In sum, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for failure

Enriquez v. Enriquez; Use of “shall” and “must” of the petitioners to pay appellate court docket fee.

Assailed in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Resolutions dated February 3, In dismissing petitioners' appeal, the Court of Appeals cited Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the Revised
1999 and July 7, 1999 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV UDK-7011 dismissing the Rules of Court which provides:
appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the appellate court docket fee.On November 17,
1988, Maximo Enriquez, later substituted by his heirs (now respondents), filed with the "Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71 of Iba, Zambales a complaint for partition against Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-568-1. The complaint involves a parcel of land
situated at Amungan, Iba, same province, covered by TCT No. T-28593, with an area of 44,984 (c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4
square meters. He alleged that he owns 10/18 undivided portion of the property, 9/18 by of Rule 41."
purchase and 1/18 by inheritance; and that petitioners have been residing in the premises
without his knowledge and consent, thereby depriving him of his undivided share of the Petitioners admit that the governing Rule on their payment of appellate court docket fee is
property. Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Petitioners, in their answer, averred that Cipriano Enriquez, one of the petitioners, owns - of "Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an
the property, while the others are in possession of the other areas with his knowledge and appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
consent. On June 4, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering the petitioners to vacate the order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof
property and to surrender possession thereof to respondents. of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record of the record or the record on appeal."
A copy of the Decision was received by counsel for petitioners on June 22, 1998. On July 3,
1998, they filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. It was approved on July 7, 1998. On February Underscoring the sentence "Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate
3, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the court together with the original record or the record on appeal," petitioners maintain that the
appellate court docket fee, thus: "For failure to pay docket fee, the appeal is deemed trial court must first send them a notice to pay the appellate court docket fee and other lawful
ABANDONED and DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 50, Revised Rules of Court." fees within the period for taking an appeal. Hence, they waited for the notice for them to pay
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Appellate Court in a the appellate court docket fee. When they did not receive any, they paid the docket fee to the
Resolution dated July 7, 1999, thus: trial court. Consequently, they cannot be faulted if they paid the appellate court docket fee
four (4) months after their Notice of Appeal was approved on July 7, 1998.
"Per copy of the official receipt attached to appellants' motion for reconsideration, the docket
fee was paid on November 4, 1998 or 4 months after the notice of appeal was filed on July 3, Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, payment of appellate
1998. Consequently, appellants' motion for reconsideration is hereby denied." court docket fee is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal. In Santos v. Court of
Appeals,1 this Court held that although an appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal
In the instant Petition for Review , petitioners raise the following errors allegedly committed taken from the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, it is not a prerequisite for the
by the Appellate Court: perfection of an appeal under Sections 202 and 233 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued
by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P.
"I. The respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred in considering petitioners' appeal as Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the perfection of an
deemed abandoned and dismissed for alleged failure of petitioners to pay docket fee. appeal, to wit: (a) the filing with the trial court of a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.
II. the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the resolution considering petitioners' appeal as deemed abandoned and However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which took effect on July 1, 1997,
dismissed on the ground that the docket fee was paid on November 4, 1998, or four (4) months now require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period
after the notice of appeal was filed on July 3, 1998. for taking an appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4, Rule 41 of the same
Rules that, "(W)ithin the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the
III. the respondent Court of Appeals in issuing the aforesaid resolutions gave premium on court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
technicalities rather on substance and substantial justice and disregarded the merits of appellate court docket and other lawful fees."
petitioners' case."
The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall"
is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory
meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.4 Petitioners cannot give a different In the present case, petitioners failed to establish any sufficient and satisfactory reason to
interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall be made only upon their warrant a relaxation of the mandatory rule on the payment of appellate court docket fee.
receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay. For it is a rule in statutory construction that every Actually, the payment of the required docket fee was late because of the erroneous
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of interpretation of the Rule by petitioners' counsel. Verily, to grant their petition would be
the statute must be interpreted together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the putting a premium on his ignorance or lack of knowledge of existing Rules. He should be
general intent of the whole enactment.5 Indeed, petitioners cannot deviate from the Rule. reminded that it is his duty to keep abreast of legal developments and prevailing laws, rules
and legal principles,12 otherwise his clients will be prejudiced, as in this case.
Also under Rule 41 of the same Rules, an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a case decided
by the RTC in the exercise of the latter's original jurisdiction, shall be taken within fifteen (15) In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing petitioners' appeal. WHEREFORE, the
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Such appeal is made by filing a instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
notice thereof with the court that rendered the judgment or final order and by serving a copy
of that notice upon the adverse party. Furthermore, within this same period, appellant shall
pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The payment of docket fee within
this period is mandatory for the perfection of appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would
not be able to act on the subject matter of the action, and the decision sought to be appealed
from becomes final and executory.6

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that payment of docket fee within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the
decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.7

Petitioners argue that the Appellate Court, in issuing the assailed Resolutions, gave premium
to technicalities rather than substance and disregarded the merits of the petition. They ask for
a liberal construction of the Rules.

Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance
with the provision set by law.
The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear. The payment of appellate docket
fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but an essential requirement for the
perfection of an appeal.8 The payment of the docket fee within the period is a condition sine
qua non for the perfection of an appeal. Contrary to petitioners' submission, the payment of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure.
It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all.9

This Court has consistently ruled that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be
properly presented and justly resolved. The rules of procedure must be faithfully followed
except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply within the prescribed
procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide
by the rules.10 Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of
proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.11
Statutes pending time to take an action or appeal Sec. 36 - Summary Procedures in Special Cases x x x The Supreme Court shall adopt special
rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditions (sic) and
Gachon v. Honorable de Vera inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified
procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral
testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.
May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally to allow the admission of an
answer filed out of time due to alleged oversight?
Pursuant to the aforequoted legislative mandate, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on
Summary Procedure, the pertinent provisions of which, as related to the issues raised in this
This is the main legal question raised in this petition for review assailing the Decision of the case, are hereunder set forth -
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24,1 which dismissed a special civil action
for certiorari and injunction filed by herein petitioners. The dispositive portion of the assailed
RTC Decision reads:2 WHEREFORE premises considered, the prayer for the issuance of a writ
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II - Civil Cases
of preliminary injunction is denied and, with respect to the merits, the instant case is hereby
ordered dismissed. Section 3 - Pleadings

Double costs against petitioners. A. (P)leadings allowed - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints, compulsory
counter-claims and cross-claims pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto
Facts: The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are undisputed
and admitted as correct by the parties. Section 5 Answer - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his
answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
A complaint for forcible entry3 was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against
Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Section 6. Effect of Failure to answer - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within
Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on the period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction prayed for therein: x x x
over him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for
extension of time to file an answer.4 On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on Section 19. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.5 shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner (a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, 6 which was attached
thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an
The foregoing should underscore quite clearly the reality that the ten-day-period to file an
amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the
answer reckoned from the date of the receipt of the summons is mandatory and no reason of
case submitted for resolution.7 On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the petitioners
any kind is acceptable to operate as an excuse. The rule is explicit. It is addressed more, being
motion for reconsideration.8 Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC9 issued a
one of procedure, to counsels than to litigants. Counsels, therefore cannot assert the validity
decision10 resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
of their clients cause to evade the mandate of the law.

Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the
Accordingly, the Court cannot fault the respondent judge [referring to Judge Jose R. Astorga]
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,11 Branch 24, praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered
in acting the way he did in Civil Case No. 130 (93) taking into account the admitted facts and
to admit the amended answer and to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for forcible
circumstances.
entry. As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.

Hence, this petition directly filed before this Court.

Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed Decision12 dismissing the petition. Respondent Judge
Norberto E. Devera, Jr., ratiocinated:13 cha nroble svirtuallawlibrary

The Issues
Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 provides, among others, as follows: Petitioners submit for resolution the following questions of law:14 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
 I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of Section 2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. -- Except in criminal cases
pleadings to be applied STRICTLY or LIBERALLY. where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional
trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
Procedure. 1948, as amended,22 this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that
(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed
Petitioners argue that the technical rules of procedure must yield to the higher interest of by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
justice. Petitioners explain that they filed the motion for extension of time to file an answer, a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure, because of oversight. That was Petitioners ask the Court to interpret a provision of the Rule on Summary Procedure. This is a
why immediately upon receipt of the denial of that motion, petitioners filed their motion to pure question of law that may be properly raised in this petition for review.
admit answer which was later verified and had to be amended. All these (actions) were done
in a period of five (5) days from the lapse of the reglementary period to file an
answer.15 Furthermore, petitioners contend that no prejudice to private respondent has been The Courts Ruling
claimed or alleged by reason of the delay in filing an answer.16 Petitioners also argue that their
defense in the action for forcible entry is based on substantial grounds, because they were in The petition has no merit.
prior physical possession of the premises subject of the action and that their houses have long
been standing on the land in question because the land on which said houses are standing are First Issue: Interpretation of the Period
(sic) the common properties of the parties.
The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows:
Citing Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray that the provisions in the Rule
on Summary Procedure regarding prohibited pleadings and the period for filing an answer be
Section 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his
given liberal interpretation. Petitioners concede that said provisions appear to be couched in
answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
mandatory language. They contend, however, that other similarly worded provisions in the
Rules of Court have nonetheless been liberally applied by this Court to promote substantial
justice.18
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that the provisions in question have to be
limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
strictly construed in order to avoid delay, considering that the Rule on Summary Procedure is
aimed at inexpensive, expeditious and summary determination of cases.19 Private respondent
adds that the petition can also be dismissed on the ground of violation of Revised Circular 28- xxx
91 on forum shopping, because three (3) months after the rendition of the assailed Decision,
a petition for quieting of title and partition, and damages, involving the same parcel of Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or
residential land (Cadastral Lot No. 709 x x x ), was filed xxx docketed as Civil Case No. 21618, petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
by (Petitioner) Victoria Guevara-Gachon (x x x), Patricio Guevara (father of Petitioner Alex
Guevara), Lilia Guevara-Doreza and Fe Guevara-Burgos against herein private respondent. (a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
Private respondent contends that the subsequent case is the appropriate forum where
ownership of the property in question may be threshed out.20
The word shall ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a
chanr oblesvirtuallawlibrary

statute.23 This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the
As observed at the outset, the issue to be resolved is whether, under the undisputed facts of word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and
this case, the Rule on Summary Procedure may be liberally construed in order to allow the the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. 24 chanr oblesvirtuallawlibrary

admission of petitioners answer which unquestionably was filed beyond the reglementary
period.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
Preliminary Matter needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very
nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.25 chanr oblesvirtuallawlibrary

It bears noting that petitioners filed directly before this Court a petition for review assailing
the RTC Decision. This remedy is allowed under paragraph 2 of Circular 2-9021 which provides:
The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving it certainly would have been more prudent for the lower court to have treated the motion to
an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.26 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon dismiss as the answer of petitioner and examined the case on its merits. As will be shown
delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this shortly, the long drawn out proceedings that took place would have been avoided.
reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu
proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. Furthermore, the said case did not involve the question of extension in the period for filing
pleadings under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in In Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 this Court allowed the notice to vacate,
cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure shall be non-extendible.27 cha nrobl esvirtuallawlibrary

served upon the tenant, by registered mail instead of personal service as required by the Rules
of Court. We thus ruled:34 chanr oblesvirtuallawlibrary

Furthermore, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,28 and
this rule should equally apply with full force in forcible entry cases where the possession of the At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
premises at the start is already illegal. summary in nature because they involve a disturbance a social order which must be abated as
promptly as possible without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules which only
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed,
Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether handed
provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The undisputed facts in the
Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing Company, through its manager, had
late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers -- the very informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new owner of the subject building; that on
mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light, petitioners invocation of the general October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the premises
principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. but petitioner refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited
the same reaction; that a final demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to petitioner by
Other than a plea for the liberal interpretation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, petitioners registered mail which he again refused. And even on the supposition that there was no
do not provide an adequate justification for the admission of their late answer. Oversight, personal service as claimed by petitioner, this could only be due to petitioners blatant attempts
which they candidly cite as the reason for their filing a motion for extension of time to file an at evasion which compelled the new landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot
answer, is not a justification. Oversight, at best, implies negligence; at worst, ignorance. The countenance an unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice
negligence displayed by petitioners is clearly inexcusable; ignorance of so basic a rule, on the by the unwarranted delay resulting from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to
other hand, can never be condoned. In either case, the directory application of the questioned acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.
provision is not warranted.
In both cases, there was substantial compliance with the law, something that cannot be said
Petitioners also cite Rosales vs. Court of Appeals29
and Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate of herein petitioners.
Court,30 but these cases do not support their position.
Second Issue: Forum-Shopping
In Rosales vs. Court of Appeals,31
this Court applied the Rule on Summary Procedure liberally
when the defendant, instead of filing an answer, filed within the reglementary period a Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by pursuing the present
pleading labeled as a motion to dismiss. In treating the motion to dismiss as an answer, the ejectment suit, notwithstanding the pendency of an action for quieting of title involving the
Court ruled:32cha nroble svirtuallawlibrary same property and parties. We are unable to find basis for this charge.

Parenthetically, petitioner argues in the present petition that, notwithstanding its being For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts
labeled as a motion to dismiss, said pleading should have been considered as his answer and circumstances; and the actions must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and
pursuant to the liberal interpretation accorded the rules and inasmuch as the grounds involved issues.35 Suffice it to say that an action for quieting of title and partition has a different cause
therein also qualify as defenses proper in an answer. In this instance the Court agrees. Indeed, of action than that in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended, ownership
the rule on summary procedure was conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of of a certain portion of the property which is determined in a case of partition does not
cases such as the present one. Well-settled is the rule that forcible entry and detainer cases necessarily mean that the successful litigant has the right to possess the property adjudged in
being summary in nature and involving disturbance of social order, procedural technicalities his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is physical or material possession of
should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override substantial justice. With the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party
this premise in mind and having insisted, however erroneously, on its jurisdiction over the case, litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a In the election case, meanwhile, the protestant Argana moved for the constitution of
partys possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay committees on revision of ballots. Expressly to hear protestee's view thereon and to afford
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion him a chance to propose his commissioners, this motion was set for hearing but, quite
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.36 It has even been ruled that the institution of a separate understandably, no appearance was entered for the deceased protestee. Accordingly, on May
action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary 6, 1964, the court a quo required the protestee's widow and children to appear within fifteen
remedy of ejectment.37 cha nroble svirtuallawlibrary

days from notice in order to be substituted for said protestee, if they so desired. They did not,
however, comply. Taking no further action in the premises, the trial court left the matter at
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision that.
is AFFIRMED in toto. Double costs against petitioners.
Then proceeding ex parte, on June 11, 1964, the protestant Argana reiterated his move for the
SO ORDERED. appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots, but this time without proposing any
provision for representation for the protestee whose widow and children he sought to be
Vda de Mesa v. Mencias; statutes prescribing procedural reqs declared "non-suited." On June 23, 1964, without notice to the protestee and/or his legal
representative — as indeed none had thus far been named — the trial court granted the
In this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, the petitioners ask this Court to motion aforesaid.
review a three-to-two decision rendered by a special division of the Court of Appeals on March
26, 1965 in C.A. 35019-R, sustaining the validity of the proceedings had and taken by the Court With the constitution of the committee on revision of ballots in which, incidentally, Ramon
of First Instance of Rizal in election case 7924 before it (Maximino A. Argana, protestant vs. Antilon Jr. was motu proprio named and then served as commissioner for the deceased
Francisco De Mesa, protestee). The issue of nullity of the judgment promulgated in the said protestee, the completion of the proceedings on revision, and the submission of the report
election case was elevated to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and mandamus, thereon, the trial court, in its decision of August 10, 1964, adjudged the protestant Maximino
upon the contention that the said court of first instance illegally and incorrectly did not allow A. Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections, and taxed the
the substitution of the present petitioners as parties for De Mesa, after the latter's death, and costs and expenses of the protest against the estate of the deceased protestee Francisco De
thereafter denied due course to their appeal from the said judgment. Mesa.

The antecedent facts are not complicated. On August 17, 1964, within the reglementary period for the finality of the decision aforesaid,
a three-pronged move was taken by De Mesa's widow, Magdalena Sibulo Vda. de De Mesa,
Opponents for the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections were Francisco De and the local chapter of the Liberal Party of which the deceased protestee was a member, thru
Mesa and Maximino A. Argana. The electorate's choice, as tallied by the local board of its president and secretary. First, they sought leave to represent the deceased protestee,
canvassers, was De Mesa. Elected vice-mayor with him was Demetrio R. Loresca. Duly, invoking specifically said protestee's interest to keep his political opponent out of the
proclaimed elected, these two qualified and assumed their respective positions upon the contested office in order to maintain his successor therein, which interest was not abated by
commencement of their term of office. his death; second, they moved for the reconsideration of the August 10, 1964 decision and/or
for new trial based, inter alia, upon the ground that, for failure to order the protestant to
Meanwhile and in due season, defeated candidate Argana, charging the perpetration of frauds,
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee after his widow
terrorism and other irregularities in certain precincts, protested the election of De Mesa, which
and children had failed to appear, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court,
protest was docketed as election case 7924, supra, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the
it was legally improper for the trial court to have proceeded ex parte with the election case;
Honorable Eulogio Mencias presiding. In his return to the protest, De Mesa traversed the
and third, they filed a "Cautionary Notice of Appeal" in anticipation of the possible denial of
charges, and, in a counter-protest incorporated therein, sought to shift responsibility for
their said motion for reconsideration and new trial.
irregularities to the protestant and his followers, impugning in view thereof the results in some
thirteen precincts. Pleading lack of personality both of De Mesa's widow and the local Liberal Party Chapter to
intervene in the case, as well as the absence of any ground for a new trial, the protestant
On March 18, 1964, however, an assassin's bullet felled De Mesa, and, forthwith, vice-mayor
opposed the foregoing moves. To the opposition, the movant below filed their reply.
Loresca was, by operation of law, duly installed as his successor. Notice of De Mesa's demise
was given on April 22, 1964 to the court a quo thru a "Constancia" filed by the decedent's On September 25, 1964 the court a quo, subscribing to the position taken by the protestant,
counsel of record, in which they also indicated their belief that, by reason of said death, their denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee, and order stricken
authority as such counsel was terminated. from the record their motion for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of
appeal.
 interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason,
broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all
On October 6, 1964 Argana qualified as mayor and assumed office means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as
Forthwith, on October 7, 1964 the movants aforesaid gave notice of their intention to take the possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the
matter on appeal to the Court of Appeals. This was met with the protestant's motion to strike will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29,
out their notice of appeal, grounded on the trial court's finding of movants' want of personality 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the
to appear in the case, and consequently to appeal the decision a quo. interests of the contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic
of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of the protestee not only does
In the meantime, Demetrio R. Loresca made common cause with De Mesa's widow and the not ipso facto divest him of the character of an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains
local Liberal Party Chapter, and moved for leave to be added to and/or substituted as party- a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and maintain therein his
protestee, claiming a legal and continuing interest in the outcome of the election protest as successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court
successor to De Mesa. to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595,
597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).
On November 10, 1964 the trial court dictated twin order (1) granting the protestant's
motion to strike out the notice of appeal heretofore adverted to; and (2) denying Loresca's Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings
motion to be substituted a party-protestee. in the election protest filed against him, and it may be stated as a rule that an election contest
survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee.
This development sent the herein petitioners to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
and mandamus, with preliminary injunction (CA 35019-R), to nullify for lack of jurisdiction the With the death of De Mesa, however, a contingency not expressly provided for by the Revised
proceedings taken by the trial court in the election case aforesaid without allowing the Election Code was ushered in. Nevertheless, the, hiatus in the special law posed no
intervention and/or the inclusion of a legal representative of the deceased protestee; or, in impediment to the course of the proceedings because, precisely by express mandate of Rule
the alternative, to compel the trial court to give due course to the petitioners' appeal from the 134 of the Rules of Court, said rules, though not generally applicable to election cases, may
decision in said case. Upon bond duly filed and approved, the Court of Appeals issued the writ however be applied "by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
of preliminary injunction prayed for. However, upon respondents' motion and over the convenient." For the eventuality here involved, the Rules specifically plot the course of action
opposition of the petitioners, the effect of said writ was temporarily suspended until the case to be taken, in the following language:
was finally decided by the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
Appropriate proceedings having been had in the case, the latter court, besides finding the shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to
inapplicability to election cases of the provisions of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
on substitution of parties in case of death, opined that the petitioners likewise lacked the may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
legal standing and/or capacity to appear in election case 7924 aforesaid and/or to appeal order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
from the decision rendered therein, and that furthermore while the petitioner Loresca may deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately
have had such personality he nevertheless failed to timely invoke the same to protect his appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. . . . (Rule 3.)
interests. Accordingly, it denied the petition for certiorari and mandamus and consequently
permanently dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction theretofore issued. That the applicability of the foregoing precept to the election contest below was initially
conceded is borne out by the proceedings on record. The trial court, it will be recalled in its
Hence, the present recourse. order of May 6, 1964, required the widow and children of the deceased protestee to appear
and be substituted for and on his behalf and to protect his interest in the case. But when they
The vital issue, to which all other issues appear to be subsidiary, is the determination of the failed to comply — mainly because of the shock and agony that followed in the wake of the
legal effect of the proceedings taken by the trial court in the election contest before it violent death of the protestee — the trial court took no further steps in the premises and,
subsequent to the demise of the protestee De Mesa. instead, at the instance of the protestant, declared said widow and children non-suited,
As we approach this question, certain postulates project themselves to the fore. It is axiomatic proceeded with the case ex parte, and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention and/or
that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee. In these moves, the trial court did not only
private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for merit the unqualified sanction of the Court of Appeals but the latter, taking an even more
all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall radical of the matter, actually held that the rule relied upon has no application to election
discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public cases.
 proceeded ex parte with the election case, said court not only acted with grave abuse of
discretion but actually committed a clear extra-limitation of its lawful jurisdiction which,
We cannot give our imprimatur to the foregoing view. All reasonable intendments deducible perforce, tainted all its proceedings with the indelible stigma of nullity (Barrameda, et al. vs.
from the law and the essential nature of the case involved, to our mind, unerringly tend to the Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, 722, 723; Ferreria vs. Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales, et al., 55 O.G. No. 8, 1358,
contrary. All the very least, nothing extant in the Revised Election Code either expressly or by 136263; Sarmiento, etc., et al. vs. Ortiz, et al., G.R. L-18583, January 31, 1964; Caisip vs.
implication renders inappropriate the application of said principle of substitution in case of Cabangon, G.R. L-14684-14686, August 26, 1960).
death to proceedings thereunder. On the contrary, because of its clear failure to meet the
contingency in question, the need to supplement the deficiency becomes imperative. Then the
exertion of judicial power to hear and determine a cause implicitly presupposes in the trial
court, amongst other essentials, jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. That jurisdiction It is no argument against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement
was inevitably impaired upon the death of the protestee pending the proceedings below such of a legal representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term "may" instead
that unless and until a legal representative is for him duly named and within the jurisdiction of of the mandatory word "shall." While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be
the trial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded any validity or binding resorted to as guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory or directory character of statutory
effect upon any party, in representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the provisions, they are in no wise absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and
fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence of the constitutionally enshrined equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the
guarantee of due process. As cogently synthesized in Cupples vs. Castro, 137 P. 2d., 755 — consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of
said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction.
Where contestant was declared elected and contestee appealed after which contestant died, Thus, Black is authority for the rule that "Where the statute provides for the doing of some act
rights of parties could not be determined in absence of contestant and his legal representative which is required by justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or
and submission would be set aside and cause taken from calendar to be heard only after public officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public interest
representative for contestant should have been substituted. (Francisco, The Revised Election or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the
Code, 1957 ed., p. 583). execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty" (Black, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 540-
543). The matter here involved not only concerns public interest but also goes into the
If this be the case with the contestant, a fortiori no less can be said of the contestee whose jurisdiction of the trial court and is of the essence of the proceedings taken thereon. On this
rights as well as those of his successor by operation of law would be at hazard in an ex parte point, there is authority to the effect that in statutes relating to procedure, as is the one now
proceeding. Further still, the fundamental purpose of the Revised Election Code, it has been under consideration, every act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or
recognized, is to protect the integrity of elections and suppress all evils that may vitiate their is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected, is mandatory (Gonzaga,
purity and defeat the popular will. Judicial experience teaches that more often than not frauds Statutes and their Construction, p. 98, citing: Estate of Naval, G.R. No. L-6736, May 4, 1954).
and irregularities committed during the voting come to light only when the ballot boxes are The present case is well within the purview of this doctrine.
opened and their contents examined. At no time then in the course of an election contest is
the need for vigilance more to be insisted upon than during that critical stage when the ballot Nor may the motu proprio appointment by the trial court of Ramon Antilon Jr. as commissioner
boxes are opened and the ballots themselves are revised. To deny a party to the contest the for the deceased protestee in the revision proceedings be decreed a substantial compliance
representation that the law allows him at this juncture is virtually to take away one of the most with the legal requirement. As aptly observed in the dissent to the decision under review, said
effective measures designed for the approximation of the primordial objective election laws commissioner was not the legal representative contemplated by the Rules to be substituted
are intended to achieve. for the deceased protestee. Said commissioner was not supposed to represent the protestee
as a party litigant. His appointment as such was made exclusively upon the initiative of the trial
In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of court and is authorized by the law. Section 175, Revised Election Code, merely as a time-saving
Court applies to election contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as device for the convenience of the court and the parties in the purely mechanical operation of
it does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that unless and until the procedure therein opening the ballots and tabulating the count and in the interest of a speedy and expeditious
detailed is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court in the absence of a duly revision and recount of the contested ballots (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632, 649-650;
appointed legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken down as null and Raymundo vs. Gonzales, 80 Phil. 719, 721). For all legal intents and purposes, while said
void. Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the protestant to commissioner's appointment may be proposed by the contestants themselves, he is
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee after the latter's nevertheless exclusively an officer or an agent of the court under its direct control and
widow and children had failed to comply with the court order requiring their appearance to be supervision.
substituted in lieu of their predecessor, but instead — in derogation of the precepts of the Rule
in question and in the total absence of a legal representative of the deceased protestee —
Equally unacceptable is the proposition that, because time is of the essence in an election substitution in lieu of the deceased protestee was not Loresca's. It was the trial court's as well
contest, recourse to the appointment of a legal representative of a deceased protestee which as the protestant's duty, upon being apprised of the protestee's death, to cause the
can only protract and delay the progress of the case is but a finical matter of procedure which appointment of his legal representative according to the procedure delineated in the Rules.
can justifiably be dispensed with. The validity of the injunction for the prompt disposal of Failing in this duty, it never became the obligation of Loresca to take it upon himself to be
election controversies as repeatedly postulated in a consistent array of jurisprudence is not appointed as such legal representative, as in fact, he was not even duly and seasonably
open to debate. The terms of office of elective officials are relatively brief. To dissipate within notified, much less ordered, to appear and be so substituted. In this posture, and particularly
the shortest time possible any aura of doubt upon the true result of elections is a much sought- because, as above held, the trial court did not even acquire jurisdiction over him, no room
after desideratum. But, salutary though the precept may be, it is no justification for cutting exists for the operation of the rule on laches against him. His intervention should not have
procedural corners or taking legal short cuts not warranted in a system of procedure where been denied.
the rule of law is still held paramount over and above all considerations of mere convenience
and expediency. We would be the last to advocate a departure from the policy of early The same cannot, however, be said of the protestee's widow or of the local Liberal Party
settlement of electoral disputes, but we are not prepared to lend our approval to a course of chapter of Muntinlupa. The protestee's claim to the contested office is not in any sense a right
action which would tend to achieve one object of desire at the expense of the orderly transmissible to this widow or heirs. Said widow's only remaining interest in the outcome of
administration of justice and with the sacrifice of the fundamental right of litigants to due the case is limited to no more than the possible award of costs against the deceased protestee.
process of law. Otherwise, the speedy trial required by the law would be converted into a Besides not being such an interest as would justify her substitution for her deceased husband
denial of justice (Querubin vs. Court of Appeals, 82 Phil. 226, 230). In law — as in any other as an indispensable legal representative, the right to such an award if eventually made has
sphere of human relations — the end very seldom, if at all, justifies the means. And, in the case already been waived by the protestant Argana. This effectively withdraws the widow from the
at bar, the admittedly imperative demand for a speedy disposition of the controversy cannot picture altogether. Much less has the local Liberal Party Chapter any claim to substitution. Not
deter our hand from striking down illegality in the proceedings therein and remanding the case being duly incorporated as a juridical person, it can have no personality to sue or be sued as
for new trial, despite the concomitant delay that may be occasioned thereby, since that is the such. And while it conceivably may derive some indirect benefit consequent to the resolution
only course open if the ends of justice are to be subserved (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. of the contest in favor of the deceased protestee, neither the chapter itself nor the officers
584, 587). thereof would become entitled thereby to any right to the contested office in case of a
favorable judgment, nor, for that matter, do they stand to sustain any direct prejudice in case
Consequent to the conclusion we have just reached, we confront the issue of who is the legal of an adverse one. No basis therefore exists upon which to predicate their claim to
representative of the deceased protestee entitled to be substituted in his stead. substitution.

As the record of the case reveals, three different aspirants vied for that legal representation: The foregoing views render academic the alternative issue raised by the petitioners regarding
Demetrio R. Loresca, the vice-mayor who succeeded to the position of mayor upon the the propriety of their appeal from the trial court's decision in the main case.
protestee's demise; Magdalena Sibulo Vda. de De Mesa, the protestee's widow; and the local
chapter of the Liberal Party at Muntinlupa, Rizal, to which the deceased protestee belonged, ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review is reversed and in lieu thereof, another is rendered
as represented by its officers who are co-petitioners herein. An examination of the —
countervailing interests of these parties seems in order. (1) Declaring null and void the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in election case
By virtue of Section 7 of the Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act 2264, the vice-mayor stands 7924 thereof, dated August 10, 1964, which proclaimed the protestant Maximino A. Argana
next in line of succession to the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the latter's position. the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections, for having been rendered
Upon the death of the protestee mayor in the case at bar, Loresca as then incumbent vice- without jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative of the deceased protestee
mayor succeeded by operation of law to the vacated office and, as a matter of right, is entitled Francisco de Mesa and all other proceedings taken by said court in said election case
to occupy the same for the unexpired term thereof or until the protest against his predecessor subsequent to the death of the said protestee;
is decided adversely against the latter. The outcome of that contest thus bears directly upon (2) Ordering the protestant Maximino A. Argana, without delay, to vacate the office of the
his right to his present position and, amongst all, he is the person most keenly concerned and mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal and to relinquish the same in favor of Demetrio R. Loresca; and
interested in the fair and regular conduct thereof in order that the true will of the electorate
will be upheld. His status as a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings — a (3) Ordering the Court of First Instance of Rizal to forthwith appoint the petitioner Demetrio R.
fact conceded by the decision under review itself — cannot thus be disputed. Loresca as the legal representative of the deceased protestee Francisco de Mesa and allow his
appearance as such in substitution of the said deceased for purposes of said election case 7924
It is not correct to subject Loresca, as the Court of Appeals did, respecting his interest in the of said court, to conduct a new trial in said election case, and thereafter to render judgment
controversy to the operation of the equitable principle of laches. The initiative to cause his therein as the evidence may warrant.
 PERFECTO, J.:

No pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to continue taking cognizance of
the appeal in the election case of Fidel C. Querubin v. Felipe S. Mamuri, CA — 2843-R,
Querubin v. CA; statutes requiring decision with prescribed period concerning the mayoralty of Ilagan, Isabela, because of the expiration of the three- month
period provided for in section 178 of the Revised Election Code, which reads as follows:
1. ELECTIONS; APPEAL IN ELECTION CONTEST; PROVISIONS AS TO TIME WITHIN WHICH TO
DISPOSE APPEAL, NATURE OF. — The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, "Sec. 178. Appeal from the decision in election contests. — From any final decision rendered
that the appeal in election contests be decided "within three months after the filing of the case by the Court of First Instance in protest against the eligibility or the election of provincial
in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken," the same as the governors, members of the provincial board, city councilors, and mayors, the aggrieved party
provision in section 177 of the same code requiring that the trial court shall decide a protest may appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within five
within six months or one year from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial office, days after being notified of the decision, for its revision, correction, annulment or
is directory in nature. confirmation, and the appeal shall proceed as in a criminal case. Such appeal shall be decided
within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which
2. ID.; ID.; INTENTION OF THE LAW LIMITING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH TO DISPOSE THE the appeal has been taken. (C. A. 357-172.)"
APPEAL. — The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to
impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals on May 22, 1948. On
interest. The terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of August 23, 1948, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-
an election should be dispelled as soon as possible. Public faith, confidence and cooperation, month period provided for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22,
essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by controversies as to who have been 1948, and that, consequently, the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case,
actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as soon as possible. invoking to the effect the doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) holding mandatory a
Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out without former legal provision that "all proceedings in electoral contest shall be terminated within one
delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, year."
of hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more
The motion to dismiss was denied on September 15, 1948, upon the ground that the period
effective the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the
within which appellant had to file his brief had not as yet expired.
period of time provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the
purposes of the system of judicial settlement of protests. The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, that the appeal in election contests
be decided "within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the
3. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OR APPEAL FOR FAILURE OF COURTS TO RENDER
court to which the appeal has been taken", the same as the provision in section 177 of the
FINAL DECISION WITHIN THE TIME AS THEREIN PROVIDED FOR, IS UNJUSTIFIED. — To dismiss
same code requiring that the trial court shall decide a protest within six months or one year
an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts, regardless of
from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial office, is directory in nature. The
cause or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said sections, is
purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need
to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the parties. That
of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The
would defeat the purposes of the due process of law and would make of the administration of
terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election
justice in election contests an aleatory process where the litigants, irrespective of the merits
should be dispelled as soon as possible.
of their respective claims, will be gambling for a deadline. The dismissal in such case will
constitute a miscarriage of justice. The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into Public faith, confidence and cooperation, essential to the success of government, are
a denial of justice. jeopardized by controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These
controversies should be settled as soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the
4. ID.; ID.; FORMER PRECEDENTS ABANDONED, THE DOCTRINE OF "STARE DECISIS." — The
will of the people in polls should be cleared out without delay. The legislative policy, as
doctrine in the case of Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as modified
embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of hastening the
in the case of Cacho v. Abad (61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme Court "has
administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the
assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which arrived here after the
constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time
expiration of the year period without any protest being made against this practice."
provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system
DECISION of judicial settlement of protests.
To dismiss an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts, Similar notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig and to the Provincial Warden of Pasig,
regardless of cause or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said Rizal, who both received them on December 2,1975,
sections, is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the
parties. That would defeat the purposes of the due process of law and would make of the On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for
administration of justice in election contests an aleatory process where the litigants, postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for
irrespective of the merits of their respective claims, will be gambling for a deadline. The failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. Acceding to
dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The speedy trial required by the counsel's request that he be given time to consider the proper remedial measure to take, the
law would be turned into a denial of justice. respondent judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976 at 8:30 A. M.

The doctrine in the case of Portillo v. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting of the promulgation
modified in the case of Cacho v. Abad (61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme of decision. Granting the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the promulgation to January
Court "has assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which arrived 26, 1976.
here after the expiration of the year period without any protest being made against this Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before Us the present petition.
practice." On January 16, 1976, this Court issued an Order temporarily restraining respondent judge from
The petition is dismissed promulgating the decision in Criminal Case No, C-5910.

Marcelino v. Cruz Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the
Jr. from promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled People of the unresolved case.
Philippines versus Bernardino Marcelino, and for release from detention of petitioner, the
accused in said case, on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the We disagree. Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty- five [851 days from
case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety [90] days from submission September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge
thereof. filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus
veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the
Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch Constitution.
XII. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his case on
August 4, 1975. On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved for time In Comia v. Nicolas, 5 Ago v. Court of Appeals 6 and Balquidra v. Court of First Instance 7 this
within which to submit their respective memoranda. The trial court granted the motion as Court ruled that the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed
follows: decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by
petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is
Upon joint motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to submit their respective this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent judge had
memoranda, simultaneously, and thereafter the case shall be deemed submitted for decision resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision
of the Court. could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at at a later date,
considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved,
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed an event which is beyond the control of the judge. As pointed out in People v. Court of Appeals
by the People. 8, the promulgation of a judgment in the trial court does not necessarily coincide with the date
On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in of its delivery by the judge of the clerk of court.
said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975. 1 Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:
A certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of the Grace SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case
Park Post Office 2 to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980 and 011981, addressed to or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months
Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango Road, Portero, Malabon, Rizal, the complaining witness, and for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior
Atty, Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg., Intramuros, Manila, counsel for the accused, collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.
respectively, were posted in said office on December 4, 1975. These notices were received by
the respective addressees on December 8 and 9, 1975. 3
To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted provision has been rendered by courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted
this Court. Thus, in approaching this novel question, We now tread upon what Mr. Cooley to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the
characterizes as "very dangerous ground when they [referring to the courts] venture to apply general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts with
rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution." the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through
9 which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason
merely of having failed to render a decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd situation
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law.
by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." 10 "The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his Construction and Interpretation of the Laws,
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than 15 the constitutional provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus, where
by enforcing the letter of the law." 11 the contrary construction) would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, it
should not be followed. "
In Trapp v. McCormick, 12 a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty [30] days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of One last point, Notwithstanding Our conclusion that courts are not divested of their
counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with jurisdiction for failure to decide a case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasize the
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending before their salas
to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the must be decided within the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said rule constitutes
Legislature or some incident of the essential act. " Thus, in said case, the statute under a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In fact a certificate to this
examination was construed merely to be directory. certificate is required before judges are allowed Lo draw their salaries.

On this view, authorities are one in saying that: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed; and the Restraining Order dated January 16,
1976 issued by this Court is lifted. Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. is already
Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict deceased, his successor is hereby ordered to decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis of
have been held by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them does the record thereof within ninety [90] days from the time the case is raffled to him.
not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would
clearly have indicated it." [American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac.
742; Heillen v. Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39, State v. Davis,
194 Mo. 585, 5 Ann. Cas. 1000, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1023, 92 S.W. 484; Wissman v. Meagher, 115 SO ORDERED.
Mo. App. 82, 91 S.W. 448; Pohle v. Dickmann, 67 Mo. App. 381; Herwick v. Koken Barber Supply Co v. CA; laws operate prospectively
Co., 61 Mo. App. 454].
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional provision under consideration. In Mikell his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co
v. School Dis. of Philadelphia, 13 it was ruled that "the legal distinction between directory and delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws." Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The check was
1

To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given
exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court in
accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New Constitution to A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
2

"promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ... " And there can company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in
be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment
merely to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris, 14 declares that of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely
procedural. Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was
reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction,
In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court had at on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
various times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior (1987) — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
3

nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate
v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.
for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in
a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
provided as follows: form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of
the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is
B.P. Blg. 22. echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or not a habitual criminal . . .
5

secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the

drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many
(Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act
Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay
No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity
1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s
1981). amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship
cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada,
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending
(Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640,
check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the
alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar
misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the
the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment
guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4 of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389
whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having
given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA,
interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a
129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be
statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively
accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should
(Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941),
have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v.
in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check
CA, 205 SCRA 419).
in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a
guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will
no longer be considered a valid defense. The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars,
to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a
circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction.
adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-
Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that
0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no
the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or
retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC
interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to
permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court Circular was issued.
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the
Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in
Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the
and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino
reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals.
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611: applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa, reversing the aforesaid
6 7 retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually
doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations
appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the 565 [1061]).
complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is
8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth
that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual
maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which
9

found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned declared "that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of
case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." — the
should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted Court said:
on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this
an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8

having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,

conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442;
was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination
petitioners on September 29, 1979. of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions aspects — with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
 Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371,
federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor
justified. Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the
opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).
of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32,
issued by the then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military
and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held Commission No 34, — declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial
12

in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and
10
law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of
should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same numerous persons — this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
observations, to wit:11

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before
Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not
its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a
survive. retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible,
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on
may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive process.
act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is xxx xxx xxx
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and
may have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military
a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President
all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that
its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in
measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying
the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to
there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped
out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual

existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that army in Aparri, Cagayan in the year 1942. On November 6, 1946, he promised to pay Mr.
the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a 14
Esteban Zeta 5 per cent of any mount he may receive as a result of his claim for backpay,
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered insurance or any other privileges granted by law (Exhibit 1). Zeta prepared the necessary
by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner papers for disability compensation and as a result Albiza received the sum of P5,919 from the
and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that United States Veterans Administration. In pursuance of the contract, Albiza paid Zeta the sums
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22. of P200 on June 7, 1951 and P100 on June 11, 1951.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, The law in force at the time of the execution of that agreement (Exhibit 1) was Commonwealth
applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the Act No. 675, section 11 of which provides as follows:
offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The
facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there No attorney, agent, or other person in charge of the preparation, filing, or pursuing
was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the of any claim for arrears in pay and allowances under this Act shall demand or
special law violated; and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an
15
charge for his services fees more than five per centum of the total money value of
honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" could not be appreciated as a valid
16
such arrears in pay and allowances, and said fees shall become due and demandable
defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on only after the payment of the said arrears in pay and allowances is received by the
the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney widow or orplan entitled thereto. The retention or deduction of any amount from
of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to any such arrears in pay and allowances for the payment of fees for such services is
great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the prohibited A violation of any provision of this section shall be punished by
correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of imprisonment of from 6 months to 1 year, or by a fine of from six hundred to one
penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards thousand pesos, or by both such imprisonment and fine,
prosecutions for their violation. Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the
17

respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go

But on June 14, 1947, Republic Act No. 145 was passed. It provides:
Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by
the Court on the law invoked.
Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of
his claim for benefits under the laws of the United States administered by the United
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine,
States Veterans Administration who shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, contract for,
must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling
charge, or receive,m or who shall attempt to solicit, contract for, charge, or receive
reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and
any fee or compensation exceeding twenty pesos in any one claim, or who shall
its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
collect his fee before the claim is actually paid to a beneficiary or claimant, shall be
deemed guilty of an offense and upon conviction therof shall for every offense be
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are fined not exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding two years
reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is or both, in the discretion of the court.
DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
The trial court held that upon the passage of Republic Act No. 145, the agreement for the
SO ORDERED payment of a 5 per cent fee on the amount collected was voided and compliance therewith
became illegal; so it sentenced the defendant-appellant to pay a fine of P200, to indemnify
People v. Zeta; presumption against retroactivity Eugenio Albiza in the sum of P280, or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Samar, finding Esteban
Zeta guilty of a violation of Republic Act No. 145 (which took effect on June 14, 1947), for On this appeal, defendant-appellant's counsel contends that the application of Republic Act
having solicited, charged demanded and collected a fee or compensation of P300 for assisting No. 145 to the defendant-appellant for having charged and collected the fee of 5 per cent is
on Eugenio Albiza in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits an infringement of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. And the case of
under the laws of the United States. U.S. vs. Diaz Conde, et al., 42 Phil., 766, is cited for the principle that law impairing the
obligations of a contract is null and void; that a law must be construed prospectively, not
retroactively, so that if it is legal at its inceptionit can not be declared illegal by subsequent
Eugenio Albiza, an enlisted man of the Philippine Army and later of the United States Armed
legislation, otherwise the sanctity of contracts will be impaired in violation of the organic law.
Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), suffered disability in the course of rendering services for the In this case the defendant-appellant had collected interest in the years 1915 and 1916 at the
rate of 5 per cent per month, an interest in excess of that authorized by the Usury Law (Act No. had been collected and said right is not protected by the non-impairment clause of the
2655), which took effect In May, 1916, and the court held that the collection of the said interest Constitution. A renowned authority on statutory construction, however states that the
was legal at the time it was made and that it cannot be declared illegal by any subsequent distinction between vested and absolute rights is not helpful, and that "a better way to handle
legislation. This case is not exactly in point, because when the Usury Law was passed the the problem" is "to declare those statutes attempting to affect rights which the court finds to
interest had already been collected; whereas in the case at bar the collection of the fee was be unalterable, invalid as arbitrary and unreasonable, thus lacking in due process" some courts
effected after Republic Act No. 145 had been passed. The claim that said Act is an ex post having recognized that the real issue in the reasonableness of the particular enactment
facto law is not fully justified because although the services were rendered before the Act took (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, pp. 121-122). The 5 per cent fee fixed in
effect, collection for said services did not take place until after the law became effective. Commonwealth Act No. 675 is to Us not unreasonable. Services were rendered thereunder to
complainant's benefit. The right to the fees accrued upon such rendition. Only the payment of
In defense of the judgment of conviction, the Solicitor General argues that contracts are not the fee was contingent upon the approval of the claim; therefore, the right was not contingent.
beyond the reach of legislation by Congress in the proper exercise of the police power of the For a right to accrue is one thing; enforcement thereof by actual payment is another. The
State, and as Republic Act No. 145 was enacted in pursuance thereto, its applicability to the subsequent law enacted after the rendition of the services should not as a matter of simple
appellant must be sustained; that the rights of defendant-appellant under the contract, Exhibit justice affect the agreement, which was entered into voluntarily by the parties as expressly
1, had not become absolute at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 154, because the directed in the previous law. To apply the new law to the case of the defendant-appellant such
agreed fee had not been collected, so that the non-impairment of contracts clause of the as to deprive him of the agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructive of the
Constitution is not applicable thereto. inviolability of contracts, and therefore invalid as lacking in due process; to penalize him for
collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of justice. Such could not have been the legislative
intent in the enactment of Republic Act 145.
Without passing upon the above arguments of both parties, we note that it does not appear
from the language of the law itself, or from any other circumstances, that the Legislature had
intended to give its provisions any retroactive effect such as to affect contracts entered into In resume, we hold that Republic Act No. 145 must be given prostective application only, and
under the sanction of the previous law (Commonwealth Act No. 675). We must, therefor, may not be given retroactive effect such as to affect rights that had accrued under a contract
consider it prospective, not retroactive. expressly sanctioned by a previous law (C. A. 675). The judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the defendant-appellant, acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
. . . The presumption, however, is that all laws operate prospectively only and only
when the legislative has clearly indicated its intention that the law operate
retroactively will the courts so apply it. Retroactive operation will more readily be
ascribed to legislation that is curative or legalizing than to legislation which may
disadvantageously, though legally, effect past relations and transactions. (2
Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 243.).

. . . Beginning with Kent's dictum in Dash vs. Van Kleeck, it has been continuously
reaffirmed that 'The rule is that statutes are prospective, and will not be construed
to have retroactive operation, unless the language employed in the enactment is so
clear it will admit of no other construction.(Id., p. 135.).

Besides, it should not be interpreted in a manner that would render its application violative of
a constitutional inhibition.

Strict construction to prevent retroactive operation has often been applied in order
that the statute would not violate contract obligations or interfere with vested rights.
The principal explanation offered by the courts, however, is that the statute must be
construed so as to sustain its constitutionality and thus prospective operation will be
presumed where a retroactive operation would produce invalidity. (2 Sutherland
Statutory Construction, supra, p. 135.).lawphi1.net

It is also argued that the right of appellant to collect the 5 per cent fee was contingent merely
and did not become absolute, complete and unconditional until the compensation benefits
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan; ex post facto law the issues raised by the exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General, 16 is of the
view that the invalidity of Presidential Decree No, 1486 as amended, creating
In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create
respondent Court has not been demonstrated.
a special Court, the Sandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled be adjudged.
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." 1 It came into
1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister
existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree. 2 Even under the 1935
Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this
Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an anti-graft statute was passed, 3 to be
proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that
supplemented five years later by another act, 4 the validity of which was upheld
such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made
in Morfe v. Mutuc, 5 a 1968 decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court: "Nothing
clear that he as incumbent President "shall continue to exercise legislative powers
can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute
until martial law shall have been lifted. " 17 Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling
was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 18 decided in 1975. In the
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended
language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality
to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be
of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ...
a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands
. 19 As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a
the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character.
recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President
The times demanded such a remedial device." 6 It should occasion no surprise,
during the period of Martial Law. " 20
therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of the
continuity need to combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited 2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in
provision. seeking to nullify Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from
J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: 21 "The Ideal situation is for the
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the
law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men
respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity which is of the very essence of the
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several
Idea of law." 22 There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists
cases. 7 The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979.
"cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does
Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash
not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then
on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. 8 A week later. respondent Court denied
is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist .To assure
such motion. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure
same fate. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under
petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent
such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
Court is violative of the due process, 11 equal protection, 12 and ex post
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
facto 13 clauses of the Constitution. 14
weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more finds no support in reason. " 23 Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient
effectively with dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service whether to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly
committed by government officials or not, with the essential cooperation of the on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
private citizens with whom they deal, cannot of itself justify any departure from or same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
disregard of constitutional rights. That is beyond question. With due recognition, the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner 15 in his pleadings principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
butressed by scholarly and diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms
of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal
rest." 24 rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony . than
the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil rights and remedies
3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to
done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." 32 Even the most careful
law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance
scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful
to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional
protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad
two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of
scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the
right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court
statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter.
of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court." 25 ,that is hardly convincing,
This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo 33 a 1949 decision,
considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through
speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven
Justice Laurel in People v. Vera 26 requiring that it "must be based on substantial
of the nine Justices then composing this Court, excepting only the ponente himself
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the
and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act
law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
of 1948, doing away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the
member of the class. 27 To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes mention of the
Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death
creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a problem,
sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability
the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It
to crimes committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.
follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been
aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into 5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition
force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as of what is prohibited by the ex post facto clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe, 34 decided
petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection in 1903. Thus: "An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an
clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 28 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it
of the Bill of Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and
protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific provision, " in that decision, one inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities." 29 The committed; or (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
the instant situation. offense in order to convict the defendant. " 35 There is relevance to the next
paragraph of the opinion of Justice Cooper: "The case clearly does not come within
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post
this definition, nor can it be seen in what way the act in question alters the situation
facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that
of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government, the benefit
"petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise ... ." 30 A more
of the appeal, and is intended
searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of
such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami 31 decision promulgated in 1970, cited by First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to
petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To be the only foundation for the claim. A person can have no vested right in such a
quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which: (1) possibility. 36
makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent
6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 decision of the United States
when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
Supreme Court. Even the very language as to what falls with the category of this
provision is well-nigh Identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I consider ex post Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review
facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that coming from this Court. The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded,
makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when in the language of Justice Harlan in the just-cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking
done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or "from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial words are
when committed. 4th Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives "vital for the protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case. Would
less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner
the offense, in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In
manifestly unjust and oppressive." 38 The opinion of Justice Chase who spoke for the the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a
United States Supreme Court went on to state: "The expressions 'ex post facto laws,' division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which
are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of
appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the
judicious Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. " 44 Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any
Wooddeson and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes
his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principle of government. " 39 much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no
review of the facts. What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in
7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha. 40 As it was decided by the American
determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be
Supreme Court in April of 1898 - the very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by
convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence 45 has been overcome.
virtue of which, American sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired - it is
In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of
understandable why he did so. Certainly, the exhaustive opinion of the first Justice
scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been
Harlan, as was mentioned by an author, has a cutting edge, but it cuts both ways. It
satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to justify a conviction
also renders clear why the obstacles to declaring unconstitutional the challenged
is set forth in People v. Dramayo. 46 Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the
Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable. After a review of the previous
fundamental law, as synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this subject, Justice Harlan
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer
made this realistic appraisal: "The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the
evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of
general rule that an accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as
proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond
in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused
reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There
any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, as vital
is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both
for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered by the accused.
commission of the offense charged against him." 41 An 1894 decision of the American
Only if the judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
Supreme Court, Duncan v. Missouri 42 was also cited by petitioner, The opinion of the
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under
then Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was
such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
categorically stated that "the prescribing of different modes of procedure and the
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof
abolition of courts and the creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
substantial protections with which the existing laws surrounds the person accused of
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant
crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition." 43
could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged: that not only did he
8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under certainty." 47 This Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing that this
fundamental and basic right to De presumed innocent has been disregarded. 48 It
does seem farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The
Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in the loss "vital protection" of view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar
liberty. that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be
construed in such a way as preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in
9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In
this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It
the exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages
commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by
were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is
certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance
made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American
of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. 49 Again this citation cuts both
ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the
opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a
defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an
opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept
of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept
inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating
proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also, The concept
of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true." 50 What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in
criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson, 51 this Court with Justice Tuason as
ponente, succinctly Identified it with "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for the preparation of defense." 52 In criminal proceedings then, due
process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that
is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence
being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court
that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction." 53 The above
formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme Court in
a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States 54 decided during the
period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: "This court has had frequent
occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal
procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard
in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to
him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority
of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law." 55

10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a
declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1606. The decision does not go as far as passing on any
question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all the safeguards of the
Constitution. It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to
People v. Ferrer; bill of attainder The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by
the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to
I. Statement of the Case
the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA,
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN
associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700,
affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:
similar "subversive" organization.
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti- Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No.
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites: willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer
and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines;
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the government,
Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of
domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said illegal means among which are the following:
Communist Party of the Philippines.
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating
circumstances are present, to wit: and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public
means; and toward this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of
authorities;
the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity. purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. established in the Philippines a Communist regime.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same 2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO
court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or
preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's
reads: Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through
armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in 1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Philippines a Communist Government. the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft,
section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist
fraud, or disguise was employed.
Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection conduct. 10
of the laws.
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in
attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against its pertinent parts as follows:
the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
special civil action for certiorari.
Party ... shall serve —
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than
facto law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor
punishment without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a organization.
judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist
serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures
Party....
to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial (b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000
function.7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as
from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor
a bill of attainder. 9
organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting
bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines
and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a
possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep
'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the
from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions
Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed
to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the
"judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or
authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally
safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to
applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or possesses
be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member,
certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them
the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of
likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and
organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a
possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable.
the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere
office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party. membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the
Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown
order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a
to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of
"Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of
specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-
acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of
action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence
dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization to the organization's illegal objectives.
controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist
feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or
movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would
reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national
deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute
definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty
a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which
be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it: fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its
operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its
conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring
engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the
abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not
provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683) members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from
basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further
other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had
foreign power. engages in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed invalidated as bills of attainder.
despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily
certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and available including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the
judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. 25 House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes
and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside controverted
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law
evidence — that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with
requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to
additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other
register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a
periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites;
society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its
that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for
operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the
all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of
claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret,
its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another
oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the
declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in
United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and
the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for
the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local,
classes of associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the
a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27
purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of
public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other
continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the
class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the
Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective
principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that
of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and
this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and
to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of
gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and
Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the
later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known,
growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist
many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound
fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we
or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of
said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of
common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is
men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus
concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation
been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;"
and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The 3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall
benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that
legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from
may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice
after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing that Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable
"the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated," — meaning because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the
in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have two mischiefs in one
existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a
whole justified their existence." statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post
facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb
bill of attainder." 31 behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct
is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey
validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4
elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this
thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts
section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes
committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and
effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association,
by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the Communist
organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period
Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after
of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of
June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other
the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California.
subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath
the petitioner therein, thus: their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall
operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date.
We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the
adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the
Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions
theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of
operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal
the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section
service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the
4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they
United States.
are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the
operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated
its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background,
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is
the statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.
in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other
judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime
bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare subject to alien dominationand control;
inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in
conduct which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few
scope but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we
continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country. accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the
threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of
United States, but to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must
making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial thisnature is
39
courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative extensive.
fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction,
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated
thus:
in the Anti-Subversion Act.
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition
would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society.
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the
It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very
sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require
structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As
supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e.,
Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the
limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to
by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing
oncriteria of judgment for weighing them. structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany
principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution,
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are relevant
which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could
to the legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine whether there
conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended
is a rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts — those which
tooverthrow the government by force and violence.
tie the legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found
according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36 2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in
sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued
vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for
renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this
penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
test.
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization;
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal
and when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization
Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are
is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith
controlledby the foreign government controlling the worldCommunist movement
such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is
and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist
engaged. 44
movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress
by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and
over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530.
by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or
in section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department
Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." or agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction.... 46
Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United
"overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other
States: 47
illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to
an oversight rather than to deliberateomission. It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other
to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a
illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow
politicalparty, is not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can
ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the
discern no reason why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of
Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive
hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely,
anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
"establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government
under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate
imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted as inthe situation described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal
in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an ordinarychange threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not
by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance,
exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom
toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of
which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45 the social order and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in
either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
conflict and its resolution through law." 49
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the
V. The Act and its Title
Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom
of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may
membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding in the title of the bill." 50
considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in
his country. What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last
proviso of section 4 which reads:
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to
the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides: And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the
of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any purpose of placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and
such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or domination of any lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision
affiliatedwith, any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose mayor with allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.
thereof —
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the
conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local governmentby accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member
democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an
of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association:
aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States
weleave this matter to future determination.
or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand
or Taiwanor Indonesia." ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and
these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the
Costs de oficio.
Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther
Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which
has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in
place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by
Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not
recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear
termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A
narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly
and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-
Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot

overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief.
Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution
under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may
affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the
Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the
presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian
regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such
organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues
to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an
US v. Macasaet bottle to Bigger, simply because he did not want to sell on credit a box of cigars to
the latter.
It was proven at the trial that the accused had been selling native wine at retail
without licensed required by the law. The evidence consists of the testimony of two The fact that the accused had been selling native wine at retail without the necessary
witnesses whom we consider worthy of credit. One of them, William Bigger, sergeant license constitutes a violation of section 66, in relation with section 68, subsection 5,
of Ninth Cavalry, United States Army, declares that he bought wine from the of the Internal Revenue Law, and the judgment appealed from, in so far as it
defendant on four different occasions, and that the last time was between the 1st sentences the said accused to the payment of a fine of P300 and the costs of the trial,
and 5th of September, 1907, on which occasion the accused give him half a bottle of and directing him to obtain the required license, is in accordance with the law, and
wine, for which he paid the latter 35 or 40 centavos, Philippine currency. This last should, therefore, be affirmed.
purchase was made in the presence of other witnesses, James B. Jelks, a corporal of
The judgment also sentences the accused to imprisonment for five months in case of
the same regiment of cavalry, who saw the former witness receive the bottle of wine
insolvency with respect to the fine imposed, and to pay the costs. This imprisonment
from the defendant and pat its price to the latter.
is subsidiary in its nature, inasmuch as the accused is to suffer the same only in the
The accused in testifying at the trial, said nothing tending to overcome the case of nonpayment of the fine and costs. In the case at bar, the law does not
declarations of the witness Bigger regarding the first purchases of wine which the authorize such subsidiary imprisonment, which is therefore, illegal. The above-
latter declares he made from the former, for which reason the testimony of the said mentioned section 66 of the Internal Revenue Law, in its paragraph No. 1, prescribes
witness on this point is competent. With regard to the sale effected in the earlier part alternatively the penalty of the fine of not less than P200 nor more than P2,000, or
of September, the accused expressly admits the material fact of having delivered imprisonment not exceeding six months, and in paragraph No. 2, a fine of not more
wine to the witness, but he states that he gave it to him as a mere gift without than P1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both penalties in the
receiving any payment for it. That wine, according to the accused, was the rest of the discretion of the court. The imprisonment is prescribed in both paragraphs as a
wine he had ordered that afternoon in order to entertain the doctor who was principal penalty, and in this manner only should it be imposed. The fine along being
attending his sick daughter. The doctor, or rather the medical student, as he really is, imposed, imprisonment can not be inflicted subsidiarily in case of insolvency,
to whom the accused refers, confirms the fact that the latter sent for some wine in because the law in question does not so provide.
order to entertain him, and it was also so declared by the person who purchased the
It seems that the judge below imposed the subsidiary imprisonment in view of the
wine by order of the accused. This, however, even supposing that it were true, would
provisions of Act No. 1732, section 1 of which provides that "when a fine is imposed
not be in conflict with the declarations of the Government witnesses, inasmuch as
as a whole or any part of the punishment for any criminal offense made punishable
the accused might have sold to sergeant Bigger the wine which remained after
by any Act or Acts of the Philippines Commission, the court shall also sentence the
entertaining the doctor.lawphil.net
guilty person to suffer subsidiary imprisonment until the fine is satisfied." This act
It is true that the above-mentioned person, who bought the wine for the doctor, can not be applied to the present case, inasmuch as it went into effect only on the
states moreover that he witnessed the act of then accused in offering and delivering 1st day of November 1907, and the trial only took place on September of the same
the wine to Sergeant Bigger, and that the latter did not pay anything for it; but it year. It is a well-settled doctrine that penal statutes can not be made retroactive,
seems to us that the contrary declaration of Bigger himself and his companion is the except in the case they are favorable to the accused. In conformity with said doctrine,
more probable, since there is nothing in the record that may explain satisfactorily the article 21 of the Penal Code provides that "no crime or misdemeanor shall be
alleged gift of the wine in question. The explanation given by the accused, that he punished by a penalty which was not established by law prior to its commission".
offered and gave the bottle of wine to Bigger gratuitously because the latter asked
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, except that part thereof which sentences
him to sell him on credit a box of cigars, which he refused to do, seems to us
the accused of five months' imprisonment in case of insolvency with respect to the
somewhat artificial in denial of the report made by the former, that the wine was
fine and costs, which is hereby reversed, with the costs of this instance against the
sold and not given as a gift, which is much more probable and credible, inasmuch as
said accused. So ordered.
the accused had already sold wine to Bigger on previous occasions, as declared by
the latter in the trial without opposition. Moreover, it does not appear to be plausible
or logical that the accused was obliged to give or that he did give, as a present, half a
 waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and
filed with the court with the proof of service.
Republic v. Samia; effects on pending actions
and our ruling in Rural Progress Administration v. Guzman, 87 Phil. 176 to the effect
On July 18, 1957, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
that, in expropriation proceedings, a motion to dismiss "need not be set for hearing
for the expropriation of 21 parcels of land located on Pingkian Street, Tondo, Manila,
it being the pleading that takes the place of an answer in an ordinary civil
pursuant to Republic Act No. 1162, as amended. The lands, with a total area of
action."chanrobles virtual law library
19,618.60 square meters, are owned by Manuel, Antonio, Amidea, Virgilio Asis and
Maria Teresa Asis, all surnamed Samia, all of whom were named party defendants. While We held that, in expropriation proceedings, a motion to dismiss takes the
place of an answer so that the court may thereafter hear the evidence, nowhere in
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, after which the case was tried upon a
the case cited did We ever rule that an ordinary motion to dismiss under Rule 8 may
stipulation of facts entered into by the parties.
not be entertained in cases of this nature. On the contrary, in Republic of the
Later, on May 29, 1959, the plaintiff amended its complaint in order to include 10 Philippines v. Samia, 89 Phil. 483, We sustained the order of the lower court granting
other parcels of land belonging to the minor children of Manuel, Antonio and Amidea the defendant's motion to dismiss "after the Republic had introduced about a third
Samia, who were also made party defendants. These lots have a total area of of its proofs."chanrobles virtual law library
18,660.70 square meters and are located at the corner of Jose Abad Santos Avenue
Indeed, there is nothing in the Rules of Court which prohibits the filing of motions to
and Bambang Street.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
dismiss in expropriation proceedings and there is no reason why cases should not be
In sum, therefore, as the trial court found, the plaintiff seeks in the case to promptly disposed of it, judging from the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff
expropriate 31 parcels of land located in two different parts of Manila and owned by appears to have no valid cause of action. This was what the trial court did in this case
14 persons. Thus, 21 lots are found on Pingkian Street, Tondo, Manila while 10 are at and We think it correctly granted the motion to dismiss for the following reasons.
the corner of Jose Abad Santos Avenue and Bambang Street. The combined area of
As stated earlier, plaintiff's action is based on Republic Act No. 1162. As originally
the two groups is 38,279.30 square meters.c
enacted on June 18, 1954, Section 1 of this law provided:
On motion of the defendants, the trial court suspended the trial of the case and later
The expropriation of landed estates or haciendas in the City of Manila, which have
dismissed the case on the ground that plaintiff had no right to expropriate the land
been and are actually leased to tenants, is hereby authorized.
in question, pursuant to our ruling in Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 84 Phil.
847, and in other cases. On June 17, 1956, the law was amended making among other things, Section 1
provide as follows:
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the plaintiff brought this appeal
to the Court of Appeals which certified the same to Us on the ground that the value The expropriation of landed estates or haciendas, or lands which formerly formed part
of the properties involved exceeds P200,000.00. thereof, in the City of Manila, which are and have been leased to tenants for at least
ten years, is hereby authorized: Provided, That such lands shall have at least fifty
Plaintiff contends that the trial court should have allowed it to complete the
houses of tenants erected thereon. (Rep. Act No. 1599).
presentation of evidence instead of granting at once defendant's motion to dismiss.
In support of this contention, plaintiff invokes Section 4 of Rule 69 (Eminent Domain) Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
of the Rules of Court which provides that - admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
Within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of answer, shall
facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use Again, on June 22, 1957, the law was amended, thus:
specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are
SECTION 1. The expropriation of landed estates or haciendas, in the City of Manila, The amended complaint shows that the biggest lot is that covered by Transfer
Quezon City and suburbs, which have been and are actually being leased to tenants, Certificate of Title No. 16168 registered in the names of Virgilio Asis and Maria Asis
is hereby authorized. (Rep. Act No. 1990) Samia which has an area of 4,260.70 square meters and that the biggest aggrupation
owned by a single individual is that owned by Manuel Samia which has a combined
Finally, on June 20, 1959, the law was again amended. As it now stands, Section 1 of
area of 6,614.50 square meters. Certainly, these lots could hardly be considered
Republic Act No. 1162, as amended by Republic Act No. 2342, provides:
landed estates within the meaning of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
The expropriation of landed estates or haciendas, or lands which formerly formed virtual law library
part thereof, or any place of land in the City of Manila, Quezon City and suburbs,
Neither can the position of the plaintiff be helped any by the fact that Republic Act
which have been and are actually being leased to tenants for at least ten years, is
No. 2342 authorizes the expropriation of "any piece of land." In the first place, in the
hereby authorized: Provided, That such lands shall have at least fifty houses of
cases of Republic v. Antonio Prieto, et al., G.R. No. L-17946; Republic v. Carmen Prieto
tenants erected thereon.
de Caro et al., G.R. No. L-18042, both promulgated April 30, 1963, We ruled that
Plaintiff contends that, tested by the provisions of Section 1 of the law as amended Republic Act No. 2342, which took effect on June 20, 1959, cannot be given
by Republic Act No. 2342, its complaint stated a cause of action so that its dismissal retrospective application so as to govern the present proceedings for condemnation,
constitutes a reversible error. It is urged that expropriation is proper because the lots because it affects substantive rights and not merely procedural matters.
in question constitute either "landed estates or haciendas, or lands which formerly
Now, the amended complaint in this case, as already stated, was filed on May 29,
formed part thereof," within the meaning of the law and that at any rate the law
1959. At the time, the law applicable was Republic Act No. 1990 which referred only
authorizes the condemnation of any piece of land so long as the same has been
to "landed estates or haciendas in the City of Manila, Quezon City and its suburbs.
leased to tenants for at least ten years and that such lands have at least fifty houses
of tenants erected thereon. In the second place, even assuming that Republic Act No. 2342 is applicable to this
case, still expropriation of the lands involved herein would not be proper. The phrase
The point is not well taken. Plaintiff can claim that the lots it is seeking to expropriate
"any piece of land" in Republic Act No. 2342 is qualified by the proviso that the piece
have an area of 38,298.30 square meters only because it has grouped together 31
of land sought to be condemned must have been leased for at least ten years and
parcels of land owned by 14 individuals. As already indicated above, these lots are
must have for at least 50 houses to built
located in two parts of the City of Manila, 21 of them being on Pingkian Street, Tondo,
thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
while 10 others are situated at the corner of Jose Abad Santos Avenue and Bambang
Street. It should be remembered that in the earlier case of Republic v. Samia, infra, Certainly, even the biggest group of lots owned by an individual defendant (Manuel
one of the reasons why the lots herein were not considered "large estate" within the Samia) which, as already stated, has a total area of 6,614.50 square meters, cannot
precept of the Constitution was the fact that the lots included therein are not accomodate the minimum number of fifty houses if, by plaintiff's own example, each
contiguous to each other. In Municipality of Caloocan, Rizal v. Manotok Realty, Inc., house must have about 150 square meters (Sec. 3, Republic Act No. 1162, as
et al., G.R. No. L-6444, May 14, 1954, We condemned the practice of grouping several amended). Such group of lots can accomodate only 44 houses at most - not to
lots so as to give them the appearance of a vast estate. We said in that case: mention the need to provide for roads and streets. And the fact remains that, as the
trial court found, "in none of the lots owned by each individual defendant are there
Divided among nine persons, the title would give 4375 square meters of land to each.
more than fifty bona fide tenants who have erected their houses thereon more than
Obviously the Government - insular or municipal - can not consider that four
ten years prior to the filing of the complaint."chanrobles virtual law library
thousand square meters is "landed estate" for expropriation purposes. And grouping
the nine persons together, or suing them together as a corporation dues not conceal Indeed, Section 1 of the law must be read in context. It must be understood in the
the resultant deprivation of nine individuals of their landed portion of 4375 square light of its own limiting clause. (Sec. 3.)chanrobles virtual law library
meters each. It would undoubtedly be unfair to implead twenty owners of small
contiguous lands and then maintain that they own a large estate subject to
condemnation proceeding (Republic v. Samia, L-3900, promulgated July 18, 1951).
 Based upon the report and re-assessment made, the Deputy Collector of Internal
Revenue, on June 22, 1955, made a demand for the payment of P87,914.93 within
Rattan v. CIR
30 days from receipt of the letter of demand, plus P8,700.00 as penalty.
Petitioner has been engaged in the manufacture and sale of articles made of rattan
including rattan round pieces. On April 19, 1954, the Collector of Internal Revenue Counsel for petitioner asked for a reconsideration and/or re- investigation, of the
demanded of the petitioner the amount of P1,313.75 as Deficiency sales tax on round assessment. On June 17, 1958, a modified assessment was made, demanding the
rattan pieces, surcharge and penalty thereon, for the period from September 4, 1951 payment of P77,087.28, all told. The motion for reconsideration and/or readjustment
to January 24, 1952. The articles were sold to foreign buyers on F. O. B. terms. On of the assessment was denied and for failure of petitioner to pay the tax liability a
June 29, 1954, the Rattan Art & Decorations, Inc., asked for the cancellation of the Warrant of Distraint and Levy, was sued out. On August 7, 1958, petitioner filed with
demand, claiming that the transaction was considered by it as an export and thus the Court of Tax Appeals a Petition for Review of the assessment of Deficiency Sales
free from sales tax, title to said articles passing only to the buyers upon arrival in the Tax, claiming the same to be erroneous and/or the liability has already prescribed.
States and after inspection. Because of the letter asking cancellation, a re-
investigation was conducted, and on September 30, 1954, the investigating agent The respondent Collector of Internal Revenue interposed the following Special and
found that the petitioner was not only liable for the P1,313.75, but for P96,706.30, Affirmative Defenses, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
computed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That the total amount of P77,087.28 representing deficiency sales tax for 1949 to
1949 (4th quarter) P 878.02 1952, 25% surcharge thereon, fixed tax for 1952 and 1953, and penalty was assessed
against petitioner in accordance with law;
1950 19,436.22
(2) That the right of the respondent to assess and collect the tax has not yet
1951 28,569.17 prescribed.

1952 35,074.54 After trial, the parties submitted their memorandum, petitioner sponsoring the
theory that in so far as the tax liability for the sales of 1949 and the first two quarters
1953 2,805.09 of 1950, the same has already prescribed; and that the assessment was erroneous,
since the transactions were export sales which were consummated outside of the
1954 (1st & 2nd qrt.) 1,151.78 Philippines and therefore exempt from sales tax. Upon the other hand, respondent
Collector of Internal Revenue took the contrary view, claiming that petitioner failed
————— to prove the assertion of prescription and that the sales having been on an F. O. B.
term, the same have been ruled by the CTA and the Supreme Court as having been
Deficiency Tax Due 87,914.82 consummated within the Philippines. Cited in support of the second contention are
several cases — G.R. No. L-11710, Western Mindanao Lumber Dev. Co. v. Coll. of Int.
Compromise 8,791.48 Rev., June 30, 1958; and others.

————— Because the assessment for 1950 did not appear to have been itemized by quarter,
so that it could not be determined when prescription had commenced, the CTA
P96,706.30 ordered the reopening of the case for the reception of evidence regarding said
aspect. The order resulted in the presentation of a Stipulation of Facts, where among
======== others, the computation was shown by the quarter. On August 31, 1960, the CTA
rendered judgment the pertinent portions of which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The issues raised in this appeal are (1) whether or not the sales to foreign buyers "The evidence shows that the assessment was made on June 22, 1955, more than
during the period in question are domestic sales subject to the sales tax; (2) assuming five years after the return was filed for the first quarter of 1950. Accordingly, the
that said sales are taxable, whether or not the right of the Government to assess the deficiency sales tax for the year 1949 and the first quarter of 1950 had already
tax on sales made from 1949 to the second quarter of 1950 has prescribed; and (3) prescribed when the assessment was made on June 22, 1955. With respect to the
the legality of the imposition of the alleged penalty in the sum of P5,700.00. deficiency sales tax for the second quarter of 1950, since the last day for filing the
return was July 20, 1950, the five-year period within which to assess said deficiency
"Under Section 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code, manufacturers (other tax had not yet terminated when the assessment was made.
than manufacturers of articles enumerated in Section 184 and 185) are subject to the
sales tax of 7% of the gross selling price of the articles sold. The tax is imposed on
sales consummated in the Philippines. . . . A sale is deemed made or consummated "FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed from is hereby
at the place where title to the article sold passes from the seller to the buyer. . . modified and petitioner is ordered to pay to the Government the sum of P68,582.23,
computed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"It appears that the articles sold by petitioner to foreign buyers were shipped abroad
under terms F. O. B. Manila; that the expenses of packing and preparing the articles Deficiency sales tax for 1950 P13,573.71
for shipment were charged to the buyers; that the freight charges were paid by the
buyers at destination; that the shipments abroad were insured by the buyers; that in Deficiency sales tax, 1951 18,928.38
those cases where the shipments insured by the petitioner, the insurance policies
were indorsed to the buyers; and that payments for said shipments were made Deficiency sales tax, 1952 22,928.89
through drafts or letters of credit drawn against local banks.
—————
"From the facts stated above, it is clear that title to the articles sold by petitioner to
the foreign buyers was transferred to the latter from the moment they were placed Total P54,800.98
on board the carrying vessels. The sales were, therefore, consummated in the
Philippines and must be treated as domestic sales subject to the sales tax. . . . The 25% surcharge 13,700.25
fact that the price of the articles were paid for in dollars or in any other foreign
currency will not alter the result. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that petitioner is —————
subject to the sales tax on its sales to the foreign buyers under the circumstances
mentioned above. Total deficiency tax & surcharge P68,501.23

Fixed tax, 1952 6.00

x x x
Fixed tax, 1953 75.00

"It appears from the stipulation submitted by the parties dated July 28, 1960 that —————
petitioner filed its quarterly return for the year 1950 within the period prescribed by
Section 183-A, that is, on or before April 20, 1950 with respect to petitioner’s return Total amount due P68,582.23
for the first quarter of that year, and on or before July 20, 1950, as regards the return
for the second quarter of the same year. =========
A motion for reconsideration of the above judgment was presented. In said motion, although goods are shipped F.O.B., the intent of the parties regarding the disposition
counsel for petitioner invoked, for the first time, the amendment of Section 186 of of the goods shall control. We may concede the merit of said argument, but the case
the Internal Revenue Code by Republic Act No. 894, wherein it was provided that at bar, petitioner has failed to show that a contrary intent was contemplated.
effective June 20, 1953, shipments abroad by manufacturers or producers,
irrespective of shipping arrangements affecting the place of transfer of title to the While it is true that payment were made after the boat had left Philippine waters,
articles shipped, were exempted from sales tax. Under petitioner’s contention, the the delay did not change the fact that the transactions were consummated in the
deficiency sales taxes prior to the passage of the law (Act 894) should be condoned, Philippines. It will be noted that the delay was merely caused by the preparation of
by giving said law retroactive effect. The CTA denied the motion for reconsideration the papers for submission to the banks against whom the letters of credit had been
on November 5, 1960, thus the instant appeal. drawn. Even on the supposition that the contracts in the involved transactions were
perfected in the United States, as claimed by the petitioner, still it does not follow
In its brief, petitioner pointed three (3) errors allegedly committed by the lower that the passing of title should also be in the United States. Transfer of title to the
court, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library vendee may be made by actual or constructive delivery (Art. 1477, NCC). The delivery
of the goods on board the carrying vessels partake of the nature of actual delivery,
(1) In not holding that by virtue of Central Bank’s Rules and Regulations the herein since from that time, the foreign buyers assumed the risk of loss of the goods and
sales having been dollar transactions were, therefore, foreign sale transactions; paid the insurance premiums covering them.

(2) In not holding that the herein transactions, made by and between the Rattan Art The third and last error deals with the contention that Republic Act No. 894, which
& Decorations, Inc., and foreign buyers were foreign sales, consummated outside exempted the transactions at bar from liability for sales tax, should be given
Philippine territory and hence not subject to the domestic sales tax; and retroactive effect and extend to petitioner the benefits thereof. It must be recalled,
however, that this is a tax case, and one who seeks exemption from payment thereof,
(3) In not holding Republic Act No. 894 as having retroactive effect. should justify the exemption with the clearest legislative grant. During the period
when petitioner was made liable for the taxes in question, Republic Act No. 894 was
Anent the first error, the petitioner has failed to prove that the transactions in not in existence. While it is true that a law creating new rights may be given
question were in fact foreign sales. While it is true that the sale was paid in dollars, retroactive effect, the same can only be made possible if the new right does not
this alone did not make it a foreign sale and exempted from the payment of the sales prejudice or impair any vested right. The government had already acquired such
tax. The compliance with Central Bank Rules and Regulations was only necessary for right in the taxes due from petitioner, when the exempting statute came to life.
the purposes of controlling the use of foreign exchange. At any rate, this Court in a Moreover, this Court has ruled that transactions before the effectivity of Republic
number of cases, where tax liability was sought to be exempted, under the same Act 894, cannot be given retroactive effect (Misamis Lumber Co., Inc., v. The Coll. of
defenses, ruled that they did not involve foreign sales (Bislig Lumber Co., Inc. v. Coll. Int. Rev., G.R. No. L-10131, September 30, 1957).
of Int. Rev., G.R. No. L-13186, Jan. 28, 1961, and cases cited therein).

This Court cannot also share the view taken by the petitioner, to the effect that the
transactions in question were consummated outside of the territory of the
Philippines and should not be subjected to domestic sales tax. It has not been denied
that the sale of the goods were on F.O.B. terms; that the expenses of packing and
preparing the articles for shipment were charged to the buyers; that the freight
charges were paid by the buyers at destination; that the shipments were insured by
the buyers. Under these circumstances, there is no mistaking the fact that when the
petitioner has placed the goods aboard the ship, all its rights ended there and the
sole authority for the disposition of the shipped merchandise rested upon the foreign
buyers. Title was transferred at that very moment. Petitioner, however, argues that
Atlas v. CA over the mining claims. These third-parties claim that as such assignees, they are
legally entitled to receive the corresponding royalties from the mining operation. In
Can a person who is not a party to a contract file a petition for declaratory relief and
effect, they ask ATLAS that they be substituted to the rights of BIGA COPPER and the
seek a judicial intepretation of such contract? Can a trial court which had already
BIGA PARTNERS under the operating agreement.
taken cognizance of an action involving a mining controversy be divested of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree ATLAS allegedly conducted a verification of the said demands and later on confirmed
No. 1281? 1 These are the threshold issues brought about by the long drawn legal that before the registration of the Articles of Partnership of BIGA COPPER, the BIGA
battle between the conflicting parties in this case. PARTNERS sold and/or assigned some of their respective shares, rights, interests and
participations over the mining claims to third parties 3 and that BIGA COPPER, acting
The facts are undisputed.
separately from the BIGA PARTNERS, likewise sold and/or assigned its undivided
On June 5, 1973, Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation (ATLAS) shares, interests and participations over the mining claims to third parties. 4
entered into an operating agreement with the heirs of Manuel Cuenco and Jose P.
On the other hand, a certain Alejandro T. Escano wrote ATLAS informing the latter
Velez (collectively referred to herein as CUENCO-VELEZ) whereby in consideration of
that he is an assignee of CUENCO-VELEZ with respect to the three (3) mining claims
royalties to be paid by ATLAS to CUENCO-VELEZ, the former was granted the right to
which CUENCO-VELEZ retained under the compromise agreement with BIGA
explore, develop and operate twelve (12) mining claims belonging to the latter
COPPER. Escano, alleged that CUENCO-VELEZ had assigned to him fifty percent (50%)
located at Toledo City, Cebu.
of their rights, interests and participations in the said mining claims. 5 In turn,
On June 17, 1973, ATLAS entered into a similar agreement with the Biga Copper CUENCO-VELEZ advised ATLAS that their assignment to Alejandro T. Escano was
Mines Exploration Company (BIGA COPPER), a partnership composed of Pablo B. already revoked or rescinded for failure of the said assignee to fulfill the conditions
Gorosin, Francisco B. Gorosin, Pedro B. Gorosin and Vicente T. Garaygay (collectively contained in their deed of assignment. 6
referred to herein as the BIGA PARTNERS). Subject of this Operating Agreement are
In the light of the foregoing situation, ATLAS instituted a petition for declaratory relief
thirty-one (31) mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu.
with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 8, and which was docketed as
It appears, however, that of the total mining claims "leased" by ATLAS from both the Civil Case No. 16669-R. Cited as respondents therein were BIGA COPPER, BIGA
CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, nine (9) mining claims overlap. These nine (9) PARTNERS, CUENCO-VELEZ and some thirty-one (31) assignees. 7
overlapping mining claims became the subject of Mines Administrative Cases Nos. V-
In their amended petition filed with the trial court, ATLAS raised the following issues
727 and V-750 whereby under date of February 12, 1974, the Director of Mines
for resolution, to wit:
resolved the same in favor of CUENCO-VELEZ. BIGA COPPER appealed this decision
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a decision dated April 1. Since ATLAS is now in the process of developing and exploring the Carmen project
14, 1974, in DANR Cases Nos. 3936 and 3936-A, affirmed the decision of the Director which includes the mining claims of the BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ, should it
of Mines. This later decision was appealed to the Office of the President under O.P. extract and sipose (sic) of ores from the BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ claims, to
Case No. 0435. whom shall ATLAS pay the royalties due thereon?

During the pendency of this appeal in the Office of the President, the parties, namely, 2. Considering that a Compromise Agreement has been entered into by and between
CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. 2 This BIGA COPPER and CUENCO- VELEZ on some claims contested by them, which
compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the nine compromise agreement was already submitted to the President for his final approval,
(9) overlapping mining claims. should ATLAS respect the same before the final approval of the President in paying
royalties under the operating agreements with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ,
Earlier, ATLAS alleged that when it started the operation of its Carmen Project, which
respectively?
includes some of the mining claims subject of the aforestated Operating Agreements
with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ ATLAS received numerous letters from third- 3. Considering further that before the compromise agreement was entered into,
parties claiming that they were assignees of BIGA COPPER and the BIGA PARTNERS BIGA COPPER had already assigned a large part of its interest to third parties, does
the compromise agreement entered into by BIGA COPPER bind these assignees? Can this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Section
BIGA COPPER enter into a compromise agreement with the CUENCO-VELEZ insofar 7, paragraphs A and C and Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1281.
as the shares of these assignees are concerned?
Section 7, paragraphs A and C and Section 12 of the Decree provide:
4. Considering finally that before and after the compromise agreement was entered
SECTION 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies,
into, BIGA COPPER and/or its partners as signed and/or sold various rights to royalties
partnerships or persons engaged in mining explorations, development and
over the mining claims covered by its Operating Agreement with ATLAS; on the other
exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
hand, CUENCO-VELEZ made assignments after the compromise agreement was
and decide cases involving:
entered into, should ATLAS recognize these assignments and pay royalties to the
assignees? (a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim
holder thereof with several mining operators;
5. Since the assignments made by BIGA COPPER and/or its PARTNERS exceeded the
participation and/or shares of the PARTNERS in the partnership, which assignment or xxx xxx xxx
who of the assignees are entitled to royalties?
(b) Cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
6. Considering that the PARTNERS made individual assignments of their respective claim owner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.
shares, rights, interests and/or participations in the so-called partnership, the total
of which together with the assignments made directly by the said partnership itself, xxx xxx xxx
aggregated 37.5% of the interest therein as of the date the PARTNERS registered the
SECTION 12. All laws, executive orders, decrees, rules and regulations or parts
Articles of Partnership of BIGA COPPER, wherein the PARTNERS represented that
thereof contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this decree, are hereby
they own 25% each in the partnership, with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
repealed and amended or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
is ATLAS, by law, bound to respect the assignments by the PARTNERS and/or by the
partnership itself prior to and/or subsequent to said registration? On March 13,1978, ATLAS filed a supplemental opposition to the supplemental
motion to dismiss arguing that BIGA COPPER had no right to unilaterally cancel their
7. Considering that the PARTNERS have also made assignments of their respective
operating agreement. 13
shares, rights, interests and/or participations after the registration of the said
partnership, are those assignments valid and binding upon ATLAS? 8 After considering the pleadings filed by the conflicting parties to the case, the trial
court, then presided by Judge Regino Hermosisima, Jr., issued an order dated May
To this petition for declaratory relief, respondents filed a motion to dismiss dated
29, 1978 requiring the defendants therein to answer the petition for declaratory
January 18, 1978 stating as grounds therefor the following:
relief it appearing "[t]hat the ground stated in the motion to dismiss does not appear
1. The Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit; to be indubitable." 14

2. The complaint states no cause of action; Accordingly, the defendants filed their answer which reiterated the allegations
contained in their motion to dismiss filed earlier. 15
3. The court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the suit. 9
On December 29, 1978, some of the defendants in the court below, namely, BIGA
ATLAS filed a written opposition thereto dated February 4, 1978. 10 COPPER, BIGA PARTNERS, Malayan Integrated Industries Corp., Guillermo Ponce and
Esmael Garaygay, filed another motion to dismiss the proceedings reiterating, once
Meanwhile, due to the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1281, effective
again, the same allegations in their previous motions to dismiss. 16 It was likewise
January 16, 1978, a number of the defendants in the court below filed a supplemental
alleged in that same motion that the trial court had already lost jurisdiction over the
motion to dismiss dated February 17, 1978. 11 They alleged in their supplemental
case in view of an action for annulment of the operating agreement between BIGA
motion that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with ATLAS had
COPPER and ATLAS which had been filed with the Bureau of Mines (docketed as
already been revoked by a letter dated February 11, 1978, 12 and that by reason of
Special Case No. V-95) and which was set for hearing on January 22, 1979.
In an order dated January 17, 1979, the trial court denied the above mentioned Here, We are confronted with a situation where the declaratory action should not
motion, ruling that there is no mining controversy involved in the case before it. have been allowed xxx, the allegations of the complaint clearly suggesting more of a
Further, the court a quo clarified that the declaratory action is merely for a judicial request for an advisory opinion or the more proper remedy of interpleader. ... 20
pronouncement on the rights and obligations of ATLAS under several operating
Claiming to be adversely affected by the decision of the Court of Appeals, ATLAS
agreements. It went on to state that the action for annulment of the operating
interposed the present petition for review on certiorari.
agreement filed with the Bureau of Mines is not Identical with the petition for
declaratory relief and, therefore, does not oust the trial court of its jurisdiction to After requiring respondents herein to file their comments to the petition, 21 Epifanio
hear the petition. 17 A. Anoos, claiming to have a legal interest over the matter in litigation, filed with this
Court a motion to admit his petition in intervention dated September 12, 1980. In
Respondents herein sought reconsideration of the immediately preceding order but
support thereof, Anoos alleges that he is one of the defendants in the proceedings
failed in their attempt. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
for declaratory relief; and that the trial court in the same case, under date of February
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09773, assailing the orders of the court a quo as
21, 1979, had already rendered a summary judgment in his favor. 22
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Anoos, in effect, joins ATLAS in its prayer to have the decision of the respondent
appellate court set aside and additionally, as arguments peculiar only to him, asserts
The issues presented before the Court of Appeals were as follows:
that (1) the Court of Appeals violated the due process clause of the Constitution when
(1) Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to try the action for declaratory it rendered the questioned decision without notice to the rest of the parties in the
relief, and assuming it had, whether it was divested of said jurisdiction by the proceeding below; and (2) that the summary judgment in his favor dated February
subsequent enactment of PD 1281 ... and 21, 1979 had already become final and executory by reason of the failure of private
respondents herein to take steps to appeal therefrom. 23
(2) Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion ... in
issuing the assailed orders. 18 On December 8, 1980, Milagros Cuenco, Antonio V. Cuenco, Ramon V. Cuenco,
Manuel V. Cuenco, Jr., Jose V. Cuenco, Filomena Cuenco, Jesus V. Cuenco and Jose P.
In its decision, 19 the appellate court ruled in favor of herein respondents and ordered
Velez, earlier referred to herein as CUENCO-VELEZ, filed with this Court a similar
the trial court to dismiss the declaratory action. We quote the pertinent portions of
petition in intervention 24 alleging that (1) their right to both substantive and
that decision, to wit:
procedural due process was violated, inasmuch as they were not impleaded before
But while we hold that respondent Judge has jurisdiction over the declaratory action the respondent appellate court; and (2) that the decision of the appellate court is not
of which he was not divested by the promulgation of PD 1281, he should have in accordance with law. 25
precisely exercised his jurisdiction by sustaining petitioners' motion to dismiss
In a resolution dated July 1, 1981 this Court finally resolved to give due course to the
grounded on lack of cause of action primordially because the allegations of the
petition for review filed by ATLAS. In that same resolution, the motions for
complaint patently present no justiciable controversy. ...
intervention of both Efifanio A. Anoos and CUENCO-VELEZ were granted. 26
xxx xxx xxx
We now proceed to the discussion of the merits of this petition. To reiterate the first
Considering then that the declaratory suit calls for resolution of questions which issue—can a person who is not a party to a contract file a petition for declaratory
necessarily involve the validity and enforcement of the operating and deeds of relief and seek a judicial interpretation of such contract?
assignment, now subject of pending administrative cases before the Bureau of Mines
We rule in the negative.
from which adequate and exclusive relief may be obtained, and the fact that Atlas'
right to file the suit is even questionable, the ineluctable conclusion is that Declaratory relief has been defined as an action by any person interested under a
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion ... deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a
statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to determine any question of
xxx xxx xxx
construction or validity arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation,
or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. 27 The only In Tadeo, this Court ruled that a notary public before whom the execution of a deed
question that may be raised in such kind of petition is the question of "construction' of sale was acknowledged is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment.
or "validity" arising under an instrument or statute. 28 "None of his rights or duties thereunder need be declared." 33 On the other hand,
in United Central, We seriously doubted if a declaratory action can be filed in relation
Corollary to this is the general rule that such an action must be justified such that no
to a contract by persons who are not parties thereto after considering that a
other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances. 29 This, in turn,
substantive law, more specifically Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that
can be explained by the fact that the only object of a declaratory action is merely to
contracts take effect only between the parties." Thus, "[i]t is quite plain that one who
terminate uncertainties in an instrument or a statute. The judgment of the court
is not a party to a contract cannot have the interest in it that the rule requires as basis
concerned cannot extend beyond a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties
for a declaratory relief." 34
to the action or provide for corrective relief. 30
Aside from the reason advanced herein above, this Court is in agreement with the
In the case at bar, ATLAS wants Us to sustain its position that under the factual
observation made by respondent appellate court at least insofar as the question of
backdrop narrated earlier, it is entitled, as a matter of law, to proceed with its petition
justiciability is concerned Clearly then, other effective remedies are available to
for declaratory relief.
ATLAS—such as an action for interpleader—to determine with finality who among
After a careful analysis of the arguments presented by the parties herein, this Court BIGA COPPER, CUENCO-VELEZ and the latter's respective assignees is entitled to the
rules that there is no legal ground to sustain the contention of ATLAS. royalties it will pay later on under the operating agreements. At this juncture, it is
worthy to recall that courts should refuse to exercise its prerogative to declare rights
ATLAS cannot be considered as an interested party under the deeds of assignment and to construe instruments where it would not terminate the uncertainty or
and, therefore, has no standing to institute the declaratory action. controversy which gave rise to the action or where it is not necessary and proper at
the time under all circumstances. 35
It cannot be disputed that ATLAS, being one of the parties to the operating
agreements, has an interest therein. A review of the record, in fact, reveals that We now come to the second issue. Is the trial court divested of jurisdiction to hear
ATLAS purports to be seeking a judicial interpretation of its operating agreements and decide a mining controversy in view of the promulgation of Presidential Decree
with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ But after evaluating the lengthy arguments it No. 1281?
presented to justify the declaratory action this Court arrives at one logical
conclusion—the ambiguity is not in the operating agreements themselves but in the The answer is in the affirmative.
validity of the assignments of mining rights made by BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-
Tracing the development of Presidential Decree No. 1281, Justice Nocon, now
VELEZ to third parties. Obviously, these third parties are not part of ATLAS' contract
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, in his separate concurring opinion on the
with either BIGA COPPER or CUENCO-VELEZ. In the same vein, neither is ATLAS a party
assailed decision, thus, correctly noted the following:
to the deeds of assignments executed by BIGA COPPER or CUENCO-VELEZ. While this
Court may concede that as a result of the numerous assignments made by both BIGA As early as January 15, 1973, PD 99-A provided where mining controversies should
COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ, ATLAS is left in a quandary as to whom to pay the be litigated: Director of Mines whose decision is appealable to the Secretary of
royalties in the course of its mining operations, legally speaking however, the Agriculture and Natural Resources and finally to the President (Sec. 2). All laws in
ambiguity or uncertainty is not of the character as to call for the procedural remedy conflict or inconsistent therewith were repealed (Sec. 3). ...
of a declaratory action—ATLAS not being a party to the said deeds of assignment.
The same procedure was reiterated in PD 309 (Sec. 5), issued on October 10, 1973,
While this issue cannot find a square precedent in existing jurisprudence, however, to accelerate disposition of mining controversies with creation (sic) of a panel of
pronouncements made by this Court in Tadeo vs. Provincial Fiscal of investigators to submit a report to the Director of Mines within five days (Sec. 1).
Pangasinan 31 and United Central & Cellulose Labor Association (PLUM) vs. Exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines is implicit from Section 3 thereof which
Santos 32 are of great significance in the resolution of this legal question. give parties in pending litigations "before any judicial tribunal" 15 days to file 'an
adverse claim of any nature whatsoever with the Bureau of Mines.'
PD 1281 issued on January 16, 1978, gives more teeth to the Bureau of Mines (Sec. From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the operative act which divested
3) for its regulatory and adjudicative powers and functions which becomes (sic) the trial court of jurisdiction to decide the declaratory action is not respondents' act
'original and exclusive even over 'cancellation and/or enforcement of mining of filing an administrative suit for the cancellation of their operating agreement with
contracts,' reiterating the same procedure laid down in PD 99-A and PD 309. Clearly, ATLAS. With or without such administrative action, the trial court is deemed to have
the three Decrees—99-A, 309 and 1281—divested judicial tribunals of jurisdiction lost jurisdiction to proceed with the declaratory action immediately upon the
over mining controversies including cancellation and enforcement of mining effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1281 on January 16, 1978.
contracts by making the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Bureau 'original
The case of Twin Peaks Mining Association vs. Navarro, 43 while not squarely
and exclusive' (Sec. 7, PD 1281). 36 (Emphasis supplied).
applicable to the present case in view of the difference in the dates when the
This Court agrees with the conclusion espoused by the respondent appellate court as respective declaratory actions were commenced, 44 nevertheless bolsters the
to this aspect of the case. conclusion We have reached thus far when it pointed out that the promulgation of
Presidential Decree No. 1281 is indicative of "[t]he trend to make the adjudication of
The declaratory action flied by ATLAS is within the ambit of Presidential Decree No.
mining cases a purely administrative matter." 45
1281. It is not an entirely different or distinct cause of action. Were We to rule
otherwise it would be ratifying two judicial bodies exercising jurisdiction over an WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the trial court has lost jurisdiction to proceed, hear and
essentially the same subject matter—a situation analogous to split jurisdiction which decide the action for declaratory relief filed by ATLAS, the summary judgment in favor
is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. 37 of herein intervenor Efifanio A. Anoos is declared null and void, having been rendered
on February 21, 1979 when Presidential Decree No. 1281 was already in full force and
Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a remedial statute. It does not create new rights or
effect. The petition in intervention of CUENCO-VELEZ is hereby dismissed for lack of
take away rights that are already vested. It only operates in furtherance of a
merit. And, finally, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-09773 is
remedy or confirmation of rights already in existence. It does not come within the
affirmed insofar as it declared that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
legal purview of a prospective law. As such, it can be applied retroactively
in proceeding with the declaratory action. No pronouncement as to costs.
independent of the general rule against the retrospective application of
statutes. 38 Being procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions pending at the time SO ORDERED.
of its enactment except only with respect to those cases which had already attained
the character of a final and executory judgment. 39 Were it not so, the purpose of the
Decree, which is to facilitate the immediate resolution of mining controversies by
granting jurisdiction to a body or agency more adept to the technical complexities of
mining operations, would be thwarted and rendered meaningless. Litigants in a
mining controversy cannot be permitted to choose a forum of convenience.
Jurisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties to such proceedings.

Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a special law and under a well-accepted
principle in statutory construction, the special law will prevail over a statute or law
of general application. 40 Jurisdiction having been conferred by a special statute
therefore prevails over the jurisdiction granted by a general law. 41

Finally, as aptly observed by the respondent appellate court, it is a rule oft repeated
by this Court that the construction placed upon a law by the officials in charge of
enforcing the same deserves great and considerable weight. Unless the same would
result in legal absurdity, the same should be respected. 42