Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez (Joan) 13 Jan 1992 MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman Regalado, J.

Type of Action: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the addendum FACTS: Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, was charged with three criminal cases: o Case No. 16698: Defensor-Santiago approved the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. Said approval was violative of Executive Order No. 324, which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to said aliens. o Case No. 91-94555: In conspiracy with Daisy Montinola (Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry) and Fermin Pacia (employee of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation), Defensor-Santiago violated PD No. 46 by soliciting and receiving money, gifts and other valuable things from several Filipino and foreign businessmen the same being given by reason of their respective official positions for past favor and expected favor and better treatment in the future from said accused. o Case No 91-94897: Defensor-Santiago was charged of libel for, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malice aforethought calling, uttering, stating, imputing and making scurrilous and defamatory statements against Maria S. Tatoy, by portraying the latter, then Chief of the Certificate Section, Commission on Immigration and Deportation to be 'a corrupt employee, a perennial trouble-maker who has filed administrative cases against all the commissioners under whom she served' and the Certificate Section of which she was the head as 'not only useless but the most corrupt unit in the CID.' SC issued a temporary restraining order on May 24, 1991, ordering the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, to respectively cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Informations Nos. 11698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e) and 91-94555 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 46. It took into consideration the fact that, according to Defensor-Santiago, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency. Defensor-Santiago filed the instant petition seeking to prevent respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from proceeding against her in an oppressive and vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to her constitutional rights, and also posited that her present recourse should be considered as an exception to the general prohibition against petitions of this nature in criminal cases. Her arguments are as follows: o In filing the criminal informations, respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Specifically, the criminal charges are meant and intended to harass her as a presidential candidate, in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." o The Ombudsman violated the very essence of fair play by choosing to file the informations at a time when petitioner was clearly disadvantaged by the injuries which she sustained in a vehicular accident, and only after 3 years from the time the 16 charges were initially filed in 1988 by disgruntled employees of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID);

o o o o

In filing the criminal informations just a year before the presidential elections, respondent Ombudsman in effect wants to detain petitioner by reason of her political aspirations. The donations received were not for personal use but were distributed to the CID employees in a raffle held during the CID Christmas party. The legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 was in accordance with the authority vested in her by Executive Order No. 324 and was intended to assure family unity. The defamatory words were made against Maria Tatoy only in self-defense.

Respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor refute the claims of petitioner, explaining in the process the sequence of events: In Cases No. 16698 and No. 91-94555: The charges involved in Criminal Case No. 16698 and No. 91-94555 were taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman upon the same having been published in the Jan. 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. The investigation was originally handled by then Investigator Gualberto de la Llana but, on request of the petitioner, was reassigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon sometime in March,1989. The case was handled by an investigating panel which submitted its draft resolution only on March 29, 1990. After the usual reviews by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, and of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the resolution was submitted for final action of respondent Ombudsman in late March, 1991. "A judicious appraisal of the record resulted in the issuance by the Ombudsman of the Memorandum for the Office of the Special Prosecutor directing the filing of the two informations which have been docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan, and Criminal Case No. 91-94555 of the Manila Regional Trial Court . . . "The said Memorandum is dated April 26, 1991, or two (2) days before petitioner met the vehicular accident on April 28, 1991. "The Ombudsman received the informations prepared by the Office of the Special Prosecutor only on May 13, 1991. Per office routine, after the Ombudsman approved the informations, they were forwarded to the Office of the Special Prosecutor which filed the same in the appropriate courts on May 13, 1991. Conclusion: The record thus attests to the fact that the filing of Criminal Cases Nos. 16698 and 91-94555 was already a settled matter as early as two days before petitioner's unfortunate mishap. Their filing in court was in accordance with routine procedure, and impelled in some way by media's impatient and irritating inquiries as to what respondent Ombudsman had done in the petitioner's cases, induced no doubt by premature persistent false reports that the cases against petitioner had been dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

In the libel case (No. 91-94897): Record will also show that the information in this case could have been filed as early as October 12, 1990 when the resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner for libel was approved by respondent Ombudsman. However, on the day it was to be filed, some lawyers of the petitioner came and asked the respondent Ombudsman to defer the filing of the information inasmuch as they intend to file a motion for reinvestigation, which they did on October 29, 1990. The reinvestigation was denied in a Memorandum dated 25 March 1991 of Special Prosecution Officer Mendoza (approved by respondent Ombudsman on April 22, 1991) and an information was subsequently filed on May 24, 1991. The case had no relation at all to the accident on April 28, 1991. Its filing after that accident was caused by a clearly delaying tactic on the part of the petitioner. It is rather unkind for

petitioner to impute ill-motivation on the part of the respondents for something she herself is to blame. It was Defensor-Santiago, personally or through counsel, who made representations with said respondent which he granted and caused him to defer action for some time on the complaints which were ultimately filed against her.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of injunction or prohibition should be issued given that the cases are criminal in nature HELD: No. The Court cannot subordinate the demands of public interest and policy to the political aspirations of Defensor-Santiago.

RATIO: The Doctrine: The doctrine is that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. Duties and responsibilities of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor: The doctrine is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had authorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to file an information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible official is vested with discretion and is endowed with the competence to determine whether the complaint filed is sufficient in form and substance to merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss the complaint in the first instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions complained of are not illegal, unjust, improper or sufficient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on proper grounds after the requisite investigative and adjudicatory proceedings. But if, as emphasized by respondent Ombudsman, "the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation constitute very valid grounds to charge petitioner Santiago and her coaccused before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts of Manila," no compelling reason would exist for us to rule otherwise. AS FOR THE EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE: o On petitioners claim that the exception to the doctrine applies which is to prevent the strong arm of the law from being utilized in an oppressive and vindictive manner and she who has consistently topped all major presidential surveys from 1990 to 1991 is prejudiced in the presidential surveys by the filing of information, SC held that this is, contextually and for legal intents and purposes herein, a mere verisimilitude. The Court cannot subordinate the demands of public interest and policy to the political aspirations of Defensor-Santiago. There is nothing to show that the informations in question were filed with the vindictive intention to oppress, harass and discriminate against her or to violate her constitutional rights. It is significant that she failed to impute, much less prove, any ill-motive. Respondent Ombudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why, he "has no purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's aspirations for the highest position in the land." The facts of record are sufficient to engender a well founded belief that each of the crimes charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is the requisite quantum of evidence at this posture of each of said cases. The asseverations of petitioner which we note have previously been raised during the preliminary investigation. She will, of course, have all the opportunity to ventilate and substantiate the same in the proceedings before and/or during the trial of these cases in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and fora for the adjudication thereof. SC approved the Comment of Ombudsman (Re: No denial on Defensors part):

o o

"In her Petition and in the Addendum hereto, the petitioner had not made any denial of the operative facts on the basis of which the charges have been filed. "Thus, in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for a violation of P.D. 46, petitioner admits the solicitation of donations and the giving of the same by those from whom such donations were solicited. Petitioner justifies the said act by claiming that the donations were not given for her 'personal use' but for the purpose of the Christmas Party of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Whether this claim would negate the applicability of P.D. 46 would involve an inquiry into certain facts which could only be ascertained during the trial of the case. Significantly, petitioner had not denied that the solicitation of said gifts was at her instance. "With respect to Criminal Case No. 16698 for a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner has also not denied that she admitted and approved the legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, which act is contrary to the express provision of Executive Order No. 324. She reasons out her doing so by putting forth certain alleged principles and provisions of the same Executive Order which could be interpreted as giving her such authority to disregard the express prohibition in Executive Order No. 324. Again, these are matters of defense which the petitioner should prove during the trial. "In the libel case, petitioner likewise admits having uttered the words constituting the bases thereof in a television interview. She does not deny its libelous nature. She claims justification for having uttered the defamatory words against complainant Maria Tatoy on the ground of self-defense.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition and the addendum thereto are hereby DISMISSED, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is hereby LIFTED.