1 Planas v. Gil

9/1/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 067
[No. 46440. January 18, 1939]
CARMEN PLANAS, petitioner, vs. JOSE GIL,

Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACTS OF THE CHIEF

EXECUTIVE; INQUIRY BY THE SUPREME COURT
INTO THE VALIDITY OR CONSTITUTlONALITY OF
SUCH ACTS.—The acts of the Chief Executive performed
within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and
courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in
such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this
legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the court
is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or
constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
2. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL

POWERS.—The classical separation of governmental
powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative
theory of government, There is more truism and actuality
in interdependence than in independence and separation
of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of
Philippine origin, we cannot lay down "with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments" not only because "the great ordinances of
the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white" but also because "even the more specific of
them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other." (Springer vs.
Government [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.)
3. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND

BALANCES.—As far as the judiciary is concerned, while
it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is by
constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate
constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is
entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the
obligation of determining in appropriate cases the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cecdfe1e216694234003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/22
or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII,

Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this
extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments of
the government and this result is one of the necessary
corollaries of the "system of checks and balances" of the
government established.
4. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—A mere plea that a subordinate

officer of the government is acting under orders from the
Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is
neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the
dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the
Chief Executive from ju
63
VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 63
Planas vs. Gil.
dicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign

passport for all the subordinate officials and employees of
the Executive Department to the extent that at the mere
invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction
of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an
executive order is necessarily abated or , suspended. The f
acts in Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil.,
366), Abueva vs. Wood ([1924], 45 Phil., 612), and
Alejandrino vs. Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil., 83), are different,
and the doctrines laid down therein must be confined to
the facts and legal environment involved and whatever
general observations might have been made in elaboration
of the views therein expressed but which are not essential
to the determination of the issues presented are mere
obiter dicta.
5. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION.—While,

generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will
not issue to restrain or control the performance of other
than judicial or quasijudicial functions (50 C. J., 658), its
issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in
this jurisdiction it may issue to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, whose acts are without or
in excess of jurisdiction. (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used
with reference to "functions" in the statute are
undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged
investigation by the respondent Commissioner of Civil

Service, which investigation if unauthorized and is
violative of the Constitution as contended is a fortiori
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
6. ID.; ID. ; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The statutory rule in this

jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the
limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but
will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person
whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for
the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive
manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and
Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307; Aglipay
vs. Ruiz [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 2164.) This court, therefore,
has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will
accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present
controversy.
7. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—A perusal of our Constitution will

show that extensive authority over the public service is
granted the President of the Philippines. Article VII of the
Constitution
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64 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Planas vs. Gil.
begins in its section 1 with the declaration that "The

Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." All executive authority is thus vested in him,
and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of seeing
that the laws are "faithfully. executed." (Art VII, sec. 11,
subsec. 1, last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which
he cannot evade, he is granted specific and express powers
and functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these
specific and express powers and functions, he may also
exercise those necessarily implied and included in them.
(Myers vs. United States [1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law.
ed., 160; 47 Sup Ct. Rep., 21; Willoughby, Constitution of
the United States, sec. 953, citing Taft's Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers, p. 139.) The National
Assembly may not enact laws which either expressly or
impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the

President of the Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes
[1921], 42 Phil., 599.) The Constitution provides that the
President "shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1],
first clause) and shall "exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law" (Ibid,
second clause). This power of control and supervision is an
important constitutional grant.
8. ID. ; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The President in the exercise of

the executive power under the Constitution may act
through the heads of the .executive departments. The
heads of the executive departments are his authorized
assistants and agents in the performance of his excutive
duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular
course of business, are presumptively his acts. (Runkle vs.
United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7
Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141. See also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16
Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U.
S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep., 80; Wolsey vs.
Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox
vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The power of removal which the

President may exercise directly and the practical
necessities of efficient government brought about by
administrative centralization easily make the President
the head of the administration. (Willoughby, Constitution
of the United States, Vol. II, 2nd ed., sec. 959.)
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the
President to conduct an investigation of the nature
involved in this proceeding, and in view of the mature and
character of the executive authority with which the
President of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional
grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over
all local govern
65
VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 65
Planas vs. Gil.
ments and to take care that the laws be faithfully

executed must be construed to authorize him to order an
investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein.
Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active
power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least

implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in
order to render the power real and. effective. If
supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after
careful study and investigation.
10. ID.; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Section 64 of the Administrative

Code of 1917 provides as follows: "In addition to his
general supervisory authority, the Governor-General
(President) shall have such specific powers and duties as
are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and
also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this
chapter. Among such special powers and duties shall be: *
* * (c) To order, when in his opinnion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of any action or
the conduct of any person in the Government service, and
in connection therewith to designate the official,
committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be
conducted." This provision of the law, in existence before
the taking effect of the Constitution, still subsists. It is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and has not been
abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly. (See sec.
2, Art. XV Constitution.)
11. ID.; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Assuming that this is not one of
the grounds provided by law for which the petitioner may
be investigated administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm.
Code), there is weight in the argument that the
investigation would, still be in order if for no other
purpose than to cause a full and honest disclosure of all
the facts so that, if found proper and justified, appropriate
action may be taken against the parties alleged to have
been guilty of the illegal acts charged. This is essential to
render effective the authority vested in the President by
the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." (Sec. 11, par. 1, Art. VII.) The enforcement of
the law and the maintenance of peace and order are
primarily an executive obligation. The declaration that the
President should "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" is more an imposition of an obligation than a
conferment of power. His oath requires him to "faithfully
and conscientiously fulfill" his duties as President,
"preserve and defend" the Constitution and "execute" the
law. This duty of the Executive to see that the laws be
faithfully executed is
66
Planas vs. Gil.
not limited to the enforcement of legislative acts or the

express terms of the Constitution but also includes the
due enforcement of rights, duties, obligations, prerogatives
and immunities growing out of the Constitution itself and
of the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle, 135 U.
S., 1; 34 Law. ed., 55.)
12. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF

THE PRESS.—The court is vigilantly alive to the
necessity of maintaining and protecting the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press, no less
than the right of assembly and petition which, according
to Stimson (The American Constitution As It Protects
Private Rights, 152), is its origin rather than its
derivation. We do not forget that when repression of
political and religious discussion became intense—when
censorship of the press Was resorted to most vigorously by
the Long Parliament in Englahd—John Milton, that great
historiographer of Cromwell, in his Areopagitica,
denounced the suppression of truth and appealed for "the
liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties" ("Areopagitica", 73, 74
Ambler's Reprint). And this court has had occasion to
vindicate this right, and it is now a settled doctrine that
the official conduct and the policies of public officials can
be criticized (U. S. vs. Bustos. 37 Phil., 731), and that
criticism of the constitution and legislation of government
measures or policies cannot be suppressed or prevented
(U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 225), unless the intention be to
incite rebellion and civil war (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 614). In the present case, however, the
petitioner is not denied the right, nor is she being
investigated because she had exercised that right. She has
a perfect right to criticize the Government, its
administration, its policies and officials, but she may not,
on the plea of freedom of speech and of the press, impute
violations of law and the commission of frauds and
thereafter fold her arms and decline to face an
investigation conducted to elicit the truth or falsity of the
charges formulated by her. Otherwise, the guarantee
which, in the language of Wendell Phillips, is "at once the

Instrument, and the guarantee, and the bright
consummate flower of all liberty" would degenerate into
an unbridled license, and render the Government
powerless to act.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
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VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 67

Planas vs. Gil.
Juan Sumulong, Vicente Sotto, Godofredo Reyes, Wenceslao

Q. Vinzons, Lorenzo Sumulong and Jose de Leon for
petitioner.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action of prohibition instituted in this

court by which the petitioner seeks to enjoin the
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service from conducting
the investigation ordered by authority of the President of
the Philippines. The case arose as a result -of the
publication in one of the local dailies of a statement in
which the petitioner, then and now a member of the
municipal board of the City of Manila, criticized the acts of
certain government officials in connection with the general
election for Assemblymen held on November 8, 1938. The
statement as published in the issue of La Vanguardia of
November 17, 1938, is translated as follows:
"All opposition efforts in the country are useless just as all

movement toward the unification of the opposition as long as in
the opposition group there are people who present their
candidacies and then speculate on these candidacies, offering
them to the highest bidder. In Manila, the opposition should have
won the November 8 elections, but lost instead because of a
disastrous division due to people who commercialized their
candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President
precisely so that the President may devote all his time to the
administration of public affairs for the welfare of the people, but
the President was the first to play politics, publicly expressing his
preference for candidates of his liking; and with the President all
other officials of the government also moved, taking part in
electoral campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to

flatten the opposition and prevent candidates supported by the
people from going to the National Assembly, and with frauds and
violations of all rules of the civil service to push to victory the
candidates of the Nacionalista Party and the administration, all
constructive opposition in the
68

Planas vs. Gil.
country is useless. In past elections, all the municipal and city

mayors have been mobilized to insure the victory of the
candidates of the administration, depriving the people of their
right to vote for the candidates of their own choosing.
"Even members of the cabinet moved, one of them, the Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez going to the extent of speaking at meetings in
the Province of Rizal to counteract the avalanche of votes for the
opposition, instead of staying in his office in the government. The
opposition is struggling within the law, but the party in power
uses means that are not worthy of gentlemen in order that it may
predominate in the government forever; never has it tried to fight
fairly.
"It may be said that the President of the United States is also
making electoral campaigns, but the situation in the United
States is different. There the President is allowed to run for
reelection while in the Philippines the Constitution wisely
provides against the reelection of the President. It is reasonable to
believe that the President is from this moment paving the way for
his reelection. It is to be feared that the new National Assembly
will change this wise provision of our Constitution to permit the
reelection of President Manuel L. Quezon."
On November 18, 1938, the day following the publication of

the foregoing statement, the petitioner received a letter,
Annex A, signed as follows: "By authority of the President:
Jorge B. Vargas, Secretary to the President," in which
letter the statement is quoted in full and the petitioner is
informed thus:
"In the above statement, you appear to make the following

charges: (1) That the President of the Philippines has violated the
Constitution in that he has taken part in politics, expressing his
preference for the candidates of the Nacionalista Party; (2) That
the whole government machinery has been put in action to
prevent the election to the National Assembly of the candidates of
the people; (3) That the candidates of the Nacionalista Party and
of the administration have won the election through frauds and
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VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 69

Planas vs. Gil.
violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the administration

does not permit the people to freely elect the candidates of their
choice.
"You are hereby directed to appear before the Commissioner of
Civil Service, either alone or accompanied by counsel, at 9 o'clock
a. m., on November the 22nd, to prove the statements made by
you. Failure to sustain your charges or to prove that they have
been made in good faith will be considered sufficient cause for
your suspension or removal from office."
At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her

counsel, appeared at the office of the respondent and
delivered to him a letter, Annex B, in which she voiced
objection to the authority of the respondent to conduct the
investigation. The respondent Commissioner did not desist
from proceeding with the investigation, but announced
before adjourning the hearing of November 22nd that he
would decide the question raised as to his jurisdiction on
November 26, 1938. It was at this state of the investigation
that the petitioner filed in this court her original petition
for prohibition of November 25, 1938, in which she at the
same time prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent commissioner from
continuing with the investigation. The petition for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary Injunction was denied by
resolution of this court dated November 25, 1938. The next
day the petitioner requested the respondent, in writing
(Annex D), to refrain from making any ruling on the
question of his jurisdiction to investigate the petitioner and
to abstain from taking any further step in connection with
said investigation until the jurisdictional issue could be
finally passed upon by this court. On the same day, the
request of the petitioner was denied and the respondent
ruled that he had jurisdiction to proceed with the
investigation (Annex E.) The respondent also notified the
petitioner to appear before him on Saturday, December 3,
1938, and to testify in her behalf and produce such other
evidence as she might desire to present in support of the
charges contained in her statement of November 17, 1938.
70

Planas vs. Gil.
The original petition of November 25th was amended by

another of December 2nd. The amendent was allowed by
this court. The Solicitor-General filed his amended answer
accordingly.
Petitioner contends in her amended petition:
"(a) That the respondent is absolutely without

jurisdiction to investigate petitioner with a view to
her suspension or removal in connection with her
statement of November 17th;
"(b) That the said investigation with a view to
petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article
VII, sec. 11 (1) of the Constitution of the Philippines
and is not warranted by any statutory provision;
"(c) That even under the- statutes in force before the
approval of the Constitution of the Philippines,
petitioner, as Councilor of the City of Manila,
cannot be investigated administratively with a view
to her suspension or removal except for acts or
conduct connected with the discharge of her official
functions;
"(d) That petitioner, as an elective official, is
accountable for her political acts to her constituency
alone, unless such acts constitute offenses
punishable under our penal laws, and not to
executive officials belonging to a party opposed to
that to which petitioner is affiliated;
"(e) That petitioner's statement of November 17th made
by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her
right to discuss freely political questions cannot
properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation had with a view to her suspension or
removal, and is only cognizable by our courts of
justice in case the contents of said statement
infringe any provision of our Penal Code;
"(f) That if petitioner's statement of November 17th, as
asserted in the Vargas letter of November 21st
Annex 'C', constitute sedition or any other criminal
offense in that said statement 'tends to create
general discontent, and hatred among the people
against their government, to make them lose faith
in the effectiveness of lawful processes to secure a

change in the control of the government,
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VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 71

Planas vs. Gil.
and to present the next National Assembly as an

illegal body, constituted by men who have been
elected through wholesale frauds and violations of
the civil service rules', then petitioner's
responsibility is a matter that should be heard and
decided by the competent courts in a trial publicly
and impartially conducted, and should not be the
subject of an administrative investigation with a
view to suspension or removal held behind closed
doors, with the power of final decision resting in the
hands of the very officials imputing seditious or
other criminal utterances to the petitioner;
"(g) That the authority sought to be conferred on
respondent by means of the two letters Annexes A
and C both signed 'By authority of the President:
Jorge B. Vargas, Secretary, to the President' is
without any force or effect, since the powers and
prerogatives vested in the President of the
Philippines by our Constitution and by our laws can
be exercised by the President alone, and cannot be
delegated to Mr. Jorge B. Vargas or to any other
person;
"(h) That the proposed investigation with a view to
petitioner's suspension or removal by this
Honorable Court, would constitute an exercise of
arbitrary, inquisitorial, unlawful, and oppressive
powers on the part of respondent, tending to the
suppression of the constitutional right of petitioner,
as a citizen, to express freely and without fear of
political persecution her honest opinions concerning
the policies and political conduct of government
officials."
Petitioner prays:
"(1) That a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith

issued directing the respondent Commissioner of
Civl Service to desist from the investigation sought
to be conducted by him of petitioner, with a view to
her suspension or removal, in connection with her

statement published November 17th, until further
orders of' this Honorable Court;
"(2) That upon due hearing the respondent be
permanently prohibited from proceeding further in
connection with said investigation;
"(3) That the orders contained in the two letters of Mr.
72

Planas vs. Gil.
Jorge B. Vargas (Annexes 'A' and 'C') and the

respondent's resolution dated November 26, 1938
(Annex 'E'), under which respondent seeks to
undertake the investigation so many times referred
to herein, be declared arbitrary and
unconstitutional, and therefore without any force or
effect;
"(4) For costs of the petitioner and for such other
remedy as to this Honorable Court may seem just
and equitable."
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his

amended answer:
(a) That respondent not only has jurisdiction but is in

duty bound to investigate the charges contained in
the petitioner's statement published on November
17, 1938, by virtue of and pursuant to the order of
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines
(par. 3) ;
(b) That the power to order an investigation is vested
in the President of the Philippines by section 11 (1)
of Article VII of the Constitution and section 64 (c)
of the Revised Administrative Code (Id.);
(c) That the question of whether or not the good of the
public service requires the investigation in question
is a matter on which the opinion of the Chief
Executive is conclusive and not subject to review by
the courts (par. 4, [b]);
(d) That an administrative investigation of any act or
conduct of any person in the government service is
independent and exclusive of any judicial action
that the interested parties may institute arising

from the same act or conduct (par. 4, [c]) ;
(e) That petitioner's theory that an elected provincial
or municipal official is accountable to his or her
constituency alone and is not subject to any
administrative investigation but only to a criminal
prosecution in court, has no basis either in law or in
precedent (par. 5, [a]);
(f) That such investigation is neither arbitrary nor
unlawful nor inquisitorial because sanctioned by
the Constietition and statutory provisions (par. 5,
[b]);
(g) That the petition does not state a cause of action
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VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 73

Planas vs. Gil.
nor does it appear that petitioner has suffered any

grievance that calls for the court's intervention, for
it is not alleged that petitioner has been removed
or suspended from office or that she has; in any
way been deprived of any civil or political right
(par. 7, [a]) ;
(h) That the present action is premature and that there
is no justification for the court to entertain the
same (par. 9); and
(i) That this court has no jurisdiction over the case
under the doctrine of separation of powers (par. 10).
The Solicitor-General, under the last paragraph (par. 10) of

his amended answer, raises the question of jurisdiction of
this court over the acts of the Chief Executive. He contends
that "under the separation of powers marked by the
Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the
orders of the Chief Executive, evidenced by Annex A and
Annex C of the petition, which are of purely administrative
character." Reliance is had on the previous decisions of this
court: Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil., 366)
; Abueva vs. Wood ([1924], 45 Phil., 612) ; and Alejandrino
vs. Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil., 83). Although this is the last
point raised by the Government in its answer, it should, for
reasons that are apparent, be first to be considered. If this
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain these
proceedings, then, the same should be dismissed as a
matter of course; otherwise, the merits of the controversy

should be passed upon and determined.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief Executive
performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his
official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain
executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference.
But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow
that we are precluded from making an inquiry into the
validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are
properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The
classical separation of governmental powers, whether
viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle,
Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the postulations of Mabini,
Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government.
74

Planas vs. Gil.
There is more truism and actuality in interdependence

than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin,
we cannot lay down "with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into watertight compartments" not
only because "the great ordinances of the Constitution do
not establish and divide fields of black and white" but also
because "even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
extreme to the other." (Springer vs. Government [1928],
277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.) As far as the
judiciary is concerned, while it holds "'neither the sword
nor the purse" it is by constitutional placement the organ
called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to
the Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary
implication the obligation of determining in appropriate
cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art.
VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to
this extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments
of the government and this result is one of the necessary
corollaries of the "system of checks and balances" of the
government established.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the
proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in
a particular way. The Commissioner of Civil Service is the
party respondent and the theory is advanced by the
Government that because an investigation undertaken by
him is directed by authority of the President of the

Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the present
proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen Planas.
The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate
officer of the government is acting under orders from the
Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is
neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the
dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief
Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of
a sovereign passport for all the subordinate offi-
75
VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 75

Planas vs. Gil.
cials and employees of the Executive Department to the

extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it
purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily
abated or suspended. The facts in Severino vs.
GovernorGeneral, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra, are different, and the
doctrines laid down therein must be confined to the facts
and legal environment involved and whatever general
observations might have been made in elaboration of the
views therein expressed but which are not essential to the
determination of the issues presented are mere obiter dicta.
While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal
writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of
other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J.,
658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute
and in this jurisdiction it may issue to any inferior
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, whose acts are without or
in excess of jurisdiction. (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used
with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged investigation by
the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service, which
investigation if unauthorized and is violative of the
Constitution as contended is a fortiori without or in excess
of jurisdiction. The statutory rule in this jurisdiction is that
the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts
or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own
jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate
cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in
excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is

granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a
multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.
Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307; Aglipay vs. Ruiz
[1937],
76

Planas vs. Gil.
35 Off. Gaz., 2164.) This court, therefore, has jurisdiction

over the instant proceedings and will accordingly proceed
to determine the merits of the present controversy.
As is seen from the foregoing relation of facts various
legal questions are propounded. Reducing, however, the
issues to what is considered is the fundamental legal
proposition presented, we are asked in these proceedings to
prohibit the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service from
conducting or continuing with the investigation ordered by
authority of the President of the Philippines. It is not
denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the
order, but it is contended "that the said investigation with
a view to petitioner's suspension or removal is against
Article VII, sec. 11 (1) of the Constitution of the Philippines
and is not warranted by any statutory provision." (Par. XV
[b], amended petition.) It, therefore, becomes necessary to
inquire into the constitutional and legal authority of the
President to order the investigation which has given rise to
the present controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show that extensive
authority over the public service is granted the President of
the Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution begins in its
section 1 with the declaration that "The Executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." All
executive authority is thus vested in him, and upon him
devolves the constitutional duty of seeing that the laws are
"faithfully executed." (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 1, last
clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot
evade, he is granted specific and express powers and
functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific
and express powers and functions, he may also exercise
those necessarily implied and included in them. (Myers vs.
United States [1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160; 47
Sup. Ct. Rep., 21; Willoughby, Constitution of the United
States, sec. 953, citing Taft's Our Chief Magistrate and His
Powers, p. 139.) The National Assembly may not enact

laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the
authority conferred upon the President of the
77
VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 77

Planas vs. Gil.
Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil.,

599.) The Constitution provides that the President "shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law" (Ibid, second clause). This power of
control and supervision is an important constitutional
grant. The President in the exercise of the executive power
under the Constitution may act through the heads of the
executive departments. The heads of the executive
departments are his authorized assistants and agents in
the performance of his executive duties, and their official
acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are
presumptively his acts. (Runkle vs. United States [1887],
122 U. S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141. See
also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968;
Jones vs. U. S'. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11
Sup. Ct., Rep., 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S.,
755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet.,
498; 10 Law. ed., 264.) The power of removal which the
President may exercise directly and the practical
necessities of efficient government brought about by
administrative centralization easily make the President
the head of the administration. (Willoughby, Constitution
of the United States, Vol. II, 2nd ed., sec. 959.)
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the
President to conduct an investigation of the nature
involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature and
character of the executive authority with which the
President of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional
grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over
all local governments and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to
order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner
herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an
active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions
in order to render the power real and effective- If su-
78

Planas vs. Gil.
pervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not

automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge
of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study
and investigation,
Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the
Chief Executive by our Constitution, we should be
reluctant to yield to the proposition that the President of
the Philippines who is endowed with broad and
extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is
expected to govern with a firm and steady hand without
vexatious or embarrassing interference and much less
dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the power to
order the investigation of the petitioner in this case, We
should avoid that result.
Our attention has been directed to the fact that, with
reference to local governments, the Constitution speaks of
general supervision which is distinct from the control given
to the President over executive departments, bureaus and
offices. This is correct. But, aside from the fact that this
distinction is not important insofar as the power of the
President to order the investigation is concerned, as
hereinabove indicated, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the
supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this regard was
in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of
views in that body, mainly between the historical view
which. recognizes the right of local self-government (People
ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871], 24 Mich., 44) and the
legal theory which sanctions the possession by the state of
absolute control over local governments (Booten vs. Pinson,
L. R. A. [N. S., 1917-A], 1244; 77 W. Va., 412 [1915]). The
result was the recognition of the power of supervision and
all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise
would be an imperium in imperio to the detriment of a
strong national government.
Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that
section 64 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides as f
ollows:
79
VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 79
Planas vs. Gil.
"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-

General (President) shall have such specific powers and duties as
are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in
particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
* * * * * *

*
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service
so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any
person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking

effect of the Constitution, still subsists. It is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and has not been
abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly. (See sec.
2, Art. XV, Constitution.)
It is next urged that assuming the power of the
President to order the investigation, that investigation
should' be in accordance with law; that the petitioner as an
elective official can be proceeded against administratively
only on the grounds specifically stated in the law, namely,
disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, or
maladministration in office; and that as an elective official
she is responsible for her political acts to her constituency
alone. At the risk of repetition, it should be observed that
in the letter addressed by Secretary Vargas, by authority of
the President, to Miss Planas, the latter is informed as
follows: "In the above statement, you appear to make the
following charges: (1) That the President of the Philippines
has violated the Constitution in that he has taken part in
politics, expressing his preference for the candidates of the
Nacionalista Party; (2) That the whole government
machinery has been put in action to prevent the election to
the National Assembly of the candidates of the people; (3)
That the candidates of the Nacionalista Party and of the
administration have won the election through frauds and
80

Planas vs. Gil.
violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the

administration does not permit the people to freely elect
the candidates of their choice"; and in that letter she is
directed to appear before the Commissioner of Civil Service
to prove the statement made by her. In the letter
designating the respondent commissioner as investigator of
the petitioner, it is stated: "The charges contained in the
foregoing statement tend to create general discontent, and
hatred among the people against their government, to
make them lose faith in the effectiveness of lawful
processes to secure a change in the control of the
government, and to present the next National Assembly as
an illegal body, constituted by men who have been elected
through wholesale frauds and violations of the civil service
rules. The interest of the public service requires that these
charges be investigated, so that, if found to be true,
appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged
to have been guilty of illegal acts, and if found untrue and
made without justifiable motives, the party making them
may be proceeded against in accordance with section 2440,
in connection, with section, 2078, of the Revised
Administrative Code." Assuming that this is not one of the
grounds provided by law for which the petitioner may be
investigated administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm. Code),
there is weight in the argument that the investigation
would still be in order if for no other purpose than to cause
a full and honest disclosure of all the facts so that, if found
proper and justified, appropriate action may be taken
against the parties alleged to have been guilty of the illegal
acts charged. This is essential to render effective the
authority vested in the President by the Constitution to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed." (Sec. 11,
par. 1, Art. VII.) The enforcement of the law and the
maintenance of peace and order are primarily an executive
obligation. The declaration that the President should "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" is more an
imposition of an obligation than a conferment of power. His
oath requires him to "faithfully and conscientiously fulfill"
his duties as Pres-
81
VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 81

Planas vs. Gil.
ident, "preserve and defend" the Constitution and "execute"

the law. This duty of the Executive to see that the laws be
faithfully executed is not limited to the enforcement of
legislative acts or the express terms of the Constitution but

also includes the due enforcement of rights, duties,
obligations, prerogatives and immunities growing out of
the Constitution itself and of the protection implied by the
nature of the government under the Constitution.
(Cunningham vs. Neagle, 135 U. S., 1; 34 Law. ed., 55.)
Petitioner contends that she has not abused the right of
free speech, and in this connection directs our attention to
the provisions of section 1 (pars. 1 and 8) of the Bill of
Rights. She also urges that "in the supposition that the
statement in question is libelous * * *, the corresponding
criminal or civil action should be brought in the courts of
justice at the initiative, not of the government, but of the
individuals claiming to have been defamed by the
statement." (P. 11, printed memorandum of the petitioner.)
We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of maintaining and
protecting the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech
and of the press, no less than the right of assembly and
petition which, according to Stimson (The American
Constitution As It Protects Private Rights, 152), is its
origin rather than its derivation. We do not forget that
when repression of political and religious discussion
became intense—when censorship of the press was resorted
to most vigorously by the Long Parliament in England—
John Milton, that great historiographer of Cromwell, in his
Areopagitica, denounced the suppression of truth and
appealed for "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue
freely according to conscience, above all liberties"
("Areopagitica", 73, 74, Ambler's Reprint). And this court
has had occasion to vindicate this right, and it is now a
settled doctrine that the official conduct and the policies of
public officials can be criticized (U. S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil.,
731), and that criticism of the constitution and legislation,
of government measures or policies cannot be suppressed
or prevented (U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 225), unless the
intention be to incite rebellion and civil war (Cooley, Cons-
82

Marcos vs. Cruz.
titutional Limitations, 614). In the present case, however,

the petitioner is not denied the right, nor is she being
investigated because she had exercised that right. She has
a perfect right to criticize the Government, its
administration, its policies and officials, but she may not,
on the plea of freedom of speech and of the press, impute
violations of law and the commission of frauds and

thereafter fold her arms and decline to face an
investigation conducted to elicit the truth or falsity of the
charges formulated by her. Otherwise, the guarantee
which, in the language of Wendell Phillips, is "at once the
instrument, and the guarantee, and the bright consummate
flower of all liberty" would degenerate into an unbridled
license, and render the Government powerless to act.
The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and

Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
_____________
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9/1/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 067

[No. 46440. January 18, 1939]

CARMEN PLANAS, petitioner, vs. JOSE GIL,

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACTS OF THE CHIEF

2. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL

3. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND

or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII,

4. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—A mere plea that a subordinate

VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 63

Planas vs. Gil.

dicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign

5. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION.—While,

investigation by the respondent Commissioner of Civil

6. ID.; ID. ; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The statutory rule in this

7. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—A perusal of our Constitution will

64 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Planas vs. Gil.

begins in its section 1 with the declaration that "The

impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the

8. ID. ; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The President in the exercise of

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The power of removal which the

VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 65

Planas vs. Gil.

ments and to take care that the laws be faithfully

power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least

10. ID.; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Section 64 of the Administrative

66 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Planas vs. Gil.

not limited to the enforcement of legislative acts or the

12. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF

which, in the language of Wendell Phillips, is "at once the

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 67

Juan Sumulong, Vicente Sotto, Godofredo Reyes, Wenceslao

This is an original action of prohibition instituted in this

"All opposition efforts in the country are useless just as all

"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to

68 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

country is useless. In past elections, all the municipal and city

On November 18, 1938, the day following the publication of

"In the above statement, you appear to make the following

VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 69

violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the administration

At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her

70 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

The original petition of November 25th was amended by

"(a) That the respondent is absolutely without

in the effectiveness of lawful processes to secure a

VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 71

and to present the next National Assembly as an

"(1) That a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith

her suspension or removal, in connection with her

72 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jorge B. Vargas (Annexes 'A' and 'C') and the

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his

(a) That respondent not only has jurisdiction but is in

that the interested parties may institute arising

VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939 73

nor does it appear that petitioner has suffered any

The Solicitor-General, under the last paragraph (par. 10) of