VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 221: Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

9/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 538
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 221

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña
*
G.R. No. 143591. November 23, 2007.
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA,

ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON,
BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN
YU LIM, JR., petitioners, vs. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON.
MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; The principle that the

accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates
during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.—The earlier
ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to
question the validity of the arrest has already been superseded by Section
26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the
principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his
arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.
Same; Same; Non-Issuance of Writs; Exceptions; As a general rule, the

Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution.—As a general rule, the Court
will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to
enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution. However, the following exceptions
to the rule have been recognized: 1) when the injunction is necessary to
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2)
when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3) when there is a prejudicial question
which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess
of authority; 5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation; 6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7) where the Court
has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution; 9) where the charges are
_______________
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d1eb914abb8dffae7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
* THIRD DIVISION.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and 10) when
there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; What the Constitution

underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause—but the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.—What
the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he
may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The general rule is that this Court
does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest—it
is only in exceptional cases when this Court may set aside the conclusions of
the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is,
when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to
protect the orderly administration of justice.—To accord respect to the
discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this
Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to
review the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations. In the same way, the
general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial
court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases when this Court may set
aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence
of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the
strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The
facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the exception.
223
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 223

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for De Leon and
Gonzalez, Jr.
Poblador, Bauista, Reyes for Lim, Jr., Dizon and Lee.
Fortun, Narvasa and Salazar for Borlongan, Jr., Bejasa and
Manuel.
Magdaleno M. Peña for himself.
NACHURA, J.:
1
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June
20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M.
Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon,
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric Lee and Ben T. Lim, Jr.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery Pena filed a civ case for recovery of
compensation and expenses, damages,
of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank
2 and Borlongan
fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional
B then submitted documents: letters by
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was Isabela Sugar Company and others
raffled to Branch 62 and was dock-eted as Civil Case No. 754. P says these are falsified because the
alleged signatories did not actually sign
Respondent
3
anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of
agency allegedly entered into The people who signed were not
stockholders etc
Petitioners gave documents KNOWING
that they were falsified
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Quirino

D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 50-60.
2 Rollo, pp. 61-66.
3 The contract was allegedly confirmed in a letter addressed to the respondent, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
224

with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such

acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully
occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard,
4
Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they
never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the
5
motion were the following documents: 1) a letter dated December
19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the
6
subject property; 2) an unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994
7
addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a letter dated
December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro8 Borlongan and signed by
Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum dated November 20, 1994
from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an
attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI
and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
_______________
This is to confirm the engagement of your services as the authorized representative of Urban
Bank, specifically to hold and maintain possession of our above[-]captioned property and to
protect the same from former tenants, occupants or any other person who are threatening to
return to the said property and/or interfere with your possession of the said property for and in
our behalf.
You are likewise authorized to represent Urban Bank in any court action that you may
institute to carry out your aforementioned duties, and to prevent any intruder, squatter or any
other person not otherwise authorized in writing by Urban Bank from entering or staying in the
premises. (Id., at p. 69).
4 Rollo, pp. 72-87.

5 Id., at p. 96.
6 Id., at p. 97.
7 Id., at p. 98.
8 Id., at p. 99.
225
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 225

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents,

9
respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit
10
with the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were
falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories
11
were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said
documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were
falsified.
12
12
In a Resolution dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor CP said that B probably guilty of 4
counts of crime of Introducing
concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) Falsified Documents penalised by the
second paragraph of RPC Art. 172
counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were Documents falsified because
signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI
falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI principal of the respondent
was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the Petitioners knew that docs were
falsified
documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere
dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Documents used as part of the civ
acase where they were used by
Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in petitioners as evidence in support of
their motion to dismiss
support of their motion13to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later,
in their Pre-Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corre-
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 106-109.

10 The case was docketed as I.S. Case No. 9248.
11 Rollo, p. 108.
12 The dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, In view of all the foregoing, undersigned finds probable cause that the crime of
Introducing Falsified Documents in evidence under par. 2, Article 172, RPC (4 counts) had
been committed and that respondents Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin de
Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel are
probably guilty.
Let Informations be filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, Philippines.
SO RESOLVED. (Id., at pp. 110-114).
13 Rollo, pp. 113-114.
226

14
sponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo
15
Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.
B: was not given a chance to submit
On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to their counter-affidavit
16
Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation. No C-A and supporting documents
were submitted by the petitioners
Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the
non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation Judge merely relied on C-A and
attachments of the respondent in
prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they issuing the warrants of arrest
were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They

then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting
documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely
relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent
in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules.
No probable cause
Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of
probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case Crime case should be suspended
because of the pending civil case - a
should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being PQ
threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.

17
In an Order dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the DENIED: the PI was not available in
the instant case because it fell within
omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary the jurisdiction of the MTCC
investigation was not available in the instant case—which fell within Warrant of arrest valid - can no
longer assail validity because they
the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the already applied for bail
validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was Civ case not a PQ
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 115-122.

15 Id., at pp. 123-126.
16 Id., at pp. 127-142.
17 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For reinvestigation is hereby denied.
Set arraignment of the accused on December 1, 1998 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. (Id., at pp. 143-150).
227
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 227

issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added,

petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since
they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue
involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and thus,
denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly,
the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts
necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants 18
of arrest,
reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion. They, likewise,
questioned the court’s conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners
already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant of
arrest. 19
On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioners now raise before us the follow-ing issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the

Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is
the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in
court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable
cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at
the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
_______________
18 Rollo, pp. 151-186.

19 Supra note 1.
228

B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the

personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of
probable cause?
C.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by

the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the
existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant
of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the
accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in
determining the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable

20
cause?
On August
21
2, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any
manner with Criminal Cases Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the
entire period that the case is pending before, or until further orders
of, this Court.
With the MTCC proceedings suspended, we now proceed to
resolve the issues raised.
Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot

and academic when the petitioners posted bail and were arraigned.
We do not agree.
_______________
20 Rollo, pp. 13-14.

21 Id., at pp. 518-522.
229
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 229

It appears that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners

immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment
being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the court
entered a plea of “Not Guilty.”
The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a
waiver of the right to question the
22
validity of the arrest has already
been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused is Accused precluded from questioning
the legality of his arrest after
precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during the trial without
invoking his objections
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections
23
thereto.
Records reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash
the information and warrant of arrest, and for reinvestigation, on the
same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly Bail bond said that they were not
waiving their right to question the
contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to validity of their arrest
24
question the validity of their arrest. On the date of the arraignment,
the petitioners refused to enter their plea, obviously because the Petitioners refused to enter plea
because the issue of the legality of the
issue of the legality of the information and their arrest was yet to be information and their arrest was yet to
be settled by the Court - the court still
settled by the Court. This notwithstanding, the court entered a plea entered a plea of not guilty
of “Not Guilty.” From these circumstances, we cannot
_______________
22 Sec. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation.—An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering
his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than
the start of the trial of the case.
23 People v. Vallejo, 461 Phil. 672, 686; 416 SCRA 193, 202-203 (2003); People v.
Palijon, 397 Phil. 545, 556; 343 SCRA 486, 496 (2000); Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 154.

24 CA Rollo, pp. 902-903.
230

reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of the petitioners, as to

preclude them from raising the issue of the validity of the arrest
before the CA and eventually before this Court.
In their petition filed before this Court, petitioners prayed for a
TRO to restrain the MTCC from proceeding with the criminal cases
(which the Court eventually issued on August 2, 2000). Thus, we
confront the question of whether a criminal prosecution can be
restrained, to which we answer in the affirmative.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or
injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal
prosecution. However, the following exceptions to the rule have Necessary to afford protection to
constituting rights of accused
been recognized: 1) when the injunction is necessary to afford
Orderly admin of justice or to avoid
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) oppression or multiplicity of suits
when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to When there is PQ
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3) when there is a Acts are GADALEJ
prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the Prosecution is under an invalid law
or ordinance or regulation
officer are without or in excess of authority; 5) where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6) when Double jeopardy is clearly apparent
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7) where the Court has no Court has no jurisdiction over the
offence
jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a case of persecution
Case of persecution rather than
rather than prosecution; 9) where the charges are manifestly false prosecution
and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and 10) when there is Charges are manifestly false and
motivated y lust for vengeance
clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
25
Clearly no prima facie case
quash on that ground has been denied.
Considering that the issues for resolution involve the validity of
the information and warrant of arrest, and considering further that no
waiver of rights may be attributed to the petitioners as earlier
discussed, we issued a TRO on August 2, 2000 to give the Court the
opportunity to resolve the case before the criminal prosecution is
allowed to continue. The
_______________
25 Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 38, 51-52;
Samson v. Secretary Guingona, Jr., 401 Phil. 167, 172; 348 SCRA 32, 36 (2000).
231
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 231
nature of the crime and the penalty involved (which is less than 4
years of imprisonment), likewise, necessitate the suspension of the
case below in order to prevent the controversy from being mooted.
We now proceed with the main issues, viz.: 1) whether petitioners
were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the
denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their
counter-affidavit; 2) whether the Informations charging the
petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were
properly issued; and 3) whether this Court can, itself, determine
probable cause.
As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly B: denied due process because they
were not afforded the right to submit
claim the right to preliminary investigation. Still, petitioners insist C-A which could have aided the court
in determining the existence of PC
that they were denied due process because they were not afforded
the right to submit counter-affidavits which would have aided the
26
court in determining the existence of probable cause. Petitioners P’s C-A is not based on the letters
personal knowledge - should not
also claim that the respondent’s complaint-affidavit was not based have been used by this court as
basis for finding PC
on the latter’s personal knowledge; hence, it should not have been 27
used by the court as basis in its finding of probable cause.
Moreover, petitioners aver that there was no sufficient evidence to No sufficient evidence to prove
elements of the crime
prove the elements of the crime. Specifically, it was not established
that the documents in question were falsified; that petitioners were
the ones who presented the documents as evidence; and that 28
petitioners knew that the documents were indeed falsified.
At the time of the filing of the C-A,
Petitioners likewise assert that at the time of the filing of the they had not yet formally offered the
docs as evidence, they could nt have
complaint-affidavit, they had not yet formally offered the documents “introduced” the same in court
as evidence;
29
hence, they could not have “intro-duced” the same in
court. Considering the foregoing, petitioners pray that 30
this Court, SC should determine if probable
cause exists
itself, determine whether or not probable cause exists.
_______________
26 Rollo, p. 651.
27 Id., at p. 696.
28 Id., at pp. 700-702.
29 Id., at p. 714.
30 Id., at p. 725.
232

31
The pertinent provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Pro-cedure,
namely, Sections 1, 3 (a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, are relevant to the
resolution of the aforesaid issues:
“SECTION 1. Definition.—Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or

proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
32
thereof, and should be held for trial.
SEC. 3. Procedure.—Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complain-ant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two
(2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally exam-
_______________
31 As amended, per Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7,
1988. The Rules were further revised and approved on October 3, 2000, which took
effect on December 1, 2000.
32 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 112, Sec. 1 reads:
SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required.—Preliminary investigation is

an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be
conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to
the fine.
233
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 233

ined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood
33
their affidavits.
SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Pro-cedure.—
(a) Where filed with the fiscal.—If the complaint is filed directly with the
fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule
shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the
34
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.”
_______________
33 Section 3(a) of the New Rules states:
SECTION 3. Procedure.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following

manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the com-plainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus
two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined
the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
34 Rule 112, Sec. 9 is presently worded as follows:
Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.—
(a) If filed with the prosecutor.—If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.
234

Petitioners were charged with the offense

35
defined and penalized by
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Penalty of Art. 172 is 4 months to 2
The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to years and 4 months
prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and PI IS NOT MANDATORY
one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary
36
investigation is not mandatory.
Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the com- Prosecution merely relied on the CA
of respondent and did not require B
plaint-affidavit of the respondent and did not require the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits
to submit their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should not be This is allowed by the rules
faulted for taking this course of action, because it is sanctioned by

the Rules. To reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit Upon filing of the C and A with
respect to case cognizable by the
with respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the
appropriate action based on the
take the appropriate action based on the affidavits and other affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the
supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means that complainant
the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see
sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the information if
he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require Not mandated to require the
submission of counter A’s - PC may
the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be be determined on the basis alone of
the affidavits and supporting
determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant
documents of the complainant, without infringing on the
constitutional rights of the petitioners.
_______________
35 Article 172.
xxxx
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the
damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false
documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of
this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
36 Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, 384 Phil. 776, 784; 328 SCRA 230, 236 (2000);
Del Rosario, Jr. v. Judge Bartolome, 337 Phil. 330, 333; 270 SCRA 645, 649 (1997).
235
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 235

On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge
must personally determine the existence of probable cause. Again,
the petitioners insist that the trial judge erred in issuing the warrant
of arrest without affording them their right to submit their counter-
affidavits.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
Consti states the exclusive and

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal personal responsibility of the issuing
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause
of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report Personally evaluate report and docs
submitted by the prosecutor
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding regarding the existence of PC
the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may Make personal determination of the
existence of PC
already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
if not satisfied he may disregard
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may prosecutor’s report and require
disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him 37
in arriving at a a conclusion as to the existence of
PC
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest in the case at bench, we find nothing wrong with the
procedure adopted by the trial judge—he relied on the resolution of
the prosecutor, as well as the supporting
_______________
37 AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 496; Ho v.
People, 345 Phil. 597, 605-606; 280 SCRA 365, 374-375 (1997); Soliven v.
Makasiar, No. L-82585, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 398.
236

documents submitted by the respondent. There is no provision of No provision which makes the
submission of counter-
law or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter- affidavits mandatory before
judge can determine whether
affidavits mandatory before the judge can determine whether or not PC exists to issue warrant
there exists probable cause to issue the warrant.
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was
followed by the prosecutor in determining probable cause for the
filing of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining
probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. To reiterate,
preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of
counter-affidavit was not necessary.
However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the
procedure laid down by the Rules, a closer scrutiny of the records
reveals that the Informations should not have been filed and the
warrants of arrest should not have been issued, because of lack of
probable cause.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime 38has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged
39
was guilty of the crime for which he is to be
prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime 40
has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused.
On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest as the existence of such facts
_______________
38 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451

SCRA 533, 550.
39 Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA 318.
40 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 38.
237
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 237

and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent

person to believe that41an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and
for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere
with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause. Otherwise,
courts would be swamped with42 petitions to review the prosecutor’s
findings in such investigations. In the same way, the general rule is
that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court,
which include the determination
43
of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases when this SC intervenes when it is
necessary to prevent the misuse
Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial of the strong arm of the law or to
protect the orderly admin of
judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is justice
necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong 44
arm of the law or to
protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in
the present case warrant the application of the exception.
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of
the RPC or Introduction of Falsified Document in a Judicial
Proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by

another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in
any subdivisions No. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced45 said document in evidence in any
judicial proceeding.
_______________
41 Id.; Cuevas v. Muñoz, 401 Phil. 752, 773; 348 SCRA 542, 561 (2000); Ho v.
People, supra note 37, at p. 608.
42 Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.
43 De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 376, 381.
44 Id.; Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.
45 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 1998 ed., p. 246.
238

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña Falsity of the document and the
defendant’s knowledge of its
falsity are essential elements of
its offence
The falsity of the document and the defendant’s
46
knowledge of its
falsity are essential elements of the offense.
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against

the petitioners on the basis of the complaint-affidavit of the
respondent, together with the following attached documents: the
motion to dismiss and answer filed by the petitioners in Civil Case
No. 754; petitioners’ pre-trial brief in said case; the alleged falsified
documents; a copy of the minutes of the regular meeting of ISC
47
during the election of the board; and the list of stockholders of ISC.
On the basis of these documents and on the strength of the affidavit
executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable
cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by the
trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.
Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, we find the complaint-affidavit and attachments C-A insufficient to support the
existence of PC
insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. Specifically,
Failed to establish prima facie that
the respondent failed to sufficiently establish prima facie that the the alleged doc were falsified
alleged documents were falsified. In support of his claim of falsity of
the documents, the private respondent stated in his complaint-
affidavit that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the
alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix
their signatures; and48 that they were not actually officers or
stockholders of ISCI. He further claimed that Enrique Montilla’s
signature appearing 49 in another memorandum addressed to
Mere assertions insufficient to
respondent was forged. These are mere assertions, insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint
warrant the filing of the complaint or the issuance of the warrant of or the issuance of the warrant of
arrest
arrest.
It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complain-ant, or Affidavit must allege facts within
affiants personal knowledge
any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their
_______________
46 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, 1987 ed., p. 270.
47 Rollo, pp. 110-114.
48 Id., at pp. 108-109.
49 Id., at p. 109.
239
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 239

(affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that

the signatures of Ponce, Abad, Ong and Montilla were falsified does Affidavit did not state that he was
present at the time of the execution
not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did of the documents
respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution of Neither did he claim that he was
familiar with the signatures of the
the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatories
signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion that
the signatories were mere dummies of ISCI and they were not in fact
officers, stockholders or representatives of the corporation. At the
very least, the affidavit was based50

on respondent’s “personal belief” Based on personal belief and NOT
personal knowledge
and not “personal knowledge.” Considering the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of the respondent, he could have submitted
the affidavit of other persons who are qualified to attest to the falsity
of the signatures appearing in the questioned documents. One cannot
just claim that a certain document is falsified without further stating
the basis for such claim, i.e., that he was present at the time of the
execution of the document or he is familiar with the signatures in
question. Otherwise, this could lead to abuse and malicious
prosecution. This is actually the reason for the requirement that
affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
The requirement assumes added importance in the instant case
where the accused were not made to rebut the complainant’s The minutes of the reg meeting as
well as the list of stockholders,
allegation through counter-affidavits. could have possibly shown that
signatories were not officers or
Neither can the respondent find support in the documents stockholders of the corporation
attached to his complaint-affidavit. The minutes of the regular
meeting, as well as the list of stockholders, could have possibly That fact they are not officers or
stockholders of ISCI does not mean
shown that the signatories were not officers or stockholders of the that their signatures were falsified -
could have signed as
corporation. However, they did not at all show representatives
_______________
50 See Nala v. Judge Barroso, Jr., 455 Phil. 999, 1011; 408 SCRA 529, 538 (2003)
in which the Court held that the affidavit and testimony of the witnesses that the
petitioner had no license to possess a firearm do not qualify as “personal knowledge”
but only “personal belief” because they did not verify nor secure a certification from
an appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a
firearm.
240

that the questioned documents were falsified. In the letter allegedly

signed by Ponce and Abad, there was no representation that they
were the president and corporate secretary of ISCI. Besides, the
mere fact that they were not officers or stockholders of ISCI does
not necessarily mean that their signatures were falsified. They still
could have affixed their signatures as authorized representatives of
the corporation.
True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It
does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Probable cause should be more
than mere suspicion
Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires
less than evidence which would51justify conviction, it should at least
be more than mere suspicion. While probable cause should be
determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the
evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential

accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of
freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of
unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding
52
trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. It is,
therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from
the pain and inconvenience of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief
53
as to the guilt of the accused.
_______________
51 See AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 496; and
Hon. Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 916, 922; 258 SCRA 280, 285-286 (1996),
where the Court found that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor in finding probable as the evidence, taken altogether constitute probable
cause.
52 Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA
609, 629-630; Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593,
December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 410.
53 R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369,
395.
241
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 241

Considering that the respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence

to support his claim that the documents were falsified, it follows that
the introduction of the questioned documents in Civil Case No. 754
is not an offense punished by any provision of the Revised Penal
Code or any other law. The petitioners should not be burdened with
court proceedings, more particularly a criminal proceeding, if in the
first place, there is no evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that an offense was committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated June 20, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order
dated August 2, 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, is ORDERED to
DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683-86.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-

Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.—Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts

and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the fact within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty for the crime which he was prosecuted.
(Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, 450 SCRA 232 [2006])
——o0o——
242
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 221: Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 221: Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 221: Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 538

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 221

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA,

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; The principle that the

Same; Same; Non-Issuance of Writs; Exceptions; As a general rule, the

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; What the Constitution

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 223

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Quirino

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such

4 Rollo, pp. 72-87.

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 225

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents,

9 Id., at pp. 106-109.

13 Rollo, pp. 113-114.

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

were not afforded the right to submit their counter-afﬁdavit. They

threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.

14 Id., at pp. 115-122.

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 227

issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added,

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the

18 Rollo, pp. 151-186.

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Can a complaint-afﬁdavit containing matters which are not within the

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by

Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?

Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable

Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot

20 Rollo, pp. 13-14.

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 229

It appears that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners

No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 154.

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of the petitioners, as to

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 231

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“SECTION 1. Deﬁnition.—Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or

SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation deﬁned; when required.—Preliminary investigation is

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 233

SECTION 3. Procedure.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following

34 Rule 112, Sec. 9 is presently worded as follows:

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioners were charged with the offense

faulted for taking this course of action, because it is sanctioned by

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 235

“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

Consti states the exclusive and

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

38 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 237

and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent

1. That the offender knew that a document was falsiﬁed by

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED