REPORT IN-045/2006

DATA SUMMARY

LOCATION
Date and time Thursday, 27 July 2006; 22:15 local time

Site 29.8 NM east of Barcelona Airport, FL 235

AIRCRAFT
Registration EC-IJF

Type and model BOMBARDIER CRJ200 CL-600-2B19

Operator Air Nostrum LAM

Engines
Type and model GENERAL ELECTRIC CF34-3B1

Number 2

CREW
Pilot in command Copilot
Age 36 years old 29 years old

Licence ATPL CPL

Total flight hours 5,100 h Not available

Flight hours on the type 3,950 h 1,714 h

INJURIES Fatal Serious Minor/None

Crew 4

Passengers 44

Third persons

DAMAGE
Aircraft Heavy damage to left engine

Third parties None

FLIGHT DATA
Operation Commercial air transport – Scheduled – International – Passenger

Phase of flight En route – Climb

REPORT
Date of approval 7 October 2010

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1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1. History of the flight

On 27 July 2006, aircraft EC-IJF, callsign AN8174, was operating out of Barcelona
airport en route to Basel. For the cockpit crew, consisting of the captain and copilot, it
was the first flight of the day. For the two members of the cabin crew, who were
attending to the 44 passengers onboard, it was the second flight after two hours of
activity. The aircraft had started its operation at 07:37, the incident flight being the
eighth and last of the day.

The aircraft took off normally at 22:01:22 from runway 25R. Six minutes later they were
cleared by ATC to deviate from instrument departure DALIN 1D to fly around a storm
area. Fourteen minutes into the flight, at 22:15:43, in an area without any weather
problems, there was a loud bang followed by strong jolts. The aircraft was 29.8 NM
east of Barcelona airport flying over the Mediterranean Sea. The airplane was climbing
through 23,515 ft. Its speed was 248 kt and its heading 060°.

The following warnings were immediately received: left engine reverser unlocked, smoke
in the lavatory, left engine low oil pressure and, seven seconds after the bang, fire in the
left engine. The crew combated the emergency by entering the engine fire procedure.
As recorded on the CVR, the engine was shut down off 16 seconds after the fire warning
was received and the first fire extinguishing bottle was discharged after 71 seconds. Since
the fire warning did not clear, they discharged the second bottle, which also failed to
extinguish the fire. They declared an emergency to ATC and decided to return to
Barcelona airport. While flying toward the field on a heading of 250°, the crew executed
a 360° turn to lose altitude and start the final approach. The cabin crew prepared the
passengers for an emergency landing with a possible evacuation on the runway.

At 22:25:30, with the aircraft on short final and after 9 minutes and 40 seconds, the
left engine fire warning cleared. The aircraft landed with a single engine on runway 25R
and came to a stop on exit taxiway GA at 22:29:27.

The cockpit crew ordered an evacuation at 22:29:44 out the right side using the front
and rear doors. The firefighting service, which had been alerted, was present during the
evacuation and applied firefighting foam as a precaution, though at that time they did
not notice any flames or smoke coming from the engine.

All 48 people onboard were uninjured. The aircraft suffered significant damage, but only
to the left engine.

1.2. Damage to aircraft

The damage to the aircraft was confined strictly to the left engine. A cursory glance
revealed that a fan blade and the upper and lower access cowls had detached, as well

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Figure 1. Left engine of aircraft EC-IJF after the incident

as areas where an intense fire had burned through. There was no damage to the rest
of the aircraft.

1.3. Personnel information

1.3.1. Information about the captain

The captain, 36 years of age, had an airline transport pilot license and CRJ-100 and
instrument ratings, all valid and in force at the time of the incident.

He had been working for Air Nostrum since the year 2000. He had a total of 5,100
flight hours and had flown 3,950 h on the CRJ, 2,300 as a copilot. As captain he had
accumulated 1,650 h since August 2004. In the 24 hours prior to the incident he had
a total of 3:20 h of flight activity. The incident flight was his first flight of the day. He
was seated in the LH seat.

As part of the initial and ongoing training he had received since joining the company,
he had taken an initial and four refresher courses on cockpit resource management
(CRM), the last of these on 1 June 2006, two months before the incident.

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1.3.2. Information about the copilot

The copilot, 29 years of age, had a commercial pilot license and valid and in force CRJ-
100 and instrument ratings at the time of the incident.

He had been working for Air Nostrum since 2004 and had accumulated 1,714 h, all as
a CRJ copilot. Like the captain, he had a total of 3:20 h of flight activity in the 24 hours
prior to the incident. The incident flight was the first of the day. He was seated in the
RH seat and was the pilot flying at the time of the incident.

As part of the initial and ongoing training he had received since joining the company,
he had taken an initial and two refresher courses on cockpit resource management
(CRM), the last of these on 26 April 2006, three months before the incident.

1.3.3. Previous flights of captain and copilot as a crew

Since the time when the copilot joined the company two years before, the two had
flown together prior to the incident flight on 24, 25 and 26 July 2006 and on 8 July
2005.

1.3.4. Information about cabin crew

The two flight attendants had valid and in force licenses and medical certificates on the
date of the event. The purser was 27 years old and had 1,536 h at the company. The
second attendant was 23 years old and had accumulated 91 hours. Their flight activity
on that day had begun when they took over as the cabin crew on aircraft EC-IJF at
Bologna airport (Italy) on the flight prior to the incident. They had been working for just
over two hours.

1.4. Aircraft information

1.4.1. General

The BOMBARDIER CANADAIR CL-600-2B19 CRJ-200 is a twin-engine jet with a capacity

for 50 passengers and is intended for use in regional and short-range flights. Its
maximum takeoff weight is 23,133 kg.

The incident aircraft, S/N 7705, had been manufactured in 2002 and delivered to Air
Nostrum in November 2002. On the date of the incident it had all the authorizations,
certificates and insurance required for the conduct of public passenger transport
operations.

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1.4.2. Status of aircraft and maintenance

The aircraft was factory equipped with two General Electric GE CF34-3B1 engines, S/N
GE-E-873549 (left engine) and GE-E-873548 (right engine).

At the time of the incident both engines had accumulated a total of 10,896 h (TSN)
and 8,899 cycles (CSN). The left engine was manufactured in June 2002 and installed
on the incident aircraft S/N 7705 EC-IJF in September 2002, prior to aircraft delivery by
Bombardier to Air Nostrum in November 2002.

As for maintenance, on 15 August 2003 the main fuel control (MFC) on the left engine
was replaced in conformance with General Electric service bulletin 73-034, which was
issued on February 10, 2003. The same action was carried out on the right engine half
a year later, on 4 January 2004. In the time since this replacement, the left engine had
operated for 8,601 h and 7,064 cycles. There were no maintenance entries in the
engine log book related to the fan blades.

1.4.3. General Electric GE CF34-3B1 engine

The CF34-3B1 is a dual shaft turbofan engine with a high bypass ratio.

In the low pressure (LP) shaft, the single-stage fan is driven by the four-stage low
pressure turbine (LPT). The fan consists of a wheel of 28 blades joined to a disk. Each
blade is made of a single piece of forged titanium weighing some 1.2 kg. 100% N1 is
equivalent to 7,400 RPM. The high pressure (HP) shaft consists of a 14-stage compressor
and a high pressure turbine (HPT) with two stages. Its nominal RPM value at 100% N2
is 17,820. Both shafts rotate clockwise as seen from the exhaust end. The location of
the engine components is generally expressed in terms of a hypothetical clock face as
seen from behind. The main fuel control (MFC) is thus at the 8 o’clock position, on the
left side.

Six of the 14 HP compressor stages feature a variable geometry (VG) system that
modifies the position of the stator vanes by means of two actuators that rely on
hydraulic force provided by the fuel.

The lubrication system for the seven bearings that support the two engine shafts
contains a maximum of seven liters of oil.

The fan discharge airflow can be reversed via blocker doors that deploy in the fan
discharge duct when the fan reverser translating cowl moves aft.

The accessory gearbox (AGB) is located ahead of the accessory compartment and has
three attachment points, at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00. These points are frangible so as to

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protect the AGB casings. There is a secondary attachment that limits the movement of
the box as a whole should the main attachments fail. The main fuel pump (MFP) and
main fuel control (MFC) is attached at the base of the AGB.

1.4.4. Engine cowls and fairings

The engine is shrouded in various cowls and fairings that provide it with a tapered
aerodynamic surface. The casings, cowls and fairings create annular compartments
around the engine within which flows a stream of air to provide cooling and to vent
possible inflammable vapors. For ease of cooling the core cavity is divided into 2 zones
(forward compartment or zone A and aft compartment or zone B) by a radial fireshield,
located just aft of the high pressure turbine. The air supply for the forward
compartment enters through 31 holes and exits through 4 holes. The air supply for the
aft compartment enters through 4 holes. By way of reference to the descriptions
provided in this report, we note the following components:

• Upper and lower access cowl.

• Translating cowl.
• Upper and lower core cowl. These are hinged and latched so as to provide access to
accessories and other engine components. These cowls are supported and closed atop
a firewall that isolates the accessory compartment area from the exhaust and low
pressure turbine. At the 11:00 position there is a blow out door that releases pressure
to the outside in the event of an excessive pressure rise.
• Exhaust nozzle fairing.

1.4.5. Fire protection systems

The aircraft has a fire detection and extinguishing system that responds to engine fire
or overheat conditions.

There are two engine detection zones: the core or the compartment under the
engine cowls (which triggers an ENG FIRE message on EICAS) and the area under the
exhaust pipe fairings (which triggers a JET PIPE OVHT message on EICAS). Each of
these zones is equipped with two detection loops to ensure system redundancy. When
a fire or overheat condition is detected in the engine core, a visual ENG FIRE
warning is generated on EICAS, the ENG FIRE PUSH button illuminates and the fire
bell sounds.

The suppression system consists of two bottles that can be discharged into either
engine. The discharge first requires pressing the ENGINE FIRE PUSH button in the
cockpit, which closes the shutoff valve, SOV, and then the BOTTLE ARMED PUSH TO

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DISCH. The system is designed to combat a confined fire detected within the engine
nacelle’s compartments.

In the lavatory there is a smoke detector that, if triggered, turns on the SMOKE TOILET
caution.

1.4.6. Fuel system

The fuel system on this aircraft allows cutting off the fuel supply from the tanks, located
in the wings, to the engines at two points. The first is in the center box at the outlet
of the tanks and relies on two SOVs (shutoff valves), one for each engine; the second
is in the main fuel control (MFC), located in the engine. The manufacturer estimates
that there is a maximum of 4.06 liters of fuel between these two cutoff points.

If the ENG FIRE PUSH button is pressed in the cockpit, the fuel SOV for that side closes,
the BOTTLE ARMED PUSH TO DISCH button illuminates and the ENG SOV CLSD
message appears on EICAS. In addition, if the thrust lever is retarded in the cockpit to
the cutoff position, the main fuel control will close.

1.4.7. EICAS warnings

The aircraft is equipped with a central advisory system, which is a part of EICAS (Engine
Indicating and Crew Alerting System), and that generates visual and aural messages to
notify the crew of conditions, alerts, cautions and warnings associated with aircraft
systems. Depending on the nature of the problem, only visual warnings, or visual and
aural signals, may be generated.

According to information in the maintenance manual, the way the messages recorded
on the flight of EC-IJF are displayed on EICAS is as follows:

• Fire in engine core: warning advisory that displays the words L ENG FIRE in red on
the EICAS screen. At the same time the master warning red pushbutton flashes and
a triple chime sounds, followed by the fire bell.
• Low oil pressure: warning notification that displays the words L ENG OIL PRESS in red
on the EICAS screen. At the same time the master warning red pushbutton flashes
and a triple chime sounds, followed by the synthetic voice “ENGINE OIL”.
• Reverser unlocked: caution notification that displays the words L REV UNLOCKED in
amber on the EICAS screen. At the same time the master caution amber pushbutton
flashes and a single chime sounds.
• Smoke in lavatory: caution notification that displays the words SMOKE TOILET in
amber on the EICAS screen. At the same time the master caution amber pushbutton
flashes and a simple chime sounds, followed by the synthetic voice “SMOKE”.

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1.4.8. EGPWS “TOO LOW TERRAIN” warning

The CRJ-200 has a ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) that monitors the flight
status of the aircraft with relation to the terrain and alerts the crew if necessary. One of
this system’s modes of operation, mode 4B, was activated while aircraft EC-IJF was on
approach, generating the “TOO LOW TERRAIN” warning. This aural notification is
triggered when the gear is down, the flaps are not in a landing configuration and the
aircraft crosses a linear boundary defined between 1,000 and 245 ft at a speed in excess
of 159 kt. This warning can be cleared in the cockpit by pressing the FLAP OVRD button.

1.5. Flight recorder and ATC information

The data from the flight data recorder (DFDR, FA2100, P/N 2100-4343-00 and S/N
000188834), the cockpit voice recorder (CVR, FA2100, P/N 2100-1020-00 and S/N
000187083) and the communications with ATC services allowed investigators to
reconstruct the sequence of events that occurred on the flight. The data correlation
between the DFDR, CVR and ATC shows an average delay of seven seconds in the time
references provided by ATC with respect to those of the DFDR. The time references used
in this section correspond to the local time as recorded by ATC.

22:19:14
22:19:58
ENGINE OIL warning
ENGINE OIL
clears
warning reappears
22:21:02
22:28:36 22:22:27 Autopilot disengaged cambio a
9 sector T2
Touchdown 156 kt flap 20 Turn to lose alt
22:17:23 (+100 sec)
22:29:27
Aircraft stops 22:25:30
10 2nd bottle
8 discharged
22:29:44 End fire warning clears 11
Evacuation 7 22:17:01 (+78 sec)
12
1st bottle discharged
6
21:53:58 change to 22:16:15 (+32 sec)
Left engine start-up 13 TWR ATC emergency
22:01:22 1 Barcelona
Start takeoff run 22:16:06 (+23 sec)
airport
change to Start engine fire procedure
2
sector T3 (switch of engine)

22:03:59 22:15:43
4,150 ft and climbing LEFT ENGINE FAILURE
Cleared to FL190 23,515 ft and climbing at 248 kt
(+0 sec) N1 vibrations increase to 2.4MILS
(+1 sec) Drop in N1 and reverser unlocked
22:07:18 (+3 sec) ENGINE OIL and fuel flow at 0 pph
11,200 ft and (+4 sec) Lavatory smoke caution
climbing (+7 sec) Left engine fire
Turn to avoid change to
storms
3
sector XAL 5

22:10:41
17,313 ft and climbing
4 Cleared to FL300
22:09:42
15,798 ft and climbing
Start straight leg on HDG 50°-60° and 250 kt

Figure 2. Complete flight path

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The flight lasted a total of 36 minutes from the initial engine startup to shutdown. Figures
2 and 3 show the complete flight of aircraft EC-IJF. The first 22 minutes (points 1 to 5 in
Figures 2 and 3) transpired without incident and with the engines working normally. The
aircraft climbed, requested a turn to avoid an area of storms and continued climbing on
a course of 50°-60° and an average GS of 250 kt (segment 5-6 in Figures 2 and 3).

At 22:15:43, with the aircraft at an altitude of 23515 ft, at 248 kt and climbing, the
left engine failed (point 6 in Figures 2 to 5). At that instant the left engine N1 RPMs
indicated 93.2% and the ITT temperature was 780 °C. On takeoff, at sea level and with
takeoff thrust, the N1 RPMs were 87.6% and the ITT temperature was 790 °C. The
recorders show the following after the failure:

• Left engine N1 vibrations at 2.4 mils and vertical acceleration at –1.32g.

• At t = +1 second the left engine reverser unlocked and N1 started to fall.
• At t = +3 seconds the left engine low oil pressure was received and the fuel flow to
the left engine dropped to zero.
• At t = +4 seconds lavatory smoke caution activated.
• At t = +7 seconds left engine fire warning activated.

Figures 4 and 5 show the progression of the engine failure parameters for one and two
minutes, respectively.

Figure 3. Complete flight: flight parameters, fire, N1 and N1 vibration advisories and autopilot setting

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Figure 4. Engine parameters during failure: 1 minute

Figure 5. Engine parameters during failure: 2 minutes

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Within 16 seconds of the fire warning (23 seconds after the failure of the engine),
the crew started the engine fire procedure by confirming the engine to be cut off.
At the 32-second mark, the ATC was notified of the emergency (point 7 in Figures 2
to 5). Seventy-one seconds after the fire warning the first bottle was discharged
(point 8 in Figures 2 and 3) and 22 seconds later (at T = 93 seconds) the second
bottle.

The return trajectory to Barcelona took place with the left engine fire warning lit (cleared
after 9 minutes and 40 seconds), the left reverser unlocked caution lit (did not clear for
remainder of flight) and left engine low oil pressure warning (cleared and then re-
activated for remainder of flight).

On the captain’s initiative, the autopilot was disengaged at 13583 ft at 22:21:02 (point
10 in Figures 2 and 3). Shortly thereafter the aircraft was at 314 kt and N1 was at 30%
(between points 10 and 11 in Figures 2 and 3). One minute before the fire warning
extinguished the copilot said “left engine shutoff valve close” following a caution
warning.

Five “TOO LOW TERRAIN” warnings were received between 172 and 63 ft. The aircraft
touched down at 22:28:36 at 156 kt with 20° flaps. The right reverser was used as
requested by the captain. At 22:29:27 the aircraft was stopped on rapid exit taxiway
GA, the right engine was stopped and at 22:29:44 the evacuation started. The
evacuation had been anticipated and reported to ATC and to the cabin crew, who
prepared the cabin and passengers for it.

Table 1 shows a transcript of the communications between the crew from the
appearance of the engine failure until the completion of the fire procedure. All of the
warnings previously described were heard during the first 23 seconds, along with the
identification of the reverser failure by the copilot, who was the pilot flying. There is no
record of any verbal communication from the captain on the CVR until the start of the
fire procedure.

The CVR reveals the constant monitoring by the copilot of altitude, speed, landing field
position and distance to clouds throughout the return flight to Barcelona.

The communications with ATC indicate that priority was given to the aircraft for landing
at Barcelona. The instructions given by sector T2 were long (one of them lasted 14
seconds) and referenced VOR-DME maneuvers. These instructions involving VOR-DME
maneuvers coincided with the reappearance in the cockpit of the low oil pressure
warning (point 9 in Figures 2 and 3).

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Time after Origin/

Content
failure function
+0 sec
(6 Figure 2)
+1 sec NOISE
SINGLE CHIME
+2 sec The reverser, the reverser, the reverser. COP/PF
TRIPLE CHIME
+3 sec
+4 sec «SMOKE»
+6 sec The reverser, the reverser, the reverser, the reverser. «SMOKE» COP/PF
+7 sec
+8 sec TRIPLE CHIME
+10 sec The reverser. COP/PF
«ENGINE OIL»
+12 sec «ENGINE OIL»
FIRE BELL «ENGINE OIL»
+15 sec OK, OK, OK, airplane. COP/PF
«ENGINE OIL»
+18 sec OK, OK, OK, it’s alright. «ENGINE OIL» COP/PF
+19 sec No, no, don’t touch that, don’t touch that. «ENGINE OIL» COP/PF
«ENGINE OIL»
+22 sec
+23 sec Sorry, sorry confirm cutting right engine? COP/PF
Cut it. CTE/PNF
The right one ¿ok? COP/PF
Cut it, cut it. CTE/PNF
+32 sec Barcelona AN8174 declaring an emergency, we need to return to the field immediately,
(7 Figure 2) we’ve had a left engine failure. COP/PF
+40 sec Are you flying or what? COP/PF
+40 sec 8174 copy, ¿why? How do you wish to return to the field? ATC
+46 sec Well, the most direct path, please, AN vector we’ve had an engine failure. COP/PF
+50 sec Confirmed. CTE/PNF
Confirmed. COP/PF
+53 sec OK left confirmed. Can you confirm? COP/PF
+56 sec (unintelligible) Engine FIRE. COP/PF
OK? COP/PF
Talk to them COP/PF
Or Gerona. COP/PF
+73 sec I have the controls. CTE/PF
8174 if you can to your left on course 330. ATC
OK talk to them. COP/PNF
To the left heading 330 AN 8174. CTE/PF
+78 sec Discharging the bottle, ok? Discharging the bottle. COP/PNF
(8 Figure 2)
8174 cleared to flight level 140, correction 160. ATC
+87 sec The engine is cut. Flue flow is at zero. To 160 ok. COP/PNF
To 160 AN 8174. OK, it was an emergency, lowering nose to 140. CTE/PF
+100 sec Discharging the other bottle, ok? COP/PNF
OK, is it out? CTE/PF

Table 1. Cockpit communications: onset of failure and fire procedure

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1.6. Investigation of engine

After the incident it was noted that a fan blade had become detached. The separation
was contained and the remains of the blade were found embedded in the fan
containment ring. The upper and lower access cowls were lost in flight and not
recovered.

There was extensive fire damage to the accessory compartment, especially to the left
side in the vicinity of the fuel pump and main fuel control. The fuel, oil and electric lines
were all damaged by the fire.

The aft Variable Geometry (VG) head line which connects the MFC to the actuator head
tube was found detached from its elbow fitting at the MFC. The elbow fitting at the
MFC was positioned outward towards the 9:00 o’clock position versus the proper
installation position towards the 6:00 position downward position. Fuel was still
observed dripping from the elbow fitting at the MFC.

The left hand (9:00 position) fusible mount bolt was sheared and had decoupled per
the design intent, leaving the AGB supported on the left hand side by the secondary
restraint cable. The right hand (3:00 position) mount attachment bolts had backed out
of their front frame inserts, leaving the mount pad pulled away from the front frame
by about 1/8 of an inch. The 6 o’clock fusible mount bolt did not separate or decouple.
There was also cracking on the forward surface of the AGB near the 6:00 position
mount. Oily deposits were observed on the compressor case above this AGB crack,
but there was no evidence of thermal damage or fire in this general area forward of
the AGB.

The air starter valve and inlet duct were separated from the starter, which was still
attached to the accessory gear box.

Play/movement was found within the throttle control system. Total system looseness was
±1.3 degrees at the MFC lever. Of the three screws which attached the throttle gearbox
to its support bracket, the top screw was found missing, the lower left hand screw was
found loose but installed and the lower right hand screw was installed and secured.

All 84 bolts securing the aft flange of the turbine transition case to the forward flange
of the low pressure turbine (LPT) case were separated, with most of them being found
lying in the bottom of the core cowl. Metallurgical examination confirmed that the bolts
separated in shear. No evidence of fatigue was found. Microstructure and hardness
confirmed that the bolts were typical of Inco 718 material.

Fire damage on the exhaust nozzle fairing indicates that the LPT stator case rotated from
its original location at the time of the fan blade separation. The rotation was the result
of separation of all 84 HPT transition case to LPT stator case flange bolts. The LPT stator

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case did rotate a second time to its final position later in the fire event from evidence
of a second separate area of fire damage to the exhaust nozzle fairing. The LPT stator
rotated in the counter clockwise direction based on the positioning of the “C” sump
service lines. Sometime later in the fire event, the LPT stator case rotated an additional
180 degrees.

The four ventilation exit ports located in the upper and lower core cowls showed
thermal distress originating from the interior or engine side. The most extensive damage
(in terms of missing and melted material) was the exit port located at the 8:00 position
in the lower core cowl. From 8:00 to 10:00, the nacelle fire seal was observed to be
thermally damaged with pieces of seal missing. The lower core cowl has a forward
compartment drain and was observed to be still wetted with fuel. There are two
additional forward compartment drain holes located aft of the above drain. These two
drains are located at 6:00 at the lowest position in the lower core cowl and were found
oily and sooted.

The exhaust nozzle, except for some discoloration, and the low pressure turbine were
undamaged.

The ENG FIRE PUSH button was confirmed to have been pressed and that both
extinguishing bottles had discharged.

1.6.1. Fan blade separation

The blade that detached from the left engine of aircraft EC-IJF was identified as the
eleventh of a total of 28 that comprise the fan assembly. The blade, P/N 6018T30P14,
is a component with a lifetime limited to 18,000 cycles (CSN). The one that failed, S/N
MAE35246, was manufactured by Teleflex (Mexico) in June 2002 and installed new on
the engine, meaning it had the same number of cycles (8,899 CSN) as the engine at
the time of the incident. Along with Teleflex, there are three other blade manufacturers
for the GE CF34-1 and CF34-3 engines. Of this engine’s 28 blades, 26 were made by
Teleflex and two by another supplier.

The blade detached due to a break in the tangs used to attach it to the fan disk (Figure
6) caused by a dwell-time fatigue crack. The point of origin was found in the middle
tang, from where it propagated by dwell-time fatigue. The forward and aft tangs also
showed fractures resulting from stress overload. The main section of the fractured pin,
which was removed from where it had become embedded in the fan containment ring,
had shear fractured and showed no signs of fatigue or of material defects.

The metallurgical and fractographic analyses revealed the presence of metallographic

defects in the drilled surfaces on the middle tang and in the forging of the piece that
reduced its dwell time fatigue-resistance properties. Specifically, extensive bands of

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Figure 6. Detached number 11 blade

“aligned alpha colonies1” were observed, the grains of which were unfavorably oriented
relative to the primary loading direction. In the separated blade, the presence of these
colonies had given rise to the incubation of fatigue cracks. The composition of the
material from which the blade had been manufactured conformed to design
specifications and did not exhibit oxygen or nitrogen enrichment.

In general, the blades are manufactured from titanium laminate bars or billet with a
diameter of between 2 and 3.5 inches. While reviewing the blade manufacturing
processes of General Electric’s four suppliers, it was noted that Teleflex utilized a larger
diameter billet, higher forging temperatures (up to 37.7º C than the other
manufacturers) and that the chemical composition of the material had the highest levels
of aluminum content.

Detecting which blades might have be affected requires cutting the blades through
destructive testing.

Also detected in the same crack initiation area was the presence of a layer where the
grain was deformed and which General Electric attributed to the use of improperly

1
At low temperatures, titanium exhibits a compact hexagonal close packed crystalline structure called alpha or alpha
phase. Depending on the thermal and mechanical alloy manufacturing method, the orientation of the alpha grains
can be more or less random. When the alpha grains in a region are similarly oriented, this region is known as the
alpha colony. The size and alignment of the colonies are very important because they affect the material’s
characteristics in such a way that the smaller and less aligned the colonies, the better the material’s resistance to
dwell-time fatigue cracking. The fabrication process is what determines the size of these colonies.

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sharpened tools. It was noted that the processes for machining and reaming the tang
holes did not specify the periodicity with which the tools used in this task were to be
replaced.

1.6.2. Detachment of the VG head line

The variable geometry head line is a flexible fuel hose that is attached to the main fuel
control (MFC) through a rigid elbow. This elbow was improperly installed; it should have
been in a top down configuration and yet it was found oriented radially toward the
outside of the engine. The diagrams in the maintenance manuals and IPC show an
outline of this hose in its proper theoretical position, although nothing is specified in
this respect in the associated texts.

As for the attachments of the line in its path along the side of the engine, it was noted
that a clamp was missing. The CF45-3B IPC SEI 779 Rev 35 and the CF34-3B1 IPC SEI
775 Rev 39 show a cushion clamp on the aft actuator head line hose assembly. This is
not consistent with CF34-3B/B1 engine drawing 6089T11, which does not call out a
clamp at this location. The error was the result of a copy from the CF34-1A/-3A/-3A2
IPC and was corrected as a result of this finding.

It was also noted that the elbow fitting was tightly installed into the MFC housing,
which indicates that it was installed in that exact position and did not move as a result
of the event. No other defects were found, such as marks, flattening or kinks in the
elbow itself indicative of tension from the hose. The flexible hose also showed no signs
of having been subjected to tension, twisting or flexing.

Tests were conducted by General Electric at Smith Tubular Systems facilities in an effort
to reproduce the conditions that caused the head line to detach. The hose was placed
under mechanical stress and over-pressurized from the inside with fuel. The stress tests
were not conclusive in revealing what caused the hose to fail. The hoses were capable
of absorbing significant stress without breaking or leaking, but these stress tests were
static and may not have accurately duplicated the shock loading of the event. That an
internal overpressure from fuel caused the detachment was ruled out since the normal
operating pressure is far below what it can withstand. The hose pressure test is a static
test. General Electric maintains that the most probable cause of the failure of the line
was a shock impact load that ripped the hose and its collar from the elbow, damaging
only the internal Teflon tubing, which started the fire.

The conclusion of the NTSB materials laboratory is that the hose detached from the
elbow under the effect of an existing fire, the heat from which caused the internal
Teflon liner or the collar to weaken, thus allowing it to separate under minimal
loading.

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1.7. Organizational and management information

1.7.1. Engine fire procedure

The Aircraft Flight Manual includes a procedure to be used in the event of an in-flight
engine fire. The procedure includes six memory items for the crew, to be executed
immediately while at a sufficient altitude. A seventh and final item in the procedure ties
in with the “In-Flight Engine Shutdown” procedure (included in Appendix II). The in-
flight engine shutdown procedure in the event of an engine failure ends by directing
the crew to the “Single-Engine Approach and Landing” procedure (included in
Appendix II).

L or R ENG FIRE or Severe Engine Damage (In Flight)

At a safe altitude, affected engine:

(1) Thrust lever ........................................................................................... Confirm and IDLE

(2) Thrust lever ........................................................................................... Confirm and SHUT OFF
(3) ENG FIRE PUSH switch .......................................................................... Confirm and select
(4) FUEL BOOST PUMP switch .................................................................... Confirm and off

After 10 seconds and fire warning persists:

(5) Affected engine BOTTLE switch ............................................................ Select, to discharge

After another 30 seconds and fire warning still persists:

(6) Other engine BOTTLE switch ................................................................ Select, to discharge

(7) Single Engine Procedures In-Flight Engine Shutdown ............................ Accomplish

The purpose of executing this procedure is to stop the flow of fuel from the engine to
the fuel nozzles and to stop the flow of fuel to the engine and, if necessary, to discharge
the extinguishing agent to the engine core cowl forward compartment (zone A). The
cutoff of fuel is achieved in two ways: first, by acting on the main fuel control (MFC)
via the thrust lever; and secondly, by closing the supply lines from the tanks to the
engine. The thrust lever that is actuated by the crew is connected by cables to the thrust
lever transmission gearbox, which is located above the engine and connected to the
MFC with a rod. The adjustment between these components for the idle, maximum
thrust, reverse thrust and fuel cutoff functions allows the movement of the thrust lever
in the cockpit to the SHUT OFF position (step 2 in the procedure) to be transmitted to
the main fuel control, which then inhibits the supply of fuel to the injectors. The second
way to cut off the engine’s fuel supply is with the SOVs. These are located in the center
box between the wings and interrupt the flow of fuel from the tanks before the inlet
to the engine. These valves are controlled from the cockpit through the ENGINE FIRE
PUSH button (step 3 in the procedure).

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1.7.2. Guidelines for action in emergency situations

The airline’s Pilot Reference Handbook (PRH) defines, among other things, the following
general guidelines for action in abnormal and emergency situations (Chapter 2.2.A and
2.2.D):

• After an in-flight engine failure, the pilot flying (PF) must focus on flying the aircraft
and handling communications, while the pilot not flying (PNF) must execute the
emergency lists.
• The nature of the failure must be clearly identified by either pilot.
• The steps to be taken in executing the procedure start with the memory items, which
must be performed immediately without resorting to the reading of any checklists.
The abnormal or emergency checklists in the quick reference handbook are executed
next. Last are the normal checklists.
• Crosschecks are essential, as is strict discipline and coordination between the crew.
The autopilot must be engaged as soon as possible whenever above 600 feet AGL.

ATC services must be notified of the urgency situation as specified in the Air Traffic
Regulations (Sections 10.5.3.1.1, 10.5.3.1.2 and 10.5.3.2.1.1) via the use of the term
“mayday”, preferably repeated three times at the start of the transmission.

1.8. Additional information

1.8.1. Statements

In his statement the pilot noted that when they took over the aircraft from the previous
crew, with which they interacted personally, the previous crew did not report any
technical problems. After takeoff, the first 15 minutes transpired normally. They were
in stable atmospheric conditions without any turbulence and the autopilot was engaged,
selected to the copilot’s side. Then, without any warning, there was a loud bang,
accompanied by strong and rhythmic vibrations. Immediately afterward the reverser
unlocked caution and left engine fire warning illuminated. Both pilot and copilot were
not absolutely sure about the position of the left engine power lever in the IDLE position
and did not recall if they moved the power lever from IDLE to SHUTOFF. With regard
to the reverser warning, he did not notice any yawing motion, and therefore did not
believe that the reverser had actually deployed. They focused on the fire warning and
discharged the bottles. The fire warning did not clear, however, and remained lit until
seconds before landing. In a subsequent statement, the captain clarified that when the
fire warning appeared, he placed his hand on the right engine throttle lever to protect
it and prevent any possible actions involving the “good” engine.

When the emergency occurred, the copilot was the pilot flying but he decided to take
control of the aircraft and disengage the autopilot. The weather on the return course

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to Barcelona was good and they had the airport lights in sight. They did not attempt
to re-start the engine.

After landing, and in light of the fact that the engine fire warning had cleared, he
decided not to stop the airplane on the runway and to evacuate on taxiway GA. The
airport fire brigade was already waiting for them and when he exited the aircraft they
were applying firefighting foam to the engine.

The copilot’s interview and statement did not provide any further data. Both the captain
and the copilot agreed that the ATC instructions did not comply with their requests for
vectors; on the contrary, they were long and referenced standard maneuvers.

1.8.2. Similar cases of fan blade separation

This event was the first in-service fan blade separation experienced by a CF34-1/-3
engine. A second contained fan blade separation event occurred on 24 may 2007. The
failed blade had 4717 cycles and 5845 hours and was manufactured by Teleflex and
part of the suspect group identified by GE. The aircraft, registration N933EV, was
operated by Atlantic Southeast Airlines and was flying from Syracuse to Atlanta at
23000 ft when the crew heard a loud bang and felt uncontrollable vibrations in the
right engine. They shut down the engine and declared an emergency. A single engine
landing was accomplish without incident. No injuries were reported. The blade
separation was contained and did not result in a fire. The upper and lower core cowls
detached and the LPT case-to-TTC flange had separated.

1.8.3. Recommendations issued by the NTSB

As a consequence of the investigations into the incidents involving aircraft EC-IJF and
N933EV, the United States accident investigation agency, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), issued seven safety recommendations on 5 March 2008 (Appendix I).

The United States civil aviation authority FAA (Federal Aviation Authority) issued the
Airworthiness Directives 2009-24-11 and 2010-01-04 in order to inspect the fan blade
abradable rub strip on certain engines for wear, the fan blades on certain engines for
cracks, and the aft actuator head hose fitting for correct position, and if necessary
repositioning on engines CF34-1A, CF34-3A and CF34-3B.

Based on the their own internal investigation and as a result of the inspections
conducted on their suppliers, General Electric adopted measures intended to reduce the
aluminum content of the material used to manufacture the blades and to control the
wear and replacement of the tools used to machine the tangs that attach the blade to
the fan disk.

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2. ANALYSIS

While in flight en route to Basel, and after 22 minutes of operation and 14 minutes of
flight, the left CF34-3B1 engine on aircraft EC-IJF experienced a general sudden and
unexpected failure. A fan blade separated, which caused the detachment and rotation
of the LPT module, among other damage. The resulting engine fire was not contained
by the cowls and fairings and burned for 9 minutes and 40 seconds in flight until the
warning cleared three minutes before landing.

2.1. Technical aspects of left engine failure

2.1.1. Description of probable failure mechanism

The following probable fracture sequence has been established for the engine:

• Onset of failure:

— Fracture of blade.
— Vibrations that affected the fan cowls and unlocked the reverser (+1 second).

• Immediately following the fault:

— Fracture of 84 bolts and first rotation of LPT module and associated elements.
Failure of oil lines.
— Damage to AGB and loose of throttle gearbox attachment screws tot support
bracket.
— Loss of oil (+3 seconds).

• Fire (+7 seconds) and failure of the VG head line.

• Second rotation of LPT module.

Occurrence of failure

The general engine failure initiated with the separation of the number 11 fan blade due
to a dwell-fatigue fatigue crack. This blade separation resulted in a significant fan mass
imbalance which resulted in high fan (N1) vibrations.

These fan vibrations caused the detachment of the upper and lower access cowls and
the triggering of the fan reverser unluck and deploy microswitches. Within a second an
EICAS message appeared warning of the unlocked reverser, though at no time did it
actually deploy (the airplane did not yaw or give any warnings that the reverser had
deployed). It is possible that the engine vibrations were transmitted to the airplane cabin

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and affected the lavatory smoke detector, triggering the alarm, and to the
accelerometers in the wheel well, which registered –1.32 g.

Immediately after the failure

The loss of low pressure shaft RPMs, with the high pressure shaft maintaining its inertia,
led to the stall of the compressor and the loss of flow in the LPT. The increased pressure
forward of the guide vanes in the first stage of the LPT shattered the engine, breaking
the 84 bolts on the transition case flange in reaction to the instantaneous stoppage of
the fan at the moment the blade separated. The LPT rotor turns inside the LP stators,
which are joined to the LPT box, the exhaust nozzle and its fairing. That is why once
the attaching bolts broke, in reaction to the gasses that were flowing through the LP
rotor, the LPT box and the exhaust nozzle and rotating some 30° counter-clockwise.
This turn caused the failure of the oil line that supplied bearings six and seven.

The accessory box was also affected by the vibrations produced by the fan failure. Its
supports suffered structural damage, oil leaked through a crack that formed and the
entire box shifted from its position. The high fan imbalance and the AGB movement
were also factors in the looseness observed in the throttle system. The observed
loosenes in the throttle gearbox system could have altered the position of the throttle
stops and affected the ability to cut the fuel flow to the engine.

The loss of oil through the failure of the accessory box and the separation of the supply
lines to bearings six and seven triggered the low oil pressure warning in the cockpit
within three seconds.

Fire and failure of VG head line

After the failure of the accessory box and the first rotation of the LPT module, a fire
ignited in the forward compartment of the engine core. This fire triggered a fire warning
seven seconds after the separation of the blade. The fire was most intense in the left
side of the engine, between 6:00 and 8:00. It was not possible to accurately determine
where the fire originated due to the extent of the damage resulting from a burn time
in excess of nine minutes.

Once the fire started, the compartment’s internal pressure increased to the point
that the blow out door opened. The fire breached the fire seal and passed to the
aft compartment, which led to the initial perforation of the exhaust nozzle fairing
(Figure 1).

One of the factors influencing the fire is related to the fact that the VG head line
detached from the main fuel control, spilling fuel onto the main fire area. There are

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varying opinions as to whether the detachment of this line caused the fire or merely
exacerbated an already existing fire.

It is General Electric’s opinion that the separation of the VG head line hose from its
fitting initiated the fire, and resulted from a sudden pull on the hose when the MFC
moved following the shift of the AGB. The different installation position of the elbow
and the lack of an attachment flange caused a reduction in the design clearance of the
hose. No signs were found, however, of damage from mechanical stresses either on the
hose or on the elbow indicative of a possible initial stress failure of the hose, except for
some references to the effects of a shock impact load different from those that might
be expected from the application of a static load.

The damage to the internal Teflon liner or to the hose collar resulted from the
overheating of the hose. This indicates that the detachment of the VG head line took
place after the fire broke out, contributing to the fire but not igniting it. In this sense,
the flow of cooling air inside the compartment dragged the flames aft, meaning the fire
must have been fed from an area that was forward of and below that which contained
the VG head line elbow.

In summary, the most likely cause for the detachment of the VG head line is considered
to be overheating from an existing fire that started and spread in seven seconds and
whose point of origin is unknown. The improperly assembled elbow and VG head line
can be ruled out as having caused the detachment of said line.

Second rotation of LPT module

Lastly, there was a second 180° counter-clockwise rotation of the LPT module and of
the exhaust nozzle fairing, which accounts for the position in which they were found
after the incident. This second rotation, like the first, resulted as a reaction of the turn
of the LPT rotor and probably happened when the engine increased their rpm once
the autopilot was disengaged (N1 near 30% and a speed of 314 kt) with the aircraft
in a nose down attitude some seven minutes after the failure. When this rotation took
place the fire was still burning in the aft engine compartment. It was then that the fire
burned through the exhaust nozzle fairing again, this time through the blow out door
(Figure 1).

2.1.2. Identification of fire

This fire was notable, in addition to its intensity, for its long duration (9 minutes and 40
seconds). The records show that a large part of the oil system, which contained six or
seven liters, spilled in less than three seconds, and that the fire was burning within seven
seconds, giving rise to temperatures that triggered the fire alarms.

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For the fire to ignite there had to be air, combustible material and an ignition source.
The air source was initially the cooling air in the engine compartment, and the
combustible material was the spilled oil and kerosene. The cracks that probably
appeared in the engine from the start of the incident led to leaks of combustible
material that built up on the cowls and fairings and which were prevented from draining
to the outside by the rotation of the LP module. The ignition would have resulted from
the contact with the hot surfaces (250 °C or higher) of the box in the combustion area
or, alternatively, by contact of the atomized kerosene mist with hot gasses outside the
exhaust nozzle.

Once the fire started, the measures used to combat it as specified in the engine fire
procedure were not effective, since it continued to burn for over nine minutes. As
revealed by the CVR, 16 seconds after the fire alarm was received (23 seconds after the
engine failure), the engine was stopped. The FDR did not reveal any changes to the fuel
flow, since it was negligible just three seconds after the separation of the blade,
meaning there is no other means of verifying that the engine was in fact stopped. The
crew statement does not permit to assure that the fuel flow to the engine was stopped
from the beginning due to the fact that they did not remember to retard the power
lever to the SHUTOFF position. At engine idle, the fuel flow is so low that fuel flow
transmitter cannot record the value and shows 0 pph, so the crew may have seen the
fuel flow at 0 and thought the engine lever was in shutoff detent. The structural
damage that was present from the start affected the integrity of the throttle gearbox,
so that despite the fact that the engine was stopped in the cockpit, this action may not
have been transmitted to the engine. At the 43-, 46- and 49-second marks following
the fire alarm, conversations can be heard in the cockpit referring to items (3) and (4)
of the procedure, but which cannot be fully confirmed. The next action intended to
fight the fire and that should have ensured the fuel supply was cut off was at the 71
second mark (78 since the failure), and involved the discharging of the first bottle, which
requires that the SOV in the wings be closed. This means a period of between 16 and
71 seconds following the fire alarm elapsed without any actions being taken to ensure
there was no fuel supply to the engine. It has to be note that the copilot informed
about the SOV closed one minute before the end of the fire warning, more than 9
minutes later from the beginning and from the discharge of the fire extinguish agent,
action that closes the SOV.

In addition to the breaches made by the fire and the structural damage to the engine,
it is considered a delay in stopping the fuel supply to the engine by the crew that kept
the fire burning until three minutes prior to landing.

2.1.3. Analysis of material failures and recommendations issued

Fan blade separation. This is a fault that is envisioned when certifying the engine and
which, according to regulations, must be contained, as happened in this case, by the

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engine fairings and cowls. The investigation by General Electric has shown the effect of
a specific manufacturer’s production process on the decreased dwell-time fatigue
resistance properties of a certain percentage of blades.

Since detecting the blades affected by these manufacturing defects requires the
performance of destructive testing, the NTSB issued two safety recommendations (A-08-
04 and A-08-05) intended to improve the safe operation.

Damage affecting the integrity of the throttle lever. There is the possibility that the
throttle lever in the cockpit may have been ineffective in stopping the flow of fuel to
the engine due to the additional clearance gained by the throttle gearbox. This failure
would result in an extended period during which the fuel was able to leak. The NTSB
has already issued recommendations A-08-03 and A-08-09 to address this.

Damage to the attachment and integrity of the AGB. The frangibility of the AGB
retaining screws is a design feature, so the fracture of one and the partial failure of
another is not a cause for concern in and of itself. However, the secondary retention
did not prevent the box casing from cracking, which allowed for the loss of oil that
would eventually catch on fire.

Failure of a variable geometry system fuel hose. The most likely reason for the failure
of this line was the progressive weakening of the line by the fire that had broken out
in the aft engine compartment. As a result of the investigation, mistakes were found in
the assembly instructions for said line and which are addressed in NTSB
recommendations A-08-07 and A-08-08.

In-flight detachment and loss of fan cowls. Since the engine failure took place over the
Mediterranean, the fall of two large sections of the cowls did not have any safety
consequences. While it is true that had this occurred over populated areas the
repercussions could have been more serious, the risk to people outside the aircraft is
minimal.

Failure to extinguish fire. Though the flames were not contained by the engine cowls,
they did not affect the engine pylons or the airframe. The discharge of two
extinguishing bottles did not manage to quench the fire that had broken out in the
engine’s accessory compartment. In this case, with both fuel and oil leaks and large
holes opened in the cowls by the fire itself, the dispersion of the fire fighting agents
made it impossible to contain the fire.

Unlocked reverser. The left reverser unlocked caution was due to the damage caused
to the system microswitches by the detachment of the fan cowls.

Alarms and warnings. Numerous aural and luminous warnings were received by the
crew over the course of the emergency. Those involving the unlocked reverser, the low

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oil pressure and the engine fire were an accurate representation of what was happening
to the left engine. The lavatory smoke warning was the only that did not reflect reality.

2.2. Aspects related to the cockpit crew

The situation faced by the crew was made more complex by the accumulation and
persistence of cockpit warnings. In seven seconds, and without any prior signs, they
received warnings involving the reverser, oil and fire in the left engine, a fire that burned
for over nine minutes while in flight. The actions explained below notwithstanding, the
emergencies were handled adequately and without any consequences to the
passengers.

In the first 22 seconds a series of superimposed warnings was received. The copilot is
heard identifying the reverser failure and telling the captain not to touch the right engine
throttle, as clarified in later statements. The captain, despite not making any comments at
the onset of the emergency, was taking measures to protect the “good” engine. This
initiative of safeguarding the throttle with the hand can be considered as a good
preventive measure, though the fact that it is not mentioned in any of the operator’s
guidelines disconcerted the copilot who, on the contrary, thought he was going to cut it.

Immediately after silencing the warnings, the copilot initiated the fire procedure, which he
then executed. Twenty-three seconds had elapsed since the general failure and 16 since
the fire warning. While there was no verbal identification of the nature of the emergency
nor of the procedure that was to be started, both the captain’s and the copilot’s priorities
and assessments of the emergencies were proper, and despite a series of erroneous
confirmations about which engine to cut, the actions taken involved the correct engine.

The copilot, at the controls at the time, in addition to initiating the emergency
procedure also handled ATC communications. This initial task overload led to a change
in functions during the emergency procedure as the role of pilot flying was transferred
to the captain. During the flight another transfer of functions would take place involving
communications, which went from the captain to the copilot on several occasions.
Keeping in mind the distribution of tasks specified by the company for this type of
situation, the copilot should have focused on flying and handling communications while
the captain combated the emergency.

Disengaging the autopilot is not considered suitable practice in these situations. On the
contrary, a reliance on automation, such as the autopilot, is recommended in
emergencies.

The appearance of the “TOO LOW TERRAIN” warnings indicate that item (5) of the
single-engine landing procedure was not executed. Visibility conditions were good, as a
result of which neither pilot took any actions or made any comments. Under less

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favorable conditions, this warning would have resulted in an unnecessary missed

approach maneuver.

Of lesser importance is the fact that in notifying of the emergency, the term “mayday”
was not used as specified in the Air Traffic Regulations. In this case it was of no
consequence since they were given priority to land, but in other circumstances, such as
those involving foreign airports or crews or with more traffic, the priority required by their
situation may not have been clear to other aircraft. The decision to return to Barcelona
is considered correct given the proximity (it was the closest airport, though not by much)
and the means and capabilities available at that airport with respect to the rest.

The coordination and information provided to the flight attendants and ATC regarding
the evacuation was complete and precise and emphasized the side to be used in the
evacuation.

The incident flight was the first flight of the day, meaning fatigue is not considered as
a factor in assessing the cockpit crew’s actions.

2.3. Aspects related to ATC services

When the engine failure occurred, the aircraft communicated its emergency situation to
ATC on the frequency it was currently assigned.

ATC was fast and efficient in providing and confirming the return course that took the
aircraft directly to Barcelona airport on a long direct approach. It also cleared the
approach path of other traffic, granting absolute priority to the aircraft in distress. From
the crew’s point of view, however, with the aircraft at too high an altitude and with
procedures to perform, the ATC instructions referencing VOR-DME maneuvers were
occasionally too long (up to 14 seconds) and contributed to the agitation of the crew,
which had requested vectors. In these situations, the cockpit workload requires short
and concise control instructions.

The mobilization of emergency services at Barcelona airport was properly coordinated

by ATC. There were no delays in responding to the scene once the aircraft landed.

3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1. Findings

• The aircraft was properly and in force licensed and certified to fly.
• Fourteen minutes after taking off from Barcelona, the number 11 fan blade in the
left engine separated.

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• There was an in-flight fire that, despite the discharging of the two extinguishing
bottles, lasted for 9 minutes and 40 seconds, and persisted until three minutes prior
to landing.
• The fire started in the engine accessory compartment and burned through the fire
seal and into the aft compartment under the exhaust nozzle fairing.
• The flames burned two large holes into the exhaust nozzle fairing, damaged the fire
seal and burned through parts of the upper engine cowl.
• The fire did not spread to other parts of the airplane.
• The weather was not a factor in the incident.

Engine

• The blade separated due to a reduction in the dwell-time fatigue resistance properties
of the middle tang that is used to hold the pin that attaches the blade to the fan disk.
• The reduction in the dwell-time fatigue resistance properties was due to the presence
of unfavorably oriented aligned alpha colonies in the titanium structure and from
which the crack propagated in low-cycle fatigue.
• The separated blade was contained by the fan containmen ring. The resulted high fan
imbalance resulted in several secondary events:

— Shear separation of the 84 bolts in the HPT transition to LPT stator case flanges.
— Rotation and separation of the LPT module and all its associated components.
— Separation of the VG head line from its MFC end fitting.
— Detachment and cracking of the accessory gearbox.
— Excessive throttle system looseness.
— Detachment and loss of the fan access cowls.
— Unlocking of the fan reverser transcowl.

• Although not casual in the failure an error was discovered in the assembly of the rigid
elbow that joins the flexible VG head line to the main fuel control (MFC). This error
revealed several inconsistencies in the documentation for installing this piece.

Crew

• All of the crew members were properly and in force certified and licensed.
• The captain and copilot had flown the three days prior to the incident. This was their
first flight of that day.
• The cockpit warnings were properly and quickly assessed and prioritized.
• The in-flight engine fire procedure was started 16 seconds after the fire warning was
received. The first extinguishing bottle was discharged after 71 seconds.
• The distribution of tasks between the crew members during the emergency was not
consistent with the operator’s operational criteria.
• An uneventful single-engine landing was made on runway 25R at Barcelona.
• The airplane was evacuated on rapid exit taxiway GA without incident.

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ATC

• ATC deviated traffic ahead of and behind EC-IJF so as to give it landing priority.
• The fire fighting service was alerted and was on hand ready to aid in the evacuation.

3.2. Causes

The failure of the left engine on aircraft EC-IJF was caused by the separation of one of
the fan blades resulting from dwell-time fatigue cracks that initiated from areas of
aligned alpha colonies in the titanium microstructure that resulted from the blade
manufacturing process.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

As a consequence of the investigations into the incidents involving aircraft EC-IJF and
N933EV, NTSB, issued seven safety recommendations regarding technical aspects
identified. The recommendations of this report only concern the operational aspects of
the incident.

The situation confronted by the crew of aircraft EC-IJF was made critical by the
practically simultaneous appearance of cockpit warnings and the presence of an
unextinguished fire in the left engine that persisted for 9 minutes and 40 seconds.
Although the emergency was satisfactorily resolved, an analysis of the crew’s actions
revealed some aspects involving crew resource management that warrant the issuance
of a safety recommendation.

REC 03/10. It is recommended that Air Nostrum reinforce its technical crew training
in the following areas:

• Leadership and techniques for deliberate decision-making in abnormal

and emergency situations.
• Crew task distribution in abnormal and emergency situations.
• Standards and procedures for fault identification, notification and
prioritization in abnormal and emergency situations.
• Strict compliance with procedures in abnormal and emergency
situations so as to avoid inducing uncertainty in other crew members.
• The appropriate use of automation in every situation.
• The use of standard terminology in abnormal and emergency situations.

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APPENDIX I
NTSB Recommendations to the
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
and Transport Canada

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The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that Transport Canada

(http://ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2008/A08_3.pdf):

Require Bombardier to redesign the retention feature of the Canadair Regional Jet-
100/-200 aircraft engine throttle gearbox to ensure that it can withstand the loads
generated by a fan blade separation or similar event (A-08-03).

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation
administration (http://ntsb.gov//Recs/letters/2008/A08_4_9.pdf):

Require GE Aviation to define a reasonable maximum cycle limit below

4,717 cycles since new for Teleflex-manufactured CF34-1/-3 fan blades,
considering the two failures and available data, and require that the blades be
removed from service before that limit is exceeded (A-08-04).

Require GE Aviation to include dwell time fatigue testing in the CF34-1/-3 fan
blade manufacturing process requirements to verify that any modified
manufacturing process adequately reduces the possibility of the presence of
aligned alpha colonies in the finished part (A-08-05).

Require GE Aviation to make modifications to the CF34-1/-3 engine design and

ensure that an engine unbalance event will not cause the engine to catch fire
(A-08-06).

Require GE Aviation to revise the CF34-1/-3 engine manual so that it clearly

specifies the aft actuator rod2 hose elbow orientation and the requirement for
adequate slack in the hose (A-08-07).

Require a one-time inspection of the aft actuator rod3 hoses installed on all CF34-
1/–3 engines to ensure hose integrity during an unbalance event (A-08-08).

Require that all operators of Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet-100/-200 aircraft

incorporate Bombardier’s redesign of the engine throttle gearbox retention as
recommended in Safety Recommendation A-08-03 (A-08-09).

2
Due to a publishing error, the text in the recommendation makes reference to the rod hose when it should read
head hose.

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Addenda Bulletin 3/2010 Report IN-045/2006

APPENDIX II
Procedures for in-flight engine
shutdown and single-engine
approach and landing

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 Report IN-045/2006 Addenda Bulletin 3/2010

IN-FLIGHT ENGINE SHUTDOWN

Accomplish an engine shutdown only when flight conditions permit:

(1) Affected thrust lever ............................................ Confirm and IDLE
(2) Affected thrust lever ............................................ Confirm and SHUT OFF
(3) 14th STAGE ISOL switch ....................................... OPEN
If engine shutdown was not due to a hydraulic system high temperature condition:
(4) Affected HYDRAULIC B pump .............................. on
• If left engine shut down ................................... HYDRAULIC 1 switch ON
• If right engine shut down ................................ HYDRAULIC 2 switch ON
(5) Affected FUEL, BOOST PUMP switch .................... Confirm and off
(6) ANTI-ICE, LH or RH COWL switch ........................ Affected side OFF
(7) APU (if available) (30,000 feet and below) ........... Start
(8) APU GEN switch .................................................. ON
(10) Fuel system .......................................................... Check
Crossflow ..................................................................... AUTO
Quantity/Balance .......................................................... CHECK
Engine damage is suspected/intentional shutdown:
(11) Land at the nearest suitable airport
(12) Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure ... Accomplish

SINGLE ENGINE APPROACH AND LANDING

(1) APU (if available) (30,000 feet and below) ............. Start
(2) APU GEN switch .................................................... ON
Below 15,000 feet:
(3) L and R PACKS ...................................................... ON
(4) Go-around thrust reference .................................... Set
Airplanes with the EGPWS installed
(5) GRND PROX, FLAP switch ...................................... OVRD
Approach and landing:
(6) Approach and landing flaps ................................... 20
(7) Final approach speed ............................................. Not less than Vref (flaps 45º) + 12 KIAS
(8) Actual landing distance .......................................... Increase by a factor of 1.25
(25%) for a flaps 20° landing
without the use of reverse thrust
CAUTION
If required, use remaining thrust reverser carefully upon landing

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