SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 75093 February 23, 1990

DELIA R. SIBAL, Petitioner, vs. NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA, NATIONAL

Semproniano S. Ochoco for petitioner. chanrobles virtual law libr ary

Williard B. Riano for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Delia R. Sibal prays for the reversal of the decision dated
April 11, 1986 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 8, 1982 awarding to petitioner separation pay but
denied her claim (1) for compensation for teaching Health subject to 19 sections; (2) for moral
damages; and (3) negating the existence of unfair labor practice. The within petition further
seeks the reinstatement of petitioner to her former position as school nurse in respondent school
without loss of seniority rights with fun backwages from the date of her illegal dismissal up to
the time of actual reinstatement; and finally, seeks the desistance of private respondent Notre
Dame of Greater Manila from further committing unfair labor practice. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual la w library

The prefatory facts and proceedings as aptly summed up by the Solicitor General and which
stand undisputed are:

Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was employed as school nurse by private respondent Notre Dame of
Greater Manila starting January 1973. Prior to school year 1976-1977, she was compensated on a
12-month basis, although she worked only during the ten-month period of classes. She was not
required to report for work for the entire Christmas and summer vacations. However, on March
10, 1976, respondent's director, Fr. Enrique Gonzales, requested her to shorten her summer
vacation, from two weeks after the last day of classes to two weeks before the first day of classes
of the next school year. Petitioner acceded to the request (Rec. p. 246). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Sometime in April 1980, Fr. Gonzales required petitioner to report during that summer to help in
the library. In a letter dated April 11, 1980, petitioner contested the order, stating that it will
necessitate a change in the terms and conditions of her employment and that library work is alien
to her profession as nurse (Rec. p. 45). Fr. Gonzales relented. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In November 1980, Fr. Gonzales was replaced by Fr. Pablo Garcia, an American, as new
director. Fr. Garcia required petitioner to report for work during the summer before the
beginning of school year 1981-1982. Petitioner informed him that her contract does not require
her to report for work during the summer vacation. Fr. Garcia promised to verify her allegation.
However, he failed to inform petitioner of his findings. Thus, in order that her failure to report
for work may not be misinterpreted, petitioner filed leaves of absence extending from April 1,
1981 to June 14, 1981 (Rec. pp. 223-225). Petitioner failed to receive her vacation pay. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

During school year 1981-1982, petitioner was assigned to teach health subjects to 900 students
spread out in nineteen (19) sections of the entire high school department. This situation came
about because the two (2) teachers of the health subjects had left the school. Petitioner, however,
was not given compensation for teaching, notwithstanding the fact that other teachers were duly
compensated for extra work done. During that school year petitioner tried to arrange for a
meeting with Fr. Garcia regarding her vacation pay, but to no avail because Fr. Garcia was
always busy. In October 1981, Fr. Garcia suffered a heart attack which necessitated his
hospitalization. In December 1981, petitioner received her 13th month pay which was computed
on the basis of a 10-month period only. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On April 5, 1982, Fr. Garcia again required petitioner to work during that summer to update all
the clinical records of the students (Rec. p. 242). In a letter dated April 7, 1982, petitioner
objected to the order by reiterating that her contract does not require her to report for work
during summer. In addition, she reminded Fr. Garcia that she had not received any compensation
for teaching health subjects the past school year (Rec. p. 6). On the same day, Fr. Garcia replied
in a letter to the effect that it was imperative for her to report for work during the summer
because it is the best time to update the clinical records when no students could disturb her. Also,
petitioner was not entitled to extra compensation for teaching because teaching was allegedly
part of her regular working program as a school nurse (Rec. p. 221). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On April 14, 1982, petitioner, apart from reiterating her objection to the order, called the
attention of Fr. Garcia to the school's failure to pay her salary for the summer of 1981 and of the
deficiency in her 13th month pay for that year (Rec. p. 8). The following day, Fr. Garcia
adamantly refused to consider petitioner's demands and threatened to take drastic measures
against her if she remains obstinate in her refusal to follow his order to report for work that
summer (Rec. p. 243). This letter was followed the next day by a memorandum to the same
effect (Rec. p. 244). In a letter dated April 19, 1982, petitioner, for the fourth time, informed Fr.
Garcia that her contract does not require her to report for work during summer, and she does not
intend to do so that summer of 1982 (Rec. p. 241). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Failing to receive the compensation demanded, May 10, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for
non-payment of the following; (1) vacation pay for four (4) summer months; (2) compensation
for teaching health subjects; and (3) deficiency in the 13th month pay for 1981 (Annexes A, B,
petition). Summons was served on respondent school on the opening day of classes on June 14,
1982 (Rec. p. 19). That very day when petitioner reported for work, respondent school served
petitioner her letter of termination effective immediately and it also submitted a copy of the
termination paper to the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) (Rec. pp. 218- 219). The
following day, petitioner filed an amended complaint, adding two more charges: illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice (Annex C, D, petition). For the next four to five weeks, more than 20
teachers and personnel, backed up by the Faculty Association of respondent school, pressed for
the ouster of Fr. Garcia with the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports (MECS) by virtue of
PD 176 and the following charges: oppressive behavior, arrogance, contempt for Filipinos in
general and Filipino teachers in particular; unfairness in dealing with personnel; dictatorial
conduct; and use of abusive language (See Annexes A to F of Annex F, petition). Fr. Garcia was
eventually replaced on September 8, 1983. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the meantime, respondent school filed its position paper on June 29, 1982, while petitioner
filed hers on July 1, 1982 (Rec. pp. 22, 210). In the hearing of July 13, 1982, petitioner directed
clarificatory questions to Miss Cristina Sison, corporate secretary of respondent school (Rec. pp.
57-141). On July 27, 1982, respondent filed its memorandum, while petitioner filed hers on
August 2, 1982 (Rec. pp. 142, 162). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On October 8, 1982, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision. Petitioner filed a memorandum of
partial appeal on November 11, 1982 (Annex F, petition). Respondent filed opposition to the
appeal on January 5, 1983. On January 18, 1983, petitioner filed reply to the opposition. In an
urgent ex parte manifestation dated September 20, 1983, petitioner informed the NLRC that Fr.
Pablo Garcia had been replaced by Fr. Jose Arong, a Filipino, as new director effective
September 8, 1983 (Annex G, petition). On April 11, 1986, public respondent NLRC rendered
the questioned decision which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. (Rollo, pp. 131-136).

Petitioner thus resorted to this petition which she filed on July 15, 1986. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner and both the Solicitor General and public respondent NLRC have narrowed down the
issues for resolution to the following:

1. Whether or not the award of separation pay instead of reinstatement is the proper remedy
under the circumstances; c hanrobles virtual law library

2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects; and chanrobles virtual law library

3. Whether or not unfair labor practice existed which would entitle petitioner to moral damages.

For the affirmative resolution of the aforestated issues, petitioner alleges the following:

1. Respondent NLRC failed to give full respect to the constitutional mandate on security of
tenure when the majority decision affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter separating and, in
effect, dismissing petitioner on the basis of her perception that petitioner and the director could
no longer work harmoniously. The award of separation pay would defeat and render nugatory the
Constitutional guaranty of security of tenure. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. Petitioner is entitled to compensation relative to her teaching job which is distinct and separate
from her duties as school nurse. chanroblesvirtualaw library chanrobles virtual law library

3. Petitioner was, from the very start, subjected to harassment and fabricated charges. She had
suffered and continues to suffer from the time of her dismissal on June 14, 1982 up to the
present. She must be entitled to an award of moral damages.
Public respondent NLRC, however, submits the following:

1. The relationship between petitioner and respondent school had come to the point that
reinstatement of petitioner would cause undue burden on both parties. It would affect petitioner's
performance of her duties as school nurse and private respondent's business. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. Teaching health subjects is allied to petitioner's job as school nurse, particularly so when the
same is done within the official eight (8) working hour schedule. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. Petitioner failed to prove her membership in a union. There was no union among the
employees of the school in which case the instances where unfair labor practice may be
committed, with the exception of one instance, and predicated on the existence of a union, would
not apply. Private respondent has not been found guilty of unfair labor practice and it, therefore,
follows that she is not entitled to moral damages.

This Court finds merit in the petition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Labor Arbiter herself had found that the termination of petitioner was not supported by any
just cause or reason. Yet, she erroneously ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement with
backwages based on the alleged reason that petitioner's working relations with the former
director, Father Garcia, had become so strained and deteriorated that it became impossible for
them to work harmoniously again. And the NLRC affirmed such finding which is untrue and
merely speculative. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It should be noted that the alleged conflict between the petitioner and the director was strictly
official in nature, the cause of which was the violation of the terms of employment by the latter.
Petitioner's assertion of her right to unpaid salaries and bonus differential was not motivated by
any personal consideration. Rather, she simply claimed benefits which, under the law, she was
entitled to and legally due her. In her act of asserting these money claims, petitioner observed
utmost tact, courtesy and civility so as not to unduly offend the sensibilities of the director by
waiting for his frill recovery from his illness before sending her formal letter of demand; and
only after the school refused to satisfy her money claims did she file the formal complaint with
the proper NLRC branch. Ironically, however, the director gave her a downright shabby
treatment by terminating her services without prior notice and without first filing a case against
her wherein she could have defended herself . The school did not even give credit to her more
than nine (9) years of continuous service. Petitioner's termination was a blatant disregard of due
process and Constitutional guarantee of protection to labor. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, in the case of Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. (145 SCRA 268), this Court held that
one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right", and the wrongful
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the
protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Significantly, about a month after petitioner's termination on June 14, 1982, more than twenty
teachers and personnel of respondent school, backed by the Faculty Association, petitioned for
the ouster of Director Fr. Garcia for serious charges under P.D. 176. Consequently, Fr. Garcia
was replaced on September 8, 1983. Clearly, therefore, when the assailed NLRC decision was
rendered on April 11, 1986, the alleged "strained relations" or "irritant factors" which the Labor
Arbiter capitalized on had been totally eliminated. Respondent NLRC obviously failed to
consider this and thus perpetuated the error committed by the Labor Arbiter in her prior decision.
The eventual replacement of Fr. Garcia all the more confirmed the discriminatory and oppressive
treatment which he gave petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The dissenting NLRC Commissioner aptly observed thus:

Moreover, it should be emphasized, that no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal
act of asserting ones right, such as in the instant case, for otherwise, an employee who shall
assert his/ her right could be easily separated from the service by merely paying his/her
separation pay on the pretext that his/her relationship with his/her employer had already become
strained.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To Our mind, strained relations in order that it may justify the award of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement with backwages, should be such, that they are so compelling and so serious in
character, that the continued employment of an employee is so obnoxious to the person or
business of the employer, and that the continuation of such employment has become inconsistent
with peace and tranquility which is an Ideal atmosphere in every workplace. (pp. 98-99, Rollo)

The respondent NLRC erred is sustaining the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner is not entitled
to compensation for teaching health subjects allegedly because petitioner taught during her
regular working hours; the subject Health is allied to her profession as nurse; and she and
respondent school had no clear understanding regarding extra compensation. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General who normally and expectedly speaks for the NLRC has ably refuted the
position taken by the latter. The Court thus finds valid and decisive the following submission of
the Solicitor General:

It is submitted, however, that petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects.
Although the subject taught is Health and allied to her profession, and is taught during regular
working hours, petitioner's teaching the subject in the classroom and her administering to the
health needs of students in the clinic involve two different and distinct jobs. They cannot be
equated with each other for they refer to different functions. Teaching requires preparation of
lesson plans, examinations and grades, while clinical work entails preparation of clinical records
and treating illnesses of students in school. There can be no doubt that teaching health subjects is
extra work for petitioner, and therefore necessitates extra compensation. After all it has been the
practice of the school to pay extra compensation to teachers who were given extra load even
during regular working hours (Annex G of Annex F, Petition). The fact that respondent school
failed to produce the records of those teachers prove that they were paid for extra work. Hence,
petitioner should likewise be paid compensation. (pp. 138-139, Rollo)

It must be noted that petitioner has established that in several precedents, non-teaching personnel
of respondent school who were made to handle teaching jobs were actually paid actual
compensation. Besides, justice and equity demand that since the principle of equal work has long
been observed in this jurisdiction, then it should follow that an extra pay for extra work should
also be applied. chanroblesvir tualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Significantly, this Court has enunciated in the care of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v.
University of Pangasinan (127 SCRA 691) that semestral breaks may be considered as "hours
worked" under the Rules implementing the Labor Code and that regular professors and teachers
are entitled to ECOLA during the semestral breaks, their "absence" from work not being of their
own will. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The records show that when summons with attached complaint of petitioner for money claims
was served on respondent school on June 14, 1982, said respondent, on the very day, gave
petitioner her walking papers. Respondent did not waste any time in dismissing her in brazen
violation of these provisions of the Labor Code, as amended: chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 118 of the Labor Code provides:

Retaliatory measures. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to pay or reduce the wages
and benefits, discharges or in any manner discriminate against any employee who has filed any
complaint or instituted any proceeding under this Title or has testified or is about to testify in
such proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, too, Art. 249 (f) provides:

Art. 249. Unfair tabor practice of employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit
any of the following unfair labor practice. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

(f) to dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having
given or being about to give testimony under this Code, chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx

For the aforestated violations, respondent becomes liable under Arts. 289 and 290 of the same
Code. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This Court has, time and again, condemned illegal termination of services of employees. In
Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment (135 SCRA 167), it
declared that while it is true that it is the sole prerogative of the management to dismiss or lay-off
an employee, the exercise of such a prerogative, however, must be made without abuse of
discretion, for what is at stake is not only private respondent's position (petitioner in this case)
but also his means of livelihood. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In arguing for petitioner's entitlement to moral damages, the Solicitor General has aptly summed
up her plight. The Solicitor General has submitted this valid justification for the award of moral
damages under Art. 1701 of the Labor Code:

Petitioner had been the subject of discrimination for over a year before she was ultimately
dismissed. When she justifiably refused to obey the order to report for work for two summers,
she was not given her vacation pay for both occasions. Unlike her, the doctor and dentist who
worked in the same clinic, were not required to report during summer and were given their
respective vacation pay. Again, petitioner, unlike the teachers who accepted extra load, was not
given extra compensation when she taught health subjects to 900 students for one year. By
withholding such compensation, respondent school stood to gain at the expense of petitioner, the
amount of the salary which it could have paid to two (2) health teachers. Petitioner's 13th month
pay was likewise underpaid because the basis for computation was only ten months, and not one
year as in the case of other regular office personnel. Finally, petitioner's travails culminated in
her unceremonious termination without due process at the beginning of the school year on June
14, 1982, by the service of her termination paper antedated June 11, 1982. Termination without
due process is specifically prohibited by Rule XIV Section 1 under Section 8 of the Rules
Implementing BP Blg. 130:

Security of tenure and due process. - No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized
cause provided by law and after due process.

The series of discriminatory and oppressive acts of respondent school against petitioner
invariably makes respondent liable for moral damages under Art. 1701, which prohibits acts of
capital or labor against each other, and Art. 21 on human relations in relation to Art. 2219 No. 10
and Art. 2220, all of the Civil Code (Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, 18 SCRA 107).
(Rollo, pp. 140-141)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of respondent NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is hereby ordered to REINSTATE petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and with backwages for three (3) years from the time of her illegal dismissal; to
pay her the regular extra compensation relative to her teaching health subjects; and to pay her
moral damages, the amount of which shall be determined by respondent NLRC. Let this case be
remanded to the NLRC for the proper implementation of this decision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. chanro blesvirtuala wlibrary c hanrobles virtua l la w library

Padilla, J., took no part.

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