(CD) David V Arroyo
(CD) David V Arroyo
(CD) David V Arroyo
DELEGATION OF POWERS
(Emergency Powers)
David v Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396 (3 May 2006)
Sandoval-Gutierriez, J.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle
I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt
to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of
inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of
those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it
encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and assembly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President,
in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected
with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
DELEGATION OF POWERS
(Emergency Powers)
SC Resolutions
PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the
calling out power of the president by the president.
What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her
calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the
executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of
arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and
the enforcement of law.”
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP
1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.