Civil Procedure Digests (Incomplete) - 1

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
I. General Principles
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
A. DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO application to amend its BOI certificate of registration
by changing the scope of its registered product from
FACTS: The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor
case, filed a motion with the CFI of Pampanga after he Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc.
the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal
peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration,
that the petitioner might cross-examine the Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing
for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty
counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court
that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him issuing any preliminary injunction.
of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not
guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the
restraining order contending that CA does not have
Then his counsel moved that the complainant present jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
provided by law. The fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act
objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused's of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the
counsel announced his intention to renounce his right Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a
to present evidence, and the justice of the peace Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
forwarded the case to the court of first instance. Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of
Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court of procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to
Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with
record. the Supreme Court.
HELD: Evidence is the mode and manner of proving While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency
competent facts and circumstances on which a party there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of
relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has
proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme
Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does not Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or
curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, jurisdiction over the case
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of
action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth. RULING: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or
superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. and method of enforcing the right to appeal from
The minority went farther than the majority and denied decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from
even any discretion on the part of the justice of the decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously
peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court,
compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
anew.
C. MARIANO ALBER V. UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO.,
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition INC.
is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
FACTS: “No less than three times have the parties here
B. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC V MARIWASA AND CA appealed to this Court.”
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of In 1949, Albert sued University Publishing Co. (UPC). He
B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by alleged that UPC was organized and existing under PH
the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of laws and that thru its president Jose Aruego (Aruego),
courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial they entered into a contract where UPC would pay him
agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI). 30 thousand pesos for the exclusive right to publish his
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revised Commentaries on the RPC and for his share in personally liable for contracts entered into or for other
previous sales of the book’s 1st edition; that UPC acts performed as such agent;
undertook to pay in 8 instalments of 3.5k and failure to
pay one instalment would render the rest due. On the issue of due process (since Aruego wasn’t named
in the case), Aruego was given his day in court;
Albert said UPC failed to pay the 2nd instalment but the
latter countered that it was the former who violated Parties to a suit are "persons who have a right to control
their contract by his failure to deliver the manuscript. the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and cross-
Later, Albert died and Justo Albert (his administrator) examine witnesses, and to appeal from a decision; in
substituted him. The CFI then favoured Justo and reality, it was Aruego who exercised these rights;
ordered UPC to pay him 23 thousand. The cases went to
SC which reduced it to 15 thousand pesos. By due process of law we mean a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and
The CFI then ordered for the execution against UPC but renders judgment only after trial;
at some point, Justo petitioned for a writ of execution
against Aruego (its president) because he and the Summary: The evidence is patently clear that Jose M.
sheriff discovered that UPC wasn’t registered in the SEC. Aruego, acting as representative of a non-existent
UPC countered by saying that Aruego was not a party to principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon;
the case so the petition should be denied. that he was the one who reaped the benefits resulting
from it, so much so that partial payments of the
SC notes that UPC doesn’t want Aruego to be a party to consideration were made by him; that he violated its
the case because if he’s not a party, a separate action terms, thereby precipitating the suit in question; and
will have to be filed by Justo which will result in him that in the litigation he was the real defendant.
dealing with the statute of limitations.
CASE REMANDED: Lower court to hold supplementary
The CFI denied the petition so Justo appealed. proceedings for the purpose of carrying the judgment
into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or
ISSUE: W/N Aruego considered a party in the case. Jose M. Aruego (because others might be liable to him
for reimbursement or contribution.)
RULING: Yes, Aruego is a party in the case. Non-
registration of UPC is undisputed. Hence, on account of D. ALVERO V. DELA ROSA
the non-registration it cannot be considered a
corporation, not even a corporation de facto; UPC then FACTS: On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano
has no personality separate from Aruego, thus cannot had filed a complaint, in the Court of First Instance of
be sued independently; the City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S.
Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes
Corporation-by-estoppel not invoked by UPC. Even if of action:
invoked, it’s not applicable; (1) to declare in force the contract of sale, between said
Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two parcels
Aruego represented a non-existent entity and induced of land in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak, in the
not only Justo but also the court to believe such barrio of Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, Province
representation; (he signed the contract as president and of Rizal, which land was subsequently sold by said
stated the UPC was registered); Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on
December 31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in
One who has induced another to act upon his wilful Japanese military notes; and
misrepresentation that a corporation was duly (2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void. On July
organized and existing under the law, cannot thereafter 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said
set up against his victim the principle of corporation by complaint, expressly admitting having sold said land to
estoppel (Salvatiera vs. Garlitos, 56 O.G. 3069); Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in December,
1944, due to the necessity of raising funds with which to
Aruego is the real defendant because it is UPC who provide for herself and family, and that she did not
came to the court, but as said, it does not have remember the previous sale; at the same time, offering
independent personaility; it is just a name; to repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in
the sum of P5,000, but that the latter refused to accept
In reality, it was Aruego, in reality, the one who the offer.
answered and litigated, through his own law firm as
counsel; Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim,
denying Fredesvindo S. Alvero's alleged ownership over
On Agency, a person acting or purporting to act on said land, and the other allegations contained in
behalf of a corporation which has no valid existence Alvero's answer.
assumes such privileges and obligations and becomes
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On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering understand the state of mind of the attorney, and his
said complaint, denied the allegations and claimed intense devotion and ardent affection towards his dying
exclusive ownership of the land in question. wife.
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of First Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a
Instance of the City of Manila, one of the respondents in difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration and
this case, rendered his decision, in which it was declared new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point
that the two parcels of land in question had been sold out specifically the findings or conclusions in the
by Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano and that judgment, are not supported by the evidence or which
Victoriano continued making monthly payments until are contrary to law, making express reference to the
December, 1941, but that owing to the war-time pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly
conditions then existing, Margarita Villarica agreed required by Rule 37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the
verbally to suspend such payments until the restoration Rules of Court. Motions of that kind have been
of peace and that Margarita Villarica, having forgotten considered as motions pro forma intended merely to
the sale of said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold the same delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will
for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on December not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the
31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, but afterwards perfection of the appeal. He could have asked for an
offered to repurchase said property from him, for the extension of time, within which to file and perfect his
sum of P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to do so,
liberation. and he must bear the consequences of his act.
Jose R. Victoriano had presented the deed of sale which A strict observance of the rules of court, which have
was older than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, the been considered indispensable to the prevention of
respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of Jose needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch
R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the of judicial business, is an imperative necessity. Human
property in question, including all the improvements laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should
existing thereon, and dismissed the counterclaim. stand in the way of performing a legal duty.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was E. PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET
notified of said decision; and on December 27, 1945, he AL.
filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which
was denied on January 3, 1946. On January 8, 1946, FACTS: Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold
Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon
record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court, Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land
without filing the P60-appeal bond. with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in
Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that
Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of
Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the
to dismiss, alleging that on the very same day, January registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita
filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said within a reasonable period of time); and that should
appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife. Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-
The respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her
ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would
although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had receive the payment of the balance and proceed with
been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed the application for registration.
too late.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having
ISSUE: Is the petition defective in form as well as in predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendor’s
substance? undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did
HELD: Yes, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's not comply with the undertaking to cause the
appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he registration of the properties under the Torrens System,
was notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and and, instead, began to improve the properties by
expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his dumping filling materials therein with the intention of
notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January converting the parcels of land into a residential or
8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to
appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946. comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in
Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC).
an excuse, for his failure to perfect and file his appeal, in
due time, the illness of his wife. It is not difficult to
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Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or
restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the
registration proceedings and then to execute a final Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken
deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a motion to from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the
cause of action. remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss.
However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC 2. No. No forum shopping was committed. Priscilla
reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss. claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by
filing a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari
Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied against the same orders. As earlier noted, he denies
the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to that his doing so violated the policy against forum
disturb its order. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of shopping.
appeal. Priscilla countered that the RTC order was not
appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of
and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer
appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and
petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title In
1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint. Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion
aside the RTC decision and remanded the records to the in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law." civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
Priscilla. cause or supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens
ISSUES: when, in the two or more pending cases, there is
1. Whether or not the RTC’s decision denying of the identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action,
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal a and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of
final order and appealable; litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment
2. Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the in one case will amount to res judicata in the other,
CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a
RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a)
in the CA. identity of the parties or at least such as to represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
HELD: asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
1. Yes. First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases
reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the should be such that the judgment which may be
RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
interlocutory one. The distinction between a final order
and an interlocutory order is well known. The first For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or the same transaction, same essential facts and
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving circumstances and must raise identical causes of action,
nothing more to be done except to enforce by subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist
execution what the court has determined, but the latter where different orders were questioned, two distinct
does not completely dispose of the case but leaves causes of action and issues were raised, and two
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory objectives were sought.
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. Should Javellana’s present appeal now be held barred
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a by his filing of the petition for certiorari in the CA when
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or his appeal in that court was yet pending?
judgment leave something to be done in the trial court
with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the We are aware that in Young v. Sy, in which the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the orders
concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to
the CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing
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the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that reflecting an accumulated input taxes in the amount of
the successive filings of the notice of appeal and the P39,330,500.85. These input taxes were allegedly paid
petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of by [MPC] to the suppliers of capital goods and services
nullifying the trial court’s dismissal orders constituted for the construction and development of the power
forum shopping that warranted the dismissal of both generating plant and other related facilities in Pagbilao,
cases. The Court said: Quezon.
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal
and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged Pursuant to the procedures prescribed under Revenue
in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced Regulations No. 7-95, as amended, [MPC] filed on June
the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her 30, 1998, an application for tax credit or refund of the
filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule aforementioned unutilized VAT paid on capital goods.
65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way
of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). In answer to the Petition, [the BIR Commissioner]
advanced as special and affirmative defenses that
The elements of litis pendentia are present between the "[MPC]'s claim for refund is still pending investigation
two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth Division, and consideration before the office of [the BIR
correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the Commissioner] accordingly, the filing of the present
same facts and refer to the same subject matter—the petition is premature; well-settled is the doctrine that
RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 provisions in tax refund and credit are construed strictly
(2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the against the taxpayer as they are in the nature of a tax
petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The exemption; in an action for refund or tax credit, the
parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and taxpayer has the burden to show that the taxes paid
the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that were erroneously or illegally paid and failure to sustain
the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata the said burden is fatal to the action for refund; it is
in the other. incumbent upon [MPC] to show that the claim for tax
credit has been filed within the prescriptive period
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are under the Tax Code; and the taxes allegedly paid by
mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. [MPC] are presumed to have been collected and
This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot hedge received in accordance with law and revenue
her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the regulations.
event that the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind
the others, she cannot post facto validate this The CTA ruled in favor of MPC and the refund was
circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary granted.
appeal had not been speedy or adequate enough, in
order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the CA a
adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in Petition for Review of the foregoing Decision. Notably,
multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner the BIR Commissioner identified and discussed as
couches it, becomes a “precautionary measure” for the grounds for its Petition arguments that were totally new
rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable and were never raised before the CTA, to wit -
decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on 1. RESPONDENT BEING AN ELECTRIC UTILITY, IT IS
forum shopping seeks to put right. SUBJECT TO FRANCHISE TAX UNDER THEN
SECTION 117 (NOW SECTION 119) OF THE TAX
In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated CODE AND NOT TO VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT).
that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule 2. SINCE RESPONDENT IS EXEMPT FROM VAT, IT IS
against forum shopping is the rendition by two NOT ENTITLED TO THE REFUND OF INPUT VAT
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory PURSUANT TO SECTION 4.103-1 OF REVENUE
decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking REGULATIONS NO. 7-95.
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR
repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a Commissioner's Petition, and in its Decision, dated 30
favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant July 2003, it pronounced that:
confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against
forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results (1) The BIR Commissioner cannot validly change his
in the dismissal of the case. theory of the case on appeal;
F. CIR vs MIRANT PAGBILAO CORP CA affirmed in toto.
FACTS: [MPC] is a domestic corporation duly organized Hence, this petition. The BIR Commissioner argues that
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the (1) The observance of procedural rules may be relaxed
Philippines. considering that technicalities are not ends in
themselves but exist to protect and promote the
For the period April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996, substantive rights of the parties;
[MPC] seasonably filed its Quarterly VAT Returns
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ISSUE: WON the contention of the BIR commissioner is be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
correct. procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. There have been some
RULING: No. The general rule is that a party instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the
cannot change his theory of the case on appeal. application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction that a party the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation and
may not change his theory of the case on appeal. Such a application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to
rule has been expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides - circumstances.
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. -
Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical
trial in the court below, he may include in his or procedural rules or to except a case from their
assignment of errors any question of law or fact that operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when
has been raised in the court below and which is within the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes
the issues framed by the parties. good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension
of the rules is discretionary upon the courts.
Thus, in Carantes v. Court of Appeals, this Court
emphasized that – In his Petition and Memorandum before this Court, the
BIR Commissioner made no attempt to provide
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the reasonable explanation for his failure to raise before the
answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. A CTA the issue of MPC being a public utility subject to
party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the franchise tax rather than VAT. The BIR Commissioner
nature of the issue in the case. When a party argues, in a singular paragraph in his Petition,
deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is subsequently reproduced in his Memorandum, that the
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not Court of Appeals should have taken cognizance of the
be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to said issue, although it was raised for the first time on
permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse appeal, entirely on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sy v.
party. Court of Appeals. He contends that -
The submission fails to take into account that although
In the more recent case of Mon v. Court of Appeals, this this Honorable Court has repeatedly ruled that litigants
Court again pronounced that, in this jurisdiction, the cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this
settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of would contravene the basic rules of justice and fair play,
the case or his cause of action on appeal. It affirms that the observance of procedural rules may be relaxed,
"courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but
decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that exist to protect and promote the substantive rights of
goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate the litigants.
something on which the court did not hear the parties,
is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. This Court is unconvinced. There is no sufficient cause
The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. to warrant the relaxation of technical or procedural
rules in the instant case. The general rules of procedure
The BIR Commissioner pleads with this Court not to still apply and the BIR Commissioner cannot be allowed
apply the foregoing rule to the instant case, for a rule to raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
on technicality should not defeat substantive justice.
The BIR Commissioner apparently forgets that there are G. SARMIENTO V. ZARATAN
specific reasons why technical or procedural rules are
imposed upon the courts, and that compliance with FACTS: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment
these rules, should still be the general course of action. case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the
Hence, this Court has expounded that - Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard since they are designed On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in
to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the favor of petitioner. (MeTC ordered the defendant to pay
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival plaintiff monthly rentals and to vacate the premises.)
claims and in the administration of justice. The Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the
requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City. In the Notice
inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to
persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of submit her memorandum in accordance with the
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40of the Rules of
administrative bodies." The adjudicatory bodies and the Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within
parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by 15days from receipt.
the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game
of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must
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Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file before the date of hearing, unless the court for
the requisite memorandum. But on 3June 2003, he filed good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his As may be gleaned above and as held time and again,
failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a
cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered
week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period
flood compounded by the grounding of the computers for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
because the wirings got wet. But the motion remained
unacted. As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a
party has a right to resist the relief sought by the
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On motion and principles of natural justice demand that his
19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal as follows: right be not affected without an opportunity to be
Record shows that defendant-appellant heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended
received the Notice of Appealed Case, through not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises
counsel, on May 19, 2003 (Registry Return upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to
Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p. study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles
298). of natural justice demand that the right of a party
Thus, under Section 7(b), Rule 40of the 1997 should not be affected without giving it an opportunity
Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen (15) to be heard.
days or until June3, 2003 within which to
submit a memorandum on appeal. As further The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard,
appears on record, however, the required as well as to have time to study the motion and
Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
only on June 9, 2003, or six (6) daysbeyond the which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the
expiration of the aforesaid fifteen day period. present case, we believe that procedural due process
was substantially complied with.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in
the Court of Appeals, which was granted the petition of There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the
respondent. The appellate court nullified and set aside suspension of the Rules:
Orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of (a) the existence of special or compelling
respondent’s appeal. Consequently, respondent’s circumstances,
appeal memorandum was admitted and the case (b) the merits of the case,
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
this appeal by petitioner. negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
rules,
ISSUE: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on merely frivolous and dilatory, and
Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
worthless piece of paper. thereby.
RULING: NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the
failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in present case. The suspension of the Rules is warranted
her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
on Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion is a worthless substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to
piece of paper with no legal effect. It is not disputed extend the period to file Memorandum. The required
that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness,
with the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment of lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood,
the required docket fees. However, before the compounded by the grounding of the computers. There
expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she filed a is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to
Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought
period of five days within which to file her extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so
Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of and the memorandum was subsequently filed within
Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules the requested extended period.
of Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions H. CHARLES CU-UNJIENG vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
which the court may act upon without and UNI0N BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party,
every written motion shall be set for hearing by FACTS: Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP)
the applicant. Every written motion required to is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land situated in
be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof Barangay Sta. Maria, San Miguel, Bulacan and registered
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its in its name.
Page 7 of 85
the appellate court together with the original record or
Petitioner offered to buy the subject property and the record on appeal.
issued checks in consideration thereof. UBP then Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and
acknowledged receipt of the checks. other legal fees within the prescribed period is both
mandatory and jurisdictional, noncompliance with
On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up letter which is fatal to an appeal. For, to stress, appeal is not a
to UBP inquiring on the status of his offer to buy the matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege.
subject premises.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the
Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager RTC to the CA must be made within fifteen (15) days
of UBP’s Acquired Assets Department advised petitioner from notice. And within this period, the full amount of
that his offer to purchase is yet to be acted upon the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must
because the bank was still awaiting the opinion of its be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the
legal division regarding the sale of "CARPable" judgment or final order appealed from.
agricultural assets acquired by the bank.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full
As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioner’s offer upon on payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
account of the legal division’s opinion that sales of lands mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the
without prior Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction to
approval are considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP entertain the appeal, thereby rendering the decision
advised petitioner to pick up the refund of his "earnest sought to be appealed final and executory.
money" at the bank’s disbursing unit.
For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and
On February 6, 1997, the petitioner filed his complaint other lawful fees within the reglementary period as
in RTC at Malolos, Bulacan, for Specific Performance and provided under Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for
Damages against UBP. RTC dismissed the case for lack the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(c) of Rule 50,
of cause of action because there was no perfected to wit:
contract of sale. SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
Petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
therein making known that he is taking an appeal from grounds:
the adverse decision to the CA. Acting thereon, the trial xxx xxx xxx
court issued an Order directing the elevation of the c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other
records of the case to the CA. lawful fees as provided in section 4 of Rule 41; xxx
This Court has invariably sustained the CA’s dismissal on
As things would have it, in the herein first assailed technical grounds under the aforequoted provision
Resolution dated May 10, 1999, the CA dismissed unless considerations of equity and substantial justice
petitioner’s appeal for nonpayment of the required present cogent reasons to hold otherwise. True, the
docket and other lawful appeal fees, to wit: rules may be relaxed but only for persuasive and
For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice
docket and other lawful fees (Sec. 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules commensurate with his failure to comply with the
of Civil Procedure), the CA Resolved to DISMISS the prescribed procedure.
appeal pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rule.
The SC emphasizes that invocation of substantial
Hence, this petition. justice is not a magical incantation that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s contention is correct. rules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may
RULING: Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
that the right to appeal is merely statutory and a party rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed.
seeking to avail of that right must comply with the
statute or rules. I. G.R. No. 142022 September 7, 2005
MINDANAO SAVINGS ANDD LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure INC., Petitioners, vs. VICENTA VDA. DE FLORES, and
provides: HEIRS OF FLORENCIO FLORES, SR., namely, EDNA
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – FLORES EISEIDEL, BELINDA FLORES, FLORENCIO T.
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant FLORES, JR., ROBERTO T. FLORES, SYLVIA FLORES SICAT
shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the and LORNA FLORES FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Facts: Florencio Flores, Sr., husband of respondent
Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to Vicenta Vda. De Flores and predecessor-in-interest of
Page 8 of 85
the other respondents, entered into a JVA with DS Appellant’s Brief for being filed twenty (20) days
Homes, Inc. (DSHI) for the development of the Flores late, and consequently dismissed petitioner’s appeal.
spouses’ 2 adjoining lots located at the center of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. Pursuant to the JVA, Flores, Sr. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by
secured a loan of ₱1.5M from petitioner MSLAI using as the appellate court in its subsequent Resolution of
collaterals the 2 aforementioned lots. Thereafter, a February 15, 2000, petitioner is now with us via the
commercial building known as the Flores Building was instant recourse on the following assigned errors, which
constructed on the lots in question. perplexingly, are actually an assault against the decision
of the trial court and not the challenged resolutions of
In 1986, the joint venture suffered severe business the Court of Appeals.
reversals on account of which DSHI discontinued the
management of the Flores Building, prompting At the outset, let it be made clear that in petitions for
respondents to take over its operations. review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Meanwhile, MSLAI, then operating under the name the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court are only
"Davao Savings and Loan Association", was placed by those committed by the Court of Appeals and not
the Monetary Board of the Central Bank under directly those of the trial court. It is thus unfortunate
receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance that the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel of the PDIC, as
Corporation (PDIC) which was later designated by the petitioner’s counsel in this case, is evidently unaware of
Monetary Board as liquidator of the already insolvent how appellate proceedings before this Court go.
MSLAI.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court’s resolution
Respondents received from PDIC a demand letter for dismissing petitioner’s appeal was correct on account of
the payment of an outstanding obligation in the petitioner’s failure to file its appellant’s brief on time.
staggering amount of ₱23,756,477.61. Unable to believe
that the original loan of ₱1.5M obtained by their Ruling: Yes. We must emphasize that review is not a
predecessor could have reached that much, matter of right. Accordingly, there should be strict
respondents then filed with the a complaint adherence to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Section 6 of
for Accounting and Liquidation of Joint Venture, which delineates the grounds for the allowance of
Annulment of Loan & Mortgages and Damages thereat review to avoid delays in the enforcement of final
docketed as Civil Case No. 2138. judgments and orders of lower courts, to wit:
SEC. 6. Review discretionary. - A review is not a matter
In a decision dated January 26, 1998, the trial court of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
rendered judgment for the respondents. granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither
On February 4, 1998, petitioner MSLAI filed with the controlling nor fully measuring the court’s discretion,
trial court a Notice of Appeal by reason of which the indicate the character of the reasons which will be
records of the case were elevated to the Court of considered:
Appeals. (a) When the court a quo has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
On February 29, 1999, the appellate court issued a Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord
notice to the parties requiring them to file their with law or with the applicable decisions of the
respective briefs within 45 days from receipt thereof. Supreme Court; or
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the
On June 21, 1999, the office of the Chief Legal Counsel accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so
of the PDIC, as counsel for petitioner MSLAI, entered its far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to
appearance in the appellate court and filed a motion for call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
a 45-day extension of time to file appellant’s brief.
Petitioner attempts to justify its tardiness by claiming
In its Resolution of August 11, 1999, the appellate court that its handling counsel who resigned from PDIC on
favorably acted on petitioner’s motion and accordingly July 30, 1999 failed to turn over the subject case to
granted petitioner forty-five (45) days from June 21 or another lawyer for re-assignment.
until August 5, 1999, within which to file its appellant’s This excuse is not only flimsy but utterly lame.
brief.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner is represented by
Come August 5, 1999, but no appellant’s brief was filed no less than the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel of the
by petitioner. Instead, on August 25, 1999, or way PDIC which has, at its helm and command, a battery of
beyond the period given by the appellate court, lawyers. As pointed out by respondents, on July 7, 1999,
petitioner filed a Motion to Admit, therein praying that the handling counsel tendered his resignation from PDIC
the appellant’s brief thereto attached be admitted. effective on July 30, 1999. Petitioner, therefore, had 29
days from July 7, 1999, or until August 5, 1999, the last
In its challenged Resolution dated October 27, 1999, the day for filing the subject brief. During those 29 days,
appellate court denied admission of the proffered petitioner had the luxury of time to file its appellant’s
Page 9 of 85
brief, or, at the very least, ask for another extension Rule 17 Sec 3 provides: ´If for any cause, the plaintiff
from the appellate court. It did not. fails to appear on the date of his presentation of his
evidence x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon
Petitioner ought to be reminded that procedural rules motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to the to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
parties’ substantive rights. Like all rules, they are separate action.”
required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons as when "transcendental matters" The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with the
of life, liberty or state security are involved. dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise.
In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without
True, litigation is not a game of technicalities. It is prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute his
equally true, however, that every case must be counterclaim. Section 3 contemplates a dismissal not
presented in accordance with the prescribed procedure procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes
to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of imputable to him and which, in the present case, was
justice. petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial.
Doubtless, and judging from the very nature of This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended
petitioner’s assigned errors, the instant petition was by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion
resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the
appeal. This cannot be allowed, more so when, as here, issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim,
such loss is occasioned by petitioner’s own neglect. permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is
evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to
J. G.R. No. 170354 June 30, 2006 prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the
EDGARDO PINGA, Petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an
GERMAN, SANTIAGO represented by FERNANDO adjudication on the merits.
SANTIAGO, Respondents.
This does not, however, mean that there is likewise
Facts: The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against such absence of evidence to prove defendant's
Pinga alleging that Pinga had been unlawfully entering counterclaim although the same arises out of the
the coco lands of the respondent cutting wood and subject matter of the complaint which was merely
bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would
As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of the not only work injustice to defendant but would be
lands to which Pinga was harvesting the fruits. reading a further provision into Section 3 and wresting a
However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend meaning therefrom although neither exists even by
the hearings, the court ordered the dismissal of said mere implication.
case.
Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be
Respondents thus filed an MR not to reinstate the case dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a
but to ask for the entire action to be dismissed and not matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as
to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte. alleged and proved, with or without any reservation
therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or
RTC granted the MR, hence the counterclaim was implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant
dismissed. RTC ruled that compulsory counterclaims dismissal of his counterclaim. The present rule
cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiff’s cause embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more
of action vis a vis the dismissal of the complaint carries equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring
with the dismissal of the counterclaim. that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
Petitioner then elevates it to the SC by way of Rule 45 complaint.
on pure questions of law. (Santiago’s motive: They just
asked for the dismissal of their entire case so that their Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit
ownership wouldn’t be put in controversy in the or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent
counterclaim) of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from
dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that
Issue: Whether or not dismissal of original complaint the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is
affects that of the compulsory counter claims? premised on those defects. At the same time, if the
counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now
Ruling: No. The counterclaims, in this case, can stand on unequivocally protect such counterclaim from
its own. peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the
complaint. Petition granted.
Page 10 of 85
Respondents likewise assail the petition for being filed
K. G.R. No. 181274 June 23, 2010 late, stressing that it was filed only after almost three
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, represented (3) months from petitioner’s receipt of the CA decision.
herein by DIRECTOR GENERAL LILIA B. DE LIMA,
Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, ROSE Issue: Whether or not the appeal was perfected outside
CARANTES, and all the other HEIRS OF MAXIMINO the reglementary period provided by law, hence, the
CARANTES, Respondents. decision already became final and executory.
Facts: Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose Ruling: No. The Court is inclined to overlook this
Carantes and the heirs of Maximino Carantes are in procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice.
possession of a 30,368-square meter parcel of land
located in Loakan Road, Baguio City. They obtained It is settled that an appeal must be perfected within the
Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) over the land reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the
from the DENR. On the strength of said CALC, decision becomes final and executory. Before the
respondents secured a building permit and a fencing Supreme Court, a petition for review on certiorari under
permit from the Building Official of Baguio City, Teodoro Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
G. Barrozo. They fenced the premises and began amended, must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
constructing a residential building thereon. notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s
Respondents received a letter from Digna D. Torres, the motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
Zone Administrator of the Philippine Economic Zone after notice of the judgment. Even then, review is not a
Authority (PEZA), informing them that the house they matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
built had overlapped PEZA’s territorial boundary. Torres may be granted only when there are special and
advised respondents to demolish the same within 60 important reasons therefor.
days from notice. Otherwise, PEZA would undertake its
demolition at respondents’ expense. In the case at bar, the Docket Division of the OSG
received a copy of the CA decision on November 7,
Without answering PEZA’s letter, respondents filed a 2007. It was not until February 1, 2008 or almost three
petition for injunction, with prayer for the issuance of a (3) months however, that the OSG, for petitioner, filed a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of petition for review on certiorari with this Court. The
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Baguio City. By OSG pleads for understanding considering the scarcity
Order dated April 8, 1999, the RTC of Baguio City issued of its lawyers and the inadvertence of the temporarily-
a TRO, which enjoined PEZA to cease and desist from designated OIC of Division XV in overlooking that the CA
threatening respondents with the demolition of their decision was adverse to PEZA.
house before respondents’ prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction can be heard. On September 19, While the Court realizes the OSG’s difficulty in having
2001, the RTC likewise issued an Order, which directed only three (3) lawyers working full time on its cases, the
the parties to maintain the status quo pending OSG could have easily asked for an extension of time
resolution of the case. within which to file the petition. More importantly, as
the government agency tasked to represent the
On October 2, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ government in litigations, the OSG should perform its
petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of injunction duty with promptness and utmost diligence.
against PEZA. The trial court ruled that respondents are
entitled to possess, occupy and cultivate the subject lots However, upon careful consideration of the merits of
on the basis of their CALC. this case, the Court is inclined to overlook this
procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Although a party is bound by the acts of its counsel,
including the latter’s mistakes and negligence, a
The OSG explains the delay in appealing the CA decision. departure from this rule is warranted where such
It attributes the delay to the inadvertence of Senior mistake or neglect would result in serious injustice to
State Solicitor Rodolfo Geronimo M. Pineda, the the client. Indeed, procedural rules may be relaxed for
temporarily-designated officer-in-charge, who took over persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice
the case when State Solicitor Maricar S.A. Prudon-Sison not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
went on maternity leave. Pineda allegedly merely noted prescribed procedure. More so, when to allow the
receipt of the CA decision without noticing that it was assailed decision to go unchecked would set a
adverse to PEZA. The OSG adds that the sparse precedent that will sanction a violation of substantive
complement of three (3) lawyers left at the time could law. Such is the situation in this case.
not tackle at once the horde of cases assigned to the
division.
Page 11 of 85
L. G.R. No. 178984 August 19, 2009 Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable
ERLINDA MAPAGAY, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact
The rule is that when a party is represented by counsel, or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
notices of all kinds. including motions, pleadings and attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
orders, must be serve on the counsel. Notice to counsel this Court. Decisions that have long become final and
of records is binding to the client. and the neglect or executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the
failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the
resulting in the Joss of his right to appeal is not ground trial court’s final judgment. This doctrine is founded on
for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its considerations of public policy and sound practice that,
face. at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become
final at some point in time.
Facts: Erinda Mapagay (Mapagay) borrowed money
from Relindia dela Cruz in November 1996. Mapagay Evidence on record shows that petitioner’s counsel of
gave her a signed check tor the loan and promised to record, Atty. Antonio J. Ballena (Atty. Ballena), received
replace the check with cash. Upon failure of Mapagay to on 21 September 2004 a copy of the RTC Decision dated
give her cash despite repeated demands, she presented 14 September 2004, which affirms petitioner’s
the check to the drawee bank. The check was conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
dishonored for the reason of “Account Closed". Her Hence, petitioner may file a motion for reconsideration
lawyer, after consultation, sent a demand letter to within 15 days from such date of receipt, which must be
Mapagay but the latter refused to receive it. on or before 6 October 2004. However, petitioner filed
her motion for reconsideration only on 3 November
Dela cruz told Mapagay to pay the loan or the former 2004, or on the 43rd day, which was obviously way
will sue her in court. Mapagay promised to pay, but beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Consequently,
failed to do so. Thus, she filed a case for the violation of the RTC Decision dated has become final and executory.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Mapagay.
Petitioner alleges that she learned of the RTC Decision
On June 1999. the Metropolitan Trial Curt (MeTC) only on 20 October 2004 when she asked a friend to
provisionally dismissed the case on the basis of check on the status of the case and that Atty. Ballena
amicable settlement betv1een the parties. Hov1ever did not inform her of the RTC Decision.
the case was revived because Mapagay failed to comply
with the terms of their agreement. The rule is that when a party is represented by counsel,
notices of all kinds, including motions, pleadings and
The MeTC rendered a Decision finding Mapagay guilty orders, must be served on the counsel. Notice to
of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. counsel of record is binding on the client, and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto the judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is
MeTC Decision. Mapagay filed a Motion for not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and
Reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC for regular on its face.
being filed outside the the reglementary period.
Mapagay alleges that she learned of the RTC Decision It is indeed settled that the omission or negligence of
only on 20 October 2004 When she asked a friend to counsel binds the client. This is more true if the client
check on the status of the case and that her lav1yer did did not make a periodic check on the progress of her
not inform her of the RTC Decision. case. Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit, so
long as a new counsel could be employed who would
The Court of Appeal(CA) held that the RTC's Decision allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
had become final and unalterable for filing the motion sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.
for reconsideration out of time. Hence, petitioner filed
the instant petition maintaining that the Court of In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner
Appeals erred in denying due course to her appeal. had constantly followed up her case with Atty. Ballena.
Petitioner did not even bother to call or personally go to
Issue: Whether or not the omission or negligence of the RTC to verify the progress of her case. Clearly,
Mapagay’s counsel binds her. petitioner did not exercise diligence in pursuing her
case.
Ruling: Yes. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of the Petitioner argues that the technical rules of procedure
judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days from should be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice,
the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the so as to afford her opportunity to present her case.
final order appealed from. Failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period renders We have invariably pronounced that the bare
the subject decision final and executory. invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a
Page 12 of 85
magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to Court in such cases when the validity or constitutionality
suspend procedural rules. Rules of Procedure are tools of a statute is involved. This amendment of the
designed to promote efficiency and orderliness, as well procedure does not carry with it the right of review of
as to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that strict the facts, but is confined to the purpose stated — that
adherence thereto is required. Procedural rules are not is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the
to be belittled or dismissed, simply because their non- statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be has uniformly been the interpretation of section 43 by
followed except only for the most persuasive reasons, this court.
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his Facts: The defendants were convicted by the justice of
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure the peace of Baguio for having played the game of
prescribed. Rules of Procedure, especially those chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35.
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be They appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they
done, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of were again tried and convicted upon the same charge.
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge An appeal was allowed to this court because the validity
of justice. We have held that the rules may be relaxed of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the
only in "exceptionally meritorious cases." trial of the cause in the court below.
In the instant case, we find no persuasive or Issues: Whether or not the court is required under the
exceptionally meritorious reasons to justify the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of
relaxation of the rules. The circumstances obtaining in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants?
the instant case show that petitioner was accorded
opportunity to settle her liability to private complainant Ruling: No. Although the SC wrote that Act No. 1627
and to present her case during the proceedings. As does not explicitly limit their powers from examining
earlier recounted, the MTC, upon motion of petitioner, issues of facts, it likewise does not expressly authorize
provisionally dismissed the case on the basis of an them to do so. The SC, nevertheless, interpreted that
amicable settlement between her and private the law was not framed to confer them the said power.
complainant. However, the case was revived, because
petitioner failed to comply with the settlement. The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the intention
Petitioner was given several opportunities during the of the 'framers' of the amended section of Act No. 1627;
trial to present evidence in her defense. Nonetheless, the latter being ambiguous in the sense that it did not
despite being duly notified and subpoenaed, she did not explicitly allow nor prohibit SC to examine issues of
appear during the trial proper and promulgation of facts on appeals. The SC found, in light of former
judgment. practices and from further understanding the
circumstances in which the framers of the amended law
It should be noted that private complainant has not were subject to, that the amendment was not meant to
been fully or partially paid the amount stated in the confer in them the jurisdiction of reviewing questions of
check. The time-honored principle is "Justice is for all. fact.
Litigants have equal footing in a court of law. Rules are
laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made The SC further distinguished their holding from Loeb vs
dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time and own Columbia Township Trustees, and Boise Artesian Hot
bidding." and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City. These two latter
cases were taken to the US SC directly from the circuit
Given the foregoing, we find no error in the Decision courts as writs of error, (not as appeals) where the US
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying SC does not only have jurisdiction to review
petitioner’s appeal. constitutional questions but also every other question
properly arising.
M. G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE In at least fourteen other cases, the SC has showed that
TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants. the ruling for this issue in the last 10 years has remained
uniform. And that the court, since its organization,
SYLLABUS (Basaha nalang ninyo ang syllabus. Ruling was never held that it had the power to review facts
taken from a digest online. Dili nako masabtan ang touching guilt of an accused person, ONLY as to when
case.) the appeal involved the validity or constitutionality of a
statute or the constitutionality of a municipal or
1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD township ordinance.
INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW. — Under the Spanish
criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were
allowed only to Courts of First Instance. By section 43 of
General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so
amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme
Page 13 of 85
N. G.R. Nos. 170609-13 January 30, 2009 Ruling: 1. Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for
BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Petitioner vs. HON. VIRGILIO M. certiorari is incorrect for it violates the hierarchy of
PATAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the courts. A regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, VICENTE indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
C. ARAGONA, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC
Respondents. and those against the latter should be filed in the Court
of Appeals. This rule, however, may be relaxed when
Facts: 5 informations for libel were filed in the RTC pure questions of law are raised as in this case.
against petitioner Miaque and 3 others. Said
informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction of the 2. No. It is undisputed that the alleged acts of libel were
offense charged. Specifically, said Informations failed to committed in Iloilo City. The Charter of the City of Iloilo
allege either that private respondent Vicente Aragona provides:
actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offenses or that the alleged libelous [The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have
remarks were printed or first published in Iloilo City. charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors
and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First
5 new informations for libel were filed against Instance (now RTC) and in the Municipal Trial Court of
petitioner in the RTC as recommended by Assistant the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to
Provincial Prosecutor Maranon. The new Informations criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial
were similarly worded as those previously quashed but fiscals.
with these added allegations: (1) Aragona, Regional
State Prosecutor VI of the Department of Justice, held The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges
office at the Hall of Justice, Iloilo City or (2) the alleged of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances,
libelous remarks were written, printed and published in and have the necessary informations or complaints
Iloilo City. prepared against the persons accused.
Petitioner filed his motions not to issue warrants of The authority to sign and file the new Informations is
arrest and, if already issued, to recall them. The motions properly lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office.
were denied on the ground that petitioner was beyond The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was clearly
the court's jurisdiction as he was not under the custody bereft of authority to file the new Informations against
of the court. petitioner. An Information, when required by law to be
filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
Petitioner contends that the Informations were filed another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over
without the mandatory preliminary investigation. the case because there is a defect in the Information.
Moreover, the new Informations were filed by one who We held in People v. Hon. Garfin:
had no authority to do so because these were filed by It is a valid information signed by a competent officer
the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor's Office and not the Iloilo which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on
City Prosecutor's Office. Jurisdiction over the subject the court over the person of the accused and the subject
matter supposedly belonged to the latter. Petitioner matter thereof. xxx Questions relating to lack of
likewise assails the refusal of respondent judge to recall jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
the warrants of arrest issued against him. proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack
of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
the People of the Philippines, contends that the
quashed Informations were merely amended to include The foregoing considered, the Informations were fatally
the allegations that Aragona actually held office in Iloilo defective. The common infirmity in the Informations
City at the time of the commission of the offenses or constituted a jurisdictional defect that could not be
that the libelous remarks were printed and first cured. There was no point in proceeding under a
published in Iloilo City. A new preliminary investigation defective Information that could never be the basis of a
was therefore unnecessary. On the warrant of arrest, valid conviction.
the OSG alleges that the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner in view of the filing of his August 8, 2005 O. G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
motions. The filing of the motions supposedly was CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY
tantamount to voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR
of the court. JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MALAY,
AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE
Issues: 1. Whether or not a direct resort to the Supreme PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO,
Court in a petition for certiorari is correct. JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL
2. Whether or not the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER,
Office has the authority to file and sign the new BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC.,
Informations against petitioner. REPRESENTED BY NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL
Page 14 of 85
AUXILIARY POLICE, AND JOHN AND JANE DOES, Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per
Respondents. accidens, however, we still find in this case that the LGU
may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition.
DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of This is because, in the exercise of police power and the
the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing general welfare clause, property rights of individuals
and demolition of establishments. This power granted may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
by the LGC, as earlier explained, is not the same power fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as stated, the government may enact legislation that may
above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
The fact that the building to be demolished is located businesses and occupations to promote the general
within a forestland under the administration of the welfare.
DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein,
strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are
protection, conservation of natural resources, and the concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or requirement of due notice and hearing, order their
illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an closure and demolition.
environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted
from the root cause of this debacle compliance. One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
Facts: Petitioner is the president and chief executive through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, given powers not only relative to its function as the
2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance executive official of the town; it has also been endowed
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While with authority to hear issues involving property rights of
the company was already operating a resort in the area, individuals and to come out with an effective order or
and the application sought the issuance of a building resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3)
permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel (vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order
over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in the closure and removal of illegally constructed
Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, establishments for failing to secure the necessary
Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement permits.
for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor PRIMARY JURISDICTION
of Boracay West Cove. The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the
controversy
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010,
the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s In alleging that the case concerns the development and
application on the ground that the proposed the proper use of the country’s environment and
construction site was within the “no build zone” natural resources, petitioner is skirting the principal
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 issue, which is Boracay West Cove’s non-compliance
(Ordinance). with the permit, clearance, and zoning requirements for
building constructions under national and municipal
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of laws. He downplays Boracay West Cove’s omission in a
the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever bid to justify ousting the LGU of jurisdiction over the
taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist case and transferring the same to the DENR. He
Order was issued by the municipal government, attempts to blow the issue out of proportion when it all
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, boils down to whether or not the construction of the
2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the three-storey hotel was supported by the necessary
assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of documentary requirements.
Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order was demolition of establishments. This power granted by
issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion. the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the
same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17
Issue: Whether or not judicial proceedings should be (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by
conducted first before the LGU can order the closure the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is
and demolition of the property in question. located within a forestland under the administration of
the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein,
Ruling: Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental
particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a protection, conservation of natural resources, and the
nuisance per se. maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or
illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an
Page 15 of 85
environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit. Likewise, the case
from the root cause of this debacle––compliance. against defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby
DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the
office of the DENR over respondents’ actions exercised reconsideration of the lower court's decision
through an instrumentality of an ex-parte opinion, in contending that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it
this case, finds no sufficient basis. At best, the legal liable for damages; that the lower court did not acquire
opinion rendered, though perhaps informative, is not jurisdiction over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as
conclusive on the courts and should be taken with a docket fee; (2) assuming that plaintiff was entitled to
grain of salt. damages, the lower court erred in awarding an amount
greater than that prayed for in the second amended
P. G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998 complaint; and (3) the lower court erred when it failed
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, to resolve the issues it had raised in its memorandum.
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and 16 Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental motion for
MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING reconsideration expounding on whether the lower court
CORPORATION, respondents. acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
despite therein plaintiff's failure to pay the prescribed
Doctrine: A party is entitled to adequate compensation docket fee.
only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined
proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual reconsideration for lack of merit. Apparently not having
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable received the order denying its motion for
of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for leave
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or to file a reply to private respondent's opposition to said
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount motion. Hence, the lower court denied said motion for
thereof. The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific leave to file a reply on the ground that by the issuance
facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had
compensatory damages are borne. A court cannot become moot and academic.
merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork
as to the fact and amount of damages as well as Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner
hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which,
suspect. Such are the jurisprudential precepts that the however, affirmed the same in toto. Hence, the instant
Court now applies in resolving the instant petition. recourse.
Facts: In the early morning of September 21, 1977, Issue: Whether or not the lower court did not acquire
the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private jurisdiction over the amended complaint increasing the
respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00
navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu,
Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it Held: Yes. With respect to petitioner's contention that
collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). amended complaint increasing the amount of damages
claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over
Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant the case when private respondent paid the docket fee
Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its
the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its
Board and after unsuccessful demands on increased claim for damages under the amended
petitioner, private respondent sued the LSC and complaint should not be considered as having curtailed
the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling
then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City paying in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 55 the
thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the
fifty-two pesos (P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of judgment even though private respondent specified the
two pesos (P2.00). In particular, private respondent amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its
prayed for an award of P692,680.00. amended complaint.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be all the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground of
substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the
ownership of the Petroparcel. amended complaint and the second amended
complaint. It did so only in its motion for
RTC rendered a decision against the defendant PNOC reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after
Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held
P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with interest plus in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of
Page 16 of 85
Appeals, participation in all stages of the case before contracts with prospective clients. Further, the Lims
the trial court, that included invoking its authority in alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted
asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the
by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. property.
Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second
amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did Lim- filed a complaint with RTC for damages
not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only RTC- On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a
on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for decision in favor of DMI and the Lims. It ordered the
reconsideration of the lower court's decision that Bank to pay the plaintiffs ₱27,974,564.00 as actual
petitioner raised the question of the lower court's lack damages, ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000 as
of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to exemplary damages, and ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s
raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. fees. But the court absolved defendants Payongayong,
Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.
Q. G.R. No. 176339 January 10, 2011 CA- found for the Bank
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM
and LELY KUNG LIM, Petitioners, vs. Issues:
SECURITY BANK CORP., TITOLAIDO E. PAYONGAYONG, 1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear
EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY and adjudicate plaintiff’s supplemental complaint
AGENCY CORP. and GIL SILOS, Respondents. against the Bank considering their failure to pay the
filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it;
Facts: From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., 2. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims
owned by petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely for the machineries, equipment, and other properties
Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from respondent they allegedly lost after they were barred from the
Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled property.
₱92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the
Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank Ruling:
to secure the same, including a building and the lot on 1. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues
which it stands (the property), located at M. de Leon St., that plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their
Santolan, Pasig City. supplemental complaint is fatal to their action.
In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the
Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC
(DMI) primarily for business although the Lims were to acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the
use part of the property as their residence. DMI and the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied
Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. The
1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due
the right to pre-terminate the lease. The contract also on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the
provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the jurisdiction it already had over the case.
property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.
2. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the
On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought
Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the
lease on December 31, 1999. Wanting to exercise its same. And, while petitioners claim that they were
right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason
Bank the terms of its purchase. DMI offered to pay the for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They
Bank ₱8 million for the property but the latter rejected merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because
the offer, suggesting ₱15 million instead. DMI made a the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a
second offer of ₱10 million but the Bank declined the supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the
same. rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing.9 The rules do not require the court
While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed to make special assessments in cases of supplemental
that they continued to use the property in their complaints.
business. But the Bank posted at the place private
security guards from Philippine Industrial Security To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank
Agency (PISA). The Lims also claimed that on several brought up the question of their failure to pay
occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration,
Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong and plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late
Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and payment before the case could be submitted for
barred the Lims as well as DMI’s employees from decision, assuming of course that the prescription of
entering the property. One of the guards even pointed their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have
his gun at one employee and shots were fired. Because no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees
of this, DMI was unable to close several projects and they owed the court. Consequently, the trial court
Page 17 of 85
should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages
not filed. pursuant to the Warsaw Convention,5 Article 28(1) of
which provides:
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised An action for damages must be brought at the option of
the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the
after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The carrier or his principal place of business, or where he
implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have has a place of business through which the contract has
waived its objection to such omission. But it is not for a been made, or before the court of the place of
party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the destination.
payment of the additional filing fees due on the
supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b)
grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the respondent’s principal place of business is in London; c)
courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules. petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney
Travel S.A.S, in Rome);6 and d) Rome, Italy is petitioner’s
R. G.R. No. 171092 March 15, 2010 place of destination, then it follows that the complaint
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, Petitioner, vs. BRITISH should only be filed in the proper courts of London,
AIRWAYS, Respondent. United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed
necessitate juris dicendi. Jurisdiction is a power for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
introduced for the public good, on account of the respondent because the summons was erroneously
necessity of dispensing justice. served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is
not its resident agent in the Philippines.
Facts: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier
filed a Complaint2 for damages against respondent RTC- On October 14, 2005, the RTC of Makati City,
British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Branch 132, issued an Order10 granting respondent’s
Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that:
took respondent’s flight 548 from London, United xxxxxSince the Philippines is not the place of domicile of
Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly the defendant nor is it the principal place of business,
requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the our courts are thus divested of jurisdiction over cases
respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in placing for damages. Neither was plaintiff’s ticket issued in this
her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, country nor was her destination Manila but Rome in
Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and Italy. It bears stressing however, that referral to the
even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all court of proper jurisdiction does not constitute
300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken constructive denial of plaintiff’s right to have access to
back!" our courts since the Warsaw Convention itself provided
for jurisdiction over cases arising from international
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was transportation. Said treaty stipulations must be
about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, complied with in good faith following the time honored
Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from principle of pacta sunt servanda.
among all the passengers in the business class section
to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her MFR- denied
appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, Petitioner now comes directly before us on a Petition
uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the for Review on Certiorari on pure questions of law,
safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, raising the following issues:
petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the plane’s
safety regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, IssueS:
Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few 1. WON RTC has jurisdiction? NO
centimeters away from that of the petitioner and 2. WON respondent air carrier of passengers, in filing its
menacingly told her that "We don’t like your attitude." motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to subject matter of the case and over its person may be
respondent’s ground manager and demanded an deemed as having in fact and in law submitted itself to
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight the jurisdiction of the lower court, especially so, when
stewards were "only doing their job." the very lawyer arguing for it is himself the resident
agent of the carrier? NO
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages.
Ruling:
On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special 1. The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of
appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss4 law in this country. Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over provides:
the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that 1. This Convention applies to all international
only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, carriage of persons, luggage or goods
Page 18 of 85
performed by aircraft for reward. It applies Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional
equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case
performed by an air transport undertaking. before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the
2. For the purposes of this Convention the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of
expression "international carriage" means any destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated
carriage in which, according to the contract given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket
made by the parties, the place of departure and and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring
the place of destination, whether or not there her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus
be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does
are situated either within the territories of two not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the
High Contracting Parties, or within the territory petitioner.
of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject 2. Special Appearance to Question a Court’s Jurisdiction
to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or Is Not Voluntary Appearance
authority of another Power, even though that
Power is not a party to this Convention. A The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised
carriage without such an agreed stopping place Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
between territories subject to the sovereignty, Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s
suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
High Contracting Party is not deemed to be to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
international for the purposes of this dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
Convention. over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of
destination in a contract of carriage are situated within Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss,
the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
carriage is deemed an "international carriage". The High together with other grounds raised therein, is not
Contracting Parties referred to herein were the deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court.
signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which What the rule on voluntary appearance – the first
subsequently adhered to it. sentence of the above-quoted rule – means is that the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is
In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was without qualification, in which case he is deemed to
London, United Kingdom while her place of destination have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his
was Rome, Italy.15 Both the United Kingdom16 and Italy17 person due to improper service of summons.
signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such,
the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject
"international carriage" within the contemplation of the forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
Warsaw Convention. voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner
filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to
case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration;
the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder
Convention. case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial
plaintiff may bring the action for damages before – reconsideration.
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to
place of business; dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special
3. the court where the carrier has an appearance with the purpose of challenging the
establishment by which the contract has been jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her
made; or three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not
4. the court of the place of destination. acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three
children for lack of valid service of summons through
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a improvident substituted service of summons in both
British corporation domiciled in London, United Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner
Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. never abandoned when she filed her motions for
Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their
the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated
London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with
and baggage check presented by both the petitioner a claim for damages. And the other subsequent
and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and
Page 19 of 85
defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper denied the urgent motion as well as respondent's
substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and On May 24, 1996, respondent filed a petition for
her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the orders of
constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons. the trial court. During the pendency of the petition, on
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of May 27, 1996, petitioner filed with the trial court a
respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other Motion for Leave to Serve Summons Through
pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be Publication. Its motion was granted, but the publication
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial was held in abeyance on October 2, 1996. On the same
court. We hence disagree with the contention of the date, petitioner entered into an agreement with TODAY
petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary for the publication of the summons on October 4, 11,
appearance before the trial court that could constitute and 18, 1996. Petitioner received the trial court's order
estoppel or a waiver of respondent’s objection to at the close of office hours on October 3, 1996.
jurisdiction over its person. Attempts to prevent the publication by requesting the
trial court through telephone to inform the newspaper
S. G.R. No. 146593 October 26, 2001 publisher of its order and informing the newspaper
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, petitioner, vs. itself of the same proved futile, as nobody in the court
ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, respondent. was contacted by petitioner while the telephone lines of
the newspaper were busy. As a result, TODAY published
Facts: On November 17, 1994, Philippine Apparel, Inc. the summons on October 4, 1996. It was only on
(PAI) entered into a credit agreement with petitioner October 8, 1996 that petitioner was able to inform the
United Coconut Planters Bank for a case-to-case credit newspaper of the October 2, 1996 order and to request
line in the amount of US$500,000.00. Respondent the latter to hold in abeyance further publication of the
Roberto V. Ongpin, then controlling stockholder of PAI, summons.
signed as surety, binding himself jointly and severally
liable with PAI for the same amount. PAI availed of the CA- the issuance of a Writ of Attachment together with
credit line by drawing on short-term loans and opening the Notice of Garnishment is hereby validated: but the
letters of credit for the importation of goods, which implementation of the Writ of Attachment/
amounted to US$650,986.34 or P16,526,653.00. Garnishment is prohibited until after the Court shall
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
As PAI failed to pay its obligations, petitioner filed a petitioner, either through voluntary appearance or
complaint against respondent Ongpin with the Regional service of summons.
Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati to enforce his obligation
as surety of PAI. Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ CA-MFR-denied
of preliminary attachment on the following grounds: (1) On August 1, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for
respondent, in fraud of creditors, had transferred certiorari (denied in aug 27, ‘97) with this Court. Again,
residence to Hongkong; (2) his obligation was not during the pendency of the case, petitioner filed with
covered by any collateral; and (3) PAI and its officers, the trial court on August 15, 1997 another Motion to
including respondent, with intent to defraud, did not Serve Summons through Publication with Leave of
disclose the fact that the Bureau of Customs had claims Court.
against PAI for unpaid customs duties and taxes in the
amount of P284,010,387.00, which fact could have On November 27, 1997, Deputy Sheriff Glenn B. Parra,
affected petitioner's decision whether to grant the loan together with Atty. Rodulfo Baculi, Jr., representative of
to PAI. petitioner, went to the PILTEL office at the Banker's
Center Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati City to serve
On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued an order summons on respondent, who was then the chairman
granting petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of of the board of PILTEL.
preliminary attachment. On November 16, 1995, a writ
of attachment and a notice of garnishment were issued There, he met for the first time Anne V. Morallo, who
by the trial court, addressed to the president and told him that she was authorized to receive court
corporate secretary of the Dominion Asian Equities processes for and on behalf of respondent even though
garnishing 8,315,600 shares of stock belonging to the latter was not holding office in the building. Morallo
respondent. was so advised by Atty. Joseph Santiago, Chief of the
Legal Department of PILTEL. Thus, Sheriff Parra served
On November 21, 1995, respondent, making a special the summons on Morallo who received it accordingly.
appearance through counsel, moved to dismiss the However, when Morallo tried to forward the court
complaint and to quash the writ of attachment and process to respondent, the latter's lawyer, Atty. David S.
garnishment on the ground that the trial court had no Narvasa, refused to receive it.
jurisdiction over the person of respondent, the
summons prepared on October 30, 1995 having been On December 4, 1997, respondent filed with the trial
unserved as of November 17, 1995. The trial court court an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) to Dismiss; (b) for
Page 20 of 85
Prohibition of the Implementation of the Writ of Petitioner cites the ruling in Macapagal v. Court of
Attachment dated 16 November 1995; (c) for Quashal Appeals13 for its contention that the "feigned
of the Notice of Garnishment dated 27 November 1997; unawareness" of a defendant is equivalent to voluntary
and (d) for Release of Properties attached thereby. On appearance. The facts of Macapagal are, however,
April 19, 1999, the trial court denied respondent's different from the facts of this case. In that case, this
motion for lack of merit. Respondent's motion for Court considered the petitioner to have been validly
reconsideration was likewise denied on October 13, served summons based on its findings that summons
1999. was served on the legal counsel of the two corporations
and its officers and directors. Petitioner's defense that
Consequently, respondent filed a petition for certiorari at the time of the service of summons he was no longer
with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and connected with both corporations, having resigned from
Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Court of Appeals. them before such service, was dismissed by this Court
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on as flimsy. The finding of this Court on the feigned
December 27, 2000, annulling and setting aside the unawareness of petitioner was based on the fact that
orders of the trial court, dated April 19, 1999 and Philfinance's woes were widely publicized. This,
October 13, 1999, on the ground that PILTEL was not together with counsel's authority to receive service of
the regular place of business of respondent and that, summons on behalf of petitioner, was the basis for this
even if it was, Morallo could not be considered a Court's ruling that jurisdiction over the person of the
competent person in charge of respondent's office, as latter had already been acquired by the trial court.
she was the executive secretary of the president of
PILTEL and not of respondent. Hence, this petition for In contrast, summons in this case was served on the
review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil executive secretary of the president of PILTEL, a
Procedure. company which is not a party to the present action.
Respondent Ongpin, through counsel, entered
Issues: "numerous special appearances" in court precisely to
1. Whether or not respondent Ongpin's continuous question the court's jurisdiction over his person either
"special appearances" before the court for five years due to failure to serve summons or to an invalid service
may be deemed voluntary appearance as contemplated of summons on him. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired
by the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure on acquisition of over the person of respondent even if he knows of the
jurisdiction over the person of defendant; and case against him unless he is validly served with
2. Whether or not the substituted service of summons summons.
on Anne V. Morallo, executive secretary of the
president of PILTEL, was valid. 2. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that (1) substituted service of summons at the
Ruling: PILTEL office where respondent sits as chairman of the
1. Petitioner maintains that the trial court had already board is invalid as the PILTEL office is not his regular
acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent place of business; and (2) Anne V. Morallo, the
Ongpin by virtue of the numerous appearances by his executive secretary of PILTEL's president, was not
counsel and respondent's undeniable knowledge of the authorized to receive the summons on behalf of
complaint against him. respondent Ongpin as she was not his executive
secretary but that of the president's.
This contention has no merit. A party who makes a
special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction We think no error was incurred by the Court of Appeals
of said court based on the ground, e. g., invalidity of the in this ruling. Rule 14, §7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
service of summons, cannot be considered to have Civil Procedure provides that if, for justifiable causes,
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.11 In personal service cannot be effected on defendant,
fact, in La Naval Drug Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,12 this service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
Court ruled that even the assertion of affirmative summons at the defendant's residence with some
defenses aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person person of suitable age and discretion residing therein,
of the defendant cannot be considered a waiver of the or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person. regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.15 The word "office" or the phrase
In the present case, although respondent had indeed "regular place of business" refers to the office or place
filed numerous pleadings, these pleadings were of business of the defendant at the time of service. The
precisely for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction rule specifically designates the persons to whom copies
of the court over the person of respondent on the of the process should be left. In Mapa vs. Court of
ground that there was no valid service of summons on Appeals,16 substituted service of summons in a person
him. It would be absurd to hold that respondent, by claiming to be authorized to receive service of summons
making such appearance, thereby submitted himself to in behalf of the corporation was held to be invalid as far
the jurisdiction of the court. as jurisdiction over the person of the chairman of the
board was concerned inasmuch as he was not holding
office in the corporation but in his residence. Thus, it
Page 21 of 85
does not necessarily follow that the regular place of and for some reason attempted personal service
business of a chairman of the board of directors is the instead.
same as the address of the corporation as it is possible
for him to hold office elsewhere. If, on the other hand, respondent is a resident and
petitioner cannot determine the correct address of
In the case at bar, the corporation (PILTEL), where respondent, petitioner only needs to show that
substituted summons was served and of which respondent's address is unknown and cannot be
respondent was the chairman of the board, was not ascertained by diligent inquiry. Upon compliance with
even a party to the present suit. Respondent was sued this requirement, it can validly serve summons by
in his personal capacity as surety for PAI. Even from the publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
initial inquiries made by the sheriff and petitioner's Petitioner cannot fall back on allegations of knowledge
representative in the office of PILTEL, it was evident of respondent to avoid complying with the standards
that respondent was not holding office there. Indeed, and guidelines set by the Rules. What we said in Oñate
Morallo, executive secretary of the PILTEL, had to call v. Abrogar20 bears repeating in this case:
respondent's secretary at the BA Lepanto Building, . . . More important than the need for insuring
Paseo de Roxas, to find out whether he was attending success in the enforcement of the writ is the
the board meeting to be held on that day. Thus, the need for affirming a principle on that "most
process server already knew that respondent was not fundamental of all requisites — the jurisdiction
holding office at the PILTEL office but somewhere else. of the court issuing attachment over the person
As the PILTEL office is not respondent's regular place of of the defendant." It may be that the same
business, it cannot therefore be said that Anne V. result would follow from requiring that a new
Morallo, the person who received the service of writ be served all over again. The symbolic
summons in behalf of respondent, was authorized to significance of such an act, however, is that it
receive service of process on behalf of respondent. would affirm our commitment to the rule of
law.
(3) It is not clear whether respondent could be
personally served with summons because he had T. G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010
transferred residence to Hongkong. Thus in its ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style
complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent's address "ACG Express Liner," Petitioner, vs.
was either at ATA Capital Corporation, 3404 1 Exchange MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
Square, #8 Connaught Place, Central Hongkong or South x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
China Morning, Post Center #22 Tai Fat Street, Taipo G.R. No. 164747
Industrial Estate, Taipo, New Territories, Hongkong. But MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner, vs.
later, it tried to personally serve summons on ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style
respondent at the PILTEL office, where he served as "ACG Express Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and
chairman of the board of directors. When respondent VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents.
failed to attend the meeting, the process server
proceeded to the BA Lepanto Building, Paseo de Roxas, Facts: Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-
Makati City, where, as the process server learned from President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana),
Morallo, respondent was allegedly holding office. ventured into the business of marketing inter-island
passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas
Under the Rules, if a defendant is a non-resident and his fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he
property in the Philippines had been attached, service came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national
may, by leave of court, be effected outside the based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Philippines or by publication in a newspaper of general Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
circulation.17In the same manner, if the whereabouts of Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed
the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, likewise distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry
be effected by publication in a newspaper of general vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor,
circulation.18 In this case, the plaintiff must show that Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-
the address of defendant is unknown and cannot be meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the
ascertained by diligent inquiry. SEACAT 25.
It is clear that petitioner is not without remedy under However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce the writ directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis
of attachment through a valid service of summons. If, Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for
indeed, respondent is no longer a resident of the a second catamaran engine from their company which
Philippines, petitioner still can, by leave of court, serve provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
summons by publication, as it in fact tried to do. The
records show that petitioner attempted to serve In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero
summons by publication, but later abandoned its effort informed Go that such act of dealing directly with
Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship and
Page 22 of 85
demanded that they respect the same, without that Cordero is entitled to a commission per vessel sold
prejudice to legal action against him and Robinson for AFFA through his efforts in the amount equivalent to
should they fail to heed the same.8 Cordero’s lawyer, 22.43% of the price of each vessel or US$328,742.00,
Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of ACCRA law firm, also and with payments of US$297,219.91 having been
wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent made to Cordero, there remained a balance of
actuations and misrepresentations committed by Go in US$31,522.09 still due to him. The CA sustained the trial
connivance with his lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in court in ruling that Cordero is entitled to damages for
breach of Cordero’s exclusive distributorship the breach of his exclusive distributorship agreement
appointment. with AFFA. However, it held that Cordero is entitled only
to commission for the sale of the first catamaran
Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of obtained through his efforts with the remaining unpaid
Customs (BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from sum of US$31,522.09 or ₱1,355,449.90 (on the basis of
Australia based on misdeclaration and undervaluation. US$1.00=₱43.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum
Consequently, an Alert Order was issued by Acting BOC from the time of the filing of the complaint until the
Commissioner Nelson Tan for the vessel which in fact same is fully paid. As to the ₱800,000.00 representing
arrived on July 17, 1998. Cordero claimed that Go and expenses incurred by Cordero for transportation, phone
Robinson had conspired to undervalue the vessel by bills, entertainment, food and lodging, the CA declared
around US$500,000.00. there was no basis for such award, the same being the
logical and necessary consequences of the exclusive
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. distributorship agreement which are normal in the field
98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and of sales and distribution, and the expenditures having
Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and redounded to the benefit of the distributor (Cordero).
conspiring together in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his Issue: Whether petitioner cordero has the legal
rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions personality to sue the respondents for breach of
(balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the first contract? (did the court have jurisdiction? YES)
vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid
commission for the sale of the second vessel in the Ruling:
amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, I. Real Party-in-Interest
moral and exemplary damages, including ₱800,000.00 First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by
representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia, the real party-in-interest as required by Section 2, Rule
telecommunications bills and entertainment, on 3 of the Rules of Court, which defines such party as the
account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive one (1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. prosecution of actions by persons without any right,
title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual
RTC- Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the
lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to
cause of action, asserting that there was no act discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds,
committed in violation of the distributorship pursuant to sound public policy.31 A case is dismissible
agreement. for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence
Cordero no longer had cause of action for his grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
commission for the sale of the second vessel under the
memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was
considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s Cordero and not Pamana who is the exclusive
lawyers on June 26, 1998. distributor of AFFA in the Philippines. For all intents and
purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision in who alone made decisions in the performance of the
favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, exclusive distributorship, as with other clients to whom
Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. he had similarly offered AFFA’s fast ferry vessels.
Moreover, the stipulated commissions from each
CA- affirmed the trial court (1) in allowing Cordero to progress payments made by Go were directly paid by
present his evidence ex-parte after the unjustified Robinson to Cordero.37 Respondents Landicho and
failure of appellants (Go, Tecson and Landicho) to Tecson were only too aware of Cordero’s authority as
appear at the pre-trial conference despite due notice; the person who was appointed and acted as exclusive
(2) in finding that it was Cordero and not Pamana who distributor of AFFA, which can be gleaned from their act
was appointed by AFFA as the exclusive distributor in of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank
the Philippines of its SEACAT 25 and other fast ferry transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson,
vessels, which is not limited to the sale of one (1) such who in turn transfers a portion of funds received to the
catamaran to Go on August 7, 1997; and (3) in finding bank account of Cordero in the Philippines as his
Page 23 of 85
commission. Out of these partial payments of his against Kukan, Inc. for a sum of money, the case
commission, Cordero would still give Landicho and docketed as Civil Case No. 99-93173 and eventually
Tecson their respective "commission," or "cuts" from his raffled to Branch 17 of the court.
own commission. Respondents Landicho and Tecson
failed to refute the evidence submitted by Cordero Following the joinder of issues after Kukan, Inc. filed an
consisting of receipts signed by them. Said amounts answer with counterclaim, trial ensued. However,
were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered by starting November 2000, Kukan, Inc. no longer
Cordero for Landicho’s airline tickets, transportation, appeared and participated in the proceedings before
food and hotel accommodations for the trip to the trial court, prompting the RTC to declare Kukan, Inc.
Australia. in default and paving the way for Morales to present his
evidence ex parte.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the
filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the On November 28, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the finding for Morales and against Kukan.
service of summons upon them in the manner required
by law or through their voluntary appearance in court After the above decision became final and executory,
and their submission to its authority.42 A party who Morales moved for and secured a writ of execution8
makes a special appearance in court challenging the against Kukan, Inc. The sheriff then levied upon various
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid personal properties. Kukan International Corporation
service of summons is not deemed to have submitted (KIC) filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. Notably, KIC
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. was incorporated in August 2000, or shortly after
Kukan, Inc. had stopped participating in Civil Case No.
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss 99-93173.
filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the
grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be In reaction to the third party claim, Morales interposed
noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2003. In it, Morales
an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the prayed, applying the principle of piercing the veil of
time provided in the summons by publication.44 Such corporate fiction, that an order be issued for the
motion did not state that it was a conditional satisfaction of the judgment debt of Kukan, Inc. with the
appearance entered to question the regularity of the properties under the name or in the possession of KIC, it
service of summons, but an appearance submitting to being alleged that both corporations are but one and
the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the the same entity. KIC opposed Morales’ motion. By Order
summons by publication issued by the court and praying of May 29, 20039as reiterated in a subsequent order,
for additional time to file a responsive pleading. the court denied the omnibus motion.
Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged the
summons by publication and also having invoked the Morales then sought the inhibition of the presiding
jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief judge, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., who eventually granted
in his motion for additional time, he effectively the motion. The case was re-raffled to Branch 21,
submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction. He presided by public respondent Judge Amor Reyes.
is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before
this Court. Before the Manila RTC, Branch 21, Morales filed a
Motion to Pierce the Veil of Corporate Fiction to declare
U. G.R. No. 182729 September 29, 2010 KIC as having no existence separate from Kukan, Inc.
KUKAN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. This time around, the RTC, by Order dated March 12,
HON. AMOR REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge 2007, granted the motion.
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, and CA- affirmed
ROMEO M. MORALES, doing business under the name
and style "RM Morales Trophies and Issue: WON it was proper for RTC to assume jurisdiction
Plaques,"Respondents. over KIC?
Facts: Sometime in March 1998, Kukan, Inc. conducted Ruling:

a bidding for the supply and installation of signages in a Propriety of the RTC Assuming Jurisdiction over KIC
building being constructed in Makati City. Morales Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc.23
tendered the winning bid and was awarded the PhP 5 explains how courts acquire jurisdiction over the parties
million contract. Some of the items in the project award in a civil case:
were later excluded resulting in the corresponding Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the
reduction of the contract price to PhP 3,388,502. filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction
Despite his compliance with his contractual over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either
undertakings, Morales was only paid the amount of PhP through the service of summons upon them or through
1,976,371.07, leaving a balance of PhP 1,412,130.93, their voluntary appearance in court and their
which Kukan, Inc. refused to pay despite demands. submission to its authority.
Shortchanged, Morales filed a Complaint6 with the RTC
Page 24 of 85
In the fairly recent Palma v. Galvez,24 the Court of jurisdiction over its person. It would defy logic to say
reiterated its holding in Orion Security Corporation, that KIC unequivocally submitted itself to the
stating: "[I]n civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction of the RTC when it strongly asserted that it
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by and Kukan, Inc. are different entities. In the scheme of
the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary things obtaining, KIC had no other option but to insist
appearance and submission to the authority of the on its separate identity and plead for relief consistent
former." with that position.
The court’s jurisdiction over a party-defendant resulting V. G.R. No. 178911 September 17, 2014
from his voluntary submission to its authority is EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D. MONSANTO,
provided under Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules, which SR., and REV. FR. PASCUAL D. MONSANTO,
states: JR.,Petitioners, vs. LEONCIO LIM and LORENZO DE
Section 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s GUZMAN, Respondents.
voluntary appearance in the actions shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to "Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a with jurisdiction over the subject matter."
voluntary appearance.
Facts: In a letter6 dated February 18, 2004, Flordelis B.
To be sure, the CA’s ruling that any form of appearance Menzon, Regional Director of the Home Development
by the party or its counsel is deemed as voluntary Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), requested the intervention of
appearance finds support in the kindred Republic v. Ker Executive Judge Sinforiano A. Monsanto (Executive
& Co., Ltd.25 and De Midgely v. Ferandos. Judge Monsanto) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged anomalous auction
Republic and De Midgely, however, have already been sale conducted by Sheriff IVLorenzo De Guzman (De
modified if not altogether superseded27 by La Naval Guzman). According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman previously
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,28 wherein the acceded to its request to move the date of the auction
Court essentially ruled and elucidated on the current sale to January 20, 2004; however, to its surprise, the
view in our jurisdiction, to wit: "[A] special appearance sale proceeded as originally scheduled on January 15,
before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the winning bid of
person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant Leoncio Lim (Leoncio) in the amount of ₱500,000.00
invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel was grossly disadvantageous to the government
or a waiver by the movant of his objection to considering that the outstanding loan obligations of the
jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive mortgagor, Eduardo Monsanto (Eduardo), was more
of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the than the bid amount. Pag-IBIG thus manifested that –
court." It is for this reason that we are making this protest.
Sheriff de Guzman failed to comply with our request for
In the instant case, KIC was not made a party-defendant deferment despitehis [acquiescence]. We are
in Civil Case No. 99-93173. Even if it is conceded that it requesting for your intervention to nullify the results of
raised affirmative defenses through its aforementioned the auction sale conducted last January 15, 2004. This
pleadings, KIC never abandoned its challenge, however will give our office a chance to be able to participate
implicit, to the RTC’s jurisdiction over its person. The and recoup our investment.
challenge was subsumed in KIC’s primary assertion that
it was not the same entity as Kukan, Inc. Pertinently, in We trust that you will give thismatter preferential
its Comment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Omnibus attention.
Motion dated May 20, 2003, KIC entered its "special but
not voluntary appearance" alleging therein that it was a Executive Judge Monsantorefrained from acting on the
different entity and has a separate legal personality letter considering that Eduardo is his relative; instead
from Kukan, Inc. And KIC would consistently reiterate he re-assigned the same to Judge Sibanah E. Usman
this assertion in all its pleadings, thus effectively (Judge Usman)8 of Branch 28.
resisting all along the RTC’s jurisdiction of its person. It
cannot be overemphasized that KIC could not file before Judge Usman noted that no formal petition orcomplaint
the RTC a motion to dismiss and its attachments in Civil was actually filed which presents a judicial issue;
Case No. 99-93173, precisely because KIC was neither moreover, the acts complained of partake of
impleaded nor served with summons. Consequently, KIC administrative matter. Consequently, Judge Usman
could only assert and claim through its affidavits, referred the matter to the Office of the Court
comments, and motions filed by special appearance Administrator (OCA) for further action.
before the RTC that it is separate and distinct from
Kukan, Inc. Subsequently, Pascual filed with the OCA, copy
furnished the RTCCatbalogan, Samar, Branches 27 and
Following La Naval Drug Corporation,30 KIC cannot be 28, a Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vac
deemed to have waived its objection to the court’s lack ate dated March 13, 2004.
Page 25 of 85
In a Manifestation dated June 7, 2005 and filed before issought; in fact, only the intervention of Executive
Branch 28, PagIBIG informed the trial court that the Judge Monsanto is requested; it was notsigned by a
loan of Eduardo had been restructured and that counsel; and most of all, there is no verification
Eduardo had commenced paying monthly orcertification against forum-shopping.
amortizations; that as a result of the restructuring, Pag-
IBIG is withdrawing its Petition for Extra-judicial In addition, it is quite unfortunate that Judge Usman
Foreclosure; and that it is no longer interested in proceeded to take cognizance of the case
pursuing an administrative action against De Guzman. notwithstanding his prior observation as stated in the
May 3, 2004 Order that no formal petition or complaint
RTC- After careful and judicious scrutiny of the records was actually filed and which presents a judicial issue.In
of thiscase, this Court is highly convinced that the public fact, Judge Usman even opined that the acts
auction sale conducted by Mr. De Guzman and Atty. complained of partake of administrative matter and
Ma. Luz Lampasa-Pabilona, Clerk of Court whereby Mr. thus referred the same to the OCA for further action.
Leoncio Lim emerged as the highest bidder and The May 9, 2005 letter of OCA directing Judge Usman to
purchaser of the subject property in good faith, and also take action on the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and
given a Certificate of Sale issued by the Sheriff and the Notice to Vacatecould not be interpreted as vesting
same was registered with the Registry of Deeds on Judge Usman with the authority and jurisdiction to take
March 5, 2004 are in order. The impugned Sheriff De cognizance of the matter. Nothing to that effect could
Guzman had accordingly performed his functions. be inferred from the tenor of the May 9, 2005 letter
Accordingly, there is no showing that hehas abuse[d] his ofOCA. Jurisdiction is vested by law. When OCA directed
authority during the conduct of the public auction. Such Judge Usman to take action on the Motion to Lift Writ
being the case, this Court is further convinced that the of Execution and Notice to Vacate, it did not deprive the
motion filed by Leoncio Lim through counsel Atty. Labid latter ofhis discretion to dismiss the matter/case for
being meritorious should be given due course. On the lack of jurisdiction, if the matter/case so warrants.
other hand, the motion to lift writ of execution and
notice to vacatefiled by Rev. Fr. Pascual D. Monsanto, Jr. In fine, there being no proper initiatory pleading filed,
being devoid of merit should be denied. then the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over
the matter/case.
CA- affirmed
No payment of docket fees.
Issue: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction? We have also noted that no docket feeswere paid
before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Ruling: "Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and Court mandates that "[u]pon the filing of the pleading
the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial or other application which initiates an action or
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter."28 proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in
Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically full." "It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction
providesthat "[a] civil action is commenced by the filing over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket
of the original complaint in court." Moreover, "[e]very fee."
ordinary civil action must bebased on a cause of action."
In Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg
No proper initiatory pleading was filed before the trial Marketing Corporation,33 we ruled thus: A court
court. acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment
In this case, records show that no formal complaint or of the prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees
petition was filed in court. The case was supposedly cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care
"commenced" through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the of court expenses inthe handling of cases in terms of
intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto on the costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe
alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-
Guzman. However, saidletter could not in any way be hours used in the handling of each case. Hence, the
considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees can
of Court defines pleadings as "written statements of the entail tremendous losses to government in general and
respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the judiciary in particular.
to the court for appropriate judgment." To stress, Pag-
IBIG’s letter could not be considered as a formal In fine, since no docket or filing feeswere paid, then the
complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case were RTC Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the
not identified pursuant to Section 1,30 Rule 3 and matter/case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance of
Section 1,31 Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or cause the same. Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken
of action was not properly mentioned or specified. by the trial court are null and void,and without force
Third, the letter miserably failed to comply with the and effect. In, particular, the July 1, 2005 and August 30,
requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore 2005 Orders of the RTC are null and void.
no caption; it was not even assigned a docket number;
the parties were not properly identified;the allegations It is settled jurisprudence that "[a]ny decision rendered
were not properly set forth; no particular relief without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
Page 26 of 85
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court."34 organized and existing under the laws of Singapore, and
Prescinding from the foregoing, we hold that the RTC- is fully owned by Saag Corporation (Bhd). On July 1,
Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant 1994, he was appointed as Area Sales Manager in the
matter/case there being no formal initiatory pleading Philippines by Thiang Shiang Hiang, Manager of Saag (S)
filed as well asnon-payment of docket fees. Pte. Ltd. Pursuant to his appointment, respondent was
Consequently, all proceedings had before the RTC authorized to organize a local joint venture corporation
Branch 28 were null and void for lack of jurisdiction. to be known as Saag Philippines, Inc. for the wholesale
trade and service of industrial products for oil, gas and
W. G.R. No.148004 January 22, 2007 power industries in the Philippines.
VINCENT E. OMICTIN, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and GEORGE I. Barely three months after, or on June 23, 1998, private
LAGOS, Respondents. respondent resigned his post as president of Saag Phils.,
Inc. while still retaining his position as a director of the
Facts: Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations company.
Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint
for two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Citing as a reason the absence of a board resolution
Prosecutor of Makati against private respondent George authorizing the continued operations of Saag Phils., Inc.,
I. Lagos. He alleged that private respondent, despite private respondent retained his possession of the office
repeated demands, refused to return the two company equipment of the company in a fiduciary capacity as
vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the director of the corporation pending its dissolution
president of Saag Phils., Inc. and/or the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute. He
likewise changed the locks of the offices of the company
On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G. allegedly to prevent Tan and petitioner from seizing
Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of private company property.
respondent, and on the same day, respondent was
charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. Private respondent stressed that Tan’s appointment
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial was invalid because it was in derogation of the company
Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Makati City. The case was by-laws requiring that the president must be chosen
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-633, entitled "People from among the directors, and elected by the
of the Philippines v. George I. Lagos." affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the
board of directors.5 As Tan’s appointment did not have
On June 4, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to the acquiescence of the board of directors, petitioner’s
recuse praying that Presiding Judge Reinato G. Quilala appointment by the former is likewise allegedly invalid.
inhibit himself from hearing the case based on the Thus, neither has the power or the authority to
following grounds: represent or act for Saag Phils., Inc. in any transaction
a) In an order, dated May 28, 1999, the or action before the SEC or any court of justice.
presiding judge summarily denied respondent’s
motion: 1) to defer issuance of the warrant of RTC- The trial court, in an order dated September 8,
arrest; and 2) to order reinvestigation. 1999, denied respondent’s motion to suspend
b) Immediately before the issuance of the proceedings and motion to recuse.
above-mentioned order, the presiding judge
and Atty. Alex Y. Tan, SAAG Philippines, Inc.’s Ad CA- it is clear that a prejudicial question exists which
Interim President, were seen together. calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings
before the lower court.
On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to
suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial Issue: whether or not a prejudicial question exists to
question because of a pending petition with the warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the pending the resolution of the intra-corporate
same parties. controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.
It appears that on January 7, 1999, private respondent NB: PLEASE READ DISCUSSION ON DOCTRINE OF
filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the declaration of PRIMARY JURISDICTION BELOW
nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a
and petitioner as President Ad Interim and Operations case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which
dividends, recovery of share in the profits, involuntary pertains to another tribunal.14 Here, the case which was
dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, recovery lodged originally before the SEC and which is now
of damages and an application for a temporary pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue
restraining order (TRO) and injunction against Saag (S) of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are
Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner. 3 intimately related to those upon which the criminal
In the action before the SEC, private respondent prosecution is based.
averred that Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign corporation
Page 27 of 85
Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the for the determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-
intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or corporate case which in this case is the RTC of
innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have
filed against him by petitioner before the RTC of Makati. been referred to the expertise of the SEC in accordance
As correctly stated by the CA, one of the elements of with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case
the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under not been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a
demand made by the offended party to the offender: Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315 are as follows: whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
1. That money, goods, or other personal until after an administrative agency has determined
property be received by the offender in trust, or some question or some aspect of some question arising
on commission, or for administration, or under in the proceeding before the court.17 The court cannot
any other obligation involving the duty to make or will not determine a controversy involving a question
delivery of, or to return the same; which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
2. That there be misrepresentation or tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question
conversion of such money or property by the demands the exercise of sound administrative
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or services in determining technical and intricate matters
denial is to the prejudice of another; and of fact.
4. That there is a demand made by the offended
party to the offender. While the above doctrine refers specifically to an
administrative tribunal, the Court believes that the
Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged circumstances in the instant case do not proscribe the
offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the application of the doctrine, as the role of an
demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests administrative tribunal such as the SEC in determining
upon the authority of the person making such a demand technical and intricate matters of special competence
on the company’s behalf. Private respondent is has been taken on by specially designated RTCs by
challenging petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., virtue of Republic Act No. 8799.19 Hence, the RTC of
Inc. in the corporate case pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending
Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this light, if the has the primary jurisdiction to determine the issues
supposed authority of petitioner is found to be under contention relating to the status of the domestic
defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, corporation, Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and
the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. Moreover, the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the
the mere failure to return the thing received for domestic corporation, the determination of which will
safekeeping or on commission, or for administration, or have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver recognizes that, in place of the SEC, the regular courts
or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the now have the legal competence to decide intra-
owner could only give rise to a civil action and does not corporate disputes.
constitute the crime of estafa. This is because the crime
is committed by misappropriating or converting money X. G.R. No. 167891 January 15, 2010
or goods received by the offender under a lawful SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO,
transaction. As stated in the case of United States v. Petitioners, vs. ANITA R. FLORES, assisted by her
Bleibel: husband, BIENVENIDO FLORES, Respondent.
The crime of estafa is not committed by the failure to
return the things received for sale on commission, or to Facts: Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land,
deliver their value, but, as this class of crime is defined denominated as Lot No. 2351 (Cad. 320-D), with an area
by law, by misappropriating or converting the money or of 25,513 square meters (sq m), located in Barangay
goods received on commission. Delay in the fulfillment Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso,
of a commission or in the delivery of the sum on such Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to
account received only involves civil liability. So long as cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided
the money that a person is under obligation to deliver is equally between the two until 1975 when the
not demanded of him, and he fails to deliver it for relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per
having wrongfully disposed of it, there is no estafa, Order2 from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
whatever be the cause of the debt. Regional Office, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga,
rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans per year,
Likewise, by analogy, the doctrine of primary which Jesus Fajardo religiously complied with. From the
jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues time petitioner cultivated the land, he was allowed by
raised by petitioner particularly the status of Saag Phils., Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on
Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the question the stony part of the land, which is the subject of
regarding the supposed authority of the latter to make a controversy.
demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects
Page 28 of 85
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His divided the agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351 equally
daughter and sole heir, herein respondent Anita Flores, among themselves. By virtue of said division, the parties
inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores effectively severed and terminated the agricultural
and Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement, leasehold/tenancy relationship between them; thus,
denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG there was no longer any agrarian dispute to speak of.
LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA
MAGKABILANG PANIG."3 This was followed by another Issue: whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has
agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," jurisdiction over the case.
executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed
to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, Ruling: There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the
allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a parties executed an agreement, denominated as
conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT
between Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG
referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, PANIG." Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was
Baliuag, Bulacan.4 In the Report and Recommendation the tiller of the land. This Kasunduan was subsequently
dated May 3, 2000, the Legal Officer advised the parties followed by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA
to ventilate their claims and counterclaims with the HATIAN SA LUPA," whereby an area of 10,923 sq m of
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Lot No. 2351 was given to petitioners. The portion of
(DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan. the land where petitioners’ house is erected is the
subject of the instant case for unlawful detainer.
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was Respondent argues that this portion is not included in
filed by herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her the deed of partition, while petitioners insist that it is.
husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its
Order dated December 10, 2002 that the resolution of
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot this case hinges on the correct interpretation of the
No. 2351, with an area of 25,513 sq m, was agricultural contracts executed by the parties. The issue of who has
land; that they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, a better right of possession over the subject land cannot
and personally cultivating the same since 1960 up to the be determined without resolving first the matter as to
present; that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is
considering that the dispute between the parties, not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is
regarding the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; incapable of pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond
and that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction the competence of the MTC.
over the controversy involving the lot in question
therefore precluded the MTC from exercising More importantly, the controversy involves an
jurisdiction over the case. agricultural land, which petitioners have continuously
and personally cultivated since the 1960s. In the
MTC- in favor of respondent Kasunduan, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the
RTC- affirmed the MTC Decision in toto tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees, petitioners
have a right to a home lot and a right to exclusive
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued possession thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No.
an Order on December 10, 2002, reversing its decision 3844 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Logically,
dated August 29, 2002. The RTC found that the issue therefore, the case involves an agrarian dispute, which
involved appeared to be an agrarian dispute, which fell falls within the contemplation of R.A. No. 6657, or the
within the contemplation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, and thus ordered the dismissal of An agrarian dispute13 refers to any controversy relating
the case for lack of jurisdiction. to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
A petition for review was then filed by respondents with agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’
the CA to annul the Order of the RTC dated December associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
10, 2002. fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed includes any controversy relating to compensation of
decision, which reinstated the MTC decision. It lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
disagreed with the findings of the RTC and ruled that conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
the part of Lot No. 2351 where petitioners’ house stood farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform
was stony and residential in nature, one that may not beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
be made to fall within the ambit of the operation of proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
Philippine agrarian laws, owing to its non-agriculture landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to
character. The CA explained that, on the strength of the any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over
two instruments, the parties made a partition and lands devoted to agriculture.14
Page 29 of 85
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy of the case were reconstituted on January 21, 1982 and
regarding tenurial arrangements. The contention that the case was renumbered as Civil Case No. 82-
the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the 1324.Thereafter, Philamgen filed its Answer to the
tenancy relationship between the parties and, complaint.
therefore, removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No.
6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute On January, 1983, judicial reorganization took place by
because the controversy involves the home lot of the passage of Executive Order No. 864 and the case at
petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant bar was re-raffled to Regional Trial Court of Manila. RTC
relationship. Manila motu proprio, dismissed the complaint in Civil
Case No. 82-1324 declaring that it lacked jurisdiction
In the case at bar, petitioners’ claim that the tenancy over the subject made being money claims arising from
relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of employer-employee relations.
no moment. As long as the subject matter of the
dispute is the legality of the termination of the ISSUES:
relationship, or if the dispute originates from such 1. WON RTC Manila erred in reversing motu proprio the
relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. L-50563 by
the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement dismissing once again Abad et al’s action on the
will not render the action beyond the ambit of an erroneous ground of lack of jurisdiction. - NEGATIVE
agrarian dispute. 2. WON RTC Manila erred in holding itself a totally
different court from the Court of First Instance whose
Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute cases were merely taken over by RTC Manila –
between the parties, regarding the interpretation of the NEGATIVE
Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to the DAR,
which in turn referred the case to the DARAB.16 In view RULING: RTC Manila's allegations do not deserve merit.
of the foregoing, we reiterate Hilario v. Prudente,17 that: One of the important features in the Judiciary
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts Reorganization effected through B.P. 129 is the addition
from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has of paragraph (6, . Sec. 19, in defining the jurisdiction of
initially been lodged with an administrative body of Regional Trial Courts (which took the place of the
special competence. For agrarian reform cases, abolished Courts of First Instance), which reading as
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian follows:
Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.
Y. G.R. No. L-65505 October 12, 1987
GABRIEL ABAD, PIO AGANON, MARIO ALARCIO, JOSE A provision not found in Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act of
AQUINO, CESAR AURELIO, SOTERO BERNARDO, 1948. It was the intention of the legislative body to
AURELIO CABRAL, JESUS CARREON, ABELARDO uncluttered the courts of cases which may be
CARILLO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL adjudicated, in the first instance, by officials or bodies
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH LII-HON. DAVID G. exercising quasi-judicial adjudicatory powers like the
NITAFAN and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL Labor Arbiters or the National Labor Relations
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents. Commission a specialized body or bodies on labor
related provisions and are not restricted by the
FACTS: Abad et al., filed on August 18, 1978 against technical rules of pleading and evidence.
Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc.
(PHILAMGEN, for brevity) for the enforcement of The Regional Trial Courts of today are actually the
contract and recovery of loss of money basically praying same courts that functioned as Courts of First Instance
for payment of the money value of the respective before the Judiciary Reorganization Act (Batas
accumulated sick leave with pay of the separated Pambansa Bilang 129). There might have been a
employees of PHILAGEM either thru retirement, change in the name and in some incidental features
retrenchment or resignation. but essentially, they are the same.
Instead of filing an answer, PHILAMGEN moved to However, whereas before jurisdiction over money
dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted claims of laborers and employees appertained to Courts
(Feb. 16, 1979). After a denial of their motion to of First Instance, the same are now to be taken
reconsider, Abad et al filed before the Supermen Court cognizance of by proper entities in the Department of
a petition for Certiorari. A decision was rendered setting Labor and Employment.
aside the aforesaid orders and the dismissed complaint
was reinstated. The case was remanded to the trial The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is
court for further proceedings. finally resolved or adjudicated does not apply when
the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. Thus
A fire destroyed the sala wherein the entire records of in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding
Civil case No. 117708 were kept. However, the records that Courts of First Instance /Regional Trial Courts no
Page 30 of 85
longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid monetary that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet
claims of labor. it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
Z. G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999 DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner,
JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents. in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under
certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
Facts: Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation
executed by lethal injection (RA 8177) The Supreme and sale.
Court issued a temporary restraining order restraining
the execution of said party. Said execution was set for FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco
Jan. 4, 1999 but the petitioner filed his Very Urgent mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to
Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28, 1998. The Court El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
wasin recess at the time but a Special Session was called
to deliberate onsaid matters. Furthermore, Congress Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he
was a new one with about 130new members whose died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the
views on capital punishment were still unexpressed. The Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure
suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999, unless it proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification necessary to give notice by publication.
of the law is going to be made). It was alleged that sine
it is already final and executory, the Supreme Court has The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
lost its jurisdiction with the case. summons to the defendant’s last known address, which
is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
Issue: Whether or not in issuing the temporary complied with this requirement.
restraining order, the Supreme Court has gone beyond
its jurisdiction since the case is already final. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the
City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
Ruling: It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme default was rendered. The decision was likewise
Court. What the SC could not do is alter the decision. In published and afterwards sale by public auction was
the case at hand, the SC did nothing of the sort. held with the bank as the highest bidder.
Jurisprudence tells us “the finality of a judgment does
not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court However, about seven years after the confirmation of
loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
same. Even after the judgment has become final, the administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside
There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues application was that the order of default and the
even after the judgment has become final for the judgment rendered thereon were void because the
purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after defendant or over the subject of the action.
the judgment has become final, facts and circumstances
may transpire which can render the execution unjust or ISSUES:
impossible. 1. Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
AA. G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918 2. Whether or not due process of law was observed
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of RULING:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant. On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different,
JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the though related, senses since it may have reference (1)
property which is the subject of the litigation may result to the authority of the court to entertain a particular
either from a seizure of the property under legal kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief,
process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of or it may refer to the power of the court over the
the law, or it may result from the institution of legal parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the litigation.
the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. The sovereign authority which organizes a court
determines the nature and extent of its powers in
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea
Page 31 of 85
with reference to the actions which it may entertain and BB. G.R. No. 151800 November 5, 2009
the relief it may grant. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Petitioner,
How Jurisdiction is Acquired vs. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA,
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary represented by PACITA V. PASCUAL, EMILIANO
appearance of a party in court and his submission to its EUSEBIO, JR., and CARLOS RUSTIA, Respondents.
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of
legal process exerted over the person. FACTS: Heirs of Margarita Vda. De Ventura (the Heirs)
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the Falsification of Public Documents and violation of Sec. 3
litigation may result either from a seizure of the (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio and spouses
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into Edilberto and Celerina Darang.
the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina to
provisions of law, the power of the court over the investigate the claims of the Heirs against her former
property is recognized and made effective. In the latter husband Edilberto. Celerina supported the report with
case the property, though at all times within the public documents which she falsified and Palacio issued
potential power of the court, may never be taken into a recommendation based on that report to award the
actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction landholding in dispute to Edilberto.
acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the The DARAB recommended that the charged against the
beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
progress, and held to abide the final event of the The CA then took cognizance of the case and granted
litigation. An illustration of what we term potential the provisional dismissal of the complaint against
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA3019 but
register the title of land under our system for the denied the dismissal of the complaint for falsification of
registration of land. Here the court, without taking public documents.
actual physical control over the property assumes, at
the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over
exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against the
entire world. RULING: The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives
and decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
In the terminology of American law the action to administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot,
foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of
rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that administrative cases.
nature and is substantially such. The expression "action
in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with This issue has been directly addressed in Kuizon v.
reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty Desierto and reiterated in the more recent Golangco v.
wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for Fung,wherein the Court declared, thus: “The Court of
the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and
based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
in rem in the circumstance that in the former an administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot,
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of
the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
obligation or lien burdening the property. All administrative cases.”
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or
other disposition of the property of the defendant, The question that arises next is what remedy should an
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of aggrieved party should avail of to assail the
remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The Ombudsman’s finding of the existence or lack of
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative
only between the parties. cases. In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court emphasized that
parties seeking to question the resolutions of the Office
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-
defendant for whom publication is made appears, the administrative cases, may file an original action for
action becomes as to him a personal action and is certiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is
conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the believed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear of discretion.
the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles governing
actions in rem.
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CC. G.R. No. 141426 May 6, 2005 RULING: NO. The complaint is for violation of the Anti-
ZENAIDA F. LANTING, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an
OMBUDSMAN, ANTI-GRAFT INVESTIGATOR OSCAR administrative complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did
RAMOS, MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, EMMANUEL SISON, she allege administrative offenses, such as dishonesty
VIRGILIO FORBES, CHARITO RUMBO, DIRECTOR or misconduct on the part of respondents. The
ERLINDA MAGALONG and ERNESTO SAW, JR., allegations describe the acts complained of as “willful,
respondents. felonious, unlawful, odious and despicable criminal
activities.”
FACTS: Lanting is an Administrative Officer of the City
Council of Manila. She filed with the Ombudsman a In her motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s
complaint charging then Manila Vice-Mayor Atienza Resolution, Lanting claimed that the Investigator
(now City Mayor); Secretary to the City Council; and a “skirted the issue of falsification of public documents
Human Resource Management Officer with violating the which is crystal clear in my complaint.” Considering that
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Falsification of the complaint is criminal in nature, the Supreme Court,
Public documents. Lanting also questions the not the Court of Appeals, has the sole authority to
appointment in the City Government of several review the Ombudsman’s Resolutions on pure question
individuals which are relatives of the respondents. of law as expressly mandated in The Ombudsman Act of
1989.
The Graft Investigator Officer issued a Resolution
recommending that Lansing’s complaint be dismissed. It In Fabian vs. Desierto, it was held that only “appeals
stated that: (1) the evidence does not warrant the filing from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
of graft charges and (2) the appointments are governed administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
by the Civil Service Commission. Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.”
Therefore, the CA did not commit grave abuse of
Lanting filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the discretion. Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over Lanting’s
Resolution on the ground that the Investigator criminal action.
“conveniently and intentionally skirted the issue of
falsification of public documents which are crystal clear DD. G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
in my complaint.” Lanting then prayed for a re- TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A.
investigation of her complaint by a Special Prosecutor. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS
The Ombudsman denied the motion. F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
Dissatisfied, Lanting filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and mandamus. Aside from FACTS: Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
several procedural errors, the petition was dismissed on president of PROMAT Construction Development
the ground that the CA has no jurisdiction over the Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
subject matter of the assailed Ombudsman’s resolution. construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.
The CA held that Section 14 of The Ombudsman Act of Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First
1989 provides that “No court shall hear any appeal or Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
application for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court on pure Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
question of law.” between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate
their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her
Lanting filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
again denied. The CA held that the Congress through harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 designated only the filed an administrative case against Agustin which
Supreme Court as the appellate authority in eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the
Ombudsman decisions in criminal cases. Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But
the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman,
Lanting’s position: Her complaint before the Jesus Guerrero.
Ombudsman was not limited to violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, but likewise includes The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the
“acts constituting ground for administrative complaint decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the
hence cognizable by the Court of Appeals. case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely pertinently provides that:
erred in dismissing Lanting’s petition for certiorari on In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the basis of The or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
Ombudsman Act. appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or
Page 33 of 85
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance Urban charged Segovia, et al with violation of the Anti
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman After a preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
Act is valid. recommended the filing of a case thus a case was filed
with the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan issued a
RULING: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the resolution placing Segovia, et al, under preventive
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 suspension of 90 days.
of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in Segovia, et al questioned it claiming that preventive
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently suspension is not mandatory but is subject to the sound
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the discretion of the court. Also, their suspension is no
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate longer necessary because the project was already
jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has cancelled, they are no longer involved in the awarding
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the of bids, and that all documents necessary for the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision investigation were already submitted.
was intended to give the SC a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the
the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the public officers who stand accused before it, pursuant to
SC Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it Act)?
states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final RULING: It is mandatory. The firmly entrenched
judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the doctrine is that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer
not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies. is mandatory after a determination has been made of
the validity of the information in a pre-suspension
But what is the proper remedy? hearing conducted for that purpose. (Socrates vs.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi- Sandiganbayan, and Luciano, et al vs. Mariano)
judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under There is no grave abuse of discretion. In ordering the
the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules preventive suspension, the Sandiganbayan did but
of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to adhere to the clear command of the law and what it
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for calls a “mass of jurispudence” emanating from this
quasi-judicial agencies. Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of
public officials and employees indicted before it.
EE. G.R. No. 124067 March 27, 1998 Indeed, that the theory of “discretionary suspension”
PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO, and should still be advocated to this late date, despite the
WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners, vs. “mass of jurisprudence” relevant to the issue, it little
The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard
and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the
CORPORATION, respondents. Highest court of the land.
DOCTRINE: Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --
Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer treating of the suspension pendente lite of an accused
is mandatory after a determination has been made of public officer -- may no longer be put at issue, having
the validity of the information in a pre-suspension been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
hearing conducted for that purpose. (Socrates vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Luciano, et al vs. Mariano) Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan: Preventive suspension was
not penal in character but merely a preventive measure
Segovia, et al were designated as members of the before final judgement. The purpose of suspension is to
Contracts Committee of NPC for the Mindanao Grid prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or
Projects. A bidding was held. The lowest and second hampering his prosecution by intimidating or
lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE and T influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary
& D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc., evidence, or from committing further acts of
respectively. Joint Venture was disqualified but instead malfeasance while in office;
of awarding the project to Urban it was also disqualified
and a failure of bidding was declared. Subsequently, the Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan: Preventive suspension is
project was cancelled. not violative of the Constitution as the person
suspended remains entitled to the constitutional
Page 34 of 85
presumption of innocence since his culpability must still information therefor and to direct and control the
be established. prosecution of the said cases. (Sec. .77, PD 1630.)
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly The provisions of the Decree notwithstanding, the
recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies Office of the Tanodbayan shall continue to have the
in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation,
case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the file the necessary information, and direct and control
discharge of court functions -- including preventive the prosecution of all cases enumerated in Section 4 of
suspension -- should be acknowledged as within the Presidential Decree No. 1606, whether such cases be
competence of the court that has taken cognizance within the exclusive original/appellate jurisdiction of the
thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts in accordance
powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment. with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1630.
(Sec. 3, PD 1861, attending PD 1606.)
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all
persons indicated upon a valid information under Act, Since violations of Republic Act 1379 are cognizable
whether they be appointive or elective officials; or exclusively by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 4
permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to of PD 1606, abrogating thereby the jurisdiction over
the career or non-career service. The term “office” in forfeiture cases theretofore vested in the Regional Trial
Section 13 of the law applies to any office in relation to Court of the city or province where the public officer or
which he is charged. employee complained of resides or holds office under
Section 2 of Republic Act 1379, the other provision of
It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive said section 2 insofar as it lodged in the City or
suspension a public officer accused before it. Provincial Fiscal the power to conduct the previous
inquiry/preliminary investigation must be deemed
Once a proper determination of the validity of the similarly modified by PD 1630, Section 17, and PD 1861,
Information has been made, it becomes the ministerial Section 3 abovequoted, in the sense that such authority
duty of the court to forthwith issue the order of of the City or Provincial Fiscal has been transferred to
preventive suspension of the accused official. the Office of the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman).
Considering, further, that PDs 1630 and 1861, Sections
FF. G.R. No. 90529 August 16, 1991 17 and 3, respectively, also provide that the Office of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) shall also have the
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and MACARIO exclusive authority to file the necessary information and
ASISTIO, JR., respondents. direct and control the prosecution of all cases falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, filed the is the Ombudsman-not the Office of the Solicitor
instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul General-that has the authority to file the petition in this
and set aside the resolution2 of respondent case.
Sandiganbayan, promulgated on October 10, 1989,
dismissing the petition for forfeiture filed by the In effect, the dismissal of the petition for forfeiture by
Republic against respondent Macario Asistio, Jr., for the the Sandiganbayan is premised on the supposition that
reason that "it is the Ombudsman — not the Office of since violations of Republic Act No. 1379 now fall
the Solicitor — General that has the authority to file the within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
petition." and considering further that the exclusive authority to
file the necessary informations and to direct and
On April 28, 1989, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the control the prosecution of all cases falling under the
aforesaid recommendation of the Ombudsman, filed a exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is vested in
Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. the Office of the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman), it
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondent Asistio, follows that it is the Ombudsman, and not the Solicitor
through counsel, on the ground that: General, who has the authority to file the petition for
1. The Sandigan bayan has no jurisdiction over the case; forfeiture.
In an Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss,6
the Solicitor General averred that: SOLGEN Contention:
1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case; It is the submission of the Solicitor General that his
In dismissing the petition for forfeiture and in ruling authority to file the petition for forfeiture under
that it is the Ombudsman who has the authority to file Republic Act No. 1379 should be retained,
the same before the court, the SANDIGANBAYAN held notwithstanding the amendments introduced by
that: Presidential Decrees Nos. 1630 and 1861 vesting in the
Other statutory provisions pertinent to the incident at Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) the exclusive
bar read: authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
The Office of the Tanodbayan shall have the exclusive all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan (specifically
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all those enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file No. 1606, as last amended by Presidential Decree No.
Page 35 of 85
1861), to file the informations therefor and to direct RATIO: Before the creation of the Sandiganbayan, it was
and control the prosecution of said cases. the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate
forfeiture proceedings before the then court of first
Several reasons are advanced by the Solicitor General instance of the city or province where the public officer
for his aforesaid postulation, viz: or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Section
1. The exclusive authority vested in the Tanodbayan by 2 of Republic Act No. 13798 which reads:
Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 1630 and Section See. 2. Filing of petition.—Whenever any public officer
3 of Presidential Decree No. 1861 is confined only to the or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
filing of the information and directing and controlling amount of property which is manifestly out of
the prosecution of the cases cognizable by the proportion to s salary as such public officer or employee
Sandiganbayan, but does not include the authority to and to his other lawful income and the income from
file a petition for forfeiture. An information, as defined legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
under Section 4, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, is presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
different from a petition, in that an information The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer
necessarily refers to a criminal proceeding while a to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a
petition does not. previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in
2. It is the intention of the legislature to delineate criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General
forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 that there is reasonable ground to believe that there
from the rest of the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, has been committed a violation of this Act and the
as may be implied from a reading of Section 9 of respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the
Republic Act No. 3019 (penalties for violations of name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 thereof), which does not include in the Court of First Instance of the city or province
Section 8 (forfeiture judgments) of the same law within where said public officer or employee resides or holds
the punishments usually associated with criminal office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or
proceedings, such as imprisonment and/or perpetual employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or
disqualification from public office. any part thereof, should not be declared property of the
3. The provision of Republic Act No. 1379 authorizing State: ...
the Solicitor General to file the petition for forfeiture
being a special and specific provision, should prevail Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. 1486 was
over Presidential Decrees Nos. 1630 and 1861 which promulgated on June 11, 1978 providing for the
contain general provisions involving violations not only creation of the Sandiganbayan and vesting it, under
of Republic Act No. 1379 but also of Republic Act No. Section 4 thereof, with original and exclusive
3019. jurisdiction to try and decide, among others:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
ISSUE: WHETHER it is the Office of the Ombudsman or otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
the Office of the Solicitor General which has the Practices Act and Republic Act No. 1379;
authority to file a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully (b) Crimes committed by public officers or employees,
acquired wealth as provided for in Republic Act No. including those employed in government-owned or
1379.1 controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
RULING: SOLICITOR GENERAL (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public
The authority thereafter restored to the then officers or employees including those employed in
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) to file informations for cases government-owned or controlled corporations in
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not include the relation to their office; Provided, that in case private
filing of a petition for forfeiture. individuals are accused as principals, accomplices or
accessories in the commission of the crimes
An information is an accusation in writing charging a hereinabove mentioned, they shall be tried jointly with
person with an offense and requires a criminal the public officers or employees concerned.
proceeding; a petition for forfeiture involves a civil xxx xxx xx
action in rem. (d) Civil suits brought in connection with the
aforementioned crimes for restitution or reparation of
The Solicitor General was, therefore, acting within the damages, recovery of the instruments and effects of the
scope of his authority when he filed the petition for crimes, or forfeiture proceedings provided for under
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Republic Act No. 1379;
(e) Civil actions brought under Articles 32 and 34 of the
Besides, such authority of the Solicitor General is not an Civil Code.
entirely new concept if we are to consider that under xxx xxx xxx
Executive Order No. 14, the Solicitor General is
empowered to assist in the filing and prosecution of Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 1606 was issued
cases for a violation thereof, including forfeiture on December 10, 1978 expressly repealing Presidential
proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 in connection Decree No. 1486 and revising in the process the
with Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing
Page 36 of 85
therefrom the civil cases stated in Section 4(d) and (e) Presidential Decree No. 1487, which was enacted on
of Presidential Decree No. 1486 which included June 11, 1978 at the same time that Presidential Decree
forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1486 was passed, is the primary law creating the
No. 1379. Office of the Ombudsman, then known as the
Tanodbayan. The powers of the then Tanodbayan were
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expanded the as follows:
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over SEC. 10. Powers.—The Tanodbayan shall have the
the offenses enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential following powers:
Decree No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses (a) He may investigate, on complaint, any administrative
irrespective of the imposable penalty, but Presidential act of any administrative agency including any
Decree No. 1606 was subsequently amended, first by government-owned or controlled corporation;
Presidential Decree No. 1860 and eventually by xxx xxx xxx
Presidential Decree No. 1861, establishing the SEC. 17. Prosecution of public personnel.—If the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: official, employee or other person has acted in a
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: manner resulting in a failure of justice, he shall file and
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, proper court or body.
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public It is important to note that when the Tanodbayan was
officers and employees in relation to their office, created, it initially had no authority to prosecute cases
including those employed in government-owned or falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed provided for under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law 1486 hereinbefore mentioned. It was the Chief Special
is higher than prision correcional or imprisonment for Prosecutor who was vested with such authority
six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, pursuant to Section 12 of said decree, thus:
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this SEC. 12. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—The
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does provisions of any law or rule to the contrary
not exceed prision correcional or imprisonment for six notwithstanding, the direction and control of the
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the prosecution of cases mentioned in Section 4 thereof,
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, shall be exercised by a Chief Special Prosecutor ... .
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The Chief Special Prosecutor ... shall have exclusive
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: authority to conduct preliminary investigations of all
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or complaints filed with the Sandiganbayan, to file
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally informations and conduct the prosecution of all cases ...
decided by them in their respective territorial
jurisdiction. A perusal of Sections 4(d) and 12 of Presidential Decree
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, No. 1486, in conjunction with Section 2 of Republic Act
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts, in the No. 1379, readily reveals that Presidential Decree No.
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases 1486 had impliedly repealed Section 2 of Republic Act
originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, No. 1379 by transferring both the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, former courts of first instance over and the authority of
in their respective jurisdiction. the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture
under Republic Act No. 1379 to the Sandiganbayan and
On the foregoing considerations, there is no issue that the then Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.
jurisdiction over violations of Republic Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan. Then, Presidential Decree No. 1607 was enacted on
Concomitant with this transfer of jurisdiction, however, December 10, 1978, amending the power of the former
is the question of whether such transfer necessarily Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints
involves a transfer of the authority to file a petition for and providing for the creation of the Office of the Chief
forfeiture from the Solicitor General to the Special Prosecutor whose powers were substantially
Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan holds in the retained by the later law, in this wise:
affirmative; the Solicitor General opines otherwise. SEC. 10. Powers.—The Tanodbayan shall have the
following powers:
The resolution of the main substantive issue posed in (a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or
the present petition renders imperative a review of the on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act
powers of the present Special Prosecutor (formerly whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of
called the Tanodbayan) and of the Ombudsman (who is any administrative agency including any government-
now the Tanodbayan). owned or controlled corporation;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—
Page 37 of 85
xxx xxx xxx With the ratification of the present Constitution, the
The Chief Special Prosecutor, ... shall have the exclusive existing Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all Special Prosecutor which continued to exercise its
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file powers except those conferred on the Office of the
informations therefor and to direct and control the Ombudsman to be known as the Tanodbayan created
prosecution of d cases therein; ... . under the said Constitution.12 The Office of the
xxx xxx xxx Ombudsman, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor
SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other were officially and respectively created under Republic
Person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act
any public official, employee, or other person has acted of 1989, and Executive Order No. 244.
in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or
proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined
the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file by Republic Act No. 6770 corollary to Section 13, Article
and prosecute the corresponding criminal or XI of the 1987 Constitution, include, inter alia, the
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the authority to: (1) investigate and prosecute on its own or
proper court or before the proper administrative on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
agency. ... public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
The scope of the then Tanodbayan's authority was or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
broadened on July 18, 1979 by a subsequent law, cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
Presidential Decree No. 1630, to include, aside from the this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
power to investigate any administrative act whether from any investigatory agency of Government, the
amounting to any criminal offense or not of any investigation of such cases;13 and (2) investigate and
administrative agency, the following powers: to file the initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten
necessary information or complaint with the and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25,
Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved there.
agency and prosecute the same if, after preliminary
investigation, he finds a prima facie case; and to file and It follows that these powers vested in the Ombudsman
prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft by the Constitution and the law have been removed
and corrupt practices and such other offenses from the erstwhile Tanodbayan (now called the Special
committed by public officers and employees, including Prosecutor) and may no longer be exercised by the
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, latter. The powers of the previous Tanodbayan is now
in relation to their office.9 The exclusive authority to limited, under the supervision and control and upon the
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable authority of the Ombudsman, to the following: (1) to
by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor and conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
to direct and control the prosecution of said cases was criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
also specifically restored by said decree to the Sandiganbayan; (2) to enter into plea bargaining
Tanodbayan.10 In addition, the power to conduct the agreements; and (3) to perform such other duties
necessary investigation and to file and prosecute the assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
corresponding criminal and administrative cases before
the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the powers of the
proper administrative agency against any public former Tanodbayan were explained as follows:
personnel who has acted in a manner warranting Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as
criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings was distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is
likewise transferred from the Chief Special Prosecutor charged with the duty to:
to the Tanodbayan. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee,
Thereafter, when Presidential Decree No. 1606 was office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1860 and 1861 be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
on January 14, 1983 and March 23, 1983, respectively,
both amendatory decrees contained a virtually identical The Constitution likewise provides that:
Section 3 granting him the same authority, to wit: The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as
SEC. 3. The provisions of this decree notwithstanding, the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to
the Office of the Tanodbayan shall continue to have the function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
file the necessary information, and direct and control Office of the Ombudsman created under this
the prosecution of all cases enumerated in Section 4 of Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7)
Presidential Decree No. 1606, whether such cases be
within the exclusive original/appellate jurisdiction of the Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts in accordance given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan
with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1630. (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution
and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT
Page 38 of 85
GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court
to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the or administrative agency and prosecute the same;
filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except (f) He may file and prosecute civil and administrative
upon orders of the Ombudsman . This right to do so was cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has other offenses committed by public officers and
been divested of such authority. employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor
(Raul Gonzales) is a mere subordinate of the Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic Act No.
prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or 6770 was enacted providing for the functional and
orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the structural organization of the present Office of the
prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if Ombudsman. This later law retained in the Ombudsman
instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his the power of the former Tanodbayan to investigate and
original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
transferred to the Ombudsman, who may however, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. In addition,
cases he is ordered to investigate. the Ombudsman is now vested with primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. It would
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, there is appear, therefore, that, as declared by respondent
no doubt that the power of the present Special Sandiganbayan, it is the Ombudsman who should file
Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation and to the petition for forfeiture involved in this case.
prosecute is subject to the following limitations: (a) it
extends only to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority of
the Sandiganbayan; and (b) the same may be exercised the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the
only by authority of the Ombudsman. exercise of his correlative powers to both investigate
and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-
The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to
actions in rem17 and therefore, civil in nature. cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
Parenthetically, considering the limited authority of the wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986.18
present Special Prosecutor, he is not allowed to file and Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is without authority
prosecute forfeiture cases provided for under Republic to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. We, however,
Act No. 1379 even if the same falls within the uphold his authority to investigate cases for the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On the premise that forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten and/or
the incumbent Special Prosecutor cannot file the unexplained wealth amassed even before the
petition, is the Ombudsman empowered to initiate and aforementioned date, pursuant to his general
prosecute the same? investigatory power under Section 15(l) of Republic Act
No. 6770.
A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the
Ombudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), In the case at bar, the alleged unexplained wealth of
and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto respondent Macario Asistio, Jr. was supposed to have
will show that, at its inception, the Office of the been acquired from 1981 to 1983. Verily, the
Ombudsman was already vested with the power to Ombudsman, like the Special Prosecutor, is without
investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before authority to initiate and file the petition for forfeiture
the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts. In against respondent Asistio.
resume Presidential Decree No. 1487 provided:
SEC. 17. Prosecution of public personnel.—If the It is our considered opinion, therefore, that in cases of
Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public unlawfully acquired wealth amassed before February
official, employee, or other person has acted in a 25, 1986, as is the situation obtaining in the case at
manner resulting in a failure of justice, he shall file and bar, it is the Solicitor General who should file the
prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or petition for forfeiture. The reason is manifestly
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the supplied by an analysis of the interplay of antecedent
proper court of body. legislation.
and Presidential Decree No. 1630, on its part, had this
more detailed provision: It will be recalled that when Presidential Decree No.
SEC. 10. Powers.—The Tanodbayan shall have the 1486 was issued on June 11, 19781 it vested in the
following powers: Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings
xxx xxx xxx provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, Section 12 of
(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima the same decree gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the
facie case, he may file the necessary information or authority to prosecute forfeiture cases. This should be
taken as merely an implied repeal by Presidential
Page 39 of 85
Decree No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former courts proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 in connection
of first instance and the authority of the Solicitor with Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2.
General to file a petition for forfeiture under Section 2
of Republic Act No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction GG. ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, G.R. No. 161602 vs. THE
and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
Special Prosecutor, respectively.
FACTS: On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the
However, on December 10, 1978, Presidential Decree Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of
No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing Presidential alleged unlawfully acquired property with the
Decree No. 1486. Issued on the same date was Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner
Presidential Decree No. 1607 which declared the official Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Sison
creation of the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor, Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S
with Section 17 thereof providing for its exclusive Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes)
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.
informations therefor, and direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein. Still and all, it now On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a motion to
bears stressing that, under the state of the law at that dismiss the action on grounds of a) violation of their
juncture, the authority of the Chief Special Prosecutor right to a speedy disposition of their case; b) lack of
no longer included the right to file actions for forfeiture jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c)
under Republic Act No. 1379, nor was such authority prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis pendentia. On
vested in any other office or agency. September 11, 2002 the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion. It also denied on March 10, 2003 their
It is a respected rule of statutory construction that subsequent motion for reconsideration.
"where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly
but by implication, is itself repealed, ... the repeal of the On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion
repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language for preliminary investigation and to suspend
of the repealing statute provides otherwise.19 Hence, proceedings. They claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a
the repeal of Presidential Decree No. 1486 necessarily forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the
revived the authority of the Solicitor General to file a Ombudsman should have first conducted a previous
petition for forfeiture under Section 2 of Republic Act inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the quondam cases before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2
courts of first instance over the case nor the authority of the law.
of the provincial or city fiscals to conduct the
preliminary investigation therefor, since said powers at In its Comment on the motion, the Republic pointed out
that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted
Special Prosecutor. That such was the intendment of such a preliminary investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-
the law can be irresistibly deduced from a reading of 0820 and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution,
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 retaining in recommending the endorsement of the matter to the
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over violations of Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the
Republic Act No. 1379, and of Section 17 of Presidential forfeiture case.
Decree No. 1607 which vested in the Chief Special
Prosecutor the right to conduct a preliminary On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a
investigation and to file only informations for cases resolution, denying the Romualdezes March 31, 2003
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. motion. It also denied by resolution on December 3,
2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the authority Thus, the Romualdezes filed the present petition for
thereafter restored to the then Tanodbayan to file certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the
informations for cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayans rulings and prevent it from further
does not include the filing of a petition for forfeiture. As proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until another
earlier mentioned, an information is an accusation in preliminary investigation is conducted in their case.
writing charging a person with an offense and requires a
criminal proceeding; a petition for forfeiture involves a ISSUE: Whether or not the preliminary investigation
civil action in rem. The Solicitor General was, therefore, that the Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-0820 in
acting within the scope of his authority when he filed 1991 satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture
the petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. cases.
Besides, such authority of the Solicitor General is not an
entirely new concept if we are to consider that under RULING: The Supreme Court held that there is no
Executive Order No. 14, the Solicitor General is reason which exists for suspending or interrupting the
empowered to assist in the filing and prosecution of conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the
cases for a violation thereof, including forfeiture Sandiganbayan. It stated that it cannot subscribe to the
Romualdezes’ claim that they are entitled to a new
Page 40 of 85
preliminary investigation since they had no opportunity prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and
to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the
The High Court aptly pointed out that: Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the
Respondents admit that the subpoena for that regular courts as well. The authority of the Ombudsman
investigation had been sent to their last known to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by
residence at the time it was conducted. The Republic public officers and employees is founded in Section 15
also categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena and Section 11 of RA 6770.
had been served on the Romualdezes. Accordingly, the a. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to
Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any
the investigation of the Romualdezes’ cases when they public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
did not show up despite notice being sent to them at act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
their last known residence. or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the from any investigatory agency of Government, the
proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the investigation of such cases.
presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach b. Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman
evidence of the complainant is accorded him. under the latter's supervision and control, the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of Sandiganbayan.
offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory
tactics" (Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 657, 662 The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by
(1995). In sum, there is no reason for suspending or law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It
interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
before the Sandiganbayan. employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
HH. Office of the Ombudsman vs. ENOC make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the 8. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or
order dated 100700 of the RTC Branch 19 of Digos, omission of any public official" is broad enough to
Davao del Sur dismissing criminal cases against embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
respondents. Respondents were charged with 11 counts employee.
of malversation through falsification, based on alleged
purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultural The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply
community members, and one count of violation of R.A. the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving
No. 3019 in connection with the purchases of supplies public officers and employees cognizable by other
for the OSCC without bidding/canvass. courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
As none of the respondents has the "rank" required is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to
under R.A. No. 8249 to be tried for the said crimes in investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by
the Sandiganbayan, the information were filed by the public officers and employees.
Ombudsman in the RTC. Invoking the ruling in Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan, respondents move to quash arguing Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by
Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and
falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts. encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance committed by public officers and
RTC granted such motion. The office of the Ombudsman employees during their tenure of office.
filed a petition contending the trial court erred invoking
Uy vs. Sandiganbayan. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has authority to the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4)
regular courts granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases
RULING: YES. The Ombudsman has powers to prosecute within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not
not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such
courts. [ruling from here same with Uy vs. cases.
Sandiganbayan] The Ombudsman is clothed with
authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should
Page 41 of 85
not be equated with the limited authority of the Special that a reelected local official may not be held
Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. administratively accountable for misconduct committed
during his prior term of office.[24] The rationale for this
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a holding is that when the electorate put him back into
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge
only act under the supervision and control and upon of his life and character, including his past misconduct.
authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then
preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to such reelection is considered a condonation of his past
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the misdeeds.
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend
to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of However, in the present case, respondents point out
the Ombudsman to these types of cases. that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E.
Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all elections. It was not made an issue during the election,
complaints against officers and employees of the and so the electorate could not be said to have voted
government and to enforce their administrative, civil for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect
and criminal liability in every case where the evidence of his life and character.
warrants
a. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize For his part, petitioner contends that “the only
the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, conclusive determining factor” as regards the people’s
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we
act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the agree with petitioner. That the people voted for an
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. official with knowledge of his character is presumed,
b. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual
Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on
11 (4c) of RA 6770, i.e. to perform such duties assigned the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or
to it by the Ombudsman. period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned
from the date of the official’s reelection, except that it
II. Garcia vs Mojica must be prior to said date.”
[G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999]
The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case.
FACTS: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively
Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for liable for an act done during his previous term, that is,
the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig.
the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence
on September 1998 when the first delivery should have The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu
been made by F.E. Zuellig. City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the
contract was signed, during petitioner’s prior term. At
Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms
regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be
Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability
This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) petitioner may have in signing the contract already
to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1] became extant on the day the contract was signed. It
hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special are supposed to have been made months later.
prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman,
was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ- While petitioner can no longer be held administratively
VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he recommended liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig,
that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case
administrative cases against petitioner and the other other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling
city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, in this case, may not be taken to mean the total
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if
recommendation. any, might have been committed in signing the subject
contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of
ISSUES: whether or not he may be held administratively liable
1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable. therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.
2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by
virtue of the LGC. 2. No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government
Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly
RULING: or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
1. NO. “In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific
Page 42 of 85
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone them for indirect contempt for such refusal.
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and
strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman Issues:
(6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day 1. Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has
suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist
it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape
* The power to preventively suspend is available not against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy 2. Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has
Ombudsman. the power to suspend the prosecutor.
“SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman or
his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or Ruling:
employee under his authority pending an investigation, Issue 1: YES. The office of the Ombudsman has the
if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong,” power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
JJ. Lastimosa v. Vasquez public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
Provision: Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 or inefficient." This power has been held to include the
(R.A. No. 6770): investigation and prosecution of any crime committed
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office omissions complained of are related to, or connected
and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty.
or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial
and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under investigation and all that remained to be done was for
his supervision and control. the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary
Doctrine: When a prosecutor is deputized by the investigation had been given over to the Provincial
ombudsman, he becomes under the supervision and Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature
control of the latter. of the offense to be charged would still be subject to
the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is
Facts: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, because under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a
public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the
complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which
complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and means that he is subject to the power of the
grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or
Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Intially, the deputy ombudsman modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot
found no prima facie evidence. After review, Omb. legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the
Vasquez reversed and directed that the mayor be information as directed by the Ombudsman.
charged with a criminal case in the RTC.
2: YES. Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the
The case was referred to provincial prosecutor Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for
Lastimosa. She conducted her own preliminary contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and
investigation and found that only acts of lasciviousness under the same procedure and with the same penalties
had been committed. She filed a case for acts of provided therein." There is no merit in the argument
lasciviousness with the MCTC. that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial,
Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman.
ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the
should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance,
failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or
Ombudsman. command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for
indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules
Petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has of Court is for respondents to determine after
no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because appropriate hearing.
the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation
to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the
Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite KK. Layno vs Sandiganbayan
Page 43 of 85
G.R. No. 65848, May 24, 1985 46891 with an area of 18,369 square meters and
situated in Barangay Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal; that
Facts: Layno was charged with violating paragraph (e), petitioner, by stealth and in the guise of merely grazing
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. was his cattle, surreptitiously entered into possession of a
then arraigned on October 3, 1983, and was suspended portion of respondents’ land; that petitioner conspired
pendente lite, by respondent Sandiganbayan on October and confederated with Gaza and Francisco by illegally
26, 1983. constructing their own houses on the subject land; that
the issue of possession was brought to the barangay for
The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft conciliation but no settlement was reached by the
and Corrupt Practices Act, suspending from office any parties; and that petitioner, Gaza and Francisco had
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution forcibly, unlawfully and unjustly possessed and continue
under a valid information under such statute, is assailed to possess the subject property and had refused to
in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding on the vacate the same.
ground that it is violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Petitioner denied that taking possession of any portion
of the property of respondents. He argued that the
Issue: Whether or not the provision is violative of the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the
constitutional presumption of innocence. ejectment case. He claimed that he had been in
possession of his land since the early 1950s. As he did
Held: Yes. It is a basic assumption of the electoral before the MTC, petitioner also alleged lack of
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
are entitled to the services of elective officials of their
choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them Issue: Whether or not estoppel bars petitioner from
could, of course, be proceeded against administratively raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction
or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his
culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a Ruling: YES. Petitioner is estopped from questioning the
criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional jurisdiction of the RTC. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension 129, the plenary action of accion publiciana must be
may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an brought before the regional trial courts. With the
unreasonable length of time raises a due process modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 7691 in
question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in 1994, the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts was
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been limited to real actions where the assessed value exceeds
nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an P20,000.00, and P50,000.00 where the action is filed in
injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. Metro Manila. Under the law as modified, jurisdiction is
There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of determined by the assessed value of the property.
Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man
they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to In the instant case, nowhere in the complaint was the
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned.
of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of There is no showing on the face of the complaint that
reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of the RTC has jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Indeed,
due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
unconstitutional application that the order of value of the property, it cannot readily be determined
suspension should be lifted. which of the two trial courts had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. However, estoppel sets in
LL. HONORIO BERNARDO, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF when a party participates in all stages of a case before
EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, Respondents. challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One
G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010 cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after
Justice Perez, Ponente voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure
affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing
FACTS: A complaint dated 14 November 2000 for accion to obtain such relief.
publiciana was filed by respondent Heirs of Eusebio
Villegas against petitioner Honorio Bernardo, Romeo Clearly, petitioner failed to point out the omission of the
Gaza and Monina Francisco. Respondents had earlier assessed value in the complaint. Petitioner actively
filed an ejectment case against the trio, with the participated during the trial by adducing evidence and
Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, which case filing numerous pleadings, none of which mentioned
was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for any defect in the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was only on
having been filed beyond the one-year prescriptive appeal before the Court of Appeals, after he obtained
period for filing a forcible entry case. an adverse judgment in the trial court, that petitioner,
for the first time, came up with the argument that the
Respondents alleged in the Complaint that their father, decision is void because there was no allegation in the
Eusebio Villegas, is the registered owner of a parcel of complaint about the value of the property.
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
Page 44 of 85
MM. BF CITILAND CORPORATION V. MARILYN B. for Petition for Review on Certiorari under RULE 65.
OTAKE RULES OF COURT:
RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
NATURE: Petition for review of the Resolutions of CA
under RULE 45 SECTION 2. MODES OF APPEAL -
ORDINARY APPEAL. - The appeal to the Court of
FACTS: BF Citiland Corporation is the registered owner Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
of a lot in Parañaque City, with an assessed value of the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
P48,000 (based on Tax Declaration). filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
On 24 February 1987, respondent Merlinda B. Bodullo copy thereof upon the adverse party. x x x
bought the adjoining lot.
PETITION FOR REVIEW. - The appeal to the Court of
However, records show respondent occupied not just Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the lot she purchased. She also encroached upon the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petitioner's lot. petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(Emphasis supplied) x x x
On 13 October 2000, petitioner filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court a complaint for accion
However, in numerous cases, this Court has allowed
publiciana praying: that judgment be rendered ordering
liberal construction of the rules when to do so would
respondent to vacate the subject lot; that respondent
serve the demands of substantial justice.
be ordered to pay P15,000.00 per month by way of
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
reasonable compensation for the use of the lot.
frowned upon.
Thus, notwithstanding petitioner's wrong mode of
The MeTC ruled in favor of BF Citiland (except rent was
appeal, the Court of Appeals should not have so easily
P10K/month), even ordering Bodullo to pay P20,000 as
dismissed the petition.
atty’s fees & costs of the suit.
2.) Metropolitan Trial Court – Under BP 129, as
The MeTC also issued writ of execution & granted the
amended, jurisdiction even in accion publiciana cases is
motion for special order of demolition.
determined by the assessed value of the property.
Merlinda Bodulla filed in the RTC a petition for certiorari
With the modifications introduced by REPUBLIC ACT
under RULE 65, seeking dismissal of the case in the
NO. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial courts has
MeTC for lack of jurisdiction.
been limited to real actions where the assessed value
exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the action is filed in
RTC reversed the MeTC – case dismissed, for lack of
Metro Manila.
jurisdiction; alleging that a suit for accion publiciana fell
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
If the assessed value is below the said amounts, the
action must be brought before first level courts.
BF Citiland claimed Bodullo was estopped for
participating in all the proceedings of the MeTC.
SEC. 33. JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL
Bodullon countered that the issue on lack of jurisdiction
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL
can be raised any time.
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS IN CIVIL CASES. - Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
BF Citiland filed a petition for review under RULE 42:
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
xxx
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
Court of Appeals dismissed case saying the proper
interest therein where the assessed value of the
appeal from the RTC decision is by way of notice of
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
appeal. Hence, BF Citiland filed this Petition for Review
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
in the SC.
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
ISSUES:
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
1. What is the proper mode of appeal from the decision
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
of the RTC?
litigation expenses, and costs:
2. Who has jurisdiction on the accion publiciana case?
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
HELD:
taxation purposes, the value of such property
1.) Notice of Appeal – because the RTC decided the
shall be determined by the assessed value of
case in the exercise of its Original Jurisdiction.
the adjacent lots.
i.e. The case filed in the RTC was an Original Action
Page 45 of 85
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
The subject lot, with an assessed value below the jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for
jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila, recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
MeTC under BP 129, as amended. According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court,
Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law. Article 155,
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court GRANT paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the petition. the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of Shari’a
Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts. It ruled that
NN. G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014 it had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner, vs. FIFTH (5th) possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim,
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, his rights were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth
represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. Mala, Shari’a District Court decided the case applying the
Respondents. provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Nature: petition for certiorari with application for Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied
issuance of TRO and/or preliminary injunction to set Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for lack of
aside the Shari'a District Court's decision. merit. Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with
Doctrine: Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction the SC.
over real actions where one of the parties is not a
Muslim. Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering the
FACTS: Roldan E. Mala purchased a parcel of land decision. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the
located in Maguindanao, from one Ceres Cañete. Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, Shari’a
Transfer Certificate of Title covering the parcel of land District Courts may only take cognizance of real actions
was issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of the where the parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that
purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued that respondent
land. Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Roldan’s action.
Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo
issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly The Supreme Court subsequently issued a TRO enjoining
covering the same parcel of land. Roldan had the parcel the implementation of the writ of execution against
of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer found Vivencio.
that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by
Roldan’s certificate of title. Issue: Whether or not a Shari’a District Court may
validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides
initiated barangay conciliation proceedings before the the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code of
Office of the Barangay Chairman. Failing to settle with the Philippines
Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to
recover the possession of the parcel of land with Held: NO. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession.
Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is
the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to
Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio hear and determine cases of the general class to which
occupied his property, depriving him of the right to use, the proceedings in question belong." This power is
possess, and enjoy it. conferred by law, which may either be the Constitution
or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to
Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a
possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has
the property, turn it over to Roldan. no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
judgment rendered, are void.
Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with
prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the
Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of subject matter of the action, the material allegations of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines and argued the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions examined.
and proceedings if both parties are Muslims.
Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District
Page 46 of 85
Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from
Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing
Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over
jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions real actions "is applicable solely when both parties are
not arising from customary contracts wherein the Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon.
parties involved are Muslims: Balindong.50 When one of the parties is not a Muslim,
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x the action must be filed before the regular courts.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a
District Court shall have original jurisdiction over: The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
xxxx Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in does not validate the proceedings before the court.
paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code, customary
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim
detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and when resolving real actions arising from customary
xxxx contracts.
When ownership is acquired over a particular property,
the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it.43 If the In real actions not arising from contracts customary to
owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to
has a right of action to recover its possession from the apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District
dispossessor.44 When the property involved is real,45 Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general
such as land, the action to recover it is a real application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the
action;46otherwise, the action is a personal action.47 In Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of
such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for the action. This is the reason why the original
Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions
them. not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with
that of regular courts.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for
recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction
Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief arises only if the parties involved are Muslims.
from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent
dispute this claim. Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code
motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section of the Philippines in resolving the action.
1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from
court shall dismiss the claim: participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – are instances when provisions in the Muslim Code apply
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce apply to
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the the female party in a marriage solemnized according to
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under
over the subject matter, that there is another action Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person
pending between the same parties for the same cause, of a different religion is disqualified from inheriting from
or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of law and
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall
under the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all be entitled to one-third of what he or she would have
of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, received without such disqualification." In these
it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court
of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special proceedings.
Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the
Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District previously cited instances. This case involves an action
Court, instead of filing the action with the regular for recovery of possession of real property. As a matter
courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition of the of law, Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance
case."48 This would have been a valid argument had all of a real action "wherein the parties involved are
the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Muslims."58 Considering that one of the parties involved
Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of in this case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a
Page 47 of 85
District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of execution returned
the action for recovery of possession of real property. unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance
The judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent of a writ of execution against Manila Surety and Fidelity
Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First Instance granted the
subject matter of the action. motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to
quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over First Instance denied. Thus, the surety company
the subject matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a appealed to the Court of Appeals.
District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A
party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First
over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, Instance’s decision. Five days after receiving the Court
even on appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is of Appeals’ decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for the first time that
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the
render judgment on the action." subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
forwarded the case to this court for resolution.
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio
Figueroa was charged with reckless imprudence This court ruled that the surety company could no
resulting in homicide before the Regional Trial Court of longer assail the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa as charged. Instance on the ground of estoppel by laches. Parties
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised for may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the
the first time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional court over the subject matter of the action if it took
Trial Court to decide the case. Ruling that the Regional them an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the crime charged, to object to the court’s jurisdiction.65 This is to
this court dismissed the criminal case despite the fact discourage the deliberate practice of parties in invoking
that Figueroa objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only
only on appeal. to repudiate the court’s jurisdiction after failing to
obtain the relief sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny of jurisdiction over the subject matter is overlooked in
Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive dismissal favor of the public policy of discouraging such
against Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia inequitable and unfair conduct.
Times Corporation actively participated in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the Labor In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15
Arbiter ruled against Metromedia Times, it appealed to years before assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of
the National Labor Relations Commission, arguing for First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety company
the first time that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction became a party to the case when it issued the counter-
over the complaint. According to Metromedia Times, bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked
the case involved a grievance issue "properly cognizable the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by seeking
by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court set aside the several affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash
decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of the writ of execution. The surety company only assailed
jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the fact that the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in 1963
the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal. when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision. This court said:
There are exceptional circumstances when a party may x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila
be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court to Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect
decide a case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v. be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the
Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the Spouses present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary
Instance of Cebu to recover P1,908.00. At that time, the once more.
court with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil
actions in which the amount demanded does not The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent
exceed P2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace but revolting.
and municipal courts in chartered cities under Section
88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this
court observed that the "non-waivability of objection to
As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, jurisdiction"69 has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine
the Court of First Instance issued a writ of attachment has become more the general rule than the exception.
against the Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:
filed a counter-bond issued by Manila Surety and A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite
dissolved the writ of attachment. is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of of the action is a matter of law and may not be
Page 48 of 85
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded action
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage filed by respondent.
of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualified by recent pronouncements which Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Out Answer With
stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In
[Tijam v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, Default because petitioners answer was allegedly filed
that the holding in said case had been applied to out of time. However, the trial court denied the motion.
situations which were obviously not contemplated A few weeks later, respondent filed a motion to dismiss
therein. x x x. petitioners counterclaim, contending that the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. In
accepted"72 rule that objections to a court’s jurisdiction response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her
over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees
the proceedings, even on appeal. This is because since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared
jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of in default for having failed to answer such counterclaim.
law"73 and "may not be conferred by consent or The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court
agreement of the parties." found petitioners counterclaim to be merely permissive
and held that petitioners failure to pay docket fees
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the
"must be applied with great care;"76 otherwise, the same. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice": Issues:
x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not 1. Whether or not the respondent is estopped from
favored by law. It is to be applied rarely — only from questioning her non-payment of docket fees because it
necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The did not raise this particular issue when it filed its first
doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity motion.
must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon to entertain the appeal of the petitioner.
for the accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment 3. Whether or not the counterclaim was permissive or
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is compulsory
void. x x x. No laches will even attach when the
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction x x x.78 Held: Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
Tijam do not exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
Fifth Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction to seek assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In
affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief from the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as
judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of estopped from assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over Roldan’s over petitioners counterclaim since this issue was raised
petition for recovery of possession. by respondent with the trial court itself the body where
the action is pending - even before the presentation of
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed any evidence by the parties and definitely, way before
the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court any judgment could be rendered by the trial court.
over the action for recovery of possession for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s action. This objection to the CA’s jurisdiction is raised for the
first time before this Court. Although the lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
OO.) EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU action, a party may be estopped from raising such
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent. questions if he has actively taken part in the very
proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to
Facts: FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the court’s jurisdiction in the event that that the
the RTC of Makati alleging that Alday owed it judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to
P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash advances, him. In this case, respondent actively took part in the
unremitted costs of premiums and other charges proceedings before the CA by filing its appellees brief
incurred as an insurance agent. Respondent also prayed with the same. Its participation, when taken together
for exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of with its failure to object to the jurisdiction during the
suit. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of entire duration of the proceedings before such court,
counterclaim, asserted her right for the payment of demonstrates a willingness to abide by the resolution of
P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is
commissions and contingent bonuses and for now most decidedly estopped.
accumulated premium reserves amounting to
P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for BOTH. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of
Page 49 of 85
or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing parties’ Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim
claim and does not require for its adjudication the by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
acquire jurisdiction. In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading,
Court set the criteria to determine whether a or if specified the same has been left for determination
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
counterclaim largely the same? authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants collect the additional fee.
claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute In Suson v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that
plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim? although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a
Is there any logical relation between the claim and the jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not
counterclaim? result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided
the docket fees are paid within the applicable
Another test, applied in Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the
is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and
a logical relationship between the claim and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner
counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials has attempted to evade the payment of the proper
of the respective claims of the parties would entail a docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to
and the court. dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to
pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion
Petitioner’s counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim
and accumulated premium reserves is merely as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from
permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioners docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent
claims differs from that needed to establish was in default for its failure to answer her counterclaim.
respondent’s demands for the recovery of cash The trial court should have instead given petitioner a
accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable
and costs of premiums. This conclusion is further prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing
reinforced by petitioners own admissions since she fees for her permissive counterclaim.
declared in her answer that respondents cause of
action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special
Agents Contract.
However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly

suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its
complaint, are compulsory.
The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid

down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,

third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in
no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Page 50 of 85
II. RULE 1-5 that these partly constituted "real action," and that
Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and,
A. MARCOS-ARANETA vs CA G.R. No. 154096, August therefore, venue was improperly laid. Pending
22, 2008 resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Irene filed
a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint), attaching
Facts: Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now Case Digest: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE
deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto meikimouse therewith a copy of the Amended
Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. Complaint in which the names of Daniel Rubio, Orlando
(FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin appeared as additional
respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would plaintiffs. As stated in the amended complaint, the
later allege, both corporations were organized pursuant added plaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new
to a contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustees. Parenthetically, the amended complaint stated
trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his practically the same cause of action but, as couched,
associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and sought the reconveyance of the FEMII shares only. RTC
UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their admitted such amended complaint. Later developments
fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent saw the CA issuing a TRO and then a writ of preliminary
of 65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene, injunction enjoining the RTC from conducting further
through her trustee-husband, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, proceedings on the subject civil cases. It further
demanded the reconveyance of said 65% stockholdings, rendered a Decision, setting aside the assailed RTC
but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige. order and the amended complaint.
In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the Issue: Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over
RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of the case on the ground of improper venue.
stock, accounting and receivership against the
Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a Held: It is the posture of Julita and Francisca that the
temporary restraining order (TRO). The second sought venue was in this case improperly laid since the suit in
the recovery to the extent of 65% of FEMII shares held question partakes of a real action involving real
by Benedicto and the other defendants named therein. properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of
Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino, Benedicto's the RTC in Batac. This contention is not well-taken. In a
daughter, filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 3341- personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
17, followed later by an Amended Motion to Dismiss. personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or
the recovery of damages.
Benedicto, on the other hand, moved to dismiss the
case filed, adopting in toto the five (5) grounds raised by Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title
Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss. Among to or possession of real property, or interest therein. In
these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the
dispute over which the Securities and Exchange venue of real actions shall be the proper court which
Commission, not the RTC, has jurisdiction; (2) venue has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
was improperly laid; and (3) the complaint failed to property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The
state a cause of action, as there was no allegation venue of personal actions is the court where the
therein that plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
trust, has accepted the trust created in her favor. where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases were where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff
consolidated. During the preliminary proceedings on
their motions to dismiss, Benedicto and Francisca, by In this case, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the
way of bolstering their contentions on improper venue, trust arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group.
presented the Joint Affidavit of Gilmia B. Valdez, The fact that FEMII's assets include real properties does
Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco who all not materially change the nature of the action, for the
attested being employed as household staff at the ownership interest of a stockholder over corporate
Marcos' Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and assets is only inchoate as the corporation, as a juridical
that Irene did not maintain residence in said place as person, solely owns such assets. It is only upon the
she in fact only visited the mansion twice in 1999; that liquidation of the corporation that the stockholders,
she did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections; depending on the type and nature of their
and that she was staying at her husband's house in stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the
Makati City. Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint corporate assets, but then only to the extent of their
affidavit, Irene presented her PhP 5 community tax stockownership. The amended complaint is an action
certificate (CTC) issued on "11/07/99" in Curimao, Ilocos inn personam, it being a suit against Francisca and the
Norte to support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos late Benedicto (now represented by Julita and
Norte. In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability
died and was substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968
and Francisca. RTC dismissed both complaints, stating and/or 1972. They are not actions in rem where the
Page 51 of 85
actions are against the real properties instead of against sold at public auction where respondent was the
persons. highest bidder;
We point out at the outset that Irene, as categorically 3 days before the expiration of the redemption period,
and peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is petitioner filed a complaint for the annulment of the
not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. extrajudicial foreclosure sale at the RTC of Manila,
The Court perceives no compelling reason to disturb, in alleging that:
the confines of this case, the factual determination of (a) the foreclosure was premature because its
the trial court and the premises holding it together. obligation to the Bank was not yet due,
Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action, (b) the publication of the notice of sale was incomplete,
contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance there was no public auction,
complaint. As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what (c) the price for which was “shockingly low”;
Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
place "where the plaintiff or any of the principal on the ground that the venue of the action was
plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amended improperly laid in Manila for the realty covered by
complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 issued the real estate mortgages is situated in Makati,
sometime in June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale
which she indicated her address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, should be filed in the RTC of Makati;
Ilocos is really of no moment. Let alone the fact that
one can easily secure a basic residence certificate Petitioner argued that its action is a personal action and
practically anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or that the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial
treasurer's office and dictate whatever relevant data foreclosure proceedings so that it may have a new one
one desires entered, Irene procured CTC No. 17019451 year period to redeem the same.
and appended the same to her motion for
reconsideration following the RTC's pronouncement Lower court rulings:
against her being a resident of Batac. RTC: reserved the resolution of the Bank’s motion to
dismiss until after the trial on the merits
There can be no serious dispute that the real party- CA: on petition for certiorari and prohibition, granted
ininterest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the petitions and dismissed the case without prejudice
the disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or to the filing of the case before the proper courts
entitled to the avails of the present suit. It is undisputed
too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and *Reconsideration was denied, hence the petition before
Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as the SC
co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's new
designated trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as Issue: WON petitioner’s action for annulment of the real
mere representatives of Irene. Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of
quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff Fortune Building is personal action or a real action for
in a personal action case, the residences of the principal venue purposes
parties should be the basis for determining proper
venue. Ruling: Yes, the action is a real action which should have
been filed before the RTC of Makati.
Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and
3342- 17, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the
plaintiff, the real party-in-interest. Following Sec. 2 of recovery of possession, or for the partition or
Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be commenced condemnation of or foreclosure of mortgage on real
and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides. Irene property, must be instituted in the CFI of the province
was a resident during the period material of Forbes where the property or any part thereof lies.
Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub,
Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it that Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted
one can have several residences, if such were the in the CFI where the defendant resides or may be
established fact. found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
B. Fortune Motors, Inc. v. CA, Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company An action for the annulment or rescission of contract
does not operate to efface the true objectives and
Facts: Private respondent extended various loans to nature of action which is to recover real property.
petitioner for a total sum of P32,500,000.00;Due to
financial difficulties, and economic recession, the An action for annulment or rescission of sale of real
petitioner was not able to pay the loan which became property is a real action; its prime objective is to recover
due;The respondent bank initiated extrajudicial said real property.
foreclosure proceedings, the mortgaged property was
Page 52 of 85
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure is right to due process was violated when she did not
no different from an action to annul a private sale of receive summons. Teresa, as a resident defendant, who
real property. does not voluntary appear in court must be personally
Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The served with summons as provided under Section 6, Rule
decision of CA is affirmed. 14 of the Rules of Court. Even if the action is quasi in
rem, personal service of summons is essential in order
C. Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, GR to afford her due process. The substituted service made
161417, February 8, 2007 by the sheriff at her husband’s office cannot be deemed
proper service absent any explanation that efforts had
Facts: Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired been made to personally serve summons upon her but
several loans from Philippine Countryside Rural Bank that such efforts failed. Further, the order of the trial
(PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. To secure the loans, he court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt using her
mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank. He was personal property is a judgment in personam which the
able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in court cannot do because it only acquired jurisdiction
loans obtained in 1998 which amounted to more than a over the res and not over the person of Teresa.
million pesos.
On the issue of extrinsic fraud, the Court of Appeals,
Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure agreeing with PCRB, is correct that there is none in the
against the spouses Biaco. Summons were issued by case at bar. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
the trial judge. The Sherriff served the summons to fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
Ernesto at the latter’s office. No summons was served outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
to Teresa. party was prevented from presenting fully his side of
the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the
Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa prevailing party. Extrinsic fraud is present where the
because she was not aware sans the summons being unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting
served her). The case was heard ex-parte and the fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by
spouses were ordered to satisfy the debt and failure to his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
do so will authorize the Sheriff to auction the false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
mortgaged the property. never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to
P150k which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+ debt. represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where
Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy was issued the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his
against the personal properties of Teresa to satisfy the client’s interest to the other side. The above is not
deficiency. applicable in the case of Teresa. It was not PCRB which
made any fraud. It should be noted that spouses Biaco
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the were co-defendants in the case and shared the same
previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to have interest.
the judgment annulled as she now claims that she was
deprived of due process when she did not receive D. JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS G.R. No. 190710,
summons; that it was only her husband who received [June 6, 2011]
the summons; that there was extrinsic fraud because
her husband deliberately hid the fact of the foreclosure FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to
proceeding. Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court
PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie
action quasi in rem, hence Teresa’s participation is not who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in
required so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a)
the res which is what happened in the case at bar; that petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma,
situation cannot occur in her case because she is a co- showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University
defendant of Ernesto. in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the trial court Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
should be annulled. Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several
articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as
HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi a musical prodigy.
in rem proceeding and that the presence of Teresa is
not required because the trial court was able to acquire Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance
jurisdiction over the res (mortgaged property). and Comment manifesting that the petition was
HOWEVER, her constitutional right to due process is adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be
superior over the procedural matters mentioned. Her served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent
Page 53 of 85
Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA
arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father. testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any,
dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to which the court may consider as potentially affecting
establish compliance with the four procedural aspects the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule
for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding
between the putative father and the child. is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a
DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing
was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA
grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
(CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse testing is considered a “search,” which, under their
failed to show that the four significant aspects of a Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding
traditional paternity action had been met and held that of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
has failed to establish a prima facie case. possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various
ISSUE: Whether aprima facie showing is necessary jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
before a court can issue a DNA testing order procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary
HELD: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa showing must be made before a court can
prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by paternity cases.
petitioner.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before
RATIO: Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The testing, the moving party must show that there is a
statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
case which parties have to face has been widely party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during the court can determine whether there is sufficient
trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be issuance of a court order for blood testing The same
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, condition precedent should be applied in our
when only the petition to establish filiation has been jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. possibility of paternity.”
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides E. Dial Corp. v Judge Soriano, Imperial Vegetable Oil
for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy Co.
and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio Facts: Petitioners are foreign corporations organize and
or on application of any person, who has a legal interest existing under the laws of US, UK, Malaysia, and are
in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such NOT domiciled in the Philippines, NOR do they have
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the officers or agents, place of business, or property in the
parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological Phil., they are not licensed to engaged, and ARE not
sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The engaged in business here. Respondent (IVO) is a
biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to Philippine corporation;The petitioners and respondent
Page 54 of 85
entered into a contract for delivery of coconut oil to the (2) When the action relates to, or the subject of which
petitioners. Those contracts stipulate that any dispute is, property within the Philippines, in which defendant
shall be resolved through arbitration, either in FOSFA or has claims or lien or interest, actual or contingent;
NIOP. Because IVO failed to deliver, petitioners and 15 (3) When relief demanded in such action consists in
others, initiated arbitration proceedings and some have excluding defendant from any interest in property
already obtained arbitration awards against located in the Philippines; and
respondent. IVO filed a complaint for injunction against (4) When defendant non-resident’s property has been
19 foreign coconut oil buyers including petitioner, with attached within the Philippines;
whom its president Dominador Monteverde, entered
into contract with. IVO repudiated Monteverde’s The complaint in this case does not involve personal
contracts oon the ground that they were mere “paper status of the plaintiff, nor any property in the
trading in futures” as no actual delivery of the coconut Philippines in which defendants have or claim an
oil was allegedly intended by the parties. interest, or which the plaintiff has attached.
IVO replaced Dominador Monteverde and named The action is purely an action for injunction to restrain
Rodrigo Monteverde in his stead and disowned the the defendants from enforcing against IVO (“abusing
former’s allegedly unauthorized acts. Petitioners and harassing”) its contracts for the delivery of coconut
allegedly “harassed” IVO to recognize the contract oil to the defendants, and to recover from the
entered into by Dominador and to come into settlement defendants P21 million in damages for such
with them, which is why IVO applied for TRO and WPI; “harassment”.
IVO also prayed for Moral Damages, Actual Damages,
Exemplary Damages, and Counsel Appearances. On It is clearly a PERSONAL ACTION as well as an ACTION IN
motion of IVO, respondent judge authorized to effect PERSONAM, not an action in rem or quasi in rem.
EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS to all the
defendants through DHL Philippines; Pursuant to such “An action in personam is an action against a person on
order, petitioners were served with summons and copy the basis of his personal liability, while an action in
of the complaint by DHL courier service. remedies (action in rem) is an action against the thing
itself, instead of the person.” (Hernandez case)
Without submitting to court’s jurisdiction, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the A personal action is one brought for the recovery of
extraterritorial service of summons to them was personal property, for the enforcement of some
improper and that hence the court did not acquire contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
jurisdiction over them. The respondent court denied the the recovery of damages for the commission of an
motion on the ground that “the present action relates injury to the person or property. (Hernandez case also)
to property rights which lie in contracts within the This case is a personal action, personal or substituted
Philippines, or which defendant claim liens or interests, service of summons on the defendants, NOT
actual or inchoate, legal or equitable. And one of the extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer
reliefs demanded consists, wholly or in part, in jurisdiction on the court.
excluding the defendants from interest in such property
for the reason that their transactions with plaintiffs General rule: when defendant is not residing in the
former president are ultra vires. Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case
against him because of the impossibility of acquiring
Furthermore, as “foreign corporations doing business in jurisdiction over his person.
the Philippines without a license, they opened Exception:
themselves to suit before Philippine courts”, pursuant (1) Voluntary appearance;
to Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines. (2) Affects personal status of plaintiffs;
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, (3) Or intended to seize or dispose of any property, real
hence this petition for certiorari with TRO, which the or personal, of the defendant located in the Philippines
court granted; All of the above is because they already have
jurisdiction over the res.
*Directly went up to the SC
F. Chua vs. Metropolitan bank
Issue: WON the extraterritorial service of summons was
proper to notify petitioners and will consequently result Facts:
to the court having jurisdiction; - Chua and Filiden (the company where Chua is
president) obtained P4 million peso loan from
Ruling: No, the extraterritorial service of summons was Metrobank
is not proper and therefore, null and void.
Only in 4 instances is extraterritorial service of - This loan is secured by a a real estate mortgage
summons proper:
(1) When the action affects personal status of the
plaintiffs;
Page 55 of 85
- Since the value of the collateral was more than actual sale that took place on 8
the loan, Chua was given an open credit line for November 2001.
future loans o And, even if an auction sale was
conducted, the Certificate of Sale would
- Chua/Filiden obtained other loans from still be void because the auction sale
respondent Metrobank, and the real estate was done in disobedience to a lawful
mortgages were repeatedly amended in order of RTC-Branch 257.
accordance with the increase in Chua/Filiden’s
liabilities. - Chua additionally prayed in their Amended
Complaint for the award of damages
- Having failed to fully pay their obligations,
petitioners entered into a Debt Settlement - RTC-Branch 257 denied Chua’s application for
Agreement with respondent Metrobank, injunction on the ground that the sale of the
whereby the loan was restructured. foreclosed properties rendered the same moot
and academic.
- Eventually, the lawyers of Metrobank o Ruled that the Nov 8 2001 auction sale
demanded that Chua/Filiden fully pay and settle was valid
their liabilities, including interest and penalties,
in the total amount ofP103,450,391, as well as - Chua filed a Motion for Reconsideration
the stipulated attorney’s fees, within three days
from receipt of said letter. - When RTC-Branch 257 failed to take any action
on said Motion, petitioners filed with the Court
- When petitioners still failed to pay their loans, of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
Metrobank sought to extra-judicially foreclose
the REM constituted on the subject properties. - CA reversed RTC-Branch 257, remanded the
Upon a verified Petition for Foreclosure filed by case for further proceedings
respondent Metrobank
- The Supreme Court dismissed Metrobank’s
- Chua, in his personal capacity and acting on appeal with finality
behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed before Branch
257, a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for - RTC-Branch 257 set the hearing for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), presentation of evidence by respondent
Preliminary Injunction and Damages (from this Metrobank for the application for preliminary
point on shall be called Injunction Complaint). injunction on November 9, 2005.
- RTC-Branch 257 issued a TRO enjoining - On 28 October 2005, Chua filed with Branch
respondents Metrobank and Atty. Celestra from 195 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
conducting the auction sale of the mortgaged (RTC-Branch 195) a Verified Complaint for
properties on 31 May 2001. Damages against respondents Metrobank, Atty.
Celestra, and three Metrobank lawyers.
- After the expiration of the TRO on 18 June o Chua sought in their Complaint the
2001, and no injunction having been issued by award of actual, moral, and exemplary
RTC-Branch 257, respondent Atty. Celestra reset damages against Metrobank for making
the auction sale on 8 November 2001. it appear that an auction sale of the
subject properties took place, as a
- On 8 November 2001, the rescheduled date of result of which, the prospective buyers
the auction sale, RTC-Branch 257 issued an of the said properties lost their interest
Order directing that the said sale be reset anew and petitioner Chua was prevented
after 8 November 2001. from realizing a profit of
P70,000,000.00 from the intended sale.
- Order was served on 8 November 2001, on
respondent Atty. Celestra’s daughter, Arlene - Chua sought the inhibition of Executive Judge of
Celestra, RTC-Branch 257
- The auction sale, however, proceeded on 8 - Chua’s motion was granted and the case was re-
November 2001, and a Certificate of Sale was raffled to RTC-Branch 258
accordingly issued to respondent Metrobank as
the highest bidder of the foreclosed properties. - Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 195 a Motion
to Consolidate the Injunction complaint (which
- Chua amended the Injunction Complaint was docketed in RTC-Branch 257) and the
o alleged that the Certificate of Sale was a Damages complaint (which was docketed in
falsified document since there was no RTC-Branch 195).
Page 56 of 85
- Metrobank filed with RTC-Branch 195 an Applicable Law: The proscription against forum
Opposition to Motion to Consolidate with shopping is found in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
Prayer for Sanctions, praying for the dismissal of of Court, which provides that:
the Complaint for Damages, on the ground of
forum shopping. SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
- RTC-Branch 195 granted the Motion to in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
Consolidate, and ordered that the Injunction asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
case be transferred to RTC-Branch 258 certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
- Metrobank filed before RTC-Branch 258. commenced any action or filed any claim involving
o Motion for Reconsideration of RTC- the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
Branch 195’s order granting to judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
consolidate no such other action or claim is pending therein;
o Manifestation and Motion raising the (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
ground of forum shopping complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same
- RTC-Branch 258 dismissed the Damages or similar action or claim has been filed or is
Complaint on the ground of forum shopping pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
o RTC-Branch 258 declared that the facts days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
or claims submitted by petitioners, the complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
rights asserted, and the principal parties
in the two cases were the same. Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere
- Chua filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
with the Court of Appeals pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
- Court of Appeals affirmed Order of RTC-Branch provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
258. The appellate court observed that submission of a false certification or non-
although the defendants in the two cases were compliance with any of the undertakings therein
not identical, they represented a community of shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
interest. It also declared that the cause of without prejudice to the corresponding
action of the two cases, upon which the administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of
recovery of damages was based, was the same the party or his counsel clearly constitutes willful
- The Court of Appeals additionally noted that and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall
petitioners admitted in their Motion for be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice
Consolidation that the Injunction Complaint and and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
the Damages Complaint involved the same cause for administrative sanctions.
parties, central issue, and subject properties.
First Issue: WON the two complaints of Chua had a
Additional facts to note: single cause of action.
- Chua/Filiden failed to state in the Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified Held: YES. In the present case, there is no dispute that
Complaint for Damages before RTC-Branch 195, petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-
the existence of the Injunction Case pending Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified Complaint
before RTC-Branch 258. for Damages before RTC-Branch 195, the existence of
the Injunction Case pending before RTC-Branch 258.
- In the Injunction Case, the damages purportedly
arose from the bad faith of respondents in Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not guilty
offering the subject properties at the auction of forum shopping, since
sale at a price much lower than the assessed (1) the two cases do not have the same ultimate
fair market value of the said properties, said to objective – Injunction Complaint seeks the annulment
be P176,117,000.00. On the other hand, the of the 8 November 2001 public auction and certificate
Damages Complaint, allegedly resulted from the of sale issued therein, while the Damages Complaint
backing out of prospective buyers, who had prays for the award of actual and compensatory
initially offered to buy the subject properties for damages for respondents’ tortuous act of making it
“not less than P175,000,000.00,” because appear that an auction sale actually took place on 8
respondents made it appear that the said November 2001; and
properties were already sold at the auction sale. (2) the judgment in the Injunction Case, on the
annulment of the foreclosure sale, would not affect the
outcome of the Damages Case, on the entitlement of
petitioners to damages.
Page 57 of 85
The Court, however, finds these arguments refuted by Moreover, petitioners admitted in their Motion to
the allegations made by petitioners themselves in their Consolidate before]RTC-Branch 195 that both cases
Complaints in both cases. shared the same parties, the same central issue, and the
same subject property.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, Second Issue: WON the forum shopping was willful and
although with different prayers. deliberate, and the Damages Case should be dismissed
with prejudice to the Injunction Case
There is a splitting of cause of action. Petitioners would
like to make it appear that the Injunction Case was Held: NO. If the forum shopping is not considered willful
solely concerned with the nullification of the auction and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed
sale and certification of sale, while the Damages without prejudice, on the ground of either litis
Complaint was a totally separate claim for damages. pendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum
Yet, a review of the records reveals that petitioners also shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there
included an explicit claim for damages in their are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with
Amended Complaint prejudice..[43] In this case, petitioners did not
deliberately file the Damages Case for the purpose of
Petitioners averred in their Amended Complaint in the seeking a favorable decision in another forum.
Injunction Case that the assessed fair market value of Otherwise, they would not have moved for the
the subject properties was P176,117,000.00. consolidation of both cases. Thus, only the Damages
Case is dismissed and the hearing of the Injunction
The Court observes that the damages being claimed by Case before RTC-Branch 258 will be continued.
petitioners in their Damages Complaint were also
occasioned by the supposedly fictitious 8 November G. MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO. vs. BARRIOS
2001foreclosure sale, G.R. No. L-1539, 03 December 1947
There is no question that the claims of petitioners for Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the
damages in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. order of the respondent judge denying the motion to
CV-05-0402 are premised on the same cause of action, dismiss the complaint of the other respondents which
i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of respondents in seek to recover amounts of money due then from the
connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject petitioner before the outbreak of the war, on the
properties. ground that the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of the court's jurisdiction in rendering said order;
At first glance, said claims for damages may appear and for prohibition to forbid the respondent judge from
different. In the Injunction Case, the damages taking cognizance of the case on the ground that the
purportedly arose from the bad faith of respondents in respondent judge had no jurisdiction to try and decide
offering the subject properties at the auction sale at a it.
price much lower than the assessed fair market value of
the said properties, said to be P176,117,000.00. On the The ground for the motion to dismiss filed by the
other hand, the Damages Complaint, allegedly resulted petitioner is that the complaint of the respondents does
from the backing out of prospective buyers, who had not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
initially offered to buy the subject properties for “not because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the
less than P175,000,000.00,” because respondents made payment of the defendants' alleged debts until after the
it appear that the said properties were already sold at termination or legal cessation of the moratorium
the auction sale. Yet, it is worthy to note that provided No. 32, the pertinent part of which reads as
petitioners quoted closely similar values for the follows: III. DEBT MORATORIUM 1. Enforcement of
subject properties in both cases, against which they payment of all debts and other monetary obligations
measured the damages they supposedly suffered. payable within the Philippines, except debts and other
Evidently, this is due to the fact that petitioners monetary obligations, entered into in any area after
actually based the said values on the single appraisal declaration by Presidential Proclamation that such area
report of the Philippine Appraisal Company on the has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is
subject properties. Even though petitioners did not temporarily suspended pending action by the
specify in their Amended Complaint in the Injunction Commonwealth Government.
Case the exact amount of damages they were seeking to
recover, leaving the same to the determination of the Issue: Whether or not the complaint of the plaintiffs-
trial court, and petitioners expressly prayed that they be respondents states no cause of action and the petition
awarded damages of not less than P70,000,000.00 in for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do
their Damages complaint, petitioners cannot deny that not entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. Yes!
all their claims for damages arose from what they
averred was a fictitious public auction sale of the Held: It is plain and Supreme Court (SC) is of the opinion
subject properties. that the complaint filed by the plaintiff respondent in
Page 58 of 85
the court below does not state facts sufficient to grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s
constitute a cause of action. A cause of action is an act motion to dismiss, and therefore we have to dismiss the
or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or present petition.
rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal
right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the This Court, in special civil actions of certiorari and
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in prohibition, can only determine the question whether
violation of said legal right. In the present case the or not the court acted without or in excess of its
complaint alleges the legal right of the plaintiffs to be jurisdiction or with grave abuse of its discretion in doing
paid the amount due them from the defendant, as well the act complained of. SC cannot correct errors
as the correlative obligation of the defendant to pay committed by the lower courts in their judgments,
said debts to the plaintiffs when it becomes due and decrees or orders rendered in the exercise of their
payable; but not the omission on the part of the jurisdiction.
defendant to pay in violation of the legal rights of the
plaintiffs to be paid, because according to the above H. G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
quoted provision of Executive Order No. 32, said debts PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO,
are not yet payable or their payment cannot be ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO,
enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
which is still in force. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35),
PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M.
As the defendant herein petitioner is not yet in default, ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO,
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him. While the ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
debt moratorium is in force the defendant-petitioner MANALO, respondents.
has no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs, and the latter
cannot file a suit against him in the courts of justice FACTS: Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara
requiring him to recognize his debts to the plaintiffs and Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14,
to pay them (after the moratorium) not only the 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and
amount of the indebtedness, but the legal interest his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
thereon from the filling of the complaint, the attorney's Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
fees of ten per centum of the amounts due, and the Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo,
costs of the suits. Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and
Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
There is no such action to compel a defendant to
acknowledge or recognize his debt which is not yet At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several
payable, distinct and different from the action for real properties located in Manila and in the province of
recovery or payment of a debt already due and payable, Tarlac including a business under the name and style
against the debtor who refuses to pay it. To allow the Manalo's Machine Shop.
plaintiffs' action and grant the relief demanded in the
complaint, would be to compel the defendant to pay On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are
legal interest of the amount claimed from filing of the eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio
said complaint, as well as the attorney’s fees of 10 per Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina,
cent of the sum due thereon as stipulated, and the costs Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition
of the suit, as if the defendants' obligations to the with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of
plaintiffs were already payable and he had failed or the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father,
refused to pay them. Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
Why should the defendant be required to bear the
expenses incidental to a suit before he has violated the On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the
plaintiffs' right? How could plaintiffs assume that the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the
defendant will not pay his debts when they become whole world in default, except the government.
payable, and for that reason they have filed this action However, the trial court upon motion of the petitioners
against defendant? Why should not the contrary be set the order of general default aside and granted
presumed, that is, that the debtor will pay his obligation herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S.
at the proper time, in order to prevent a suit, preserve Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who
its credit, and avoid the expenses incident to a suit, and (10) days within which to file their opposition to the
the payment of legal interest on the amount due and petition.
attorney's fees? After stating SC’s opinion that the On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order a.)
complaint of the plaintiff’s respondent’s states no cause Admitting the opposition of the petitioners only for the
of action, SC has to hold that the facts stated in the purpose of considering the merits thereof and b.)
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the denying the prayer of the petitioners for a preliminary
present case do not entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the
It requires no argument to show that the respondent dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses
judge had jurisdiction and did not exceed it or act with
Page 59 of 85
being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature
issue of the present proceeding of an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts
of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a
contending that there was absence of earnest efforts deceased person, such as the fact of death of the late
toward compromise among members of the same Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his
family. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said
certiorari and the motion for reconsideration of the said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his
resolution was likewise dismissed. residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the
The petitioners alleged that the CA erred in upholding administration of the estate rest. The petition in
the orders of the RTC which denied their motion for the SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of
outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of
of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to the properties left by the deceased which are sought to
aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
members of the same family have been made prior to relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
the filling of the petition but that the same have failed. doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein
(private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement
Petitioners claimed that the petition in SP. PROC. No. of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.
92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family. They point out that it Petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC.
contains certain averments, which, according to them, No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special
are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit: proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
X X X person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would
since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the
not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO. which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage construed in order to promote their object and to assist
and control the properties aforementioned, without the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage determination of every action and proceedings.'
xxx. Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so
X X X broad that it must necessarily include special
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and proceedings.
controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not
prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1,
xxx. Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation
X X X of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the
Thus, according to the petitioners, the petition should dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of
be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter
Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a provision is clear enough. Article 222 of the Civil Code is
complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear
precedent for filling the claim has not been complied from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver person or persons against another or other in a court of
in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which
efforts toward a compromise have been made involving the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
members of the same family prior to the filling of the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A
petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice,
Philippines. whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the action/petition? – IT IS
A SPECIAL PROCEEDING It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein
RULING: It is a fundamental rule that in the petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-
determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, 63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant
the averments and the character of the relief sought in was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of
the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. The respondents merely seek to establish the fact
Page 60 of 85
of death of their father and subsequently to be duly (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners
that they can validly exercise their right to participate in are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling
the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5)
decedent consistent with the limited and special Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the
jurisdiction of the probate court. decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of
the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626
contains certain averments which may be typical of an On the other hand, Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors contending that the Shari’a District Court has no
therein, took advantage of the said defect in the jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro
petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic and
which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an that private respondents’ complaint is barred by
Answer containing admissions and denials, special and prescription.
affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for
actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court
fees and costs in an apparent effort to make out a case dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The
of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the
Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code. settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims. On August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed granted the motion for reconsideration filed by
to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition respomdents.
for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio
Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and Petitioners seek recourse before this Court alleging that
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized respondent Shari’a District Court-Marawi City lacks
that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited jurisdiction over petitioners who are Roman Catholics
and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of and non-Muslims.
collateral matters and issues which may be properly
threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, ISSUES:
the rule has always been to the effect that the 1. What is the nature of the complaint filed by
jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature respondents before the Shari’a Court? - IT IS A SPECIAL
of an action, is determined by the averments in the PROCEEDING
complaint and not by the defenses contained in the 2. WON the Shari’a Court has jurisdiction over the
answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too compliant? –YES, it has authority to receive evidences
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its to determine whether the deceased is a Muslim or not.
proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it 3. WON the motion for reconsideration is defective for
should be in the instant petition for settlement of lack of notice of hearing. –NO
estate. 4. WON the action has prescribed. - NO
I. G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009 RULING: 1. The determination of the nature of an action
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., or proceeding is controlled by the averments and
LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA character of the relief sought in the complaint or
ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners, petition. The designation given by parties to their own
vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided
MONTAÑER, Respondents. by the substantive averments of the pleadings."
FACTS: On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Although private respondents designated the pleading
Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint"
Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the
Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
Montañer-Dalupan are their children. On May 26, 1995, sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died. of the estate of a deceased Muslim, such as the fact of
Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation
On August 19, 2005, respondents Liling Disangcopan that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an
and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as
Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of known to the private respondents, and a probable list of
properties before the Shari’a District Court. In the said the properties left by the decedent, which are the very
complaint, respondents made the following allegations: properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
Page 61 of 85
Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the appointment of administrators or executors regardless
intention of the private respondents to seek judicial of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.
settlement of the estate of the decedent.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners
We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a that the district court does not have jurisdiction over
quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, the case because of an allegation in their answer with a
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim.
deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and
the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses
as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss.
status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special the defendant or result in having "a case either thrown
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of stratagem. Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of which is dependent on a question of fact does not
estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death render the court to lose or be deprived of its
of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as jurisdiction." In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court
among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has
respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine
Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after
recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the
The erroneous understanding of the proceeding by the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court
petitioners is attributable to the fact that the parties should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and
the case was denominated as a special civil action. 3. The Rules require every written motion to be set for
hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a hearing to all parties concerned. The Rules also provide
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted
definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, upon by the court without proof of service thereof."
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its
action, in which "a party sues another for the provisions "in order to promote the objective of
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of
or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse every action and proceeding." Moreover, this Court has
parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of
the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will
seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no defect in the questioned final and executory judgment
definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being therein." In these exceptional cases, the Court considers
sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, that "no party can even claim a vested right in
the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as
decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than
pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those on technicalities.
entitled to the same.
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the
2. Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the
of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims: control its process to ensure conformity with the law
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because
District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result
over: in a miscarriage of justice. In addition, the present case
xxxx calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate affected.
of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
Page 62 of 85
4. Petitioners’ argument that the action has prescribed no part of the compensation to which Lora would be
is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not entitled to receive could be paid to any companion or
yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the helper of Lora. From the facts alleged in the complaint,
estate of the decedent. In the event that a special it is clear that there is a primary right in favor of
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a Marquez (to be paid for his services even through Lora
decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, only) and a corresponding duty devolving upon the
including prescription in relation to recognition and respondents (to pay for said services). Since (as alleged
filiation, should be raised and settled in the said respondents refused to comply with their duty,
proceeding. The court, in its capacity as a probate court, Marquez now is entitled to enforce his legal right by an
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the action in court. The complaint in the case at bar,
decedent. In the case at bar, the determination of the therefore, contains both the primary right and duty and
heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer the delict or wrong combined which constitute the
to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has cause of action in the legal sense as used in Code
jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent. Pleading, and the cause of action is full and complete.
J. G.R. No. L-4845. December 24, 1952 2. The principle underlying respondents’ objection is
L. G. MARQUEZ and Z. GUTIERREZ LORA, plaintiffs. L. one of procedure recognized under the common law,
G. Marquez, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCISCO VARELA where no one could sue for the breach of a contract
and CARMEN VARELA, Defendants-Appellees. who was not a party thereto, and the action allowed to
be brought only in the name of the one holding the
FACTS: Gutierrez Lora was authorized by respondents legal title or interest therein and not of substantive law.
Valera to negotiate the sale of their share or interest in The requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity
a parcel of land on Plaza Goiti, Manila. Lora and L. G. of contract.
Marquez (herein petitioners), a real estate broker,
agreed to work together for the sale of respondents’ Under the common law, in order that two or more
property. Petitioners found a ready, willing, and able persons may join in an action upon a contract, there
buyer, which accepted respondents’ price and terms, must be community of interest between them; that is,
but that thereafter respondents, without any justifiable they must be parties to the contract and jointly
reason, refused to carry out the sale and to execute the interested therein. Persons subsequently admitted to
necessary deed therefor; and that as a consequence the benefit of a contract, without the privity or assent
petitioners failed to receive the commission which they of the promisor, cannot join in a suit on the contract.
were entitled to receive.
But we did not import into this jurisdiction the common
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint law procedure. Our original Code of Civil Procedure (Act
as to L. G. Marquez on the ground that he has no cause 190) was taken mainly from the Code of Civil Procedure
of action against respondents. Such motion having been of California, and this in turn was based upon the Code
granted, plaintiff L. G. Marquez has prosecuted this of Civil Procedure of New York adopted in that stated in
appeal. 1948. Our system of pleading is based on the Code
Pleading, that system used in the states of the Union
The respondents contended that Marquez cannot join that had adopted codes of procedure. Such code system
in this action and enforce therein his rights directly of pleading adopted in substance the rules of equity
against them, evidently because respondents never practice as to parties, under which "all persons having
dealt with Marquez, directly or indirectly, or, in other an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining
words, that both Marquez and his services were not the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs." In
known to them. New York and California interest in the subject matter,
or in any relief growing out of the same transaction or
ISSUES: series of transactions is sufficient to allow joinder.
1. WON there is a valid cause of action in favor of
Marquez against the respondents. –YES The principle underlying the rule is that all persons
2. WON Marquez is a real party in interest over the having a material interest under the substantive law
subject action considering that he is not a party of the should be made parties, as distinguished from that of
contract between Lora and the Varelas. – YES the common law which allowed only a two-sided
controversy, each party to be opposed to the other.
RULING: 1. It is not denied that Lora, if he rendered the
service alleged in the complaint, would have a right to The above principles have not been changed by the
be paid compensation for the service he rendered reforms in the rules in 1940 and 1941. The action is still
jointly with Marquez. He acted as a broker, and a broker to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
is entitled to a commission for his services. There is no interest. Under section 6 of Rule 3, "All persons in
prohibition in law against the employment of a whom . . . any right to relief in respect to or arising out
companion to look for a buyer; neither is it against of the same transaction . . . is alleged to exist, whether
public policy. Neither was there even any implied jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, . . . join as
understanding between Lora and the respondents that
Page 63 of 85
plaintiffs . . ., where any question of law or fact common MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition in which it
to all such plaintiffs . . . may arise in the action; . . ." asserted that a complaint cannot be separated from its
annexes; hence, the trial court in resolving a motion to
Marquez, in the case at bar, clearly falls under the dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
above rule. He is entitled to be paid his commission out action must consider the complaint’s annexes.
of the very contract of agency between Lora and the
respondents; Lora and he acted jointly in rendering RTC issued an order denying MOELCI II’s motion. Thus,
services to respondents under Lora’s contract, and the MOELCI II elevated the case to the CA alleging grave
same questions of law and fact govern their claims. The abuse of discretion on the part of Judge of the RTC for
rules do not require the existence of privity of contract denying its motion. The CA dismissed MOELCI II’s
between Marquez and the respondents as required petition holding that the allegations in David’s
under the common law; all that they demand is that complaint constitute a cause of action. Hence, this
Marquez has a material interest in the subject of the petition.
action, the right to share in the broker’s commission to
be paid Lora under the latter’s contract, which right ISSUES:
Lora does not deny. This is sufficient to justify the 1. WON the complaint states a cause of action. –YES
joinder of Marquez as a party plaintiff, even in the 2. WON the denial of the motion for preliminary hearing
absence of privity of contract between him and the is erroneous. –NO
respondents.
RULING: 1. Citing the case of The Heirs of Juliana
CAUSE OF ACTION DISTINGUISHED FROM RIGHT OF Clavano v. Genato, the Supreme Court ruled that it is a
ACTION. The term "cause of action" has been held to be well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on
synonymous with "right of action" ; but in Code the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
Pleading one is distinguished from the other in that a action, the question submitted to the court for
right of action is a remedial right belonging to some determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the
person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or
the operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
The right of action is a matter of right and depends on admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting
the substantive law, while the cause of action is a them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
matter of statement and is governed by the law of in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated
procedure. otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of action must
appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a
K. G.R. No. 129928 August 25, 2005 dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC., considered nor facts not alleged, which would require
Petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO S. DAVID, Respondent. evidence and therefore must be raised as defenses and
await the trial. In other words, to determine the
FACTS: Private respondent Virgilio S. David (hereinafter, sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged
David), a supplier of electrical hardware, filed a case for in the complaint, and no other should be considered.
specific performance and damages against MOELCI II, a The respondent Judge of the above cited case departed
rural electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental. The from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving
said case, which was essentially a collection suit, was evidence in support of the private respondent’s
predicated on a document attached to the complaint as affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of action.
Annex ‘’a’’ which according to David is the contract
pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of To determine the existence of a cause of action, only
10 MVA Transformer. the statements in the complaint may be properly
considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of
MOELCI II filed a Motion (For Preliminary Hearing of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine
Affirmative Defenses and Deferment of Pre-Trial their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish
Conference) on the ground of lack of cause of action, sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
there being allegedly no enforceable contract between maintained, the same should not be dismissed
David and MOELCI II. MOELCI II argued that the regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
document referred to by David was only a quotation defendants.
letter and not a contract. Thus, it contends that David’s
Amended Complaint is dismissible for failure to state a The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint
cause of action. as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
David contended that because a motion to dismiss on valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
the ground of failure to state a cause of action is complaint.
required to be based only on the allegations of the
complaint, the "quotation letter," being merely an In the case at bar, it has been hypothetically admitted
attachment to the complaint and not part of its that the parties had entered into a contract sale David
allegations, cannot be inquired into. bound himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10 MVA
Page 64 of 85
Power transformer with accessories for a total price of Such interpretation is now specifically expressed in the
₱5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 6, Rule 16
price of ₱2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal provides that a grant of preliminary hearing rests on the
demands, MOELCI II has failed to pay the price thereof sound discretion of the court, to wit-
plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of SEC. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.- If no
₱272,722.27; and that apart from the previously stated motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for
contract of sale, David regularly delivered various dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an
electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion
demands, has an outstanding balance of ₱281,939.76. of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon
as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
We believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause
of action. Even extending our scrutiny to Annex "A," Based on the foregoing, a preliminary hearing
which is after all deemed a part of the Amended undeniably is subject to the discretion of the trial court.
Complaint, will not result to a change in our conclusion. Absent any showing that the trial court had acted
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such
Contrary to MOELCI II’s assertion, Annex "A" is not an grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of
"undisguised quotation letter." While Annex "A" is jurisdiction, as in the present case, the trial court’s
captioned as such, the presence of the signatures of order granting or dispensing with the need for a
both the General Manager and the Chairman of the preliminary hearing may not be corrected by certiorari.
Committee of Management immediately below the
word "CONFORME" appearing on the document’s last I. G.R. No. 140892. September 21, 2005
page lends credulity to David’s contention that there Dr. Ibarra S. Santos and Josefina M. Rivera, Petitioners,
was, or might have been, a meeting of minds on the vs. Spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon and Virginia
terms embodied therein. Thus, the appendage of Annex Enales, Respondent.
"A" does not entirely serve to extinguish David’s claims.
FACTS: Records show that on September 25, 1995,
In fact, the ambiguity of the import and nature of Annex respondent spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon filed with
"A" which necessitates a resort to its proper the MTC of Parañaque City a complaint for forcible
interpretation, strengthens the propriety of the trial entry against Josefina Rivera, petitioner. Petitioner
court’s denial of MOELCI II’s Motion. The interpretation Rivera claimed that the real owner of the subject
of a document requires introduction of evidence which property is Dr. Ibarra Santos, also a petitioner.
is precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a
complaint states a cause of action. The Court of Appeals The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent
therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI II’s petition and spouses de Leon. Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed the
upheld the trial court’s ruling. MTC Decision. Petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review, but it was denied.
Now, whether in truth Annex "A" is, as entitled, a mere
quotation letter is a matter that could best be proven Subsequently, or on July 3, 1996, petitioners Dr. Ibarra
during a full-blown hearing rather than through a Santos and Josefina Rivera filed with the RTC, Branch
preliminary hearing as this may involve extensive proof. 260, Parañaque City, Civil Case No. 96-0285 for
Verily, where a preliminary hearing will not suffice, it is declaration of nullity of a Deed of Sale with prayer for a
incumbent upon the trial court to deny a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
preliminary hearing and go on to trial. The veracity of Impleaded as defendants were spouses Pablo and
the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the Nieves de Leon (herein respondents), Virginia Enales
trial of the case on the merits. and Pericles Telan, deputy sheriff IV of the said MTC.
2. In Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals, The complaint alleges that petitioner, Dr. Ibarra Santos,
decided under the old Rules of Court, we held that a is the registered owner of the subject parcel of land and
preliminary hearing permitted under Section 5, Rule 16, its improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It No. 69150 of the Registry of Deeds; that Virginia Enales
rests largely on the sound discretion of the court, thus: and Rosendo Rivera (deceased husband of petitioner
SEC. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any Josefina Rivera) sold Dr. Santos’ property to respondent
of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, spouses de Leon; and that in Civil Case No. 9500 for
except improper venue, may be pleaded as an forcible entry filed by said respondent spouses with the
affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be MTC of Parañaque City involving the same property, a
had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. writ of execution was issued evicting from the premises
petitioner Josefina Rivera, the lessee of Dr. Santos.
The use of the word "may" in the aforequoted provision Petitioners Dr. Santos and Rivera thus prayed that the
shows that such a hearing is not mandatory but Deed of Sale between Virginia Enales and Rosendo
discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, Rivera, as vendors, and respondent spouses de Leon, as
opportunity, permission and possibility. vendees, be declared void; and that a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction be
Page 65 of 85
issued enjoining the sheriff from implementing the and that her right as a lessee has been prejudiced when
Decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 9500. the property, belonging to Dr. Santos, was sold by
persons who are not its real owners to spouses de Leon.
On August 1, 1996, respondent spouses de Leon filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it In determining whether the allegations of the complaint
states no cause of action. The motion was granted. are sufficient to support a cause of action, the
complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
Hence, both petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals proving the existence of a cause at the outset; this will
a petition for review. The CA subsequently denied the have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. A
petition holding that the complaint does not state a complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of
cause of action considering that while it alleges that the the cause of action even though the allegations may be
Deed of Sale is null and void, however, petitioner Dr. vague and indefinite. To sustain a motion to dismiss for
Santos failed to specify the grounds why the said lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that
document is a nullity and should, therefore, be the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
annulled. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
but was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, the indefinite or uncertain. The determination of the issue
instant petition. of ownership of a property requires proofs which can be
threshed out, not in a motion to dismiss, but in a full-
Petitioners Dr. Santos and Rivera contend that the Court blown trial on the merits.
of Appeals erred in ruling that the complaint states no
cause of action. They insist that the allegations therein M. G.R. No. 172175 October 9, 2006
"are sufficient for rendering a valid judgment in SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA,
accordance with their prayer." Their complaint states petitioners, vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
only the ultimate facts since the details can be proven respondent.
during the trial.
FACTS: On February 18, 2003, spouses Expedito and
ISSUE: WON the allegations in the complaint are Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. - YES foreclosure proceedings and loan documents with
damages against respondent Chinabank before the
RULING: The general rule is that the allegations in a Regional Trial Court. They alleged that on June 28, 1995,
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action they obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00
against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, from respondent secured by a Real Estate Mortgage
the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
accordance with the prayer therein. Title (TCT) No. T-23136.
A cause of action exists if the following elements are Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by paying their loan obligations hence they requested for
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is restructuring which was allegedly granted by
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named Chinabank. Hence, they were surprised when
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject
an act or omission on the part of such defendant property on October 9, 2001 where it emerged as the
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a highest bidder. Respondent bank was issued a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff Provisional Certificate of Sale and upon petitioners’
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery failure to redeem the property, ownership was
of damages. consolidated in its favor.
The above allegations quoted above sufficiently According to petitioners, the foreclosure proceedings
establish a cause of action. They specify that petitioners should be annulled for failure to comply with the
Dr. Ibarra Santos is the absolute owner of the disputed posting and publication requirements. They also
parcel of land and the improvements thereon. His claim claimed that they signed the Real Estate Mortgage and
of ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Promissory Note in blank and were not given a copy and
No. 4569216 of the Registry of Deeds for Parañaque the interest rates thereon were unilaterally fixed by the
City. Definitely, as the registered owner of the subject respondent.
property, he has a cause of action against spouses de
Leon who claim to have purchased the same from The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA ruled that
Virginia Enales and Rosendo Rivera who are not the true the complaint states no cause of action because
owners thereof. petitioners admitted that they failed to redeem the
property and that ownership of the same was
On the part of petitioner Josefina Rivera, she alleged in consolidated in the name of Chinabank. Hence, this
the same complaint that she has been in possession, as petition.
a lessee, of the same property since 1983 as shown by a
Contract of Lease between her and Dr. Ibarra Santos; ISSUE: WON the complaint states a cause of action-YES
Page 66 of 85
RULING: A cause of action is a formal statement of the We find the allegations in the complaint sufficient to
operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The establish a cause of action for nullifying the foreclosure
question of whether the complaint states a cause of of the mortgaged property. The fact that petitioners
action is determined by its averments regarding the acts admitted that they failed to redeem the property and
committed by the defendant. Thus it "must contain a that the title was consolidated in respondent bank’s
concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts name did not preclude them from seeking to nullify the
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action." Failure to extrajudicial foreclosure. Precisely, petitioners seek to
make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the nullify the proceedings based on circumstances
complaint "warrants its dismissal." obtaining prior to and during the foreclosure which
render it void.
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party N. G.R. No. L-32958 November 8, 1930
violates the right of another. Its essential elements are BLOSSOM AND COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
as follows: vs. MANILA GAS CORPORATION, defendant-appellee.
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is "As a general rule a contract to do several things at
created; several times is divisible in its nature, so as to authorize
2. An obligation on the part of the named successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a
defendant to respect or not to violate such single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no
right; and bar to a suit for a subsequent breach thereof. But where
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total,
in violation of the right of the plaintiff or there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein
constituting a breach of the obligation of the recover all his damages."
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages FACTS: On March 3, 1927, the plaintiff filed a
or other appropriate relief. complaint against the defendant contending that on
September 10, 1918, it entered into a contract with the
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element defendant in which the plaintiff promised and
that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right undertook to purchase and receive from the defendant
to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages and the defendant agreed to sell and deliver to the
or other appropriate relief. In determining whether an plaintiff, for a period of four years, three tons of water
initiatory pleading states a cause of action, "the test is gas tar per month from September to January 1, 1919
as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can and twenty tons per month after January 1, 1919, for
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the remaining period of the contract; one-half ton of
the prayer?" To be taken into account are only the coal gas tar a month from September to January 1,
material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts 1919, and six tons per month after January 1, 1919, for
and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not the remainder of the contract. (old contract)
considered. The court may consider in addition to the
complaint the appended annexes or documents, other On January 31, 1919, this contract was amended so that
pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records. it should continue to remain in force for a period of ten
years from January 1, 1919, and it was agreed that the
In the instant case, petitioners specifically alleged that plaintiff should not be obliged to take the qualities of
respondent bank acted in bad faith when it the tars required during the year 1919, but that it might
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property purchase tars in such quantities as it could use to its
notwithstanding the approval of the restructuring of advantage at the stipulated price. That after the year
their loan obligation. They claimed that with such 1919 the plaintiff would take at least the quantities
approval, respondent bank made them believe that specified in the contract of September 10, 1918, to be
foreclosure would be held in abeyance. They also taken from and after January 1, 1919, and that at its
alleged that the proceeding was conducted without option it would have the right to take any quantity of
complying with the posting and publication water gas tar in excess of the minimum quantity
requirements. specified in that contract and up to the total amount of
output of that tar of defendant's plant and also to take
Assuming these allegations to be true, petitioners can any quantity of coal gas tar in excess of the minimum
validly seek the nullification of the foreclosure since the quantity specified in that contract and up to 50 per cent
alleged restructuring of their debt would effectively of defendant's entire output of coal gas tar, and that by
modify the terms of the original loan obligations and giving the defendant ninety days' notice, it would have
accordingly supersede the original mortgage thus the right at its option to take the entire output of
making the subsequent foreclosure void. Similarly, the defendant's coal gas tar, except such as it might need
allegation of lack of notice if subsequently proven for its own use in and about its plant. That in
renders the foreclosure a nullity in line with prevailing consideration of this modification of the contract,
jurisprudence. plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant of
certain piece of land to which the plaintiff in turn
Page 67 of 85
executed a mortgage thereon to the defendant for The defendant contended that the complaint has the
P17,140.20, to secure the payment of the balance of the same cause of action as the action brought on or about
purchase price. (10-year contract) the 16th day of June, 1925, wherein said plaintiff
recovered judgment upon the merits thereof, against
That about the last part of July, 1920 the defendant said defendant decreeing a breach of the contract sued
herein, the Manila Gas Corporation willfully, and upon herein, and awarding damages therefor in the
deliberately breached its said contract with the plaintiff sum of P26,119.08.
by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar to it
thereunder solely because of the increased price of its The RTC rendered judgment awarding damages to
tar products and its desire to secure better prices plaintiff only amounting to 2, 219.60. The plaintiff
therefor than plaintiff was obliged to pay to it, appealed the case seeking to recover damages from the
notwithstanding the frequent and urgent demands defendant which it claims to have sustained after
made by the plaintiff upon it to comply with its September, 1923, arising from, and growing out of, its
aforesaid contract by continuing to deliver the coal and original contract of September 10, 1918, as modified on
water gas tar to the plaintiff thereunder, but the said January 1, 1919, to continue for a period of ten years
defendant flatly refused to make any deliveries under from that date.
said contract.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff, in a former action, having
On November 23, 1923, the plaintiff was forced to recovered judgment for the damages which it sustained
commence an action against the defendant before the by reason of a breach of its contract by the defendant
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the damages up to September, 1923, can now in this action recover
which it had up to that time suffered by reason of such damages it may have sustained after September, 1923,
flagrant violation of said contract on the part of the arising from, and growing out of, a breach of the same
defendant herein, and to obtain the specific contract, upon and for which it recovered its judgment
performance of the said contract. in the former action. –NO
Judgment was rendered by RTC in favor of the plaintiff RULING: Plaintiff’s original cause of action, in which it
herein and against the said defendant, the Manila Gas recovered judgment for damages, was founded on the
Corporation, for the sum of P26,119.08, as the damages ten-year contract, and that the damages which it then
suffered by this plaintiff by the defendant's breach of recovered were recovered for a breach of that contract.
said contract from July, 1920, up to and including Both actions are founded on one and the same contract.
September, 1923, but the court refused to order the In the instant case the plaintiff alleges and relies upon
said defendant to resume the delivery of the coal and the ten year contract on January 11, 1920, which in bad
water gas tar to the plaintiff under said contract, but faith was broken by the defendant.
left the plaintiff with its remedy for damages against
said defendant for the subsequent breaches of said As a general rule a contract to do several things at
contract, which said decision was affirmed by our several times in its nature, so as to authorize successive
Supreme Court on March 3, 1926. actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of
a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for
The defendant made no deliveries under its contract, a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant
from July, 1920 to March 26, 1926, or until after the or contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all
court for damages. his damages.
On January 31, 1926, Plaintiff notified defendant in The counsel for the plaintiff contends that the former
writing that it desired to take the delivery of 50 per cent judgment did not constitute a bar to the present action
of defendant's coal tar production for that month and but that the plaintiff had the right to elect to waive or
that on November 1, 1926, it desired to take the entire disregard the breach, keep the contract in force, and
output of defendant's coal gas tar. But still defendant maintain successive actions for time to time as the
refused to make either of such deliveries unless plaintiff installments of goods were to be delivered, how
would take all of its water gas tar production with the numerous these actions might be.
desired quantity of coal gas tar which refusal was a plain
violation of the contract. Plaintiff further notified As there was a total breach of the contract by the
defendant that in February, 1927, it would require 50 defendant's refusal to deliver, the plaintiff cannot split
per cent of its total water gas tar production and that in up his demand and maintain successive actions, but
April 1927, it would require the total output of the must either recover all his damages in the first suit or
defendant of both coal and water gas tars, and that it wait until the contract matured or the time for the
refused to make either of such deliveries. Thus, plaintiff delivery of all the goods had arrived. In other words,
filed an action for rescission of the contract and there can be but one action for damages for a total
damages amounting to 300,000.00 breach of an entire contract to deliver goods, and the
fact that they were to be delivered in installment from
time to time does not change the general rule.
Page 68 of 85
It will thus be seen that, where there is a complete and RULING: "The rule is well established that the creditor
total breach of a continuous contract for a term of may waive whatever security he has and maintain a
years, the recovery of a judgment for damages by personal action, in the absence of statutory provisions
reason of the breach is a bar to another action on the to the contrary."
same contract for and on account of the continuous
breach. Most of the provisions of our Code of Civil Procedure
are taken from that of California, and in that jurisdiction
Plaintiff contends that such deliveries were made under the rule has always been, and still is, that a party who
and in continuation of the old contract. The record sues and obtains a personal judgment against a
tends to show that tars which the defendant delivered defendant upon a note, waives thereby his right to
after April 7, 1926, were not delivered under the old foreclose the mortgage securing it.
contract of January 1, 1920, and that at all times since
July 1920, the defendant has consistently refused to We have the rule against splitting a single cause of
make any deliveries of any tars under that contract. action. This rule, though not contained in any statutory
provision, has been applied by this court in all
O. G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939 appropriate cases. The rule against splitting a single
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated
vs. ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL litigation between the same parties in regard to the
CO., INC., defendants-appellees. same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from
unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and
FACTS: On June 11 , 1930, defendant herein, Esteban expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from
Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, executed in favor that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem
of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the
note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos same cause). And it developed, certainly not as an
(P1,614), and in security for its payment, Esteban original legal right of the defendant, but as an
Icarañgal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of interposition of courts upon principles of public policy
land in Pañgil, Laguna, which was duly registered on to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to a
August 5, 1931, in the registry of deeds of the Province repeated and unnecessary litigations.
of Laguna. Thereafter, promissors defaulted in the
payment of the agreed monthly installments; For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the
wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the CFI an action for creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor.
the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment This single cause of action consists in the recovery of
was there rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of execution the credit with execution of the security. In other
was subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the words, the creditor in his action may make two
provincial sheriff of Laguna, at the indication of the demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure
plaintiff, levied on the properties of the defendants, of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same
including that which has been mortgaged by Esteban cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that
Icarañgal in favor of the plaintiff. reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though
the debt and the mortgage constitute separate
The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by both refer to one and the same obligation.
virtue of a writ of execution issued by the municipal Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for
court of the City of Manila, the property which was the a single breach of that obligation.
subject of the mortgage and which has been levied
upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at In the case at bar, Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule
the public auction on May 12, 1933. above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action
by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and
By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the
from the sale of the property and, in consequence mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint
thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the
remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously
action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court or successively, one to recover his credit and another to
dismissed the action thus the plaintiff took the present foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing
appeal. him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so
much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and
ISSUE: WON plaintiff is barred from foreclosing the real oppression to the debtor.
estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a
personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express
the promissory note for the payment of which the statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
mortgage was constituted as a security. -YES against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for
debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other
words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but
Page 69 of 85
not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no rights and privileges pertaining to said position. The
means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter,5
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal prompting respondent PCSO to file a petition for
action will leave open to him all the properties of the certiorari with the CA. The CA reversed the decision of
debtor for attachment and execution, even including the NLRC.
the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the ISSUE: W/N the claims for moral and exemplary
mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon damages of the petitioner is allegedly "tantamount to
would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency splitting of cause of action under Sec. 4, Rule 2 of the
judgment, in which case, all the properties of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure" is contrary to law.
defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are
again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. RULING: NO. The filing of a petition for damages before
the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause of action
In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of under the Revised Rules of Court. The Revised Rules of
action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to Court prohibits parties from instituting more than one
the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely suit for a single cause of action. Splitting a cause of
accidental and are all under his right of election. On the action is the act of dividing a single cause of action,
other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to claim or demand into two or more parts, and bringing
bring a personal action against the debtor and suit for one of such parts only, intending to reserve the
simultaneously or successively another action against rest for another separate action. The purpose of the
the mortgaged property, would result not only in rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to the
multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and defendant and avoid multiplicity of suits. The prevailing
obnoxious to law and equity, but also in subjecting the rule at the time that the action for unfair labor practice
defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of and illegal dismissal was filed and tried before the CIR
his residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place was that said court had no jurisdiction over claims for
where the property lies. damages. Hence, petitioner, at that time, could not
raise the issue of damages in the proceedings. However,
P. G.R. No. 147593 July 31, 2006 on January 27, 1967, the Supreme Court rendered its
GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF ruling in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Ferrer,
APPEALS and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES et al. upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims
OFFICE, respondents. for damages incidental to an employee's illegal
dismissal. Petitioner properly filed his claim for damages
FACTS: Petitioner was the Chief Legal Officer of after the declaration by the Court and before the ruling
respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office on their case became final. Such filing could not be
(PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in considered as splitting of cause of action.
the activities of CUGCO, an organization composed of
the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Q. G.R. No. L-25134 October 30, 1969
Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and THE CITY OF BACOLOD, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAN
Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). In April 1964, he MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., defendant-appellant.
was administratively charged before the Civil Service
Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules FACTS: On February 17, 1949, the City Council of
for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949
prejudicial to the interest of the service. On July 14, imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation
1965, the Civil Service Commission rendered a decision engaged in the manufacturer bottling of coca-cola,
finding petitioner guilty of the charges and pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and other soft drinks
recommending the penalty of dismissal. within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of
ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every
The following day, on July 15, 1965, the General bottle thereof," plus "a surcharge of 2% every month,
Manager of PCSO, sent petitioner a letter of dismissal, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year," upon
in accordance with the decision of the Civil Service "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned
Commission. Petitioner filed a motion for who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due"
reconsideration of the decision of the Civil Service under the ordinance. In 1959, this ordinance was
Commission on August 10, 1965. At the same time, amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by
petitioner, together with ASSPS (CUGCO), filed with the increasing the fee to "one-eighth (1/8) of a centavo for
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a complaint for unfair every bottle thereof." In other words, the fee was
labor practice against respondent PCSO and its officers. increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks.
On November 19, 1966, the CIR issued its decision Appellant refused to pay the additional fee and
finding respondent PCSO guilty of unfair labor practice challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.
for having committed discrimination against the union
and for having dismissed petitioner due to his union Under date of March 23, 1960, appellee sued appellant
activities. It ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to in Civil Case No. 5693 of the Court of First Instance of
his former position with full backwages and with all the
Page 70 of 85
Negros Occidental, with the corresponding Complaint action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action. The
alleging, inter alia: rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended
3. — That the defendant, Manager of the San Miguel "to prevent repeated litigation between the same
Brewery, Bacolod Coca Cola Plant, Bacolod Branch since parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to
the approval of Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949 as protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to
amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous
took effect on July 1, 1959, only paid to the plaintiff suits." Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rule of Court is
herein the P0.01 bottling tax per case of soft drinks unmistakably clear as to the effect of the splitting up of
thereby refusing to pay the P0.03 bottling tax per case a cause of action. It says, "if separate complaints are
of soft drinks which amounted to P26,306.54 at P0.02 brought for different parts (reliefs) of a single cause of
per case of soft drinks such as coca cola and tru orange action, the filing of the first (complaint) may be pleaded
manufactured or bottled by said company as per in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the
statement submitted by the Assistant City Treasurer of merits in either is available as a bar in the others."
Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex "C" of this
complaint; In other words, whenever a plaintiff has filed more than
one complaint for the same violation of a right, the
Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharge filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of
provided for in the ordinances in question, appellee the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any
filed a second action (Civil Case No. 7355) to collect the of the other possible reliefs arising from the same
said surcharges. Under date of July 10, 1964, it filed the violation, whether the first action is still pending, in
corresponding complaint before the same Court of First which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint
Instance of Negros Occidental. would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally
terminated, in which case, the defense would be res
ISSUE: W/N appellee may institute more than one suit adjudicata.2 Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata,
for a single cause of action. on the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on
the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since
RULING: We find appellant's position essentially either of the former is by law only the result or effect of
correct. There is no question that appellee split up its the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it.
cause of action when it filed the first complaint on
March 23, 1960, seeking the recovery of only the R. G.R. No. 133113 August 30, 2001
bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner, vs. MONTANO M. DIAZ,
mentioning in any manner the surcharges. The rule on JR., respondent.
the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force then FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a
provided: housing complex located in Quezon City. It instituted
SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. — before RTC Makati an interpleader case against Arreza
A single cause of action cannot be split up into and Diaz who were conflicting claimants of the property
two or more parts so as to be made the subject (Civil Case No. 94-2086). The RTC ruled in favor of
of different complaints. . Arreza. In view of said decision, Bliss executed a
SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. — If separate contract to sell the property to Arreza and Diaz was
complaints were brought for different parts of a constrained to transfer possession together with all
single cause of action, the filing of the first may improvements to Arreza.
be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a
judgment upon the merits in either is available Thereafter, Diaz filed a case against Arreza and Bliss for
as a bar in the others. the reimbursement of the cost of his acquisition and
improvements on the property (Civil Case No. 96-1372).
In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
pay the difference in bottling charges from July 1, 1959, judicata and lack of cause of action. RTC denied the
such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee Motion to Dismiss. Arreza appealed to CA which
to be paid said charges in full under the Ordinance, was dismissed the petition saying that res judicata does not
one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, apply because the interpleader case only settled the
appellee became entitled, as a result of such non- issue on who had a better right. It did not determine the
payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the parties‘ respective rights and obligations. The action
balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of the filed by Diaz seeks principally the collection of damages
corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a in the form of the payments Diaz made to Bliss and the
consequence of the failure to pay the former. Stated value of the improvements he introduced on the
differently, the obligation of appellant to pay the property matters that were not adjudicated upon in the
surcharges arose from the violation by said appellant of previous case for interpleader.
the same right of appellee from which the obligation to
pay the basic charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is ISSUE: Are Diaz's claims for reimbursement against
obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints for Arreza barred by res adjudicata?
each of two reliefs related to the same single cause of
Page 71 of 85
RULING: YES. The court in a complaint for interpleader approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area
shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties only to the extent of 44 hectares and has ordered that
and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, the remainder of 100 hectares to be distributed to the
obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights.
That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The On August 12, 1997, the writ of preliminary injunction
second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 issued by the RTC was challenged by some farmers
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an before the CA (Court of Appeals) through a petition (for
interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, certiorari and prohibition) praying for the lifting of the
third party complaints and responsive pleadings injunction and for issuance of writ of prohibition from
thereto, as provided by these Rules. The second further trying the RTC case. Some alleged farmer-
paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly beneficiaries went on a hunger strike on October 9,
authorize the additional pleadings and claims 1997 in front of the DAR compound in Quezon City
enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete protesting about the decision made by the Office of the
adjudication of the controversy and its incidents. President on March 29, 1996. The Office of the
Pursuant to said Rules, respondent should have filed his President resolved the strikers’ protest by issuing the
claims against petitioner Arreza in the interpleader so-called “win-win” resolution, which was drafted by
action. Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good then deputy executive secretary Renato Corona, on
faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, November 7, 1997.
respondent Diaz should have crystallized his demand
into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Governor Fortich and NQSRMDC received a copy of the
Arreza. This he failed to do. Having failed to set up his said “win-win” resolution and filed the present petition
claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with urgent
being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now prayer of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
barred. against then deputy secretary Renato Corona and DAR
secretary Ernesto Garilao. A motion for leave to
The elements of res adjudicata are: (a) that the former intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in
judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the interest. In seeking the annulment of the “win-win”
subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; resolution, the petitioners claim that the OP came up
and (d) there must be between the first and second with a purely political decision to appease the farmers
causes of action identity of parties, subject matter, and by reviving and modifying the decision (made on March
cause of action. In the present case, we find there is an 29, 1996) which has been declared final and executory
identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 94- in an order issued on June 23, 1997. They (petitioners)
2086 and Civil Case No. 96-1372. Respondent Diaz's also allege that the respondent (then deputy secretary)
cause of action in the prior case, now the crux of his committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond
present complaint against petitioner, was in the nature his jurisdiction when he drafted the questioned
of an unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which is now resolution on November 7, 1997.
barred. There being a former final judgment on the
merits in the prior case, rendered in Civil Case No. 94- ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of Res Judicata applies in the
2086 by Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of case at bar
Makati, which acquired jurisdiction over the same
parties, the same subject property, and the same cause RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the acts of
of action, the present complaint of respondent herein the petitioner does not constitute forum shopping,
(Diaz) against petitioner Arreza docketed as Civil Case “that there is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of
No. 96-1372 before the Regional Trial of Makati, Branch an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
59 should be dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata. favorable opinion other than by appeal or certiorari in
another”. The principle applies not only with respect to
S. G.R. No. 131457 April 24, 1998 suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
FORTICH vs. CORONA litigation commenced in the courts while administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
FACTS: On March 29, 1996, strikers went on protest administrative processes in anticipation of an favorable
concerning the decision of the Office of the President administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This
issued through the executive secretary Ruben Torres specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the
which approved the conversion of a 144 hectare of second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
agricultural land to an agro-industrial (institutional) Furthermore, the court has explained that the test for
area. That event led to the issuance of the so-called determining whether a party violated the rule against
“win-win” resolution made by the Office of the forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia
President on November 7, 1997 through then Deputy are present or where a final judgement in one case will
Executive Secretary, Renato Corona, which substantially amount to res judicata in the other, which are absent in
modified its earlier decision after it had become final the case at bar.
and executory. The said resolution modified the
Page 72 of 85
A cursory examination of the cases filed by the of the President need not be impleaded. However, their
petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar motion was denied.
with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Issue: Whether the Office of the President should be
Secretary's order to proceed with the compulsory considered as an indispensable party and must
acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules. - NO
the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title Held: No. An indispensable party is a party in interest
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, without whom no final determination can be had of an
with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) action without that party being impleaded.
the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in
NQSRMDC's title, used documents which were earlier the controversy that a final decree would necessarily
declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the affect their rights, or that the court cannot proceed
cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made without without their presence. "Interests" within the meaning
payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice of this rule, should be material, directly in issue and to
to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present be affected by the decree as distinguished from a mere
petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it incidental interest in the question involved. On the
seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is
Resolution of the Office of the President dated joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such
November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long party has any real interest on the subject matter or
after the previous two cases were instituted. because any relief is demanded, but merely because the
technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is party on the record. In the case at bar, the failure to
the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer- implead the Office of the President does not warrant
beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. the dismissal of the case as such is considered as a pro
In their motion, movants contend that they are the forma party.
farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are
real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as U. De Castro vs. CA, 384 SCRA 607
Annex "I" in their motion a Master List of Farmer- Facts: Private respondent Artigo sued petitioners
Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was Constante and Amor de Castro to collect the unpaid
made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive balance of his broker’s commission from the De Castros.
portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which
directs the DAR "to carefully and meticulously The appellants, De Castros, were co-owners of 4 lots in
determine who among the claimants are qualified Cubao, Quezon City. The appellee, Artigo, was
farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of the said authorized by appellants to act as real estate broker in
document reveals that movants are those purportedly the sale of these properties for the amount of Php
"Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In 23,000,000.00, 5% of which will be given to the agent as
other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer- commission. Appellee first found the Times Transit
beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real Corporation and 2 lot were sold. In return, he received
party in interest is a party who would be benefited or Php 48,893.76 as commission.
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Real interest means a present Appellee apparently fell short changed because
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere according to him, his total commission should be Php
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or 352,500.00 which is 5% of the agreed price of Php
consequential interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants' 7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to
interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. appellants for the 2 lots that it was he who introduced
Ergo, they are not real parties in interest. the buyer to appellants and unceasingly facilitated the
negotiation which ultimately led to the consummation
T. SAMANIEGO vs AGUILA 334 SCRA 438 (2000) of the sale. Hence, he sued to collect the balance of Php
303,606.24 after having received Php 48,893.76 in
Facts: Private respondents Vic Alvarez Aguila and advance.
Josephine Taguinod filed for exemption from the
Operation Land Transfer Program of the DAR for the Appelants argued that appellee is selfishly asking for
land owned by their father Salud Aguila. The tenants more than what he truly deserved as commission to the
Samaniego, et. al, opposed the petition for exemption. prejudice of other agents who were more instrumental
The Office of the President granted the exemption. The to the consummation of the sale and that there were
petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA dismissed the more or less 18 others who took active efforts.
appeal for failure to implead the Office of the President,
as they should be considered as indispensable parties. The de Castros argued that Artigo’s complaint should
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, contending have been dismissed for failure to implead all the co-
that under Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the Office owners of the 2 lots. The de Castros contend that failure
to implead such indispensable parties is fatal to the
Page 73 of 85
complaint since Artigo, as agent of all the four co- Issue: Whether the petitioners should be exempted
owners, would be paid with funds co-owned by the four from payment of docket fees and other lawful fees as
co-owners. provided under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
– YES
It was shown also that Constante Amor de Castro signed
the authorization of Artigo as owner and representative Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the hearing
of the co-owners. requirement, contrary to petitioners’ claim, was
complied with during the hearings on the motions to
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint merits dismissal or dismiss filed by respondents. In said hearings,
failure to implead other co-owners as indispensable petitioners counsel was present and they were given
parties. the opportunity to prove their indigency. Clearly, their
non-payment of docket fees is one of the grounds
HELD: No. The de Castros’ contentions are devoid of raised by respondents in their motions to dismiss and
legal basis. The CA explained that it is not necessary to the hearings on the motions were indeed the perfect
implead the co-owners since the action is exclusively opportunity for petitioners to prove that they are
based on a contract of agency between Artigo and entitled to be treated as indigent litigants and thus
Constante. The rule on mandatory joinder of exempted from the payment of docket fees as initially
indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant found by the Executive Judge.
case.
W. National Power Corporation v. Provincial
Constante signed the note as owner and as Government of Bataan, GR No. 180654, 04/212014
representative of the other co-owners. Under this note,
a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Facts: On March 28, 2003 petitioner National Power
Constante and Artigo. Whether Constatnte appointed Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax
Artigo as agent, in Constatnte’s individual or delinquency from the respondent Provincial
representative capacity, or both, the de Castros cannot Government of Bataan (the Province) for P45.9 million
seek the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The Province
other co-owners as indispensable parties. The de based its assessment on the NPC's sale of electricity that
Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily it generated from two power plants in Bataan. Rather
liable under the contract of agency, citing Article 1915 than pay the tax or reject it, the NPC chose to reserve its
of the Civil Code, the solidary liability of the four co- right to contest the computation pending the decision
owners, however, militates against their theory that the of the Supreme Court in National Power Corporation v.
other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable City of Cabanatuan,[1] a case where the issue of the
parties. When the law expressly provides for solidarity NPC's exemption from the payment of local franchise
of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a tax was then pending.
contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to
pay the entire obligation. The agent may recover the Province again sent notices of tax due to the NPC,
whole compensation from any one of the co-principals, calling its attention to the Court's Decision in National
as in this case. Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan that held the
NPC liable for the payment of local franchise tax. The
Indeed, Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a NPC replied, however, that it had ceased to be liable for
creditor may sue any of the solidary debtors. This article the payment of that tax after Congress enacted
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Republic Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act. By operation of the EPIRA in
Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of 2001, the NPC had ceased to engage in power
the solidary debtors or some or all of them transmission, given that all its facilities for this function,
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them including its nationwide franchise, had been transferred
shall not be an obstacle to those which may to the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO).
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as
the debt has not been fully collected. The new law relieved the NPC of the function of
generating and supplying electricity beginning that year.
V. Frias v. Judge Sorongon and First Asia Realty Consequently, the Province has no right to further
Development Corp., GR No. 184827, 02/11/2015 assess it for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 local franchise
tax.
Facts: The RTC issued an order denying the petitioners’
motion for leave to litigate as indigents. Petitioners NPC received a copy of the Certificate of Sale of Real
argue that respondent judge did not conduct the proper Property covering the auctioned properties for
hearing as prescribed under Section 21, Rule 3 of the P60,477,285.22, the amount of its franchise tax
Rules of Court. They claim that private respondents delinquency.
neither submitted evidence nor were they required by
respondent judge to submit evidence in support of their On July 7, 2004 the NPC filed with the Regional Trial
motions on the issue of indigency of petitioners. Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a petition for
Page 74 of 85
declaration of nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer CATOLICO, SOPHIE CLIDORO, and JOSE CLIDORO, JR.,
for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Respondents.
Province, the provincial treasurer, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. FACTS: The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. T-2275 for revival of
The NPC alleged that the foreclosure had no legal basis judgment filed by Rizalina Clidoro, et al. against Onofre
since R.A. 7160 which authorized the collection of local Clidoro, et al., praying that the Decisiondated
franchise tax had been modified by the EPIRA. November 13, 1995 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 19831, which affirmed with modification
Issues: the RTC Decision dated March 10, 1988 in Civil Case No.
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule T-98 for partition, berevived and that the corresponding
that the NPC no longer owned or operated the writ of execution be issued.
business subject to local franchise tax;
(2) Whether or not the Province cannot execute on On September 3, 2003, defendants-appellees except
former NPC properties that had been taken Gregoria Clidoro-Palanca, moved to dismiss the said
from it and transferred to other government complaint on the following grounds: "1.) The petition,
corporations; and not being brought up against the real partiesin-interest,
(3) Whether or not PSALM and TRANSCO are is dismissible for lack of cause of action; 2.) The
indispensable parties to the case. substitution of the parties defendant is improper and is
not in accordance with the rules; 3.) Even if the decision
Ruling: NPC failed to present evidence that it no longer is ordered revived, the same cannot be executed since
owned or operated the business subject to local the legal requirements of Rule 69, Section 3 of the 1997
franchise tax and that the properties the Province levied Rules of Civil Procedure has not been complied with;
on did not belong to it. But proving these things did not and 4.) The Judgment of the Honorable Court ordering
require the presentation of evidence in this case since partition is merely interlocutory as it leaves something
these events took place by operation of law. Within six more to be done to complete the disposition of the
(6) months from the effectivity of this Act, the case."
transmission and subtransmission facilities of NPC and
all other assets related to transmission operations, After the filing of plaintiffs-appellants'
including the nationwide franchise of NPC for the Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
operation of the transmission system and the grid, shall defendants-appellees' Reply, plaintiffs-appellants'
be transferred to the TRANSCO. Rejoinder and defendants-interested parties' Sur-
Rejoinder, the RTC issued the assailed Order dated
The above created the TRANSCO and transferred to it December 8, 2003 dismissing the instant complaint for
the NPC's electrical transmission function with effect on lack of cause of action, the complaint shows that most
June 26, 2001. The NPC, therefore, ceased to operate of the parties-plaintiffs, parties defendants and
that business in Bataan by operation of law. Since the interested parties are already deceased and have no
local franchise tax is imposed on the privilege of more natural or material existence. This is contrary to
operating a franchise, not a tax on the ownership of the the provision of the Rules (Sec. 1, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of
transmission facilities, it is clear that such tax is not a Civil Procedure). They could no longer be considered as
liability of the NPC. the real parties-in-interest. Besides, pursuant to Sec. 3,
Rule 3 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), where the action
An indispensable party is one who has an interest in is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
the controversy or subject matter and in whose representative or someone acting in fiduciary capacity,
absence there cannot be a determination between the the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case.
parties already before the court which is effective, In the instant case the beneficiaries are already
complete or equitable.[2] Here, since the subject deceased persons.
properties belong to PSALM Corp. and TRANSCO, they
are certainly indispensable parties to the case that Also, the Complaint states thatthey were the original
must be necessarily included before it may properly go parties in Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition, but this is not
forward. For this reason, the proceedings below that so (paragraph 2). Some of the parties are actually not
held the NPC liable for the local franchise tax is a parties to the original case, but representing the original
nullity. parties who are indicated as deceased. From the
foregoing, the Court finds the instant complaint to be
X. G.R. No. 176598 July 9, 2014 flawed in form and substance. The suit is not brought by
PETRONIO CLIDORO, DIONISIO CLIDORO, LOLITA the real parties-ininterest, thus a motion to dismiss on
CLIDORO, CALIXTO CARD ANO, JR., LOURDES CLIDORO- the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
LARIN, MATEO CLIDORO and MARLIZA CLIDORO-DE is proper (Section 1(g), Rule 16).
UNA, Petitioners, vs. AUGUSTO JALMANZAR,
GREGORIO CLIDORO, JR., SENECA CLIDORO-CIOCSON, Issue: Whether the complaint for revival of judgment
MONSERAT CLIDORO-QUIDAY, CELESTIAL CLIDORO- may be dismissed for lack of cause of action as it was
BINASA, APOLLO CLIDORO, ROSALIE CLIDORO- not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest.
Page 75 of 85
Ruling: No. The Court emphasizes that lack of cause of With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that
action is not enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules of there would be instances where the parties in the
Court as one of the grounds for the dismissal of a original case and in the subsequent action for revival of
complaint. As explained in Vitangcol v. New Vista judgment would not be exactly the same. The mere fact
Properties, Inc.,5 to wit: that the names appearing as parties in the the
Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a complaint for revival of judgment are different from the
dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss names of the parties in the original case would not
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the necessarily mean that theyare not the real parties-in-
determination of a lack of cause of action can only be interest. What is important is that, as provided in
made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the
that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
provides that a motion may be made on the ground of the suit." Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the
"that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case for
action." revival of judgment would be benefited by the
enforcement of the decision in the partition case.
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant
hypothetically admits the truth ofthe material Y. G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986
allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
plaintiff's complaint. When a motion to dismiss is HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL &
grounded on the failure tostate a cause of action, a FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the
facts alleged in the complaint. FACTS: Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the
order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional
In a motion to dismiss for failureto state a cause of Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which
action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his
facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire
action lies on whether or not the court, admitting the original record of the case shall be transmitted to this
facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of
with the prayer of the complaint. BP129.
In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival of However, the order appealed from states that the first
judgment that the parties therein were also the parties cause of action alleged in the complaint was against
inthe action for partition. Applying the foregoing test of respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the
hypothetically admitting this allegation in the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
complaint, and not looking into the veracity of the which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various
same, it would then appear that the complaint occasions from August to October, 1981; and the
sufficiently stated a cause of action as the plaintiffs in second cause of action was against respondent
the complaint for revival of judgment (hereinafter Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
respondents), as the prevailing parties in the action for amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires
partition, had a right to seek enforcement of the which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several
decision in the partition case. occasions. Counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
It should be borne in mind that the action for revival of since the amount of the demand against said
judgment is a totally separate and distinct case from the respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section
original Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition. As explained in 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise
Saligumba v. Palanog,9 to wit: exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
procedural means of securing the execution of a (P20,000.00).
previous judgment which has become dormant after
the passage of five years without it being executed It was further averred in said motion that although
upon motion of the prevailing party. It isnot intended to another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly
re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the obligation was separate and distinct from that of the
first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a other respondent. At the hearing of said Motion to
new and independent action, different and distinct Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving
fromeither the recovery of property case or the for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack
reconstitution case [in this case, the original action for of jurisdiction.
partition], wherein the cause of action is the decision
itself and not the merits of the action upon which the Petitioner maintains that the lower court has
judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. x x x10 jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality
Page 76 of 85
rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims
of the Interim Rules. in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty
follows: thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has
Provided, That where there are several claims or causes jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are
of action between the same or different parties, separate and independent, their joinder in one
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the cause of action where the amount of the demand is
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a
action arose out of the same or different transactions. separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or
municipal trial court.
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the On the other hand, there is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount former and present rules in cases where two or more
involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a
sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former
interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the rule, "where the claims or causes of action joined in a
separate claims are owned by or due to different single complaint are separately owned by or due to
parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. jurisdictional test"
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with The difference between the former and present rules in
the pertinent portion of the former rule under Section cases of permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated
88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de
as follows: Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to
Where there are several claims or causes of action the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86
between the same parties embodied in the same Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the joined in a complaint against the defendant to collect
totality of the demand in all the causes of action, their respective claims, each of which was within the
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total
of the same or different transactions; but where the exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that
claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction.
are separately owned by or due to different parties, In said case, although the plaintiffs' demands were
each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. separate, distinct and independent of one another, their
joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and
ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly ruled on the each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In
application joinder of the permissive joinder of the the case of International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90
parties Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly
sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also
RULING: Yes. In cases of permissive joinder of parties, held that the municipal court had jurisdiction because
whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 the amount of each claim was within, although the total
of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive
jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
joining or being joined in one complaint separate
actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount Z. G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
jurisdictional test. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that FACTS: Respondents in the present Petition are the
the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with
of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu
misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple
against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their
and distinct and neither of which falls within its parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan,
jurisdiction. on 25 June 1976.3 Together with their application for
registration. The petitioner Republic of the Philippines
There is no difference between the former and present (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents'
rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing
or more separate causes of action. In such cases, the that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period
Page 77 of 85
of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in
law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient dropping of a party and the severance of any claim
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
belonging to the Republic and were not subject to
private appropriation. , the MTC promulgated its The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the
Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC
the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It
of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect
the misjoinder when the application for registration was
ISSUE: Whether the MTC has jurisdiction to proceed and still pending before it; and more regrettable that the
hear the application for registration filed by respondent petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC
to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes
RULING: No. Court finds that the MTC had no of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for before this Court.
registration filed by the respondents but for reasons
different from those presented by petitioner Republic. AA. G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975
ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and LEONARDO NG SUA and CO OYO, petitioners, vs.
expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge, Branch III,
a single application by several applicants for as long as CFI, Cebu and TAN PUT, respondents.
they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be
registered;24and (2) the filing of a single application for (TAAS KAYO NGA CASE)
registration of several parcels of land provided that the FACTS: The case was elevated to the SC by way of
same are located within the same province.25 The petition for certiorari to annul and set aside certain
Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to actuations of the CFI; specifically, its granting of the
the present situation wherein two applicants filed a motion to drop the two non-defaulted defendants and
single application for two parcels of land, but are proceeding to hear to hear the rest of Tan Put’s
seeking the separate and individual registration of the (plaintiff’s) evidence ex-parte, and subsequently
parcels of land in their respective names. rendering judgment by default against the defaulted
defendants.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide
for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, Alfonso Ng Sua and Antonio
of Court to determine the proper course of action. Lim Tanhu were partners in the commercial partnership
Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself of Glory Commercial Company with Tee Hoon as the
provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not manager. When Tee Hoon died, Tan Put, claiming to be
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be the widow, filed a complaint against spouses Antonio
applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay. Later, the complaint included
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever Lim Tanhu’s son Lim Teck Chuan, as well as the spouses
practicable and convenient." Alfonso Ng Sua and Co Oyo, and their son Eng Chong
Leonardo. Tan Put claims in her complaint that after Tee
Considering every application for land registration filed Hoon died, there was no liquidation of the company
in strict accordance with the Property Registration assets made and that she owns one third of the
Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the company shares. However, Lim Tanhu, Ng Sua, Lim Teck
joint application for registration filed by the Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo continued to manage
respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of the company and used the company funds to acquire
causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint lands and buildings in several areas. Allegedly, the
application for registration, respondents Jeremias and defendants also used the company assets to organize
David, more appropriately, should have filed separate another corporation known as Glory Commercial, Inc.
applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively. Subsequently, Tan Put amended her complaint and
added other averments. According to Tan Put, she had
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not asked the defendants to liquidate the business of the
involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear defunct partnership including real estate investments in
and proceed with the case.26 They are not even Hong Kong. The defendants did not make good in their
accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under promise to liquidate the said properties, and instead,
the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action induced her to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and
and parties involve an implied admission of the court's interests in the same. After the quitclaim was executed,
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, Lim Tanhu allegedly offered to pay her P65,000 and
acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its issued a receipt to her bearing the said amount. She
own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined signed the receipt but was not given a copy of it and
Page 78 of 85
had not received the said money. When she eventually CFI: (Ruling on the motion of Tan Put to dismiss the
made a formal demand for the accounting and counterclaim of the defendants) Overruled. The
liquidation of the partnership company’s assets, the counterclaim was accepted by the court and declared to
defendants refused and stated that they will not give be a compulsory counterclaim.
her share.
Tan Put: Denied all the allegations in the defendants
Lim Tanhu, et. al.: The amended complaint (2nd counterclaim.
paragraph) should not be admitted as there were --- However, on the date set for the pre-trial, the
material modifications of the causes of action previously spouses Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas did not appear, it
alleged. being their belief that they were all compulsory parties
and that the defense of one is the defense of all of
CFI: The judge allowed the amendment and said that them. Thus, they were all “declared in DEFAULT”. The
the present action is for accounting of real and personal said spouses tried to lift the order thru a motion for
properties as well as for the recovery of the same with reconsideration, but the court denied such. During the
damages. The amended complaint only alleged facts trial, while her allegedly adopted son Antonio Nuñez
that merely amplified the material averments was testifying and was up for re-cross-examination, Tan
constituting the cause of action in the original Put suddenly filed a motion to drop Lim Teck Chuan and
complaint. It likewise include necessary and Eng Chong Leonardo as defendants to the case without
indispensable defendants without whom no final justifications, which was granted by the court.
determination can be had in the action and in order that
complete relief is to be accorded as between those CFI: With the granting of the motion to drop Lim Teck
already parties. Thus, the amendments were allowed Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo as defendants, the case
because they did not change the main causes of action against the two was dismissed upon order. However,
in the original complaint. since the spouses Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas were
---Trial continued declared to be in default for their non-appearance in
the pretrial, they remain to be defendants in the
The defendants filed a single answer with counterclaim. complaint. Aside from giving the said order, the court
They assert that Tan Put was not Tee Hoon’s legitimate proceeded to hear ex-parte the rest of Tan Put’s
wife as the real Mrs. Tee Hoon, Ang Siok Tin, is in Hong evidence.
Kong. They also denied the allegations of fraud and --- The dropped defendants separately filed a motion
claimed that proper liquidation had been regularly for reconsideration over the said orders of the RTC, but
made of the business of the partnership and Tee Hoon were all denied. However, the denial of their motions
regularly received his share until his death. After which, was received after the RTC’s judgment was
the partnership was dissolved and his supposed share promulgated.
were all given to Ang Siok and their children.
Thus, all the defendants filed a motion to quash the
Lim Tanhu, et.al.: (By way of COUNTERCLAIM) The case order dropping the 2 defendants, but was later declared
should be dismissed since Tan Put is not the legitimate to be abandoned by the defendants. Hence this present
wife, and thus, lacks the legal capacity to sue them. petition for certiorari to annul the decision and
Further, even before the death of Tee Hoon, Tan Put actuations of the CFI.
was no longer the decedent’s common law wife and the
‘quitclaim’ was only offered to her by Lim Tanhu out of Lim Tanhu, et.al. : There was a compulsory counterclaim
the latter’s kindness and generosity. Thus, in the event in the common answer of the defendants and it is the
that Tan Put is filing the case under Art. 144 of the Civil nature of such that it cannot be decided in an
Code (this part was already removed in the present Civil independent action. Under Sec.4 Rule 18, the CFI has no
Code and was replaced by the Family Code), then, her authority to divide the case before it by dismissing the
acceptance of the ‘quitclaim’ constitutes a waiver for case against the non-defaulted defendants, and
her claims. thereafter proceeded to hear the case ex-parte and
subsequently rendering judgment against the defaulted
The newly acquired properties of the defendants were defendants. Further, under the said rule, when a
bought out of their own personal funds and not from common cause of action is alleged against several
the funds belonging to the partnership. Further, since defendants, the default of any of them is a mere
Tee Hoon and Tan Put did not have a child together, formality by which those defaulted are not allowed to
there was no one who is lawfully entitled to succeed to take part in the proceedings. But otherwise, all the
the properties left by Tee Hoon together with the defendants, defaulted and not defaulted, are supposed
widow and the legitimate children. to have but a common fate, win or lose. Thus, there
shall only be one common judgment for or against all
Tan Put: The said counterclaim should be dismissed as it the defendants, whether defaulted or non-defaulted.
is merely permissive and the corresponding filing fee Following such argument, either the CFI dismiss the
was not paid. case against all the defendants or resume the
proceedings and allow the non-defendants to defend
the case for all the defendants.
Page 79 of 85
Tan Put: The spouses Lim Tanhu and the spouses Ng be "on such terms as are just" — just to all the other
Suas were properly declared in default. Thus, they have parties.
no personality or interest to question the dismissal of
the case as against their non-defaulted co-defendants In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record to
and should suffer the consequences of their own legally justify the dropping of the non-defaulted
default. defendants, Lim and Leonardo. Even Tan Put’s motion
dropping them as defendants did not provide any
ISSUE: Whether or not, by virtue of the nature of the justification. From all appearances, Tan Put just decided
counterclaim of the defendants, either the dismissal of to ask for it, without any relevant explanation at all.
the complaint be applied to all the defendants or the Usually, the court in granting such a motion inquires for
proceedings be resumed and the non-defaulted the reasons and in the appropriate instances directs the
defendants be allowed to present defense on behalf of granting of some form of compensation for the trouble
all of them. undergone by the defendant in answering the
complaint, preparing for or proceeding partially to trial,
RULING: Yes. The defendants’ counterclaim is a hiring counsel and making corresponding expenses in
compulsory one because the same evidence to sustain it the premises. Nothing of these, appears in the order in
will also refute the cause or causes of action alleged in question. Most importantly, the judge ought to have
plaintiff's complaint. Moreover, it is compulsory considered that the outright dropping of the non-
because it is obvious that the same cannot "remain defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo, over their
pending for independent adjudication by the court." objection at that, would certainly be unjust not only to
the petitioners, their own parents, who would in
Further, under the rules, "(i)f a counterclaim has been consequence be entirely defenseless, but also to Lim
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of and Leonardo themselves who would naturally
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be correspondingly suffer from the eventual judgment
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the against their parents. Respondent court paid no heed at
counterclaim can remain pending for independent all to the mandate that such dropping must be on such
adjudication by the court." In the instant case, it was terms as are just" — meaning to all concerned with its
evident that the judgment against the defaulted legal and factual effects.
defendants was rendered before the non-defaulted
defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the order Thus, it is quite plain that respondent court erred in
dropping them as defendants in the case was received issuing its order of dismissal of the order dropping the
by them. non-defaulted defendants in the complaint as well as its
order denying reconsideration of such dismissal. Though
It should be noted that when Tan Put earlier questioned Lim and Leonardo are not parties to the herein petition,
the defendants’ counterclaim, the CFI ruled that the such consideration is inconsequential. The fate of the
same was permissive, and yet, contrary to the nature of case of petitioners is inseparably tied up with said order
compulsory counterclaim, it granted the dropping of the of dismissal, if only because the order of ex-parte
non-defaulted defendants and proceeded in hearing hearing of the case which directly affects and prejudices
Tan Put’s evidence ex-parte. said petitioners is predicated thereon.
Moreover, it is clear that all the defendants are Hence, PETITION GRANTED. All proceedings held by the
indispensable parties and under the rules of court and respondent CFI particularly the ex-parte proceedings
according to jurisprudence, “when an indispensable against the defendants are annulled and set aside.
party is not before the court (that) the action should be Further, “[r]espodent court is hereby ordered to enter
dismissed." an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal
of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein
Additionally, the order dropping the non-defaulted petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso
defendants “was not predicated on Section 2 of Rule 17 Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is
but more on Section 11 of Rule 3. But the truth is that hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further
nothing can be more incorrect.” To start with, the latter action in said civil case gave and except as herein
rule does not comprehend whimsical and irrational indicated.”
dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. What it
really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non- BB. G.R. No. 196750
joinder and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of the
anybody in a complaint in court only to drop him ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA,
unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. Petitioner, vs. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL
The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA,
been made in the honest conviction that it was proper MAUDE NOBLEZA, Respondents.
and the subsequent dropping is requested because it
has turned out that such inclusion was a mistake. And FACTS: Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a
this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping 313-square meter parcel of land located at Cor.
Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City denominated as Lot
Page 80 of 85
133-B-1-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69
(TCT) No. T- 12255 (subject land).6 During his lifetime, of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested
he contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) childrenand SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. –
(b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he A person having the right to compel the partition of real
had seven (7) children. estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth
in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, adequate description of the real estate of which
Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of his partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, other persons interested in the property.
Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold
their respective interests over the subject land to Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in
Santiago for a consideration of 447,695.66, as the property are indispensable parties; as such, an
embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the
Adjudication with Deed of Sale10 dated November 22, said parties.32
1989 (subject document),11 which was, however, not
signed by the other heirs who did not sell their In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has
respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are
Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land,
and their children).12 On December 22, 1989, the same namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion,
parties executed a Supplemental Contract13 whereby Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr.,
the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo,
aforesaid consideration, only 109,807.93 will be paid up Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and,
front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the
balance of 337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject Civil Code,33 their respective interests shall be
land.14 However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo,
T-12255 cancelled and the subject document registered Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito,
because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and
surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Neobel.34
Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the subject
land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint15 dated The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own
January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant –
receivership.16 have vested rights over the subject land and, as such,
should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude(Heirs of action for partition thereof. However, a reading of
second wife) maintained that Santiago had no legal Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s
right to file an action for judicial partition nor compel interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding
them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because, inter alia: therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly,
(a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject
shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when
asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only pursuant to Article 97235 of the Civil Code, the proper
their legitimate issues may validly inherit the same.17 representatives to his interest should have been his
children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s
ISSUE: Whether or not CA correctly ruled that Felcon’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for
siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are partition defective.
indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial
partition CC. G.R. No. 121171 December 29, 1998
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
RULING: YES. An indispensable party is one whose APPEALS, JESUS S. CABARRUS, SR., JESUS S.
interest will be affected by the court’s action in the CABARRUS, JR., JAIME T. CABARRUS, JOSE MIGUEL
litigation, and without whom no final determination of CABARRUS, ALEJANDRO S. PASTOR, JR., ANTONIO U.
the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject MIRANDA, and MIGUEL M. ANTONIO, as Minority
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so Stock-Holders of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his Corporation, respondents.
legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a FACTS: The development, exploration and utilization of
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court the mineral deposits in the Surigao Mineral Reservation
which is effective, complete, or equitable.30 Thus, the have been authorized by the Republic Act No. 1528, as
absence of an indispensable party renders all amended by Republic Act No. 2077 and Republic Act No.
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want 4167, by virtue of which laws, a memorandum of
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but agreement was drawn on July 3, 1968, whereby the
even as to those present.31 Republic of the Philippines thru the Surigao Mineral
Page 81 of 85
Reservation Board, granted MMIC the exclusive right to RULING:
explore, develop and exploit nickel, cobalt, and other 1. The RTC of Makati, Branch 62, did not have
minerals in the Surigao Mineral Reservation. MMIC is a jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award.
domestic corporation engaged in mining with
respondent Jesus S. Cabarrus Sr. as president and The use of the term "dismissed" is not "a mere semantic
among its original stockholders. The Philippine imperfection". The dispositive portion of the Order of
government undertook to support the financing of the trial court dated October 14, 1992 stated in no
MMIC by purchase of MMIC debenture bonds and uncertain terms:
extension of guarantees. 4. The Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
The term "dismiss" has a precise definition in law. "To
Further, from the DBP and/or the government financing dispose of an action, suit, or motion without trial on the
institutions to subscribe in MMIC and issue guarantee/s issues involved. Conclude, discontinue, terminate,
of foreign loans or deferred payment arrangements quash."
secured from the US Eximbank, Asian Development
Bank (ADB), Kobe steel of amount not exceeding Admittedly, the correct procedure was for the parties to
US$100 million. On July 13, 1981, MMIC, PNB, and DBP go back to the court where the case was pending to
executed a mortgage trust agreement whereby MMIC have the award confirmed by said court. However,
as mortgagor, agreed to constitute a mortgage in favor Branch 62 made the fatal mistake of issuing a final
of PNB and DBP as mortgages, over all MMIC assets; order dismissing the case. While Branch 62 should have
subject of real estate and chattel mortgage executed by merely suspended the case and not dismissed it, neither
the mortgagor, and additional assets described and of the parties questioned said dismissal. Thus, both
identified, including assets of whatever kind, nature or parties as well as said court are bound by such error.
description, which the mortgagor may acquire whether
in substitution of, in replenishment or in addition It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondents do,
thereto. Due to the unsettled obligations, a financial that petitioner APT was charged with the knowledge
restructuring plan (FRP) was suggested, however not that the "case was merely stayed until arbitration
finalized. The obligations matured and the mortgage finished," as again, the order of Branch 62 in very clear
was foreclosed. The foreclosed assets were sold to PNB terms stated that the "complaint was dismissed." By its
as the lone bidder and were assigned to the newly own action, Branch 62 had lost jurisdiction over the
formed corporations namely Nonoc Mining case. It could not have validly reacquired jurisdiction
Corporation, Maricalum Mining and Industrial over the said case on mere motion of one of the parties.
Corporation and Island Cement Corporation. In 1986, The Rules of Court is specific on how a new case may be
these assets were transferred to the asset privatization initiated and such is not done by mere motion in a
trust. On February 28, 1985, Jesus S. Cabarrus Sr. particular branch of the RTC. Consequently, as there
together with the other stockholders of MMIC, filed a was no "pending action" to speak of, the petition to
derivative suit against DBP and PNB before the RTC of confirm the arbitral award should have been filed as a
Makati branch 62, for annulment of foreclosures, new case and raffled accordingly to one of the branches
specific performance and damages. The suit docketed of the Regional Trial Court.
as civil case no. 9900, prayed that the court: 1.) Annul
the foreclosures, restore the foreclosed assets to MMIC, 2. Petitioner was not estopped from questioning the
and require the banks to account for their use and jurisdiction of Branch 62 of the RTC of Makati.
operation in the interim; 2.) Direct the banks to honor
and perform their commitments under the alleged FRP; The Court of Appeals ruled that APT was already
3.) Pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, estopped to question the jurisdiction of the RTC to
litigation expenses and costs. A compromise and confirm the arbitral award because it sought affirmative
arbitration agreement was entered by the parties to relief in said court by asking that the arbitral award be
which committee awarded damages in favor of vacated.
Cabarrus.
The rule is that "Where the court itself clearly has no
ISSUES: jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in not holding action, the invocation of this defense may be done at
that the makati regional trial court, branch 62 which has any time. It is neither for the courts nor for the parties
previously dismissed civil case no. 9900 had lost to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that
jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award under the jurisdiction this matter being legislative in character." 25
same civil case and not ruling that the application for As a rule then, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply
confirmation should have been filed as a new case to be to confer jurisdiction upon a courtbarring highly
raffled off among the different branches of the rtc. meritorious and exceptional circumstances. 26 One such
2. Whether the court of appeals likewise erred in exception was enunciated in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 27
holding that petitioner was estopped from questioning where it was held that "after voluntarily submitting a
the arbitration award, when petitioner questioned the cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
jurisdiction of the rtc-makati, branch 62 and at the same merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
time moved to vacate the arbitral award. jurisdiction or power of the court."
Page 82 of 85
Petitioner's situation is different because from the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such
outset, it has consistently held the position that the value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing
RTC, Branch 62 had no jurisdiction to confirm the the writ of execution.
arbitral award; consequently, it cannot be said that it
was estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction. The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or
Petitioner's prayer for the setting aside of the arbitral keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant
award was not inconsistent with its disavowal of the unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action
court's jurisdiction. for damages is brought by him against the officer within
one hundred twenty (1 20) days from the date of the
DD. G.R. No. L-46843 October 18, 1988 filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall
VIRGILIA CABRESOS, WELDELINO CABRESOS, RUBYLIN prevent such claimant or any third person from
CABRESOS, LUZVIMINDA CABRESOS, MARILOU vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
CABRESOS, ROQUELITO CABRESOS and SYLVIA LUNA action. (Rule 39, Sec. 17)
CABRESOS, petitioners, vs. MEYNARDO A. TIRO in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII Court of First ISSUE: Whether petitioners are considered third party
Instance of Misamis Oriental, DAMASO B. DAHINO in within the definition of the said rule
his capacity as Provincial Deputy Sheriff of Misamis
Oriental, RAMON QUIZ and GENEROSA ENRIQUEZ, RULING: YES. It is important to determine whether the
respondents. above rule applies to the petitioners. The key word in
the said rule is "third party." By "third party" is meant a
FACTS: On September 17, 1968, the private respondents person who is not a party to the action under
filed against spouses Galicano and Florentina Cabresos a consideration. We agree with the private respondents
case for recovery of ownership and possession of a that the petitioners are privies to the case for recovery
portion of a residential—commercial parcel of land of ownership and possession filed by the former against
situated in the Poblacion of Balingoan Misamis Oriental. the latter's predecessors-in-interest, the latter being the
They alleged that since February 24, 1961, the spouses daughter-in-law and grandchildren of the losing party in
Cabresos have illegally occupied the premises in Civil Case No. 3150. By the term "privies" is meant those
question and have refused to vacate it despite repeated between whom an action is deemed binding although
demands to do so. The piece of land under litigation is they are not literally parties to the said action. There is
the southern portion of a parcel of residential- no doubt that the assailed decision is binding on the
commercial land owned by the private respondents. petitioners. The house they constructed while the case
The private respondents averred that they are the real was pending started out only as a "camarin" which was
owners and actual possessors of the lot in dispute. As an converted into a house.
affirmative defense, they alleged prescription.
With respect to the contention of the petitioners that
After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of there exists a variance between the dispositive portion
Misamis Oriental, 15th Judicial District, Branch VIII of the questioned decision and the writ of execution
through then District Judge Bernardo Teves rendered subject of this petition, the said contention is
judgment in favor of the private respondents. On June untenable. The order to vacate the litigated premises
26, 1976, the private respondents filed a motion for extends to those considered as privies to the action for
execution. Consequently, on July 1, 1976, Judge Teves recovery of ownership and possession. The fact that the
issued a writ of execution. On September 7, 1977, this petitioners' house is not strictly speaking the same
petition was filed praying for a restraining order on the structure referred to in the dispositive portion of the
allegations that the respondent judge had threatened to said civil action does not bring them outside the ambit
issue the writ of demolition on September 12, 1977 of the order to vacate. What the rule prohibits is for the
despite the variance in the decision and the writ of writ of execution to be different from or to exceed the
execution and that the respondent sheriff notified the terms of the judgment. (see Rule 39, Section 8, Revised
petitioners of his intention to demolish their house on Rules of Court; Mutual Security Insurance Corporation v.
the same date. In support of their claim, the petitioners Court of Appeals 153 SCRA 678; Villoria v. Piccio, 95 Phil.
invoke section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court 802).
which partly provides that:
SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third The judgment in Civil Case No. 3150 accords recovery of
person.—If property levied on be claimed by any other ownership and possession to the private respondents.
person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such There can be no recovery if the ejected tenants keep on
person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to building a new house alongside the old one everytime
the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right they sense a judgment against them. Notwithstanding
or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the the inclusion of the second house in the writ of
levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, execution issued to enforce it, that judgment remains
the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unaltered or unmodified considering that the alleged
unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand owners of said house are the successors-in-interest of
of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim the petitioners.
by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the
Page 83 of 85
EE. G.R. No. 138343 February 19, 2001 Simply put, the TRO allows Respondent Patricia Lim-Yu
GILDA C. LIM, WILHELMINA V. JOVEN and DITAS A. to act for herself and to enter into any contract on her
LERIOS, petitioners, vs. PATRICIA LIM-YU, in her own behalf. However, she cannot transact in
capacity as a minority stockholder of LIMPAN representation of or for the benefit of her parents,
INVESTMENT CORPORATION,respondent. brothers or sisters, or the Limpan Investment
Corporation. Contrary to what petitioners suggest, all
FACTS: The Board of Directors of Limpan Corporation that is prohibited is any action that will bind them. In
issued a resolution authorizing the partial payment for short, she can act only on and in her own behalf, not
the legal services rendered by petitioner Lim to be in that of petitioners or the Corporation.
form of shares of stock there being no available funds to
pay the same. As a result, the unsubscribed shares of There appears to be a confusion on the nature of the
LIMPAN were issued and all of its authorized capital suit initiated before the SEC. Petitioners describe it as a
stock became fully subscribed with petitioner Lim derivative suit, which has been defined as "an action
ending up controlling 62.5% of the shares. Respondent brought by minority shareholders in the name of the
Yu filed a complaint against the members who approved corporation to redress wrongs committed against it, for
the resolution. Petitioners moved to dismiss alleging Yu which the directors refuse to sue. It is a remedy
had no legal capacity to sue on the basis of a TRO issued designed by equity and has been the principal defense
by the SC on her guardianship case and thus of the minority shareholders against abuses by the
incapacitated from filing a derivative suit. The SEC majority."10 In a derivative action, the real party in
Hearing Officer held in abeyance the motion but the SEC interest is the corporation itself, I not the shareholder(s)
En Banc ordered the case to proceed. CA affirmed the who actually instituted it.
SEC En Banc.
"If the suit filed by respondent was indeed derivative in
ISSUE: Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in character, then respondent may not have the capacity
sustaining the respondent's legal capacity to sue the to sue. The reason is that she would be acting in
petitioners by relying solely on the first half of this representation of the corporation, an act which the TRO
Honorable Court's TRO and without considering the enjoins her from doing.
second half of said TRO
We hold, however, that the suit of respondent cannot
RULING: Petitioners point out that both the SEC and the be characterized as derivative, because she was
Court of Appeals considered only the first part of the complaining only of the violation of her preemptive
Supreme Court TRO and completely ignored the second right under Section 39 of the Corporation Code.11 She
part. Supposedly, the latter part barred respondent was merely praying that she be allowed to subscribe to
from entering into agreements that would affect her the additional issuances of stocks in proportion to her
family and the corporation. Hence, they claim that the shareholdings to enable her to preserve her percentage
TRO, taken as a whole, proscribed respondent's of ownership in the corporation. She was therefore not
"derivative suit," which sought to "enjoin herein acting for the benefit of the corporation. Quite the
[P]etitioner Gilda C. Lim from further voting or contrary, she was suing on her own behalf, out of a
exercising any and all rights arising from the issuance to desire to protect and preserve her preemptive rights.
her of 15,515 shares of stock of the corporation.” Unquestionably, the TRO did not prevent her from
pursuing that action.
We do not agree. The pertinent portion of the TRO
issued by this Court reads as follows: To repeat, the TRO issued by this Court had two
"(b) to ISSUE the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER components: (1) it allowed respondent to enter into
prayed for, limited however, to the 'Writ of Preliminary agreements on her own behalf; and (2) it clarified that
Injunction' dated 22 August 1994 and the Order dated respondent's acts could not bind or affect the interests
14 July 1994 both issued in SP Proceeding No. 94-71010 of her parents, brothers or sisters, or Limpan. In other
which in the opinion of the Court are all too words, respondent was, as a rule, allowed to act; but, as
encompassing and should be limited in scope and an exception, was prohibited from doing anything that
subject to the conditions set forth in the Resolution of would bind the corporation or any of the above-named
September 28, 1994 that, '(D)uring the effectivity of the persons.
Temporary Restraining Order, petitioner Patricia C. Lim,
her attorneys, representatives, agents and any other In this light, the TRO did not prohibit respondent from
persons assisting petitioner Patricia C. Lim will be able filing, on and in her own behalf; a suit for the alleged
to act, enter into or sign contracts or documents solely violation of her preemptive rights to purchase
for and on behalf of Patricia C. Lim; said actions, additional stock subscriptions. In other words, it did not
contracts or documents should not in any way bind or restrain respondent from acting and enforcing her own
affect the interests of her parents, Isabelo P. Lim and rights. It merely barred her from acting in
Purificacion C. Lim, her brothers and sisters and any representation of the corporation.
family owned or controlled corporation in particular,
the Limpan Investment Corporation." Petitioners fail to appreciate the distinction between
the act itself and its net result. The act of filing the suit
Page 84 of 85
did not in any way bind the corporation. The result of
such act affected it, however. Similarly, respondent can
sell her shares to the corporation or make a will and
designate her parents, for example, as beneficiaries. It
would be quite far-fetched to say that these acts are
prohibited by the TRO, even if they will definitely affect
the corporation and her parents.
Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court12 defines a real

party in interest - as one who is entitled to the avails of
any judgment rendered in a suit, or who stands to be
benefited or injured by it. In the present case, it is clear
that respondent was suing on her own behalf in order
to enforce her preemptive rights. Nothing, not the TRO,
barred her from filing that suit.
Page 85 of 85

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1

F. CIR vs MIRANT PAGBILAO CORP CA affirmed in toto.

Facts: Sometime in March 1998, Kukan, Inc. conducted Ruling:

However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly

The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,

Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court12 defines a real

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