On The One 

 
In this paper I will refute the claim that the so called neoplatonists were addressing an entirely new 
question when they asked how the entirety of reality could come from a single cause called the one. 
 
The position I will refute maintains that whilst Plato’s metaphysics is in agreement with that of the 
neoplatonists when it claims that mind is ontologically prior to and the cause of matter, the claim that 
mind itself is caused by a first principle - called alternatively the good, the one, the first, or the 
ineffable - is not present in Plato’s system and represents an innovation that Plato would not have 
supported. 
 
This first principle is maintained by the neoplatonists to be entirely ineffable. They argue that no 
positive predicates can be said of it that are accurate. They even go so far as to claim that it cannot 
be said to be the same as itself, nor different from others, that it cannot be described, nor known, 
nor even named in the sense that the name would be an accurate or appropriate descriptor. Yet, it is, 
in some way, the singular cause of all reality. 
 
Plato often did not write as directly as he perhaps could have. His use of dialogue and analogy to 
present his ideas can make them obscure and difficult to reconstruct into simple statements. As a 
result, I will make liberal use of direct quotations - despite the issues with doing so - so as to allow 
the reader to easily look at Plato’s (albeit translated) writing and consider for themselves, without too 
much trouble, if the claims I make follow from the text. 
 
First I ground the argument in a description of, from Plato, the nature of the dialectic; a method of 
inquiry that promises to yield a first principle of all, before looking at the outcome of a demonstration 
of such. I will then show how the outcome matches the theoretical description of the aims, 
methodology, and purpose of the dialectic referencing across Plato’s dialogues, and with particular 
focus on this promised first principle of all. 
 
I will therefore make clear that the dialectic, in theory, is expected to yield a first principle exactly as 
is maintained by the neoplatonists, and that the term neoplatonist, to the degree it refers to this claim 
of innovation, is a misnomer. 
 
The purpose of this, aside from correcting the narrative regarding the platonic tradition, is to 
demonstrate in what sense platonic philosophy can be said to be justified from both the coherentist 
and foundationalist theories of epistemic justification (Olsson, 2017) 

From Plato 

The Dialectic 

The Republic 
Here Plato’s description of the method and purpose of the dialectic will be quoted. 
 
“At any rate,” I said, “no one will ever contradict us when we say that it (dialectic) is some 
method of investigation different from these, which tries to ascertain step by step about 
everything what each really is in itself. Nearly all the other arts are concerned with the 
opinions and desires of men, or generation and composition, or the care of things growing 
and being compounded; and the few which do take hold of truth a little, as we said, 
geometry and those which go with it, we see are in dreamland about real being, and to 
perceive with a waking vision is impossible for these arts so long as they leave untouched 
the hypotheses which they use and cannot give any account of them. For when a beginning 
is something a man does not know, and the middle and end are woven of what he does not 
know, how can such a mere admission ever amount to knowledge?” 

 
“This way. In the first part [CD] the soul in its search is compelled to use as images the 
things imitated —the realities of the former part [BC]—and from things taken for granted 
passes not to a new beginning, a first principle, but to an end, a conclusion; in the second 
part [DE] it passes from an assumption to a first principle free from assumption, without the 
help of images which the other part [CD] uses, and makes its path of enquiry amongst ideals 
themselves by means of them alone.” 
 
“you will understand easier when I have said some more first. I suppose you know that 
students of geometry and arithmetic and so forth begin by taking for granted odd and even, 
and the usual figures, and the three kinds of angles, and things akin to these, in every branch 
of study; they take them as granted and make them assumptions or postulates, and they 
think it unnecessary to give any further account of them to themselves or to others, as being 
clear to everybody. Then, starting from these, they go on through the rest by logical steps 
until they end at the object which they set out to consider.” 
 
“Then you know also that they use the visible figures and give lectures about them, while 
they are not thinking of these they can see but the ideas which these are like; a square in 
itself is what they speak of, and a diameter in itself, not the one they are drawing. It is always 
so; the very things which they model or draw, which have shadows of their own and images 
in water, they use now as images; but what they seek is to see those ideals which can be 
seen only by the mind.” 
 
“This ideal, then, that I have been describing belongs to the first part [CD]of things thought, 
but the soul, as I said, is compelled to use assumptions in its search for this; it does not pass 
to a first principle because of being unable to get out clear above the assumptions, but uses 
 as images the very things [in BC] which are represented by those below [in AB] and were 
esteemed and honoured as bright compared with those.” 
 
“Now, then, understand,” I said, “that by the other part [DE]of things thought I mean what the 
arguing process itself grasps by power of dialectic, treating assumptions not as beginnings, 
but as literally hypotheses, that is to say steps and springboards for assault, from which it 
may push its way up to the region free of assumptions and reach the beginning of all, and 
grasp it, clinging again and again to whatever clings to this; and so may come down to a 
conclusion without using the help of anything at all that belongs to the senses, but only 
ideals themselves, and, passing through ideals, it may end in ideals.” 
 
“I understand,” said he, “though not sufficiently, for you seem to me to describe a heavy 
task; but I see that you wish to lay down that a clearer perception of real being and the world 
of mind is given by knowledge of dialectic, than by the so-called ‘arts’ which start from pure 
assumptions. It is true that those who view them through these are compelled to view them 
with the understanding and not the senses, but because they do not go back to the 
beginning in their study, but start from assumptions, they do not seem to you to apply a 
reasoning mind about these matters, although with a first principle added they belong to the 
world of mind. The mental state of geometricians and suchlike you seem to call 
understanding, not reason, taking understanding as something between opinion and 
reason.” 
 
“Then the dialectic method proceeds alone by this way, demolishing the hypotheses as it 
goes, back to the very beginning itself, in order to find firm ground; the soul’s eye, which is 
really buried deep in a sort of barbaric bog,* it draws out quietly and leads upwards, having 
the arts we have described as handmaids and helpers. These we have often termed 
sciences from habit, but they need another name, one clearer than opinion and dimmer than 
science. We have defined it already somewhere as understanding; but we are not debating 
about names when we have before us things so great to examine.” 
 
“Then, my dear Glaucon,” said I, “is this the law at last, which dialectic brings out to its final 
meaning, and which being the law of mind would have a likeness in the power of sight trying, 
as we described it, to look at last upon living things themselves, and the stars themselves, 
and finally upon the sun itself? Just so when a man tries by discussion to get a start towards 
the real thing, through reason and without any help from the senses, and will not desist until 
he grasps by thought alone the real nature of good itself, he arrives at the very end of the 
world of thought, as the other before was at the end of the world of sight.” 
 
The expectation of Plato’s dialectic then is that in treating hypotheses it should be able to gain hold, 
in some sense, of something that could be reasonably called a region free of assumptions and a 
beginning of all, and from that region one could pass from ideals to ideals. 
 
However, the actual method itself is not clarified sufficiently here. For clarity on the method itself we 
must look to the Philebus. 

The Philebus 
The Philebus contains a description of the dialectical method, with two examples given: 
 
SOCRATES: It is a gift of the gods to men, or so it seems to me, hurled down from heaven 
by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire. And the people of old, superior to us 
 and living in closer proximity to the gods, have bequeathed us this tale, that whatever is said 
to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness. Since this is the 
structure of things, we have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every 
one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And once we have 
grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other 
number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it is not 
only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many 
kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of the unlimited to the plurality before we know the 
exact number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one. Only then is it 
permitted to release each kind of unity into the unlimited and let it go. The gods, as I said, 
have left us this legacy of how to inquire and learn and teach one another. But nowadays the 
clever ones among us make a one, haphazardly, and many, faster or slower than they 
should; they go straight from the one to the unlimited and omit the intermediates. It is these, 
however, that make all the difference as to whether we are engaged with each other in 
dialectical or only in eristic discourse. 
PROTARCHUS: Some of what you said I think I understand in some way, Socrates, but of 
some I still need further clarification.  
SOCRATES: What I mean is clear in the case of letters, and you should take your clue from 
them, since they were part of your own education.  
PROTARCHUS: How so?  
SOCRATES: The sound that comes out of the mouth is one for each and every one of us, but 
then it is also unlimited in number.  
PROTARCHUS: No doubt.  
SOCRATES: Neither of these two facts alone yet makes us knowledgeable, neither that we 
know its unlimitedness nor its unity. But if we know how many kinds of vocal sounds there 
are and what their nature is, that makes every one of us literate.  
PROTARCHUS: Very true.  
SOCRATES: And the very same thing leads to the knowledge of music.  
PROTARCHUS: How is that?  
SOCRATES: Sound is also the unit in this art, just as it was in writing.  
PROTARCHUS: Yes, right.  
SOCRATES: We should posit low and high pitch as two kinds, and equal pitch as a third 
kind. Or what would you say?  
PROTARCHUS: Just that.  
SOCRATES: But you could not yet claim knowledge of music if you knew only this much, 
though if you were ignorant even about that, you would be quite incompetent in these 
matters, as one might say.  
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.  
SOCRATES: But you will be competent, my friend, once you have learned how many 
intervals there are in high pitch and low pitch, what character they have, by what notes the 
intervals are defined, and the kinds of combinations they form—all of which our forebears 
have discovered and left to us, their successors, together with the names of these modes of 
harmony. 
 
The dialectic must take it’s object of study and assess not just the unity of the idea itself and the 
infinite, but also the many inbetween. Summarised: 
 
Original unity under dialectic  Plurality that lies between the original unity and the unlimited  
consideration 

Writing  The different kinds of vocal sounds and their nature 

 Music  The different kinds of intervals in high pitch and low pitch, 
what character they have, by what notes the intervals are 
defined, and the kinds of combinations they form 

The Parmenides and The First Hypothesis 

This description fits what is occuring in the Parmenides. Here a number of starting points 
(hypotheses) are taken as ways of considering a different kind of one, including the one itself as 
original unity under consideration. 
 
The reasoning proceeds such that it elucidates the nature of each, as demanded by the Philebus. 
Just as with letters and sounds, the dialectic concerning the one must look at the one itself, plus 
every other kind of one that is possible on until it exhausts the infinity of possible ones. 
 
Thus we can add the topic to our table: 
 
Original unity under dialectic  Plurality that lies between the original unity and the unlimited  
consideration 

Writing  The different kinds of vocal sounds and their nature 

Music  The different kinds of intervals in high pitch and low pitch, 
what character they have, by what notes the intervals are 
defined, and the kinds of combinations they form 

One  The different kinds of ones 

 
Indeed, the project is proposed in the Republic: 
 
“Start from what has been said already, and reason it out. If the ‘one’ is sufficiently seen in 
itself and by itself, or if it is sufficiently apprehended by any other sense, it could not draw 
towards real being, as we described in the case of the finger; but if some opposite is always 
seen along with it so that it appears to be no more than the opposite, at once it would need a 
critic to decide; the soul would be forced to be puzzled over it and enquire by stirring 
thought within itself, and to ask, ‘What, after all, is the one in itself?’ So the study of the ‘one’ 
would be one of the studies which lead and divert the soul towards the contemplation of real 
being.” 
 
“But surely,” he said, “an opposite is just what the ‘one’ especially has when it is examined 
by sight; for we can at the same time see the same thing both as one and as an infinite 
number. 
 
The first hypothesis considers the original unity. The one itself. 
 
“Well then,” said he, “if the one exists, the one cannot be many, can it?” “No, of course not.” 
“Then there can be no parts of it, nor can it be a whole.” “How is that?” “The part surely is 
part of a whole.” “Yes.” “And what is the whole? Is not a whole that of which no part is 
wanting?” “Certainly.” “Then in both cases the one would consist of parts, being a whole 
and having parts.” “Inevitably.” “Then in both cases the one would be many, not one.” 
“True.” “Yet it must be not many, but one.” “Yes.” “Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be 
a whole and will not have parts.” “No.” 
  
The first hypothesis proceeds in this manner, excluding a number of things that could possibly be 
said about it, on the general basis that any predicate would make it many and not one, until 
concluding: 
 
“But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?” “Of course 
not.” “Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or 
opinion of it.” “Evidently not.” “And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor 
known, nor does any existing thing perceive it.” “Apparently not.” “Is it possible that all this is 
true about the one ?” “I do not think so.” 

The Good and The One 

To maintain that the neoplatonists make no innovation upon Plato’s work when they claim that an 
unhypothetical first principle called the one is the cause of all reality, it is important to understand in 
what way it can be maintained through Plato’s work that the good and the one are identical. What 
follows is an attempt to demonstrate that by looking at the sun analogy of Plato’s Republic. 
 
“Then, my dear Glaucon,” said I, “is this the law at last, which dialectic brings out to its final 
meaning, and which being the law of mind would have a likeness in the power of sight trying, 
as we described it, to look at last upon living things themselves, and the stars themselves, 
and finally upon the sun itself? Just so when a man tries by discussion to get a start towards 
the real thing, through reason and without any help from the senses, and will not desist until 
he grasps by thought alone the real nature of good itself, he arrives at the very end of the 
world of thought, as the other before was at the end of the world of sight.” 
 
Here in the Republic it is said that a major goal of the dialectic is bringing out the law of mind, the 
very end of the world of thought, the real nature of the good itself. 
 
“So shall I be, my good man,” said I, “and very well satisfied. But I am afraid I shall not be 
able and my clumsy eagerness will only make a fool of me. But bless you, my friends, let us 
pass by the question what the good is, just for the present; I fear my present impulse is not 
strong enough to carry me as far as what I think on that subject now. But there is an 
interesting offspring of the good, as it seems to me, and very like it; I am willing to speak of 
that, if you care, or not if you don’t care.” 
 
Then the question of what the good ​is​ will not be addressed here, but instead an offspring of the 
good. If indeed the good can be shown to be like the one, beyond knowledge, then it is unsurprising 
that the discourse regarding the sun analogy is not intended to directly speak of what the good is in 
itself. This would be because the good itself would share in the same qualities of the one itself which 
lead to the claim in the first hypothesis that there is no description, thought, nor perception of it. 
 
“Shall I suggest how sight is related to this divinity?” “Well, how?” “Sight itself is not the sun, 
nor is that in which it is, which we call eye.” “It is not.” “But sight is the most sunlike, I think, 
of the organs of sense.” “Much the most.” “Moreover, the power which it has is always being 
dispensed by the sun like an inundation, and sight possesses it?” “Certainly.” “Then again 
the sun is not sight, but the cause of sight, and is seen by sight itself.” “That is quite 
correct,” he said. 
 
“Surely, now,” I said, “my meaning must appear to be that this, the offspring of the good 
which the good begat, is in relation to the good itself an analogy, and what the good effects, 
 by its influence, in the region of the mind, towards mind and things thought, this the sun 
effects, in the region of seeing, towards sight and things seen.” 
 
Here there is an analogy that is being constructed regarding the sun and what it effects and the good 
and what it effects. 
 
“Then that which provides their truth to the things known, and gives the power of knowing to 
the knower, you must say is the idea or principle of the good, and you must conceive it as 
being the cause of understanding and of truth in so far as known; and thus while knowledge 
and truth as we know them are both beautiful, you will be right in thinking that it is something 
different, something still more beautiful than these. As for knowledge and truth, just as we 
said before that it was right to consider light and sight to be sunlike, but wrong to think them 
to be sun; so here, it is right to consider both these to be goodlike, but wrong to think either 
of them to be the good—the eternal nature* of the good must be allowed a yet higher value.” 
 
Then the idea of the good provides truth to things known and is the cause of understanding and 
truth. 
 
The good itself, however, is not knowledge or truth. 
 
“What infinite beauty you speak of!” he said, “if it provides knowledge and truth, and is 
above them itself in beauty! You surely don’t mean that it is pleasure!”  
 
“Hush!” I said. “But here is something more to consider about its likeness.”  
“What?”  
 
“The sun provides not only the power of being seen for things seen, but, as I think you will 
agree, also their generation and growth and nurture, although it is not itself generation.”  
 
“Of course not.” 
 
“Similarly with things known, you will agree that the good is not only the cause of their 
becoming known, but the cause that knowledge exists and of the state of knowledge,* 
although the good is not itself a state of knowledge but something transcending far beyond it 
in dignity and power.” 
 
So the good - which seems here to not be in the class of things known, causes things known to 
become known, and is also the cause that knowledge exists - itself transcends states of knowledge 
in dignity and power. 
 
“This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, [517b] 
likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the 
fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of 
the things above is the soul's ascension to the intelligible region, you will not miss my 
surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows whether it is true. But, at any 
rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen 
and hardly seen is the idea of good, [517c] and that when seen it must needs point us to the 
conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving 
birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world 
being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in 
private or public must have caught sight of this.” 
  
As Damascius succinctly summarises: “Analogy, too, can treat things that have no being 
whatsoever, as for example: what the sun is to the seen and the seer, the One is to the knower and 
the known.” 
 
The good : the sun :: idea of the good : sunlight, and here the descriptions associated with each are 
listed: 
 
 
Things seen  Things known 

The sun  The good 

The cause of light and sight   
Provides the power of being seen for things  The cause of things known becoming known 
seen  Cause that knowledge exists and the state of 
Provides generation, growth, and nurture  knowledge 
Is not itself generation  Is not knowledge, nor truth, nor a state of 
Effects, in the region of sight, what the good  knowledge 
effects in the region of mind  Effects, in the region of mind, what the sun 
effects in the region of sight 

Sunlight (and sight)  The idea of the good (and the knower) 
Like knowledge and truth, and thus sunlike, but  Is in the world of the known 
not the sun  Provides truth and reason 
Gives the power of knowing to the knower 
The cause of understanding and of truth 
The cause of all right and beautiful things 
Gives birth to light and the sun 
Must be seen by one (the knower) who is to act 
with reason 
 
Alternatively, one might construct this analogy as: the idea of the good : the sun and sunlight, and 
maintain that Plato intended no distinction between the good and the idea of the good (Silverman, 
2014). 
 
However, combining all the descriptions from the above quotes regarding the idea of the good and 
the good seems to cause issues and even a clear contradiction. Socrates initially says he cannot 
speak of the good directly, only an offspring from the good. The good is not a state of knowledge, 
whilst the idea of the good ‘must be seen’. 
 
As a result, the analogy must be maintained to have been intended to be as Damascius and I claim. 
 
The good then appears to share similar characteristics with the one of the first hypothesis of the 
Parmenides. Both are said to be beyond knowledge. 
 
We must therefore assert that either there are two unintelligible objects beyond the realm of the 
known, the good and the one, or rather that there is one.  
 
The good and the one - two terms to name the same unintelligible principle - are identical. 
The Unhypothetical First Principle and Cause of All 
In the discourse on the dialectic in the Republic it was said that the dialectic should yield an 
assumptionless or unhypothetical first principle. 
 
The lack of ascribable positive predicates for the one of the first hypothesis indicates that fits this 
description. Similarly with the good of the Republic. If it is beyond knowledge, what hypotheses 
could be made regarding it?  
 
We can then conclude that, in Plato’s system, the good or the one, when the descriptions in the 
Republic and the Parmenides are considered, are names for the same principle, which is the chief 
object of consideration for the dialectical method, is also the unhypothetical first principle, and the 
cause of the idea of the good, which in turn is the cause of the sun and sunlight in the physical 
world. 
 

Opposition 
There is no shortage of opposition to this view. 
 
Shorey (1965) claims that “Quite irrelevant are Plato's supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν (good) 
with the ἕν (one)”. In his Unity of Plato’s Thought (1960), Shorey rejects neoplatonic interpretations of 
the Parmenides. 

From The Neoplatonists 

The following sections attempt to demonstrate that the above picture of Plato’s system is generally 
in line with neoplatonic models, with particular reference to the one as unhypothetical first principle, 
and the good and the one as being names for the same. 
 
Although they all accept this general framework, Proclus adds rigor upon Plotinus’ work, and 
Damascius deals critically with all models that precede his own. 

Plotinus 
Ennead. III. 
"For Intellect subsists after The First, and is indigent of nourishment and intelligence, being 
proximate to that nature which is indigent of nothing, not even intelligence (thought). 
In​tellect, however, has true plenitude and thought, because it has these primarily: but that 
which is prior to Intellect and these neither needs nor has, otherwise it would not be The 
Good itself." 
 
En. VI. 
"All beings are beings through The One, both such as are primarily beings, and such as in 
any respect whatever are said to be classed in the order of beings. What indeed would they 
be, if they were not one? Truly, if deprived of oneness, they are no longer that which they 
were said to be. Neither would an army or a choir or a herd exist, as such, unless each of 
them was one. But neither would a house or a ship have an existence, unless they 
 possessed The One; since a house is one thing, and also a ship, which one if they lose the 
house will no longer be a house, nor the ship a ship. Contin​ued magnitudes, therefore, 
unless The One is present in them, will not exist. Hence when they are divided, so far as they 
lose The One they change their existence. The bodies, also, of plants and animals, each of 
which is one, if they fly from The One, thereby becoming dissipated into multitude, will lose 
the essence which they before possessed, no longer being that which they were, but 
becoming other things, and continuing to be these so long as they are one. Health, likewise, 
subsists when the body is congregated into one, [i. e. when it possesses symmetry], and 
beauty flourishes when the nature of The One confines the parts of the body. And Virtue 
reigns in the soul when the soul tends to unity, and is unit​ed in one concord." 
 
The principal cause of our uncertainty is that our comprehension of the One comes to us 
neither by scientific knowledge, nor by thought, as the knowledge of other intelligible things, 
but by a presence which is superior to science. When the soul acquires the scientific 
knowledge of something, she withdraws from unity and ceases being entirely one; for 
science implies discursive reason and discursive reason implies manifoldness. (To attain 
Unity) we must therefore rise above science, and never withdraw from what is essentially 
One; we must therefore renounce science, the objects of science, and every other right 
(except that of the One); even to that of beauty; for beauty is posterior to unity, and is 
derived therefrom, as the day-light comes from the sun. That is why Plato says of (Unity) that 
it is unspeakable and indescribable. Nevertheless we speak of it, we write about it, but only 
to excite our souls by our discussions, and to direct them towards this divine spectacle, just 
as one might point out the road to somebody who desired to see some object. Instruction, 
indeed, goes as far as showing the road, and guiding us in the way; but to obtain the vision 
(of the divinity), is the work suitable to him who has desired to obtain it. 
 
A principle has no need of anything beneath it. The Principle of all things has no need of any 
of them. Every non-self-sufficient being is not self-sufficient chiefly because it aspires to its 
principle. If the One aspired to anything, His aspiration would evidently tend to destroy His 
unity, that is, to annihilate Himself. Anything that aspires evidently aspires to happiness and 
preservation. Thus, since for the One there is no good outside of Himself, there is nothing 
that He could wish. He is the super-good; He is the good, not for Himself, but for other 
beings, for those that can participate therein. 

Proclus 
Metaphysical Elements 
 
PROPOSITION I. 
Every multitude partakes in some respect of The One. 
For if it in no way or degree participates of The One, neither will the whole be one, nor each 
of the many things from which multitude arises, but each mul​titude will originate from certain 
or particular things, and this will continue ad infinitum. And of these in​finites each will be 
again infinite multitude. For, if multitude partakes in no respect of any one, neither as a whole 
nor through any of its parts, it will be in every re​spect indeterminate. Each of the many, 
whichever you may assume, will be one or not one; and if not one will be either many or 
nothing. But if each of the many is nothing, that likewise which arises from these will be 
nothing. If each is many, each will consist of infinites without limit. But this is impossible. For 
there is no being constituted of infinites without limit, since there is nothing greater than the 
infinite itself; and that which consists of all is greater than each particular thing. Neither is 
any thing composed of nothing. Every mul​titude therefore partakes in some respect of The 
One. 
 
PROPOSITION V. 
All multitude is posterior to The One. 
For if multitude is prior to The One, The One in​deed will participate of multitude, but 
multitude which is prior will not participate of The One, since prior to the existence of The 
One that multitude was. For it does not participate of that which is not: because a par​ticipant 
of The One is one and at the same time not one — but, on the hypothesis, The One will not 
yet subsist, that which is first being multitude. But it is impossible that there should be a 
certain multitude which in no respect whatever participates of The One. Multitude, there​fore, 
is not prior to The One. But if multitude and The One subsist simultaneously, they will be 
naturally coordinate with each other, and intimately related. Nothing in time prohibits this, 
since neither is The One essentially many, nor is multitude The One, because they are 
directly opposite to each other by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other. Hence 
mul​titude essentially will not be one, and each of the things which are in it will not be one, 
and this will be the case to infinity, which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its 
own nature participates of The One, and there is no thing of it which is not one. For if it is not 
one it will be an infinite, consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence it entirely 
partici​pates of The One. If therefore The One, which is es​sentially one, in no possible respect 
participates of multitude, multitude will be wholly posterior to The One — participating 
indeed of The One, but not being par​ticipated by it. But if The One participates of multi​tude, 
subsisting indeed as one according to its essence, but as not one according to participation, 
The One will be multitude, just as multitude is united by reason of The One. The One 
therefore will communicate with multitude, and multitude with The One. But things which 
coalesce and communicate with each other in a certain respect, if they are impelled together 
by another, that is prior to them: but if they themselves harmonize they are not antagonistic 
to each other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. If therefore The One and [6] 
multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as it is multitude is not one, and The 
One so far as it is one is not multitude, neither will one of these sub​sisting in the other be one 
and at the same time two. And if there is something prior to them, which impels them to 
harmonize, this will be either one or not one. But if it is not one, it will be either many or 
nothing. But neither will it be many, lest multitude should be prior to The One, nor will it be 
nothing. For how could nothing impell together those things which are something or many? It 
is therefore one alone. For this one is not many, lest there should be a progres​sion to infinity. 
It is therefore The One itself, and all multitude proceeds from The One itself. 
 
PROPOSITION XII. 
The Principle and First Cause of all beings is The Good It​self. 
For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been demonstrated], it is necessary to call 
that cause either The Good, or that which is better than The Good. But if it is better than The 
Good, is any thing imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if 
nothing is imparted by it, an absurdity will re​sult. For we would no longer rank it in the order 
of causes, since it is everywhere necessary that something should be present from cause to 
the things caused, and especially from the First Cause, on which all things de​pend, and by 
reason of which every being exists. But if something is imparted by it, in the same manner as 
there is by The Good, there will be something better than goodness in beings, emanating 
from the First Cause.  
 
For if it is better than and above The Good it will in no way bestow on secondary natures 
anything inferior to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself. But what can be 
 greater than goodness? Since that which is better than other things is so called because it is 
a participant to a greater degree of the good. Hence if the not good cannot be said to be 
better than The Good, it must be entirely secondary to it. If, too, all beings desire The Good 
how is it possible that there should be anything prior to this cause? For if they also desire 
that which is prior to The Good, how can they specially desire The Good? But if they do not 
de​sire it, how is it possible that they should not desire the cause of all, since they proceed 
from it? If therefore The Good is that on which all beings depend, The Good is the Principle 
and First Cause of all things. 
 
PROPOSITION XIII. 
Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good; and The Good 
is the same as The One. 
For if The Good is preservative of all beings — by reason of which it is desirable to all things 
— that indeed which is preservative and connective of the essence of every thing is The One. 
For by The One all things are preserved, but dispersion expels everything from its essence. If 
this be the case, The Good will cause those things to which it is present to be one, and will 
connect and contain them through union. And if The One is collective and connective of 
beings, it will perfect each of them by its presence. The union therefore which unites a thing 
with all is a good. But if union is a good per se, and Good itself has a unifying power, that 
which is simply good and simply one are the same, causing beings to be both good and one. 
Hence those things which in a certain way or respect fall off from The Good, at the same 
time lose the participation of The One. And those things which become destitute of The One, 
being filled with separation, are equally deprived of The Good. Goodness therefore is union, 
and union is goodness, and The Good itself is one, and The One is that which is primarily 
Good. 

Damascius  
(I 1) Is the so-called one principle of all things beyond all things or is it one among all things, 
as if it were the summit of those that proceed from it? And are we to say that “all things” are 
with the [first principle], or after it and [that they proceed] from it? If someone were to assert 
this last hypothesis, how could [it] be something outside of all things? For “all things” means, 
stricto sensu, “that from which nothing whatsoever is absent.” But the first principle is 
missing. Therefore, what comes after the first principle would not be properly speaking “all 
things,” but rather all things up to the point of the first principle. Moreover, the term “all 
things” designates a limited multiplicity, since the indefinite could not be exactly equivalent 
to “all things.” Therefore, outside of all things nothing whatsoever will come to be. Totality is 
a kind of limit; it denotes an inclusivity in which the first principle functions as the upper 
extreme and the farthest thing from the first principle functions as the lower extreme. 
Therefore, “all things” [designates what is] within these limits. 
 
Nor must we even speak about the One’s relationship with itself in the case of what is truly 
one, since it is absolutely simple. 
 
The One is the principle of all things. Plato as well, after he ascended to this, required no 
other principle in his dialogues. For that other is the ineffable principle, but it is not the 
principle of rational discourse or of cognitions. For neither is it the principle of lives, of 
beings, nor of ones, but it is the principle of all things in an absolute way, stationed beyond 
all apprehension. And therefore Plato indicated nothing about this principle,46 but instead 
starting from the One, he proceeded to the negation of all other things except the One itself. 
Indeed, he ultimately denied its being one,47 but did not deny the One. Moreover, he denied 
 this denial but not the One, and he denied the name and the conception and all knowledge 
of it, and why ought we to elaborate?48 [He denied] Being as a whole and in its entirety, 
whether [Being] is the Unified or the unitary,49 or if you wish, the two principles consisting in 
the indefinite and limit,50 and yet that which is beyond all these things, the One, he never in 
any way denied. And that is why in the Sophist he designates it as One before Being,51 and 
in the Republic, as the Good beyond every essence.52 Still, the One alone was never 
rejected [in the philosophy of Plato]. 
 
 

References 
 
Olsson, Erik, "Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<​https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/justep-coherence/​>. 
 
Shorey, Paul. (1960). The Unity of Plato's Thought:(New Impr.). University of Chicago Press. 
 
Shorey, Paul, “Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey” Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. (1969) 
 
Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<​https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/plato-metaphysics/​>.