CHARLES L. ONG, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Land Registration; Requisites to be Established by the Applicant for Registration of Title.—Pursuant to

the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a  bona fide  claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These requisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in
a petition for review on certiorari.
Same; Petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.—There is
no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The Report
dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is “within the alienable and
disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such on
November 21, 1927.” This finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report dated January 7, 1999 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy of the plan covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to
prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Same; Tax Declarations; While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property.—The records
show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil
on August 24, 1998, who in turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997. The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr.,
Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration which was
submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 25606 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho
and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property. Even if we
were to tack petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-
interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required
possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Same; Possession; Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public
domain because the law requires possession and occupation.—As correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals,
possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba, 427 SCRA 611 (2004): The law speaks
of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Same; Burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear, positive
and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration
required by law.—The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by
clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature
and duration required by law. Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not constitute the “well-nigh
incontrovertible” evidence necessary in cases of this nature. Accordingly,
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ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Republic

the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial court and in denying his
application for registration of title over the subject lot.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 Celestino O. Domingo, Jr. for petitioner.
 The Solicitor General for respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on  certiorari  assails the April 25, 2006 Decision1  of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002
Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of  Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No.
99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution3  which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized
representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for
Registration of Title4  over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less.

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1 Rollo, pp. 10-21. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso.
2 Id., at pp. 29-32.  Penned by Judge Genoveva Coching-Maramba.
3 Id., at pp. 27-28. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso.
4 Records, pp. 1-13.

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They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive
property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil
on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot
in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration of title.
Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12,
1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to
prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine
and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond
the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which
cannot be the subject of private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his
brothers, viz.:
“The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the
applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara
and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin
Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses
Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants.
The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest
and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.
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Ong vs. Republic

The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the applicant and her (sic)
predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has (sic) been continuous and peaceful under  bona
fide claim of ownership before the filing of the instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court hereby orders and decrees the
registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897 approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated
in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four (574)
square meters, subject of the application for registration of title, in accordance with Presidential Decree No.
1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of his brothers namely, ROBERTO
L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro Manila, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land
Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as the applicant.
SO ORDERED.”5

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo  granting
the application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”6
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration required
by law. However,

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5 Rollo, pp. 31-32.

6 Id., at p. 20.

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petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession
of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated
1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither
was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject
lot prior to the filing of the application.  Thus, the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L.
ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND
IS CORRECT.7

The petition lacks merit.

Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (“Property Registration Decree”), as amended, provides—
“SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

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7 Id., at p. 4.

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Ong vs. Republic
 Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a  bona fide  claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo  are generally binding on this Court except for
certain recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals
arrived at conflicting findings.9 After a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The Report10  dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that the
subject lot is “within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map
No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21, 1927.”11 This finding is, likewise,
embodied in the Report12dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue
print Copy13 of the plan covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

_______________

8 Republic v. Enciso, G.R. No. 160145, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 700, 711.
9 Abejaron v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 552, 571; 359 SCRA 47, 63 (2001).
10 Records, pp. 99-101.
11 Id., at p. 99.
12 Exhibit “N,” Records, pp. 28-30.
13 Exhibit “B,” Records, p. 8.

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The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,14 who in turn purchased the same from spouses
Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.15 The latter bought the subject lot from
Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979.16  The
earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 2560617 issued
in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner and a claim of title over the subject property.18 Even if we were to tack petitioner’s claim of
ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin
Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required possession from
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to
acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and
occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:19
“The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation,
it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word  occupation  serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual posses-

_______________

14 Exhibit “S,” Records, p. 12.

15 Exhibit “T,” Records, p. 85.
16 Exhibit “U,” Records, p. 86.
17 Exhibit “V,” Records, p. 87.
18 Tan v. Mueco, 420 Phil. 497, 503; 368 SCRA 429, 433 (2001).
19 G.R. No. 155012, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 611.

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Ong vs. Republic

sion of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.”20

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject
lot.21  No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on
several occasions.22  Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that he and his
wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the same from spouses
Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997.23Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence
was presented to establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioner’s other
alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioner’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the
nature and duration required by law.24 Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not constitute the
“well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence necessary in cases of this nature.25  Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial court and in denying his application
for registration of title over the subject lot.