CASE DIGEST ADDISON V.

FELIX (August 03, 1918)

CELERINA J. SANTOS
VS. FACTS:
RICARDO T. SANTOS Petitioner Addison sold four parcels of land to Defendant spouses Felix and Tioco located in
Lucena City. Respondents paid 3K for the purchase price and promised to pay the remaining
FACTS: by installment. The contract provides that the purchasers may rescind the contract within one
year after the issuance of title on their name.
On 2007, RTC declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos presumptively dead after her husband,
respondent Ricardo had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for The petitioner went to Lucena for the survey designaton and delivery of the land but only 2
the purpose of remarriage. In his petition, Ricardo alleged that when they move to Tarlac and parcels were designated and 2/3 of it was in possession of a Juan Villafuerte.
things went wrong with their financial status, Celerina left to work abroad as Domestic Helper The other parcels were not surveyed and designated by Addison.
in Hong Kong and was never heard from her again; He claimed that he exerted effort to
locate Celerina; that it was 12 years from the date of his RTC petition since Celerina left. He Addison demanded from petitioner the payment of the first installment but the latter contends
believed that she passed away. And in 2008 Ricardo remarried. that there was no delivery and as such, they are entitled to get back the 3K purchase price
they gave upon the execution of the contract.
On the other hand, Celerina filed a petition that she learned about Ricardo’s petition only
sometimes in 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition ISSUE:
for relief, or other appropriate remedies. WON there was a valid delivery.

On the same year, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the court of appeal HELD:
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, Celerina claimed that she never The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing sold. With respect to two of the
resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. It was not parcels of land, he was not even able to show them to the purchaser; and as regards the
true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she left their conjugal other two, more than two-thirds of their area was in the hostile and adverse possession of a
dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in 2008 to cohabit with third person.
another woman. She was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptive dead. It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instruments is equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic
ISSUE: delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had
such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could
Whether or not the declaration of appearance of a presumptively dead spouse in accordance have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of
with Article 42 of the family Code is the proper remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgement possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment
declaring presumptive death. whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will
of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But
RULING: if there is an impediment, delivery cannot be deemed effected.

An action for Annulment of judgement is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is
obtained fraudulently. It is the remedy when RTC’s judgement, order or resolution has
become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
G.R. No. 92989 - July 8, 1991 obligation to secure the written consent of the mortgagee or he lays himself open to criminal
PERFECTO DY, JR. petitioner, vs. prosecution under the provision of Article 319 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. And even if
COURT OF APPEALS, GELAC TRADING INC., and ANTONIO V. GONZALES, no consent was obtained from the mortgagee, the validity of the sale would still not be
respondents. affected.
Facts:
Perfecto and Wilfredo Dy are brothers. Sometime in 1979, Wilfredo purchased a truck and a Thus, we see no reason why Wilfredo Dy, as the chattel mortgagor cannot sell the subject
farm tractor through financing from Libra Finance, which were both mortgaged to Libra as tractor. There is no dispute that the consent of Libra Finance was obtained in the instant
security for the loan. case. In a letter dated August 27, 1979, Libra allowed the petitioner to purchase the tractor
and assume the mortgage debt of his brother. The sale between the brothers was therefore
Perfecto wanted to buy the farm tractor from his brother, so that he wrote a letter to Libra valid and binding as between them and to the mortgagee, as well.
requesting that he be allowed to purchase from Wilfredo the said tractor and assume the
mortgage debt of the latter, which letter was approved by Libra thru its manager, Cipriano Article 1496 of the Civil Code states that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the
Ares. Thus, Wilfredo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Perfecto over the subject vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to
tractor. However, said tractor was in the possession of Libra due to Wilfredo’s failure to pay 1501 or in any other manner signing an agreement that the possession is transferred from
the amortizations. Despite the offer of full payment for the tractor, the immediate release the vendor to the vendee. We agree with the petitioner that Articles 1498 and 1499 are
could not be effected because Libra insisted on full payment, not only for the tractor but also applicable in the case at bar.
for the truck as well.

Perfecto was able to convince their sister, Carol, to purchase the truck so that full payment Article 1498 states:
could be made for both the truck and tractor. Thus, a PNB check was issued (P22,000) in
favor of Libra settling in full the indebtedness of Wilfredo with Libra. The latter insisted that Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
the out-of-town check be cleared first before releasing the chattels in question. equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Meanwhile, a collection case filed by Gelac Tracding against Wilfredo was pending in another xxx xxx xxx
court, which issued an alias writ of execution. The provincial sheriff was able to seize and
levy on the tractor which was in the premises of Libra. The tractor was subsequently sold at Article 1499 provides:
public auction where Gelac was the lone bidder, and later sold it to one of its stockholders,
Antonio Gonzales. Article 1499. The delivery of movable property may likewise be made by the mere consent or
agreement of the contracting parties, if the thing sold cannot be transferred to the possession
It was only when the PNB check was cleared that Perfecto learned about Gelac having of the vendee at the time of the sale, or if the latter already had it in his possession for any
custody of the tractor. Consequently, he filed an action to recover the subject tractor against other reason. (1463a)
Gelac with RTC-Cebu.
In the instant case, actual delivery of the subject tractor could not be made. However, there
The RTC rendered judgment directing Gelac and Gonzales to return the same to the was constructive delivery already upon the execution of the public instrument pursuant to
petitioner, and to pay jointly and severally damages and expenses (for hiring a tractor). Article 1498 and upon the consent or agreement of the parties when the thing sold cannot be
immediately transferred to the possession of the vendee. (Art. 1499)
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of RTC and dismissed the complaint, holding that
the tractor in question still belonged to Wilfredo when it was seized and levied by the sheriff Petition granted, RTC decision reinstated.
by virtue of the alias writ of execution issued in favor of Gelac. Hence, the instant petition

Issue:
Whether or not the chattel mortgagor, Wilfredo, had the right to sell the property mortgaged

Ruling:
YES. The mortgagor who gave the property as security under a chattel mortgage did not part
with the ownership over the same. He had the right to sell it although he was under the
Danguilan vs IAC consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual
possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.
Facts:
Apolonia Melad filed a complaint against Felix Daguilan with CFI Cagayan for recovery of a As consistently held by jurisprudence, ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only
farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased from Domingo Melad in by delivery. That symbolic delivery was effected through the deed of sale, which was a public
1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the Danguilan. She claimed to be the instrument, Addison vs Felix controls:
illegitimate daughter of Domingo and presented a deed of sale purportedly signed by the
latter. She only moved out in 1946 because Danguilan approached her and asked permission "in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the
to cultivate the land and to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he would deliver vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
part of the harvest from the farm to her, which he did from that year to 1958. Deliveries later material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the
stopped thus the complaint. ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When
there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the
Danguilan, on the other hand, is the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece. He presented purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
a private instrument which Domingo Melad also purportedly signed, giving to him the farm in instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser
1943 another private instrument in which Domigo also gave him the residential lot, on the cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or
understanding that the Danguilan would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
death. interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality—the delivery has not been effected."

Lower court ruled in favor of Danguilan. Upon appeal, the IAC modified the deicision and (eventually, the Court said that both claims were weak, but the presumption is in favor of
ruled that the conveyance of the real properties in question were null and void, as they were Danguilan who is in possession)
donations of real property and as such should have been effected through a public
instrument.

Apolonia Melad alleges that the deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent POWER COMMERCIAL V. CA (June 20, 1997)
was only three years old and the consideration was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria
Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory. Danguilan, on the other hand, avers FACTS:
that this contract was simulated and prepared after Domingo's death. Petitioner asbestos manufacturer Power Commercial and Industrial Corporation bought the
property of spouses Reynaldo and Angelita Quiambao located in Makati City.
Issue:
WON Apolonia Melad can be considered as the owner of the disputed properties Since there are lessees occupying the subject land, part of the deed of sale is a warranty of
respondents that will defend its title and peaceful possession in favor of the petitioners.
Held:
Decision of trial court reinstated. Danguilan wins. The property is mortgage to PNP and as such, petitioners filed a request to assume
Based on the evidence adduced, it is clear that Domingo did intend to donate the properties responsibility of the mortgage. Because of petitioner’s failure to produce the required papers,
to Danguilan. The fact that the donation was executed in a private document is not material their petition was denied.
because the donation was onerous- the properties were given to the Danguilan in exchange
for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Petitioners allege that the contract should be rescinded because of failure of delivery.
Hence, it could not come under the operation of Article 749 requiring donations of real
properties to be effected through a public instrument. ISSUE:
WON the contract is recissible due to breach of contract.
As to the deed of sale executed between Domingo and Apolonia, the record shows that the
Apolonia Melad did not take possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited until HELD:
1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the Danguilan. If she did have There is no breach of contact in this case since there is no provision in the contract that
possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, imposes the obligation to the respondents to eject the people occupying the property.
and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother. She thus failed to show that she
There was also a constructive delivery because the deed of sale was made in a public
document. The contention of the petitioners that there could be no constructive delivery
because the respondents is not in possession of the property is of no merit. What matters in a
constructive delivery is control and not possession. Control was placed in the hands of the
petitioners that is why they were able to file an ejectment case. Prior physical delivery or
possession is not legally required and the execution of the deed of sale is deemed equivalent
to delivery.
Chua v. CA, G.R. No. 150793, Nov. 19, 2004 (443 SCRA 259) respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on
the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as a derivative suit.
Facts: Furthermore, the SC stated that the appeal lacked the basic requirement of an allegation in
Private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a compliant- the complaint that the shareholder is suing on a derivative cause of action for and in behalf of
affidavit charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification of the corporation and other shareholders who wish to join. In the criminal complaint filed by the
public documents. The said accused prepared, certified and falsified the Minutes of the respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf and for the benefit of the
Annual Stockholder’s meeting of the Board of Directors of the corporation. The document corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not be
made it appear in the Minutes that Lydia Hao was present. deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.

Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the information for falsification of public document before
the MeTC against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against his wife, Elsa Chua. Vive Eagle Land Inc. vs Ca
During the trial, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera
appeared as private prosecutors and presented Hao as witness. Chua moved to exclude Facts:
complainant’s counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to Sps Raul and Rosalie Flores (Spouses Flores) were the owners of 2 parcels of land with an
allege and prove any civil liability. The MeTC granted Chua’s motion and ordered the private area of 1,026 and 2963 sqm, respectively. From these lots, there were 3 deed of sales
counsels excluded. Hao moved for reconsideration but was denied. executed.

Due MeTC’s grant of exclusion, Hao filed a petition for certiorari entitled Lydia C. Hao, in her First, between the Spouses Flores and Tatic Square International Corporation. They
own behalf and for the benefit of Siena realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the executed a MOA that the Spouses Flores obliged themselves to spend for and cause the
Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of registration of the first deed of absolute sale, to cause the issuance of the torrens titles over
Manila, before the RTC of Manila branch 19. The RTC gave due course to the petition and the property to and under the name of TATIC, as vendee, and to pay the capital gains tax on
reversed the MeTC order allowing the private prosecutors to intervene in the civil aspect of the said sales. Tobias (the broker) and Tatic bound and obliged themselves for the eviction of
the criminal case. the tenants of the property, 60 days from the execution of the MOA, with the assistance of
Spouses Flores.
Chua moved for reconsideration but was denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari, alleging
among others that the court acted with grave abuse of discretion for allowing Siena Realty On the second deed which was executed between TATIC and the Petitioner Vive Eagle Land
Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner although it was not party to the criminal Inc (VELI), TATIC obliged itself to spend for the registration of the second deed of absolute
complaint. The CA denied the petition. sale and the issuance of the titles over the property to and under the name of petitioner VELI,
Petitioner, Chua, had argued before the CA that respondent had no authority to bring suit in and to cause the eviction of the tenants/occupants from the property within sixty days from
behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board Resolution authorizing her to file the suit. April 12, 1988. TATIC did not bind itself to pay the capital gains tax for the said sale.
Respondent, Hao, countered that the suit was brought under the concept of a derivative suit And on the third deed executed between VELI and the Respondent, petitioner VELI did not
oblige itself to spend for the registration of the said deed, to secure a torrens title over the
Issue: property to and under the name of the respondent, or to cause the eviction of the
Whether or not the criminal complaint was in the nature of a derivative suit. tenants/occupants on the property.

Held: The respondent counsel later demands VELI to pay for the capital gains tax, cause the
NO. The criminal case was not in the nature of a derivative suit. registration of the said deed and cause the eviction of squatters and occupants in the area in
The case is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal cases filed with the RTC of which VELI in return rejected the demand.
Iloilo for estafa and falsification of public document. Among the basic requirements for a The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner to transfer the title in their favor,
derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of the to cause the eviction of the squatters in the property and to pay the capital gains tax.
corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on Petitioner VELI then alleged that being a juridical entity as a corporation, they are exempt
behalf of the corporation and all other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join. This from paying capital gains tax, that Spouses Flores and Tobias were the ones liable for the
was not complied with by the petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in payment of the capital gains tax and that the same shall be responsible for the eviction of the
the instant petition which, in part, merely sates that this is a petition for review on certiorari on current settlers.
pure questions of law to set aside a portion of the RTC decision in the said criminal cases
since the trial courts judgment of acquittal failed to impose civil liability against the private
The trial court then rendered its decision in favor of the respondent. It was held that VELI is
liable for the payment of the capital gains tax as the respondents were not even the parties of
the deed executed by Spouses Flores and Tatic.
The petitioner appealed before CA. The court affirned trial court’s ruling with modification that
it is also the petitioner who shall cause for the registration of the title and the eviction of the
squatters.

The petitioner now appealed before the Supreme Court that CA erred in ruling the the
respondent is not bound by the deeds executed by the Spouses Flores, TATIC and Tobias,
and by TATIC and petitioner VELI simply because the respondent was not a party to the said
deeds. The petitioners insist that the respondent acquired the rights and interests of its
predecessors; and, being the vendee/owner of the property covered by TCT No. 241846, the
petitioners had the right to enforce the said contracts against its predecessors.

Issue:
Whether or not VELI is obliged to transfer the title to and under the respondent?

Held:
Yes.

Ruling:
Under Article 149518 of the New Civil Code, petitioner VELI, as the vendor, is obliged to
transfer title over the property and deliver the same to the vendee. While Article 149819 of
the New Civil Code provides that the execution of a notarized deed of absolute sale shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the property subject of the contract, the same shall not apply if,
from the deed, the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In the present
case, the respondent and petitioner VELI agreed that the latter would cause the eviction of
the tenants/occupants and deliver possession of the property. It is clear that at the time the
petitioner executed the deed of sale in favor of the respondent, there were tenants/occupants
in the property. It cannot, thus, be concluded that, through the execution of the third deed of
sale, the property was thereby delivered to the respondent.