Diaz V. Encanto GR No. 171303 - JANUARY 20, 2016 - Topic: Human Relations Facts

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7. DIAZ V.

ENCANTO service during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence she is not
GR No. 171303 | JANUARY 20, 2016 | entitled to be paid. While Diaz was able to teach during the second
Topic: Human Relations
semester of AY 1988-89, she was not able to claim her salaries for
FACTS: her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form.
Petitioner Diaz has been a professor in UP since 1963. In 1988, she
applied for sabbatical leave with pay for one year. The Chair of the Diaz instituted a complaint against UP., Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara
Broadcast Department initially recommended to the College of Mass and Abad with the Pasig RTC praying that the latter be adjudged,
Communication (CMC) Dean Encanto that Diaz's sabbatical jointly and severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among
application be granted. Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz's others, that they conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not
sabbatical application to the Secretary of UP, recommending its paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of
denial. Encanto also requested the her salary be withheld effective academic year 1988-89, for the entire period when her sabbatical
July 1, 1988 until further notice since her sabbatical application has application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries she earned
not yet been approved and that she did not teach that semester. from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May
1989. She likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and
On July 4, 1988, it was recommended that Diaz be granted a leave attorney's fees" The RTC held that Diaz was entitled to a sabbatical
without pay in order to enable the CMC to hire a substitute. The leave and that they delay in the resolution of her application was
next day, the UP’s Secretary referred to the Vice President for unreasonable and unconscionable but the CA reversed it on appeal,
Academic Affairs, the fact of denial of such sabbatical request, for ruling that there was neither negligence nor bad faith in denying her
his own recommendation to the UP President. On July 8, 1988, Abad application and withholding her salaries.
returned the Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had
ISSUE:
promised him to put down in writing the historical backdrop to the Whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved
latest denial of her sabbatical leave, but she did not do so. On Diaz's Diaz's application for leave thus entitling her to damages
request to teach for that semester, the Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs and the HRDO Director instructed Encanto that HELD:
until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the No, they did not act in bad faith. Diaz's complaint for recovery of damages
before the RTC was based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents in
Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her
denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and 20 of
date of actual report for duty, she is considered absent without the Civil Code" Xxxxx Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial
official leave. limitation on all rights' by setting certain standards that must be observed
in the exercise thereof. Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the
On November 8, 1988, Abad, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which
confirm as valid Encanto's reason of shortage of teaching staff in is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
denying her sabbatical. Later, he also informed Diaz of her lack of
The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC to this Court, denominated damnum absque injuria. Similarly, the Court cannot grant
have already established that a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz's claim for attorney's fees as no premium should be placed
petitioner Diaz cannot demand its grant" It does not matter that there was on the right to litigate. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate or to
only one reason for the denial of her application, as the approving incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be
authorities found that such reason was enough. Moreover, not only the awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's
Court of Appeals but also the Ombudsman, and this Court, have ruled that persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner Diaz's sabbatical righteousness of his cause.
leave application was denied. Those three separate rulings verily must be
given great weight in the case at bar.

The Court does not find any reason to disregard those findings, especially
when our own perusal of the evidence showed no traces of bad faith or
malice in the respondents' denial of petitioner Diaz's application for
sabbatical leave. They processed her application in accordance with their
usual procedure with more leeway, in fact, since petitioner Diaz was given
the chance to support her application when she was asked to submit a
historical background; and the denial was based on the recommendation
of respondent Encanto, who was in the best position to know whether
petitioner Diaz's application should be granted or not.

Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not there was bad faith in the
delay of the resolution of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application, the
Court still rules in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction
that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests
upon the party alleging the same. Petitioner Diaz has failed to prove bad
faith on the part of the respondents. There is nothing in the records to
show that the respondents purposely delayed the resolution of her
application to prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that the
delay of six months in resolving a sabbatical leave application has never
happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that occurred was
due to the fact that petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave did
not follow the usual procedure; hence, the processing of said application
took time.

Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not
be held liable for any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. The law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal wrong" Situations like this have been appropriately

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