CASE DIGEST ( ARTICLE 4 )

CONCEPT OF RETROACTIVE LAW

A. TAN V CRISOLOGO, G.R. NO. 193993, NOV. 08, 2017

FACTS:
On 19 January 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America (U.S.A.).

On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in Quezon City. She indicated that
she was a Filipino Citizen by birth. Her application was approved by the Election Registration
Board (ERB) on 16 November 2009 making her a registered voter of Precinct 0853-A, Sto.
Domingo, Quezon City.

On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before a notary public in Makati City.

The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. She stated in her petition
that she lost her Philippine citizenship when she became a naturalized American citizen.
However, Tan executed a sworn declaration renouncing her allegiance to the U.S.A.
Thereafter, the BI confirmed her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2010 National Elections
to run as congresswoman for the First District of Quezon City.

On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bingbong" Crisologo (Crisologo) filed a petition

before the MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 37-09-1292, seeking the exclusion of Tan from
the voter's list because (1) she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter; and (2)
she failed to meet the residency requirement of the law.

In her answer, Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been born to Filipino
parents on 1 April 1968. Although she became a naturalized American citizen on 19 January
1993, Tan claimed that since 1996 she had effectively renounced her American citizenship as
she had been continuously residing in the Philippines. She had also found employment within
the country and even set up a school somewhere in Greenhills.
ISSUES:
The pivotal question in this case is whether Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at the
time she registered as a voter.
RULING:
Tan appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, where it was reversed
But her questioned citizenship was cured when [Tan] made the following acts:
Without any doubt, only Filipino citizens are qualified to vote and may be included in the
permanent list of voters.[25] Thus, to be registered a voter in the Philippines, the registrant
must be a citizen at the time he or she filed the application.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26
October 2009, and that she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 30 November 2009, or more than a month after the ERB approved her application.
Tan argues that (1) her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a
retroactive effect, such that a natural-born Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or
her Filipino citizenship,[26] and that (2) the reacquisition cured any and all de... defects,
assuming any are existing, attendant during her registration as a voter.[27]
Congress declared as a state policy that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions laid
out by the law
In other words, by declaring "deemed to have not lost their Philippine citizenship," does this
mean that once Philippine citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath of Allegiance
required in R.A. No. 9225, the effect on the citizenship status retroacts to the period before
taking said oath. We rule in the negative.
Serreno, "the renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
An interpretation giving R.A. No. 9225 a retroactive effect to those who have lost their
Philippine citizenship through naturalization by a foreign country prior to R.A. No. 9225
would cause confusion to what is stated in Section 3: "natural-born citizens by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic." To go beyond what
the law says and interpret it in its ordinary and plain meaning would be tantamount to judicial
legislation.
The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the
whole law.
To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who have "reacquired" from those who
"retained" Philippine citizenship,[41] coupled with the legal effects of renunciation of
citizenship, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive
application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied
retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign
country prior to the effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law
would readily reveal that only those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e.,
natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity
of the said law, shall be considered as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.
Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it
was lost would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino would still be considered a
Philippine citizen when in fact he had already renounced his citizenship.
Finally, it is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
 operation, unless the legislature intended to give them a retroactive effect.
All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225, we agree with
the CA that Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her
inclusion to the permanent voter's list is highly irregular.

The Ruling of the RTC

Aggrieved, Tan appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, where it was reversed and
Crisologo's petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The RTC's position was that Tan's
questioned citizenship was cured, to wit:

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that [Tan] upon registration as voter in the First District of
Quezon City was still a naturalized American Citizen. But her questioned citizenship was
cured when [Tan] made the following acts:

1) She took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on November 30, 2009;
She filed a Petition for Reacquisition and/or Retention of Philippine Citizenship under
2) 
Republic Act No. 9225 before the [BI];
On December 1, 2009, the [BI] has issued an Order granting the petition and ordering the
3) issuance of a Certificate of Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship in favor of
[Tan]; and
Lastly, [Tan] executed a Sworn Declaration that she make a formal renunciation of her
United States nationality; that she absolutely and entirely renounce her United States
4) 
nationality together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity
there unto pertaining before a notary public on December 1, 2009.

With these acts of [Tan], she is deemed to have never lost her Filipino citizenship.

Rationale: xxxxxx

Exceptions:

A. ARGUEGO, JR. V COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 112193, MARCH 13, 1996

FACTS:
Antonia Aruego and her sister Evelyn filed a petition in the courts seeking Jose Aruego, Jr.
And his five minor children to recognize them as illegitimate children and compulsory heirs of
Jose who died on March 30, 1982. They claim there is open and continuous possession of
status of illegitimate children of Jose who had an amorous relationship with their mother Luz
Fabian until the time of his death. The court declared that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate
daughter of the deceased with Luz Fabian while Evelyn is
not. Antonia and Evelyn contested the decision citing provisions of the Family Code
particularly Art. 127 on Filiation, Art. 172 on illegitimate children’s filiation, and Art. 256 on
the retroactivity of the code.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively and will it impair
the vested rights of the respondents.
RULING:
The meaning of vested and acquired rights under Art. 256 was not defined by the Family
Code, hence the court will determine it according to issues submitted to them. The action must
be governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code and not by Art. 175 (2) of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given any retroactive effect since its application is prejudicial under Art.
285. The supreme court denied the petition and upheld the court of appeals decision.

B. BERNABE V ALEJO, G.R. NO. 140500, JANUARY 21, 2002

FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary,
Carolina Alejo, of 23 years. 
The son, Adrian Bernabe was born on September 18, 1981. Fiscal Bernabe died on August
13, 1993, and his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as
the sole surviving heir.
May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed complaint that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged a legitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given share in Fiscal Bernabes estate.
RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code (took effect
on 1988) as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. CA, the complaint is now barred.
RTC granted Ernestina’s Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the dismissal of the
Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death
of the putative father had barred the action.
the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian
Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the
alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.

ISSUES:
W/N Family Code should be applied retroactively
W/N Adrian Bernabe, an illegitimate son, has a right to be recognized
RULING:
NO. FC should not be applied retroactively
Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code,
which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained
the age of majority.
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, it gives Adrian the right to file his petition
for recognition within four years from attaining majority age.
The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right. (FC did not apply
retroactively because it will impair this vested right)

RTC said that the father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing. The
action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give
him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under
Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Adrian was only 7 y/o when the Family Code took effect and only 12 when his alleged father
died in 1993. The minor must be given his chance to exercise his right.

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.

C. MONTAÑEZ V CIPRIANO, G.R. NO. 181089, OCTOBER 22, 2012

FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married Socrates Flores (Socrates). On January
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio V. Cipriano
(Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of
her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC
rendered its decision declaring the marriage of Lourdes with Socrates null and void. Said
decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage,
filed a complaint for bigamy against Lourdes alleging that Lourdes failed to reveal to Silverio
that she was still married to Socrates.

Lourdes moved to quash the information alleging that her first marriage to Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of
prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. She also averred that she had contracted
her second marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the existing law at that
time did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage. Hence, the RTC granted the motion to quash.
ISSUES:
Was the RTC correct in quashing the information for bigamy?
RULING:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence
of the first marriage.

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had
not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Clearly, the annulment of
respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in
2003.

In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated.

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of
the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus: “The
fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.” GRANTED.

D. CASTILLO V DE LEON CASTILLO, G.R. NO. 189607, APRIL 18, 2016

FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato). 

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was
null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member
of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the
ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said
that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6
January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and
could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no
judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that
even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains
that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since
Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before
contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in
1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil
Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were
celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not
state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

ISSUES:
W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
RULING:
NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity
of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was
no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage
was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless,
the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid. 
RATIO:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law
in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted
both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil
Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and
83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85
and 86.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following
ways: 
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a
voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; 
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; 
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage
cannot be collaterally attacked; 
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by
legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and 
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a
voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza,
People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on
the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a
previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second
marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered
bigamous and void.

E. DACUDAO V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. NO. 188056, JANUARY 8,

2013

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates
after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary
issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases
already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in
Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated
March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the
Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the
Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was
forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses
Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the
respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department Order and
the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due process, right to equal
protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that
orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at
the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed issuances
should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being
investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against
passing laws with retroactive effect.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.
RULING:
Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and
one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial
statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or
take away vested rights but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation
already existing rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural
law.

F. SUMIRAN V DAMASO, G.R. NO. 162518, AUGUST 19, 2009

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

G. INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY V DE

LIMA, G.R. NO 212719, JUNE 25, 2019

FACTS:
ISSUES:
WON the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR
RULING:
 H. INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY V DE
LIMA, G.R. NO 214637, JUNE 25, 2019

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:

I. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION V

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. NO. 205837, NOVEMBER 21, 2017

FACTS:
ISSUES:

RULING:

CASE DIGEST ( ARTICLE 6 )

RIGHTS: XXXXX

CONCEPT OF WAIVER AND REQUISITES FOR VADILITY

A. GUY V COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 163707, SEPTEMBER 15, 2006

FACTS:
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima
Wei, who died intestate leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and
personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy,
Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the
appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They
likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be
appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner
prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and
that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to
Article 175 of the Family Code..
ISSUES:
Whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
RULING:
No. Ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to
present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for
recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code. Under the Family Code,
when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may
be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by
the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is
clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence
to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be
impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of
administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents’
filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the
status of each heir. That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other
to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.

B. F.F CRUZ & CO., INC. V HR CONSTRUCTION CORP., G.R. NO. 187521,
MARCH 14, 2012

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. (FFCCI) assailing the Decision[1] dated February 6, 2009 and
Resolution[2] dated
April 13, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91860
Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower
Agusan Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract
Agreement[3] with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor,
equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the
East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the... specifications of the main
contract.
HRCC submitted its third progress billing in the amount of P2,569,543.57 for its completed
works from September 26 to October 25, 2004.[8] FFCCI did not immediately pay the amount
stated in the third progress billing, claiming that it still... had to evaluate the works
accomplished by HRCC
On November 25, 2004, HRCC submitted to FFCCI its fourth progress billing in the amount
of P1,527,112.95 for the works it had completed from October 26 to November 25, 2004.
Subsequently, FFCCI, after it had evaluated the completed works of HRCC from September
26 to November 25, 2004, approved the payment of the gross amount of P1,505,570.99 to
HRCC. FFCCI deducted therefrom P150,557.10 for retention and P27,374.02 for expanded
withholding tax... leaving a net payment of P1,327,639.87, which amount was paid to HRCC
on March 11, 2005
On March 7, 2005, HRCC, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Subcontract Agreement,
filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Complaint[11] against
FFCCI praying for the payment of the following: (1) overdue obligation in the... reduced
amount of P4,096,656.53 as of December 15, 2004 plus legal interest; (2) P1,500,000.00 as
attorney's fees; (3) P80,000.00 as acceptance fee and representation expenses; and (4) costs of
litigation.
ISSUES:
First, does the act of [FFCCI] in conducting a verification survey of [HRCC's] billings in the
latter's presence amount to a waiver of the right of [FFCCI] to verify and approve said
billings? What, if any, is the legal significance of said act?

RULING:
Generally, the arbitral award of CIAC is final... and may not be appealed except on questions...
of law.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008[22] vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the Philippines. Under Section 19 of E.O. No. 1008, the... arbitral award of
CIAC "shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court
In People of the Philippines v. Donato,[35] this Court explained the doctrine of waiver in this
wise:
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the
party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable... person, of
a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such
person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent... with claiming it."
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:... x x x the doctrine of
waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers
every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right or privilege... of which he is the owner or which belongs
to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit,... do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy;
and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law... or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at large

C. PEOPLE V MORIAL, G.R. NO. 129295, AUGUST 15, 2001

FACTS:
On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of the
investigation and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial were asked
several questions by the policemen and were invited to the police station for continuing
investigation. They were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again
after they woke up at past 6 in the morning. That investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez
resulted into the admission by Leandro that he was one of those who participated in the
robbery with homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements were reduced into writing.
SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel, whatever
will be his answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a
lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the former
and he first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After Leandro
agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against him as evidence in
court, the investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of the counsel.
After “all the material points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if he can leave
due to very important engagement. The latter agreed to the lawyer’s request. But before
leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in his absence, the
latter agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the
investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered

ISSUES:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.
RULING:
Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation;
therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other
co-accused. The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez
cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left after Leonardo had admitted that he and his
companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize that he only left
after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring to the participation of the three
accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires that “any
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times
be assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3 states that “in the
absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted.”

Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and
to answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his
right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of
the counsel. In the case at bar, no such written and counseled waiver of these rights was
presented as evidence.

D. MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 189516, JUNE 8, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel
Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September 2000, Edna
and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with
Edna. On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the
Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly
support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed
an Affidavit. On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where
he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The
Deed of Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. Colonel
Otamias retired on April 1, 2003. The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. Edna
alleged that the Armed Forces of the Philippines suddenly decided not to honor the agreement
between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family.

In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment.

In another letter dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's
request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias' pension "unless ordered by the appropriate
court.”

Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and
Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed a case.

ISSUES:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot be directed
to automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of Colonel
Otamias.
RULING:
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as: a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the
intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or
such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional
doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.

In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement: The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and,
since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights
of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and
does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.

When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to
claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement
benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits
does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to
receive support.

E. DOÑA ADELA EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC. V TRADE AND INESTMENT

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 201931, FEBRUARY 11, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioner Dona Adela filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the RTC. After finding
the petition sufficient in form and substance, RTC declared petitioner herein as insolvent and
stayed all civil proceedings against it. Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as a
receiver and proceeded to make the necessary report, to engage appraisers and require the
creditors to submit proof of their respective claims. Atty. Gonzales then filed a Motion for
Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement incorporating therein her proposed terms of
compromise. Then, TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement which
was approved. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration claiming that TIDCORP
and BPI’s agreement imposes upon it several obligations such as payment of expenses and
taxes and waiver of confidentiality of bank deposits when it is not a party and signatory to the
said agreement. RTC denied the motion.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement to waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank deposits under R.A. No.
1405.
RULING:
NO. R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed. These
are under any of the following instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in
cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction
of duty of public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Anti-Money
Laundering Council may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court.
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP
only. There was no written consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos,
Jr., that petitioner is waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the
waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the
agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it was
without the express consent of petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the said
agreement.
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and conformity
of the receiver. We, thus, hold that petitioner is not bound by the said provision.