Notes: Quo vs. Universal International Group of Taiwan

10/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 547
Notes.—Because it commands the performance of an

act, a mandatory injunction does not preserve the status
quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere
prohibitive injunction. (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Universal International Group of Taiwan, 340 SCRA
359 [2000])
Judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by
the pendency of an appeal taken therefrom. (Intramuros
Tennis Club, Inc. [ITC] vs. Philippine Tourism Authority,
341 SCRA 90 [2000])
——o0o——

G.R. No. 173294. February 27, 2008.*

RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES
A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage;

Psychological Incapacity; The Supreme Court has been consistent
in holding that if a petition for nullity based on psychological
incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause,
incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of
celebration of the marriage must always be proved; Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.—The trial court apparently
overlooked the fact that this Court has been consistent in holding
that if a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to
be given due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the
fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the
marriage must always be proved. As early as Santos v. CA, et al.,
240 SCRA 20 (1995), we already held that: [P]sychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
124
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e1ad64acfef4c2b12003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/13
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bier vs. Bier
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in

marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. x x x This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of a petition for
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be
confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.—These must be strictly
complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This is specially so since the Family
Code does not define psychological incapacity. The determination
thereof is left solely to the discretion of the courts and must be
made on a case-to-case basis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Habitual alcoholism, chain-
smoking, failure or refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities
as a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not
suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as
opposed to physical) illness.—Petitioner was able to establish that
respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a
happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to her husband’s
needs and who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality
of her acts, as testified to by petitioner and his brother, was not
tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as petitioner would
have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or
refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as a married
person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to
nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity, if not
shown to be due to some psychological (as opposed to physical)
illness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although absence can indeed make
the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well be true—out of
sight, out of mind—the couple drifted apart and respondent
obviously
125
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 125
Bier vs. Bier
fell out of love with petitioner.—The undeniable fact is that the

marriage, according to petitioner’s own evidence, was off to a good
start. According to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving and
caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She even
willingly consented to the difficult living arrangement of taking
turns in going back and forth between the Philippines and Saudi
Arabia just so they could be together. Perhaps it was this unusual
arrangement which took a heavy toll on their relationship. They
barely saw and spent time with each other. Respondent could
have gotten used to petitioner’s absence. And although absence
can indeed make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as
well be true: out of sight, out of mind. The couple drifted apart
and respondent obviously fell out of love with petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It was not enough that respondent,
the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to
perform the same—proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor, an adverse integral element in respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying with
her essential marital obligations.—We agree with the CA that the
change in respondent’s feelings towards petitioner could hardly be
described as a psychological illness. It was not enough that
respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was
unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor, an adverse integral element in respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from
complying with her essential marital obligations, had to be
shown. This petitioner failed to do. Consequently, we are
unconvinced that respondent’s condition was rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating disorder.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ferrer and Associates Law Office for petitioner.
126

Bier vs. Bier
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside

the March 20, 2006 decision2 and July 3, 2006 resolution3
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952.
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma.
Lourdes A. Bier through his sister. Their courtship, which
blossomed as a result of the exchange of long distance calls
between them, lasted six months. Back then, petitioner
observed respondent to be a very sweet and thoughtful
person. This, he said, made him fall in love with her.
On July 26, 1992, six months after their first meeting,
they were married at the UST Santissimo Rosario Parish
Church. Everything went well for the first three years of
their marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner
could hope for in a wife—sweet, loving and caring. She also
took good care of the house. As petitioner was based in
Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician at Saudia
Airlines, the parties decided to maintain two residences,
one in the Philippines and another in Saudi Arabia. They
took turns shuttling between the two countries just so they
could spend time together.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after
three years of marriage. According to petitioner,
respondent ceased to be the person he knew and married.
She started becoming aloof towards him and began to
spend more time with her friends than with him, refusing
even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent
reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She
also started neglecting her husband’s needs and the upkeep
of their home, and became an absentee wife. After being
gone from their home for days
_______________

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred
in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao (retired) and Lucas P.
Bersamin of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 17-38.
3 Id., pp. 39-40.
127
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 127

Bier vs. Bier
on end, she would return without bothering to account for

her absence. As a result, they frequently quarreled.
Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the

United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89, a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations to petitioner. It was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-98-33993.
Per sheriff’s return, summons was served through
substituted service as personal service proved futile.
Respondent, however, did not file an answer.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor
Edgardo T. Paragua to investigate if there was collusion
between the parties and to intervene for the State to see to
it that evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City
Prosecutor Paragua manifested that, since both parties
failed to appear before him, he was unable to make a ruling
on the issue of collusion and determine if the evidence was
fabricated.
After petitioner filed his pre-trial brief, Prosecutor
Paragua filed a second manifestation stating that
petitioner had appeared before him and that, after
investigation, he was convinced that there was no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence was not
fabricated.
At pre-trial, only petitioner appeared. As respondent
failed to attend the same, the RTC declared her to have
waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Again, respondent did not take part in the proceedings.
Petitioner filed a written offer of exhibits which was
admitted by the trial court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
certification and manifested its disfavor towards declaring
the marriage null and void. It argued that no persuasive
evidence was presented warranting the grant of the
petition, specially since
128

Bier vs. Bier
petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in

Republic v. CA and Molina4 (Molina).
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment5 granting
the petition:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring as VOID, based upon the respondent’s
psychological incapacity, the marriage contracted on July 26, 1992
between Renne Enrique E. Bier and Ma. Lourdes A. Bier. As
such, their property relations shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
Henceforth, their property relations shall be governed by the
regime of complete separation of property.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General, National Census and Statistics Office and the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, ordering them to attach a copy of this
Decision to the Marriage Contract of herein petitioner and
respondent on file with respective office.
With costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.”
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the

OSG, appealed the decision of the RTC to the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. The CA held that petitioner
failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Molina as
the root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity was
not medically or clinically identified. Worse, the same was
not even alleged in the petition filed in the court a quo. As
such, it granted the appeal and reversed the decision of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision6
read:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

GRANTED. The Decision dated 06 March 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-98-
33993, which declared as void the marriage between appellee and
respondent, is
_______________
4 335 Phil 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).

5 Rollo, p. 47.
6 Id., p. 36.
129
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 129

Bier vs. Bier
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Renne Enrique

E. Bier and respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision.

The same was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner contends that the guidelines enunciated in
Molina, specifically its directive that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained, and that it must be proven to be existing at the
inception of the marriage, need not be strictly complied
with as Molina itself stated the guidelines were merely
“handed down for the guidance of the bench and bar” and
were not meant to be a checklist of requirements in
deciding cases involving psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the Molina
doctrine should be applied, the RTC erred in ruling that he
failed to comply therewith.
The petition must fail.
Preliminarily, we must pass upon petitioner’s argument
that the finding of the trial court on the existence or non-
existence of psychological incapacity is final and binding on
us absent any showing that its factual findings and
evaluation of the evidence were clearly and manifestly
erroneous.7 Petitioner’s position is of course the general
rule. In the instant case, however, it is the exception to the
general rule which must be applied; the court a quo clearly
erred in granting the petition. It stated in the body of its
decision that:
“While this Court agrees with the observation of the

Office of the Solicitor General that the juridical
antecedence of the psychological disorder and its root
cause were not established, the same will not serve as a
hindrance for the Court to
_______________
7 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil 169, 182; 256 SCRA 158,
170 (1996).
130

Bier vs. Bier
declare that respondent is indeed suffering from a

psychological incapacity. The failure of the Psychological
Report to identify the root cause of respondent’s psychological
incapacity is not a fatal flaw that will prevent the Court from
declaring a marriage a nullity based on psychological incapacity.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this

Court has been consistent in holding that if a petition for
nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due
course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that
it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the
marriage must always be proved.8 As early as Santos v.
CA, et al.,9 we already held that:
“[P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
x x x This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
These must be strictly complied with as the granting of

a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological
inca-
_______________
8 Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007, 521

SCRA 121, 127-128; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, 28
February 2007, 517 SCRA 123, 133; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, 21
September 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 526; Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R.
No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 433 and 438; Dedel v. Court
of Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 232-233; 421 SCRA 461, 465 (2004); Choa v.
Choa, G.R. No. 143376, 26 November 2002, 392 SCRA 641, 650-651;
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919; 320 SCRA 76 (1999);
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 4; and Santos v.
Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 22, 39; 240 SCRA 20, 33 (1995).
9 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra.
131
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 131

Bier vs. Bier
pacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.10 This is specially so since the Family
Code does not define psychological incapacity. The
determination thereof is left solely to the discretion of the

courts and must be made on a case-to-case basis.11
Also, even if Molina was never meant to be a checklist of
the requirements in deciding cases involving Article 36
(psychological incapacity) of the Family Code, a showing of
the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the
party’s psychological incapacity and its existence at the
inception of the marriage cannot be dispensed with. In
Marcos v. Marcos (Marcos),12 a case cited by petitioner to
support his argument that the totality of evidence
presented was enough to prove the existence of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, this Court reiterated
that:
“The [Molina] guidelines incorporate the three basic

requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or
clinically identified.” What is important
_______________
10 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006, 495 SCRA 396,
401, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 40; p. 34.
11 During the Congressional Hearing before the Senate Committee on Women
and Family Relations on February 3, 1988, Justice Eduardo Caguioa stated that:
[a] code should not have so many definitions, because a definition straight-
jackets the concept and, therefore, many cases that should go under it are
excluded by the definition. That’s why we leave it up to the court to determine the
meaning of psychological incapacity.
12 G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 764.
132

Bier vs. Bier
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the

party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
xxx xxx xxx
[t]he totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.”

(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the 2005 case of Republic v. Iyoy13 held

that even if Marcos (2000) relaxed the rules such that the
personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the totality of evidence must still prove the gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity. Failure in this regard will spell
the failure of the petition.
From the foregoing, one can conclude that petitioner’s
insistence that Marcos effectively overturned the need to
present evidence on the aforesaid requirements has no
merit. Thus, unless the law itself or the Court provides
otherwise, these requirements must be established before a
petition for nullity of the marriage based on psychological
incapacity can be granted.
We hold that the trial court’s decision to declare the
parties’ marriage void ab initio by reason of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was clearly and manifestly
erroneous as it overlooked the need to show the gravity,
root cause and incurability of respondent’s psychological
incapacity and that it was already present at the inception
of the marriage.
Be that as it may, the main question that begs to be
answered in the instant case is whether the totality of the
evi-
_______________

13 Supra note 8, at p. 526.
133
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 133

Bier vs. Bier
dence presented was enough to establish that respondent

was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations. We rule in the negative.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his
marriage with respondent.14 He failed to discharge it.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own
testimony and that of his brother, Roderico Bier. He also
presented as evidence a psychological report written by Dr.

Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who also testified on
the matters contained therein.
Dr. Tayag’s report, which found respondent to be
suffering from psychological incapacity, particularly a
narcissistic personality disorder, relied only on the
information fed by petitioner. This was admitted by
petitioner in his petition for review on certiorari and
memorandum filed in this Court. In both instances,
petitioner reasoned out that the personal examination of
respondent was impossible as her whereabouts were
unknown despite diligent efforts on his part to find her.
Consequently, Dr. Tayag’s report was really hearsay
evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the
alleged facts she was testifying on. Her testimony should
have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and
unreliable.15
Furthermore, as already stated, the report also failed to
identify the root cause of respondent’s narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. It merely concluded that:
“This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person suffering

Narcissistic Personality Disorder that is considered to be severe,
incurable and deeply rooted with her functioning. Thus, making
_______________
14 Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 376,
citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4, at p. 676; p. 209.
15 Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, supra note 8, at p. 133, citing Choa v. Choa,
supra note 8, at p. 655.
134

Bier vs. Bier
herself psychologically incapacitated so as to comply with the

essential marital functions.”
Although there is no requirement that a party to be

declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a condition
sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder.16
In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that
respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had
become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to

her husband’s needs and who eventually abandoned him.
However, the totality of her acts, as testified to by
petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a
psychological incapacity, as petitioner would have us
believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or
refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as a
married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do
not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some
psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.17
The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to
petitioner’s own evidence, was off to a good start. According
to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving and caring
wife who took good care of him and their home. She even
willingly consented to the difficult living arrangement of
taking turns in going back and forth between the
Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they could be
together. Perhaps it was this unusual arrangement which
took a heavy toll on their relationship. They barely saw and
spent time with each other. Respondent could have gotten
used to petitioner’s absence. And although absence can
indeed make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as
well be true: out of sight, out
_______________
16 Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, supra.

17 Id., p. 135, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4, at p.
674; p. 207.
135
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 135

Bier vs. Bier
of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent

obviously fell out of love with petitioner.
Nevertheless, we agree with the CA that the change in
respondent’s feelings towards petitioner could hardly be
described as a psychological illness. It was not enough that
respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had
difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral
element in respondent’s personality structure that
effectively incapacitated her from complying with her
essential marital obligations,18 had to be shown. This

petitioner failed to do. Consequently, we are unconvinced
that respondent’s condition was rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating disorder.
Even if we assume the correctness of petitioner’s
contention that the Molina guidelines are not set in stone,
there is still no reason to disavow the same as the facts and
circumstances in this case do not warrant a deviation
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
March 20, 2006 decision and July 3, 2006 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952 are
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna

and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—The law recognizes that not all marriages are

made in heaven. (Paras vs. Paras, 529 SCRA 81 [2007])
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly
_______________
18 Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, supra note 8, at pp. 129-130.
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10/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 547

Notes.—Because it commands the performance of an

G.R. No. 173294. February 27, 2008.*

Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage;

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bier vs. Bier

incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in

VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 125

Bier vs. Bier

fell out of love with petitioner.—The undeniable fact is that the

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside

VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 127

on end, she would return without bothering to account for

Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

4 335 Phil 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).

VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 129

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Renne Enrique

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision.

“While this Court agrees with the observation of the

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

declare that respondent is indeed suffering from a

The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this

“[P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)

These must be strictly complied with as the granting of

8 Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007, 521

VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 131

pacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of

determination thereof is left solely to the discretion of the

“The [Molina] guidelines incorporate the three basic

132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the

inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.”

Furthermore, the 2005 case of Republic v. Iyoy13 held

VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 133

dence presented was enough to establish that respondent

presented as evidence a psychological report written by Dr.

“This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person suffering

134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

herself psychologically incapacitated so as to comply with the

Although there is no requirement that a party to be

become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to

16 Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, supra.

VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 135

of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent

essential marital obligations,18 had to be shown. This

Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—The law recognizes that not all marriages are

18 Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, supra note 8, at pp. 129-130.

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