Rs 21852

The United Arab Emirates (UAE):
Issues for U.S. Policy
Updated August 19, 2019
Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov
RS21852
The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
Summary
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been a significant U.S. partner in Gulf security, helping to
address multiple regional threats by hosting U.S. military personnel at UAE military facilities and
buying sophisticated U.S. military equipment, including missile defenses and combat aircraft.
The alliance with the United States is expected to continue after UAE President Shaykh Khalifa
bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, who suffered an incapacitating stroke in January 2014, is succeeded by
his younger brother and de-facto UAE leader Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan.
With ample financial resources and a military that has long been advised and armed by the United
States, the UAE has increasingly asserting itself in the region. The UAE has been part of a Saudi-
led military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen, an effort to
which the United States provides logistical support but which has produced criticism over the
effects of the war on Yemen’s civilians. That criticism has contributed to a July 2019 decision to
remove most of the UAE’s ground forces from that conflict. UAE forces continue to support pro-
UAE factions in southern Yemen and, alongside U.S. special operations forces, continue to
combat Al Qaeda’s affiliate in that country. The UAE is supporting an anti-Islamist commander
based in eastern Libya, Khalifa Hafter, who in April 2019 launched an assault to capture Tripoli
from a U.N.-backed government based there. The UAE has sought to counteract criticism by
expanding its financial donations not only to Yemen but also to regional and international
organizations and economically-strapped countries.
The UAE’s opposition to Muslim Brotherhood-linked regional organizations as regional and
domestic threats has driven UAE policy in the region. The UAE’s stance has contributed to a
major rift with Qatar, another member of the Gulf Cooperation Council alliance (GCC: Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman), but which supports Brotherhood-related
groups as Islamists willing to work within established political processes. In June 2017, the UAE
joined Saudi Arabia in isolating Qatar until it adopts policies closer to those of the three GCC
states on the Brotherhood and other issues. On Iran, the UAE has supported the Trump
Administration policy of pressuring Iran economically and politically. However, the UAE
leadership’s apparent concerns that U.S.-Iran tensions could embroil the UAE into war with Iran
has caused an apparent UAE shift toward more engagement with Iran. That shift likely
contributed to the UAE decision to scale back its efforts against the Houthis in Yemen, while at
the same time illustrating UAE divergence from Saudi policy.
The UAE’s tradition of social tolerance has won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in
the Middle East. And, the country’s wealth - amplified by the small citizenship population
requiring government services - has helped the government maintain popular support. Since 2006,
the government has held a limited voting process for half of the 40 seats in its quasi-legislative
body, the Federal National Council (FNC). The most recent such vote was held in October 2015,
and resulted in the selection of a woman as speaker of the FNC. However, the country remains
under the control of a small circle of leaders. And, since the Arab Spring uprisings, the
government has become more wary of the potential for regional conflicts to affect domestic
stability and has suppressed domestic opponents. The country sought to showcase its continued
commitment to pluralism by hosting a visit by Pope Francis in February 2019.
In part to cope with the effects of reduced prices for crude oil during 2014-2018, the government
has created new ministries tasked with formulating economic and social strategies that, among
other objectives, can attract the support of the country’s youth. Any U.S. assistance to the UAE
has been very small in dollar amounts and intended mainly to qualify the UAE for inclusion in
training and other programs that benefit UAE security.

Contents
Governance, Human Rights, and Reform........................................................................................ 1
Governance Issues..................................................................................................................... 4
Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections ......................................................... 4
Muslim Brotherhood and other Opposition ........................................................................ 5
Other Government Responses............................................................................................. 5
U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts and UAE Restrictions ................................................ 6
Other Human Rights-Related Issues ......................................................................................... 6
Media and Research Institute Freedoms ............................................................................. 6
Justice/Rule of Law............................................................................................................. 7
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 7
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 8
Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons ............................................................................ 8
Foreign Policy and Defense Issues .................................................................................................. 9
Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 10
Policy Toward and Intervention in Regional Conflicts ............................................................ 11
Egypt .................................................................................................................................. 11
Libya ................................................................................................................................. 12
Islamic State/Syria Conflict .............................................................................................. 12
Iraq .................................................................................................................................... 13
Yemen ............................................................................................................................... 13
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 15
Israeli-Palestinian Dispute ................................................................................................ 16
UAE Foreign Aid .................................................................................................................... 17
Defense Cooperation with the United States........................................................................... 18
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE .................................. 18
U.S. and Other Arms Sales ............................................................................................... 19
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers................................................................. 22
Cooperation against Terrorism and Proliferation .................................................................... 23
International Terrorism Issues ........................................................................................... 23
Port and Border Controls .................................................................................................. 25
Export Controls ................................................................................................................. 25
Nuclear Agreement and Other Technology Issues......................................................................... 26
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 27
Oil and Gas Sector and “Clean Energy” Initiatives ................................................................ 28
U.S.-UAE Trade and Trade Promotion Discussions ............................................................... 28
U.S. Assistance to the UAE..................................................................................................... 29
“Open Skies” Issue ........................................................................................................... 29
Figures
Figure 1. UAE at a Glance .............................................................................................................. 3

Tables
Table 1. UAE Leadership ................................................................................................................ 1
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 29

Governance, Human Rights, and Reform

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi,
the oil-rich federation capital; Dubai, a large commercial hub; and the five smaller and less
wealthy emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm al-Qaywayn, and Ras al-Khaymah. Sharjah
and Ras al-Khaymah have a common ruling family—leaders of the Al Qawasim tribe. After
Britain announced in 1968 that it would no longer ensure security in the Gulf, six “Trucial States”
formed the UAE federation in December 1971; Ras al-Khaymah joined in 1972. The federation’s
last major leadership transition occurred in November 2004, upon the death of the first UAE
president and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan.
Table 1. UAE Leadership

UAE president and Ruler of Abu Dhabi Emirate.
Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan Incapacitated since 2014 stroke
Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum UAE Vice President, Prime Minister, and Defense
Minister, and ruler of Dubai Emirate
Mohammad bin Zayid al- Nuhayyhan Crown Prince/heir apparent of Abu Dhabi, de facto
President of UAE due to brother’s incapacitation
Sultan bin Mohammad Al Qassimi Ruler of Sharjah Emirate

Saud bin Saqr Al Qassimi Ruler of Ras al-Khaymah Emirate. His elder brother,
Khalid bin Saqr, claims his 2003 removal as heir
apparent was illegitimate and that he is the rightful ruler
of the emirate. That claim is not recognized by UAE.
Humaid bin Rashid Al Nuami Ruler of Ajman Emirate
Saud bin Rashid Al Mu’alla Ruler of Umm al-Qaywayn Emirate
Hamad bin Mohammad Al Sharqi Ruler of Fujairah Emirate
Abdullah bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan Foreign Minister
Amal al-Qubaisi Federal National Council speaker. Only woman to head
a GCC legislative body.
Yusuf al-Otaiba Ambassador to the United States. Son of former
longtime UAE Oil Minister Mani Saeed al-Otaiba
Congressional Research Service 1

Shaykh Zayid’s eldest son, Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan, born in 1948, was elevated
from Crown Prince to ruler of Abu Dhabi upon Zayid’s death. In keeping with a long-standing
agreement among the seven emirates, Khalifa was subsequently selected as UAE president by the
leaders of all the emirates, who collectively comprise the “Federal Supreme Council.” The ruler
of Dubai traditionally serves concurrently as Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE; that
position has been held by Shaykh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, architect of Dubai’s
modernization drive, since the death of his elder brother Shaykh Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum
in January 2006. The Federal Supreme Council meets four times per year to establish general
policy guidelines, although the leaders of the emirates consult frequently with each other.
UAE leadership posts almost always change only in the event of death of an incumbent. The
leadership of the UAE was put into doubt by Shaykh Khalifa’s stroke on January 24, 2014. He
has not appeared publicly since and reportedly is incapacitated, but, in order not to cause turmoil
within ruling circles, there is unlikely to be a formal succession as long as he remains alive. His
younger brother and the third son of Shaykh Zayid, Crown Prince Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid
al-Nuhayyan (born in 1961), is almost certain to succeed him in all posts. Shaykh Mohammad
had been assuming day-to-day governing responsibilities prior to Khalifa’s stroke and has been
de facto leader since. He is widely perceived as the key strategists of UAE foreign and defense
policy.
Several senior UAE officials are also brothers of Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid, including
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid, deputy Prime Minister Mansur bin Zayid, deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Interior Sayf bin Zayid, and National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun
bin Zayid. In 2017, Shaykh Mohammad appointed his son, Khalid bin Mohammad, as deputy
National Security Adviser.
As shown in the table above, each emirate has its own leader. The five smaller emirates, often
called the “northern emirates,” tend to be more politically and religiously conservative and
homogenous than are Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are urban amalgams populated by many Arab,
South Asian, and European expatriates.

Figure 1. UAE at a Glance
Population 9 million+ (U.N. estimate), of whom about 11% are citizens. U.S. population estimate is 6.1
million, and the causes of the discrepancy between U.S. and U.N. estimates are unclear.
Religions The citizenry is almost all Muslim, of which 85% are Sunni and 15% are Shia. Of the total
population, 76% is Muslim; 9% is Christian; and 15% is other—but primarily Buddhist or
Hindu.
Ethnic Groups 11% Emirati (citizenry); 29% other Arab and Iranian; 50% South Asian; 10% Western and
other Asian expatriate
Size of Armed Forces About 50,000

Inflation Rate About 2% (2017)
GDP and GDP-related GDP Growth Rate: 0.8% (2017). Well below the 3% growth of 2016 and nearly 4% in 2015.
Metrics GDP on Purchasing Power Parity basis (PPP): $696 billion (2017)
Per capita (PPP): over $68,600
Oil Exports About 2.7 million barrels per day
Foreign Assets/Sovereign About $600 billion

Wealth Reserves
U.S. citizens in UAE About 60,000
Major Sites Dubai’s “Burj Khalifa," world's tallest building; Burj al-Arab hotel in Dubai bills itself as
"world's only 7-star hotel"; local branches of Guggenheim and Louvre museums in Abu
Dhabi.
Sources: Map created by CRS. Facts from CIA, The World Factbook; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, Economist
Intelligence Unit.

Governance Issues
UAE leaders argue that the country’s social tolerance and distribution of national wealth have
rendered the bulk of the population satisfied with the political system, and that Emiratis are able
to express their concerns directly to the country’s leaders through traditional consultative
mechanisms. Most prominent among these channels are the open majlis (councils) held by many
UAE leaders. UAE officials maintain that Western-style political parties and elections for a
legislature or other representative body would aggravate schisms among tribes and clans, cause
Islamist factions to become radical, and open UAE politics to regional influence. UAE officials
have stated that the UAE’s end goal is not to form a multiparty system, arguing that this model
does not correspond with UAE cultural or historical development.1 Such assertions appear, at
least in part, to signal that the country will work to prohibit the development of factions linked to
regional Islamist movements or to regimes in the region. UAE law prohibits political parties.
Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections

The UAE has provided for some formal popular representation through a 40-seat Federal
National Council (FNC)—a body that can review and recommend, but not enact or veto,
legislation. The FNC can question, but not remove, ministers and it conducts such questionings
regularly. Its sessions are open to the public. The seat distribution of the FNC is weighted in favor
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which each hold eight seats. Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah have six
each, and the others each have four. The government has not implemented calls, such as were
expressed in a March 2011 petition signed by 160 UAE intellectuals, to transform the FNC into
an all-elected body with full legislative powers.2 Each emirate also has its own appointed
consultative council.
First FNC Votes. In 2006, the UAE leadership apparently assessed that it had fallen too far behind
its Gulf neighbors on political reform and it instituted a limited election process for half of the
FNC seats, with the other 20 FNC seats remaining appointed. The Election Commission approved
a small “electorate” of about 6,600 persons, of which about 20% were women. Out of the 452
candidates for the 20 elected seats, there were 65 female candidates. Only one woman was
elected (from Abu Dhabi), but another seven women were given appointed seats.
The September 24, 2011, FNC election, held in the context of the “Arab spring” uprisings, had an
expanded electorate (129,000), nearly half of which were female. There were 468 candidates for
the 20 seats, including 85 women. However, turnout was about 25%, which UAE officials called
disappointing. Of the 20 winners, only one was female. Other winners were elected largely along
tribal lines. Of the 20 appointed seats, six were women. The government selected a woman, Amal
al-Qubaisi, to be deputy speaker—the first woman to hold as high a position in a GCC
representative body.
The 2015 elections were again for half the FNC, but the electorate was expanded to 225,000
voters, about double that in 2011. The 2015 process included “early voting” and out of country
voting, culminating on “election day” of October 3, 2015. There were 330 candidates (somewhat
lower than in 2011), including 74 women (almost as many as in 2011). Turnout was 35%, which
government officials stated was a more satisfactory turnout than in 2011. One woman was
elected, as happened in 2011. Of the 20 appointed seats, eight were women. Of those, Abu Dhabi
representative Ms. Amal al-Qubaisi, was promoted to speaker.
1 Anwar Gargash. “Amid Challenges, UAE Policies Engage Gradual Reforms.” The National, August 26, 2012.
2 Al Jazeera News Network, March 9, 2011.

The next FNC elections are to be held in October 2019. The election process will implement a
December 2018 UAE leadership decree that half of the FNC members will be women – a quota
that will be achieved by appointing enough women to constitute half of the body, after accounting
for those elected.3 UAE officials assert that there are plans to eventually make all 40 seats elected,
but likely not in the 2019 vote. A National Election Committee has been meeting to review
procedures, particularly the use of technology for voter screening, for the upcoming election,4 and
training for citizens to register their candidacies via electronic media has been held.
Muslim Brotherhood and other Opposition

There has been little evident clamor for major political reform, but some UAE intellectuals and
youth have agitated for greater political space. During the 2011 “Arab Spring” uprisings, some
UAE youth tried unsuccessfully to use social media to organize a public protest in March 2011.
Five high-profile activists—the so-called “UAE-5”—were arrested in November 2011 but their
prison sentences were commuted.
The government has particularly targeted Islamists linked to the Muslim Brotherhood
organization, which UAE leaders named in 2014 as one of 85 “terrorist organizations”(a list that
included Al Qaeda and the Islamic State).5 The leadership apparently views the Brotherhood and
its affiliates as striving to displace established leaders in the region and as a “gateway” for
recruitment for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.
The UAE affiliate of the Brotherhood is the Islah (Reform) organization, which emerged in 1974
as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and attracts followers mostly from the less wealthy and
more religiously conservative northern emirates. Islah has no history of attacks or violence inside
the UAE. UAE officials accuse Islah of being funded by the main Brotherhood chapter in Egypt.6
The government stepped up its crackdown on Islah in 2012, the year that Muslim Brotherhood
figure Mohammad Morsi was elected president of Egypt. UAE authorities arrested and revoked
the citizenship of several senior Islah members, including a member of the Ras al-Khaymah
ruling family. In July 2013, the UAE State Security Court convicted and sentenced 69 out of 94
UAE nationals (“UAE-94”)—Islamists arrested during 2011-2013—for trying to overthrow the
UAE government. In June 2014, 30 persons, of which 20 are Egyptian nationals, were convicted
for connections to the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt.
Other Government Responses

The government has also addressed domestic opposition with reforms and economic incentives.
In 2011, the government invested $1.5 billion in utilities infrastructure of the poorer, northern
emirates; raised military pensions; and began subsidizing some foods. In 2013, a “new look”
cabinet included several young figures. Cabinet reshuffles in February 2016 and October 2017
added more young ministers, many of them female, and established minister of state positions for
“tolerance,” “happiness,” artificial intelligence, and food security. Other reforms included
formation of an Emirates Foundation for Schools, run by an independent board of directors;
limiting the mandate of the Ministry of Health to a focus on disease prevention; and creating a
science council with a mandate to promote a new generation of Emirati scientists.
3 Communication from UAE Embassy Washington, DC, representatives. December 11, 2018.
4 https://gulfnews.com/uae/preparations-for-fnc-elections-reviewed-1.62709184
5 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists.” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014.
6 “UAE Targets Muslim Brotherhood in Crackdown on Dissent,” BBC, September 26, 2012.

U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts and UAE Restrictions

Human rights observers assert that U.S. officials downplay criticism of the UAE’s human rights
record because of the U.S.-UAE strategic alliance. U.S. officials assert that they continue to
promote democracy, rule of law, independent media, and civil society in the UAE through State
Department programs that are tolerated by the UAE government. Such programs have included
the broader Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which has its headquarters for the Gulf
region located at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi.
On the other hand, the UAE government has expelled some U.S. and European-sponsored
democracy promotion efforts that the government asserted were too intrusive into UAE politics.
In 2012, the government ordered closed the offices in the UAE of the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) and the Germany-based Konrad Adenauer Foundation. No U.S. funding for
democracy promotion in UAE has been provided in recent years.
Other Human Rights-Related Issues7

Recent State Department human rights reports and reports by independent groups such as Human
Rights Watch assert that there are a variety of human rights problems in the UAE including:
unverified reports of torture, government restrictions of freedoms of speech and assembly, and
lack of judicial independence. UAE organizations that monitor the government’s human rights
performance include the Jurists’ Association’s Human Rights Committee, the Emirates Human
Rights Association (EHRA), and the Emirates Center for Human Rights (ECHR), but their degree
of independence is uncertain. In a January 2018 U.N. Human Rights Council Universal Periodic
Review, UAE officials highlighted that they had formed a new human rights commission under
international standards known as the “Paris Principles.”8
According to the State Department, there are an estimated 20,000 to 100,000 stateless persons in
the UAE (“Bidoon”). Most Bidoon lacked citizenship because they did not have the preferred
tribal affiliation when the country was founded. They lack accepted forms of identification and
their movements within the UAE or internationally are restricted.
Media and Research Institute Freedoms

The UAE government has increased restrictions on media usage, particularly social media, since
the 2011 Arab uprisings. A 2012 “cybercrimes decree” (Federal Legal Decree No. 5/2012)
established a legal basis to prosecute those accused of using information technology to promote
dissent. It provides for life imprisonment for anyone using such technology to advocate the
overthrow of the government. In May 2015, the government enacted an Anti-Discrimination Law,
which criminalizes the publication of “provocative” political or religious material. Several
activists have been jailed for violating the decree, including Ahmed Mansoor, who was arrested in
2018 for “defaming” the country on social media. On December 31, 2018, a UAE court upheld
his 10-year prison sentence and fine of $272,000.
A “National Media Council” (NMC) directly oversees all media content. Some media
organizations report that the government has banned some journalists from entering the country,
and prohibited distribution of books and articles that highlight human rights abuses.
7 Much of this section is from the State Department reports on human rights practices for 2018. Found at:
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper.
8 UAE Officials under Investigation for Torture. Al Jazeera, January 22, 2018.

The country has also become less welcoming of research institutes, several of which had opened
in UAE in the 1990s. The government applied increasingly strict criteria to renewing the licenses
of some research institutes and some left the UAE as a result.9 On the other hand, some new
UAE-run think tanks have opened or become increasingly active in recent years, including the
Emirates Policy Center and the TRENDS Institute.
Justice/Rule of Law
The UAE constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but court decisions are subject to
being overruled by political leaders. UAE judicial institutions include Sharia (Islamic law) courts
that adjudicate criminal and family law matters, and civil courts that adjudicate civil matters. The
civil court system, based on French and Egyptian legal systems, was established in 1973 when a
Federal Supreme Court was inaugurated. This court, which consists of a president and a five
judges appointed by the UAE leadership, adjudicates disputes between emirates or between an
emirate and the UAE federal government; and the constitutionality of federal and other laws. It
also interprets the provisions of the constitution and questions ministers and senior federal
officials for official misconduct. A 2012 amendment to the UAE constitution set up a “Federal
Judicial Council” chaired by the UAE president, which human rights groups asserted reflected
increased political influence over the judiciary. Foreign nationals hold positions in the judiciary,
making them subject to being threatened with deportation for judgments against Emiratis.
The UAE justice system has often come under criticism in cases involving expatriates. Western
expatriates have sometimes been arrested for sexual activity on beaches. In 2007, human rights
groups criticized the conservative-dominated justice system for threatening to prosecute a 15-
year-old French expatriate for homosexuality, a crime in UAE, when he was raped by two UAE
men; the UAE men were later sentenced for sexual assault and kidnapping. During 2012-13, a 78-
year-old pediatrician from South Africa was imprisoned for two months for alleged issues of
malpractice related to his six-week service as a doctor in Abu Dhabi in 200210 and prevented from
leaving the UAE. In May 2018, UAE authorities detained a British academic, Matthew Hedges,
on charges of “spying for a foreign state.” He was sentenced to life imprisonment in November
but shortly thereafter, following expressions of outrage from British and other world leaders, was
pardoned by the leadership.
Women’s Rights
Women’s political rights have expanded steadily. As of December 2011, UAE women are allowed
to pass on their citizenship to their children—the first GCC state to allow this. However, UAE
women are still at a legal disadvantage relative to men, for example in divorce cases and other
family law issues. The penal code allows men to use physical means, including violence, against
female family members. Many domestic service jobs are performed by migrant women, and they
are denied basic legal protections such as limits to work hours.
Recent cabinet reshuffles have greatly increased the number of female ministers. Seven women
are in the FNC, one is now its speaker, and, as noted, the FNC will have women as half its
members after the 2019 vote. About 10% of the UAE diplomatic corps is female, whereas there
were no female diplomats prior to 2001. The UAE Air Force has several female fighter pilots.
9 CRS conversations with UAE officials, 2012-2017.

10 Lydia Polgreen. “Emirates’ Laws Trap a Doctor Just Passing Through.” New York Times, April 12, 2013.

Religious Freedom11
The UAE constitution provides for freedom of religion but also declares Islam as the official
religion. The death penalty for conversion from Islam remains in law, but is not known to be
enforced. In practice, non-Muslims in UAE are free to practice their religion.
UAE officials boast of the country’s religious tolerance by citing the 40 churches in the UAE, of
a variety of denominations. In 2016 the government donated additional lands for the building of
more churches, as well as some new Hindu and Sikh temples. In January 2017, the Ministry
hosted an event for 30 Christian leaders from nine denominations located throughout the Gulf; the
event took place at the site of an early Christian monastery on Sir Bani Yas Island in Abu Dhabi.
In November 2017, the Abu Dhabi Department of Justice signed an agreement with Christian
leadership to allow churches to handle non-Islamic marriages and divorces. There are no Jewish
synagogues or Buddhist temples.
In September 2016, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid met with Pope Francis in the Vatican and
invited him to visit. The visit took place during February 3-5, 2019, and enabled the UAE—at a
time of widespread criticism of its intervention in Yemen—to showcase its commitment to
religious tolerance, and the Pope to advocate for the creation of more churches in the UAE to
better accommodate the approximately 1 million Christians in the country, almost all of whom are
expatriates.12 The papal visit was the first such trip to the Gulf region.
The Shia Muslim minority, which is about 15% of the citizen population and is concentrated
largely in Dubai emirate, is free to worship and maintain its own mosques. However, Shia
mosques receive no government funds and there are no Shias in top federal posts. At times, the
government has acted against non-UAE Shia Muslims because of their perceived support for Iran
and Iran’s regional allies. The government has at times closed Shia schools and prohibited the
holding of conferences for international Shias. The government has deported some foreign Shias
in recent years.
In December 2018, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom spoke at the Forum for
Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies’ fifth annual conference in Abu Dhabi about advancing
religious freedom across the world.
Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons

UAE law prohibits all forms of compulsory labor, but enforcement is inconsistent. On several
occasions, foreign laborers working on large construction projects have conducted strikes to
protest poor working conditions and nonpayment of wages. There have been numerous and
persistent allegations that foreign workers are housed in cramped “labor camp” conditions, have
their passports held, are denied wages or paid late, are forced to work long hours, are deported for
lodging complaints, and are subjected to many other abuses. The government has put in place a
“Wages Protection System,” an electronic salary payments system that requires companies with
more than 100 workers to pay workers via approved banks and other financial institutions,
thereby facilitating timely payment of agreed wages.
The Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MOHRE, formerly the Labor Ministry) has
addressed problems such as those above by penalizing employers and requiring that workers’
11 The State Department’s International Religious Freedom report for 2018, from which this section is primarily
derived, is available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/united-arab-
emirates/
12 “Pope Makes Historic Gulf Visit, Amid Yemen Crisis and Siege of Christians.” New York Times, February 4, 2019.

salaries be deposited directly in banks. In 2011 the UAE reformed its “kafala” system to allow
migrant workers to more easily switch employers.
Trafficking in Persons13
The UAE is considered a “destination country” for women trafficked from Asia and the former
Soviet Union. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2019, for the ninth year in
a row, rated the UAE as “Tier 2.” The rating is based on the assessment that the UAE does not
meet the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking, but is taking significant efforts to
do so. The 2019 State Department report credits the UAE with implementing reforms that reduce
forced labor among foreign workers in the private sector, instituting direct governmental
oversight of domestic laborers, increasing the number of labor trafficking prosecutions, and
funding and implementing a national action plan to combat trafficking in persons. In 2015, the
government put into effect amendments to victim protection clauses of Federal Law 51 of 2006
on Combating Human Trafficking Crimes.
Since 2013, the UAE government, through its “National Committee to Combat Human
Trafficking,” has assisted human trafficking victims, including through shelters in several UAE
emirates. The government opened its first shelter for male sexual trafficking victims in 2013. The
government assists victims of human trafficking through a human rights office at Dubai
International Airport. An issue in previous years was trafficking of young boys as camel jockeys,
a concern alleviated with repatriation of many of those trafficked and the use of robot jockeys.
Foreign Policy and Defense Issues

Despite its small population and territorial size, the UAE has increasingly attempted to influence
regional outcomes, 14 putting to use the training, arms, and advice the country has received from
its close security partnership with the United States. The UAE and the five other members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) also have
close defense ties to the United States. The GCC was formed in late 1981 in response to the Iran-
Iraq war, during which the GCC states gave extensive financial and political backing to Iraq.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been closely aligned, particularly in their assertion that Islamist
movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Iran pose significant threats to the
region. The two countries led a move, on June 5, 2017, to isolate Qatar by denying it land, sea,
and air access to their territories. The UAE and Saudi Arabia asserted that Qatar supports Iran and
Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, although many experts assert that Saudi Arabia and the
UAE sought primarily to limit Qatar’s foreign policy independence. The rift has, to date, defied
mediation efforts by U.S. officials and caused repeated postponements of a U.S.-GCC summit—
first planned for May 2018—that is to formally unveil a U.S.-led “Middle East Strategic
Alliance” (MESA) to counter Iran.15 That plan suffered a setback in April 2019 when Egypt said
it would not join the MESA.
13 Much of this section is taken from the State Department Trafficking in Persons Report for 2019. It can be found at:
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/united-arab-emirates/
14 Many of these themes are discussed in, Kareem Fahim and Missy Ryan. “In the UAE, U.S. Finds an Ally and a
Headache.” Washington Post, August 4, 2017.

15 Al Jazeera, July 28, 2018. See also CRS In Focus IF11173, Cooperative Security in the Middle East: History and
Prospects, by Clayton Thomas.

In December 2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced the formation of a “joint cooperation
committee” as a subgroup of the GCC.16 The rift has derailed a long-standing GCC plans to
establish a joint military command and joint naval force to be based in Bahrain, supported by an
Abu Dhabi-based “Gulf Academy for Strategic and Security Studies.” Yet, the UAE and Saudi
Arabia have allowed Qatari commanders to participate in joint GCC security meetings,
suggesting that the UAE and Saudi Arabia do not want the Trump Administration to assess them
as harming U.S. security interests in the Gulf. The broader issues dividing Qatar and some of its
neighbors had caused rifts in the past, although not as extended as the current crisis. In March
2014, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Qatar, but that dispute
was resolved in November 2014 following an agreement that the GCC countries will not
undermine each other’s interests.
As of mid-2019, differences have emerged between the two kingdoms that has called into
question their strategic alliance. As discussed further below, the UAE has reduced its military role
in Yemen, promoted groups in southern Yemen at odds with Saudi-backed factions there.
The UAE has had border disputes and other disagreements with the Kingdom. A 1974 “Treaty of
Jeddah” with Saudi Arabia formalized Saudi access to the Persian Gulf via a corridor running
through UAE, in return for UAE gaining formal control of villages in the Buraymi oasis area. In
March 2011, the UAE contributed 500 police officers to a Saudi-led GCC military intervention in
Bahrain to support the Al Khalifa regime against a Shia-led uprising. At least some of the UAE
force remained after that time, and one UAE police officer was killed in a bombing in Manama in
March 2014.
Iran
UAE leaders assert that Iran is a threat to the UAE and they have supported Trump
Administration policy to apply maximum pressure on Iran economically and politically. When the
July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) was finalized,
the UAE asserted the pact could reduce the U.S. interest in countering Iran’s regional activities.
They strongly support the Trump Administration’s characterization of Iran as a major U.S.
adversary,17 and applauded the May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, and re-imposition of
all U.S. sanctions on Iran. UAE leaders explained their intervention in Yemen in 2015, discussed
further below, primarily as an effort to counter Iran’s regional ambitions.
In January 2016, the UAE withdrew its ambassador from Iran in solidarity with Saudi Arabia’s
breaking relations with Iran over issues related to the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia cleric.
Because of Hezbollah’s affiliation with Iran, in February 2016, the UAE barred its nationals from
travelling to Lebanon, downgraded its diplomatic relations with Lebanon, and joined the other
GCC states in a declaration that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. UAE policy in east Africa,
Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere is driven largely by the UAE objective of weakening Iran.
Yet, in mid-2019, as U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf grew, the UAE leadership appeared to shift
toward more engagement with Iran, apparently to avoid being drawn into a war with Iran that
could see the UAE incur significant damage. In early August, UAE security officials visited Iran
for the first bilateral security talks since 2013. That visit came after the UAE government
declined to directly blame Tehran for attacks on six commercial tankers in the Gulf in May and
16 UAE, Saudi Arabia Announce new Partnership in ‘Rebuff’ to Kuwait’s GCC Efforts. The New Arab, December 5,
2017.
17 Faisal Abbas. “After 8 years of Obama, Trump is breath of fresh air in Gulf States.” CNN.com, November 22, 2016.

June 2019. A variety of experts note that billions of dollars in UAE investment in infrastructure
could be at risk in the event of war with Iran, a risk highlighted by a July comment by Lebanese
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that: “What will be left of the UAE’s glass towers if a war
breaks out?”18
In formulating policy toward Iran, some UAE officials have expressed concerns that the large
Iranian-origin community in Dubai emirate (estimated at 400,000 persons) could pose an internal
threat to UAE stability. Dubai leaders express less concern about Iranian-origin residents,
asserting that this population is a product of long-standing UAE-Iran commercial ties. The
extensive Iranian commercial presence in the UAE also gives the United States ample
opportunity to enlist the UAE in sanctioning Iran. In 2010, when international sanctions on Iran
tightened dramatically, the UAE government directed its banks to limit transactions with Iran,
even though a decline in UAE-Iran trade harmed the powerful UAE trading community.
Gulf Islands Dispute

An additional complication in UAE-Iran relations is a dispute over several Persian Gulf islands.
In 1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.-backed Shah, seized the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands
from the emirate of Ras al-Khaymah, and intimidated the emirate of Sharjah to reach an
agreement for shared control of another island, Abu Musa. In April 1992, Iran asserted complete
control of Abu Musa. The UAE has called for peaceful resolution of the issue through direct
negotiations, referral to the International Court of Justice, or through another agreed forum. The
United States takes no position on the sovereignty of the islands, and supports the UAE’s call to
negotiate the dispute. In October 2008—after the UAE protested Iran’s opening in August 2008
of administrative and maritime security offices on Abu Musa—the UAE and Iran established a
joint commission to resolve the dispute. The dispute flared again in 2012, when then-President
Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa and spoke to the inhabitants there, an action that UAE officials
said undermined diplomacy. Iran incurred further UAE criticism with a May 2012 visit to Abu
Musa by then-Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander-in-Chief Mohammad Ali
Jafari. In 2014, the two countries discussed a possible solution under which Iran might cede
control of the disputed islands in exchange for rights to the seabed around them.19 Iran reduced its
presence on Abu Musa as a confidence-building measure. No discussions have been reported in
recent years.20
Policy Toward and Intervention in Regional Conflicts

Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the UAE has become more active in the region, including through
the use of its own military forces and its development of regional military facilities from which to
project power. The UAE’s capabilities have been enhanced by the many years of defense
cooperation with the United States. The UAE’s opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood generally
drives its policies toward countries where Brotherhood-linked groups are prominent.
Egypt
In line with opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, the UAE supported the Egyptian military’s
2013 toppling of Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohammad Morsi, who was elected president in
18 “The UAE’s Ambitions Backfire as it Finds Itself on the Front Line of US-Iran Tensions.” Washington Post, August
11, 2019.
19 Awad Mustafa. “Iran, UAE Close to Deal on Hormuz Islands,” Defense News, December 9, 2013.
20 Author conversations with UAE representatives, May 2016.

2012. The UAE has given Egypt over $20 billion in assistance (including loans, grants, and
investments) since the ouster of Morsi. UAE officials denied that they had blocked a potential
competitor to President Sisi in March 2018 elections from leaving UAE to return to Egypt.
Libya
Intra-GCC differences—as well as differences between the UAE and U.S. policy—have
manifested in post-Qadhafi Libya. In 2011, several GCC states, including the UAE, conducted air
strikes and armed some Libyan rebels to help overthrow then-Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi.21
In post-Qadhafi Libya, the UAE and Qatar support rival groups in the highly fractured country.
The UAE, possibly in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions on Libya, reportedly
provides arms in support of Field Marshal Khalifa Hafter and his Libyan National Army (LNA)
movement and reportedly continues to support operations at an airbase in eastern Libya from
which pro-LNA forces fly air strikes.22 Hafter, a former commander in the Libyan armed forces,
has refused to recognize the authority of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA)
and leads a coalition of military personnel and militias that has fought Islamist groups and some
GNA-aligned forces. In July 2018, press reports claimed that UAE-based entities had signed
agreements with Hafter-aligned oil authorities in eastern Libya to export Libyan oil in violation of
U.N. Security Council resolutions.23 Other outside actors, including Russia, have given Hafter
some backing as well, and supported his 2019 assault on Tripoli as an attempt to unify Libya and
counter Islamist militia groups that back the GNA.
In August 2014, the UAE and Egypt carried out an air strike in Libya against a Muslim
Brotherhood-linked Islamist militia that reportedly enjoyed support from Qatar.24 The United
States criticized the strike as detracting from Libyan stability.
Islamic State/Syria Conflict25

As a member of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, during 2014-2015,
UAE pilots conducted more strikes in Syria against Islamic State positions than any country
except the United States, and the UAE was the only Arab state that commanded strikes. The UAE
also hosted other forces participating in the anti-Islamic State effort, including French jets
stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base and 600 forces from Australia.26
The GCC states all sought the goal of ousting President Bashar Al Asad, in part to strategically
weaken his ally, Iran. But the GCC efforts to try to achieve that goal diverged. The UAE
contributed to a multilateral pool of funds to buy arms for approved rebel groups in Syria.27After
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, the UAE accepted Assad’s eventual victory.28 In
recognition of Russia’s predominant position in Syria, and its growing involvement in the region
21 James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael Schmidt. “Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels.” New York
Times, December 6, 2012.
22 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/466.
23 Wall Street Journal. July 13, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-a-e-backed-militia-leaders-bid-to-take-control-of-
libyan-oil-exports-1531474200.
24 “U.S. Officials: Egypt, UAE behind Airstrikes in Libya.” Associated Press, August 26, 2014.
25 For more information on the Syria conflict, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.

26 “Islamic State Crisis: Australia to Send 600 Troops to UAE.” BBC News, September 14, 2014.
27 Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, 2013-2014.
28 Author conversations with UAE officials. October 2017.

more generally, de facto UAE leader Mohammad bin Zayid has engaged Russian leaders with
increasing frequency. On December 27, 2018, in the wake of President Trump’s announcement
that a substantial portion of the 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria would be withdrawn, the UAE
reopened its embassy in Damascus. UAE officials explained the move as an effort to reassert
Arab influence in counter to Iran’s presence in Syria.29
The UAE has also sought to alleviate suffering from the Syria crisis through donations to Syrian
refugees and grants to Jordan to help it cope with the Syrian refugees that have fled there. In
2018, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, in roughly equal proportions, provided a total of $2.5
billion to help stabilize Jordan’s finances.30 UAE forces also have participated in annual military
exercises in Jordan intended to help protect Jordan from Syria conflict spillover.
Iraq
The GCC states all supported Iraq against Iran in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and all broke
relations with Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1990s. No Arab state, including the UAE,
participated in the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. In 2008, the UAE
posted an ambassador to Iraq, wrote off $7 billion in Iraqi debt, and Shaykh Mohammad bin
Zayid visited the country. It opened a consulate in the Kurdish region of Iraq in 2012. However,
the relationship deteriorated as the Shia-dominated government of former Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki (2006-2014) marginalized Sunnis. UAE officials welcomed the change of leadership in
Iraq to Prime Minster Haydar Al Abadi in August 2014 and hosted him in December 2014. The
GCC states did not conduct anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq.
Since mid-2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have improved ties to Iraq’s Shia leaders to dilute
Iranian influence there.31The UAE and Germany jointly run a fund to pay for coalition efforts to
reconstruct and stabilize areas of Iraq liberated from the Islamic State.32 The UAE donated $50
million to the fund in late 2016, and UAE companies have separately invested in housing and
other projects in Iraq. The UAE-Germany cooperation reprises their joint cooperation in Iraq
during 2003-2011, in which the UAE provided facilities for Germany to train Iraqi police and the
UAE provided over $200 million for Iraq reconstruction, including for hospitals and medical
treatment in the UAE for Iraqi children.
Yemen33
In Yemen, another state roiled by the 2011 Arab uprisings, the UAE intervened militarily since
early 2015 with military personnel, armor, and airstrikes, in close partnership with Saudi Arabia,
against the Zaydi Shia “Houthi” faction. The Saudi-led coalition asserted that the intervention
was required to roll back the regional influence of Iran, which has supplied the Houthis with
arms, including short-range ballistic and cruise missiles the Houthis have fired on the UAE and
29 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-emirates/uae-reopens-syria-embassy-a-boost-for-assad-
idUSKCN1OQ0QV.
30 https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/en/uae-extends-aed-3-billion-economic-aid-package-to-jordan/.
31 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-uae/iraqi-shia-leader-visits-uae-strengthening-ties-with-sunni-
states-idUSKCN1AT0K6.
32 http://www.arabianbusiness.com/uae-germany-set-up-joint-fund-stabilise-iraq-after-isil-595060.html.
33 For more information on the conflict in Yemen and on congressional action toward U.S. support for the Arab
coalition, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp; and CRS Report
R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher
M. Blanchard.

Saudi Arabia and their ships in the vital Bab el Mandeb Strait. In October 2016, the Houthis used
anti-ship cruise missiles to damage a UAE Navy logistics ship in the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Since
the UAE intervened, nearly 150 UAE soldiers have died.34
The Saudi and UAE-led intervention in Yemen has precipitated widespread international criticism
of the two countries over the humanitarian effects of the war and other alleged abuses. In June
2017, UAE officials denied allegations by human rights organizations that UAE forces were
maintaining a secret network of prisons in Yemen in which detainees were being severely abused.
In early 2019, press investigations indicated that the UAE was arming some anti-Houthi militia
commanders that were, and may still be, linked to Al Qaeda and/or the Islamic State.35 Some of
these reports also indicate that some U.S. armor supplied to the UAE might have fallen into the
hands of the Houthis.
In an attempt to address critics, the UAE has highlighted the country’s humanitarian aid to the
people of Yemen in the context of the conflict. The UAE has provided $4 billion to Yemen, of
which about $1.25 billion was provided in 2018, according to official UAE media. However,
some of the total aid figure represents infrastructure investments, not grant aid.
Criticism of the Arab coalition war effort has produced increasing congressional opposition to the
U.S. logistical support provided to the effort, which included intelligence and aerial refueling
under a cross-servicing agreement, as well as related arms sales and some direct U.S. military
action to prevent Iranian weapons flows to the Houthis. In November 2018, the United States
ended the refueling for coalition aircraft. But, fallout from the Saudi killing of journalist Jamal
Kashoggi in October 2018 propelled additional congressional efforts to cease U.S. support for the
coalition Yemen effort. For information on Congressional initiatives on the Yemen issues, see
CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019, by
Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.
The international criticism, coupled with the apparent UAE shift toward engagement with Iran,
contributed to a UAE decision in July 2019 to withdraw most of its ground forces from Yemen.
The UAE decision has raised questions over whether a broader shift away from a close strategic
alliance with Saudi Arabia and its Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. A possible rift appeared
to widen in August when separatists in Aden, backed by the UAE, conducted an insurrection that
caused the remnants of the Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al Hadi government to flee to Saudi Arabia.
36
The differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia might also have been aggravated by the
Saudi willingness to work with Muslim Brotherhood elements in Yemen.
The UAE continues to work closely with U.S. forces and with local Yemeni communities to
counter the local faction of Al Qaeda—Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).37 U.S.
Special Operations Forces in Yemen reportedly worked with the UAE to defeat AQAP fighters at
the port of Mukalla in April 2016, in the process killing the leader of the Yemeni branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood. In January 2017, the Trump Administration authorized a raid in concert
with some UAE special forces on allies of AQAP, an operation in which one U.S. soldier was
34 Al Jazeera, August 13, 2017; https://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/08/yemen-war-takes-toll-uae-soldiers-

170813153447270.html; CRS conversations with UAE representatives. May 2018.
35 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/saudi-arabia-uae-gave-weapons-al-qaeda-linked-groups-cnn-
190205055102300.html.
36 Simon Henderson. “MbS and MbZ: Could Yemen Crisis End the Saudi-UAE Partnership?” The Hill, August 13,
2019.
37 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Missy Ryan. “U.S. Forces to Stay Longer in Yemen to Fight al Qaeda.” Washington Post,
June 18, 2016.

killed. In August 2017, UAE and U.S. forces reportedly advised about 2,000 Yemen government
forces conducting an operation against AQAP sanctuaries in Shabwa Province.38 In March 2019,
a UAE led operation, assisted by the United States, rescued an American hostage in Yemen,
Danny Lavone Burch, who had been held by a gang with some ties to Al Qaeda.39 Congressional
criticism of UAE operations in Yemen has not extended to the anti-AQAP mission.
Related UAE Power Projection Capabilities/East Africa

A pillar of the UAE’s effort to intervene in Yemen has been to establish military bases and
support friendly leaders and factions in several East African countries.40 During 2015, UAE
forces deployed to Djibouti to support the intervention in Yemen, but in mid-2015 a UAE-
Djibouti dispute over funding arrangements caused UAE (and Saudi) forces to begin using
facilities in Eritrea to stage and to train pro-government Yemeni forces—a relationship that might
violate a U.N. embargo on Eritrea. Perhaps to solidify its relations with Eritrea, the UAE helped
broker a rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which culminated in a trilateral (Ethiopia-
Eritrea-UAE) summit in Abu Dhabi on July 24, 2018, which came one month after the UAE
pledged to give Ethiopia $3 billion in investments.41 Yet, during a visit to the United States in late
July 2018, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, said he had rejected a UAE offer to build
an Islamic center in Ethiopia and downplayed the UAE role in brokering the rapprochement. The
UAE reportedly will be investing in energy infrastructure linking the two countries.42
Somalia and Somaliland. Also in 2015, the UAE expanded its partnership with the fragile
government in Somalia to open a new center at which a few hundred UAE special forces trained
Somali commandos to counter the Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabab. The UAE also established a base
at the port of Berbera, in the breakaway region of Somaliland, and agreed to train Somaliland
security forces, severing the UAE’s security alliance with Somalia by 2018.4344
Sudan. The UAE and Saudi Arabia spearheaded a largely successful effort to persuade Sudan’s
leaders to forgo a two decade alliance with Iran that began in 1993. Sudanese troops joined the
Arab coalition effort in Yemen and Sudan’s then-leader, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, visited the UAE
in February 2017.45In April 2019, Bashir was ousted by military colleagues in response to a
popular uprising. In late April 2019, the UAE and Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion in aid to
Sudan, although the two were criticized for supplying funds to Sudan even though the military
initially refused to transfer authority to civilian rule for two years.
Afghanistan
The UAE has assisted the U.S.-led mission to stabilize Afghanistan by allowing the use of its
military facilities for U.S. operations there and by deploying a 250-person contingent since 2003,
38 “Yemeni Forces Target Qaeda Stronghold.” New York Times, August 7, 2017.
39 Operation Led by U.A.E. Freed American Hostage n Yemen. New York Times, March 7, 2019.
40 Material in this section is taken from: Alex Mello and Michael Knights. “West of Suez for the United Arab
Emirates.” Warontherocks.com. September 2, 2016.

41 Reuters, June 15, 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/ethiopiaNews/idAFL8N1TH4GJ.
42 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritra-pipeline/uae-plans-oil-pipeline-from-ethiopia-to-eritrea-in-latest-
horn-of-africa-move-idUSKBN1KV0VS.
43 http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/02/15/510655/Somalia-UAE-military-base-Somaliland-Nur-Jimale-Farah-Berbera-
Yemeni-conflict.
44 UAE to Train Somaliland Forces under Military Base Deal. Reuters, March 16, 2018.
45 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-praises-sudans-role-in-arab-coalition.

in the restive south. During 2012-2014, the UAE deployed six F-16s for close air support
missions there.46 The UAE also has donated several hundred million dollars of aid to Afghanistan
since the fall of the Taliban regime. The risks of the involvement were evident in January 2017
when five UAE diplomats were killed by a bomb during their visit to the governor’s compound in
Qandahar. The UAE Ambassador survived. In December 2018, the UAE hosted meetings
between Taliban representatives, U.S. officials, and officials from several regional stakeholder
countries to discuss a possible political settlement in Afghanistan.
Before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the UAE apparently did not perceive
the Taliban movement as a major threat. The UAE was one of only three countries (Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia were the others) that recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of
Afghanistan, even though the Taliban regime was harboring Al Qaeda leaders.
Israeli-Palestinian Dispute
The UAE has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, but UAE troops did not participate
militarily in any major Arab-Israeli war (two of which - 1948 and 1967 - occurred before the
UAE was formed). In recent years, Israel and the UAE have informally aligned against Iran and
there are consistent reports of quiet diplomatic cooperation and security cooperation.47 The UAE
reportedly has been participating in talks with the United States and Israel to counter Iran,
reportedly an outgrowth of the February 2019 U.S.-led “Warsaw Ministerial” that discussed
regional issues, particularly how to counter Iran.48 Israeli diplomats have attended multilateral
meetings in the UAE, such as the January 2014 conference of the 144-country International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), attended by Israel’s Minister of National Infrastructure,
Energy, and Water. In November 2015, the UAE gave Israel permission to establish a diplomatic
office in Abu Dhabi to facilitate Israel’s participation in IRENA.49 The interactions indicate that
the UAE has set aside its recriminations over an Israeli assassination of Hamas figure Mahmoud
al-Mabhouh at a hotel in Dubai in 2010.
There apparently are unspecified levels of Israel-UAE bilateral trade, even though the UAE
formally claims it is enforcing the Arab League primary boycott of Israel. The UAE did not host
multilateral Arab-Israeli working groups on regional issues during 1994-1998, but, in 1994, the
UAE and the other GCC states ended enforcement of the Arab League’s secondary and tertiary
boycotts (boycotts of companies doing business with Israel and on companies that deal with
companies that do business with Israel). In August 2018, the head of state-owned Dubai Ports
World, which has ties with Israeli shipping company Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. and
other Israeli firms,50 visited Israel.
The UAE has deferred to Saudi Arabia in formulating Arab or GCC proposals to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In 2007, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan in a
“quartet” of Arab states to assist U.S. diplomacy on Israeli-Palestinian issues, and it attended the
Annapolis summit on the issue that year. The UAE, as do other Arab states, support of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) bid for statehood recognition and oppose the Trump Administration’s
2018 recognition that Israel’s capital is in Jerusalem and 2019 recognition of Israeli sovereignty
46 “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S.” op. cit.

47 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/secret-jet-flying-between-israel-and-uae-567607953.
48 “United Arab Emirates, Israel, and U.S. Hold Secret Talks on Confronting Iran.” New York Times, August 16 2019.
49 Simon Henderson. “Israel’s Gulf Breakthrough.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 30, 2015.
50 Times of Israel, September 14, 2018.

on the Golan Heights. Yet, the UAE government attended the June 2018 workshop in Bahrain on
the economic component of a Trump Administration Israel-Palestinian peace plan that is far less
favorable toward the Palestinians than were previous peace proposals.
In line with UAE animosity toward Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, the UAE does not
support Hamas51 but rather its rival, the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
which runs the West Palestinian Authority (PA) based on the West Bank. In June 2015, the UAE
donated $12 million to help the Gaza victims of war with Israel, channeling the funds through
Fatah, not Hamas.52 The UAE also hosts and financially backs senior PLO official Mohammad
Dahlan, hoping to propel him to succeed PA President Mahmoud Abbas.
According to the UAE government, the UAE has provided over $500 million to humanitarian
projects for Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian territories and in Syria, sending the funds
through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). In April 2018, the UAE contributed $50
million to UNRWA to help it compensate for a shortfall in its operating funds caused by the
Trump Administration cessation of funding to the agency.53 The UAE in the past funded a
housing project in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip, called “Shaykh Khalifa City.”
UAE Foreign Aid54

The UAE asserts that it has provided billions of dollars in international aid through its
government and through funds controlled by royal family members and other elites. Among
initiatives outside the Near East and South Asia region are the following:
 The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), established in 1971, has
distributed over $4 billion for more than 200 projects spanning 53 countries.
 The UAE provided $100 million for victims of the December 2004 tsunami in
the Indian Ocean.
 During 2011-2012, UAE foundations responded to U.N. appeals for aid to the
victims of a drought in East Africa and provided about $2 million for victims of
conflict in Somalia. In October 2013, the UAE reopened a UAE embassy in
Mogadishu, in part to facilitate the delivery of relief to Somalis.
 The UAE has donated for disaster relief and for health care facilities in the
United States, including: $100 million to assist New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina; $150 million to Children’s National Medical Center in Washington, DC;
$5 million to the reconstruction of the new pediatric health care wing at St.
John’s Mercy Hospital in Joplin, MO, in the wake of the May 2011 tornado
there; and $10 million to assist with the reconstruction and recovery efforts of
communities affected by Hurricane Sandy in 2013. In 2012, Johns Hopkins
officials unveiled the Sheikh Zayid Cardiovascular and Critical Care Tower,
funded by a UAE donation.
51 Hamas formed in the late 1980s out of Brotherhood groups in the Palestinian territories.
52 “UAE Money to Gaza Gives Boost to Former Fatah Leader.” Associated Press, June 17, 2015.
53 https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/united-arab-emirates-makes-extraordinary-contribution-us-50-
million-unrwa.
54 Factsheets provided by UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, and author conversations with UAE representatives.
2011-2016.

 In December 2018, the UAE announced it would increase its contribution to the
U.N. Central Emergency Relief Fund to $5 million in 2019, from $1.75 million
provided in 2018.
Defense Cooperation with the United States

The UAE’s ability to project power in the region is a product of many years of U.S.-UAE defense
cooperation that includes U.S. arms sales and training, strategic planning, and joint exercises and
operations. The UAE’s armed forces are small—approximately 50,000 personnel—but they have
participated in several U.S.-led military operations, including Somalia (1992), the Balkans (late
1990s), Afghanistan (since 2003), Libya (2011), and Syria (2014-2015). Some experts say the
UAE has joined U.S.-led operations to further invest the United States in UAE security and
increase UAE influence over U.S. policy. The UAE reportedly has also augmented its manpower
by recruiting foreign nationals and hiring U.S. and other security experts to build militias and
mercenary forces that supplement UAE national forces.55
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE

The United States and UAE have established a “Defense Cooperation Framework” to develop
joint strategic approaches to regional disputes and conflicts and to better integrate U.S.
capabilities with those of the UAE. The Framework includes UAE development of a defense plan
that will facilitate joint U.S.-UAE planning in case of attack on the UAE.56 In accordance with the
Framework, the two countries have established a “Joint Military Dialogue” (JMD) to identify
shared security objectives and consult on a wide range of strategic issues. The fourth U.S.-UAE
JMD was help on April 11, 2019.
The Framework builds on the July 25, 1994, bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA),
the text of which is classified.57 The DCA was accompanied by a separate “Status of Forces
Agreement” (SOFA) giving U.S. military personnel in UAE certain legal immunities, but several
incidents reportedly caused the UAE to void the SOFA and to agree with the United States to
handle legal incidents on a “case-by-case basis.”58 On May 15, 2017, Secretary of Defense James
Mattis and Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid confirmed that the United States and the UAE had
concluded negotiations on a new DCA with a 15-year duration.59 The two countries announced
the revised DCA was in force as of the visit to Abu Dhabi of National Security Adviser John
Bolton on May 30, 2019.60
In accordance with the DCA:
 The United States stations about 5,000 U.S. military personnel at several UAE
facilities including Jebel Ali port (between Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Al Dhafra Air
Base (near Abu Dhabi), and naval facilities at Fujairah.61 Jebel Ali, capable of
handling aircraft carriers, is the U.S. Navy’s busiest port of call. The U.S. forces
in UAE support U.S. operations in Afghanistan, combat the Islamic State, deter
55 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss.
56 Author conversations with UAE officials, July 2014.
57 Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S.
Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.

58 Author conversations with UAE representatives, 2010-2016.
59 Department of Defense. “SecDef Meets with UAE’s Crown Prince.” May 15, 2017.
60 UAE-US defence agreement kicks in as John Bolton visits Abu Dhabi. The National, May 30, 2019.
61 Forbes. “Where U.S. Troops Are In The Middle East [Infographic].” June 7, 2017.

Iran, and intercept terrorists and illicit shipments of weaponry or proliferation-

related equipment. The number of U.S. forces currently in UAE is much higher
than the 800 U.S. personnel there prior to the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq. The
number of U.S. forces might have increased since May 2019 in conjunction with
the U.S. deployment of additional combat aircraft and missile defense equipment
to the region related to heightened U.S.-Iran tensions.
 The United States stations combat and other aircraft. Most of the U.S. military
contingent in the UAE are Air Force personnel deployed at Al Dhafra air base.
The facility at first only hosted U.S. surveillance aircraft such as the U-2 and the
KC-10 refueling aircraft, but the UAE later permitted the stationing of F-15s; the
“Stealth” F-22 Raptor;62 and the Global Hawk and the AWACS (Airborne
Warning and Control System).63 Dhafra is the only overseas base for F-22s. In
April 2019, the United States deployed the F-35 combat aircraft to Al Dhafra –
the first such U.S. deployment of that aircraft in the Middle East region.64
 The United States trains UAE forces. About 600-800 UAE military personnel
study and train in the United States each year, mostly through the Foreign
Military Sales program, through which the UAE buys most of its U.S.-made
arms. The quality of the UAE force has, by all accounts, benefitted substantially
from the U.S. training. U.S. military officers say that UAE fighter pilots,
operators of HAWK surface-to-air missile batteries, and special operations forces
are highly proficient and have demonstrated their effectiveness in recent combat
missions, particularly against AQAP in Yemen.
 Since 2000, the UAE has hosted a “Joint Air Warfare Center” (AWC) where
UAE and U.S. forces conduct joint exercises on early warning, air and missile
defense, and logistics.65 Since 2009, UAE Air Force personnel have participated
in yearly Desert Falcon exercises at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.66
 Within a broader GCC context, joint statements issued after a 2015 and a 2016
U.S.-GCC summit at Camp David announced a new U.S.-GCC strategic
partnership in which the United States pledged to increase U.S.-GCC cooperation
on maritime security, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism; organize additional
large-scale joint military exercises and U.S. training for GCC special forces; and
try to realize a long-discussed concept of a Gulf-wide ballistic missile defense
capability.67
U.S. and Other Arms Sales

U.S. officials assert that arms sales to the UAE enhance U.S. security by building up indigenous
GCC capabilities and promoting interoperability. UAE representatives assert that the country
would like to work out a mechanism with the United States under which requests for munitions
62 Washington Post, April 28, 2012.

63 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/dhafra.htm.
64 https://www.thenational.ae/uae/us-air-force-sends-next-generation-fighter-jets-to-uae-1.849993.
65 Rajiv Chandresekaran. “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S.” Washington Post, November 9, 2014.
66 “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S.” op. cit.
67 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Annex to U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint
Statement, May 14, 2015. See also: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/21/fact-sheet-

implementation-us-gulf-cooperation-council-strategic.

and arms purchases could receive expedited U.S. consideration. Some options might include
designating the UAE as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” (MNNA), or a mechanism UAE officials say
they prefer: legislation that would declare the UAE a key U.S. defense partner.68 Two Gulf
states—Kuwait and Bahrain—are designated as MNNAs. Yet, the United States’ preference to
work with the GCC as a bloc rather than country-by-country was enshrined in a December 16,
2013, Presidential Determination to allow defense sales to the GCC as a bloc.69 Some defense
sales to the UAE might be contingent on the UAE’s joining the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), which UAE officials say they are considering trying to do.70 The UAE does not
receive U.S. aid to purchase U.S. weaponry. On the other hand, congressional opposition to
further U.S. support for UAE operations in Yemen could mean that U.S. arms sales to the UAE
will halt or slow.
Among major FMS programs with or potential sales to the UAE
 F-16 Program. In 2000, the UAE purchased 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with
the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the High
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), at a value of about $8 billion. Congress
did not block the sale, although some Members questioned the AMRAAM as an
introduction of the weapon into the Gulf. In April 2013, the United States sold
the UAE an additional 30 F-16s and associated “standoff” air-to-ground
munitions, in conjunction with similar weapons sales to Israel and Saudi Arabia,
which U.S. officials indicated were intended to signal resolve to Iran.71 The UAE
also has about 60 French-made Mirage 2000 warplanes, and is reportedly
considering buying French-made Rafales and the Boeing F/A-18.
 F-35. UAE officials and industry sources say the country wants to buy two dozen
of the advanced F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter,”72 asserting that possessing the most
sophisticated U.S. aircraft enhances interoperability with U.S. air operations.
Even though Israel and the UAE are aligned on many regional policies, U.S.
officials have said that the United States would not sell the aircraft to the UAE
before Israel receives the weapon; delivery to Israel is expected to begin in late
2016. That apparently is an effort to enforce U.S. law that requires maintaining
Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME) in the region. However, it was
reported in November 2017 that the Trump Administration agreed to preliminary
talks on future UAE procurement of the F-35.73
JDAMs and other Precision-Guided Munitions. The United States has sold the UAE precision-
guided missiles for the F-16s, including the ATM-84 SLAM-ER Telemetry missile and 5,000
GBU-39/B “bunker buster” bombs. (The sale of the SLAM-ER to UAE was the first sale of that
weapon to a Gulf state.) During 2008-11, the United States sold the UAE an unspecified number
of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits (which convert gravity bombs to precision-guided
bombs) worth an estimated $625 million. In 2015, the United States sold the UAE precision-
guided munitions (Guided Bomb Units—GBU-31s and GBU-12s) and additional JDAMs that the
UAE used in Yemen. On May 24, 2019, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of
immediate foreign military sales and proposed export licenses for direct commercial sales of
68 Author conversations with UAE representatives, 2016.

69 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/16/presidential-determination-gulf-cooperation-council.
70 Ibid.
71 Thom Shanker. “Arms Deal with Israel and 2 Arab Nations Is Near.” New York Times, April 19, 2013.
72 https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/07/11/uae-to-trump-sell-us-some-f-35-fighter-jets/.
73 Barbara Opall. “Trump Could Let the UAE Buy F-35 Jets.” Defense News, November 6, 2017.

defense articles—training, equipment, and weapons—including sales of additional precision

guided munitions (PGMs) with an estimated value of $1 billion (Precision Kill Weapons Systems,
Transmittal Number 17-73 and Javelin Guided Missiles, Transmittal Number 17-70). In making
the notifications, Secretary of State Pompeo invoked emergency authority codified in the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). The notification from Secretary Pompeo cited Iran’s “malign
activity” and the need “to deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle
East” as justification for the sales.74 The President vetoed measures to block the UAE sales
(S.J.Res. 37) and Congress was not successful in attempts to override the veto.
 Apache Helicopters. On November 4, 2010, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of two potential sales, including a $5 billion
sale of AH-64 Apache helicopters (30 helicopters, remanufactured to Block III
configuration).75
 Missiles. The UAE reportedly possesses a small number (six) of Scud-B ballistic
missiles obtained from a non-U.S. suppliers.76 The United States does not supply
or assist the UAE with ballistic missile technology, in part because the country is
not an adherent of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). UAE
officials say the country is considering trying to join that convention.77
 Drones. In 2013, the UAE agreed to a commercial sale, worth about $200
million, for Predator X-P unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), although they are
unarmed and for surveillance only. The system arrived in 2017. Joining the
MTCR might make the UAE eligible to buy a U.S.-made armed drone, such as
the “Guardian.” These weapons are MTCR “Category One” systems, the sale of
which to non-MTCR countries is precluded. On May 24, 2019, the State
Department approved the sale to UAE of the Blackjack Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle, with an estimated value of $80 million, under the emergency notification
discussed above (Transmittal Number 17-39).
 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). In September 2006, the United
States sold UAE High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army
Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs), valued at about $750 million.
 Tanks. UAE forces still use primarily 380 French-made Leclerc tanks.
Missile and Rocket Defenses

A long-standing U.S. objective—and a driving force behind the formation of the “U.S.-GCC
Strategic Cooperation Forum” formed in March 2012—has been to organize a coordinated Gulf-
wide ballistic missile defense (BMD) network. This objective has taken on greater urgency in the
United States and in the Gulf as Iran’s missile capability has advanced and Iran has supplied
short-range missiles to the Houthis and other allies.
The UAE hosts an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Center—a training facility to
enhance intra-GCC and U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation. A U.S. sale to the UAE of the
Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile defense system, with an estimated value of $9
billion value, was announced in December 2007. In 2008, the United States sold the UAE
74 Letter from Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James E. Risch,
May 24, 2019.
75 DSCA transmittal number 10-52. http://www.dsca.mil.
76 According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies “Military Balance” publication, 2016.
77 Author conversations with UAE officials, 2016.

vehicle-mounted “Stinger” antiaircraft systems with an estimated value of $737 million. In 2016,
the Administration notified Congress of a potential sale of “Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures” to protect UAE head of state aircraft against missile threats.
On May 11, 2017, the Administration notified a potential sale to the UAE of 60 PAC-3 and 100
Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles, with a total estimated value of
about $2 billion. Because these are defensive systems, the sale was not affected by the June 26,
2017, commitment (rescinded in early 2018) by then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Senator Bob Corker to withhold informal clearances on sales of “lethal military
equipment” to the GCC states until there is a path to the resolution of the intra-GCC dispute. On
May 3, 2019, the State Department approved a sale of up to 452 PAC-3 missiles and related
equipment, with an estimated value of $2.728 billion.78
THAAD. The UAE was the first GCC state to order the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
System (THAAD), the first sale ever of that sophisticated missile defense system, with an
estimated value of about $7 billion. The delivery and training process for the UAE’s THAAD
system took place in late 2015.79
UAE Defense Cooperation with Other Powers

Despite expressing no concerns about any interruption or diminution of its defense ties to the
United States, the UAE has sought to diversify its defense partnerships. In 2004, the UAE joined
NATO’s “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” later gaining “observer” status in NATO. In 2011, the
UAE sent an Ambassador to NATO under that organization’s revised alliance policy. In 2017,
NATO established a liaison office in Abu Dhabi under the auspices of the embassy of Denmark.
Since well before the formation of the anti-Islamic State coalition, the UAE has been hosting
other countries’ forces. In January 2008 the UAE and France signed an agreement to allow a
French military presence in UAE. The facilities used—collectively termed Camp De La Paix
(“Peace Camp”)—were inaugurated during a French presidential visit in May 2009. It includes a
900-foot section of the Zayid Port for use by the French navy; an installation at Dhafra Air Base
used by France’s air force; and a barracks at an Abu Dhabi military camp that houses about 400
French military personnel.
India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the UAE in August 2015, the first such visit by an
Indian leader since 1981. The visit included a strategic component in light of India’s naval
exercises with GCC countries in recent years. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid made a
reciprocal visit to India in January 2017, during which the two countries signed a
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement.”
The UAE relationship with Russia has attracted significant attention, particularly for the potential
to violate a provision of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA,
P.L. 115-44). That act provides for sanctions on entities that conduct significant defense-related
transactions with Russia. In February 2017, press reports indicated that the UAE and Russia
might jointly develop a combat aircraft based on the Soviet-era MiG-29. The collaboration—with
a partner that is acting against the UAE’s interests in Syria and other parts of the region—
appeared as an acknowledgment by the UAE of Russia’s growing role in the region.80 The UAE
78 DSCA Transmittal No. 19-37, May 3, 2019.

79 Adriane Eliot. “Antiballistic System Shared with International Partner.” http://www.army.mil website, January 13,
2016. https://www.army.mil/article/160912/Antiballistic_system_shared_with_international_partner/.
80 http://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2017/02/20/Russia-UAE-to-collaborate-on-5th-generation-fighter/

might also be attempting to engage Russia in defense cooperation in order to perhaps try to steer
Russian policy in Syria or enlist Russian cooperation in settling regional conflicts. In February
2019, the UAE ordered EM150 “Kornet” anti-tank weapons from the Russian Joint Stock
Company, with an estimated valued of $40 million.81
Significant differences between the UAE and United States emerged in 2015 over apparent
purchases of weapons by the UAE’s Al Mutlaq Technology Company of weapons from North
Korea. The North Korean supplier is said to be Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation
(Komid), which has been sanctioned by the United States for its involvement in North Korean
strategic programs.82
Cooperation against Terrorism and Proliferation

The UAE cooperates with U.S. counterterrorism and counterproliferation policies in the region,
not only through operations against terrorist groups but also in seeking to preventing the
movement of terrorists, pirates, human traffickers, and proliferation-related technology through
UAE borders and waters.
U.S. programs, which have sometimes included providing small amounts of counterterrorism
assistance, have helped build the UAE’s capacity to enforce its borders and financial controls. In
FY2015, about $400,000 in DOD funds were provided to the UAE to assist its counternarcotics
capability, and about $300,000 in similar funding was provided in FY2016. In FY2015, about
$260,000 in State Department funds were provided to the UAE to build its capacity to counter
terrorism financing (see below). About $310,000 in such funding was provided in FY2016.
International Terrorism Issues83

During the mid-1990s, some Al Qaeda activists reportedly were able to move through the UAE,
and two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers were UAE nationals who reportedly used UAE-
based financial networks. Since then, State Department reports on terrorism have credited the
UAE with making significant efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing, and with
continuing to foil potential terrorist attacks within the UAE. UAE authorities have arrested and
prosecuted Al Qaeda and Islamic State operatives; denounced terror attacks; improved border
security; instituted programs to counter violent extremism; instituted laws to block suspect
financial transactions; criminalized use of the internet by terrorist groups; and strengthened its
bureaucracy and legal framework to combat terrorism. Human rights groups allege that UAE
counterterrorism law is often used against domestic political dissidents. In 2014, the government,
with FNC concurrence, enacted a revised counterterrorism law that makes it easier to prosecute,
and increases penalties for, planning acts of terrorism, and authorizes the UAE cabinet to set up
lists of designated terrorist organizations and persons.84
The UAE cochairs the anti-Islamic State-related “Coalition Communications Working Group”
along with the United States and Britain. At the December 2014 GCC summit, the leaders
announced the creation of a regional police force to be headquartered in Abu Dhabi. The UAE has
4591487612266/.
81 “United Arab Emirates Announces $1.3 Billion in Defense Deals at IDEX.” Defense News, February 18, 2019.
82 David Kirkpatrick.“Leaked Emails from Emirati Diplomats Cloud Libya Peace Negotiations.” New York Times,
November 13, 2015.

83 Much of this section is taken from Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2017; and author conversations with executive branch officials, 1997-2018.
84 “UAE Stiffens Counterterror Laws.” Defense News, July 26, 2014.

also joined the Saudi-initiated GCC “Security Pact” that requires increased information-sharing
and cooperation among the GCC states on internal security threats.
Among notable UAE counterterrorism actions, in October 2010, UAE authorities assisted in
foiling an Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula plot to send bombs to the United States. In
December 2012, the UAE, working with Saudi Arabia, arrested members of an alleged terrorist
cell plotting attacks in the United States. In April 2013, UAE authorities arrested seven non-UAE
Arab nationals allegedly affiliated with Al Qaeda. In 2014, the UAE tried nine people on charges
of supporting the Al Nusrah Front (renamed Front for the Conquest of Syria), an Al Qaeda-linked
faction of Syrian rebels that is named by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO).85 UAE authorities failed to prevent a December 1, 2014, killing of an American teacher by
a 38-year-old Emirati woman who allegedly had visited extremist websites, although they
defused a bomb she planted outside the home of an American doctor. In 2015, the UAE arrested
and prosecuted, or deported, numerous individuals who allegedly planned to join the Islamic
State or commit terrorism in the UAE. In March 2016, UAE courts convicted 30 out of 41
individuals (38 of whom were UAE citizens) belonging to a group called Shabab al Manara of
plotting terrorist attacks in the UAE. Facilities and assets of the group were closed or seized.
Yet, the United States and the UAE sometimes differ on whether some groups are terrorist
organizations. For example, the 85 groups that the UAE government designates as terrorist
organizations include some U.S.- and Europe-based groups that represent Muslims in those
societies and which neither the United States nor any European government accuses of
terrorism.86 These groups include the U.S.-based Muslim American Society and Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR); the Muslim Association of Sweden; the Federation of
Islamic Organizations in Europe; and the U.K.-based Islamic Relief. The United States Embassy
in Abu Dhabi questioned the UAE government about why it designated these groups.87 The UAE
also identifies as terrorist groups several organizations that the United States has not designated
as terrorist groups, including the Houthis in Yemen and the Afghan Taliban. The UAE, as noted
above, also considers the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group; the Trump Administration
reportedly considered designating it as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).
Antiterrorism Financing and Money Laundering (AML/CFT). The UAE Central Bank’s Financial
Intelligence Unit is credited in State Department terrorism reports with providing training
programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and terrorism financing, and making
mandatory the registration of informal financial transmittal networks (hawalas). In September
2012, the FBI Legal Attache established a suboffice at the U.S. consulate in Dubai to assist with
joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing. In June 2014 the UAE set up a financial
task force to better prevent use of UAE financial institutions by terrorist organizations. In October
2014, the country adopted a law (Federal Law No. 9) to strengthen a 2002 anti-money-laundering
law. On October 29, 2018, the government announced it replaced a 2002 anti-money-laundering
law with a new law that raises the country’s anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism
financing rules to international standards.88
The country is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Actions Task Force
(MENAFATF), a FATF-style regional body, and it chairs the MENAFATF’s Training and
Typologies Working Group. The UAE is a participant in the Counter-Islamic State Finance Group
chaired by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. In May 2017, the UAE joined the U.S.-GCC
85 The group changed its name and claimed to have severed connections to Al Qaeda in mid-2016.
86 “UAE Lists Scores of Groups as ‘Terrorists.’” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2014.
87 State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism: 2014. Released June 19, 2015.
88 Fact sheet provided by UAE embassy representatives. October 31, 2018.

Terrorist Financing Targeting Center based in Riyadh. In October 2017, the members of the center
designated as terrorists several AQAP and Islamic State-Yemen individuals and entities.
Countering Violent Extremism. In 2011, the UAE founded the Global Counterterrorism Forum
(GCTF) along with the United States and Turkey. In December 2012, during a meeting of the
GCTF, the UAE-based “International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism,”
known as Hedayah (“guidance”), was inaugurated. The government partners with the U.S.
government to run the Sawab Center, an online counter-Islamic State messaging hub.89 The
center, which has an annual budget of about $6 million and a staff of 14, is an institution for
training, dialogue, collaboration, and research to counter violent extremism. Its priority is to work
to prevent educational institutions from becoming breeding grounds for violent extremism. It also
promotes information sharing so that police organizations around the world can receive
information from family members who report on relatives who have become radicalized.90
Several UAE-based think tanks, including the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
(ECSSR), the Emirates Policy Center, the TRENDS Institute, the Tabah Foundation, and the
Future Institute for Advanced Research and Statutes, also conducted seminars on confronting
terrorism and violent extremism. In June 2018, the cabinet approved the formation of the UAE
Fatwa Council, headed by President of the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies
Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah. The cabinet tasked the council with presenting a clear image of
Islam, including issuing general fatwas and licensing individuals to issue fatwas.
Transfers from Guantanamo. The UAE has cooperated with U.S. efforts to reduce the detainee
population at the U.S. prison facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In November 2015, the
Department of Defense transferred five Yemeni detainees from the facility to the UAE. In August
2016, another 15 Guantanamo detainees (12 Yemenis and 3 Afghans) were transferred to the
UAE, the biggest single Guantanamo transfer to date. The day before it left office in January
2017, the Obama Administration transferred another three to the UAE.
Port and Border Controls

The UAE has signed on to several U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation and terrorism. These
include the Container Security Initiative, aimed at screening U.S.-bound containerized cargo
transiting Dubai ports, and the UAE has cooperated with all U.S. measures designed to protect
aircraft bound for the United States. Several U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers,
colocated with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid in Dubai, inspect U.S.-bound
containers, many of them apparently originating in Iran. The UAE is also a party to the
Proliferation Security Initiative, the Megaports Initiative designed to prevent terrorists from using
major ports to ship illicit material, and the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism. In 2013,
a “preclearance facility” was established at the Abu Dhabi International Airport for travelers
boarding direct flights to the United States. The UAE government supports the Department of
Homeland Security’s programs to secure any UAE-to-U.S. flights, including collecting passenger
information and employing retina-screening systems.
Export Controls
The UAE effort to prevent the reexport of advanced technology, particularly to Iran, has
improved considerably since 2010. As a GCC member, the UAE participates in the U.S.-GCC
Counter-proliferation Workshop. Taking advantage of geographic proximity and the presence of
89
State Department Country Reports on Terrorism: 2016.
David Ignatius. “A Small Organization Offers a Fresh Approach on Preventing Terrorism” Washington Post, op-ed.
90
October 21, 2014.

many Iranian firms in Dubai emirate, numerous Iranian entities involved in Iran’s weapons and
technology programs maintained offices in Dubai. In connection with revelations of illicit sales of
nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea by Pakistan’s nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan,
Dubai was named as a key transfer point for Khan’s shipments of nuclear components. Two
Dubai-based companies, SMB Computers and Gulf Technical Industries, were apparently
involved in transshipping components.91 In 2004, the United States sanctioned a UAE firm,
Elmstone Service and Trading FZE, for selling weapons-related technology to Iran, under the
Iran-Syria Non-Proliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). In 2006, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a licensing requirement on U.S. exports to Mayrow General
Trading Company and related UAE-based companies after Mayrow allegedly transshipped
devices used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan.92
In February 2007 the Bush Administration threatened to characterize the UAE as a “Destination
of Diversion Control” and to restrict the export of certain technologies to it. A June 2010 Iran
sanctions law, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA,
P.L. 111-195), formally authorizes countries to be designated as Destinations of Diversion
Control and subject to U.S. sanctions. The UAE avoided designation by strengthening its export
control regime, including a September 2007 law, enacted with FNC concurrence, that tightened
export controls. UAE authorities used that law to shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly
involved in dual use exports to Iran and other countries.
The issue of leakage of technology has sometimes caused U.S. criticism or questioning of UAE
investment deals. In December 2008, some Members of Congress called for a review by the
interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) of a proposed joint
venture between Advanced Micro Devices and Advanced Technology Investment Co. of Abu
Dhabi for the potential for technology transfers. In February 2006, CFIUS approved the takeover
by the Dubai-owned Dubai Ports World company of a British firm that manages six U.S. port
facilities. Congress, concerned that the takeover might weaken U.S. port security, opposed it in
P.L. 109-234, causing the company to divest assets involved in U.S. port operations.
Nuclear Agreement and Other Technology Issues93

The UAE announced in 2008 that it would acquire its first nuclear power reactors to satisfy
projected increases in domestic electricity demand.94 As a condition of receiving U.S. nuclear
technology, the United States and the UAE reached an agreement that commits the UAE officials
to strict standards that ensure that its nuclear program can only be used for peaceful purposes.
Among those commitments is to refrain from domestic uranium enrichment or reprocessing spent
nuclear reactor fuel—both processes could produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The
Obama Administration signed an agreement for the United States to assist the program, subject to
conditions specified in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2153(b)], on
May 21, 2009 (and submitted to Congress that day). Some in Congress expressed concerns about
91 Milhollin, Gary and Kelly Motz. “Nukes ‘R’ US.” New York Times, op. ed. March 4, 2004.
92 BIS, “General Order Concerning Mayrow General Trading and Related Enterprises,” 71 Federal Register 107, June
5, 2006.
93 This section was prepared by Paul Kerr, Analyst in Weapons of Mass Destruction Nonproliferation, CRS. See CRS
Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher
M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
94 UAE officials estimate that their country must expand its power generation and transmission capacity from the
current level of 16 gigawatts to 40 gigawatts by 2020 in order to meet projected demand increases.

the potential for leakage of technology to Iran as well as the potential for regional proliferation of
nuclear technology, but several congressional resolutions approving the agreement (S.J.Res. 18
and H.J.Res. 60) were introduced, as was one disapproving (H.J.Res. 55). No measure blocking
the agreement was enacted within 90 days of the submission of the agreement to Congress, and
the “1-2-3 Agreement” entered into force on December 17, 2009. The International Atomic
Energy Agency announced in December 2011 that a group of experts that reviewed the UAE’s
regulatory framework for the program found “noted good practices” and provided suggestions to
the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation, the UAE’s nuclear regulatory authority.95 Still,
reflecting the fact that a Saudi nuclear program might not be bound by the same restrictions that
the UAE committed to, UAE officials reportedly told U.S. officials in October 2015 that they no
longer consider themselves bound by the pledge that the country would not enrich uranium.96
A number of U.S. and European firms have secured administrative and financial advisory
contracts with the program. In January 2010, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC),
the institution that is administering the program, announced that it had chosen the Korea Electric
Power Corporation (KEPCO of South Korea) to construct the first of four APR1400 nuclear
reactors that would sell electricity to the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority. The first
plant is undergoing preoperational testing. The other three are to be operational by 2020.97
The United States gives the UAE small amounts of assistance to help safeguard its nuclear
program and prevent illicit exports of technology from it. For FY2015, the Department of Energy
provided the country with about $370,000 for such purposes, and for FY2016, about $220,000
was provided for those programs.
On other technology issues, in July 2014 the UAE announced it will form a “UAE Space
Agency” that, by 2021, is to launch an unmanned spaceship that will probe Mars. The
government plans to send its first astronaut to the International Space Station in April 2019.
Economic Issues
The UAE, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has developed a free market
economy, but its financial institutions are weakly regulated. As have the other GCC states that
have long depended on exports of hydrocarbons, the UAE has announced plans and policies
(“Vision 2021”) to try to further diversify its economy to a “post-oil” era. Dubai emirate, in
particular, has long pursued an economic strategy based on attracting investors to construct
luxurious and sometimes futuristic projects that provide jobs and attract tourism and publicity.
The country is also accepting investment by China under that country’s “Belt and Road Initiative”
(BRI) intended to better connect China economically to other parts of Asia, Central Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa.in April 2019, the UAE and China signed deals worth $3.4 billion, most
of which will be invested to store and ship Chinese products from the UAE port of Jebel Ali.98
To help it weather the effect of the sharp drop in oil prices since mid-2014, the government cut
some subsidies and raised capital on international markets, including an April 2016 bond offering
of $5 billion and an October 2017 bond offering of about $10 billion. The government budget was
95 http://www.iaea.org/press/?p=2572.
96 “Post Iran Nuclear Deal, UAE Diplomat Tells Congressman His Country no Longer Feels Bound by Previous
Agreement with US.” AlJazeera.com, October 16, 2015.
97 http://enec.gov.ae/our-nuclear-energy-program/prime-contractor/.
98 The UAE Signed a Massive, $3.4 Billion Deal with China – and That ‘Isn’t a Surprise.” NBC News, April 29, 2019.

only slightly in deficit 2017 and 2018, and, coupled with the bond offerings, the UAE has been
able to avoid drawing down its $600 billion in various sovereign wealth funds overseen by the
Emirates Investment Authority (EIA).99
Oil and Gas Sector and “Clean Energy” Initiatives

The key factor in the UAE’s wealth is that it exports large amounts of crude oil while having a
small population that receives benefits and services. The UAE exports nearly as much oil as Iraq,
while its citizen population is a small fraction of that of Iraq. Abu Dhabi has 80% of the
federation’s proven oil reserves of about 100 billion barrels, enough for over 100 years of exports
at the current production rate of about 2.9 million barrels per day (mbd). Of that, over 2.2 mbd are
exported, and the UAE has as much as 500,000 bpd of spare capacity.100 UAE representatives
indicated in late October 2018 that they might increase production to over 3 mbd,101 but the
subsequent sharp drop in world oil prices and OPEC agreement in November 2018 to cut
production has likely forestalled any UAE production increase.
The United States imports negligible amounts of UAE crude oil; the largest share of UAE oil
goes to Japan and China. The UAE has vast quantities of natural gas but consumes more than it
produces. It has entered into an arrangement (Dolphin Energy) with neighboring countries under
which a pipeline carries natural gas from the large gas exporter, Qatar, to the UAE and on to
Oman. However, the political differences with Qatar have contributed to UAE evaluation of
renewable and other alternatives to relying on Qatar-supplied natural gas.
The UAE is trying to secure its oil export routes against any threat by Iran to close the strategic
Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE and other major oil exporters transport their oil
exports. In July 2012, the UAE loaded its first tanker of oil following completion of the Abu
Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) which terminates in the emirate of Fujairah, on the Gulf of
Oman. The line, which cost $3 billion, can transport 1.5 million barrels per day of crude oil—
about half of UAE production. The UAE is planning a large refinery near that terminal, and
possibly a second oil pipeline, to secure its oil exports and value-added petroleum products.102
The UAE government is also attempting to plan for a time when the developed world is no longer
reliant on oil imports. The government has set a target of using 21% renewable energy sources by
2021. It has funded “Masdar City”—a planned city, the first phase of which was completed in
2015, that relies only on renewable energy sources and features driverless taxis.
U.S.-UAE Trade and Trade Promotion Discussions

U.S. trade with the UAE is a significant issue because the UAE is the largest market for U.S.
exports to the Middle East. Over 1,000 U.S. companies have offices there and there are over
60,000 Americans working in UAE. U.S. exports to the UAE in 2018 totaled nearly $20 billion,
about the same as in 2017. U.S. imports from UAE for 2017 totaled about $5 billion, somewhat
higher than the $4.3 billion in imports for 2017. U.S. products sold to UAE are mostly
commercial aircraft, industrial machinery and materials, and other high-value items.
99 The two largest of the UAE’s sovereign wealth funds are run by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and
Mubadala (“Exchange”).
100 http://www.thenational.ae/events/areas/abu-dhabi/adnoc-preserves-spare-supplies.
101 CRS conversation with UAE representatives. October 24, 2018.
102 “Abu Dhabi: In the Pipeline.” The Middle East, January 26, 2012.

On November 15, 2004, the Bush Administration notified Congress it had begun negotiating a
free trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE. Several rounds of talks were held prior to the June
2007 expiration of Administration “trade promotion authority.” The FTA talks were later replaced
by a U.S.-UAE “Economic Policy Dialogue,” between major U.S. and UAE economic agencies.
The dialogue, consisting of two meetings per year, began in late 2011 and also included
discussion of reform of UAE export controls. In addition, as part of the GCC, the UAE negotiated
with the United States a September 2012 “GCC-U.S. Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic,
Investment, and Technical Cooperation”—a GCC-wide trade and investment framework
agreement (TIFA). The agreement was negotiated by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).
U.S. Assistance to the UAE

As noted, because of the UAE’s relative wealth, it receives only very small amounts of U.S.
foreign assistance. Amounts provided for counternarcotics, counterterrorism financing, and
nuclear security are broken down in the sections above. For FY2015, U.S. assistance to the UAE
totaled about $840,000. For FY2016, total U.S. aid to the UAE was about $1.15 million. For
FY2017, the United States provided about $563,000, almost all of which was for an in-country
counternarcotics program.
“Open Skies” Issue

In 2015, several U.S. airlines asserted that two UAE airlines, Emirates Air (Dubai-based) and
Etihad Air (Abu Dhabi-based), as well as Qatar Airways, had an unfair competitive advantage
because of alleged receipt of subsidies from their respective governments. The U.S. airlines
asserted that the “Open Skies Agreement” that the UAE and Qatar have with the United States
should be renegotiated so as to limit the access of the three Gulf-based airlines to U.S. routes. The
airlines assert they are not subsidized and instead create substantial numbers of jobs for American
workers building and serving their aircraft and operations in the United States. UAE officials
assert that the country will not agree to renegotiate the Open Skies Agreement. The Obama
Administration declined to renegotiate the agreement and President Trump, following a February
2017 meeting with U.S. airline executives, did not indicate any change to that stance.
Author Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE):

Issues for U.S. Policy

Updated August 19, 2019

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Governance, Human Rights, and Reform

Table 1. UAE Leadership

Sultan bin Mohammad Al Qassimi Ruler of Sharjah Emirate

Congressional Research Service 1

Congressional Research Service 2

Figure 1. UAE at a Glance

Size of Armed Forces About 50,000

Foreign Assets/Sovereign About $600 billion

Congressional Research Service 3

Federal National Council (FNC) and FNC Elections

Congressional Research Service 4

Muslim Brotherhood and other Opposition

Other Government Responses

Congressional Research Service 5

U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts and UAE Restrictions

Other Human Rights-Related Issues7

Media and Research Institute Freedoms

Congressional Research Service 6

9 CRS conversations with UAE officials, 2012-2017.

Congressional Research Service 7

Labor Rights and Trafficking in Persons

Congressional Research Service 8

Foreign Policy and Defense Issues

Headache.” Washington Post, August 4, 2017.

Prospects, by Clayton Thomas.

Congressional Research Service 9

Congressional Research Service 10

Gulf Islands Dispute

Policy Toward and Intervention in Regional Conflicts

20 Author conversations with UAE representatives, May 2016.

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Islamic State/Syria Conflict25

23 Wall Street Journal. July 13, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-a-e-backed-militia-leaders-bid-to-take-control-of-

Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.

27 Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, 2013-2014.

28 Author conversations with UAE officials. October 2017.

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Congressional Research Service 13

34 Al Jazeera, August 13, 2017; https://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/08/yemen-war-takes-toll-uae-soldiers-

June 18, 2016.

Congressional Research Service 14

Related UAE Power Projection Capabilities/East Africa

Emirates.” Warontherocks.com. September 2, 2016.

Congressional Research Service 15

46 “A Quiet, Potent Ally to U.S.” op. cit.

50 Times of Israel, September 14, 2018.

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UAE Foreign Aid54

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Defense Cooperation with the United States

Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and U.S. Forces in UAE

Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.