consciousness is its negative power, by which we

Jean Paul Sartre: can experience "nothingness." This power is

also at work within the self, where it creates an
Existentialism intrinsic lack of self-identity. So the unity of the
self is understood as a task for the for-itself
rather than as a given.
In order to ground itself, the self needs projects,
which can be viewed as aspects of an
individual’s fundamental project and motivated
by a desire for "being" lying within the
individual's consciousness. The source of this
project is a spontaneous original choice that
depends on the individual's freedom. However,
self’s choice may lead to a project of self-
deception such as bad faith, where one’s own
The real nature as for-itself is discarded to adopt
philosophical career of Jean Paul Sartre (1905- that of the in-itself. Our only way to escape self-
1980) focuses, in its first phase, upon the deception is authenticity, that is, choosing in a
construction of a philosophy of existence known way which reveals the existence of the for-itself
as existentialism. Sartre's early works are as both factual and transcendent. For Sartre, my
characterized by a development of proper exercise of freedom creates values that
classic phenomenology, but his reflection any other human being placed in my situation
diverges from Husserl’s on methodology, the could experience, therefore each authentic
conception of the self, and an interest in ethics. project expresses a universal dimension in the
These points of divergence are the cornerstones singularity of a human life.
of Sartre’s existential phenomenology, whose
purpose is to understand human existence After a brief summary of Sartre’s life, this article
rather than the world as such. Adopting and looks at the main themes characterizing Sartre’s
adapting the methods of phenomenology, Sartre early philosophical works. The ontology
sets out to develop an ontological account of developed in Sartre’s main existential
what it is to be human. The main features of this work, Being and Nothingness, will then be
ontology are the groundlessness and radical analysed. Finally, an overview is provided of the
freedom which characterize the human further development of existentialist themes in
condition. These are contrasted with the his later works.
unproblematic being of the world of things.
Sartre’s substantial literary output adds
dramatic expression to the always unstable co-
existence of facts and freedom in an indifferent
Table of Contents
world. 1. Sartre's Life
Sartre’s ontology is explained in his 2. Early Works
philosophical masterpiece, Being and a. Methodology
Nothingness, where he defines two types of b. The Ego
reality which lie beyond our conscious c. Ethics
experience: the being of the object of d. Existential Phenomenology
consciousness and that of consciousness itself. 3. The Ontology of Being and Nothingness
The object of consciousness exists as "in-itself," . The Being of the Phenomenon and
that is, in an independent and non-relational Consciousness
way. However, consciousness is always a. Two Types of Being
b. Nothingness
consciousness “of something,” so it is defined in
4. The For-Itself in Being and Nothingness
relation to something else, and it is not possible . A Lack of Self-Identity
to grasp it within a conscious experience: it a. The Project of Bad Faith
exists as "for-itself." An essential feature of b. The Fundamental Project
 c. Desire on it, Sartre published the Critique of Dialectical
5. Relations with Others in Being and Nothingness Reason. In the Fifties and Sixties, Sartre
. The Problem of Other Minds travelled to the USSR, Cuba, and was involved
a. Human Relationships in turn in promoting Marxist ideas, condemning
6. Authenticity the USSR's invasion of Hungary and
. Freedom
Czechoslovakia, and speaking up against
a. Authenticity
b. An Ethical Dimension France's policies in Algeria. He was a high
7. Other Contributions to Existential profile figure in the Peace Movement. In 1964,
Phenomenology he turned down the Nobel prize for literature.
. Critique of Dialectical Reason He was actively involved in the May 1968
a. The Problem of Method uprising. His study of Flaubert, L'Idiot de la
8. Conclusion Famille, was published in 1971. In 1977, he
9. References claimed no longer to be a Marxist, but his
. Sartre's works political activity continued until his death in
a. Commentaries 1980.
1. Sartre's Life 2. Early Works
Sartre was born in 1905 in Paris. After a Sartre's early work is characterised by
childhood marked by the early death of his phenomenological analyses involving his own
father, the important role played by his interpretation of Husserl's method. Sartre's
grandfather, and some rather unhappy methodology is Husserlian (as demonstrated in
experiences at school, Sartre finished High his paper "Intentionality: a fundamental ideal of
School at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris. After two Husserl's phenomenology") insofar as it is a
years of preparation, he gained entrance to the form of intentional and eidetic analysis. This
prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieure, where, means that the acts by which consciousness
from 1924 to 1929 he came into contact with assigns meaning to objects are what is analysed,
Raymond Aron, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice and that what is sought in the particular
Merleau-Ponty and other notables. He passed the examples under examination is their essential
'Agrégation' on his second attempt, by adapting structure. At the core of this methodology is a
the content and style of his writing to the rather conception of consciousness as intentional, that
traditional requirements of the examiners. This is, as 'about' something, a conception inherited
was his passport to a teaching career. After from Brentano and Husserl. Sartre puts his own
teaching philosophy in a lycée in Le Havre, he mark on this view by presenting consciousness
obtained a grant to study at the French Institute as being transparent, i.e. having no 'inside', but
in Berlin where he discovered phenomenology rather as being a 'fleeing' towards the world.
in 1933 and wrote The Transcendence of the Ego.
His phenomenological investigation into the
The distinctiveness of Sartre's development of
imagination was published in 1936 and
Husserl's phenomenology can be characterised
his Theory of Emotions two years later. During
in terms of Sartre's methodology, of his view of
the Second World War, Sartre wrote his
the self and of his ultimate ethical interests.
existentialist magnum opus Being and
Nothingness and taught the work of Heidegger in
a war camp. He was briefly involved in a
Resistance group and taught in a lycée until the a. Methodology
end of the war. Being and Nothingness was
Sartre's methodology differs from Husserl's in
published in 1943 and Existentialism and
two essential ways. Although he thinks of his
Humanism in 1946. His study of Baudelaire was
analyses as eidetic, he has no real interest in
published in 1947 and that of the actor Jean
Husserl's understanding of his method as
Genet in 1952. Throughout the Thirties and
uncovering the Essence of things. For Husserl,
Forties, Sartre also had an abundant literary
eidetic analysis is a clarification which brings
output with such novels as Nausea and plays
out the higher level of the essence that is hidden
like Intimacy (The wall), The flies, Huis Clos, Les
in 'fluid unclarity' (Husserl, Ideas, I). For Sartre,
Mains Sales. In 1960, after three years working
the task of an eidetic analysis does not deliver
something fixed immanent to the phenomenon. must be able to accompany any representation
It still claims to uncover that which is essential, of which I am conscious, but reified this 'I' into
but thereby recognizes that phenomenal a transcendental ego. Such a move is not
experience is essentially fluid. warranted for Sartre, as he explains in The
Transcendence of the Ego. Moreover, it leads to
In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre the following problems for our
replaces the traditional picture of the passivity phenomenological analysis of consciousness.
of our emotional nature with one of the subject's The ego would have to feature as an object in all
active participation in her emotional states of consciousness. This would result in its
experiences. Emotion originates in a obstructing our conscious access to the world.
degradation of consciousness faced with a But this would conflict with the direct nature of
certain situation. The spontaneous conscious this conscious access. Correlatively,
grasp of the situation which characterizes an consciousness would be divided into
emotion, involves what Sartre describes as a consciousness of ego and consciousness of the
'magical' transformation of the situation. Faced world. This would however be at odds with the
with an object which poses an insurmountable simple, and thus undivided, nature of our access
problem, the subject attempts to view it to the world through conscious experience. In
differently, as though it were magically other words, when I am conscious of a tree, I am
transformed. Thus an imminent extreme danger directly conscious of it, and am not myself an
may cause me to faint so that the object of my object of consciousness. Sartre proposes
fear is no longer in my conscious grasp. Or, in therefore to view the ego as a unity produced by
the case of wrath against an unmovable consciousness. In other words, he adds to the
obstacle, I may hit it as though the world were Humean picture of the self as a bundle of
such that this action could lead to its removal. perceptions, an account of its unity. This unity
The essence of an emotional state is thus not an of the ego is a product of conscious activity. As a
immanent feature of the mental world, but result, the traditional Cartesian view that self-
rather a transformation of the subject's consciousness is the consciousness the ego has
perspective upon the world. In The Psychology of of itself no longer holds, since the ego is not
the Imagination, Sartre demonstrates his given but created by consciousness. What model
phenomenological method by using it to take on does Sartre propose for our understanding of
the traditional view that to imagine something self-consciousness and the production of the
is to have a picture of it in mind. Sartre's account ego through conscious activity? The key to
of imagining does away with representations answering the first part of the question lies in
and potentially allows for a direct access to that Sartre's introduction of a pre-reflective level,
which is imagined; when this object does not while the second can then be addressed by
exist, there is still an intention (albeit examining conscious activity at the other level,
unsuccessful) to become conscious of it through i.e. that of reflection. An example of pre-
the imagination. So there is no internal reflective consciousness is the seeing of a house.
structure to the imagination. It is rather a form This type of consciousness is directed to a
of directedness upon the imagined object. transcendent object, but this does not involve
Imagining a heffalump is thus of the same my focussing upon it, i.e. it does not require that
nature as perceiving an elephant. Both are an ego be involved in a conscious relation to the
spontaneous intentional (or directed) acts, each object. For Sartre, this pre-reflective
with its own type of intentionality. consciousness is thus impersonal: there is no
place for an 'I' at this level. Importantly, Sartre
b. The Ego insists that self-consciousness is involved in any
Sartre's view also diverges from Husserl's on the such state of consciousness: it is the
important issue of the ego. For Sartre, Husserl consciousness this state has of itself. This
adopted the view that the subject is a substance accounts for the phenomenology of 'seeing',
with attributes, as a result of his interpretation which is such that the subject is clearly aware of
of Kant's unity of apperception. Husserl her pre-reflective consciousness of the house.
endorsed the Kantian claim that the 'I think' This awareness does not have an ego as its
object, but it is rather the awareness that there claim that the agent is responsible for the pre-
is an act of 'seeing'. Reflective consciousness is reflective transformation of his consciousness
the type of state of consciousness involved in my through emotion. In the case of the imaginary,
looking at a house. For Sartre, the cogito the traditional view of the power of fancy to
emerges as a result of consciousness's being overcome rational thought is replaced by one of
directed upon the pre-reflectively conscious. In imaginary consciousness as a form of pre-
so doing, reflective consciousness takes the pre- reflective consciousness. As such, it is therefore
reflectively conscious as being mine. It thus again the result of the spontaneity of
reveals an ego insofar as an 'I' is brought into consciousness and involves self-conscious
focus: the pre-reflective consciousness which is states of mind. An individual is therefore fully
objectified is viewed as mine. This 'I' is the responsible for his imaginations's activity. In all
correlate of the unity that I impose upon the three cases, a key factor in Sartre's account is his
pre-reflective states of consciousness through notion of the spontaneity of consciousness. To
my reflection upon them. To account for the dispel the apparent counter-intuitiveness of the
prevalence of the Cartesian picture, Sartre claims that emotional states and flights of
argues that we are prone to the illusion that this imagination are active, and thus to provide an
'I' was in fact already present prior to the account that does justice to the phenomenology
reflective conscious act, i.e. present at the pre- of these states, spontaneity must be clearly
reflective level. By substituting his model of a distinguished from a voluntary act. A voluntary
two-tiered consciousness for this traditional act involves reflective consciousness that is
picture, Sartre provides an account of self- connected with the will; spontaneity is a feature
consciousness that does not rely upon a pre- of pre-reflective consciousness.
existing ego, and shows how an ego is
constructed in reflection.
d. Existential Phenomenology
Is there a common thread to these specific
c. Ethics features of Sartre's phenomenological
An important feature of Sartre's approach? Sartre's choice of topics for
phenomenological work is that his ultimate phenomenological analysis suggests an interest
interest in carrying out phenomenological in the phenomenology of what it is to be human,
analyses is an ethical one. Through them, he rather than in the world as such. This privileging
opposes the view, which is for instance that of of the human dimension has parallels with
the Freudian theory of the unconscious, that Heidegger's focus upon Dasein in tackling the
there are psychological factors that are beyond question of Being. This aspect of Heidegger's
the grasp of our consciousness and thus are work is that which can properly be called
potential excuses for certain forms of behaviour. existential insofar as Dasein's way of being is
essentially distinct from that of any other being.
Starting with Sartre's account of the ego, this is This characterisation is particularly apt for
characterised by the claim that it is produced by, Sartre's work, in that his phenomenological
rather than prior to consciousness. As a result, analyses do not serve a deeper ontological
accounts of agency cannot appeal to a pre- purpose as they do for Heidegger who distanced
existing ego to explain certain forms of himself from any existential labelling. Thus, in
behaviour. Rather, conscious acts are his "Letter on Humanism", Heidegger reminds
spontaneous, and since all pre-reflective us that the analysis of Dasein is only one chapter
consciousness is transparent to itself, the agent in the enquiry into the question of Being. For
is fully responsible for them (and a fortiori for Heidegger, Sartre's humanism is one more
his ego). In Sartre's analysis of emotions, metaphysical perspective which does not return
affective consciousness is a form of pre- to the deeper issue of the meaning of Being.
reflective consciousness, and is therefore
spontaneous and self-conscious. Against Sartre sets up his own picture of the individual
traditional views of the emotions as involving human being by first getting rid of its grounding
the subject's passivity, Sartre can therefore in a stable ego. As Sartre later puts it
in Existentialism is a Humanism, to be human is a. The Being of the Phenomenon
characterised by an existence that precedes its
essence. As such, existence is problematic, and and Consciousness
it is towards the development of a full In Being and Time, Heidegger presents the
existentialist theory of what it is to be human phenomenon as involving both a covering and a
that Sartre's work logically evolves. In relation disclosing of being. For Sartre, the phenomenon
to what will become Being and Nothingness, reveals, rather than conceals, reality. What is
Sartre's early works can be seen as providing the status of this reality? Sartre considers the
important preparatory material for an phenomenalist option of viewing the world as a
existential account of being human. But the construct based upon the series of appearances.
distinctiveness of Sartre's approach to He points out that the being of the phenomenon
understanding human existence is ultimately is not like its essence, i.e. is not something which
guided by his ethical interest. In particular, this is apprehended on the basis of this series. In this
accounts for his privileging of a strong notion of way, Sartre moves away from Husserl's
freedom which we shall see to be fundamentally conception of the essence as that which
at odds with Heidegger's analysis. Thus the underpins the unity of the appearances of an
nature of Sartre's topics of analysis, his theory of object, to a Heideggerian notion of the being of
the ego and his ethical aims all characterise the the phenomenon as providing this grounding.
development of an existential phenomenology. Just as the being of the phenomenon transcends
Let us now examine the central themes of this the phenomenon of being, consciousness also
theory as they are presented in Being and transcends it. Sartre thus establishes that if
Nothingness. there is perceiving, there must be a
3. The Ontology of Being and Nothingness consciousness doing the perceiving.
Being and Nothingness can be characterized as a How are these two transphenomenal forms of
phenomenological investigation into the nature being related? As opposed to a conceptualising
of what it is to be human, and thus be seen as a consciousness in a relation of knowledge to an
continuation of, and expansion upon, themes object, as in Husserl and the epistemological
characterising the early works. In contrast with tradition he inherits, Sartre introduces a
these however, an ontology is presented at the relation of being: consciousness (in a pre-
outset and guides the whole development of the reflective form) is directly related to the being of
investigation. the phenomenon. This is Sartre's version of
One of the main features of this system, which Heidegger's ontological relation of being-in-the-
Sartre presents in the introduction and the first world. It differs from the latter in two essential
chapter of Part One, is a distinction between two respects. First, it is not a practical relation, and
kinds of transcendence of the phenomenon of thus distinct from a relation to the ready-to-
being. The first is the transcendence of being hand. Rather, it is simply given by
and the second that of consciousness. This consciousness. Second, it does not lead to any
means that, starting with the phenomenon (that further question of Being. For Sartre, all there is
which is our conscious experience), there are to being is given in the transphenomenality of
two types of reality which lie beyond it, and are existing objects, and there is no further issue of
thus trans-phenomenal. On the one hand, there the Being of all beings as for Heidegger.
is the being of the object of consciousness, and
on the other, that of consciousness itself. These b. Two Types of Being
define two types of being, the in-itself and the
As we have seen, both consciousness and the
for-itself. To bring out that which keeps them
being of the phenomenon transcend the
apart, involves understanding the
phenomenon of being. As a result, there are two
phenomenology of nothingness. This reveals
types of being which Sartre, using Hegel's
consciousness as essentially characterisable
terminology, calls the for-itself ('pour-soi') and
through its power of negation, a power which
the in-itself ('en-soi').
plays a key role in our existential condition. Let
us examine these points in more detail.
Sartre presents the in-itself as existing without result of applying a logical operator, negation, to
justification independently of the for-itself, and a proposition. For it is not the same to say that
thus constituting an absolute 'plenitude'. It there is no rhinoceros in the café, and to say that
exists in a fully determinate and non-relational Pierre is not there. The first is a purely logical
way. This fully characterizes its transcendence construction that reveals nothing about the
of the conscious experience. In contrast with the world, while the second does. Sartre says it
in-itself, the for-itself is mainly characterised by points to an objective fact. However, this
a lack of identity with itself. This is a objective fact is not simply given independently
consequence of the following. Consciousness is of human beings. Rather, it is produced by
always 'of something', and therefore defined in consciousness. Thus Sartre considers the
relation to something else. It has no nature phenomenon of destruction. When an
beyond this and is thus completely translucent. earthquake brings about a landslide, it modifies
Insofar as the for-itself always transcends the the terrain. If, however, a town is thereby
particular conscious experience (because of the annihilated, the earthquake is viewed as having
spontaneity of consciousness), any attempt to destroyed it. For Sartre, there is only
grasp it within a conscious experience is destruction insofar as humans have identified
doomed to failure. Indeed, as we have already the town as 'fragile'. This means that it is the
seen in the distinction between pre-reflective very negation involved in characterising
and reflective consciousness, a conscious grasp something as destructible which makes
of the first transforms it. This means that it is destruction possible. How is such a negation
not possible to identify the for-itself, since the possible? The answer lies in the claim that the
most basic form of identification, i.e. with itself, power of negation is an intrinsic feature of the
fails. This picture is clearly one in which the intentionality of consciousness. To further
problematic region of being is that of the for- identify this power of negation, let us look at
itself, and that is what Being and Nothingness will Sartre's treatment of the phenomenon of
focus upon. But at the same time, another questioning. When I question something, I posit
important question arises. Indeed, insofar the possibility of a negative reply. For Sartre,
Sartre has rejected the notion of a grounding of this means that I operate a nihilation of that
all beings in Being, one may ask how something which is given: the latter is thus 'fluctuating
like a relation of being between consciousness between being and nothingness' (BN, 23).
and the world is possible. This issue translates Sartre then notes that this requires that the
in terms of understanding the meaning of the questioner be able to detach himself from the
totality formed by the for-itself and the in-itself causal series of being. And, by nihilating the
and its division into these two regions of being. given, he detaches himself from any
By addressing this latter issue, Sartre finds the deterministic constraints. And Sartre says that
key concept that enables him to investigate the 'the name (...) [of] this possibility which every
nature of the for-itself. human being has to secrete a nothingness which
c. Nothingness isolates it (...) is freedom' (BN, 24-25). Our
power to negate is thus the clue which reveals
One of the most original contributions of
our nature as free. Below, we shall return to the
Sartre's metaphysics lies in his analysis of the
nature of Sartre's notion of freedom.
notion of nothingness and the claim that it plays
a central role at the heart of being (chapter 1,
Part One). 4. The For-Itself in Being and Nothingness
The structure and characteristics of the for-itself
Sartre (BN, 9-10) discusses the example of are the main focal point of the
entering a café to meet Pierre and discovering phenomenological analyses of Being and
his absence from his usual place. Sartre talks of Nothingness. Here, the theme of consciousness's
this absence as 'haunting' the café. Importantly, power of negation is explored in its different
this is not just a psychological state, because a ramifications. These bring out the core claims of
'nothingness' is really experienced. The Sartre's existential account of the human
nothingness in question is also not simply the condition.
a. A Lack of Self-Identity amounts to defining projects for the for-itself.
Insofar as they contribute to this task, they can
The analysis of nothingness provides the key to
be seen as aspects of the individual's
the phenomenological understanding of the for-
fundamental project. This specifies the way in
itself (chapter 1, Part Two). For the negating
which the for-itself understands itself and
power of consciousness is at work within the self
defines herself as this, rather than another,
(BN, 85). By applying the account of this
individual. We shall return to the issue of the
negating power to the case of reflection, Sartre
fundamental project below.
shows how reflective consciousness negates the
pre-reflective consciousness it takes as its
object. This creates an instability within the self Among the different types of project, that of bad
which emerges in reflection: it is torn between faith is of generic importance for an existential
being posited as a unity and being reflexively understanding of what it is to be human. This
grasped as a duality. This lack of self-identity is importance derives ultimately from its ethical
given another twist by Sartre: it is posited as a relevance. Sartre's analysis of the project of bad
task. That means that the unity of the self is a faith is grounded in vivid examples. Thus Sartre
task for the for-itself, a task which amounts to describes the precise and mannered movements
the self's seeking to ground itself. of a café waiter (BN, 59). In thus behaving, the
waiter is identifying himself with his role as
waiter in the mode of being in-itself. In other
This dimension of task ushers in a temporal
words, the waiter is discarding his real nature as
component that is fully justified by Sartre's
for-itself, i.e. as free facticity, to adopt that of the
analysis of temporality (BN, 107). The lack of
in-itself. He is thus denying his transcendence
coincidence of the for-itself with itself is at the
as for-itself in favour of the kind of
heart of what it is to be a for-itself. Indeed, the
transcendence characterising the in-itself. In
for-itself is not identical with its past nor its
this way, the burden of his freedom, i.e. the
future. It is already no longer what it was, and it
requirement to decide for himself what to do, is
is not yet what it will be. Thus, when I make who
lifted from his shoulders since his behaviour is
I am the object of my reflection, I can take that
as though set in stone by the definition of the
which now lies in my past as my object, while I
role he has adopted. The mechanism involved in
have actually moved beyond this. Sartre says
such a project involves an inherent
that I am therefore no longer who I am.
contradiction. Indeed, the very identification at
Similarly with the future: I never coincide with
the heart of bad faith is only possible because
that which I shall be. Temporality constitutes
the waiter is a for-itself, and can indeed choose
another aspect of the way in which negation is at
to adopt such a project. So the freedom of the
work within the for-itself. These temporal
for-itself is a pre-condition for the project of bad
ecstases also map onto fundamental features of
faith which denies it. The agent's defining his
the for-itself. First, the past corresponds to the
being as an in-itself is the result of the way in
facticity of a human life that cannot choose what
which he represents himself to himself. This
is already given about itself. Second, the future
misrepresentation is however one the agent is
opens up possibilities for the freedom of the for-
responsible for. Ultimately, nothing is hidden,
itself. The coordination of freedom and facticity
since consciousness is transparent and
is however generally incoherent, and thus
therefore the project of bad faith is pursued
represents another aspect of the essential
while the agent is fully aware of how things are
instability at the heart of the for-itself.
in pre-reflective consciousness. Insofar as bad
faith is self-deceit, it raises the problem of
b. The Project of Bad Faith accounting for contradictory beliefs. The
The way in which the incoherence of the examples of bad faith which Sartre gives, serve
dichotomy of facticity and freedom is to underline how this conception of self-deceit
manifested, is through the project of bad faith in fact involves a project based upon inadequate
(chapter 2, Part One). Let us first clarify Sartre's representations of what one is. There is
notion of project. The fact that the self-identity therefore no need to have recourse to a notion of
of the for-itself is set as a task for the for-itself, unconscious to explain such phenomena. They
can be accounted for using the dichotomy for- Moreover, the triad of these three moments is,
itself/in-itself, as projects freely adopted by unlike a Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis
individual agents. A first consequence is that triad, inherently instable: if the for-itself
this represents an alternative to attempts to achieve one of them, it will conflict
psychoanalytical accounts of self-deceit. Sartre with the others. Since all human lives are
was particularly keen to provide alternatives to characterised by such a desire (albeit in
Freud's theory of self-deceit, with its appeal to different individuated forms), Sartre has thus
censorship mechanisms accounting for provided a description of the human condition
repression, all of which are beyond the subject's which is dominated by the irrationality of
awareness as they are unconscious (BN, 54-55). particular projects. This picture is in particular
The reason is that Freud's theory diminishes the illustrated in Being and Nothingness by an
agent's responsibility. On the contrary, and this account of the projects of love, sadism and
is the second consequence of Sartre's account of masochism, and in other works, by biographical
bad faith, Sartre's theory makes the individual accounts of the lives of Baudelaire, Flaubert and
responsible for what is a widespread form of Jean Genet. With this notion of desire for being,
behaviour, one that accounts for many of the the motivation for the fundamental project is
evils that Sartre sought to describe in his plays. ultimately accounted for in terms of the
To explain how existential psychoanalysis works metaphysical nature of the for-itself. This means
requires that we first examine the notion of that the source of motivation for the
fundamental project (BN, 561). fundamental project lies within consciousness.
Thus, in particular, bad faith, as a type of
project, is motivated in this way. The individual
c. The Fundamental Project choice of fundamental project is an original
If the project of bad faith involves a choice (BN, 564). Consequently, an
misrepresentation of what it is to be a for-itself, understanding of what it is to be Flaubert for
and thus provides a powerful account of certain instance, must involve an attempt to decipher
types of self-deceit, we have, as yet, no account his original choice. This hermeneutic exercise
of the motivation that lies behind the adoption aims to reveal what makes an individual a unity.
of such a project. This provides existential psychoanalysis with its
principle. Its method involves an analysis of all
As we saw above, all projects can be viewed as the empirical behaviour of the subject, aimed at
parts of the fundamental project, and we shall grasping the nature of this unity.
therefore focus upon the motivation for the
latter (chapter 2, Part Four). That a for-itself is
defined by such a project arises as a
consequence of the for-itself's setting itself self- d. Desire
identity as a task. This in turn is the result of the
for-itself's experiencing the cleavages The fundamental project has been presented as
introduced by reflection and temporality as motivated by a desire for being. How does this enable
amounting to a lack of self-identity. Sartre Sartre to provide an account of desires as in fact
describes this as defining the `desire for being~ directed towards being although they are generally
(BN, 565). This desire is universal, and it can thought to be rather aimed at having? Sartre
take on one of three forms. First, it may be discusses desire in chapter I of Part One and then
aimed at a direct transformation of the for-itself again in chapter II of Part Four, after presenting the
into an in-itself. Second, the for-itself may notion of fundamental project.
affirm its freedom that distinguishes it from an
in-itself, so that it seeks through this to become In the first short discussion of desire, Sartre presents
its own foundation (i.e. to become God). The it as seeking a coincidence with itself that is not
conjunction of these two moments results,
possible (BN, 87, 203). Thus, in thirst, there is a lack
third, in the for-itself's aiming for another mode
that seeks to be satisfied. But the satisfaction of thirst
of being, the for-itself-in-itself. None of the aims
is not the suppression of thirst, but rather the aim of
described in these three moments are realisable.
a plenitude of being in which desire and satisfaction
are united in an impossible synthesis. As Sartre existing approaches to the problem of other minds.
points out, humans cling on to their desires. Mere Looking at realism, Sartre claims that no access to
satisfaction through suppression of the desire is other minds is ever possible, and that for a realist
indeed always disappointing. Another example of approach the existence of the other is a mere
this structure of desire (BN, 379) is that of love. For hypothesis. As for idealism, it can only ever view the
Sartre, the lover seeks to possess the loved one and other in terms of sets of appearances. But the
thus integrate her into his being: this is the transphenomenality of the other cannot be deduced
satisfaction of desire. He simultaneously wishes the from them.
loved one nevertheless remain beyond his being as
the other he desires, i.e. he wishes to remain in the Sartre also looks at his phenomenologist
state of desiring. These are incompatible aspects of predecessors, Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl's
desire: the being of desire is therefore incompatible account is based upon the perception of another body
with its satisfaction. In the lengthier discussion on from which, by analogy, I can consider the other as a
the topic "Being and Having," Sartre differentiates distinct conscious perspective upon the world. But
between three relations to an object that can be the attempt to derive the other's subjectivity from my
projected in desiring. These are being, doing and own never really leaves the orbit of my own
having. Sartre argues that relations of desire aimed at transcendental ego, and thus fails to come to terms
doing are reducible to one of the other two types. His with the other as a distinct transcendental ego. Sartre
examination of these two types can be summarised praises Heidegger for understanding that the relation
as follows. Desiring expressed in terms of being is to the other is a relation of being, not an
aimed at the self. And desiring expressed in terms of epistemological one. However, Heidegger does not
having is aimed at possession. But an object is provide any grounds for taking the co-existence of
possessed insofar as it is related to me by an internal Daseins ('being-with') as an ontological structure.
ontological bond, Sartre argues. Through that bond, What is, for Sartre, the nature of my consciousness
the object is represented as my creation. The of the other? Sartre provides a phenomenological
possessed object is represented both as part of me analysis of shame and how the other features in it.
and as my creation. With respect to this object, I am When I peep through the keyhole, I am completely
therefore viewed both as an in-itself and as endowed absorbed in what I am doing and my ego does not
with freedom. The object is thus a symbol of the feature as part of this pre-reflective state. However,
subject's being, which presents it in a way that when I hear a floorboard creaking behind me, I
conforms with the aims of the fundamental project. become aware of myself as an object of the other's
Sartre can therefore subsume the case of desiring to look. My ego appears on the scene of this reflective
have under that of desiring to be, and we are thus left consciousness, but it is as an object for the other.
with a single type of desire, that for being. Note that one may be empirically in error about the
presence of this other. But all that is required by
5. Relations with Others in Being and Sartre's thesis is that there be other human beings.
Nothingness This objectification of my ego is only possible if the
So far, we have presented the analysis of the for-itself other is given as a subject. For Sartre, this establishes
without investigating how different individual for- what needed to be proven: since other minds are
itself's interact. Far from neglecting the issue of inter- required to account for conscious states such as those
subjectivity, this represents an important part of of shame, this establishes their existence a priori.
Sartre's phenomenological analysis in which the This does not refute the skeptic, but provides Sartre
main themes discussed above receive their with a place for the other as an a priori condition for
confirmation in, and extension to the inter-personal certain forms of consciousness which reveal a
realm. relation of being to the other.

a. The Problem of Other Minds b. Human Relationships

In chapter 1, Part Three, Sartre recognizes there is a In the experience of shame (BN, 259), the
problem of other minds: how I can be conscious of objectification of my ego denies my existence as a
the other (BN 221-222)? Sartre examines many subject. I do, however, have a way of evading this.
This is through an objectification of the other. By
reacting against the look of the other, I can turn him spontaneous decision, but has consequences for the
into an object for my look. But this is no stable for-itself. To express this, Sartre presents his notion
relation. In chapter 1, Part Three, of Being and of freedom as amounting to making choices, and
Nothingness, Sartre sees important implications of indeed not being able to avoid making choices.
this movement from object to subject and vice-versa,
insofar as it is through distinguishing oneself from Sartre's conception of choice can best be understood
the other that a for-itself individuates itself. More by reference to an individual's original choice, as we
precisely, the objectification of the other corresponds saw above. Sartre views the whole life of an
to an affirmation of my self by distinguishing myself individual as expressing an original project that
from the other. This affirmation is however a failure, unfolds throughout time. This is not a project which
because through it, I deny the other's selfhood and the individual has proper knowledge of, but rather
therefore deny that with respect to which I want to one which she may interpret (an interpretation
affirm myself. So, the dependence upon the other constantly open to revision). Specific choices are
which characterises the individuation of a particular therefore always components in time of this time-
ego is simultaneously denied. The resulting spanning original choice of project.
instability is characteristic of the typically conflictual
state of our relations with others. Sartre examines
examples of such relationships as are involved in b. Authenticity
sadism, masochism and love. Ultimately, Sartre With this notion of freedom as spontaneous choice,
would argue that the instabilities that arise in human Sartre therefore has the elements required to define
relationships are a form of inter-subjective bad faith. what it is to be an authentic human being. This
6. Authenticity consists in choosing in a way which reflects the
If the picture which emerges from Sartre's nature of the for-itself as both transcendence and
examination of human relationships seems rather facticity. This notion of authenticity appears closely
hopeless, it is because bad faith is omnipresent and related to Heidegger's, since it involves a mode of
inescapable. In fact, Sartre's philosophy has a very being that exhibits a recognition that one is a Dasein.
positive message which is that we have infinite However, unlike Heidegger's, Sartre's conception
freedom and that this enables us to make authentic has clear practical consequences.
choices which escape from the grip of bad faith. To
understand Sartre's notion of authenticity therefore For what is required of an authentic choice is that it
requires that we first clarify his notion of freedom. involve a proper coordination of transcendence and
facticity, and thus that it avoid the pitfalls of an
a. Freedom uncoordinated expression of the desire for being.
This amounts to not-grasping oneself as freedom and
For Sartre (chapter 1, Part Four), each agent is facticity. Such a lack of proper coordination between
endowed with unlimited freedom. This statement transcendence and facticity constitutes bad faith,
may seem puzzling given the obvious limitations on either at an individual or an inter-personal level.
every individual's freedom of choice. Clearly, Such a notion of authenticity is therefore quite
physical and social constraints cannot be overlooked different from what is often popularly
in the way in which we make choices. This is misrepresented as a typically existentialist attitude,
however a fact which Sartre accepts insofar as the namely an absolute prioritisation of individual
for-itself is facticity. And this does not lead to any spontaneity. On the contrary, a recognition of how
contradiction insofar as freedom is not defined by an our freedom interacts with our facticity exhibits the
ability to act. Freedom is rather to be understood as responsibility which we have to make proper
characteristic of the nature of consciousness, i.e. as choices. These are choices which are not trapped in
spontaneity. But there is more to freedom. For all that bad faith.
Pierre's freedom is expressed in opting either for
looking after his ailing grandmother or joining the
French Resistance, choices for which there are c. An Ethical Dimension
indeed no existing grounds, the decision to opt for Through the practical consequences presented
either of these courses of action is a meaningful one. above, an existentialist ethics can be discerned. We
That is, opting for the one of the other is not just a
pointed out that random expressions of one's infinite freedom of the earlier philosophy is now
spontaneity are not what authenticity is about, and narrowed down by the constraints of the political and
Sartre emphasises this point in Existentialism and historical situation.
Humanism. There, he explicitly states that there is an In Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre analyses
ethical normativity about authenticity. If one ought different dimensions of the praxis. In the first
to act authentically, is there any way of further volume, a theory of "practical ensembles" examines
specifying what this means for the nature of ethical the way in which a praxis is no longer opposed to an
choices? There are in fact many statements in Being in-itself, but to institutions which have become
and Nothingness which emphasise a universality rigidified and constitute what Sartre calls the
criterion not entirely dissimilar from Kant's. This 'practico-inert'. Human beings interiorise the
should come as no surprise since both Sartre and universal features of the situation in which they are
Kant's approaches are based upon the ultimate value born, and this translates in terms of a particular way
of a strong notion of freedom. As Sartre points out, of developing as a praxis. This is the sense Sartre
by choosing, an individual commits not only himself, now gives to the notion of the 'singular universal'.
but the whole of humanity (BN, 553). Although there b. The Problem of Method
are no a priori values for Sartre, the agent's choice
In this book Sartre redefines the focus of
creates values in the same way as the artist does in
existentialism as the individual understood as
the aesthetic realm. The values thus created by a
belonging to a certain social situation, but not totally
proper exercise of my freedom have a universal
determined by it. For the individual is always going
dimension, in that any other human being could
beyond what is given, with his own aims and
make sense of them were he to be placed in my
projects. In this way, Sartre develops a 'regressive-
situation. There is therefore a universality that is
progressive method' that views individual
expressed in particular forms in each authentic
development as explained in terms of a movement
project. This is a first manifestation of what Sartre
from the universal expressed in historical
later refers to as the 'singular universal'.
development, and the particular expressed in
7. Other Contributions to Existential individual projects. Thus, by combining a Marxist
Phenomenology understanding of history with the methods of
If Being and Nothingness represents the culmination existential psychoanalysis which are first presented
of Sartre's purely existentialist work, existentialism in Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a method
permeates later writings, albeit in a hybrid form. We for understanding a human life. This, he applies in
shall briefly indicate how these later writings extend particular to the case of an analysis of Flaubert. It is
and transform his project of existential worth noting however that developing an account of
phenomenology. the intelligibility of history, is a project that Sartre
a. Critique of Dialectical Reason tackled in the second volume of the Critique of
The experience of the war and the encounter with Dialectical Reason, but which remained unfinished.
Merleau-Ponty contributed to awakening Sartre's 8. Conclusion
interest in the political dimension of human Sartre's existentialist understanding of what it is to be
existence: Sartre thus further developed his human can be summarised in his view that the
existentialist understanding of human beings in a underlying motivation for action is to be found in the
way which is compatible with Marxism. A key nature of consciousness which is a desire for being.
notion for this phase of his philosophical It is up to each agent to exercise his freedom in such
development is the concept of praxis. This extends a way that he does not lose sight of his existence as a
and transforms that of project: man as a praxis is both facticity, as well as a free human being. In so doing,
something that produces and is produced. Social he will come to understand more about the original
structures define a starting point for each individual. choice which his whole life represents, and thus
But the individual then sets his own aims and thereby about the values that are thereby projected. Such an
goes beyond and negates what society had defined understanding is only obtained through living this
him as. The range of possibilities which are available particular life and avoiding the pitfalls of strategies
for this expression of freedom is however dependent of self-deceit such as bad faith. This authentic option
upon the existing social structures. And it may be the for human life represents the realisation of a
case that this range is very limited. In this way, the universal in the singularity of a human life.
 9. References and Further Reading
a. Sartre's Works BROWSE BY TOPIC
 "Intentionality: a Fundamental Ideal of Husserl's
Phenomenology" (1970) transl. J.P.Fell, Journal of the Browse by
British Society for Phenomenology, 1 (2), 4-5. Topic
 Psychology of the Imagination (1972) transl. Bernard
Frechtman, Methuen, London.
 Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1971) transl. Philip © Copyright Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and its Authors |
Mairet, Methuen, London. ISSN 2161-0002
 The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of
Consciousness (1957) transl. and ed. Forrest Williams and
Robert Kirkpatrick, Noonday, New York.
 Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological
Ontology (1958) transl. Hazel E. Barnes, intr. Mary
Warnock, Methuen, London (abbreviated as BN above).
 Existentialism and Humanism (1973) transl. Philip Mairet,
Methuen, London.
 Critique of Dialectical Reason 1: Theory of Practical
Ensembles (1982) transl. Alan Sheridan-Smith, ed.
Jonathan Rée, Verso, London.
 The Problem of Method (1964) transl. Hazel E. Barnes,
Methuen, London.
b. Commentaries
 Caws, P. (1979) Sartre, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London.
 Danto, A. C. (1991) Sartre, Fontana, London.
 Howells, C. (1988) Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
 Howells, C. ed. (1992) Cambridge Companion to Sartre,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
 Murdoch, I. (1987) Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, Chatto
and Windus, London.
 Natanson, M. (1972) A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's
Ontology, Haskell House Publishers, New York.
 Schilpp, P. A. ed. (1981) The Philosophy of Jean-Paul
Sartre, Open Court, La Salle.
 Silverman, H. J. and Elliston, F.A. eds. (1980) Jean-Paul
Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy,
Harvester Press, Brighton.

Author Information
Christian J. Onof
Email: [email protected]
University College, London
United Kingdom
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