Facts:: GR Nos. 221697, GR No. 221698-700 March 8,2016

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MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700


March 8,2016

Perez, J.:
FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24,
2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually
demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for
good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that
she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents
cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate
for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only
natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical of
Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability
that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said
probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the
1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being
found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements
of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning
to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe
presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.

JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña


G.R. No. 83820 25 May 1990 –Political Law-Citizenship

FACTS:
On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of
Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen.
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the evidence presented, Osmeña maintained
that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio
Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines.

COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof
that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates for obtaining the highest
number of votes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed.
HELD:
Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided for
under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;

2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and

3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.

The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3) mentioned
hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship.

The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law” has no retroactive effect.
The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU VS MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO


GR # L-83882, January 24, 1989 [Naturalization; Express renunciation]

FACTS:

Willie Yu, despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen, applied and renewed his Portuguese passport. Moreover, while
still a citizen of the Philippines, petitioner also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign nationality in commercial documents,
constitute an express renunciation of one’s Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.

HELD:

Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s Philippine citizenship
acquired through naturalization. In a related jurisprudence, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

ANGAT VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 132244, 14 September 1999 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; RA No. 8171]

FACTS:

Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina.
RTC allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC declared him as
citizen of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition should have been dismissed by the court
for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.

RULING:

No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which
has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's order was null and void.
RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for repatriation of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost the Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since these laws could only apply to
persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of
an allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition. Parenthetically, under these
statutes, the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even required to file a petition in court; all he
had to do is to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said oath with the proper
civil registry.

ANTONIO BENGSON III vs HREP ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and Teodoro Cruz


G.R No. 142840 7 May 2001 –Political Law-Citizenship

FACT:

Respondent Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac. Cruz lost his Filipino citizen when
he rendered service in the Armed Forces of America. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630 Sec.1 “Having these taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Pangasinan is deemed to have recovered his original status as natural-born citizen, the Act
of reparation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to
regain his citizenship is untenable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not reparation results in the recovery of the original nationality.

HELD:

Yes, respondent Cruz has not required by law to through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship,
he is perform a natural born Filipino. He possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House
of Representatives.
Natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.” On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law,
which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all contest to the election returns and
qualification of the members of the Congress. HRET court has the power to exercise its corrective power and annulment
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court is judgement. There is no such showing of grave of abuse of
discretion in the case.

Petition was DISMMISSED.

MERCADO VS.MANZANO

307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law – Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance)

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office on the ground
that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local Government Code of
1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective local position.

ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.

HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000

o Principle of jus sanguinis


o How Philippine citizenship is acquired
o Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at
the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since
then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she
ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These
were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was
born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her
birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

TECSON VS. COMELEC


FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31
December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner
Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ
is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:


No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact
that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando
Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in
such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at
the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a
Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution
considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

Labo vs. COMELEC


Facts:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City
on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same
office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground
that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May
9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from
promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11,
1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal
or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in
the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer,
among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent
Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his
proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to implement its
May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already become final and
executory.Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final
and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number
of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be
final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2. WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be
proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec
cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992,
said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the
interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality
on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo,
not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of
no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next
highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he
was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor
in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-
92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City
from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for
his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
• The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
• The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
• On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
• Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar
are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
• Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
• The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
• 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
• 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
• The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
• A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
• Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
• WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
• The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from
China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of
hard work.
• As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
• The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong
Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
• As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
• The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
• Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
• The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his
life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
• On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15,
1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory
and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
• Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.
• After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
• Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since
employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank
of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
• In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed
the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning
of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
• The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

• SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:


1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
• SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
• The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before
that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born
• Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status
to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
• To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is
to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his
father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
• He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957.
• In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
• In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
• The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here
in the Philippines.
• Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of
the oath of citizenship.
• SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after
his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the
Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of
due process because he has already been laid to rest

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American
citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
ARTIVLE IV- CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and

[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

ARTICLE V- SUFFRAGE

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

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