be observed in preferential
from the exact sciences, physics and chemistry, must be value ascriptions to either quantitative or qualitative
discarded; for its ideal consisted in reducing the more methods, or the belief in the power of standardized
complex to the more simple, the whole into its parts, the
methods—independent of the contexts of their uses.
later-evolved to the earlier-existent, thus denying or elimi-
Standardization primarily takes the form of institu-
nating just the factor which constituted or revealed what
tional attribution of value to the method—and bypasses
was truly genetic. Newer modes of manifestation cannot be
stated in atomic terms without doing violence to the more the issue of how the method produces data out of the
synthetic modes which observation reveals. (Baldwin, original phenomena. Methods have become separate
1930, p. 7, emphases added) items in an eclectic toolbox of psychology from which
they can be taken and applied, rather than tools that are
In a retrospect from the twenty-first century, used to craft new knowledge while carefully preserving
Baldwin’s revolutionary call for de-quantification of the phenomena under study.
psychology’s methodology was precisely right. As
mathematicians who look at what psychologist do often Data: Collected or Derived?
point out, the reduction of all mathematics to merely An alternative view on methodology considers it as a
statistical methods is a serious self-limiting act of pos- dynamic cycle in the construction of general knowledge.
sible creativity. Furthermore, as Rudolph (2006) points It entails mutually linked components of assumptions
out—the reality of psychological phenomena is proba- about the world at large (axioms), specific constructed
 Basics of Science: Consistency of Concepts, Phenomena, and Methods 173

theories of the given target area, understanding of perti- (Valsiner, 2000c, chap. 5). Frames of reference are gen-
nent phenomena, and ways of constructing specific eral conceptual positioning devices within the minds of
methods to transform some aspects of the phenomena researchers who set up their research questions and
into purposefully derived data. Data are always con- construct methods to unify different levels of the
structed—or better—derived from phenomena, on the methodology cycle. The same phenomenon can be stud-
basis of the investigator’s reasoning (Kindermann & ied using the different perspectives specified by the
Valsiner, 1989; Valsiner, 2000b). The data are not col- multiple reference frames. Frames of reference narrow
lected just on the basis of the richness of phenomena but down the focus of empirical research efforts, like the
in accordance with the researcher’s construction of ax- magnification levels in a microscope; while some de-
iomatic and theoretically relevant kinds of data. tails become observable better in selecting a particular
frame, others vanish from the view.
Hypotheses Testing: Theory-Driven versus
The reference frames are necessary and needed
Pseudo-Empirical
“ blinders” or theoretical general orientation tools that
The reliance on abduction in knowledge construction make focusing on our desired object possible, while
provides a new look at the practice of hypotheses testing eliminating distractions. Although four frames can be
in psychology. Empirical proof of a hypothesis is pro- discerned in psychology, two of these are relevant to de-
ductive when it leads to a new idea rather than confir- velopmental science.
mation of an existing concept—which would border on
pseudoempiricism: The Intra-Individual (Intra-Systemic)
Reference Frame
[P]sychological research tends to be pseudoempirical,
that is, it tends to involve empirical studies of relation- The intra-individual frame of reference treats all issues
ships which follow logically from the meanings of the of an individual system’s (e.g., person’s or society’s) or-
concepts involved. An example would be studying ganization as if it is fully determined by relationships
whether all bachelors are really male and unmarried. within the system. Consider an intrinsic organization of
(Smedslund, 1995, p. 196) human (self-reported) personality structure such as
Freud’s construction of generic personality structure as
Child psychology may be vulnerable to the empirical
involving the ideas of id, ego, and superego. These three
demonstration efforts of researchers’ underlying under-
components are located within each person, and their
standings of the issues because children are nonneutral
particular set of relationships gives rise to the immense
objects of investigation. Furthermore, societies create
variety of psychological phenomena of personality-in-
expectations for normal child development, and much of
contexts. For example, the intra-individual frame of ref-
the researchers’ efforts are dedicated to proving that
erence separates the person from the environment, or
persons at the fringes of such norms are of some (spe-
vice versa. A study of the environment as such—not tak-
cial) kind (e.g., the ones at risk for some negative out-
ing into account the environment’s relations with the
come). Pseudoempiricism can be countered by the
persons who inhabit it—could be equally expressed
careful elucidation of theoretical assumptions and their
within the intra-individual frame.
linkages with research questions that provide the inves-
tigator new knowledge that cannot be derived from the The Inter-Individual (Inter-Systemic)
meanings of the terms in use. Reference Frame
In contrast, deductively generated (i.e., theories-
This frame involves comparison of features that are pro-
based) hypotheses would highlight the role of empirical
jected into the systems on the basis of external features
investigation for science. When a hypothesis is set
of the projected characteristics that differ between the
within any of the following four reference frames, the
systems. In contrast with the intra-systemic frame, the
empirical efforts acquire vertically consistent meaning.
focus here is removed from the projection itself (which
is taken for granted) to the differences in the “expres-
Organizing Knowledge Construction: Frames
sions” of the projected characteristics from one system
of Reference
to another.
We preset our research efforts within the framework This reference frame is most widely used in psychol-
of wide general perspectives—frames of reference ogy. It involves comparisons of individuals (e.g., “Mary
174 Developmental Epistemology and Implications for Methodology

does better than Susie on test X”), or samples of sub- isons. Not only is the finding “Johnny does better than
jects (e.g., males and females). It is assumed the parties Jimmy in math” a statement about differences between
compared have some characteristics inherent in them- the two children but it also simultaneously reflects the
selves, but in a dif ferent quantity than in the others. So, claimer’s evaluative preference. Why is it assumed that
comparing males and females on the characteristic of having a higher score on a math test is “ better ” than
“aggressiveness” presumes that the quality of that char- having a lower score? This belief is encoded into our col-
acteristic is the same for men and women, but that its lective cultural-meaning system of seeing educational
quantity may differ in some systematic way between the achievement as valuable.
two genders.
The inter-individual frame of reference is widely The Individual-Ecological Reference Frame
popular in psychology—a discipline with idealized The individual-ecological frame of reference considers a
quantitative tactics of data construction—which makes system (e.g., person, social group, community) that is
comparisons between “more” and “less” “ having X” the focus of attention of the investigator as that system
cases an appealing and easy empirical research goal. acts on its environment and as the results of such action
Yet, such popularity is increasingly viewed as an obsta- participate in the transformation of the system. This
cle for science (Essex & Smythe, 1999; Smyth, 2001) reference frame involves mutual consideration of the
because it obscures a number of relevant aspects of the person and the environment and focuses on their rela-
phenomena: their systemic organization, their stability tionship. It allows a glimpse into the goal-oriented ac-
and dynamics, and finally, their development. The use of tions of the person who acts on the environment with
the inter-individual reference frame guarantees that ac- some future-oriented purpose (e.g., solving a problem).
cess to processes of development is denied by the very The action results in feedback from the changed envi-
actions of the researcher. ronment on the person. That feedback participates in the
The result of the use of this reference frame is change of the person into a new state.
demonstrated by the difference between the compared Human development through problem-solving activi-
subjects and usually fortified by statistical safeguards to ties, over the whole life span, is a realistic phenomenon
grant solidity to the finding (i.e., its replicability in the that can be studied through the use of individual-
overwhelming majority of similar samples, randomly ecological frame. Each problem for our actions is given
drawn). It is in the use of the inter-individual reference by some problem situation in a here-and-now setting.
frame that statistical methods are adequately usable be- We set up a goal (desired solution) and try to act toward
cause the assumptions of this frame and those of statis- reaching that goal. The process of trying will lead to
tics fit in a vertically consistent way (see Figure 4.1). modification of ourselves; we transform due to the
The inter-individual frame of reference relies on exchange relation with the problem situation. The goal-
human propensity for evaluative competitive compar- oriented, problem-solving effort is the context for de-
velopment of the problem solver. It is not necessary to
General Assumptions compare the problem solver with others of the kind
(this was the focus of the inter-systemic reference
frame), but the process of unfolding of solutions
Theories Intuitive Phenomena
Experiencing and construction of novel ones is the focus area of the
individual-ecological frame.

The Individual-Socioecological Reference Frame

Methods
The individual-socioecological reference frame is an ex-
tension of the individual-ecological one. It includes both
Data
the focus on system ←→ environment and the role of
others’ social regulation of that relationship. The devel-
Figure 4.1 The basic structure of methodology as a cycle.
Source: From “Changing Methodologies: A Co-Constructivist oping person faces one’s environment, acts on it, and
Study of Goal Orientations in Social Interactions,” by A. U. transforms oneself. However, the environment is largely
Branco and J. Valsiner, 1997, Psychology and Developing Soci- pre-prepared by another person (e.g., parents set up “ap-
eties, 9(1), pp. 35–64. propriate environments” for children), and the person’s
 Basics of Science: Consistency of Concepts, Phenomena, and Methods 175

acting within an environment is socially guided in ex- statistical relationships between two features of static
plicit and implicit ways. being (a person “ has” attachment type A, B, or C, and
The individual-socioecological reference frame that predicts some “state of affairs” over time).
thus includes the same features as the individual- Translation of the research questions from dynamic
ecological frame: and developmental ones into static ontological ones is
rampant in psychology. This process happens due to the
• An active person social constraints from the use of conventionalized
• Environment methods and data analytic strategies in the research pro-
• Person’s acting toward the environment cess. Efforts to “predict behavior ” lead to the verifica-
tion of essentialist stability of such behavior and its
What distinguishes this frame is: mental derivates (thoughts, beliefs, values) rather than
to the investigation of the processes of behaving, think-
• The guiding role of somebody else acting to coordi- ing, believing, and valuing. As Wittgenstein pointed out
nate person environment relationships ( be it another years ago, a conceptual confusion reigns in psychology,
person, social institution, or a symbolic object within resulting in the “problem and method passing one an-
the environment) other by” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 232).
• The transformation of the person as a result of this
socially guided action Methodology as an Epistemic Cycle

The researcher who adopts the individual-socioeco- The components in the methodology process cycle (see
logical reference frame would study the same phenome- Figure 4.1) are depicted as existing at different levels of
non that a user of the individual-ecological frame might generality: The axiomatic views of the world (general
study, yet do it differently. In the individual-socioeco- assumptions) are more general than theories or intuitive
logical frame, the researcher needs to analyze the struc- reflections about phenomena, and the latter is more gen-
ture of social suggestions that exist in the encounter eral than the methods that generate data.
between the person and the environment. Some of these In this scheme of scientific epistemology, an empha-
suggestions are encoded into the environment itself, oth- sis is reserved for the subjectivity of the researcher who
ers are produced by the other persons who are active in intuitively experiences phenomena in connection with
the same environment, regulating the person’s conduct his or her axioms and constructs theories from a per-
in it (see elaborations in Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter sonal standpoint. Scientists are not feelingless robots
8, this Handbook, this volume). but subjective, personally involved human beings who
have their subjective preferences and positions from
Consensual Habit: Changing the Question which they look at their research.
Very often, empirical research practices replace one All new models representing an object of investiga-
frame of reference (Valsiner, 2000c, chap. 5) with an- tion are created by subjective individuals—usually in
other. For example, the phenomena of mother-infant mu- their privacy of introspection, but at times through their
tual bonding is a relevant aspect of human relationships immersion in the group of like-minded thinkers. Immer-
detectable across country, time, and context. In contrast, sion in a group results in intellectual interdependency
the abstracted use of infants’ (or mothers’) attachment (see Valsiner & van der Veer, 2000) both among and be-
type (A, B, C, or other) as de facto personality charac- tween scientists, as well as in the societies they inhabit.
teristics that predict some future state of the children The methods and the data are constructed by the re-
(or mothers) shows a loss of the basic question of attach- searcher on the basis of the specific structure of the pro-
ment (as a relationship that is a basis for becoming) and cess cycle. Methodology here is equal to the cyclical
its replacement by another question (that of prediction process of general knowledge construction, where dif-
of a future way of being on the basis of general attach- ferent parts of the cycle feed into other parts. It would
ment traits—the earlier way of being). What at first was be appropriate to depict Figure 4.1 not merely as a cycle
a dynamic phenomenon (the process of mother and in- but also as a helix; there is never a full return to the pre-
fant relating with each other to form a functional affec- viously generated knowledge, even if there may be out-
tive bond) becomes changed into a question of formal ward resemblance between what is new and what is old.
176 Developmental Epistemology and Implications for Methodology

Such helical development of scientific knowledge allows Axiomatic System A Axiomatic System B
us to benefit from the history of ideas, a need to make
sense of a basic issue (such as development) in the pres-
ent leads us to look back in the history for times when Theory A Theory B
similar needs were detected. An analysis of the “ turns”
in the nonlinear development of the helix of knowledge
may allow us to avoid creating similar pitfalls in our Method A1, A2, A3 Method B1, B2, B3
current science.1

Two Kinds of Consistencies Phenomenon A Phenomenon B

The major role of methodology in any science is in grant- Figure 4.2 Vertical and horizontal consistency in methodology.
ing consistency between the abstract /theoretical and em-
pirical /concrete facets of the research process, keeping in “ worse”—than qualitative ones) or social censorship
close touch with the phenomena that are the object of (“ you’ll never get your papers published if you use such
investigation (Branco & Valsiner, 1997; Cairns, 1986; methods”). In contrast, the same question answered
Winegar & Valsiner, 1992). Developmental psychology with vertical consistency requires an analysis of
has been in a severe methodological crisis over recent whether the method preserves relevant aspects of the in-
decades because in most cases its empirical enterprise vestigator’s desired phenomena. For example, intelli-
and assumed theoretical stance have not been consistent gence test items, or personality inventory items,
with one another (Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar, Huizenga, separated from their respective “standardized meth-
& Nesselroade, 2003; Smedslund, 1994; Valsiner, 1997, ods,” can be productively used to study specific ques-
chap. 3). Vertical consistency between assumptions, theo- tions of the cognitive processes of children (Piaget,
ries, methods, data, and phenomena is necessary for valid 1922) or the adult self-construction processes (Valsiner,
knowledge construction. In its stead, we see many efforts Diriwächter, & Sauck, 2004). The problem-solving tasks
to create horizontal consistency at different levels: be- of such methods gain access to specific psychological
tween varied methods (standardization of fixed methods, processes; dequantification of existing quantitative
empirical validation of methods based on other methods), methods is a promising area of research.
between theories (clashes between proponents of theo-
Objectivity through Subjectivity
ries), and between worldviews (see Figure 4.2; broken ar-
rows denote horizontal and solid arrows show vertical The actual process of knowledge construction entails
consistency). human subjectivity—for example, that of the scientist in
It is the vertical consistency that matters for scien- relation to the objective reality. Science operates
tific knowledge, although most of the social organiza- through the integration of empirical /inductive and theo-
tion of psychology is dedicated to discussions along the retical /deductive lines or of “ two inductions” in the
lines of horizontal consistency. So, questions about the terms of C. L. Morgan (Morgan, 1894, chap. 5, 2003;
“right methods” for the study of X when answered with Valsiner, 2003a). Morgan’s epistemological scheme is
horizontal consistency lead to answers of either subjec- worth closer attention (see Figure 4.3).
tive evaluation (quantitative methods are “ better ”—or The scientist (psychologist) is constantly operating
on an intramental understanding—the “ first induction”
or “subjective induction”—of what is being studied, how
1
As an example, consider our contemporary renewed interest to study it, and what to expect. Here the role of a philoso-
in the brain localization of different mental functions,
pher and psychologist converge: Both rely on their pow-
brought to fashion by technological advances (functional
ers of thinking to make sense of some phenomenon.
magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]). The research questions
about functional localization in the deep structures of the
However, the scientist moves, differently from
brain, remains similar to the question phrenologists posed— philosophers, away from such intrapsychological reflec-
only in respect to the skull. Modern neuroscience reenacts tion to gain knowledge through observing others
some version of “intracranial phrenology”—thus, actually (through extrospection). The results of such observation
denying the science the potentially great benefits that new lead to the “second induction” or “objective induction.”
technology affords in principle. The second induction is the process of relying on the
 Foundations of Developmental Thinking 177

knowledge base—Valsiner, 2000c, 2001a), across

human history (Stearns & Lewis, 1998), across life
course (Brandtstädter, Chapter 10; Elder & Shanahan,
Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume), and across
species (Matsuzawa, 2001). The interdisciplinary na-
ture of developmental science is itself created by gener-
alization of this knowledge.

Special Axiomatic Features of Development

The ability to maintain consistently a developmental

viewpoint in child (or adult) psychology is constrained
by four fundamental conditions:

1. The irreversible nature of development based on the

irreversibility of time (Bergson, 1907/1911; Pri-
gogine, 1973)
Figure 4.3 C. L. Morgan’s scheme of two inductions.
2. The complex, yet dynamic and often ill-defined, na-
Source: From An Introduction to Comparative Psychology, by ture of the developing structure (organism, person,
C. L. Morgan, 1894, London: Walter Scott. social network, community, etc.) and its equally dy-
namic and structured environment (Bronfenbrenner,
empirical evidence emphasized in psychology. Here the 1979; Bronfenbrenner & Crouter, 1983; Bronfen-
scientist resembles a writer, composer, or painter—all brenner & Morris, 1998; Magnusson and Stattin,
of whom, in their own ways, rely on the experiences with Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume)
the outside world to create a new form of understanding. 3. The multilevel nature of the developing system and
the environment (Gottlieb, 1992, 2003; Lerner, 1991)
Knowledge Creation as Abductive Process
4. The focus on variability in person-environment rela-
Without the first induction, the second induction is un- tionships as phenomenon (rather than error), and the
able to make sense of the world; both work together. The analysis of new qualitative forms of development that
crucial question is how the two inductions meet. Mor- emerge from these relations (Fischer & Bidell, Chap-
gan’s effort was to demonstrate that the unity of both in- ter 7; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter 8, this Hand-
ductions is necessary for scientific inference. book, this volume; Molenaar et al., 2003; Valsiner,
New knowledge emerges from the unity of inductive 1987, 2004a)
processes through abduction. Abduction is a process of
creative synthesis—a qualitative “leap” of our under- None of these four features of psychological phenom-
standing—into a new general state of knowing (Peirce, ena are obligatory for nondevelopmental areas of psy-
1892, 1935). As such, scientific knowledge goes beyond chology. Traditions in nondevelopmental psychology can
the commonsense knowledge of any society rather than succeed by ignoring both the irreversibility of time and
follow it. The conceptual frameworks of developmental the structure of the phenomena.
science need such creative synthesis.
Development as Construction of New Forms
Development can be defined as the constructive trans-
FOUNDATIONS OF formation of form in irreversible time through the pro-
DEVELOPMENTAL THINKING cess of organism ←→ environment interchange. The
emphasis on novelty construction in development is
Developmental science attempts to transcend our West- based on the basic assumption of the open-systemic na-
ern culturally structured knowledge of children. In that ture of development (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Lerner,
effort, it extends itself toward understanding human de- 1978, 1984; Valsiner, 1987). All biological, psychologi-
velopment within varied societies (comparative-cultural cal, and social organisms exist and develop only because
178 Developmental Epistemology and Implications for Methodology

of their permanent exchange relations with their envi- developmental transformations that occur in milli- or
ronments. Hence, models that explain processes of de- microseconds.
velopment are those that either imply their dynamic The hierarchical systems view of developmental
interchange or take it into account in direct ways. Devel- processes is elaborated in the theory of probabilistic
opmental phenomena are self-organizing systems rather epigenesis (Gottlieb, 1997, 1999, 2003; Gottlieb et al.,
than ontological objects (Allen, 1981; Jantsch, 1980). Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume). In addition to
the fourfold separation of the levels of organization (ge-
Developmental and Nondevelopmental Perspectives
netic activity, neural activity, behavior, and environ-
In the most general terms, nondevelopmental and devel- ment), the phenomena of human psychology require
opmental perspectives are opposites that deal with further differentiation beyond the behavioral level,
the same phenomena. They can be contrasted, but not through the inclusion of higher mental functions in the
eclectically mixed (Branco & Valsiner, 1997; Valsiner, scheme (see Figure 4.4).
2000c). The nondevelopmental perspective is based on Figure 4.4 reminds us about the systemic hierarchical
the axiom of identity: organization of all living systems. The issue at stake for
science is not whether there are levels (a “ yes” verdict is
X = [is] = X axiomatically given here), or their ontological structure
(e.g., the nature of thought or affect). How many levels
Questions of development are ruled out from are posited depends on the theoretical intentions of the
that axiomatic basis. In contrast, the developmental researcher. The levels are conceptual organizing devices
perspective is based on the axiom of becoming, which that keep the researcher from assuming the unstructured
takes two forms: field of “ variables” of various kinds. Development en-
tails the coordination of structures of functioning
X → [becomes] → Y processes. In such hierarchical systems the notion of
X → [remains] → X causality takes on a new meaning—the whole system of
multilevel processes becomes the “general cause” for
The axiom X → [remains] → X is not the same as the development. In it, the higher order levels of organiza-
identity axiom of nondevelopmental perspectives—X = tion execute control over lower levels (cf. the issue of
[is] = X. Being is conceptualized as an ontological en- “downward causation”; Moreno & Umerez, 2000). At
tity, while remaining, as a process of maintaining an the same time, these “causal effects” are never linear
emerged state of the system, is implied. Both becoming mechanical “causal arrows,” but entail negotiation be-
and remaining are processes that guarantee both relative tween the levels of organization. Such causal processes
stability and change in development. In the case of re- are in effect processes of buffering between the levels.
maining, the system maintained in its general form de-
pends on constant innovation of the form by new parts.
Higher Mental
Biological organisms maintain themselves by both new Functions
E (Affective
cell production and old cell death, while the form (the Cognition)
structure of the organism) in general remains the same.
A D Behavior
Multilevel Nature of Developmental Processes

Developmental science investigates transformation of Neural

B Activity
structures at different levels of generality: phylogeny,
cultural history, ontogenesis, and microgenesis. Each of
these levels of processes are characterized by its own Genetic
C Activity
functional time unit; for instance, a period of 1 million
years in phylogeny may be a reasonable time frame,
Time Present
while in cultural history 500 years may suffice. On-
togeny is limited to the maximum length of the organ- Figure 4.4 An organizational scheme of parallel processes
ism’s lifetime, while microgenesis may be limited to involved in development.
 Developmental Systems Analysis: Rethinking Morgan’s Canon 179

However, independent of how many and which levels Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume; use of a “catas-
of organization are described by authors, the crucial trophe theory” in looking at marriage, Gottmann, Mur-
feature of development of organisms remains the exis- ray, Swanson, Tyson, & Swanson, 2002; use of systemic
tence of qualitatively different levels of organization. cycles in family, Stratton, 2003). A conclusive step here
would be the unification of qualitative and quantitative
Dynamic Order in Hierarchical Complexity sides of developmental transformation—something from
One issue of developmental science includes how the the realm of chemical reactions (Prigogine, 1973) car-
relations between adjacent levels are organized.2 Let ried over to developmental science.
us begin from recognizing development as a systemic, Third, the explanation of maintenance of coherently
multilevel process: functioning whole, the structure that sets the stage for
further development under some ( but not other) circum-
Individual human development involves incremental and stances, requires a basic reformulation of causality in
transformational processes that, through a f low of interac- open systems.
tions among current characteristics of the person and his Psychology mixes the levels of functional organiza-
or her current contexts, produces a succession of relatively tion of systems, and child psychology in its sociomoral
enduring changes that elaborate or increase the diversity vulnerabilities has contributed greatly to such
of the person’s structural and functional characteristics
confusion. Interestingly, it is the most biologically as-
and the patterns of their environmental interactions
tute—bordering on developmental science—part of
while maintaining coherent organization and structural-
functional unity of the person as a whole. (Ford & Lerner,
psychology, “evolutionary psychology,” that has been at
1992, p. 49, emphases added) the forefront for creating such confusions (Crawford &
Krebs, 1998; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003a, 2003b).
If the previous framework is consistently put to prac- Arguments within evolutionary frameworks leap over
tice in child psychology, it leads to basic reorganization the biological, psychological, and social phenomena or-
of the methodology of psychology. Each of the empha- ganizational levels, as if the world were one primordial
sized facets of this definition indicates a need to recon- soup in which all organisms are trying to cheat the oth-
ceptualize child psychology’s socially conventional ers by gaining the upper hand for the control of re-
ways of deriving the data from phenomena (Kindermann sources (Strout, 2006). The environments of species
& Valsiner, 1989). are sufficiently different, even if they “share” the same
First, the f low of interactions between person and con- habitat, that human higher psychological functions (of
text leads to the necessity of utilizing time-preserving an- morality, values, and meanings) cannot be explained
alytic units in the empirical research. Such units would through evolutionary psychology unless these models
be characterized by time-based description of transfor- honor the hierarchical—yet mutually inclusive—sepa-
mation of the phenomenon under study in a specifiable di- ration of levels of organization.3
rection. Ford and Lerner (1992, pp. 140–142) formulate
behavior episode schemata as an example of time-based
units of analysis. In repeated everyday life contexts, per- DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS:
sons construct generalized schemata that would guide RETHINKING MORGAN’S CANON
their actions in similar-looking settings, depending on
their goals. The emphasis on the irreversible, constructive, and hierar-
Second, the focus on sequential transformation calls chically redundant nature of development necessitates
for developing new techniques for both qualitative and clear methodological ground rules through which ex-
quantitative analyses of complex developing systems planation of development is possible. The “principle
(e.g., the use of a web metaphor—Fischer & Bidell, of parsimony” (“Morgan’s Canon”) has served as the

2 3
This point is relevant in the wake of abuses of the human Imanishi (2002, p. 43) provides a nice comparison with
genome discoveries—it has become tempting to link the ge- grasshoppers: “Where we see a steppe, the grasshopper may
netic level of organization with complex psychological phe- see a forest.” This continues the classic von Uexküll (1957)
nomena (e.g., claims of discovery of “ the gene” for intelligence demonstration of varied perceptual inputs of different
or schizophrenia). species.