Garcia V Corona GR. No. 132451. December 17, 1999: Issue

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National Economy (Sec. 19 & 20); related provisions: Art.

XII (re National Economy


and Patrimony)
timing of full deregulation not justiciable

Garcia v Corona
GR. No. 132451.
December 17, 1999

FACTS:

After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the
Philippines,the government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of
deregulation by enacting RepublicAct No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180)or the “Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.”

R.A 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to
promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result.

Congress responded to the decision by enacting on a new oil deregulation law, R.A.
No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive provisions found in the
invalidated law.

Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price
control at a time when the market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly
would be contrary to public interest, as it would only provide an opportunity for the
Big 3 (Shell, Caltex, Petron) to engage in price-fixing and overpricing. He stated that
Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 is “glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition, and
anti-people,” and thus asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.

Garcia’s plea for nullity was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is susceptible of Judicial Determination.


RULING:

The court dismissed the petition.

It was declared that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to the Court are
non-justiciable matters that preclude the Court from exercising its power of judicial
review. The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local
downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress which the Court
cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation
of powers.

For a court to exercise this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:

(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these requirements. An actual case or
controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice.

It is not the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the
exercise by the courts of its power of review; more importantly, the issue involved
must be susceptible of judicial determination.

The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full
deregulation should be effective. In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time
is not for judicial determination. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great
variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic. They are not within
the appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice. It would be an extravagant
extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis for the
determination.

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