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VOL. 380, APRIL 5, 2002 325

Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

*
G.R. No. 149148. April 5, 2002.

SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OFFICE

OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), PRIMO C. MIRO, DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ROXAS CITY,
EXECUTIVE JUDGE, HONORABLE SALVADOR GUBATON,
OFFICE OF THE CITY FISCAL, HONORABLE JULIUS ABELA,
and SANTIAGO B. VILLARUZ, respondents.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Ombudsman; Court has jurisdiction over

petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases.—In Tirol, Jr. v. del Rosario,we held that
although as a consequence of the decision in Fabian v. Desierto appeals
from the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases are now cognizable by the Court of Appeals,
nevertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed in this Court to
set

______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

aside the Ombudsman’s order or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto,we again

held that this Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning
resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.
Same; Same; Same; Recognized exceptions to the general rule of the
Court’s policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
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investigations.—While this Court’s policy is one of non-interference in the

conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers with
a latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, nonetheless
exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, to wit: 1. When
necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3. When there is a prejudicial
question which is sub judice; 4. When the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority; 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7.
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8. Where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; 9. Where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; 10. When there is clearly no
prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied.
Same; Same; Same; Court holds that the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) acted without or in excess of its authority when it ordered the
filing of informations against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and
the Revised Penal Code, despite the absence of probable cause.—In this
case, we hold that the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or
in excess of its authority when it ordered the filing of informations against
petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, §3(e) and the Revised Penal Code,
Art. 171, par. 3, despite the absence of probable cause, defined as such
ground as engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, warranting the filing of the
case in court.

PETITION for review of a resolution of the Ombudsman.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Lolita A. Quisumbing for petitioner.

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VOL. 380, APRIL 5, 2002 327

Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated April

20, 2001, of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), finding a
prima facie case for violation of §3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code
against petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce, and the order, dated June
29, 2001, denying her motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz is one of the oppositors in
Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433, entitled “In the Matter of the
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Petition to Approve the Will of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz,

1
deceased, v. Nicolas P. Villaruz.” The case, originally assigned to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15, Roxas City, of which
Judge Roger B. Patricio was presiding judge, was later re-assigned
to Branch 19 of the same court, presided over by Judge (now Justice
2
of the Court of Appeals) Sergio Pestaño.
Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz was originally the administrator
of the estate of his mother Remedies Bermejo Villaruz. However, in
an order issued by the trial court on June 10, 1998, he was removed
as such for patent neglect of his legal duties and failure to comply
with the court orders. In his place, respondent’s eldest brother,
Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., was appointed regular administrator, “upon
filing and approval by this Court of an Administrator’s Bond in the
3
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).”
In a motion, dated July 1, 1998, Nicolas filed a motion for the
approval of his bond, furnished by the Philippine Surety &
Insurance, Inc., in the amount of P50,000.00. Santiago and his
brother Jose Ma. Villaruz opposed Nicolas’ motion and4 prayed that
Jose Maria be instead appointed regular administrator. Attached to
their opposition was a certification, dated August 31, 1988, executed
by their mother Remedios before, she passed away, author-

______________

1 Order dated September 22, 2002; Rollo, pp. 38-40.

2 Orders dated June 10, 1998, September 22, 1998, and October 12, 1998; id., pp.
35-41.
3 Order dated June 10, 1998; id., pp. 35-37.
4 Order dated September 22, 1998; id., pp. 38-40.

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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

izing Santiago to take possession of and/or to manage her nipa lands,

which were then in his care, for a period of 20 years or during her
lifetime, whichever was longer. Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz also
gave Santiago the option of leasing the properties for P120,000.00 a
5
year plus land taxes. The oppositors likewise submitted an
agreement, dated February 6, 1993, executed by the three children of
Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz,
6
in which they agreed to honor the lease
until August 23, 2008.
In an order, dated September 22, 1998, Judge Patricio denied the
oppositors’ opposition, while recognizing the validity of the
certification executed by Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz and the
agreement of the heirs, and stated that the administration of the new
administrator was subject to them. No mention of the agreement
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was, however, made in the dispositive portion of the order, which

simply read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for lack of merit, oppositors’

Opposition and Motion dated July 15, 1998 is denied, while action on
petitioner’s Motion to Approve Administrator’s Bond dated July 1, 1998 is
held in abeyance until after petitioner submits to this Court, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this order, an updated certification from the Supreme
Court to the effect that the Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance, Inc. has
no pending obligation and/or liability to the government insofar as
7
confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases are concerned.

On October 12, 1998, Judge Sergio Pestaño, to whom the case was
in the meantime reassigned, approved the administrator’s bond of
respondent Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. in an order which stated:

It appearing from the Certification issued by the Supreme Court that

Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. has no pending obligation
and/or liabilities to the government insofar as confiscated bonds in

______________

5 Certification of Remedios B. Villaruz dated August 23, 1988; Records, p. 17.

6 Agreement of Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., Jose Ma. B. Villaruz, and Santiago B. Villaruz dated
February 6, 1993; Records, p. 18.
7 Rollo, pp. 38-40.

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VOL. 380, APRIL 5, 2002 329

Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

civil and criminal cases are concerned, the Administrator’s bond filed by
petitioner Nicolas B. Villaruz, is approved.
Send copy of this Order to petitioner through his counsel, to the Clerk of
8
Court of this court, and to the oppositors through their counsel.

After receiving a copy of Judge Pestaño’s order, respondent Susan

Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City, prepared a Letter of Administration (LOA) which read:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by Honorable
Sergio Pestaño, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City,
Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. has been appointed Administrator of the estate of
Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz, deceased, with full authority to take possession
of all property/ies of said deceased in any province or provinces in which it
may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation
of said property, he having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court. Said

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Administrator shall within three months from the date of this appointment
return to the Court a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal
estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge
and shall render a true and just account of his administration to the Court
within one year and at any other time when required by the Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign and seal these presents in Roxas City,
Philippines, this 16th day of October 1998.
(sgd.) Susan Mendoza-Arce     
(t)SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE

The LOA9 was based on the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks
of Court. Accordingly, on December 7, 1998, administrator

______________

8 Id., p. 41.
9 Rollo, p. 42; The Manual for Clerks of Court, p. 612 (1991) prescribed the form
for Letters of Administration as follows:

Know All Men By These Presents:

That by order of this Court dated ______, 19__, issued by Hon. ___ ___, Judge of the _____
Court, Branch _____ _____ has been appointed Administrator of the estate of ______,
deceased, with full authority to take possession of all property of said deceased in any province
or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all

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Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., accompanied by three armed security guards

and respondent’s Deputy Sheriff Charles Aguiling, took possession
of the entire estate of the decedent, including the 10
nipa lands which
had been leased to respondent Santiago B. Villaruz.
This gave rise to the present action. In a letter-complaint to the
Ombudsman, dated March 25, 1999, respondent Santiago B.
Villaruz alleged that petitioner committed two crimes in issuing the
LOA, to wit:

1. Falsification by a public officer under Article 171, par. 3 of

the Revised Penal Code, by “attributing to persons who
have participated in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them.”
2. Corrupt practice in violation of §3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) by “causing any
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
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or judicial functions through manifest partiality,

11
evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.”

Attached to his letter-complaint to the Ombudsman were affidavits

executed by respondent Santiago B. Villaruz and his employees,
namely, Teresita B. Bechayda, Ramon Benliro, Jr., Garry B.
12
Bonales, Romeo S. Bolante, and Sulpico B. Blanco. In his affida-

______________

other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, he/she having filed a bond
satisfactory to the Court. Said Administrator shall within three months from the date of this
appointment return to the Court a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of
the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge, and shall render a true and
just account of his administration to the Court within one year and at any other time when
required by the Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign and seal these presents in ________, Philippines, this
_____ day of _____, 19__.

10 Affidavit of Santiago B. Villaruz dated March 25, 1999; Records, pp. 3-8.
11 Letter-complaint dated March 25, 1999; Rollo, pp. 16-17.
12 Records, pp. 23-27.

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vit, respondent accused petitioner of acting “with manifest partiality,

evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence” by falsely
attributing to Judge Pestaño the appointment of Nicolas B. Villaruz
as new administrator and investing him with “full authority to take
possession of all property/ies” of the decedent, because the fact was
that it was Judge Patricio who had appointed Nicolas administrator
of the estate subject to the terms and conditions of the lease
agreement in favor of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz. Respondent
claimed that he had been deprived of income in the amount of
P33,000.00 every week, as well as of the bancas and boats used 13
in
his business, as a result of the issuance of the order in question.
In her report, dated May 13, 1999, Graft Investigation Officer
Estrela Alma A. Singco stated that “the allegations in the complaint
warrant further investigation” and recommended that petitioner be
14
ordered to file her counter-affidavit.
In her counter-affidavit, dated June 23, 1999, petitioner admitted
issuing the LOA in favor of Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. She claimed,
however, that she acted in compliance with the order of Presiding
Judge Sergio Pestaño and that, in preparing the LOA, she merely
adopted the legal form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court,

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which had been approved by this Court. She said she issued the
LOA “in line [with] my official functions which [are] ministerial in
15
nature and devoid of any bad faith and with manifest partiality.”
In a reply-affidavit, dated June 29, 1999, respondent Santiago B.
Villaruz reiterated the arguments raised in his letter-complaint and
asserted that legal forms are mere guidelines in the preparation of
legal documents and that respondent usurped the functions of the
16
branch clerk of court when she issued the LOA.

______________

13 Affidavit of Santiago B. Villaruz dated March 25, 1999; Records, pp. 3-8.
14 Records, pp. 46-47.
15 Id., pp. 50-51.
16 Id., pp. 59-66.

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Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

In a resolution, dated April 20, 2001, Ricardo A. Rebollido, Graft

Investigation Officer II, found probable cause against petitioner.
Based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits submitted by the
parties, he found petitioner guilty of the charge by making it appear
that it was Judge Pestaño, instead of Judge Patricio, who had
appointed Nicolas B. Villaruz as administrator, without regard to the
lease agreement in favor of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz. The
Graft Investigation Officer found that although petitioner’s duties
were ministerial, she should have read the order recognizing the
lease. The resolution concluded,

All things considered, respondent [now petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce] in

the discharge of her official administrative or judicial functions, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence caused
undue injury to complainant and gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to Administrator Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. who has been the one
reaping the fruits and products of the said 120 hectares of nipa lands the
fruits and products of which lawfully and rightfully belong to complainant
as lessee.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds a prima facie case
against respondent ATTY. SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of Falsification of Official
Document under paragraph 3, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Let
17
the corresponding Informations be filed before the proper court.

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Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, maintaining that her official

duties as a clerk of court were ministerial in nature and that she
merely tried to comply with the dispositive portion of orders and
decisions of the trial court. She pointed out that neither the order,
dated June 10, 1998, nor the order, dated September 22, 1998, issued
by Judge Patricio mentioned the lease of nipa lands and that it was
only in the text of the order, dated September 22, 1998, that said
lease was referred to. In discharging her official duties, she argued,
she could not be guilty of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
18
gross inexcusable negligence, as asserted by complainant.

______________

17 Rollo, pp. 21-28 (emphasis in the original).

18 Id., pp. 29-33.

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In an order, dated June 29, 2001, the Graft Investigation Officer

found “no new matters or issues raised therein which would justify
the reversal or modification of our earlier findings,” and held that in
any event “the grounds relied by respondent are evidentiary matters
which could well be ventilated before the court of justice.” Hence,
this petition.
We first dispose of a procedural issue raised by respondent
Santiago B. Villaruz. In his Comment, dated October 12, 2001,
respondent invokes Rule 65, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and contends that the petition for certiorari in this case should have
been filed in the Court of Appeals. This provision states in pertinent
parts:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed.—The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts
or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided
by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.

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No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for

compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
19
The contention has no merit. In Tirol, Jr. v. del Rosario, we held
that although as a consequence of the decision in Fabian v.
20
Desierto appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases are now cognizable by the
Court of Appeals, nevertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the
Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action of

______________

19 317 SCRA 779 (1999).

20 295 SCRA 470 (1998).

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certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed in this Court to set21 aside the
Ombudsman’s order or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto, we again
held that this Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases.
Coming now to the merits, we find the petition meritorious.
22
To begin with, in Posadas v. Ombudsman, we held: “The rule,
of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. But as
has been held, infinitely more important than conventional
adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen’s right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution.”
In that case, the Ombudsman ordered the prosecution of certain
officials of the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon
City for preventing the National Bureau of Investigation from
arresting without warrants student-suspects in the killing of a
fraternity member. The question was whether there was probable
cause for violation of P.D. No. 1829, which makes it unlawful for
anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders. The Court found none and enjoined the Ombudsman and
his agents from prosecuting the U.P. officials. The attempted arrest
was declared illegal and petitioners to be simply protecting the rights
of the students.
Indeed, while this Court’s policy is one of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating
officers with a latitude of discretion in the determination of probable

23
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23
cause, nonetheless exceptions to the general rule have been
recognized, to wit:

1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the

constitutional rights of the accused;

______________

21 G.R. Nos. 140619-24, March 9, 2001, 354 SCRA 158.

22 341 SCRA 388 (2000).
23 Sebastian, Sr. v. Garchitorena, 343 SCRA 463 (2000); Camanag v. Guerrero,
268 SCRA 473 (1997); Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680 (1992).

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2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or

to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
24
denied.

In this case, we hold that the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

acted without or in excess of its authority when it ordered the filing
of informations against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019,
§3(e) and the Revised Penal Code, Art. 171, par. 3, despite the
absence of probable cause, defined as such ground as engenders a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, warranting the filing of the
25
case in court.
First. Petitioner Arce allegedly violated §3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 by including the phrase “with full authority to take
possession of all property/ies of said deceased in any province or

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provinces in which it may be situated . . .” in the LOA she prepared

in Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433. This provision states:

______________

24 Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388 (2000); Venus v. Desierto, 298 SCRA
196 (1998); Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990).
25 RULES OF COURT, RULE 112, §1.

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Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers.—In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: . . . .
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

The elements of the offense are:

1. That the accused are public officers or private persons

charged in conspiracy with them;
2. That said public officers committed the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official duties or in relation
to their public positions;
3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party;
4. That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality,
26
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
27
These elements must all be proven. In this case, there is no basis
for the finding that in issuing the LOA in question petitioner acted
with “partiality,” or bias which excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are, with “bad
faith,” which connotes not only bad judgment or negligence but also
a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing, a breach of duty
amounting to fraud, nor with “gross negligence,” which is
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
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______________

26 Bunye v. Sandiganbayan, 306 SCRA 663 (1999); Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 272

SCRA 563 (1997); Ponce de Leon v. Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 745 (1990).
27 Avila, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 236 (1999); Fernando v.
Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680 (1992).

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acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,

not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
28
indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.
The Manual for Clerks of Court describes the clerk of court as
“an officer of the Court, a public officer, and an ‘officer of the law,’
[although] the position is not that of a judicial officer, nor is it
synonymous with the Court . . . . The office is essentially a
29
ministerial one.” Petitioner performed a ministerial duty in
preparing the letter of administration based on the dispositive
portions of the orders dated September 22, 1998 and October 12,
1998. She merely copied substantially the form for letters of
administration prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Courts. The
LOA may not be accurate for lack of reference to the lease
agreement in favor of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz, but it cannot
be said with certainty that she acted either with gross negligence or
from some corrupt motive. The fact is that, instead of employing her
own words, she used phrases in the Manual prescribed by this Court.
Second. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) found a prima
facie case for falsification under Article 171, par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code against petitioner because she stated in the letter of
administration that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. had been appointed
administrator by Judge Sergio Pestaño when what the latter did was
to approve the administrator’s bond.
We disagree with the Ombudsman’s findings. Art. 171, par. 3 of
the Revised Penal Code provides:

Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical

minister.—The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
....
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them.

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28 Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 656 (1994); Alejandro v. People, 170
SCRA 400 (1992).
29 Manual for Clerks of Court (1991), p. 2.

338

338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of

30
dolo, such as falsification. In this case, there is no reasonable
ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was
present. Petitioner prepared the letter of administration on the basis
of the order of Judge Pestaño, dated October 12, 1998, approving the
administrator’s bond filed by Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. By the approval
of his bond, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. qualified as administrator so that
in a sense, therefore, the statement in the letter of administration
“[t]that by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by
Honorable Sergio Pestaño, Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Roxas City, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. has been appointed
Administrator of the estate of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz,
deceased” is correct. There was nothing willful or felonious in
petitioner’s act warranting her prosecution for falsification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution
dated April 20, 2001, of the Graft Investigation Officer, as approved
by the Office of the Ombudsman, and his order, dated June 29, 2001,
are hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint of respondent Santiago B.
Villaruz against petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce for violation of
R.A. No. 3019, §3(e) and for falsification committed by a public
officer under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

     Bellosillo (Chairman) and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

          Quisumbing, J., No part. Close relations to counsel of a
party.

Petition granted, resolution of the Graft Investigation Officer set

aside. Complaint against petitioner dismissed.

Note.—The Supreme Court will not interfere with the

Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers.
(Knecht vs. Desierto, 291 SCRA 292 [1998])

——o0o——

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30 See REVISED PENAL CODE, ART. 3.

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339

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