Modernisation Branch

Discussion Paper

Fighting to Win: the importance of

the tank to the Australian Defence Force
in the 21st Century
Brigadier Chris Mills and
Lieutenant Colonel Leo Purdy
November 2016

DPS: APR030-17
Modernisation Branch
Discussion Paper
Fighting to Win: the importance of
the tank to the Australian Defence Force
in the 21st Century

Brigadier Chris Mills and

Lieutenant Colonel Leo Purdy
November 2016
© Commonwealth of Australia 2016
This discussion paper is sponsored by the Director General
Modernisation Branch, Army Headquarters. This work is copyright.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of study, research,
criticism or review (as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968) and
with standard source credit included, no part may be reproduced by
any process without written permission. Inquiries should be directed
to Director General Modernisation Branch, Army Headquarters,
Department of Defence, Russell Offices, Russell ACT 2600.
Executive Summary
This discussion paper aims to inform the reader of the role, utility and
enduring need for the tank as part of the Australian Defence Force. It
does so by answering four questions:
• What is a tank and why is it unique?
• Why is it important to Army and the Joint Land Force?
• What is the relevance of the tank to Australia’s strategic context?
• How does the ADF maintain a credible, deployable and
sustainable tank capability?

Key Points
• The tank is unique; no other capability in the Australian
Defence Force provides the advantages it does in
close combat.
• Tanks provide a matchless combination of firepower, mobility,
protection and connectivity to the Australian soldier.
• Tanks increase the likelihood of mission success and
decrease the likelihood of Australian casualties.
• The tank is deployable domestically, regionally and globally.
• Tanks are a key part of the Combined Arms team and
Joint Land Force.
• Australian soldiers have fought with tanks from France to
Afghanistan.

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4
Fighting to Win: the importance
of the tank to the Australian
Defence Force in the
21st Century.
By Brigadier Chris Mills and Lieutenant Colonel Leo Purdy

Abstract. The debate over the role, utility and importance of the
tank capability in the Australian Defence Force is often speculative
and pejorative. This paper aims to inform this debate by examining
the unique character and role of the tank, illustrating its enduring
importance to Army’s combined arms approach and its relevance to
the Joint Land Force. It concludes by questioning whether Australia’s
59 M1 Abrams tanks are sufficient to provide a credible, deployable and
sustainable capability in the 21st Century.

‘Mobility is crucial – only movement brings victory. However, that

mobility must be protected so that the weapons of the weak such
as IEDs do not kill unprotected soldiers. Firepower is critical when
you fight. Before you get to work your social magic on ‘the people’
you have to win the fight against an armed opposition. Combat
power still counts.’

Major General Craig Orme,

Commander of Australia’s forces Iraq in 2014.1

1
As quoted in Ironsides- Journal of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 2014.

5
The tank is a unique contributor to the Australian Defence Force’s
combat power. It provides a matchless combination of firepower,
mobility, protection and connectivity to the modern Australian soldier.
The tank is unique amongst ground combat vehicles; it alone is
designed to specifically enter, fight and endure alongside soldiers in
close combat. While it was designed in response to the stalemate
of trench warfare in the First World War, it has continued to evolve
ever since. Both guardian angel of the infantry and highly capable
tank-killer, the tank is ideally suited to aggressive mobile action in
concert with other arms and services. From the battlefields of France
through to Afghanistan, Australian soldiers have fought with tanks, be
they Australian, British or American. These experiences reinforce the
importance of the tank to the Joint Land Force, from stability operations
to conventional war. Elementally, tanks increase the chances of winning
in combat and reduce friendly casualties.

However, discussion surrounding the tank in Australian service is often

clouded by speculation rather than fact. This is a result of a weak
understanding of what they are and do. This is compounded by the
time which has elapsed since the Australian Defence Force (ADF)
has deployed its own tank forces. However, it is unwise to ignore the
advantage that this capability provides Australian soldiers because of
a short memory or a myopic view of land warfare. This short paper will
explain the importance of the tank to the ADF in the 21st Century. It
will describe why the tank is unique, why a credible tank capability is
essential to the Joint Land Force and highlight its relevance within the
current strategic environment. It concludes by examining some of the
challenges to sustaining the capability and offers some ways to address
these. This paper is not a detailed examination of the evolution of tanks
or a review of its operational employment, although aspects of each are
touched upon. These facets have been examined elsewhere in much
greater detail than available here.

6
Figure 1. The M1A1 Situational Awareness Abrams Main Battle Tank.

7
What is a tank and why is it unique?
The tank is the ‘predator supreme’ of land forces.2 Tanks are armoured
fighting vehicles (AFV) – machines designed to destroy and protect.
Tanks are typically equipped with a turret featuring a large calibre
cannon and machine guns which fire at a target within eye sight (direct
fire). Tanks are fitted with protective armour to survive all but the most
significant threats faced on the battlefield. Further, a tanks propulsion
system and tracked drive train enable it to move across country at high
speed and fight alongside infantry soldiers on broken ground. Army’s
current fleet of 59 M1A1 Situational Awareness Main Battle Tanks, M1
hereafter, was acquired in 2006 to replace the aged Leopard AS1 tank
which had been in service since 1977. The M1, like all AFV, is a blend of
design trade-offs which create a unique combination of characteristics.
These characteristics are firepower, mobility and protection – colloquially
known as the ‘Iron Triangle’ of AFV design. The M1 complements the
other AFVs in the ADF’s inventory; including the Australian Service Light
Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and the M113AS4 Armoured Personnel
Carrier (APC), each of which have a different balance of trade-offs. To
understand why the tank is unique among armoured vehicles a brief
examination of these characteristics is necessary.

First, the tank generates the greatest amount of direct firepower of any
land vehicle. Firepower is the measure of the amount of ‘fire’ or shots a
capability can generate, the effect of these shots on a target and how
long these effects can be sustained. The M1’s firepower centres upon a
120mm cannon which fires a variety of munitions to destroy tanks, other
armoured vehicles, low flying aircraft, fortifications and buildings. The tank
is also equipped with a heavy machine gun and two medium machine
guns which fire rapidly at less well protected targets such as trucks,
utility vehicles and soldiers. Importantly, these weapons are mated to an

2 Major General (Retired) De Vries, R., 2013, Eye of the Firestorm- Strength Lies in
Mobility, Paarl Media, Paarl, p 110.

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advanced fire control system which allows accurate, stable long range
direct fire for several kilometres whilst the vehicle is moving. This system
incorporates a 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infra-Red thermal imager
which allows the tank to see by day and night; enabling it to detect,
discriminate and engage a target with accurate direct fire often beyond
the range of adversary systems. This fire can be applied at long range
with precision and at close range to provide an overwhelming weight of
fire support. The tank stores a large amount of ammunition for all these
weapons, allowing it to fight for prolonged periods without rearming.

In comparison a Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) like the ASLAV,

which will be replaced under Land 400 Phase Two, is equipped with a
small calibre rapid firing auto-cannon and machine guns. These provide
the ability to fight for information and self defence, however, have less
utility in destroying fixed installations and heavier AFV. CRV are primarily
tasked to find an enemy force’s vulnerabilities and exploit them, not
engage in sustained close combat. Recent experience in Afghanistan
highlights the ASLAV’s limitations in the direct fire support role

‘While the 25mm [auto-cannon] is an excellent weapon for

traditional cavalry operations, it had significant limitations in its range
and penetration, which was amplified when the enemy were able
to use thick walls for cover… the 25mm was unable to penetrate
a number of structures used by the enemy. From my experience,
I am confident that the infantry would have been provided far better
protection and direct fire support… should we have been equipped
with MBT [tank] in Afghanistan.’3

Similarly APCs, which are optimised to transport infantry and cargo

around the battlespace, often make compromises in terms of
firepower and protection to do so. APCs are frequently equipped with
self-protection weapons systems only, lacking the range and destructive

3 Email provided by Cavalry Troop Leader regarding an engagement which occurred on

24 August 2010 around the village of Derapet.

9
effects of cannon. Likewise, to optimise their mobility and carrying
capacity, they may feature far less armour to shield them from direct fire,
sacrificing some protection. This limits how and where they can transport
and accompany infantry. An evolution beyond the APC is the Infantry
Fighting Vehicle (IFV). IFV are tracked AFV designed to transport infantry
into battle and fight with them in close combat. IFV designs may trade
some carrying capacity for greater firepower and protection and achieve
mobility akin to the tank. Like tanks IFV seek to quickly close with the
enemy, however do so to dismount their infantry virtually on top of an
objective. This maintains the tempo of the assault, narrows the window
in which enemy weapons can be employed against unprotected infantry
and positions the IFV to provide fire support. IFVs are generally equipped
with a medium cannon and machine guns to provide suppressing fires to
fix an enemy force in place. An IFVs auto-cannon is optimised to provide
rapid suppression to protect infantry and tanks by countering enemy
heavy weapons such as machine guns and anti-armour systems.

Importantly, tanks, IFVs and the infantry which they carry into battle,
fight as a team. The destructive firepower of the tank, complements
the suppressive firepower of the IFV. The infantry provide intimate
protection to both vehicle systems in close combat, where firepower
and protection advantages may be negated, and capture terrain
from the enemy. While IFV fight with tanks and infantry in a symbiotic
relationship, IFV are not tanks and should not be misconstrued as a
replacement for them. The IFV, tank and CRV are to the Army what
landing ships, frigates and submarines are to a navy and transport,
fighter and reconnaissance aircraft are to air forces. These each
perform different, but complementary, roles.

Cavalry find the enemy and exploit their weaknesses.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles fix the enemy and Infantry capture terrain.
Tanks destroy the enemy.

10
Figure 2. M1 Abrams tanks applying direct fire during training at the
School of Armour.

Second, a common misperception is that the tank has poor mobility4

within Australia’s region and is not deployable. This is not true and
as others have previously written ‘the idea that tanks are difficult or
impossible to deploy is, in short, a myth.’5 The ill-informed often argue
that weight limits the tank’s tactical mobility, preventing it from operating

4 Mobility is the ability to physically move troops, vehicles or equipment between

geographic points to perform their primary function, and is divided into tactical,
operational and strategic categories. Tactical or battlefield mobility relates to the
movement of tanks, in actual or imminent contact with an enemy, to minimise exposure
to their fire or move to a point of advantage. Its key factors include speed, rate of turn,
acceleration and braking distance, terrain and obstacle crossing ability. Operational
Mobility relates to the movement of tanks within an area of operations, key factors
include self-deployment range (the distance that can be travelled by the platform on its
organic fuel or power source), platform weight, power and reliability. Strategic Mobility
relates to movement of tanks to an area of operations; factors include deployability
and sustainability via air, sea, road and rail assets. As discussed in Ogorkiewicz, R.M.,
Technology of Tanks Volume II, 1991, Janes Information Group, Surrey, pp 223-7.
5 Kilcullen, D., ‘Australian Tanks: Facts not mythology’, in Defender- Summer 2006/07, p 35.

11
effectively on soft, boggy terrain and heavily vegetated areas. Others
suggest that the M1 has poor strategic mobility e.g. it is so heavy that
it cannot be deployed to and sustained within a conflict zone. However,
mobility is characterised by more than weight and a cursory analysis of
these key factors illustrates the hollowness of these statements.

In terms of tactical mobility the M1 eclipses all other ground-based

vehicles. Tactical mobility is the combination of vehicle speed, rate of
turn, climb, obstacle crossing ability and trafficability ­— key attributes
when moving to and engaged in combat. The M1 can rapidly accelerate
to around 65 kilometres per hour on road and travel off road at around
50 kilometres per hour, allowing it to sprint between positions of cover.
It can ‘pivot’ or turn on its own axis, climb a 60% slope or a metre high
wall and cross a gap of about three metres, such as a trench, at speed.
Notably, while the tracked M113 possesses a tighter turn rate and the
wheeled ASLAV a higher on road speed, both vehicles have significantly
less capability in traversing broken terrain, crossing obstacles or turning
in the narrow confines of a street. Trafficability, or the tractive and
pushing power of the vehicle, is influenced by vehicle ground pressure
and engine power to weight ratio. The M1 generates lower ground
pressure than the ASLAV and M113 as well as the wheeled protected
mobility vehicles which have been routinely deployed in the region and
globally. This is because a tank’s weight is evenly distributed across
hundreds of pieces of track, rather than four or eight wheels. Rather
than an ‘elephant in stilettos’, the M1 tank is more akin to a ‘centipede
in sneakers’. Table 1. illustrates the tanks ground pressure when
compared to other vehicles.

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Table 1. Comparative Ground Pressures6

Vehicle Ground Pressure in

kPa (approx)

Human male (1.8 meter tall, medium build) 55 kPa (8 psi)

M1A1 SA MBT 103 kPa (15 psi)

ASLAV CRV 111 kPa (16.1 psi)

M113AS4 APC 113 kPa (16.4 psi)

1993 Toyota 4Runner / Hilux Surf 170 kPa (25 psi)

Average Passenger car 205 kPa (30 psi)

Mountain bike 245 kPa (40 psi)

Racing bicycle 620 kPa (90 psi)

Furthermore, the M1 harnesses the power of a jet engine. The M1’s

Army Ground Turbine 1500 horsepower (hp) gas turbine engine has the
power to propel it through difficult terrain which lighter vehicles cannot
‘push’ through, such as boggy ground or jungle. The tank’s engine far
surpasses the M113AS4’s and ASLAVs diesel engines which produce
350 and 275 hp respectively. These characteristics allow the tank to cross
a variety of terrain types such as jungle, desert or savannah and crush or
drive through obstacles such as barbed wire entanglements, concrete
blocks, trees, car bodies and even buildings. This high degree of tactical
mobility allows tanks to close with the enemy on ground of their choice,
and their advantage, rather than be channelled into an area of the enemies
choosing. Historically, tanks were often the only vehicle with sufficient

6 Hunnicutt, R.P., 2015 (reprint), Abrams: A History of the American Main Battle Tank, Vol.
2, Echo Point Books & Media, USA and http://www.expedition-trucks.com/brokers/
wheel-pressure-expedition-trucks.

13
tactical mobility to support Australian soldiers during the South West Pacific
Campaign (fought in our region) during the Second World War. Tanks were
used extensively to support infantry to secure heavily fortified objectives in
New Guinea, Papua and Bougainville. Australian troops also conducted
numerous amphibious landings utilising tanks such as at Labuan, Tarakan
and Balikpapan.7 In US service they were also employed to destroy other
tanks, such as occurred during the battles on Saipan where the United
States Marine Corps destroyed 48 Japanese tanks. Likewise, the British
and Japanese armies also utilised tanks during the war in Burma and
Malaya. The ADF’s M1 tank has far greater tactical mobility than the tanks
used during these campaigns and can rely upon far more capable assets
to provide it strategic mobility.

Figure 3. Joint assets providing mobility to the M1 Abrams; a tank being

moved on road via a tank transporter, rail loading at Darwin, offloading from
a strategic airlifter and an M88 loading onto an amphibious ship.

7 See Handel, P, 2003, Dust, Sand and Jungle- A History of Australian Armour
1927-1948, A Royal Australian Armoured Corps Memorial and Army Tank Museum
Publication, Puckapunyal for an overview of Australian armour deployments.

14
While the M1 is larger and heavier than the M113 and ASLAV, it should
not be concluded that the tank cannot be deployed and has poor
strategic mobility because of these factors. The M1 can deploy via tank
transporter trucks on road and via Australian rail. Army has routinely
employed both methods between the Northern Territory, South Australia,
Victoria and Queensland in support of training. This capability will grow as
project Land 121 delivers a range of Heavy Equipment Transporters and
trailers to enhance Army’s road transport assets. Likewise, the M1 tank is
transportable via the ADF’s C-17 Globemaster aircraft. The strategic airlift
capability of the C-17 has been demonstrated operationally numerous
times. In 2003 C-17s lifted five M1 tanks and five M2 IFVs from Germany
to an airfield behind enemy lines in Iraq. In Afghanistan they deployed a
Canadian Army 15 tank armoured squadron and an armoured engineer
troop and a 17 tank USMC tank company in 2006 and 2010 respectively.
Australia’s own C-17s have also demonstrated this capability lifting
M1 tanks from Darwin around Australia. Further, the Canberra Class
Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious ships provide the ability to
lift much larger quantities of land forces between ports. These ships,
complemented by the Landing Ship Dock (LSD) HMAS Choules, each
have the ability to lift over a squadron of tanks at a time, as well as the
personnel, stores and equipment to crew, support and sustain them.
As the Australian amphibious system matures the introduction of more
and more capable ship to shore connectors and Army watercraft, such
as envisioned under project Land 8710 Phase One, will provide greater
flexibility to transport AFVs in riverine and coastal settings.

The tank is the most tactically mobile ground combat vehicle in

the ADFs inventory.

The tank is deployable domestically, regionally and globally by

the ADF.

Third, the tank has the highest level of physical protection of any ground
combat vehicle. Neither the ASLAV nor M113 have sufficient protection

15
to accompany infantry onto an objective in a high threat environment and
are at increased risk when providing static fire support. The limitations of
lightly protected vehicles in the latter role are highlighted below:

‘Based on the effects of fire from an RPG [rocket propelled grenade]

that landed close to an ASLAV, an impact from that round would have
caused significant damage…When these munitions were fired at the
overwatch position, our vehicles were forced to move to avoid being
hit, often leaving dismounted infantry with no vehicle protection’.8

Likewise, given its primary role is to provide armoured transport, the

M113’s design trades firepower and protection for greater internal
volume, or ‘lift’ capacity. The lightly protected M113 APC was designed
to deliver infantry to an area out of contact, the infantry then close
with the enemy on foot. Consequently, the infantry devoid of armoured
protection are not only exposed to lethal fire from rifles and machine
guns as they close with an enemy, but are exposed for longer periods.
For the infantry soldier fighting on the ground, the tank provides
both a physical shield and a means to destroy targets. The infantry
are protected from enemy fire by the vehicle itself as they close with
the enemy and they can direct the fire of the tank to destroy targets
that they cannot. This intimate support is essential in close combat
as it provides the infantry soldier with an overwhelming advantage.
The enduring and imposing physical presence of the tank in this role
provides an intangible boost to morale that instils confidence in soldiers
in lethal environments. One infantry commander recounted in his
recollection of the Battle of Binh Bah, which involved close infantry-tank
cooperation, that ‘… an infantryman feels invincible when standing next
to a monster’.9

8 Email from Cavalry Troop Leader explaining the limitations of the ASLAV during his tour
of duty in Afghanistan in 2011-12.
9 As quoted by Brigadier Colin Khan, Commanding Officer of 5th Battalion Royal
Australian Regiment during the Battle of Binh Bah in South Vietnam 1969, to the 2008
Combat Officers Advanced Course. Authors notes.

16
When the tanks base armour is coupled with other protective measures
such as long range sensors and communications systems shielded
against cyber attacks, electronic counter measures effective against
improvised explosive devices and defensive aid suites which ‘shoot
down’ incoming rockets and missiles, its protection is unsurpassed on
the battlefield. While it is not invincible, neither the ASLAV nor M113
have sufficient protection to protect like the tank does. Furthermore,
until an IFV which can deliver infantry onto an objective and support
them is introduced into service, as planned under Land 400 Phase
3, the M1 is the only ADF vehicle that can provide intimate support
to the infantry during close combat. Only the tank has the necessary
protection levels to withstand prolonged exposure to enemy weapon
systems. In short – the tank can take a hit and keep fighting.

The tank is the only ADF vehicle that has sufficient protection to
effectively provide intimate support to infantry during sustained
close combat.

Given these characteristics, the tank is indeed unique. The tank is

designed to move, endure, fight and win in the close combat zone
which unprotected humans and lightly protected vehicles cannot
survive. In simple terms, CRVs, IFVs and APCs are not tanks. These
AFV all make different design trade-offs to tailor vehicle performance to
their primary role. Importantly, because of these design trade-offs each
of these vehicles and armour in general have inherent vulnerabilities.
These are protected by fighting as part of a team.

The tank is unique; no other capability in the Australian Defence

Force can provide the advantages it provides in close combat.

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Why is the tank important to Army and the
Joint Land Force?
Army defines a combined arms team as the grouping of land systems
that together overmatch an adversary’s use of individual weapon
systems. This grouping includes, as a minimum, armour, artillery,
infantry, combat engineers and aviation. All of these elements are
needed as each possess different characteristics and provide different
effects to the team.10 While artillery provides immense indirect firepower
to the team, it has limited tactical mobility and protection. Infantry
and engineers lack inherent firepower and mobility, but can fight
to seize and hold almost any terrain type and shape terrain for use
against the enemy. Aviation (helicopters) whilst well-armed and largely
unconstrained by terrain, do not have the persistent presence of ground
forces. Armour provides a unique blend of direct firepower, mobility and
protection to this team. Although Armour incurs a logistics burden and
is by no means invulnerable, it is an essential element of the combined
arms team. As one armour advocate has offered ‘Armored [sic] vehicles
are immensely important, unless you are building a force to re-enact
World War I’11.

The battles fought by Australian combined arm teams with tanks in

New Guinea, Borneo, Korea and Vietnam shaped the decision to buy
the M1, and reinforce the need to maintain it. Studies by the University
of New South Wales on combat action in Vietnam demonstrated that a
combined arms team which included tanks greatly reduced the number
of Australian casualties sustained in combat. In the jungle this reduced
Australian casualties from 1.7 Australians killed for every 1 enemy
killed, to 0.6 Australians for every 1 enemy killed. Similarly, the success

10 Directorate of Plans-Army, 2014, The Australian Army: An Aide-Memoire, Version 1.2,

Commonwealth of Australia, pp 12-13.
11 ‘Why the U.S. Army Needs Armor’ by Elfendahl. M., McKinney, C. amd McMaster, H.R.,
Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2013, pp 129-136.

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rate of the action jumped from around 50% when tanks were not part
of the combined arms team to 95% when they were.12 The Israeli
Defence Force shared similar deductions with the RAND Corporation
during its detailed analysis of Operation Cast Lead conducted in Gaza
during 2008-9. Through discussion with Israeli Army officers RAND
surmised ‘Quite simply, armored [sic] forces reduce operational risks
and minimize friendly casualties.’13 This analysis was mirrored by the
experience of Canadian officers in Afghanistan who cited that their
‘Leopard C2 tanks have saved Canadian and Afghan lives’.14 Without
tanks there is a capability gap which lowers the odds of success in
combat and increases the likelihood of casualties.

Tanks increase the likelihood of mission success and decrease the

likelihood of Australian casualties.

Following Vietnam the ADFs focus on joint warfare became paramount.

Combined arms teams now form the foundation of Army’s contributions
to the Joint Land Force. This force is a combination of naval, air and
land assets, which together deliver joint effects during land combat.
However, some have suggested that aircraft, drones and precision fires
have or will eventually replace the tank in this force. This speculation
reveals a poor understanding of the tank and what it provides. Aerial
delivered munitions, precision artillery fires and land attack cruise
missiles provide the ability to strike and destroy identified targets at
range. Although these provide phenomenal firepower to the Joint Land
Force, they like all capabilities, have inherent limitations which preclude
them from replacing the tank. These systems are subject to the

12 Hall R. and Ross A., 2003, The Effectiveness of Combined Arms Teams in Urban
Terrain: The Battle of Binh Ba, Vietnam 1969, and the Battles of Fallujah, Iraq, 2004,
Australian Defence Studies Centre UNSW Canberra, Canberra, pp v-vi.
13 Johnson, D.E., 2011, Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, pp134 and 178.
14 Cadieu, T., 2008 ‘Canadian Armour in Afghanistan’, Canadian Army Journal Vol. 10.4
Winter 2008, p 21.

19
effects of adverse weather and have varying levels of persistence and
presence on the battlefield, which limit the ability to detect, locate and
identify enemy forces. Tanks do not leave the battle when the weather
deteriorates or visibility reduces and are not subject to the same
constraints of air or remotely operated forces. The difficulty of targeting
mobile forces from the air, and the utility of the tank to the joint force,
is illustrated by this statement from an Iraqi tank battalion commander
during the 1991 Gulf War; ‘when I went into Kuwait I had 39 tanks,
after six weeks of bombardment I had 32 left, after 20 minutes in action
against M1’s, I had none’.15 It is as illogical to claim that air delivered
precision munitions provide the same capability as a tank as it is to
argue that air defence missiles replace fighter jets or that torpedo boats
could replace frigates.

The tank’s strengths actually complement aircraft and other Joint Land
Force elements. The so called Blitzkrieg campaigns of the Second
World War, the Arab-Israeli, Gulf, Afghan and Iraq wars all highlight
the effectiveness of the tank operating in partnership with aircraft in
combat. The tank is designed to endure and fight in close proximity
to the enemy. It is ideally postured, given its sensors, communications
systems and protection, to coordinate firepower from the Joint Land
Force at the point of decision. Furthermore, the paucity of some
ADF platforms, particularly scarce helicopters and fixed wing aircraft,
necessitates a balanced range of options to support the combined
arms team, including the tank. Additionally tanks, and armour, provide a
level of responsiveness, mobility and protection when integrated as part
of the combined arms team that precision fires, aerial fire support or
naval gunfire simply cannot. Land forces provide complementary effects
to the joint team, as the Israeli experience in Lebanon shows

15 Dasch, J.M. and Gorish, D.J., 2011, The TARDEC Story: Sixty-five Years of Innovation
1946-2010, Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Centre, Detroit,
p 145.

20
 ‘The IDF had learned in Lebanon that, in the absence of pressure
from ground forces, its adversaries knew how to avoid detection
and attack by overhead platforms. In Gaza, IDF ground maneuver
[sic] “forced the enemy to react, to move, to expose himself. Taking
them from amorphous in nature to shaped, which is critical in an
urban area. Thus, ground maneuver was critical in creating targets
for ground and air fires. Fires were also important because they
“paralyzed the enemy,” thus fixing his position. This allowed IDF
ground forces to close with Hamas fighters who were reluctant to
expose themselves to attack from air or artillery. The Israeli Navy, in
addition to blockading Gaza, also provided fires and UAV support
for ground forces.’16

Air, Naval and Land forces are all essential to the joint team. Given the
unique effects that tanks provide, a Joint Land Force committed to
combat without them does so at a disadvantage.

Tanks are a key part of the Joint Land Force. They provide unique
effects in close combat and enable the delivery of joint effects
from air and naval capabilities.

16 Johnson, op cit, p 134.

21
The relevance of the tank to Australia’s
strategic context
The 2016 Australian Defence White Paper specifies that

‘… the future force will be more agile and potent. The future
force will be more capable of conducting independent combat
operations to defend Australia and protect our interests in the
immediate region. This force will also enhance Australia’s ability
to contribute to global coalition operations…

Achieving Australia’s Strategic Defence Objectives requires land

forces that have the mobility, firepower, protection and
situational awareness to deploy quickly to where they are
needed, achieve their missions safely and return home.
The Government will make significant new investments in our
land forces, including new combat vehicles…

…Soldiers in the future Army will be supported by new vehicles

and manned and unmanned aircraft with increased firepower,
protection, mobility, situational awareness and logistics support.
The Government will replace the Army’s current ageing fleet of
mobility and reconnaissance vehicles with a new generation of
armoured combat reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles,
as well as tank upgrades and new combat engineering
equipment.’17

As these paragraphs highlight, Australia requires combat capabilities

which deploy quickly with sufficient mobility, firepower and protection to
achieve their mission without undue risk. As the preceding paragraphs
have illustrated the tank provides the Joint Land Force with such

17 Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, 2016 Australian Defence White Paper, Department

of Defence, Canberra, pp 97-8.

22
a blend of capabilities. Yet there remain those unconvinced of the
relevance of the tank to this strategic imperative. Some claim that
Army bought the M1 to fight a far-fetched Cold War scenario and that
tanks are not relevant in our region. Others suggest the tank is an
unnecessary capability which we have not deployed in decades and
are not needed for the conflicts we may choose to fight. In the strategic
context provided by Government on what is required of the ADF in
future combat operations, and given the unique capabilities the tank
provides, these assertions are highly questionable.

An Australian tank capability is critical to deter and defeat armed

attacks against Australia and its interests. Tanks are necessary for
future independent combat operation to defend Australia and as part
of combat operations regionally and globally. Tanks and other AFVs are
the foundation of credible conventional land deterrence for Australia.
They also provide the bulk of land combat power if deterrence fails. This
is recognised regionally and globally. The tank is a key element of all
major regional armies including those of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea and China. Notably, all
of these countries are in the process of replacing or modernising their
tank capabilities. The tank remains and is increasingly relevant in our
region as modern and highly capable tanks, AFVs and anti-armour
weapons proliferate. And while the ADF is a small force by regional
standards, importantly it retains qualitative technological advantages in
key areas. Thus the notion that the tank is a Cold War relic only suited
to the Russian steppe is simply not accurate – tanks are in widespread
use in our region. A credible M1 tank capability is therefore important
to maintaining the ADF’s deterrent value and defeating attacks upon
Australian interests.

Contrary to the argument that Australians don’t deploy or fight

with tanks, historically Australian soldiers have fought with tanks in
every major conflict land forces have been committed to including;

23
Figure 4. Australian Army Tank Employment WWI to Afghanistan.

24
25
France, North Africa, the Levant, the South West Pacific, Korea,
South Vietnam and most recently in Afghanistan as shown in
Figure 4. In Afghanistan in October 2012 the Australian Special
Operations Task Group fought alongside tanks during operations
in northern Helmand Province. Like their British counterparts
who were reliant on a small detachment of Danish tanks, the
Australian force in Afghanistan were reliant upon the support
provided by a United States Marine Corps tank company. These
tanks conducted tasks including direct fire support, obstacle
breaching, intimate support, information gathering and served as
a significant deterrent. The Australian Special Operations Task
Group commander advised that:

‘The M1 system enabled the Commando Company Group to

close with an enemy who was defensively arrayed in a series of
positions that were heavily defended with IEDs, anti-personnel
mines, snipers and heavy weapons.’18

Therefore, while Australian tanks may have last served in South

Vietnam, Australia has fought with US tanks and employed its
other AFVs in recent operations including East Timor, Iraq and
Afghanistan. Tanks and armour in general, remain a very important
element to future Australian military operations both regionally
and globally.

Whether future commitments are regional or global, or their nature

is humanitarian, counter-insurgency or major war; the Joint Land
Force must be prepared for combat. History has demonstrated
that benign situations can, very quickly, turn to open conflict. The
1993 Battle of Mogadishu, popularised by the film Black Hawk
Down, provides an example of how quickly a benign situation

18 Source: Email from the Commander of Rotation XVIII Special Operations Task Group.
Authors notes.

26
can deteriorate and the strategic importance of maintaining a
balanced robust force, even on peace keeping operations. In
October 1993, a US Special Operations force attempted to capture
a Somali warlord and his retinue. In the course of the raid two
Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and the lightly armed
and protected quick reaction forces sent to recover the personnel
from the downed aircraft were isolated and in danger of being
overrun. Eventually these forces were rescued by a combined
Malaysian and Pakistani United Nations armoured vehicle convoy
which included M60 tanks. 18 US soldiers were killed in action
and a further 73 were wounded during the course of the raid and
subsequent recovery operations. Notably, in the month prior to
the ill-fated raid, the commanding US General in Somalia had
requested M1 tanks and Bradley M2 IFVs to augment US quick
reaction forces. This request was denied by the office of the US
Secretary of Defence due to the perceived optics of deploying
tanks to the peace keeping operation. Consequently, US ground
based quick reaction forces were reliant on light, unprotected
trucks and jeeps when they responded to the crash sites – with
tragic results. In the aftermath of this incident US Secretary of
Defence Les Aspin stepped down as a result of his office’s decision
to refuse these requests for tanks, armoured vehicles and AC130
aircraft to support the mission.19

Perhaps learning from this and in response to the uncertainty of

operations during the Australian led intervention in East Timor in
1999, the ADF placed a squadron of Leopard tanks on standby
to deploy at short notice, had the mission disintegrated into close
combat. One soldier offered that:

19 Sangvic, R, ‘Battle of Mogadishu – Anatomy of a failure’, School of Advanced

Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

27
 ‘If it [the largely unopposed lodgements and subsequent
deployment of INTERFET forces] had gone a different way and we
didn’t have the Leopards, then we would have been fighting with
one arm behind our backs.’20

Australia cannot be lulled into the falsity that it has the luxury to merely
contribute forces of choice to wars of choice. Australia cannot now,
nor has it been able to in the past, accurately predict the wars it fights.
The expectation that Australia can opt out of conflict when its interests
are involved, either in our region or globally, is naïve and potentially
dangerous. It also ignores the reality of the connected world where
we are bound to many nations by diplomacy, information, economics,
heritage and culture. Australia may find itself embroiled in crises or
conflict, which it can neither choose to nor afford to avoid. Further,
the proliferation of technologies formerly associated with high end
conventional threats into the hands of non-state actors in recent
conflicts, such as those being fought in Gaza, Syria and Iraq, points to
increasing levels of lethality on any battlefield of the future. As a result,
even Australian forces deployed on peacekeeping missions in the future
may face the threat of highly lethal weapons.21 It is important to remind
ourselves that the enemy has a vote in battle – if the threat warrants
it, Australia may be forced to send highly capable combat forces to
achieve humanitarian objectives. This is why protection remains a high
priority for Army in its acquisition of a new generation of armoured
vehicles as described within the Governments strategic guidance.

20 Bostock, I., ‘East Timor: An Operational Evaluation. By the Book’, Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 3 May 2000, pp 23-7 and Johnson, D.E, Grissom, A. and Oliker, O., 2008, In
the Middle of the Fight- An Assessment of Medium-Armoured Forces in Past Military
Operations, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica., pp 137-45.
21 Hoffman, F.G., 2007, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac
Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, pp 43-6.

28
Maintaining a credible, deployable and
sustainable M1 tank capability.
Given the importance of the M1 Abrams tank to the ADF, does Australia
have enough tanks to provide a sustainable basis to train the Joint Land
Force and deploy a credible capability if required? Training the force
includes individual and collective training at Army schools and combat
brigades. When the aforementioned combined arms approach, air-land
integration and drilling in amphibious manoeuvre are also considered,
this training places a significant burden on the tank fleet. However, this
training is necessary to generate combat ready tank squadrons available
to deploy on operations. An assessment of the M1’s predecessors
indicates that deploying a tank squadron on operations also places heavy
demands on the tank capability. To deploy and sustain a tank squadron
group of around 26 vehicles in South Vietnam, Australia maintained a
fleet of around 128 Centurion tanks. Following Vietnam, these were
replaced by 90 Leopard AS1 tanks in 1977 to provide a three-squadron
tank regiment to maintain infantry-tank skills and remain abreast of
developments in contemporary armoured warfare.22 In turn these were
replaced in 2006 by 59 M1 Abrams tanks, or around two thirds of the
previous fleet. While the number of M1s acquired is arguably more a
product of the resources available at that time than an accurate reflection
of the actual tanks required, it does reflect a downward trend in fleet size
over time. When training and operational requirements are considered,
does the ADF have the critical mass to train the Joint Land Force and
deploy a credible tank capability on operations?

A brief examination of the Canadian Army, of similar size and composition

to the Australian Army, and their experience with their tank fleet is

22 Pelvin, R. 2005, ‘ Acquiring Armour: Some Aspects of the Australian Army’s Leopard
Tank Purchase’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 2005, Land warfare
Studies Centre, Canberra, pp 193- 195.

29
informative. By the early 2000s the value of the tank to the Canadian
Army was in question as these had not deployed to a combat zone since
the Korean War, over 50 years prior. Consequently, Canada planned
to replace its aged Leopard 1 tanks with a lighter wheeled mobile gun
system. However combat experience in Afghanistan led to a reversal of
this decision. Canadian forces had encountered fierce opposition from
an enemy who were well equipped and liberally employed improvised
explosive devices to reduce their mobility. This left the Canadians,
who lacked heavy combat power such as tanks, fighting at a distinct
disadvantage against a determined enemy. Consequently, Leopard
tanks and Badger armoured engineer vehicles were deployed to provide
combat overmatch to defeat the enemy and restore mobility to the
battlefield. The successful employment of these systems led Canada
to revitalise its tank capability in 2007. The Canadian Army Journal
summarises this decision succinctly

‘By deploying tanks and armoured engineers to Afghanistan in

October 2006 and supporting the acquisition of the Leopard 2,
the leadership of the Canadian Forces (CF) has acknowledged
the importance of maintaining heavy armour in a balanced force.
While the continued development of sensors and technology
will be extremely important to achieving improved situational
awareness (SA) on the battlefield, the hard-earned experiences
of the Canadian Army and our allies in sustained combat in
Afghanistan and Iraq have proven we must be prepared to get
our hands dirty and come into physical contact with the enemy if
we wish to define their strength, composition and intentions, and
subsequently kill them. Canadian tanks and armoured engineers
have better protected our dismounted infantry soldiers in
Southern Afghanistan, allowing them to close with and destroy a
fanatical and determined enemy in extremely complex terrain.’23

23 Cadieu, T., 2008 ‘Canadian Armour in Afghanistan’, Canadian Army Journal Vol. 10.4
Winter 2008, p 5.

30
To revitalise its tank capability, Canada’s Department of National
Defence decreed that it would acquire 100 modern tanks as this
number represented ‘the minimum fleet size to support a deployed
tank squadron’.24 This number was sufficient to provide for
two combat-ready squadrons of approximately 20 tanks each: the
first for deployment and a second for rotation into theatre to allow for
depot repair and overhaul of the first. This number also provided a
third squadron supporting collective training and a fourth squadron
to facilitate individual training. Additional vehicles included armoured
recovery vehicles and armoured engineer vehicles. The Canadian
Forces eventually acquired 127 vehicles: 82 tanks, 12 armoured
recovery vehicles, 18 armoured engineer vehicles and 15 tanks as
spares. Thus in light of the Canadian experience and Australia’s similar
individual and collective training approach, it is questionable whether
the ADF’s M1 fleet is sufficient to enable it to deploy and sustain a tank
squadron on operations for a prolonged period.

In terms of tank sustainment, the United States Army, which

developed the M1 tank system during the 1970s, employs
the world’s best practices to sustain the tank. Advice from the
US Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command indicates
that to generate a tank capability that is available for training and
operations, treatment of risk factors such as fleet age, rate of effort
(usage), parts availability, maintenance effort and fleet size are
critical. Complementary studies of the M1 tank in US service by
the RAND Institute demonstrate that the combination of age and
training tempo result in higher costs as vehicles breakdown more

24 The Canadian Army also operates six Leopard 1 based Beaver armoured bridge layers,
but does not operate a dedicated armoured breaching vehicle. It utilises tank based
attachments, such as mine ploughs, rollers and dozer blades, to provide a limited
breaching capability. National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Backgrounder-
Renewing the Canadian Forces’ Tank Capability, BG07.012 – April 12, 2007, available
on the internet, URL: http://web.archive.org/web/20081209033111/http://www.forces.
gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2252

31
frequently and consume parts quicker. Further, this maintenance
liability increases with the age of the vehicle.25 These factors
correlate to the challenges the ADF faces in the generation of a
sustainable tank capability. The small Australian M1 fleet is now
10 years old and endures a rate of effort at least twice that when
compared to US Army units. While this maintains a high standard
of training and proficiency, this also places significant stress on
the vehicle, reducing the mean time between components failing
and increasing the number of components which fail – more things
break more often. This training is routinely conducted in some of
the harshest tank-training environments in the world ranging from
dry desert to wet tropical jungle, further exacerbating these factors.
Consequently, the M1 tank is wearing out faster than anticipated,
which ultimately affects the ADF’s ability to generate the unique
effects the tank provides in combat. This is compounded by
Australia being at the end of a very long supply chain extending
back to the United States for items such as track, fire control
systems and ammunition.

Fleet size underwrites all of these issues. When balanced against

the remit of Army’s training requirements, the small M1 fleet size
results in the vast majority of vehicles committed to training and
few held in reserve to enable rotation for repairs, maintenance
or upgrades. This means vehicles remain in service, or are
pressed back into service prematurely, with outstanding repairs or
maintenance tasks or simply becoming unserviceable and therefore

25 Australian Management Office, 2016, Site Visit Report- Sustainment and Support
Assessment, US Department of Defense, Detroit, Peltz, E., Colabella, L., Williams, B.
and Boren, P., 2004, The Effects of Equipment Age on Mission-Critical Failure Rates: A
Study of M1 Tanks (MR-1789-A), RAND Corporation Arroyo Centre, Santa Monica and
Colabella, L., Bower, A., Galway, A., Pint, E. and Eng, J., 2013, Measuring the Value of
Renewal: Age, Operational Tempo, Deployment, and Reset Effects on the Readiness
and Maintenance Costs of Army Vehicles, RAND Corporation Arroyo Centre, Santa
Monica, pp 25-55.

32
unavailable. This in turn subtracts from the fleet size, leading to an
even smaller number of vehicles absorbing a greater rate of effort
burden to meet the training requirement, and wearing out faster
or breaking down more often as a result. This cause and effect
interplay creates a cycle which leads inexorably to deterioration of
the tank capability. How does the ADF sustain the tank capability
into the future when these factors are considered?

There are several measures that the ADF may take to help preserve
the M1 fleet until it is upgraded in the early part of the next decade
under Project Land 907 Phase Two. First, a greater emphasis on
simulation systems in training would reduce the physical burden on
the M1 fleet. The introduction of tactical simulators would enable
the judicious replacement of some field training with synthetic
surrogates. This may improve training outcomes through the
provision of greater evidence based after action analysis, greater
frequency of exposure to training serials and enable exposure to
complex training serials which are difficult to replicate in the field.
Simulation also lowers the risk of these difficult training serials and
potentially affords savings to the ADF.

Second, steps such as the manufacture of spare parts domestically

to shorten lines of supply and fatten stocks will likely improve
parts availability. Standardising and export of repair procedures
and expanding heavy maintenance to regional repair organisations
would help increase efficiency. The effects of age however, can
only be reversed through a rebuild process. This presents an
opportunity to increase the involvement of the Australian industrial
base. Rebuilding tanks requires growth in the capacity, expertise
and capability of the industry base. This would require commitment
from Government, Defence and industry to deliver. Furthermore,
a proven rebuild capability may subsequently result in follow on
opportunities to conduct the upgrade of the tank fleet under

33
Land 907 Phase Two or assembly of the armoured engineering
systems forecast under Land 8160 Phase One. Likewise both of
these projects offer significant opportunities for Australian industry
to increase its through life support to the M1 tank capability as
described in recent Defence policy.26

Ultimately, successful capability management requires a ‘right sized’

fleet to ensure that adequate vehicles are provided to meet
organisational need. Without the right number of vehicles across
the fleet, even a greatly expanded maintenance effort supported by
domestic parts supply cannot overcome the negative effects that
training tempo and fleet age place upon the capability. Vehicles are not
only required in the operational tank squadrons and in training schools
but are also required to provision a robust repair and sustainment pool.
The size of this base should be sufficient to enable a ‘best practice’
maintenance regime to be applied, facilitating fleet rotation to reduce
the burden per vehicle in regional areas and enabling major servicing,
repairs and upgrades on a national level. A regime such as this would
yield improved vehicle serviceability and availability rates. For the
present, the small fleet size is and will remain a significant constraint on
the ADF unless a cost effective method can be developed to acquire
sufficient vehicles to provision the operational and training forces as well
as a robust sustainment pool. Without a ‘right sized’ fleet the ADFs tank
capability will face even greater challenges as it continues to age.

26 Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, 2016 Australian Defence White Paper, Department

of Defence, Canberra, pp 108-9.

34
Conclusion
This paper has illustrated the importance of the M1 tank capability to
the ADF. It highlighted the advantages that the tank provides to the
combined arms team in close combat by examining its unique blend
of firepower, mobility and protection. This was reinforced by analysis
of operational experiences which show that tanks reduce Australian
casualties and increase the likelihood of mission success. Likewise, it
illustrated the place of the tank in the Joint Land Force. It dispelled the
misperception of the tank’s lack of mobility by demonstrating Australia’s
M1 tank is the most tactically mobile ground combat vehicle in the
ADF’s inventory and is deployable within our region and globally. It also
described the linkages between Government’s Defence policy guidance
and the role of the tank within it. Ultimately, the tank remains relevant to
future military operations.

It also explained the challenges the ADF faces to sustaining the M1

tank. The effects of age, a high rate of effort, maintenance constraints,
and lengthy supply lines are compounded by a small fleet size.
Innovative approaches by Australian industry are very important to
addressing the challenges faced by the ADF now and to develop a
pathway to sustain the system until its upgrade early next decade.
Given that the M1 tank is such an important part of the ADF, it is
therefore timely to re-examine the means necessary to maintain a
credible, deployable and sustainable capability.

35
About the Authors: Brigadier Mills is the Director General
Modernisation within Army Headquarters. In this role he coordinates
the modernisation of the Army, which includes the next generation
of Armoured Fighting Vehicles to be delivered by projects
Land 400 Phases Two and Three, Land 907 Phase Two and
Land 8160 Phase One. Lieutenant Colonel Purdy is the Staff Officer
Grade 1 Armoured and supervises the management and development
of Australia’s M1 Abrams tank capability and future armoured
engineering systems.

36
 Modernisation Branch
Discussion Paper

Fighting to Win: the importance of

the tank to the Australian Defence Force
in the 21st Century
Brigadier Chris Mills and
Lieutenant Colonel Leo Purdy
November 2016

DPS: APR030-17