Community-Based Dispute Resolution

Exploring everyday justice provision in Southeast Myanmar

Executive Summary
March 2017

Community-Based Dispute Resolution

By Helene Maria Kyed, Danish Institute for International Studies

This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International
Community-Based Dispute Resolution Page 1
Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
States Agency for International Development, the United States Government or the International Rescue Committee (IRC).
Exploring everyday justice provision in Southeast Myanmar

March 2017

Cover photo: Payment of compensation and signing of a promise letter at a ward office.
Photo: Helene Maria Kyed

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ 4

1. Summary ............................................................................................................. 5

2. The formal legal systems ..................................................................................... 6

3. Community-Based Dispute Resolution by Ward and Village leaders ..................... 8

3.1 Local justice providers................................................................................................................. 8

3.2 Organisation ............................................................................................................................... 8

3.3 Women’s participation ................................................................................................................. 8

3.4 Official mandates of local justice providers .................................................................................. 9

3.5 Links to a state system................................................................................................................ 9

3.6 Types of disputes and crimes...................................................................................................... 9

3.7 Dispute resolution procedures and methods ............................................................................... 9

3.8 Norms, rules and laws............................................................................................................... 10

3.9 Remedies and punishments ...................................................................................................... 10

3.10 Service fees ............................................................................................................................ 10

3.11 Complaints and reporting of cases .......................................................................................... 10

4. Justice facilitators and informal justice providers ..............................................11

5. Justice perceptions and preferences ..................................................................11

6. Strengths of CBDR .............................................................................................12

7. Limitations of CBDR ...........................................................................................13

8. Recommendations ..............................................................................................14

8.1 Risks and risk mitigation ........................................................................................................... 15

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Abbreviations

CBDR Community Based Dispute Resolution

CBO Community Based Organisation
EAOs Ethnic Armed Organisations
GAD General Administration Department
GoB Government of Burma/Myanmar
IRC International Rescue Committee
KNU Karen National Union
KNPP Karrenni National Progressive Party
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NMSP New Mon State Party
VTA Village Tract Administrator
WA Ward Administrator

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1. Summary

Justice provision in Myanmar is characterised research-based report which provides in-depth

by legal pluralism. There are a wide range of empirical knowledge of how disputes and crimes
justice providers, different co-existing legal are resolved in practice at the lowest, most
systems, and varied justice perceptions. Despite utilized level, in selected areas of Southeast
this pluralism, a common pattern is that most Myanmar. The aim is to inform the International
citizens predominantly seek solutions to Rescue Committee’s (IRC) support to access to
disputes and crimes within their own village or justice through CBDR. It identifies the various
neighbourhood. Official courts are feared, justice providers, and those informal justice
distrusted, and associated with high costs. facilitators who people approach to help resolve
cases.
They are places that most people try to avoid.
When people decide to report a dispute or By drawing on a range of case examples and
crime, community-based dispute resolution direct observations, it explores people’s justice
(CBDR) with its focus on negotiating a mutual seeking practices and details the varied
agreement is the preferred justice option. While resolution procedures, remedies, complaint
this empirical reality is increasingly mechanisms, and rules/norms that are applied
acknowledged, very little international support in CBDR. Examples are given of how some
has so far targeted this level of justice provision cases travel between different justice forums,
in Myanmar. Formal justice sector reform and including to the formal legal systems.
improving the rule of law are crucial in the Geographically the report covers areas
current Myanmar transition, but these are long- administered by the Government of
term processes. This calls for the need Burma/Myanmar (GoB) and by the main Ethnic
simultaneously to engage with existing Armed Organisations (EAOs) in Karen, Mon and
community level mechanisms that already work to a lesser extent Kayah States.
and are seen as legitimate by ordinary citizens.
To do so requires a deep understanding of All three states have experienced decades of
actual practices in each particular setting, rather armed conflict but since the ceasefires in 2012
than pre-conceived normative ideas about what have been relatively stable. Parallel state
CBDR means. This document summarises a systems de facto prevail, including different

Resolution of a theft and drug case at a ward office.

Photo: Helene Maria Kyed

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legal systems. To set out the wider context for Overall, the report recommends that
CBDR, a chapter is devoted to an outline of the international support engages from the outset
GoB as well as the EAO’s legal systems, with already existing CBDR forums, rather than
including how they tend to operate in practice. trying to establish alternative or parallel
The report discusses the similarities and institutions. Support should be firmly grounded
differences between CBDR in GoB and EAO in how disputes and crimes are already dealt
areas, including their official mandates and with and understood in the target communities.
practices. As a basis for identifying entrance A good starting point is to focus on what already
points for IRC support, the report outlines the works – on success stories - and then identify
strengths and limitations of CBDR. areas for improvement, based on participatory
The main insights of the report draw on data dialogues with local justice providers and
from the EverJust research project, coordinated ordinary citizens. Reliance on a standard set of
by this report’s author1. externally defined concepts and intervention
models should be avoided.
Everjust conducted interviews and participant
observation of everyday justice provision in 12 Although legal awareness is needed, it is
research sites over a one year period (February important to be realistic about what formal
2016 to January 2017) in Mon and Karen states. justice options can entail for ordinary citizens.
Longer-term research and direct observations of Programming must be sensitive to the socio-
dispute resolution provide unique insights into cultural and religious beliefs that inform people’s
everyday practices and ordinary people’s justice preferences towards either not reporting
perceptions of problems and justice, which cases at all or seeking localised solutions. There
hitherto has been lacking in Myanmar where is a need to gradually increase the inclusion of
interview and survey-based research has vulnerable groups in CBDR forums, including
dominated. In the report, Everjust research women and minorities.
insights are supplemented with other recent
studies of access to justice2, and the IRC’s own
work.

2. The formal legal systems

After decades of military rule and a highly township courts and the lower levels, which
politicised judiciary, the GoB judicial system was apply CBDR. In practice, the judicial courts
reformed in 2010 to adhere to the core rule of suffer from a legitimacy crisis. Different logics
law principles of independence, openness and and practices have been inherited from past
the rights of defence and appeal. Another colonial as well as post-colonial military
significant change is that the township courts regimes. Despite reform efforts, courts are
now constitute the lowest level of the judicial associated with corruption, high costs,
system, which previously included people’s inefficiency, and injustices.
courts at ward and village tract levels.
Ordinary citizens experience the legal system as
Today the latter have the mandate to maintain intimidating due to formality, language and fear
law and order and community peace, but they of official authorities. Even legal professionals
are detached from the court system and instead like lawyers have little trust in the court system
administered by the General Administration and often contribute to diverting cases away
Department (GAD). Consequently, there is no from a formal legal process. Ward and village
referral and appeal system between the level dispute resolvers do much the same by

1
For more information see: https://www.diis.dk/en/everjust Myanmar Research) (2014): Between fear and hope: Challenges
2
See Denney, L., W. Bennett and Khin Thet San (2016): Making and opportunities for strengthening rule of law and access to
Big Cases Small and Small Cases Disappear. Experiences of justice in Myanmar. London: Pyoe Pin/DFID; McCartan, B. and K.
Local Justice in Myanmar, MyJustice report, November 2016; Jolliffe (2016): Ethnic Armed Actors and Justice Provision in
MLAW (Myanmar Legal Aid Network) and EMR (Enlightened Myanmar. The Asia Foundation, October 2016.

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recommending parties not to go to court in order have an institutionalised system of referrals and
to avoid wasting time and money. appeals from the village level to the Supreme
Courts. The EAOs grant a wide jurisdiction to
Simultaneously, references to ‘the law’ and to the village level, which can make by-laws and
upper-levels of the state system by ward/village apply customary rules.
dispute resolvers constitute an important ‘back-
up’ for enforcing agreements and decisions The stability established with the ceasefires
outside of the courts. since 2012 has strengthened the EAO justice
systems, including their links to the village level
Legally the GoB judicial system is the only and the use of more formalised procedures. The
official court system in Burma, but de facto the EAO’s constitute an important back-up for
main Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) also village leaders to successfully resolve disputes
have their own justice systems, laws and and enforce village rules.
prisons. The full report looks at the EAO justice
systems of the Karen National Union (KNU), the There is a general impression that the EAO
New Mon State Party (NMSP) and to a lesser systems enjoy more legitimacy among the
degree the Karrenni National Progressive Party ethnic populations than the GoB courts, albeit
(KNPP). villagers in EAO areas also prefer village level
resolutions as a first option. EAO courts are not
They are organised around three levels of associated with high costs and they use
‘justice committees’ or courts with varying levels procedures and languages that ethnic people
of independence from the administrative and can identify with.
armed wings and can bring to trial any criminal
and civil cases. Unlike the GoB system, they

Victim of land confiscation shows her land documents to researcher

Photo: Helene Maria Kyed

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A core weakness of the EAO systems is human mobile or convened without the required judge
resource constraints and institutional instability, and committee members. Because the systems
which creates large variety in how cases are are not officially recognised by the GoB and
tried and reported. There is inconsistent use of territorial boundaries are unclear, there are also
law and legal procedures, which can work many jurisdictional challenges, especially in
positively to support flexibility and negotiated mixed-administered areas. Cases involving
settlements, but which also implies parties from two ethnic groups are complicated
unpredictability. In some areas, courts are to handle.

3. Community-Based Dispute Resolution by Ward and Village leaders

A core characteristic of CBDR in Southeast armed actors (EAO and Tatmadaw) act as third
Myanmar is the large variety of actual practices. party mediators.
Different factors account for this complexity,
including the type of dispute/crime; the socio- 3.2 Organisation
economic position of parties in a case and their
justice preferences and beliefs; the skills and It is rare that village/ward leaders resolve
personality of the dispute resolver, and; the disputes alone without the advice of elders or
available justice forum options and mandates of household leaders but the degree of
local justice providers. This makes it impossible institutionalisation varies. In some GoB areas
to draw up a generic model and fixed typologies there are both examples of village/ward leaders
of CBDR. Not only are there significant who resolve disputes as individuals and
differences between GoB and EAO examples where the leader has decided to form
administered areas but also between rural and a special committee or to invite people close to
urban areas. Even within each of these types of him on a case-by-case basis. This variety
area there is variety. This calls for a kind of reflects that GoB law does not stipulate the
programming that is context-sensitive and formation of local justice committees. By
adjustable to the empirical reality. contrast, the NMSP and the KNU have
established village committees, which include 5-
The full report captures the complexities of 7 members that are selected by the village
CBDR practices, but also traces some trends leader who acts as the chairperson.
and patterns across GoB, KNU, NMSP, KNPP,
and mixed-administered areas. Village leaders are not permitted to resolve
cases without the participation of a minimum
3.1 Local justice providers number of committee members in these areas.
In mixed-administered areas, there is often a
In GoB areas the elected and legally recognised situation of dual-leadership. Where the two
ward and village tract administrators (WA/VTA) leaders have a good relationship, they resolve
constitute the principle local justice providers. disputes together with a committee, but there
Commonly, however, the village leaders (rural), are also situations of disputed leadership, which
100 HH leaders (urban) and strong elders tends to result in the lack of a committee.
(rural/urban) are actually the first instance for
third party resolutions, and if unsuccessful, the 3.3 Women’s participation
case is forwarded to the WA/VTA. Few disputes
proceed further than this level. In EAO areas the Village/ward leadership and membership of
locally elected village headmen or chairmen are committees for resolving disputes tend to be
the principle local justice providers, supported exclusively male. In rare cases, village/ward
by the EAO’s laws. The NMSP also has ‘village leaders do ask a woman to join a hearing to give
tract justice committees’, but these cannot issue advice in disputes involving women. The only
punishments. In fewer cases, actors who are not exception is in KNU administered areas, where
considered justice providers, like women’s the Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO) has
groups, monks, paramilitaries, and individual been empowered since 2012 to receive

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complaints directly from women and to mediate villagers or kin (related to inheritance, divorce,
disputes as a member of the village committee. and disputed land/household plots), and debt
disputes (related to informal moneylending).
3.4 Official mandates of local justice Debt cases are most prevalent in urban GoB
providers areas. Other cases resolved inside the village or
ward, but that are less common include: thefts,
Apart from stipulating that WA/VTAs should physical fights, public nuisance, and arson.
maintain community peace, security, law and Murder, land confiscations by external actors
order, and discipline, GoB law does not define and drug trafficking are as a rule not resolved at
their specific mandates for dispute resolution, village or ward levels, even though the latter two
including what disputes they can resolve and are increasing. Rape is a more blurred category.
how. By contrast, NMSP and KNU laws, Some village/ward leaders try to resolve rape
stipulate what types of crimes and degrees of cases through compensational justice if the
penalties the village level can deal with. victims’ families prefer this, while others insist
on forwarding rape cases to police or an upper-
They can decide all civil cases, however not level court.
involving suits above a stipulated value. Village
justice providers have the mandate to make by- A specific trait of NMSP and KNU villages, are
laws, approved by the EAO, and to issue offences related to a set of written village rules.
punishments. Despite this level of legislation, These largely relate to morally inappropriate
there is high flexibility in practice, and not all behaviour, like prohibitions on alcohol sale and
village leaders have written copies of the laws abuse, gambling, speaking disrespectfully,
and criminal procedures. driving irresponsibly and/or at specified times,
roaming of animals, and touching unmarried
3.5 Links to a state system women. These offences are treated as public
crimes and are punished, not mediated. The
There is no referral and appeal system between EAOs back these village rules.
WA/VTA level and the GoB courts. The law only
stipulates that leaders at these levels should 3.7 Dispute resolution procedures and
collaborate with the police in information methods
gathering and arrests. In practice, WA/VTAs
sometimes send and accompany parties to the Mediation and reconciliation, with an emphasis
judicial system, but their recordings of pre- on reaching a consensus-based agreement
hearings and prior decisions are not included in between the parties and avoiding conflict
court processes in any institutionalised way. escalation, are used across all areas. However,
This contrasts with the NMSP and KNU system, to varying degrees this is combined with
where the village committees are an integrated arbitration. Where a perpetrator is identified and
part of the justice system in the sense of asked to admit guilt, such as in theft and debt
referrals and appeals. There are procedures in cases, mediation takes the form of negotiating
place for sharing records and forwarding cases the value of a compensation. In NMSP and KNU
to higher levels, but in practice human resource areas, arbitration is more frequent because
constraints and the mobility of court locations village justice providers can issue punishments.
means that there is often a variety of ways that Each party is heard one by one in front of the
cases reach the higher courts. In mixed- other, and commonly relatives on each side act
controlled areas, some village leaders fear as witnesses. One exception is the NMSP at
forwarding cases to higher levels due to the VTA level, where parties are commonly heard
situation of dual-subordination. separately.

3.6 Types of disputes and crimes Evidence is rarely used, but where documents
exist, these are scrutinised in debt, marriage
The most common disputes resolved through and land disputes. This is much less the case in
CBDR across all areas are marriage disputes rural villages because of lesser existence of
(including divorce, quarrels, adultery and documents. Village elders may be consulted as
domestic violence), land disputes between a kind of evidence-building. The atmosphere is

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informal and there is a large space for written guidelines and rules of conduct for
participation in the negotiation of a final dispute resolution procedures identified.
settlement but the justice providers do also
intervene to set the appropriate tone and 3.9 Remedies and punishments
suggest settlements.
Apart from compensation, the GoB village and
Threats of sending a case to a higher-level court ward leaders as a rule do not issue
or the police is an integrated part of trying to punishments, although this did occur in the past
make the parties agree to a settlement and/or (like the use of foot lock and temporary
for an offender to agree to pay compensation. In detention). This differs significantly from KNU
GoB areas these threats carry less weight and NMSP villages, where fines, communal
because in reality few cases are transferred. labour and, for NMSP villages, foot locks are
More often the WA/VTAs simultaneously used, sometimes in combination with and
threaten and encourage victims not to go to the sometimes as a substitute for compensation.
formal system. In EAO areas, where there are A warning system where justice providers get
more institutionalised links to the EAO justice the parties to sign a promise letter, Kahn Wan,
system, such threats are seen as more to avoid repeat offences and/or to ensure that
effective. The use of written records, complaints compensation is paid exists in all areas, but how
and other bureaucratic documents is more it is applied varies. In GoB areas if a perpetrator
frequent in GoB areas at Ward and Village Tract breaks the Kahn Wan, the only option is to
levels, but in all areas, it is only the case type forward the case to the police or administration,
and the final decision that is recorded, not the and this is often ineffective. In NMSP and KNU
actual proceedings of the dispute resolution areas, the village justice providers can issue a
process. Parties to a dispute are asked to sign community punishment, which tends to make
that they agree with the final settlement, but it is the warning system more efficient. In NMSP
only in GoB Ward and Village Tract levels that villages, property is also used as collateral in the
forms with official stamps are used for this Kahn Wan. There was no evidence of physical
purpose. punishments. In all areas, it is common for
dispute resolvers to consider the economic
3.8 Norms, rules and laws situation of the losing party when deciding on
compensation and payment method.
In GoB areas the WA/VTA say that they use a
combination of GoB law and customary law, but 3.10 Service fees
there was no evidence found of any literal
application of written law. Common sense, The majority of local justice providers in GoB
experience, advice from elders, and scattered areas charge fixed fees for resolving a dispute
and varied knowledge about certain law articles when parties make a complaint, although this is
are the primary sources of norms and rules not official. This is not the case in EAO villages,
applied. Reference to GoB law is used as a but ‘thank you’ contributions may be given to the
threat to get parties to agree to a negotiated justice providers after a case is concluded.
settlement, rather than as a legal instrument to Payments are as a rule only considered bribery
decide cases. This is especially the case in if done secretly and/or during a dispute
urban wards where there is a higher level of resolution process.
formality and use of documents. In NMSP and
KNU areas, there are written village rules, which 3.11 Complaints and reporting of cases
are publicly displayed and literally applied.
Reference to EAO laws are done in much the In GoB areas, a dispute resolution process
same was as with GoB law in GoB areas, and depends on a complaint being reported to the
although some village leaders do have copies of WA/VTA, but in KNU and NMSP villages, the
the law, they do not use them literally. Unwritten justice committee can directly charge a person
customary and religious norms also influence who for instance has committed adultery (KNU)
decisions, such as avoiding divorce, using or broken the village rules (KNU/NMSP),
spiritual oaths and ritual community offerings. In independently of a victim, where this applies.
none of the areas under research were any

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Complaints can be made directly to the village village or ward leader and may accompany
or ward leader, but it is very common that a them there to make them feel more comfortable
party to a dispute first shares his/her case with and safe. When a complaint is made, there is
an informal ‘justice facilitator’, who they trust typically a pre-hearing of the complainant, but to
and/or think have the capacity to help them to what extent this is recorded varies and depends
bring the case towards a resolution. on literacy levels. In urban GoB areas,
These may be family members, neighbours, complaints are more formal and summons
elders, women’s groups, religious leaders, letters are written and have official stamps.
household leaders, educated persons, Different actors are engaged to summon the
paramilitaries, and in rarer cases community- parties, ranging from the use of household
based organisations. In some situations, these leaders, elders, and paramilitaries where these
facilitators help a party to report the case to the exist

4. Justice facilitators and informal justice providers

While ward and village leaders constitute the Such facilitators include: religious leaders,
primary justice providers, many victims and especially monks; astrologers or fortune-tellers;
disputing parties also make use of ‘justice women’s organisations (GoB or ethnic-based);
facilitators’ who may also act as informal justice CBO actors; political party members; elders; 10
providers. They give advice, confidence and and 100 household leaders; paramilitaries;
support before a case is reported to a justice educated and well-connected persons, and;
provider. armed actors.

They help make connections, write complaint Some individuals combine the use of different
letters, gather information, give spiritual justice facilitators and providers, giving way to a
guidance and protection, and/or help to put kind of ‘forum shopping’. The use of justice
pressure on the relevant persons to enforce a facilitators constitutes a complex and very
decision made by a justice provider. The use of significant layer of access to justice in Southeast
justice facilitators is most prevalent in GoB and Myanmar, which can both substitute for and
mixed-administered areas, when cases are facilitate a third party resolution.
complicated and/or when parties to a dispute
fear to report a case to a third party or distrust
their village or ward leader.

5. Justice perceptions and preferences

A focus on how CBDR works in practice, should purpose of justice is to ‘make big cases small
not distract from the empirical reality that many and small cases disappear’.
people prefer not to report disputes and crimes
at all, not even to village and ward justice This supports a preference for social harmony
providers. Many prefer to internalise the and reconciliation. Bringing ones dispute into
problem and make peace with it, which some the public realm, by reporting to a third party, is
combine with seeking spiritual remedies to ease associated in the first instance with conflict-
the suffering, for instance through prayer or by escalation, which causes feelings of shame and
addressing a religious or spiritual actor. Cultural loss of dignity. Such feelings are stronger, if
and religiously informed perceptions of parties fail to resolve a dispute within their own
problems and injustices as the result of fate, village or neighbourhood, through a consensus-
misfortune and, for Buddhists, past life deeds, based agreement. Going to a higher authority,
inform the tendency not to seek remedies. like the police or court, equals escalation of
There is also a shared cultural notion that the conflict and more shame.

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These cultural and religious norms are
widespread among female and male villagers in
Mon and Karen State, Christian as well as
Buddhist, but tend to influence the practices of
vulnerable groups like poor minority migrants
and women more strongly. A plausible reason
for this is that the cultural and religiously
informed perceptions of problems and justice,
often are reinforced by other factors, such as
fear of authority and formality, disbeliefs in just
outcomes, and consideration of financial costs
and time, which affect vulnerable groups more.
KNU village rules displayed at village entrance
Combined, these factors support the use of Photo: Helene Maria Kyed
CBDR within the local community as the
preferred justice option, but they also highlight
the need for international support to CBDR to be
sensitive towards people’s reluctance to seek
third party mediation.

6. Strengths of CBDR

The most important strength of CBDR in  CBDR is less costly and/or less time-
Southeast Myanmar is the fact that it is the consuming than going to the formal system
preferred justice option for the vast majority of outside the community.
urban and rural citizens if and when they seek a
third party resolution. Even if the formal justice  Although the sustainability of resolutions in
system worked in accordance with international CBDR forums vary, there is a general sense
rule of law standards, multiple factors suggest that negotiated settlements are more
that CBDR would still be relevant: effective for reaching a final decision. CBDR
providers support quick solutions.
 Culturally informed feelings of shame and
loss of dignity associated with making a case  CBDR can prevent the escalation of local
public are lower when disputes and crimes conflicts.
are resolved inside a person’s own village or
neighbourhood.

 Religious and culturally informed preferences

for reconciliation and consensus-based
agreements, including compensational
justice, rather than seeking punitive justice,
supports CBDR mechanisms.

 Fear of higher-level authorities and formality

creates a preference for CBDR, which is
conducted in largely informal ways and in a
relaxed, familiar environment, where the
parties often know their local justice provider.

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7. Limitations of CBDR

The most significant weakness of current CBDR

forums in Southeast Myanmar is the lack of  Village and ward justice providers cannot
transparent guidelines and rules of conduct for deal with big cases that involve powerful
how disputes are resolved. Many people are not external actors, including land grabbing
fully aware of what they can expect from a and drug-trafficking, which is creating
CBDR process, and there are no clear frustration among many community
mechanisms for holding justice providers members who see these problems as
accountable. the most severe. Inaction by local justice
providers creates suspicion that they are
One reason for this is the volatility of the wider involved in the big cases.
political context, which positions local justice
providers in a precarious position with no clear  Village leaders in EAO areas find it
mandates and backing from higher-level difficult to handle cases involving
authorities and the official law. This is most persons that are not from their own
prevalent in mixed-administered areas where ethnic group, often leaving these cases
there is dual-subordination, but it is also the unresolved.
case in many GoB areas, because of the
unclear legal framework.  Varied knowledge of and insecurity
about the official mandates of local
Other limitations include: justice providers, especially in GoB and
mixed-administered areas.
 Weak enforcing power for outcomes and
agreements, especially in GoB areas  Low or no participation of women in
where there is no option for community CBDR, with the exception of some KNU
punishments and the formal system villages.
does not work as an effective back-up. In
mixed-administered areas, local leaders
often fear to enforce decisions because
of dual subordination.

 Fairness of dispute resolution depends

on the attitude and personality of the
individual leader and/or his committee,
rather than on any institutionalised
accountability mechanisms. Elections of
leaders are insufficient to avoid bribery
and discrimination.

Community-Based Dispute Resolution Page 13

8. Recommendations

Despite the identified weaknesses, CBDR

practices in Southeast Myanmar provide a solid
basis for supporting access to justice. The IRC
should work with the grain, rather than
implement new parallel institutions and train in
abstract legal concepts. Working with the grain
implies an inclusive and participatory approach,
which takes its point of departure in facilitating
reflective dialogues about existing CBDR
practices that already work, using case
scenarios and role-plays.

A good place to begin is with success stories,

before moving on to identify areas for
improvement. It is important to conduct activities
inside the selected villages and wards. The
circle of participants should be gradually
broadened, from identified justice providers and
their advisors to a broader representation of
Karen Women Organisation village
citizens, including vulnerable groups. A
leader with the register of cases
thorough understanding of the local political Photo: Helene Maria Kyed
landscape is crucial for ensuring that informal
powerbrokers and justice facilitators, who in
explicit and implicit ways influence access to  Trust and confidence building in seeking
justice, are also targeted. third party resolutions, like insuring
confidentiality in CBDR processes and
Specific entrance points for support may include providing information about available
the following: options, is a more sustainable approach
than trying to push people to report
 Help develop transparent and easily cases, which may cause feelings of
understandable CBDR guidelines and shame and loss of dignity.
rules of conduct that are publicly
available and communicated during  Encourage an incremental approach to
CBDR processes. These should also the inclusion of women and minorities in
include safeguards against corruption dispute resolution forums. Rather than
and complaint mechanisms to improve immediately installing women as
local accountability. decision-makers or using quotas, women
could begin by taking advisory roles after
 Legal rights awareness that focuses on participating in training and dialogues.
enhancing people’s awareness of their
right to seek justice should be sensitive
 Support women’s protection by brokering
to cultural and religiously informed
open debates about gender-based
understandings of problems and conflict.
violence and discrimination in non-
Rather than lecturing in abstract,
confrontational ways: rather than begin
legalistic definitions of justice and rights,
with defining domestic violence as a
support should broker conversations
crime punishable by law, begin a debate
about what justice means to people and
about problems associated with
what realistic options they have
marriage disputes.
available.

Community-Based Dispute Resolution Page 14

 There is also a risk that GoB actors could see
 Help create community awareness of the current support to CBDR in EAO areas as
fact that village/ward providers cannot political support to the EAO state systems. It is
resolve big issues like drug trafficking therefore important to liaise with state-level
and land confiscation, and assist local governments to ensure that they understand the
providers in identifying and linking up benefits of programme activities for ordinary
with NGOs and other relevant citizens and for avoiding escalation of local
organisations that can help address conflicts.
these politically sensitive issues.
Sustainable support to CBDR requires strong
 Support awareness of official laws and investments in obtaining context-specific
linkages to the formal legal system, in knowledge, trust-building and broad-based
ways that do not lead to unrealistic participation, which are time-consuming. There
expectations of justice outcomes in the is a therefore a risk of spreading out support
formal system. Enhance the knowledge activities across too many villages and wards.
of local justice providers to provide This calls for the selection of a few targeted
informed alternative options to the areas, and gradual scaling-up within a realistic
parties, rather than using references to time-line. A legalistic approach to access to
the law and the official system as justice that pushes people to seek third party
threats. Convene dialogue meetings at resolutions and short-time frames that do not
village/ward level with formal justice adequately build up trust in available CBDR
system actors to discuss transfer options options, risk doing harm and excluding people
and to build trust. Including existing, from obtaining desirable outcomes.
informal justice facilitators in these
activities is crucial.

 Integrate ongoing learning and research

into programme activities to ensure that
activities are based on actual practices
and experiences and adjusted to the
continuously changing environment.
While surveys can be useful to establish
base-lines, these should be combined
with more in-depth qualitative dialogues
and exercises where villagers/ward
residents talk about actual cases and
their justice perceptions. More research
should be done on the gendered-aspects
of CBDR, on villages in Kayah state, and
on the justice seeking practices and
perceptions of Hindu and Muslim
minorities.

8.1 Risks and risk mitigation

The transitional context of Myanmar/Burma

presents good opportunities for influencing
positive changes, but also poses risks. The
future roles and official mandates of current
CBDR actors in GoB and EAO areas are
unclear, and may change during the course of
new reforms and peace negotiations. This
should be factored into programme objectives.

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