GOTESCO vs.

CHATTO; directors, writers, editors and

GOTESCO vs. CHATTO; administrators of a certain newspaper
GOTESCO vs. CHATTO; known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling
GOTESCO vs. CHATTO; Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering
GOTESCO vs. CHATTO; damages resulting from an alleged libelous
publication.
The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to
iii. Joint Tortfeasors; have incited the Filipino people into
believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and
wo or more persons whose negligence in a a corrupt person, unworthy of the position
single accident or event causes damages to which he held. The said editorial alluded to
another person. In many cases the joint him as an eagle that surprises and devours,
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable a vulture that gorges himself on dead and
for the damages, meaning that any of them rotten meat, an owl that affects a petulant
can be responsible to pay the entire omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the
amount, no matter how unequal the blood of the victim until he leaves it
negligence of each party was. bloodless.
After hearing the evidence adduced during
Example: Harry Hotrod is doing 90 miles an trial, the judge of the CFI rendered
hour along a two-lane road in the early judgment in favor of petitioner, holding all
evening, Adele Aimster has stopped her car the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar
to study a map with her car sticking out and Liquete who were found to be editors
into the lane by six inches. Hotrod swings but in a subordinate position and found to
out a couple of feet to miss Aimster's have merely acted under the direction of
vehicle, never touches the brake, and hits their superiors) liable jointly and severally
Victor Victim, driving from the other for sustained damages on account of
direction, killing him. While Hotrod is petitioner’s wounded feelings, mental
grossly negligent for the high speed and suffering and injuries to his standing and
failure to slow down, Aimster is also reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as
negligent for her car's slight intrusion into P25,000 as punitive damages.
the lane. As a joint tortfeasor she may have This judgment prompted defendants to
to pay all the damages, particularly if appeal to the SC, claiming that the CFI
Hotrod has no money or insurance. committed several errors in rendering said
However, comparative negligence rules by judgment among which was that the lower
statute or case law in most jurisdictions will court committed an error in rendering a
apportion the liability by percentages of judgment jointly and severally against the
negligence among the tortfeasors defendants.
(wrongdoers) and the injured parties.
ISSUE
Article 2194, CC: 1. WON the defendants, regardless of
The responsibility of two or more persons their participation in the commission of the
who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. actual tort, may be held jointly and
severally liable as joint tort feasor.
WORCESTER vs. OCAMPO, 1912; 2. WON the above damages for the
wounded feelings, mental suffering and
FACTS injuries was correct.
Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the 3. WON the lower court was correct in
Civil Commission of the Philippines and awarding punitive damages and damages
Secretary of the Interior of the Insular for the wounded feelings, mental suffering
Government commenced an action against and injuries.
defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes,
Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose, HELD
Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners,
1. YES. Joint tort feasors are all the
persons who command, instigate, promote, Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally
encourage, advise, countenance, liable for the tort which they commit. The
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of person injured may sue all of them, or any
a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, number less than all. Each is liable for the
if done for their benefit. whole damage caused by all, and
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally altogether jointly liable for the whole
liable for the tort which they commit. They damage. It is no defense for one sued
are each liable as principals, to the same alone, that the others who participated in
extent and in the same manner as if they the wrongful act are not joined with him as
had performed the wrongful act defendants; nor is it any excuse for him
themselves. that his participation in the tort was
insignificant as compared with that of the
***If several persons jointly commit a tort, others.
the plaintiff or person injured, has his
election to sue all or some of the parties Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata.
jointly, or one of them separately, because The damages can not be apportioned
tort is in its nature a separate act of each among them, except among themselves.
individual. They can no insist upon an apportionment,
for the purpose of each paying an aliquot
Defendants fail to recognize that the basis part. They are jointly and severally liable
of the present action is a tort. They fail to for the full amount.
recognize the universal doctrine that each
joint tort feasor is not only individually A payment in full of the damage done, by
liable for the tort in which he participates, one of the joint tort feasors, of course
but is also jointly liable with his tort satisfies any claim which might exist
feasors. The defendants might have been against the others. There can be but one
sued separately for the commission of the satisfaction. The release of one of the joint
tort. They might have sued jointly and tort feasors by agreement, generally
severally, as they were. It is not necessary operates to discharge all.
that the cooperation should be a direct,
corporeal act. **note: Ponente used Of course the courts during the trial may
examples of torts as held under common find that some of the alleged joint tort
law** (In a case of assault and battery feasors are liable and that others are not
committed by various persons, under the liable. The courts may release some for
common law, all are principals). So also is lack of evidence while condemning others
the person who counsels, aids, or assists in of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true
any way the commission of a wrong. Under even though they are charged jointly and
the common law, he who aided, assisted or severally.
counseled, in any way the commission of a
crime, was as much a principal as he who This same principle is recognized by Act
inflicted or committed the actual tort. 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section
6 provides that:
It may be stated as a general rule, that the Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is
joint tort feasors are all the persons who chargeable with the publication of any
command, instigate, promote, encourage, words in any part . . . or number of each
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or newspaper, as fully as if he were the author
abet the commission of a tort, or who of the same.
approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit. They are each liable as In our opinion the lower court committed
principals, to the same extent and in the no error in rendering a joint and several
same manner as if they had performed the judgment against the defendants and
wrongful act themselves. allowing an execution against their
individual property. The provisions of the from his standpoint, sustains, the courts
Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the must have some tangible basis upon which
defendants and appellants have no to estimate such damages.
application whatever to the question
presented in the present case. "The enjoyment of a private
The courts during the trial may find that reputation is as much a constitutional right
some of the alleged joint tort feasors are as the possession of life, liberty or
liable and that others are not liable. The property. It is one of those rights necessary
courts may release some for lack of to human society, that underlie the whole
evidence while condemning others of the scheme of human civilization. The respect
alleged tort. And this is true even though and esteem of his fellows are among the
they are charged jointly and severally. highest rewards of a wellspent life
However, in this case, the lower court, vouchsafed to man in this existence.
committed no error in rendering a joint and
several judgment against the defendants. The law recognizes the value of such
As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of a reputation and constantly strives to give
the Philippine Commission: “Every author, redress for its injury. It imposes upon him
editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable who attacks it by slanderous words or
with the publication of any words in any libelous publications, the liability to make
part * * * or number of each newspaper, full compensation for the damage to the
as fully as if he were the author of the reputation, for the shame, obloquy and for
same. the injury to the feelings of its owner, which
are caused by the publication of the slander
Disposition Judgment of the lower court or libel. The law goes further. If the words
modified. Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, are spoken or the publication is made with
Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit held the intent to injure the victim or with
jointly and severally liable for the sum of criminal indifference to civil obligation, it
P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos imposes such damages as the jury, in view
absolved from any liability. of all the circumstances of the particular
case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to
2. The amount of damages resulting pay as an example to the public and to
from a libelous publication to a man's good deter others from doing likewise, and for
name and reputation is difficult of punishment for the infliction of the injury.
ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize
that the damage thus done is great and 3. Yes. After a careful examination of
almost immeasurable. The specific amount the evidence, and in view of all of the facts
the damages to be awarded must depend and circumstances and the malice
upon the facts in each case and the sound connected with the publication of said
discretion of the court. No fixed or precise editorial and the subsequent publications
rules can be laid down governing the with relation to said editorial, that the lower
amount of damages in cases of libel. It is court, by virtue of the provisions of Act No.
difficult to include all of the facts and 277 of the Philippine Commission, was
conditions which enter into the measure of justified in imposing punitive damages
such damages. A man's good name and upon the defendants.
reputation are worth more to him than all
the wealth which he can accumulate during Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court,
a lifetime of industrious labor. To have in an action for libel, to render a judgment
them destroyed may be eminently of more for punitive damages, in an amount which
damage to him personally than the the court may think will be a just
destruction of his physical wealth. The loss punishment to the libeler and an example
is immeasurable. No amount of money can to others.
compensate him for his loss.
Notwithstanding the great loss which he,
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel Whether or not diligence of a good father
may always be recovered if the defendant has been observed by MMTC?
or defendants are actuated by malice. In
the present case there was not the slightest Held:
effort on the part of the defendants to show The SC ruled that MMTC, being sued
the existence of probable cause or as employer of the bus driver Leonardo
foundation whatever for the facts contained under Art. 2180 or vicarious liability, was
in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will not able to prove that it had exercised due
against the plaintiff are seen throughout diligence of a good father of a family in the
the record. The said editorial not only selection and supervision of its employees
attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, as it has not proven that it exercised due
but upon every occasion, the defendants diligence in supervising its employees for
resorted to ridicule of the severest kind. mere imposition of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies without anything more
Taking into consideration the fact that is not sufficient to overcome the
some of the defendants have been presumption of negligence imposed upon
prosecuted criminally and have been them by the law.
sentenced, and considering that fact as a
part of the punitive damages, we have The basis of the employer’s vicarious
arrived at the conclusion that the judgment liability is that the responsibility imposed
of the lower court should be modified, and by the article arises by reason of a
that a judgment should be rendered presumption of negligence on the part of
against the defendants, jointly and the persons made responsible under the
severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the article from their failure to exercise due
Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum care and vigilance over the acts of
of P10,000, as punitive damages, with subordinates to prevent them from causing
interest at 6 per cent from the 23d day of damage. Negligence is imputed to them by
January, 1909. law, unless they prove the contrary by
showing that they exercised diligence of a
MMTC vs. CA, 1993 good father of a family to prevent damage.
It is clear that it is the non-performance of
Facts: certain duties of precaution and prudence
The case arose from Nenita who incurred imposed upon them that is why they are
injuries from being thrown out of the made answerable for damages caused by
windshield of the jeepney that she was their employee.
riding that collided with a bus operated by
MMTC (petitioner). Nenita filed for For the doctrine to apply, it must first be
damages for neither the operator of the shown that there is employer-employee
jeepney nor the MMTC would pay for the relationship and that the plaintiff must
damages sustained by Nenita. The RTC show that the tort complained of was
ruled that MMTC is abstained from liability committed in the scope of his assigned task
for it has proven that it has shown diligence and that is when the employer may find it
of a good father of a family in employing necessary to interpose a defense of due
and supervising its employees. MMTC diligence of a good father of a family. The
stated that it goes through a process of diligence of a good father of a family
screening, interviewing, and seminar required to be observed by the employer to
attending before they hire their employees. prevent damages under Art. 2180 refers to
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC due diligence in the selection and
holding that the MMTC was not able to supervision the employees to protect the
further prove that its employees complied public.
with its requirements.
iv. Particular Persons held liable by
Issue: law;
 property, there are other heirs. There are
Possessor or user manual also other occupants of the house that
maintain themselves out of a common
fund, they do not pay rent because of their
Article 2183, CC; relation to her father but do occupy the
The possessor of an animal or whoever property.
may make use of the same is responsible
for the damage which it may cause, Issue/s:
although it may escape or be lost. This Whether or not the Vestils liable for
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages. Yes.
damage should come from force majeure
or from the fault of the person who has Held:
suffered damage. The cause of Theness’ death was the dog
bites. She developed hydrophobia, a
VESTIL vs. IAC; symptom of rabies, and had died due to
broncho-pneumonia, a complication of
Summary rabies.
(dog bite) Theness died due to being bitten
by the Vestil’s dog. The Vestil are liable for The Vestils are the possessors of the
damages as possessors of the dog under property and Purita is the only heir residing
Article 2183. in Cebu City. They use it as a second home
and visited weekly - renting it out to the
Facts of the case boarders, paying for utilities and hiring the
Theness (3 years old) was bitten by the maid who cleaned and cooked for the house
Vestil’s dog at the house of Vicente occupants. An occupant of the household
Miranda, Purita Vestil’s late father while (Marcial Lao) testified that they maintain
playing with Purita’s daughter. She was the house for business purposes and that
treated for multiple lacerated wounds on he is one of the boarder of said property.
the forehead and was administered with an
anti-rabies vaccine. She was later re- Liability is due to the possession of the dog,
admitted due to vomiting of saliva. She regardless of the ownership of the dog or
died due to broncho-pneumonia. Her property. Under Article 2183, regardless if
parents, the Uys, sued the Vestils for the animal was tame or vicious or if it had
damages, holding them liable as been lost and removed from the control of
possessors of the dog, Andoy. the Vestils, liability still attach because one
who possesses an animal for utility,
Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint. pleasure or service must answer for the
Court of Appeal: Theness had died due to damage which the animal may had caused.
the dog bites. Under Article 2183 of the
Civil Code., the Vestils are liable for Article 2183: The possessor of an animal…
damages as possessor of the property and is responsible for the damage it may
the dog. cause… The responsibility shall cease only
in case the damage should come from force
Defense: The dog was tame and had majeure or from the fault of the person who
merely been provoked, although no one suffered damage.
had seen it bite Theness. Additionally, she
had died of broncho-pneumonia, which had The Vestils are liable for damages for
no correlation to dog bites. Theness’ death as possessor of Andoy, the
dog. Theness is just 3 years old and could
Anyway, she (Purita) could not be held not be faulted for any of actions of alleged
liable because the dog does not belong to provocations. Notably, the Vestils had
her but to Vicente Miranda, her father. She offered to assist in the hospitalization
is not the sole owner of the unpartitioned
expense, even if they declared the Uys to Chapman attempted to board the front
merely be their casual acquaintances only. platform but, seeing that he could not
reach it without extra exertion, stopped
beside the car, facing toward the rear
platform, and waited for it to come within
Owner of Motor Vehicle reach for him to board. While in this
position, he was struck from behind and
Articles 2184 to 2186, Civil Code; run over by Underwood s automobile.

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, Immediately prior to the incident,

the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, Underwood s automobile, which was being
if the former, who was in the vehicle, could driven by his chauffeur, followed behind a
have, by the use of the due diligence, street car from Manila bound to Santa Ana
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably (Opposite direction of the San Marcelino
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he street-car that Chapman wanted to board).
had been found guilty of reckless driving or Just before reaching the scene of the
violating traffic regulations at least twice accident, the street car being followed by
within the next preceding two months. Underwood took the switched off the main
line to the left. Thereupon, Underwood s
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, automobile no longer followed that street-
the provisions of article 2180 are car nor went to the left, but either kept
applicable. straight ahead on the main street-car track
or a bit to the right. The street-car which
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the the Chapman intended to board was on the
contrary, it is presumed that a person main line and bound in an opposite
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent direction. When the front of the "San
if at the time of the mishap, he was Marcelino" car (the one which plaintiff
violating any traffic regulation. attempted to board) was almost in front of
Underwood s automobile, the latter s driver
Article 2186. Every owner of a motor suddenly went to the right striking and
vehicle shall file with the proper running over Chapman.
government office a bond executed by a
government-controlled corporation or The trial court rendered decision in favor of
office, to answer for damages to third the defendant.
persons. The amount of the bond and other
terms shall be fixed by the competent Issue: Is defendant liable in the case at
public official. bar?

CHAPMAN vs. UNDERWOOD, 27 PHIL Held: A careful examination of the record

375; leads to the conclusion that the Under wood
Facts: J.H. Chapman visited a man by the s driver was guilty of negligence in running
name of Creveling, in front of whose house upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing
the accident occurred. Chapman wanted to an incoming car upon the wrong side. The
board a certain "San Marcelino" single- plaintiff, out to board the car, was not
track street-car coming from Santa Ana obliged to observe whether a car was
and bound for Manila. Being told by coming upon him from his left hand. He had
Creveling that the car was approaching, he only to guard against those coming from
hurriedly, passed from the gate of the right. He knew that, according to the
Creveling s home into the street for the law of the road, no automobile or other
purpose of signaling and boarding the car. vehicle coming from his left should pass
upon his side of the car. He needed only to
The car was a closed one, the entrance watch for cars coming from his right, as
being from the front or the rear platform. they were the only ones under the law
permitted to pass up on that side of the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage bound for the
street car. airport. Several members of his family
were in the car. Coming from the opposite
Underwood, however, is not responsible for direction was the Cadillac car of defendant
the negligence of his driver, under the facts Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael
and circumstances of this case. As stated in Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a
the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., moderate speed with their headlights on.
663), the driver does not fall within the list Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela.
of persons in Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he
article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts was about eight (8) meters away. Instead
the defendant would be responsible. of slowing down behind the caretela
defendant’s driver veered to the left with
The owner of an automobile who permits the intention of passing by the caretela but
his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for in doing so its rear bumper caught the
example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, ream of thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching
without any effort to stop him, although he it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to
has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, the other end and collided with the on-
becomes himself responsible, both coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
criminally and civilly, for the results on his part, slackened his speed and tried
produced by the acts of his chauffe ur. On to avoid the collision by veering to the right
the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden but the collision occurred just the same
act of negligence, and without the owner injuring the plaintiff and members of his
having a reasonable opportunity to prevent family. Plaintiff brought an action for
the acts or its continuance, injures a person damages against both the driver and owner
or violates the criminal law, the owner of of the Cadillac car. There was no question
the automobile, although present therein at that defendant’s driver was negligent and
the time the act was committed, is not liable.
responsible, e ither civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be ISSUE:
continued in the presence of the owner for
such a length a time that the owner, by his Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai,
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his owner of the car, who was in the car, was
own. solidarily liable with the driver under Art.
2184, of the Civil Code.
In this case, it DOES NOT appear that,
from the time the automobile took the RULING:
wrong side of the road to the commission
of the injury, sufficient time intervenedto The applicable law is Article 2184 of the
give the defendant an opportunity to Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the
correct the act of his driver. Instead, it causative factor was the driver’s
appears that the interval between the negligence, the owner of the vehicle who
turning out to meet and pass the street car was present is likewise held liable if he
and the happening of the accident was so could have prevented the mishap by the
small as not to be sufficient to charge exercise of due diligence. The basis of the
defendant with the negligence of the driver. master’s liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the
CAEDO vs. YU KHE TAI, 26 SCRA 410; relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is
that ultimately the negligence of the
FACTS: servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him,
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car reflects his own negligence if he fails to
at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, correct it in order to prevent injury or
1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the damage.
 caused heavy damage to the Lancer
Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, resulting in an explosion of the rear part of
must be sought in the immediate setting the car. Gonzaga continued on his way and
and circumstances of the accident, that is, did not bother to bring the victims to the
in his failure to detain the driver from hospital.
pursuing a course which not only gave him
clear notice of the danger but also sufficient 2. UCPB was paid P244, 500.00 by its
time to act upon it. We do not see that such insurance company representing the
negligence may be imputed. The car, as coverage of the damaged car. As the 18-
has been stated, was not running at an wheeler truck is registered under the name
unreasonable speed. The road was wide of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were
and open, and devoid of traffic that early made by UCPB General Insurance Co. for
morning. There was no reason for the car the payment of the aforesaid amounts.
owner to be in any special state of alert. He However, no payment was made. Thus,
had reason to rely on the skill and UCPB filed a case on March 13, 1991.
experience of his driver. He became aware
of the presence of the carretela when his 3. Petitioner interposed the defense
car was only twelve meters behind it, but that it could not be held liable for the
then his failure to see it earlier did not collision, since the driver of the truck,
constitute negligence, for he was not Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of
himself at the wheel. And even when he did its co-defendant SUGECO. In fact, it was
see it at that distance, he could not have SUGECO, and not petitioner, that was the
anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a
pass the carretela on its left side in spite of Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and
the fact that another car was approaching SUGECO. Petitioner, however, admitted
from the opposite direction. The time that it was the owner of the truck in
element was such that there was no question.
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to
assess the risks involved and warn the 4. The trial court rendered a decision
driver accordingly. The thought that in favor of UCPB General Insurance and
entered his mind, he said, was that if he ordered PCI Leasing and Gonzaga to pay
sounded a sudden warning it might only the principal amount with 12% interest as
make the other man nervous and make the of the filing of the complaint plus attorney’s
situation worse. It was a thought that, wise fees.
or not, connotes no absence of that due
diligence required by law to prevent the 5. On appeal to the CA, the same was
misfortune. Under the facts the owner of affirmed with modification in that the
the car was not liable. award of attorney’s fees was deleted and
the rate of interest was lowered to 6% per
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC. vs. annum. The CA found petitioner liable for
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE, CO. INC. the damage caused by the collision since
2008; under the Public Service Act, if the property
covered by a franchise is transferred or
FACTS: leased to another without obtaining the
1. On October 19, 1990 at about 10:30 requisite approval, the transfer is not
p.m., a Mitsubishi Lancer owned by UCPB binding on the Public Service Commission
and insured with UCPB General Insurance and, in contemplation of law, the grantee
Inc. was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler continues to be responsible under the
Fuso Tanker Truck owned by PCI Leasing & franchise in relation to the operation of the
Finance. The truck was allegedly leased to vehicle, such as damage or injury to third
and operated by Superior Gas & Equitable parties due to collisions.
Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its
employee Renato Gonzaga. The impact
6. Petitioner claims that the CA's only limitation is that he cannot recover
reliance on the Public Service Act is damages twice for the same act or
misplaced, since the said law applies only omission of the defendant. In case a
to cases involving common carriers, or separate civil action is filed, the long-
those which have franchises to operate as standing principle is that the registered
public utilities. In contrast, the case before owner of a motor vehicle is primarily and
this Court involves a private commercial directly responsible for the consequences
vehicle for business use, which is not of its operation, including the negligence of
offered for service to the general public. the driver, with respect to the public and all
third persons. In contemplation of law, the
ISSUES: registered owner of a motor vehicle is the
1. WoN PCI Leasing, as registered employer of its driver, with the actual
owner of a motor vehicle may be held liable operator and employer, such as a lessee,
with the driver therof for damages caused being considered as merely the owner's
to third parties - YES agent. This being the case, even if a sale
has been executed before a tortious
2. WoN PCI Leasing is absolved from incident, the sale, if unregistered, has no
liability by the enactment of RA 8556 or effect as to the right of the public and third
the Financing Company Act of 1998 – NO persons to recover from the registered
owner. The public has the right to
RULING: Petition DENIED. CA decision conclusively presume that the registered
AFFIRMED. owner is the real owner, and may sue
accordingly.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner's contention has partial 3. In the case now before the Court,
merit, as indeed, the vehicles involved in there is not even a sale of the vehicle
the case at bar are not common carriers, involved, but a mere lease, which remained
which makes the Public Service Act unregistered up to the time of the
inapplicable. However, the registered occurrence of the quasi-delict that gave
owner of the vehicle driven by a negligent rise to the case. Since a lease, unlike a
driver may still be held liable under sale, does not even involve a transfer of
applicable jurisprudence involving laws on title or ownership, but the mere use or
compulsory motor vehicle registration and enjoyment of property, there is more
the liabilities of employers for quasi- delicts reason, therefore, in this instance to uphold
under the Civil Code. The principle of the policy behind the law, which is to
holding the registered owner of a vehicle protect the unwitting public and provide it
liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use with a definite person to make accountable
is well established in jurisprudence. for losses or injuries suffered in vehicular
accidents. This is and has always been the
2. For damage or injuries arising out of rationale behind compulsory motor vehicle
negligence in the operation of a motor registration under the Land Transportation
vehicle, the registered owner may be held and Traffic Code and similar laws, which, as
civilly liable with the negligent driver either early as Erezo v. Jepte, has been guiding
1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks the courts in their disposition of cases
relief based on a delict or crime under involving motor vehicular incidents. It is
Articles 100 and 103 of the RPC; or 2) also important to emphasize that such
solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief principles apply to all vehicles in general,
based on a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 not just those offered for public service or
and 2180 of the Civil Code. It is the option utility.
of the plaintiff whether to waive completely
the filing of the civil action, or institute it 4. The new law, R.A. No. 8556,
with the criminal action, or file it separately notwithstanding developments in foreign
or independently of a criminal action; his jurisdictions, do not supersede or repeal
the law on compulsory motor vehicle the chaos that may result if registered
registration. No part of the law expressly owners or operators of vehicles are freed
repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. from such responsibility. Petitioner pays
4136 , as amended, otherwise known as the price for its failure to obey the law on
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. compulsory registration of motor vehicles
Neither is there an implied repeal of R.A. for registration is a pre-requisite for any
No. 4136. As a rule, repeal by implication person to even enjoy the privilege of
is frowned upon, unless there is clear putting a vehicle on public roads.
showing that the later statute is so
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant Manufacturers/processors of
to the existing law that they cannot be foodstuffs;
reconciled and made to stand together.
There is nothing in R.A. No. 4136 that is Article 2187, Civil Code;
inconsistent and incapable of reconciliation. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
5. A lease such as the one involved in goods shall be liable for death or injuries
the instant case is an encumbrance in caused by any noxious or harmful
contemplation of law, which needs to be substances used, although no contractual
registered in order for it to bind third relation exists between them and the
parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to consumers.
be avoided is the exacerbation of the
suffering of victims of tragic vehicular Sections 92-107 (Chapter 1), RA No.
accidents in not being able to identify a 7394 (1992);
guilty party. A contrary ruling will not serve
the ends of justice. The failure to register a ARTICLE 92. Exemptions. — If the
lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, concerned department finds that for good
should not benefit the parties responsible, or sufficient reasons, full compliance with
to the prejudice of innocent victims. The the labeling requirements otherwise
non-registration of the lease contract applicable under this Act is impracticable or
between petitioner and its lessee precludes is not necessary for the adequate
the former from enjoying the benefits protection of public health and safety, it
under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8556. shall promulgate regulations exempting
such substances from these requirements
6. This ruling may appear too severe to the extent it deems consistent with the
and unpalatable to leasing and financing objective of adequately safeguarding public
companies, but the Court believes that health and safety, and any hazardous
petitioner and other companies so situated substance which does not bear a label in
are not entirely left without a remedy. They accordance with such regulations shall be
may resort to third-party complaints deemed mislabeled hazardous substance.
against their lessees or whoever are the
actual operators of their vehicles. In the ARTICLE 93. Grounds for Seizure and
case at bar, there is, in fact, a provision in Condemnation of Mislabeled Hazardous
the lease contract between petitioner and Substances. — a) Any mislabeled
SUGECO to the effect that the latter shall hazardous substance when introduced into
indemnify and hold the former free and commerce or while held for sale shall be
harmless from any "liabilities, damages, liable to be proceeded against and
suits, claims or judgments" arising from the condemned upon order of the concerned
latter's use of the motor vehicle. Whether department in accordance with existing
petitioner would act against SUGECO based procedure for seizure and condemnation of
on this provision is its own option. articles in commerce: Provided, That this
Article shall not apply to a hazardous
7. The burden of registration of the substance intended for export to any
lease contract is minuscule compared to foreign country if:
 ARTICLE 94. Labeling Requirements
1) it is in a package labeled in of Cigarettes. — All cigarettes for sale or
accordance with the specifications of the distribution within the country shall be
foreign purchaser; contained in a package which shall bear the
following statement or its equivalent in
2) it is labeled in accordance with Filipino: “Warning” Cigarette Smoking is
the laws of the foreign country; Dangerous to Your Health”. Such
statement shall be located in conspicuous
3) it is labeled on the outside of place on every cigarette package and shall
the shipping package to show that it is appear in conspicuous and legible type in
intended for export; and contrast by typography, layout or color
with other printed matter on the package.
4) it is so exported, Any advertisement of cigarette shall
contain the name warning as indicated in
b) any hazardous substance the label.
condemned under this Article shall after
entry of order of condemnation be disposed ARTICLE 95. Penalties. — a) Any
of by destruction or sale as the concerned person who shall violate the provisions of
department may direct, and the proceeds Title III, Chapter IV of this Act, or its
thereof, if sold, less the legal cost and implementing rules and regulations, except
charges, shall be paid into the treasury of Articles 81 to 83 of the same Chapter, shall
the Philippines; but such hazardous be subject to a fine of not less than Five
substance shall not be sold under any order hundred pesos (P500.00) but not more
which is contrary to the provisions of this than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
Act: Provided, That, after entry of the order or imprisonment of not less than three (3)
and upon the payment of the costs of such months but not more than two (2) years or
proceedings and the execution of a good both, at the discretion of the court:
and sufficient bond conditioned that such Provided, That, if the consumer product is
hazardous substance shall not be sold or one which is not a food, cosmetic, drug,
disposed of contrary to the provisions of device or hazardous substance, the penalty
this Act, the concerned department may shall be a fine of not less than Two hundred
direct that such hazardous substance be pesos (P200.00) but not more than Five
delivered to or retained by the owner thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or
thereof for destruction or for alteration to imprisonment of not less than one (1)
comply with the provisions of this Act under month but not more than one (1) year or
the supervision of an officer or employee both, at the discretion of the court.
duly designated by the concerned
department. The expenses for such b) Any person who violates the
supervision shall be paid by the person provisions of Article 81 to 83 for the first
obtaining release of the hazardous time shall be subject to a fine of not less
substance under bond. than Two hundred pesos (P200.00) but not
more than Five thousand pesos
c) all expenses in connection with (P5,000.00) or by imprisonment of not less
the destruction provided for in paragraphs than one (1) month but not more than six
(a) and (b) of this Article and all expenses (6) months or both, at the discretion of the
in connection with the storage and labor court. A second conviction under this
with respect to such hazardous substance paragraph shall also carry with it the
shall be paid by the owner or consignee, penalty of revocation of business permit
and default in such payment shall and license.
constitute a lien against any importation by
such owner or consignee. CHAPTER V

Liability for Product and Service

 likewise liable, pursuant to the preceding
ARTICLE 96. Implementing Agency. article when:
— The Department of Trade and Industry
shall enforce the provisions of this Chapter a) it is not possible to identify the
and its implementing rules and regulations. manufacturer, builder, producer or
importer;
ARTICLE 97. Liability for the Defective
Products. — Any Filipino or foreign b) the product is supplied, without
manufacturer, producer, and any importer, clear identification of the manufacturer,
shall be liable for redress, independently of producer, builder or importer;
fault, for damages caused to consumers by
defects resulting from design, c) he does not adequately preserve
manufacture, construction, assembly and perishable goods. The party making
erection, formulas and handling and payment to the damaged party may
making up, presentation or packing of their exercise the right to recover a part of the
products, as well as for the insufficient or whole of the payment made against the
inadequate information on the use and other responsible parties, in accordance
hazards thereof. with their part or responsibility in the cause
of the damage effected.
A product is defective when it does not offer
the safety rightfully expected of it, taking ARTICLE 99. Liability for Defective
relevant circumstances into consideration, Services. — The service supplier is liable for
including but not limited to: redress, independently of fault, for
damages caused to consumers by defects
a) presentation of product; relating to the rendering of the services, as
well as for insufficient or inadequate
b) use and hazards reasonably information on the fruition and hazards
expected of it; thereof.

c) the time it was put into The service is defective when it does not
circulation. provide the safety the consumer may
rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant
A product is not considered defective circumstances into consideration, including
because another better quality product has but not limited to:
been placed in the market.
a) the manner in which it is
The manufacturer, builder, producer or provided;
importer shall not be held liable when it
evidences: b) the result of hazards which may
reasonably be expected of it;
a) that it did not place the product
on the market; c) the time when it was provided.

b) that although it did place the A service is not considered defective

product on the market such product has no because of the use or introduction of new
defect; techniques.

c) that the consumer or a third The supplier of the services shall not be
party is solely at fault. held liable when it is proven:

ARTICLE 98. Liability of Tradesman a) that there is no defect in the

or Seller. — The tradesman/seller is service rendered;
b) that the consumer or third party replaced by another of a different kind,
is solely at fault. mark or model: Provided, That any
difference in price may result thereof shall
ARTICLE 100. Liability for Product and be supplemented or reimbursed by the
Service Imperfection. — The suppliers of party which caused the damage, without
durable or non-durable consumer products prejudice to the provisions of the second,
are jointly liable for imperfections in quality third and fourth paragraphs of this Article.
that render the products unfit or
inadequate for consumption for which they ARTICLE 101. Liability for Product
are designed or decrease their value, and Quantity Imperfection. — Suppliers are
for those resulting from inconsistency with jointly liable for imperfections in the
the information provided on the container, quantity of the product when, in due regard
packaging, labels or publicity for variations inherent thereto, their net
messages/advertisement, with due regard content is less than that indicated on the
to the variations resulting from their container, packaging, labeling or
nature, the consumer being able to advertisement, the consumer having
demand replacement to the imperfect powers to demand, alternatively, at his
parts. own option:

If the imperfection is not corrected within a) the proportionate price

thirty (30) days, the consumer may
alternatively demand at his option: b) the supplementing of weight or
measure differential;
a) the replacement of the product
by another of the same kind, in a perfect c) the replacement of the product
state of use; by another of the same kind, mark or
model, without said imperfections;
b) the immediate reimbursement
of the amount paid, with monetary d) the immediate reimbursement
updating, without prejudice to any losses of the amount paid, with monetary
and damages; updating without prejudice to losses and
damages if any.
c) a proportionate price reduction.
The provisions of the fifth paragraph of
The parties may agree to reduce or Article 99 shall apply to this Article.
increase the term specified in the
immediately preceding paragraph; but The immediate supplier shall be liable if the
such shall not be less than seven (7) nor instrument used for weighing or measuring
more than one hundred and eighty (180) is not gauged in accordance with official
days. standards.

The consumer may make immediate use of ARTICLE 102. Liability for Service
the alternatives under the second Quality Imperfection. — The service
paragraph of this Article when by virtue of supplier is liable for any quality
the extent of the imperfection, the imperfections that render the services
replacement of the imperfect parts may improper for consumption or decrease their
jeopardize the product quality or value, and for those resulting from
characteristics, thus decreasing its value. inconsistency with the information
contained in the offer or advertisement, the
If the consumer opts for the alternative consumer being entitled to demand
under sub-paragraph (a) of the second alternatively at his option:
paragraph of this Article, and replacement
of the product is not possible, it may be
a) the performance of the services, established in the pertinent provisions of
without any additional cost and when this Act. However, if the damage is caused
applicable; by a component or part incorporated in the
product or service, its manufacturer,
b) the immediate reimbursement builder or importer and the person who
of the amount paid, with monetary incorporated the component or part are
updating without prejudice to losses and jointly liable.
damages, if any;
ARTICLE 107. Penalties. — Any person
c) a proportionate price reduction. who shall violate any provision of this
Chapter or its implementing rules and
Reperformance of services may be regulations with respect to any consumer
entrusted to duly qualified third parties, at product which is not food, cosmetic, or
the supplier’s risk and cost. hazardous substance shall upon conviction,
be subject to a fine of not less than Five
Improper services are those which prove to thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by
be inadequate for purposes reasonably imprisonment of not more than one (1)
expected of them and those that fail to year or both upon the discretion of the
meet the provisions of this Act regulating court.
service rendering.
In case of juridical persons, the penalty
ARTICLE 103. Repair Service Obligation. shall be imposed upon its president,
— When services are provided for the manager or head. If the offender is an
repair of any product, the supplier shall be alien, he shall, after payment of fine and
considered implicitly bound to use service of sentence, be deported without
adequate, new, original replacement parts, further deportation proceedings.
or those that maintain the manufacturer’s
technical specifications unless, otherwise COCA-COLA BOTTLER’S PHILIPPINES
authorized, as regards to the latter by the vs. CA, (1993);
consumer.
FACTS:
ARTICLE 104. Ignorance of Quality The private respondent in this case
Imperfection. — The supplier’s ignorance of was the owner of a school canteen that sold
the quality imperfections due to soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and
inadequacy of the products and services other goods to both students and the
does not exempt him from any liability. public. One day she received some
complaints from parents that the Coke and
ARTICLE 105. Legal Guarantee of Sprite soft drinks she sold contained fiber-
Adequacy. — The legal guarantee of like matter and other foreign substances or
product or service adequacy does not particles. Testing done by the Department
require an express instrument or of Health confirmed the presence of these
contractual exoneration of the supplier substances. As a consequence of that
being forbidden. discovery, her sales severely plummeted,
eventually costing her her job and shop.
ARTICLE 106. Prohibition in Contractual
Stipulation. — The stipulation in a contract She demanded payment of
of a clause preventing, exonerating or damages from the petitioner which the
reducing the obligation to indemnify for latter refused.
damages effected, as provided for in this
and in the preceding Articles, is hereby The petitioner anchored its
prohibited, if there is more than one person arguments on failure of the private
responsible for the cause of the damage, respondent to exhaust administrative
they shall be jointly liable for the redress remedies and prescription. The private
respondent contended that her complaint The Court has repeatedly held in
was one for damages which did not involve past cases that the existence of a contract
administrative action and that her cause of between the parties does not bar the
action was based on an injury to plaintiff’s commission of a tort by the one against the
right which can be brought within four other and the consequent recovery of
years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil damages therefor.
Code.
The trial court granted the Provinces, cities, municipalities
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, reasoning
that the complaint was based on a contract
and not a quasi-delict.

The Court of Appeals annulled the

trial court’s orders, ruling that petitioner’s Article 2189, Civil Code;
complaint was based on a quasi-delict and Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
not for a breach of warranty. The action liable for damages for the death of, or
had not prescribed yet. injuries suffered by, any person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets,
ISSUE: bridges, public buildings, and other public
Whether or not the action for works under their control or supervision.
damages should be treated as one for
breach of implied warranty against hidden Section 24; LGC 1991;
defects or merchantability or one for quasi- Local government units and their officials
delict are not exempt from liability for death or
injury to persons or damage to property.
RULING:
The action is one for quasi-delict. City of Manila vs. Teotico, 1968;
The allegations in the complaint, FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered
that there was reckless and negligent and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
manufacture of “adulterated food items Burgos Avenue, Manila as he was trying to
intended to be sold for public consumption” board a jeepney, causing injuries which
on the part of petitioner, supported the required him to incur medical expenses.
public respondent’s conclusion that the
cause of action was based on a quasi-delict. Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a
complaint for damages against the City of
The vendee’s remedies against a Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
vendor with respect to the warranties officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
against hidden defects of or encumbrances
upon the thing sold are not limited to those The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in
prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. favor of Teotico and dismissing the
The vendor could likewise be liable for amended complaint, without costs.
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, and an action based thereon may be On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision
brought by the vendee. was affirmed by the CA, except insofar as
the City of Manila is concerned, which was
As a general rule, a pre-existing sentenced to pay damages in the
contract between the parties bars the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this
applicability of the law on quasi-delict. An appeal for certiorari by the City of Manila.
exception to the rule is that the liability
itself may be deemed to arise from quasi- ISSUE: WON the City of Manila should be
delict, such as the acts which break the held liable as the incident happened on a
contract. NATIONAL highway
HELD: the decision appealed from is hereby specifically — “of the defective condition of
affirmed roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control
YES or supervision.”

The question to be determined is if present In other words, said section 4 refers to

case is governed by Section 4 of Republic liability arising from negligence, in general,
Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) regardless of the object thereof, whereas
reading: Article 2189 governs liability due to
“defective streets,” in particular. Since the
The city shall not be liable or held for present action is based upon the alleged
damages or injuries to persons or property defective condition of a road, said Article
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the 2189 is decisive thereon.
Municipal Board, or any other city officer,
to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, xxxxx
or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions. Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries
were due to the defective condition of a
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the street which is “under the supervision and
Philippines which provides: control” of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn,
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be alleged that “the streets aforementioned
liable for damages for the death of, or were and have been constantly kept in
injuries suffered by, any person by reason good condition and regularly inspected and
of defective conditions of road, streets, the storm drains and manholes thereof
bridges, public buildings, and other public covered by the defendant City and the
works under their control or supervision. officers concerned” who “have been ever
vigilant and zealous in the performance of
Manila maintains that the former provision their respective functions and duties as
should prevail over the latter, because imposed upon them by law.“ Thus, the City
Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas Avenue was and is under its control and
the Civil Code is a general law, applicable supervision.
to the entire Philippines.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that
The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, said Avenue is a national highway was
and, we think, correctly. It is true that, made, for the first time, in its MR of the
insofar as its territorial application is decision of the CA . Such assertion raised,
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a therefore, a question of fact, which had not
special law and the Civil Code a general been put in issue in the trial court, and
legislation; but, as regards the subject- cannot be set up, for the first time, on
matter of the provisions above quoted, appeal, much less after the rendition of the
Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a decision of the appellate court, in a motion
general rule regulating the liability of the for the reconsideration thereof.
City of Manila for: “damages or injury to
persons or property … Upon the other At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil
hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code Code, it is not necessary for the liability
constitutes a particular prescription making therein established to attach that the
“provinces, cities and municipalities . . . defective roads or streets belong to the
liable for damages for the death of, or province, city or municipality from which
injury suffered by any person by reason” — responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or located in the Municipality of San Juan,
municipality have either “control or Metro Manila. After resettling hundreds of
supervision” over said street or road. Even squatter families occupying the land
if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a covered by the proclamation, the
national highway, this circumstance would Municipality of San Juan started to develop
not necessarily detract from its “control or its government center. On October 6,
supervision” by the City of Manila, under 1987, after Congress had already convened
Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon
thereof provides: Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164,
amending Proclamation No. 1716 by
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The excluding from its operation the parcels of
Municipal Board shall have the following land not being utilized for government
legislative powers: center sites purposes but actually occupied
for residential purposes. On June 1, 1998,
xxx xxx xxx the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association, Inc., one of the herein private
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law respondents, filed with the Regional Trial
to provide for the laying out, construction Court a petition for prohibition with urgent
and improvement, and to regulate the use prayer for restraining order against the
of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan
wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to
other public places; to provide for lighting, enjoin them from either removing or
cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and demolishing the houses of the association
public places; . . . … the building and repair members who were claiming that the lots
of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all they occupied have been awarded to them
structures in and under the same …to by Proclamation No 164. The regional trial
provide for and regulate cross-works, court dismissed the petition and the appeal
curbs, and gutters therein, . . … and before the Court of Appeals was likewise
regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and dismissed. This decision became final.
culverts; … to regulate the lights used on Disregarding the ruling of the court, private
all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . respondent hired a private surveyor to
make consolidation-subdivision plans of
Then, again, the determination of whether the land in question, submitting the same
or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the to respondent DENR in connection with
control or supervision of the City of Manila their application for a grant under
and whether the latter is guilty of Proclamation No. 164. To prevent DENR
negligence, in connection with the from issuing any grant to private
maintenance of said road, which were respondents, petitioner municipality filed a
decided by the Court of Appeals in the petition for prohibition with prayer for
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings issuance of a temporary restraining order
of said Court thereon are not subject to our and preliminary injunction against
review. respondent DENR and private respondent
Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 1989; municipality but the Court of Appeals
(Separate) reversed the decision, hence, the present
recourse.
Municipality of San Juan vs. CA, GR
191920, 2005; Issues:
On February 17, 1978, then President Is proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of
Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. legislative power? More specifically, is
1716 reserving for Municipal Government Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?
Center Site Purposescertain parcels of land
Held: Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a responsible for damages caused:
valid act of legislation. Not withstanding
the fact that the reversal of the decision of (1) By the explosion of machinery which
the Court of Appeals would be justified has not been taken care of with due
upon the issue of res judicata, there, exists diligence, and the inflammation of
a more basic reason for setting aside the explosive substances which have not been
appealed decision and this has reference to kept in a safe and adequate place;
the fundamental and gross error in the (2) By excessive smoke, which may be
issuance of Proclamation No. 164. harmful to persons or property;
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the
late President Ferdinand Marcos in the due (3) By the falling of trees situated at or
exercise of legislative power vested upon near highways or lanes, if not caused by
him. Being a valid act of legislation, said force majeure;
Proclamation may only be amended by an
equally valid act of legislation. (4) By emanations from tubes, canals,
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a sewers or deposits of infectious matter,
valid act of legislation. constructed without precautions suitable to
the place. (1908)
After the so-called bloodless revolution of
February 1986, President Corazon Aquino Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two
took the reigns of power under a preceding articles should be the result of
revolutionary government. On March 24, any defect in the construction mentioned in
1986, she issued Proclamation No. 3, Article 1723, the third person suffering
promulgating the Provisional Constitution, damages may proceed only against the
the President shall continue to exercise engineer or architect or contractor in
legislative power until a legislature is accordance with said article, within the
elected and convened under a new period therein fixed.
constitution. When Congress was convened
on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this Article 1723, CC;
legislative power under the Freedom The engineer or architect who drew up the
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164 was plans and specifications for a building is
issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative liable for damages if within fifteen years
power was already solely in Congress. The from the completion of the structure, the
Supreme Court holds that the issuance of same should collapse by reason of a defect
Proclamation No 164 was an invalid in those plans and specifications, or due to
exercise of legislative power. the defects in the ground. The contractor is
Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby likewise responsible for the damages if the
declared void. The appealed decision of the edifice falls, within the same period, on
Court of Appeals is hereby set aside. Public account of defects in the construction or
respondent DENR is hereby permanently the use of materials of inferior quality
enjoined from enforcing Proclamation No. furnished by him, or due to any violation of
164. the terms of the contract. If the engineer
or architect supervises the construction, he
Proprietorof building/structure/thing; shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.

Article 2190 to 2190 CC; Acceptance of the building, after

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or completion, does not imply waiver of any of
structure is responsible for the damages the cause of action by reason of any defect
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs. (1907) The action must be brought within ten
years following the collapse of the building.
GOTESCO vs. CHATTO;