Other Dark Sides of Resilience Politics PDF
Other Dark Sides of Resilience Politics PDF
Other Dark Sides of Resilience Politics PDF
Siobhan McDonnell
To cite this article: Siobhan McDonnell (2019): Other Dark Sides of Resilience: Politics and
Power in Community-Based Efforts to Strengthen Resilience, Anthropological Forum, DOI:
10.1080/00664677.2019.1647828
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Oceanic people and places are increasingly labelled as either Disaster; resilience;
‘resilient’ or ‘vulnerable’ to disasters and climate change. Resilience vulnerability; Pacific; climate
is often described in disaster discourse as a strategy designed to change
overcome vulnerability by helping communities to ‘bounce back’ in
the wake of ‘natural’ disasters. Using ethnographic research
conducted with Community Disaster and Climate Change
Committees (CDCs) in Vanuatu in the wake of Tropical Cyclone
Pam, this paper seeks to problematise disaster responses that see
the ‘community’ as a space to be acted upon by outsiders, or
where people will respond in a unified way to the challenges of
rebuilding after disaster. Using political ecology framings this paper
critiques the ideas of resilience that appear entrenched in
community-based disaster and climate change adaptation
discourse and practice in Oceania. Rather than presupposing
resilience or vulnerability, this paper details the dispersal and
distribution power and agency amongst individual actors and
groups that either supported or manipulated, the distribution of
goods by Community Disaster Committees. In this way, it moves
beyond the limitations of conceptual framings of resilience in
disaster management and climate change into a more considered
appraisal of power, by exploring what James Ferguson has termed
‘the politics of distribution’ in the context of disaster.
Oceanic people and places are increasingly labelled as either ‘resilient’ or ‘vulnerable’ to
disasters and climate change. This is particularly true of island states, which are often
framed by narratives of ‘sinking’ which are, in turn, powerfully resisted by Oceanic acti-
vists who offer the battle cry: ‘We are not drowning. We are fighting’ (350 Pacific 2013;
Kelman 2018). It is a necessary battle cry, as across Oceania countries are experiencing
the dramatic impacts associated with climate change. These include an increase in
extreme weather events, sea-level rise, changes in temperatures and extreme drought
(UNU-EHS 2016). In Vanuatu, where the research that informs this paper was under-
taken, scientific studies based on the best available data (PACCSA 2014) suggest a
range of climate impacts. Given that annual temperatures have increased in Port Vila
since 1950, further warming and an increase in annual temperatures are anticipated. Sat-
ellite data indicates sea-level rises around the Vanuatu archipelago of around 6 mm per
year since 1993. By 2030, under a high emissions scenario, the rise in sea level is
In this definition, emphasis is placed on the system to efficiently recover from a hazard.
How this is done appears to contain potential contradictions between efforts that ‘pre-
serve’ or ‘restore’ the existing system, thereby maintaining the status quo, and those
designed to ‘improve’. These internal contradictions remain foundational to many discus-
sions of resilience as a conceptual and normative framework designed to create better
development outcomes (see also Dousset and Nayral 2018, 8).
Across Oceania resilience is often represented as a normative framework that attempts
to understand the capacity of individuals and groups to respond to external stresses and
shocks: as their capacity to ‘bounce back’ in response to change (Brown 2014, 108; Harri-
son and Chiroro 2017, 1024). Numerous climate change reports and disaster preparedness
plans highlight the vulnerability of Oceanic countries, particularly low-lying atolls, and
discuss strengthening resilience as a strategic development response. For example, in
accordance with the established IPCC definition, as reflected in the new Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals and agreements under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the Secretariat for the Pacific Community worked with Oceanic states
4 S. MCDONNELL
discourses of vulnerability being attached to whole regions, or nation states. At the time of
writing, Vanuatu has, once again, received the dubious honour of being the country with
the highest exposure to risk of ‘natural hazards’ (United Nations University 2016). This
analysis of risk is related not only to geophysical ‘natural hazards’, the effects of which
have been exacerbated by climate change, but is also based on an assessment of the coun-
try’s vulnerability as assessed in terms of ‘infrastructure, nutrition, living conditions and
economic circumstances’ (United Nations University 2016, 8). This analysis labels
Vanuatu as a country at risk, and the population as vulnerable. Here the vulnerability
of the country is also attached to people who reside within it; it is a definition that is
attached to place rather than to any particular personal circumstances of the population
(Lewis and Kelman 2010, 193). Such index-based analyses can hide more than they dis-
close because they fail to measure the structural factors that contribute to differences in
vulnerability across the population.
assumes that for communities to be strengthened – made resilient – they must be sub-
jected to specialised outside knowledge. To become resilient, the community is acted
upon by experts. Little credence is given in the models to the knowledge and capacity
that might be possessed by people living in villages, for instance indigenous knowledge
in relation to disaster management. Instead, resilience often imposes its own framework
on the existing values, knowledge and agency that are present in local contexts (Weichsel-
gartner and Kelman 2015, 263). In an illustration of the way disasters are ‘rendered tech-
nical’, experts discuss the problems of disaster in technical terms that can be solved by
applying expert-driven solutions (Li 2011). This is not to suggest that expertise is not
useful in the context of disaster responses; rather, it is an attempt to question the assump-
tions behind these ideas of expertise: Who is seen as ‘expert’? And who, by contrast, is
viewed as acted upon.
The first period of ethnographic research undertaken for this paper was conducted in
two villages located on the central island of Efate in 2015, some eight months after Cyclone
Pam. During this period, people on Efate Island, including in these two villages, were also
experiencing the effects associated with a prolonged drought. Interviews were conducted
with 32 people in these communities, including both the Chairman and all members of the
two Committee Disaster Committees (men and women); community members, including
those designated as ‘vulnerable’ during the disaster; chiefs, church leaders as well as men,
women and young people. In addition, separate interviews were undertaken with INGO
staff, including staff within the Vanuatu Red Cross. The 2015 research was followed by
a second and third period of fieldwork conducted in 2017 and 2018, which included a
second round of interviews and discussions with Committee and community members,
as well as feedback workshops with INGO staff in three of the main organisations
located in Port Vila. In total 72 people were interviewed as part of this work. The
names of the communities and all participants have been removed. However, where rel-
evant the position held by a particular person is included so as to situate their perspective.
On Efate Island, Committees were established by the Red Cross who completed two
days of training in each of the ‘vulnerable’ communities, the culmination of which was
the formation of the Committee. The membership of the Committee is limited to those
who attended the training. In each of the locales where the ethnographic research was
undertaken, the Red Cross insisted that membership be based on formal gender equality,
resulting in an initial committee of five men and five women but with a male Chair. Once
Committees are established, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by Red Cross
with the provincial office so as to establish the disaster management hierarchy in relief
efforts. A second Memorandum of Understanding was signed between ‘the community’
and the Red Cross which set out a role of the Committee. However, it was unclear in
research conducted who exactly had signed the MOU as the community representatives.
The Vanuatu Government National Disaster Management Office outlines a herculean
set of tasks as the ‘roles and responsibilities’ of the Committees in relation to disaster risk
reduction and climate change (see Table 1). These large and variable roles appear to be
priority tasks that have been identified as necessary to prepare local populations for
climate change adaptation and disasters. It is worth noting that the Committees are
entirely voluntary and members receive no payment for any tasks that they assist with.
Three separate Committee members describe some of the roles that they performed in
the lead up to Cyclone Pam as follows:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 7
Disaster risk reduction roles: Assist with preparation, response and recovery work ahead of a hazard or disaster,
(2) In the event of an impending particularly with vulnerable community members
disaster
Disaster risk reduction roles: Undertake initial community assessment after an impact of hazard or extreme event
(3) Post-disaster Assist Rapid Technical Assessment teams with assessments
Assist with vulnerability assessments
Assist vulnerable community members go to safe areas
Assist with distribution of relief supplies
Advise community to ‘build back better’ by considering extreme weather events
Committee members to participate in the school safety committee
Source: Vanuatu Government National Disaster Management Office.
My work is to make sure that when the cyclone hits everyone must be inside a good,
strong house and make sure that everyone has enough food and water in their
houses. Our committee is also supposed to check to make sure that all the houses are in a
good condition ahead of the cyclone. We also need to make sure all vulnerable people
with special needs—disabled people—are in safe houses so that they are safe when the
cyclone hits.
CDCs needed to assess which are the strong, safe houses in the community ahead of the
cyclone. Another job that we did was cut down all the trees that could hit houses in the
cyclone.
When the cyclone came we were inside the safe houses, we did lots of preparation
to make sure that all the houses were safe. Through our work preparing the
community only one house was damaged. The community was well prepared when the
cyclone hit.
Operating at the frontline of disaster preparedness and management across a wide array of
tasks, the Community Disaster Committees established across Vanuatu have been widely
credited for saving lives by attending to local preparations in the lead up to the Cyclone
Pam (Handmer and Ivenson 2017; CARE 2016, 39). The unpaid labour of Committees
is clearly an extremely valuable resource that can help to effectively manage disasters
and aid with climate change adaptation projects. However, preliminary research suggests
that Committees may operate more successfully in some villages than others.
8 S. MCDONNELL
This problematic statement suggests both that members will collectively ‘work together’,
and that the desired outcome is to return to the status quo that proceeded the disaster.
Efforts to strengthen community resilience offer a kind of optimistic ‘self-help’ strategy
supposedly designed to counter the effects of the vulnerabilities of a social group that
may otherwise be ‘helpless’ (Lewis and Kelman 2010, 205). However, no amount of
strengthening of community capacity could adequately address the root causes of vulner-
ability of certain cohorts of people living within villages. Evidence from other disaster con-
texts, such as those black communities seriously impacted by Hurricane Katrina in New
Orleans, suggests that communities are not able to be resilient in the face of long-term gov-
ernmental neglect and structural violence (Lewis and Kelman 2010, 205). Similarly, given
the potential long-terms impacts of climate change in the region, resilient discourse may
be setting up Oceanic communities to fail.
The Vanuatu Government Disaster Review Plan also invokes the idea of the hom-
ogenous, unified community with shared characteristics, implying the existence of a
group of individuals that possess a similar set of values and goals (Agarwal and Gibson
1999, 636). In practice ‘communities’ do not exist as coherent identities, but rather
consist of various groups of people with shifting allegiances. In the context of Indigenous
people, idealised visions of shared-community interests are often grafted onto suggestions
of collective approaches to ‘traditional’ governance and resource management that
promote environmental stewardship and community harmony. This vision has long
been critiqued for failing ‘to attend to differences within the communities, and how
these differences affect resource management outcomes, local politics and strategic inter-
actions, as well as the possibility of layered alliances that can span multiple levels of poli-
tics’ (Agarwal and Gibson 1999, 633; see also Green 2016; Li 1996). The imaginary of the
collectively governed, egalitarian community is in practice a space of overlapping and con-
tested interests.
The vision of the community as a unified, collective group has long been attractive to
policy makers involved in arguing for community-based adaptation and resource manage-
ment. However, in practice, efforts to strengthen resilience through community-based
interventions may fail to pay attention to the power and the political leverage of key
actors. In the post-disaster period attention to power is vitally important to ensuring equi-
table access to disaster relief. Political ecology scholars have challenged the conceptual
framings of resilience for failing to pay attention to the role of politics and power relations
(Beymer-Farris, Basset, and Bryceson 2012; Ingalls and Steadman 2016). Political ecology
research considers how social and environmental conditions are constituted through
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 9
unequal power relations, both global and local, by considering the role played by a panoply
of actors operating in ‘historically and culturally constructed fields of power’ (Peluso and
Watts 2001, 25). Post-disaster environments provide an arena for considering the
struggles over scarce, relief-related resources. Developing a community-based committee
approach may permit some members of the community to benefit while at the same time
disadvantaging others.
Building on the challenges posed by political ecology theorists to concepts of resilience,
and on the work of Ferguson (2015) on the ‘politics of distribution’ I seek to describe the
way villages are governed by existing institutions and actors who utilise their own agency
in ways that either support, or circumscribe, ‘top-down’ national approaches to disaster
distribution. The two villages that form the basis of this research present a study in con-
trasts: in one village (termed ‘village A’) the work of the Community Disaster Committee
is highly regarded by chiefs, church leaders, women leaders, youth, and other village
members. In the other village (termed ‘village B’), the work of the Committee has been
repeatedly undermined, and the efforts of the Chairman and other members of the Com-
mittee have been largely discredited.
In the village where the Committee operated well (village A) the members of the Com-
mittee highlighted the importance of the support of chiefs and church leaders in establish-
ing and recognising the role of the Committee. The Committee Chairman describes how
the senior village chief announced the composition of the Committee and the role that the
Committee would play during a number of church services; ‘After the CDC was formed
the chief announced my role as the Chairman, and the other members of the Committee,
in church. He told everyone that they had to support the work of the Committee’. This
early statement of support meant that the Chairman operated with the imprimatur of
the Chief, supported by both local chiefly and religious institutions.
community. Relief efforts operate as a new form of social transfer which, like the presence
of cash transfer systems in certain countries in Africa, may bring with them a particular
‘politics of distribution’ (Ferguson 2015, 10). These new welfare systems, and particularly
those of South Africa and Namibia, are accompanied by a ‘the exhaustion of older forms of
politics and [the] vital possibilities for new ones’ (Ferguson 2015, 14). Like cash transfers,
relief after disaster is provided without any requirement of labour, thereby creating a par-
ticular ‘politics of distribution’.
Exploring the politics of distribution, it is evident that access to resources post-disaster
became a central claim to status and authority within local villages. Ferguson suggests that
the politics of distribution is apparent in ‘new kinds of political claim making’ (Ferguson
2015, 14). More specifically, he describes the politics of distribution as ‘the general pro-
cesses of distribution as they unfold in contemporary societies, and about the sorts of
binding claims and counter-claims that can be made about these processes’ (Ferguson
2015, 20). In the aftermath of the cyclone, the claims of Community Disaster Committees
to represent the legitimate community structure were either supported or contested by
powerful men already embedded in alternative local authority structures. Assuming the
position as Chairman of a CDC became a position of considerable power over scarce
relief resources. In terms of the stipulated role of CDCs, the Chairman has a degree of
access and control over the management of relief efforts at the local scale of the
‘community’.
In the post-disaster context, the position as a Chairman becomes one of elevated status,
which can be supported by the existing leadership and subsumed into already existing
power structures, as occurred in village A. Alternatively, Chairman and committee
members can be viewed as a rival source of authority by local leadership, as occurred in
village B. In this context, Community Disaster Committees can be viewed as externally
imposed on to communities, operating as a challenge to the existing roles and responsi-
bilities of chiefs. The Chairman of the CDC of village B describes the political contesta-
tions surrounding the distribution of goods after Cyclone Pam:
Some chiefs keep pushing to take over the Committee. When the relief supplies came all the
men wanted to be involved. They were cross with me, they came and talked strongly to me. I
was in the chief’s farea sharing the food and they would come and yell at me and I just said, ‘I
am doing my job’.
Here the resources made available in the period post-cyclone provided a channel for the
politics of disaster distribution – the contestations of status and authority accompanied the
distributions of funds, material goods and other offers of assistance at the local scale within
the ‘community’. The politics of distribution is made manifest in the series of political
claims and counter-claims about who is best able to represent the community so as to
access relief supplies.
At the local level, the experience of both the disaster and the relief effort is directly
related to how individuals and family groups are positioned in relation to supportive
social relations as well as economic and political agency (Nadiruzzaman and Wrathall
2015, 196; Watts and Bohle 1993). Villages are dominated by localised leadership and
power structures. Gender, age, local claims to authority such as through chiefly status
or other leadership positions, wealth and status all structure the relative positioning of
individuals and families at the local level. Social relationships and power structures
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 11
have a significant impact on how disaster supplies are distributed. In Vanuatu, claims to
authority over the allocation and distribution of resources were contested between local
customary institutions, provincial agencies and village-based Community Disaster Com-
mittees. In particular, various actors demonstrated their own agency by directly accessing
disaster relief, thereby bypassing the disaster management hierarchy. In village B, the fero-
city of the politics around the distribution of disaster relief was enhanced by the sense of an
imposed structure operating as an alternative to existing institutional authority as rep-
resented by the chiefs and churches. A local chief offers an account of the politics that sur-
rounded the work of the Committee in village B:
With the Cyclone and the relief effort there was a lot of politics. Some men wanted to overrule
the Committee. Some chiefs went directly to Shefa Province to receive the distributions but
Shefa told them that they were not Committee members and they had to go back to the
island.
In this account, the local provincial distribution structure was forcefully adhering to the
operational disaster-management hierarchy, by reasserting the role of the CDCs as the
legitimate community representatives. It also demonstrates the repeated challenges and
counter-claims made by powerful men to the structure imposed by the disaster manage-
ment hierarchy that positioned the Committee as the legitimate community
representatives.
Political ecologists have offered a pointed critique of resilience framings as being ‘naïve
about, or perhaps even unable to engage with, the workings of power’ (Ingalls and Stead-
man 2016, 1; Walsh-Dilley, Wolford, and McCarthy 2013). While offering the intuitive
appeal in highlighting strengths of communities in the face of extreme change, resilience
has been critiqued for its failure to consider how this capacity is contingent on political
and institutional arrangements (Brown 2014, 109), such that the agency of a group or indi-
vidual is configured by gender, race, class dimensions. These issues have prompted politi-
cal ecologists to ask: ‘resilience for what and for whom’ (Friend and Moench 2013, 104;
Brown 2014, 109), to which it is important to add: resilience as defined by whom, and
for what political purpose?
Ethnographic accounts of relief distribution contained in this paper suggest that the
work to strengthen community-based approaches in disaster management and climate
change adaptation can assume a simplistic and idealised vision of people working together
for a common good. These assumptions are particularly problematic in a post-disaster
context where people’s livelihoods are threatened and where existing institutional arrange-
ments and power structures may be challenged. Ideas of a unified, homogeneous ‘commu-
nity’ fail to take into account localised expressions of social structures and power relations
embedded in ideas of gender, status and authority, and the difference and diversity
amongst people. Instead, the concept of community so regularly deployed in policy
praxis as a way of managing disaster and climate change adaptation must be understood
‘as a political association formed through processes of political and cultural creation and
imagination – the generation of meaning in the contexts of unequal power’ (Roseberry
1989, 14). The space of the ‘community’, so reified in disaster-management hierarchies,
is itself an imagined illusion.
In the immediate aftermath of the cyclone, the politics of distribution highlight the con-
tested spaces of the community and the alternate claims made by powerful actors to relief
12 S. MCDONNELL
resources. These actors strategically tried to pas bihaen (pass behind) the Committee to
directly access relief resources. The phrase, however, also implies a subverting of the estab-
lished process for distributing resources. Used in terms of marriage, for example, the
phrase ‘pas bihaen’ means to have extra-marital affairs. Amidst the politics of distribution,
the Chairman and committee members of village B were left with the unenviable position
of trying to defend their position as the representative of the community in the disaster
management hierarchy. Here the Chairman describes his position, at the time:
We signed an MOU with Red Cross to say that after any disaster we would manage the dis-
tribution in the community. But some people wanted to pas bihaen.
Donors want to support people, so they provided resources directly to people. Some men will
just distribute and tell me what they have done after. The Committee distributed the food and
clothing from our Australian friends, but for lots of the other things other men just distrib-
uted them.
The big problem with our work is that all other men pas bihaen the Committee.
We wrote letters to Port Vila or to Shefa Province to make a request for supplies needed to
help with the recovery—things like a chainsaw and generator—but the generator never came
and the chainsaw just pas bihaen. I had to get the chainsaw back from the people who had
taken it.
Now I’m trying to place things that are donated in the clinic so that they don’t get taken by
the chiefs. Chiefs, individuals and church members have all been trying to pas bihaen to get
clothes, food.
In this discussion, the Chairman makes his claim to authority to manage distributions by
referencing the work of international agencies and their processes in legitimating the role
of the Committee as the legitimate community structure. The ‘we’ of this quote is not the
community but rather it is the Committee members themselves who have signed onto the
Memoranda of Understanding. In the face of this imposed community structure, existing
male leaders have chosen to pas bihaen, strategically engaging in challenging the authority
of the Committee by making their own claims to accessing, managing and facilitating relief
efforts. In this way, local powerful men were enacting an alternative idea of the ‘commu-
nity’, one in which they are positioned as the authority figures who can lay claim to the
masculine status associated with managing the distribution of resources to their family
and kinship groups.
As well as undermining the operations of the Committee externally – by accessing relief
efforts directly – the operations of the Community Disaster Committee in village B were
also undermined by critiques from other people living within the village locale. The idea of
the Committee as an imposed structure became evident in the many critiques made by
local chiefs, women and young people of the work of the Committee. Within the village
in the post-disaster period, many people began to challenge the behaviour of the Commit-
tee, and key Committee members, on moral grounds associated with failing to demon-
strate an understanding of kastom. Kastom in this context can be understood as the
‘ways of place’: the correct and proper way of behaving as a person of the place, a man-
ples. Specifically, the Committee was critiqued for not upholding the locally-privileged
kastom moral code of sharing the distribution of goods amongst kin and family. Many
of the same chiefs who had been involved in trying to pas bihaen the Committee to
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 13
access aid were also involved in critiquing the efforts of the Committee to the point where
Committee membership began to decline. In village B, the female members left the Com-
mittee due to the accusations from powerful men that surrounded the distribution of food,
clothes and other material goods.
The outcome of these repeated challenges to the authority of the Community Disaster
Committee in village B was that the Committee was no longer able to perform its role and
functions. In the post-disaster period, in several instances where clothes and other material
goods were distributed, chiefs and other villagers from village B decided that the distri-
bution would be managed by the Committee from village A, rather than their own
CDC. This had two effects. First, it further exacerbated the rivalry between the two villages,
which created a regional discussion around the politics of distribution with suggestions
made that one village benefitted significantly more than the other from relief efforts.
Second, even more concerning, was the human cost in terms of reputational damage as
well as the breakdown in family and kinship ties, associated with the failure of the Com-
mittee in village B to secure the support of powerful chief and church leaders.
As the relief effort progressed, accusations were repeatedly made that the Committee
members in village B were hiding food or acting selfishly in the interests of their own
families, rather than properly managing the distribution of goods for the benefits of all
members of the village. Regardless of whether these accusations were true, they served
to delegitimise the Committee on the basis that they were not upholding local kastom
values. The challenges of powerful men to the operations of the Committee were
deemed morally appropriate by many village members, on the basis that the Committee
had not performed its distribution functions in accordance with the proper practice of
kastom. These challenges also created a significant human cost to the members, and par-
ticularly female members, of the Committee, who were deemed to have managed the dis-
tribution of relief efforts in ways that were self-interested, and who were subsequently
widely regarded by other Community members as immoral and unfair. The second and
third periods of fieldwork conducted as part of this research starkly illustrated one
aspect of this human cost: the Chairman of the village B Committee is no longer living
in the village as a result of the reputational damage of being involved in the relief distri-
bution process. Beyond the Chairman many of the members of the original CDC no longer
want to be involved in Committee work.
to challenge the role of the Community Disaster Committee as the legitimate representa-
tive of the ‘community’. There is a very real human cost to disaster and climate change
adaptation programming that fails to pay attention to the operation of power at the
local scale. In answering the question ‘resilience for whom?’, we need to ask a further ques-
tion: when resilience is based on a model of collective community working together to
‘bounce back’ are there some people disadvantaged, or bearing additional costs? And if
so, how are these costs accounted for in attempts to strengthen resilience? There is a
danger that without attention to power, strengthening the resilience of one group may
come at the cost of another. In this way, community-based approaches to strengthening
resilience may, in practice, actually perpetuate vulnerabilities.
Resilience is the discourse of development in which ‘more is better’. It is aimed squarely
at an audience of international donors, with policy developed to attend to an international,
rather than a local audience. Resilience continues to be defined by an external audience of
INGOs, government and academics with little reference to the actual population that have
experienced either disaster or the ongoing effects of climate change. It is designed to
counter international assessments of ‘vulnerability’, whether based on risk or supposed
individual characteristics such as being female, young, old or disabled. These designations
of vulnerability fail to pay attention to localised structures based on family and kin, cul-
tural norms and existing institutional arrangements. Efforts to strengthen resilience or
address vulnerability must pay more attention to power, institutional and structural
arrangements. In Oceania, efforts to strengthen resilience must be reoriented so as to
involve the local affected population in defining aspects of resilience that are meaningful
in their lives and livelihoods, as they are increasingly affected by ‘natural’ disasters and
climate change.
Resilience narratives that are designed as community-based approaches to disaster
management or climate change adaptation, flatten the local scale into a homogenous
group in which people are supposed to work together around a shared set of values.
Approaches to community-based disaster management and climate change adaptation
also position ‘the community’ as a space to be acted on by external technical knowledge,
strengthened by engagement with external expertise. Rather than viewing the community
as a romanticised space of resilience, the ethnographic research that informs this paper
illustrates how key actors influenced decision-making over the distribution of aid
resources, post-disaster. Establishing Community Disaster Committees without reference
to existing institutional arrangements, or attention to local politics and power, created
contestation over the resources that were distributed in the immediate period after Tropi-
cal Cyclone Pam.
Rather than establishing new externally imposed structures, another model of disaster
distribution at the local level could involve building from existing institutional arrange-
ments. Programming that wishes to address gender equity in terms of distribution could,
for example, work in partnership alongside existing women’s church groups. These partner-
ships would need to be built over time and, would inevitably, involve more than just two
days of training in each village area. Existing church and chiefly institutions are also the
subject of unequal power and politics. However, they are also institutions that have a par-
ticular function and form, and that operate with an existing mandate.
Discussions of resilience can privilege ideas of recovery, rather than any fundamental
change to the system that addresses the causes of the problem. They can thereby create
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 15
a conservative narrative that allows for the continuance of unsustainable practices (Adger,
Brown, and Nelson 2011; Barnett and O’Neill 2010). Returning to the question posed by
political ecology theorists, we need more awareness in disaster and climate change policy
documents around the politics of resilience. We must ask: resilience for whom? Resilience
offers a supposedly apolitical conceptual lens. However, the danger of this framing is that it
can obscure some of global structural inequalities associated with climate change and
disaster.
The most effective way of ensuring the resilience of people in Oceania to the threats
posed by climate change and disaster is to stop global carbon emissions. This geo-political
solution is surely the root cause of climate-related vulnerabilities (Ribot 2014). By contrast,
the language of resilience is, as described in this paper, locates risks and solutions at the
scale of the community: as a strategy designed to address the vulnerabilities of particular
communities. At its most problematic, the concept of resilience offers a morally-loaded
discourse in which the responsibility for the response to disasters can be placed on the
individual or community, with the expectation that they will ‘bounce back’. At the
same time, removing responsibility from the states or the global international community
of polluters who are contributing to issues of climate change and exacerbating the intensity
of ‘disasters’ in Oceania. In its failure to attend to global structural inequalities, resilience
as a conceptual framing can place the burden of disaster management and climate change
adaptation on the same Oceanic populations that are already disproportionately burdened
by the impacts of climate change. There is a representational politics implicit to determi-
nations of who is able to be resilient and how resilience is made manifest, and it is this that
we must carefully consider in approaches that are designed to strengthen community-
based resilience to disasters or climate change.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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