(CD) David V Arroyo

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

DELEGATION OF POWERS
(Emergency Powers)
David v Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396 (3 May 2006)
Sandoval-Gutierriez, J.

Seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in


Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5),
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle
I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt
to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of
inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of
those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it
encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and assembly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

RULING:
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President,
in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected
with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
DELEGATION OF POWERS
(Emergency Powers)
SC Resolutions
 PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the
calling out power of the president by the president.

What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her
calling-out power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the
executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of
arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and
the enforcement of law.”

 Factual Basis of its declaration


The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness
of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle
liberty.
 Overbreadth Theory
Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows a party to
whom the law may constitutionally be applied to challenge the statute on the ground that it violates the First
Amendment rights of others.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP
1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

 Calling Out Power Doctrine


On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-
out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination
of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes
necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’
And such criterion has been met.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
DELEGATION OF POWERS
(Emergency Powers)
 Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.)
the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for
it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative
powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA
the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1,
Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take
care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

 Take Over Power Doctrine


The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune
without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare
the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

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